LNG TODAY - King & Spalding
LNG TODAY - King & Spalding
LNG TODAY - King & Spalding
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<strong>LNG</strong> <strong>TODAY</strong><br />
Tower of London<br />
May 4, 2006<br />
THE <strong>LNG</strong> “CHAIN”<br />
NATURAL GAS TO <strong>LNG</strong> SIMPLIFIED<br />
Production on<br />
land/offshore<br />
Natural Gas<br />
Pretreatment/<br />
liquefaction<br />
Vaporization<br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
Natural Gas<br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
Storage<br />
Storage<br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
Loading Transportation Unloading<br />
1
WHAT IS <strong>LNG</strong>?<br />
• NOT LPG OR NGL<br />
• NATURAL GAS THAT HAS BEEN COOLED<br />
UNTIL IT LIQUEFIES (-160°C)<br />
• VOLUME IS REDUCED 600 TIMES<br />
• LIGHTER THAN AIR WHEN VAPORIZED<br />
• NOT UNDER PRESSURE<br />
• COLORLESS, ODORLESS<br />
AND NON-TOXIC<br />
• STORED COLD<br />
• CAN BE HEATED AND VAPORIZED AGAIN<br />
WHEN NEEDED<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> IS SIMPLY ANOTHER METHOD TO<br />
TRANSPORT GAS TO MARKET<br />
2
Proved Natural Gas Reserves (2004)<br />
Source: BP<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> VERSUS PIPELINE GAS<br />
• Pipelines have point-to-point rigidity<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> May Allow Better Price<br />
Competition<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> may be a better option<br />
than pipeline if:<br />
– long distance<br />
– buyer has security of supply<br />
concerns<br />
– borders to be crossed; and/or<br />
– single buyer cannot support<br />
purchase alone<br />
3
SAMPLE <strong>LNG</strong> - PNG COST COMPARISON<br />
Singapore Study (Oct 2005)<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> TRADE CHARACTERISTICS<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> is not a commodity business -- no spot<br />
market or in transit sales like for oil or LPG<br />
• “Baseload” sales of <strong>LNG</strong> are long term: 20-25<br />
years<br />
• Long term contracts are take-or-pay<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> projects are capital intensive<br />
• Fully dedicated shipping often required<br />
• Project financing depends on players,<br />
creditworthy buyers, agreements and reliable<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> chain<br />
4
<strong>LNG</strong> PROJECT HISTORY<br />
KENAI ALASKA<br />
STARTED ASIAN <strong>LNG</strong> TRADE<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> Export Projects<br />
History<br />
USA, Alaska<br />
Norway<br />
(2006)<br />
Russia (2008)<br />
Trinidad<br />
Libya<br />
Algeria<br />
Malaysia<br />
Egypt (2)<br />
Indonesia (2)<br />
EG<br />
UAE<br />
Brunei<br />
(2007) Qatar<br />
Nigeria<br />
Indonesia –<br />
Oman<br />
Tangguh<br />
(2008)<br />
Yemen (2008-9) Australia (2)<br />
5
EXAMPLE PLANNED GREENFIELD<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> EXPORT PLANTS<br />
Egypt<br />
Russia<br />
Venezuela<br />
Nigeria<br />
Iran<br />
Indonesia<br />
Planned<br />
Peru<br />
Angola<br />
Australia<br />
6
Conventional Example: Darwin <strong>LNG</strong> (2006)<br />
Several Import Terminals under Construction<br />
7
Terminal Technology:<br />
Italy’s s Adriatic <strong>LNG</strong> - 1 st Gravity Based Offshore<br />
Sponsor’s Claim:<br />
“<br />
”<br />
• Constructing in Spain<br />
• May, 2008 Start-Up<br />
(17 Km offshore Italy)<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> SHIPPING TRENDS<br />
• 200 vessel milestone just<br />
reached; more than 25 on<br />
order<br />
• Ahead of supply?<br />
• Ship size growing (>150)<br />
• Capital / operating costs<br />
increasing<br />
• Effect of China?<br />
• Shipbuilding / charter<br />
terms evolving,<br />
depending on leverage<br />
8
Types of Terminals: Energy Bridge On-Board<br />
Regasification Terminal (2005 - 1 st Cargo)<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> Tanks<br />
Traction Winch<br />
Boiler<br />
HP Pumps<br />
Vaporizers<br />
Turret & Buoy<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> FINANCING TRENDS<br />
• “Current and upcoming<br />
liquefied natural gas<br />
projects in the Gulf are<br />
soaking up huge amounts<br />
of available global project<br />
finance liquidity.<br />
• Last year's Qatargas 2 deal<br />
broke all project financing<br />
records. The overall deal,<br />
totalling $10.65 billion,<br />
involved 57 major lenders<br />
an unprecedented number.”<br />
Qatar: Wednesday, March 22, 2006<br />
9
Major natural gas trade movements<br />
BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2005<br />
MAJOR TRADE ROUTES 2004<br />
10
<strong>LNG</strong> TRENDS<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> supply issues, yet to<br />
meet <strong>LNG</strong> demand<br />
• NOC strength - market entry<br />
upstream is difficult<br />
• Liberalization vs.<br />
Nationalization in Upstream<br />
• Regasification boom on both<br />
sides of Atlantic<br />
• Terminal capacity has been<br />
taken to support race for<br />
upstream projects<br />
11
Value Chain Integration – Ownership Flows<br />
QP/EM<br />
gas assets<br />
BG/Petronas<br />
gas assets<br />
Power<br />
assets<br />
UF/ENI<br />
Liquefaction<br />
Qatar<br />
(Ras Laffan/<br />
Qatargas)<br />
Liquefaction<br />
Egypt<br />
(E<strong>LNG</strong>)<br />
Receiving<br />
terminal<br />
UF<br />
South<br />
Hook<br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
(UK)<br />
QP/EM<br />
Rovigo<br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
(Italy)<br />
QP/EM<br />
Brindisi<br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
(Italy)<br />
BG / ?<br />
Dragon<br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
(UK)<br />
BG/<br />
Petronas<br />
Segas<br />
(Egypt)<br />
UF/<br />
ENI<br />
Oman<br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
UF<br />
Supply<br />
Side<br />
Power<br />
assets<br />
(Edison)<br />
Power<br />
assets<br />
(Enel)<br />
Gas<br />
assets<br />
Buy<br />
Side<br />
#6656<br />
OTHER <strong>LNG</strong> TRENDS<br />
• Some gas markets liberalizing<br />
(e.g. EU 2 nd Gas Directive)<br />
• Who will build / use needed<br />
downstream pipeline / storage?<br />
• North America / UK a special<br />
focus due to expected high<br />
demand<br />
• However, will high <strong>LNG</strong> prices<br />
cause gas demand<br />
destruction?<br />
• Threats to <strong>LNG</strong> - coal, nuclear<br />
and GTL<br />
12
NO SHORTAGE OF ISSUES…<br />
US AND UK GAS SECURITY - THEIR DEPENDENCY ON<br />
IMPORTS NOW MORE LIKE JAPAN’S?<br />
13
POLITICS - UPSTREAM<br />
Larges Gas Reserves (2005)<br />
Rank Country Proved reserves (TCF)<br />
1. Russia 1,680 [Sakhalin issues]<br />
2. Iran 940 [Project stalled?]<br />
3. Qatar 910 Ras Laffan<br />
4. Saudi Arabia 235 None<br />
5. UAE 212 Das Island (at max?)<br />
6. United States 189<br />
7. Nigeria 176 N<strong>LNG</strong>; Brass; OK<br />
8. Algeria 160 4 Projects (--Skikda)<br />
9. Venezuela 151 [2 Projects stalled]<br />
10. Iraq 110 None<br />
SUPPLIES TAKE TIME TO DEVELOP….<br />
EVEN IF PARTIES AGREE UPSTREAM TERMS<br />
14
CONSTRUCTION COSTS ON THE RISE<br />
CONSTRUCTION COSTS - NORWAY<br />
15
<strong>LNG</strong> PRICING - OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRADERS….<br />
IF THEY COULD FIND AVAILABLE <strong>LNG</strong><br />
THE CASE OF <strong>LNG</strong><br />
Contractual Overview<br />
Memorandum of Understanding<br />
Memorandum of Understanding<br />
Investor<br />
Investor<br />
Investor/<br />
Operator<br />
Investor/<br />
Operator<br />
Investor<br />
Investor<br />
Financing<br />
Agreement<br />
EPC <strong>LNG</strong> Plant<br />
Contractor Construction<br />
Agreement<br />
Feedstock<br />
Gas Supply<br />
Agreement<br />
Lender<br />
Shareholder<br />
Agreement<br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
EXPORTING<br />
PROJECT<br />
COMPANY<br />
State-Owned<br />
Energy<br />
Company<br />
Tech. Serv.<br />
Agreem.<br />
PSC / <strong>LNG</strong><br />
Project<br />
Agreement<br />
Host<br />
Government<br />
Operation & Maintenance<br />
Contract<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> Sales and<br />
Purchase Contract<br />
Time charter or<br />
ship building<br />
agreements and<br />
ship operating<br />
agreements<br />
Shipping<br />
Company<br />
Shareholder<br />
Agreement<br />
Host<br />
Government<br />
Lender<br />
Financing<br />
Agreement<br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
IMPORTING<br />
PROJECT<br />
COMPANY<br />
Government<br />
agreements<br />
Tech. Serv.<br />
Agreem.<br />
Fuel Supply<br />
Agreement<br />
Receiving<br />
Terminal<br />
Construction<br />
Agreement<br />
EPC<br />
Contractor<br />
Power<br />
Plant<br />
Power<br />
Purchase<br />
Agreement<br />
Electricity<br />
Buyers<br />
16
<strong>King</strong> & <strong>Spalding</strong><br />
Key Areas of <strong>LNG</strong> Expertise<br />
• In-depth Industry Experience<br />
Worldwide:<br />
– Export Terminals and Upstream<br />
Development<br />
– Import Terminals<br />
– <strong>LNG</strong> and Gas Sales Agreements<br />
– Shipping Contracts and Maritime<br />
Issues<br />
– Construction and Other Major<br />
Project Contracts<br />
• US and English Law Capability<br />
17
THANK YOU<br />
<strong>King</strong> & <strong>Spalding</strong><br />
Key Areas of <strong>LNG</strong> Expertise<br />
18
Key Issues for <strong>LNG</strong> Export Developers and Recent<br />
Developments in <strong>LNG</strong> Sale and Purchase Agreements<br />
Kenneth S. Culotta<br />
The Tower of London<br />
May 4, 2006<br />
Focus on the Changing Marketplace<br />
• Key Issues for <strong>LNG</strong> Export Developers<br />
– Evolving Role of State Partner<br />
– Relevant US Regulatory Issue: <strong>LNG</strong>/Gas Quality and<br />
Interchangeability<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> SPAs: the Trend Toward Complexity Continues<br />
– <strong>LNG</strong> Pricing and Price Revision<br />
– Diversion Clauses<br />
– Relevant EU Regulatory Issue: Profit Sharing Mechanisms<br />
1
Key Issues for <strong>LNG</strong> Export Developers:<br />
Role of State Partner<br />
• To Netbacks -- and Beyond!<br />
– Traditional <strong>LNG</strong> pricing: State Partner as Supply<br />
Utility<br />
• 1960s - largely fixed pricing<br />
• 1970s - linkage to oil export prices (transportation adder)<br />
• 1980s - increasing resort to price reviews (mostly on “agree<br />
to agree” basis)<br />
– Liquid Market Pricing: State Partners Protect<br />
Revenue Share<br />
• 1990s/2000s: US market began to revive: upside available<br />
on a new scale<br />
• Variable costs shifted to buyers -- or limited<br />
• Netback pricing increasingly becoming the rule: gas-on-gas<br />
• Price reviews increasingly “binding”<br />
How Do You Know if the Market is Liquid?<br />
“I I know it when I see it!”<br />
2
Key Issues for <strong>LNG</strong> Export Developers:<br />
Role of State Partner<br />
• To Netbacks -- and Beyond!<br />
– Transatlantic Arbitrage Appears: State Partners Yearn for<br />
Upside<br />
• Spanish contracts…US deliveries! US contracts … Spanish<br />
deliveries!<br />
• Death of destination restrictions?<br />
• Diversion and profit sharing arrives<br />
– The Next Generation: State Partners as Market Partners<br />
• Direct-to-market sales by state partners<br />
• Terminal capacity by state partners<br />
• Downstream gas marketing organizations<br />
– What’s next?<br />
• Eliminating the middleman?<br />
Key Issues for <strong>LNG</strong> Export Developers:<br />
U.S. Regulatory Issues: Gas Quality /<br />
Interchangeability<br />
• NEWS FLASH! U.S. domestic gas supplies<br />
declining!<br />
• EXTRA! EXTRA! Up to 90% of world <strong>LNG</strong> supplies<br />
are incompatible with the US pipeline system!<br />
• AES Ocean Express v. Florida Gas Transmission,<br />
107 FERC 61,276 (2004)<br />
– Stems from a complaint by AES regarding FGT’s tariff standards<br />
– Numerous intervenors on the quality / interchangeability issue<br />
3
U.S. Regulatory Issues: Gas Quality /<br />
Interchangeability (cont.)<br />
• Issue: What are the correct<br />
standards for gas<br />
composition/quality in FGT’s<br />
system?<br />
– By implication, what will US<br />
pipeline standards be in the<br />
“<strong>LNG</strong> Age”?<br />
– Who pays any costs needed to<br />
make <strong>LNG</strong> compatible with US<br />
pipes and appliances?<br />
• Conflicting imperatives<br />
U.S. Regulatory Issues: Gas Quality /<br />
Interchangeability (cont.)<br />
• Positions of the Parties:<br />
– <strong>LNG</strong> Suppliers (NGC + Work Group):<br />
• Uniform national standard needed<br />
• Each party that benefits from <strong>LNG</strong> supply<br />
should pays its costs (<strong>LNG</strong> suppliers<br />
already bear plenty!)<br />
– NGC+ Work Group was formed at<br />
request of FERC. It recommended:<br />
» upper Wobbe limit of 1400<br />
» minimal constituent limits<br />
– Emphasis on need to persuade<br />
exporters to consider the US market<br />
• NGC+ Guidelines would accommodate over<br />
65% of all world <strong>LNG</strong><br />
4
U.S. Regulatory Issues: Gas Quality /<br />
Interchangeability (cont.)<br />
• Positions of the Parties:<br />
– FGT:<br />
• Heat content: 1,025 Btu to 1,110 Btu<br />
• Wobbe range: 1,340 to 1,396<br />
• Wobbe fluctuation tolerance: +/- 2% within 6<br />
minutes<br />
• Max temperature: 120º F<br />
• Detailed constituents limits<br />
– Emphasis on protecting Dry-low-NOx<br />
turbines (and manufacturer warranties)<br />
U.S. Regulatory Issues: Gas Quality /<br />
Interchangeability (cont.)<br />
• Positions of the Parties:<br />
– Utilities (generators):<br />
• Standards should be conservative,<br />
accommodate local requirements, costs should<br />
be borne by upstream pipes or <strong>LNG</strong> projects<br />
– Pipelines:<br />
• Somewhere in-between; emphasis on pipeline<br />
operational concerns (Washington Gas Light);<br />
allocation of costs to those who benefit<br />
– FERC:<br />
• Supported modified FGT standards w/deferred<br />
implementation and further empirical testing,<br />
“socialization” of costs<br />
5
U.S. Regulatory Issues: Gas Quality /<br />
Interchangeability (cont.)<br />
• Current status:<br />
• ALJ adopted FGT’s revised position in 11 April<br />
preliminary decision<br />
• ALJ determined that potential costs for testing,<br />
remediation, and repair were speculative, and<br />
were not appropriately considered in the<br />
context of the proceeding -- this issue still<br />
outstanding<br />
• Briefs on exceptions due in May; if none filed,<br />
this decision becomes a final agency decision<br />
– Critical fact:<br />
• AES v FGT only directly affects FGT’s markets<br />
(including Alabama-Florida border area); many<br />
battles yet to be fought<br />
How Will the Principles of AES v FGT Be<br />
Applied in Future Cases?<br />
US East Coast: the<br />
Holy Grail?<br />
California - another<br />
area of marginal<br />
liquidity<br />
Florida - not the most<br />
liquid US market!<br />
6
Focus on the Changing Marketplace:<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> Sales and Purchase Agreements<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> SPAs: The Trend<br />
Toward Complexity<br />
Continues<br />
– <strong>LNG</strong> pricing<br />
– Price Revision<br />
– Diversion Clauses<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> SPAs: the Trend Toward Complexity<br />
Continues… <strong>LNG</strong> Pricing<br />
• Index pricing anticipates<br />
arbitrage<br />
– For US destinations: monthly<br />
Henry Hub<br />
– For UK destinations: National<br />
Balancing Point<br />
– For European destinations:<br />
often still “oil” based, but<br />
nuanced:<br />
• E.g., for 85% of quantities,<br />
monthly average of prices for Gas<br />
Oil and Fuel Oil; for 15%, tied to<br />
index for power prices<br />
• E.g., tied to indexed power pool<br />
prices in destination market<br />
7
U.S. Pricing - Netback to Producer<br />
Hub<br />
Sales Price<br />
Index<br />
NYMEX<br />
Receiving<br />
Terminal X<br />
Transport<br />
Pipelines<br />
Shipping<br />
Liquefaction<br />
Gas<br />
Producer<br />
Hub Price 7.50<br />
Less Transport Cost Terminal to Hub (0.25)<br />
Gas Price Out of Terminal 7.25<br />
Less Terminal Cost (0.35)<br />
Ex-ship <strong>LNG</strong> Price 6.95<br />
Less Shipping Cost (0.50)<br />
FOB <strong>LNG</strong> Price 6.45<br />
Less Liquefaction Cost(s) (1.25)<br />
Gas Producer Netback 5.20<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> SPAs: The Trend Continues…<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> Pricing<br />
• Netback Pricing becoming more complex<br />
– “Per terminal” pricing (multiple destination terminals<br />
contemplated)<br />
• Index-based (gas, oil or mixed fuel)<br />
• Pool-based (gas sales by buyer and affiliates within defined<br />
period and at a defined liquid trading point)<br />
– Annual Election<br />
• Who gets to make the election?<br />
• Maximizes opportunity to anticipate annual price trends on a<br />
per market basis -- or to anticipate one’s market position!<br />
8
<strong>LNG</strong> SPAs: The Trend Continues…<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> Pricing<br />
• Netbacks becoming more aggressive<br />
– Then: obligation to maximize Buyer’s US<br />
sales:<br />
• “Buyer shall…diligently seek to maximize the<br />
net proceeds from its sales of Regasified<br />
<strong>LNG</strong>…to ensure that the amount paid to<br />
Seller…reflects the fair market value to<br />
Buyer’s…<strong>LNG</strong> customers.”<br />
– Now: downstream market “adder”<br />
• Based on deemed or actual net revenues from<br />
buyer’s (or its buyers’) gas marketing activities<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> SPAs: The Trend Continues…<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> Pricing<br />
• Price Revision:<br />
– Contract silent? Increasingly rare!<br />
– Triggered if the index by which price is determined exceeds, or<br />
falls below, certain thresholds<br />
– Review triggered if either party believes contract price no longer<br />
represents a “fair market price”<br />
– Review triggered if a party believes contract price fails to achieve<br />
“optimal market value”, taking into account market points<br />
accessible from relevant terminal<br />
• Practical Issues:<br />
– When is the change effective?<br />
– How far back in time does it apply?<br />
• Failure to Agree? How to resolve?<br />
9
<strong>LNG</strong> SPAs: The Trend Toward<br />
Complexity Continues…Diversion<br />
Clauses<br />
• Why Divert?<br />
– Increasingly market-sensitive pricing is developing<br />
– Different market sensitivities drive price differentials, e.g.:<br />
• Seasonal differentials<br />
– UK’s NBP and Nymex diverge in winter<br />
» Winter 2005-6: shortage of gas supplies to UK<br />
– Summer 2003: Nymex and Spanish power pool prices diverge<br />
» BP-Repsol netbacks follow<br />
– Winter 2003-4:Nymex surges<br />
» Spanish gas diverted to US East Coast markets<br />
• Short-term spikes<br />
– Hurricanes Rita and Katrina result in shut-ins<br />
– March 2003: cold weather froze wells<br />
– OFO’s<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> SPAs: The Trend Continues…<br />
Diversion Clauses<br />
• The Lessons of Early Diversions<br />
– Sellers saw the upside possibilities<br />
– Sellers also saw the lack of transparency in the<br />
netback pricing<br />
– Governments saw what they were missing!<br />
10
<strong>LNG</strong> SPAs: The Trend Continues…<br />
Diversion Clauses<br />
• How do diversion clauses work? Some conceptual<br />
issues:<br />
– Title and risk transfer: FOB v DES<br />
• FOB: free on board at loading port. Implies:<br />
– buyer ownership and control of cargo<br />
– buyer responsibility for/control of shipping fleet<br />
• DES: delivered ex-ship at unloading port or edge of international<br />
waters. Implies:<br />
– seller continuing ownership and control of cargo<br />
– shipper responsibility for/control of shipping fleet<br />
– Who controls regasification capacity? Market pipeline capacity?<br />
Downstream gas customer relationships?<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> SPAs: The Trend Continues…<br />
Diversion Clauses<br />
• Underlying economic consideration: cost of the<br />
use of the “diversion option”:<br />
• Covering the downstream gas buyer<br />
• Shipping cost differentials<br />
• Firm terminal use/payment obligations<br />
• Unwinding market hedges<br />
• Conceptual Conclusions<br />
– The party with most control over cargo, shipping and<br />
regas capacity is best positioned to manage the risks<br />
and efficiencies of diversions.<br />
– The party that does not control diversions seeks<br />
coverage of its risks associated with diversions.<br />
11
<strong>LNG</strong> SPAs: The Trend Continues…<br />
Diversion Clauses<br />
• Examples:<br />
– FOB sale:<br />
• Buyer is best positioned to make diversion decisions<br />
(controls shipping, regas and downstream marketing risks)<br />
• Seller’s concern: will the price obtained at the diversion<br />
delivery point exceed the price that would be obtained at the<br />
originally intended delivery point?<br />
– DES sale:<br />
• Seller controls certain risks relevant to diversion decisions<br />
(controls shipping)<br />
• Buyer controls certain risks relevant to diversion decisions<br />
(controls regas and downstream markets)<br />
• Buyer’s concern: how will regas and market exposure be<br />
covered?<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> SPAs: The Trend Continues…<br />
Diversion Clauses<br />
• Mechanics of Diversion Rights<br />
– Mutual agreement?<br />
– Automatic upon occurrence of triggering event, e.g.,<br />
pricing divergence from index?<br />
– One party decides; the other complies?<br />
– How much discussion of the matter?<br />
• Destination of Diverted Cargo<br />
– A specifically designated alternative receiving<br />
terminal at which buyer has rights?<br />
– A terminal (specified or not) at which buyer does not<br />
have rights?<br />
12
Diversion Clauses<br />
• Mechanics of Typical Diversion Clause<br />
– Before or after Annual Delivery Program established?<br />
– One Party exercises right to propose diversion:<br />
• Other party estimates costs/losses associated with diversion<br />
• Other party proposes any mitigating techniques to reduce<br />
such costs:<br />
– Other party’s recovery of costs may be limited to<br />
estimate<br />
– If Buyer diversion:<br />
• What if diversion sales result in less than originally<br />
contemplated netback?<br />
• Seller typically does not accept additional risk/cost<br />
Diversion Clauses<br />
• Mechanics of Typical Diversion Clause<br />
– Buyer diversion rights (continued):<br />
• More common in FOB contracts<br />
• Also sometimes permitted in DES contracts where:<br />
– Buyer can show Seller that Seller revenues will be<br />
enhanced<br />
– Buyer unable to take at intended receiving terminal<br />
– Seller unable to deliver to intended receiving terminal<br />
• Except in the last case, Seller typically doesn’t accept more<br />
risk or cost than in case of delivery to intended terminal<br />
13
Diversion Clauses - PSMs<br />
• Splitting the “Upside”: Contractual and<br />
Legal Considerations of Profit-Sharing<br />
Mechanisms (PSMs)<br />
– Contractual Mechanics:<br />
• Older contracts:<br />
– no mention in some (all risk and reward to<br />
buyer)<br />
– floor is contract price, with any higher price split<br />
equally (all risk and some reward to buyer)<br />
• Newer contracts:<br />
– Seller keeps all upside, covers buyer costs<br />
» costs are actual or fixed<br />
– floor is contract price, with any higher price split<br />
in agreed ratio after deduction of additional<br />
costs (some risk and some reward to buyer)<br />
Diversion Clauses and Profit Sharing<br />
Mechanisms<br />
– Destination Restrictions, Diversions, PSMs and the<br />
EU: What is the Legal Effect of a Diversion Clause?<br />
• Is a PSM a per se restriction on trade (like destination<br />
restrictions)?<br />
– Nigeria case, 2002: “Both the so-called territorial sales<br />
restrictions and profit splitting mechanism violate<br />
European Union competition rules.”<br />
– Is a diversion clause a “destination restriction”?<br />
– In fact, the Nigerian case apparently did not involve a<br />
profit-sharing clause. N<strong>LNG</strong> merely confirmed that “none<br />
of its existing gas supply contracts contained so-called<br />
profit splitting mechanisms effecting [sic] the EU markets<br />
and that it would not introduce these in future contracts.”<br />
• This Texas lawyer is not giving an opinion!<br />
14
Diversion Clauses - PSMs<br />
• Splitting the “Upside”: Contractual and<br />
Legal Considerations of Profit-Sharing<br />
Mechanisms<br />
– Legal Effects (EU):<br />
• Theory: price differentials at different delivery<br />
points within the market should encourage<br />
arbitrage<br />
– Arbitrage should tend to equalize prices across<br />
the market<br />
– Competition between supplies should drive<br />
prices closer to costs<br />
• This is why destination restrictions are prohibited<br />
within the EU under Art. 81(1) of the EU Treaty;<br />
they discourage arbitrage<br />
• How does this principle apply to splitting of upside<br />
on sales?<br />
Diversion Clauses - PSMs<br />
• Splitting the “Upside”: Contractual and<br />
Legal Considerations of Profit-Sharing<br />
Mechanisms<br />
– Legal Effects (EU):<br />
• Theory: behavior which restricts buyers/resellers of<br />
a commodity from arbitrage in response to market<br />
signals is anticompetitive<br />
– If a buyer wants to make a diversion from the<br />
originally intended destination in order to take<br />
advantage of market arbitrage, any clause<br />
which would discourage this behavior is<br />
anticompetitive<br />
– Likewise, a levy on resales that discourages<br />
this behavior is anticompetitive. Does that<br />
include all PSMs?<br />
• EU Law? No clear guidance, but…..<br />
15
Diversion Clauses - PSMs<br />
• Splitting the “Upside”: Contractual and Legal<br />
Considerations of Profit-Sharing Mechanisms<br />
– Legal Effects (EU):<br />
• Article in Spring 2005 Competition Policy Newsletter offers<br />
compelling reasoning:<br />
– In context of DES deviations: deviation is a change in the<br />
contractual relationship that occurs before buyer takes<br />
title, thus by definition does not interfere with buyer’s<br />
right to resell.<br />
– In context of FOB deviations: deviation obliges buyer to<br />
pay seller a PSM, essentially an obligation triggered by<br />
the use made of product after delivery to buyer, thus<br />
clearly a restriction on buyer’s freedom and prima facie a<br />
violation of Art 81(1)<br />
Diversion Clauses - PSMs<br />
• Splitting the “Upside”: Contractual and<br />
Legal Considerations of Profit-Sharing<br />
Mechanisms<br />
– Legal Effects (EU):<br />
• Whether PSM violates Art. 81(1) may depend on<br />
method of clause<br />
– “Raw” PSM: splits entire difference between,<br />
on one hand, upstream price between seller<br />
and buyer and, on other hand, price obtained<br />
by buyer when reselling at alternative<br />
destination<br />
– “Net” PSM: splits incremental profit differential<br />
between, on one hand, the downstream profit<br />
expected by buyer at original intended<br />
destination and, on other hand, profit made at<br />
alternative destination (i.e., split of profits after<br />
deduction of incremental costs)<br />
16
PSMs: “Raw” v “Net” Example<br />
Alternative Destination:<br />
Downstream wholesale price = 130<br />
Costs = 10<br />
Original Intended Destination:<br />
Downstream wholesale price = 120<br />
Costs = 10<br />
Seller Upstream<br />
Price to Buyer: 100<br />
Profit Sharing: 50/50<br />
DIVERSION<br />
Raw PSM: at alternative destination, difference<br />
between final price (130) and initial price (100)<br />
is 30. Thus:<br />
• 15 goes to seller<br />
• 5 goes to buyer (after deduct buyer<br />
costs of 10)<br />
If sold at original destination, difference<br />
between final price (120) and initial price (100)<br />
is 20. Deducting buyer costs of 10, buyer nets<br />
10<br />
Net PSM: at alternative destination:<br />
• incremental profit is 10<br />
• 5 goes to seller (half of incremental<br />
profit)<br />
• 15 goes to buyer (all original profit, half<br />
of incremental profit)<br />
Diversion Clauses - PSMs<br />
• PSMs may be illegal per se in the EU, but the Nigeria<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> case was 2002 and no offense committed (on this<br />
count, anyway)<br />
• Other markets are not so restrictive:<br />
– US competition law applies “rule of reason” test<br />
– A struggle between market liberalization and security<br />
of supply?<br />
• EU policy wonks have rethought the issue as recently as<br />
Spring 2005<br />
• The June 2005 Gazprom/E.ON decision presaged the<br />
next engagement: the Sonatrach <strong>LNG</strong> contracts<br />
17
Thank You!<br />
18
<strong>LNG</strong> Terminals and the Impact on the<br />
Downstream Market<br />
Ned Crady<br />
Elba, USA berth (opened 2005)<br />
1<br />
THE <strong>LNG</strong> “CHAIN”<br />
Production<br />
Field<br />
Development<br />
Liquefaction Shipping Regas<br />
Power<br />
Generation &<br />
Gas Distribution<br />
2
TERMINAL GAS CONTRACTUAL SCHEME<br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
Transporter<br />
FOB<br />
Charter<br />
Port Liability<br />
Agreement<br />
Terminal<br />
Operator<br />
Receiving<br />
Terminal<br />
Construction<br />
EPC<br />
Contractor<br />
Ex ship Charter<br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
Seller(s)<br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
Sales<br />
Contract<br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
Buyer<br />
Terminal Use<br />
Agreement<br />
Gas Sales<br />
Agreement<br />
Gas<br />
Buyer(s)<br />
Fuel Supply<br />
Agreement<br />
Power<br />
Plant<br />
Gas<br />
Transporter<br />
Gas Transportation<br />
Agreement<br />
Electricity<br />
Buyers<br />
Power<br />
Purchase<br />
Agreements<br />
Pipeline<br />
Construction<br />
EPC<br />
Contractor<br />
3<br />
KEY PURCHASE CONTRACT DRIVERS<br />
• Long term contract (20+ years)<br />
• Buyer has Take-or-Pay Obligation<br />
• US$ <strong>LNG</strong> Sales Price that supports Seller’s upstream<br />
development, <strong>LNG</strong> infrastructure, cost of shipping (if exship)<br />
and return on investments<br />
• Sufficient annual volume (allowing optimized shipping<br />
capacity)<br />
• Creditworthy buyer(s)<br />
• Assurance of adequate gas reserves<br />
• Destination restrictions (except in Europe)<br />
• “Bankable” terms (supports financing of infrastructure)<br />
• Sound contractual basis governed by NY or English law.<br />
Disputes resolved by international arbitration.<br />
4
LINKS IN THE <strong>LNG</strong> CHAIN<br />
• Each link must meet its<br />
contractual obligations<br />
• Failure of one link of <strong>LNG</strong><br />
chain affects other key<br />
links<br />
• Contracts must set forth<br />
integrated responsibilities<br />
• Long-term nature<br />
requires joint planning<br />
and flexible relationships<br />
5<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> EXPORT “PLAYERS”<br />
GOVERNMENTAL<br />
• Sonatrach (Algeria)<br />
• PERTAMINA (Indonesia)<br />
• Petronas (Malaysia)<br />
• Qatar General Petroleum Corp.<br />
• Abu Dhabi National Oil Corp.<br />
• Oman Government<br />
• Brunei Government<br />
• Nigeria National Petroleum Corp.<br />
• National Gas Company of Trinidad & Tobago<br />
• Sirte Oil (Libya)<br />
• Egypt Government Petroleum Corp.<br />
• Statoil<br />
6
<strong>LNG</strong> EXPORT “PLAYERS”<br />
NON-GOVERNMENTAL<br />
• Shell<br />
• ExxonMobil<br />
• Mitsubishi<br />
• JILCO ( Japan)<br />
• Total<br />
• BP<br />
• Mitsui<br />
• Unocal<br />
• BG<br />
• Woodside<br />
• BHP<br />
• ChevronTexaco<br />
• ConocoPhillips<br />
• Korea <strong>LNG</strong><br />
• Repsol<br />
• Agip<br />
• Suez/Tractebel<br />
• Marubeni<br />
• Marathon<br />
• Itochu<br />
• Nissho Iwai<br />
• Partex (Oman)<br />
• Gaz de France<br />
• Hess<br />
• Hunt Oil<br />
7<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> IMPORT “PLAYERS”<br />
• Statoil<br />
• Cabot<br />
• BG<br />
• Gazprom<br />
• Gaz de France<br />
• Distrigaz<br />
• Centrica<br />
• Total<br />
• Eni<br />
• Edison<br />
• Enagas<br />
• Gas Natural<br />
• Endesa<br />
• Union Fenosa<br />
• CMS Energy<br />
• Coral (Shell)<br />
• Suez<br />
• BP<br />
• Botas<br />
• Petronas<br />
• Sonatrach<br />
• Exxon<br />
• Other National Oil Companies?<br />
• Trading Companies?<br />
• Large LDC’s<br />
• YOUR LOGO HERE<br />
8
Overview of Typical<br />
Contract Mismatches<br />
• Volume & Scheduling Mismatches<br />
• Force Majeure Issues and Mismatches<br />
• Pricing Mismatches<br />
• Credit Support Mismatches<br />
• Physical Mismatches<br />
9<br />
Volume and Scheduling Mismatches<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> Supply Contracts<br />
– Annual Contract Quantities & Adjustments<br />
– Annual / Quarterly Take or Pay Obligations<br />
– Annual Delivery Program / 90 Day Program / Ratable<br />
Deliveries<br />
– Delivery in ‘Standard Cargo Lots’<br />
– Physical Storage & Vaporization / Send-out Constraints<br />
– Non-availability of “Cover <strong>LNG</strong>” in Event of Seller’s<br />
Delivery Failure<br />
– Buyer’s “Reasonable Efforts” Undertaking to Receive<br />
Off-Specification <strong>LNG</strong><br />
– <strong>LNG</strong> boil-off during loading, transportation and<br />
discharge operations<br />
10
Volume and Scheduling Mismatches (continued)<br />
• North American Gas Marketing Contracts<br />
– Monthly / Daily / Hourly Delivery Send-out / Delivery<br />
Quantities & Adjustments<br />
– Monthly “Take or Pay” Obligations<br />
– Pipeline Takeaway Constraints & Imbalance Charges<br />
– Availability of Cover Gas or Alternative Fuel in Event<br />
of Delivery Failures<br />
– Buyer’s Right to Reject Off-Specification Gas (UCC<br />
Article 2)<br />
11<br />
TAKE-OR-PAY MISMATCH<br />
• Multiple delivery destinations adding to complexity.<br />
TOP adjustments increasing, such as:<br />
– buyer’s “Upward” or “Downward” flexibility<br />
– seller’s diversion rights<br />
– major scheduled maintenance of facilities or<br />
terminal “operational constraints”<br />
– cancel right if buyer unable to schedule for<br />
delivery<br />
– if inadequate gas reserves or deliverability<br />
12
Force Majeure Mismatches<br />
• Typical Force Majeure Clauses in <strong>LNG</strong> SPAs<br />
– Scope of Coverage<br />
• “Traditional” Force Majeure Events<br />
• Upstream Reservoir, Production & Liquefaction Facility<br />
Events<br />
• Marine Transportation Events<br />
• Downstream Customer Facility Events<br />
– Import Terminal and Trunkline<br />
– Coverage for Downstream Customer Facilities?<br />
• Construction-Related Events<br />
• Political Events<br />
13<br />
Force Majeure Mismatches (cont’d)<br />
– North American Natural Gas Sales Contracts<br />
• Typical U.S. gas market contract forms (ex.<br />
NAESB) do not cover upstream <strong>LNG</strong> production<br />
and transportation risks<br />
– Language is broadly drafted, but intention of<br />
drafters was to cover domestic gas field and<br />
pipeline transportation – related events<br />
– No mention of <strong>LNG</strong> Vessels, Terminals, etc.<br />
• May also be limited as to duration during which<br />
force majeure relief may be sought<br />
• Excuse for non-performance due to political events<br />
is often covered<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> Sector is aggressively lobbying NAESB to<br />
extend Force Majeure to cover <strong>LNG</strong> Vessels and<br />
Import Terminals but the Market wants no part of<br />
upstream liquefaction or well head risk.<br />
14
Pricing Mismatches<br />
• Choice of Pricing Index<br />
– Traditional <strong>LNG</strong> supply contracts use oil-based pricing<br />
indexes (JCC, ICP, etc).<br />
– Newer North America-oriented <strong>LNG</strong> supply contracts<br />
are using NYMEX / Henry Hub index<br />
– Basis differential risk may be allocated to either Seller<br />
or Buyer or split<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> Sellers frequently view basis risk as being<br />
Buyer’s problem<br />
• Depending upon the market, timing and amount of<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> delivered may itself have an impact on local<br />
basis differential<br />
15<br />
Pricing Mismatches (continued)<br />
• Invoicing and Payment Mismatches<br />
– Even with the use of a common pricing index,<br />
mismatches in the applicable index may occur due to<br />
invoicing and payment timing mismatches<br />
• FOB <strong>LNG</strong> purchases are usually invoiced at or shortly<br />
after loading and can become payable before the cargo<br />
is even discharged (on longer voyages)<br />
• Ex-ship <strong>LNG</strong> purchases are usually invoiced at or shortly<br />
after discharge and can become payable before sendout<br />
of the vaporized <strong>LNG</strong> is completed<br />
16
Pricing Mismatches (continued)<br />
• Invoicing and payment under many gas marketing<br />
contracts is set on a monthly basis for delivered<br />
quantities<br />
• Index reference that applies on the date of invoicing<br />
in the above settings may be different due to<br />
passage of time<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> vessel timecharter contracts typically require<br />
payment of charter hire monthly in advance,<br />
regardless of volume of <strong>LNG</strong> commodity actually<br />
transported<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> vessel voyage charters typically require<br />
payment of freight rate upon completion of voyage /<br />
discharge of cargo<br />
17<br />
Credit Support Mismatches<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> Supply and Transportation Contracts<br />
– Many ‘traditional’ <strong>LNG</strong> supply and transportation<br />
contracts do not require the Seller / Transporter to<br />
provide credit support in the event of an unexcused<br />
Seller / Transporter performance failure<br />
– Of those <strong>LNG</strong> supply and transportation contracts that<br />
do, typical Seller’s / Transporter’s credit support is in<br />
the form of a corporate guarantee<br />
– Often no credit support default provision or credit<br />
support replacement obligation<br />
18
Credit Support Mismatches (continued)<br />
• North American Gas Marketing & Transportation<br />
Contracts<br />
– Fairly detailed credit support obligations applicable to<br />
both Seller / Transporter and Buyer / Shipper<br />
– Fairly easy and quick recourse to available credit<br />
support<br />
– Clear guidelines as to credit support defaults and<br />
credit support replacement obligations<br />
– Fairly “light” triggers to require additional credit<br />
support<br />
19<br />
Physical Impact<br />
• Increased Supply of Natural Gas<br />
• Increased Need for Storage<br />
20
Proposed European <strong>LNG</strong> Import Terminals<br />
21<br />
Proposed European <strong>LNG</strong> Import Terminals (cont’d)<br />
22
Proposed European <strong>LNG</strong> Import Terminals (cont’d)<br />
23<br />
Regional <strong>LNG</strong> Imports at New Terminals,<br />
2010, 2015, 2020, and 2025 (billion cubic feet)<br />
2010<br />
2015<br />
2020<br />
2025<br />
WA/OR<br />
Mountain<br />
West<br />
North<br />
Central<br />
2008<br />
East<br />
North<br />
Central<br />
114 128<br />
New<br />
England (2020)<br />
New England<br />
Mid<br />
256<br />
Atlantic<br />
128<br />
(2020)<br />
Middle Atlantic<br />
CA<br />
AZ/NM<br />
West<br />
South<br />
Central<br />
1086<br />
1551<br />
East<br />
South<br />
Central<br />
930 930<br />
807<br />
South<br />
Atlantic<br />
188<br />
413<br />
(2016)<br />
South Atlantic<br />
183183183 244 Florida<br />
293 293 293<br />
(2007)<br />
Mexico into US<br />
615<br />
310<br />
FL<br />
146<br />
(2010)<br />
(20xx) – Start year of first new terminal<br />
(2010)<br />
(2006) East South Central<br />
West South Central<br />
Annual Energy Outlook 2005<br />
24
But What does <strong>LNG</strong> Have to Do With Natural Gas<br />
Storage?<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> will go into storage pending alignment of credit<br />
worthy, baseload gas purchasers who can take 100% of<br />
terminal send out capacity<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> will require cover gas in the event of:<br />
• production and liquefaction outages/shipping delays<br />
• Force Majeure, quality issues<br />
• Make up <strong>LNG</strong> will in turn be vaporized and swapped into<br />
storage to replace cover gas<br />
• Natural Gas Storage Facilities<br />
• are cheaper than another <strong>LNG</strong> tank<br />
• provide more pipeline alternatives (hub services)<br />
25<br />
Underground Gas Storage Facilities in Europe (end of 1999)<br />
26
Proposed New European Storage Facilities (cont’d)<br />
27<br />
Proposed New European Storage Facilities<br />
28
29<br />
Source: FERC Website (04/27/06)<br />
30
Source: FERC Website (04/27/06)<br />
31<br />
Not All Storage is Equal:<br />
Pad Gas Requirements and<br />
Cycling Capability Differ<br />
Source: FERC Staff Report (9/30/2004)<br />
32
Not All Storage is Equal:<br />
Development Costs Vary<br />
Source: FERC Staff Report (9/30/2004)<br />
33<br />
Not All Storage is Equal:<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> Storage Versus Salt Storage<br />
34
THANK YOU!<br />
Ned Crady<br />
Partner, Global Transactions<br />
(w) 713-751-3203<br />
NCrady@KSLaw.com<br />
35
STRUCTURING A<br />
BANKABLE<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> PROJECT<br />
SCOTT SAMUEL AND DANIEL R. ROGERS<br />
The Tower of London<br />
May 4, 2006<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> PROJECT FINANCING<br />
2<br />
1
OVERVIEW OF PRESENTATION<br />
• Import Terminal Financing Needs<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> Gas Supply Chain<br />
• Possible <strong>LNG</strong> Structures<br />
• Project Structuring Fundamentals<br />
• Some Common Impediments to Project<br />
Financing <strong>LNG</strong> Facilities<br />
3<br />
IMPORT TERMINAL FINANCING NEEDS<br />
4<br />
2
IMPORT TERMINAL FINANCING NEEDS<br />
• Current European landscape:<br />
– Over 25 <strong>LNG</strong> import terminal projects planned or announced for<br />
Europe<br />
– 6-10 new <strong>LNG</strong> import terminals likely to be developed in<br />
Europe/Mediterranean basin<br />
– Capital costs likely to be similar<br />
• Current U.S. landscape:<br />
– Over 50 <strong>LNG</strong> import terminal projects planned or announced for US<br />
– Approximately 6-10 new <strong>LNG</strong> import terminals predicted for US by<br />
2010<br />
– Estimated capital cost per facility is $500 to $750 million<br />
– Expansions underway at existing terminals<br />
• Result: Approx. $6 – 15 billion in capital needed for import terminal<br />
infrastructure (excluding new pipelines)<br />
5<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> Gas Supply Chain<br />
Upstream Gas Field<br />
Pipeline<br />
Liquefaction Plant<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> Tankers<br />
Import Terminal<br />
6<br />
3
Possible <strong>LNG</strong> Structures<br />
• Import Terminals<br />
• Upstream development and liquefaction plant<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> Tankers<br />
7<br />
UNIFIED (INTEGRATED) FINANCING<br />
STRUCTURE<br />
Government<br />
Production Sharing Agreement<br />
Upstream<br />
Gas Producers<br />
On-loans<br />
Financiers<br />
Loan Agreement<br />
Downstream<br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
Company<br />
Shareholders<br />
Ownership<br />
Financiers’ security package<br />
8<br />
4
SALE AND PURCHASE STRUCTURE<br />
Government<br />
Production Sharing Agreement<br />
Upstream<br />
Gas Producers<br />
GAS<br />
Gas Sales Agreement<br />
Financiers<br />
Loan Agreement<br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
Downstream<br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
Company<br />
Shareholders<br />
Ownership<br />
Offtakers<br />
9<br />
TOLLING STRUCTURE<br />
Government<br />
Production Sharing Agreement<br />
Upstream<br />
Gas Producers<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> Sale and Purchase<br />
Agreements<br />
Offtakers<br />
GAS<br />
Tolling Agreement<br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
Financiers<br />
Loan Agreement<br />
Downstream<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> Company<br />
Shareholders<br />
Ownership<br />
10<br />
5
SALE AND PURCHASE STRUCTURE<br />
Government<br />
Production Sharing Agreement<br />
Financiers<br />
Loan Agreement<br />
Upstream<br />
Gas Producers<br />
GAS<br />
Gas Sales Agreement<br />
Financiers<br />
Loan Agreement<br />
Downstream<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> Company<br />
Shareholders<br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
Ownership<br />
Offtakers<br />
11<br />
UNIFIED (INTEGRATED) FINANCING<br />
STRUCTURE<br />
Government<br />
Production Sharing Agreement<br />
Upstream<br />
Gas Producers<br />
On-loans<br />
Financiers<br />
Loan Agreement<br />
Downstream<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> Company<br />
Shareholders<br />
Financiers’ security package<br />
12<br />
6
KEY CONSIDERATIONS<br />
• Structuring for expansions<br />
– Same or new entity for expansion?<br />
– Project-on-project financing issues<br />
– Collateral allocation & priority issues<br />
– Shared facilities<br />
– Liability insulation<br />
– Effects on available financing sources<br />
13<br />
KEY CONSIDERATIONS<br />
• Contract chain risk allocation and mitigation<br />
– Structural and contract mitigants<br />
– Contract alignment<br />
– Focus on the “revenue contracts”<br />
• Off-taker / capacityholder credit is critical<br />
– Credit “pressure points” are a big factor in level of lender<br />
recourse to sponsors<br />
14<br />
7
PROJECT FINANCING IMPEDIMENTS<br />
15<br />
SOME IMPEDIMENTS TO FINANCING<br />
• Common financing impediments<br />
– Sponsor credit and performance concerns<br />
– Contract price / volume risk volatility<br />
– Construction and completion risks<br />
– Misalignment of key revenue contract terms<br />
• Term mismatches<br />
• Unhedged pricing index mismatches<br />
• Volume & scheduling mismatches<br />
• Force majeure mismatches<br />
• Quality specification mismatches<br />
16<br />
8
SOME IMPEDIMENTS TO FINANCING<br />
(continued)<br />
• Some more common financing impediments<br />
– Contract default and damage / remedy mismatches<br />
– Payment timing and currency mismatches<br />
– Credit support mismatches<br />
– Conditions precedent (CP) mismatches<br />
• How many of these impediments are addressed will impact<br />
on available financing sources and terms<br />
17<br />
POLITICAL RISK MITIGANTS<br />
FOR <strong>LNG</strong> PROJECTS<br />
• External<br />
– Investment protection treaties<br />
– Private political risk insurance<br />
– Political risk insurance from multilateral and export<br />
credit agencies<br />
• Internal<br />
– Legislative protection<br />
– Stabilisation clauses<br />
– Externalisation of governing law and venue for dispute<br />
resolution<br />
18<br />
9
PARTING COMMENTS<br />
• Parting comments:<br />
– Up-front project structuring and risk analysis<br />
is key<br />
– Keep risk-sharing expectations realistic<br />
– Keep execution timing expectations realistic<br />
– Keep financing expectations realistic<br />
– Look at all financing alternatives, including<br />
the less traditional financing sources and<br />
structures<br />
19<br />
Thank You!<br />
20<br />
10
<strong>LNG</strong> IMPORT TERMINALS:<br />
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES<br />
Philip Weems & Susan Beck<br />
London<br />
4 May 2006<br />
THE “<strong>LNG</strong> CHAIN”<br />
AND COST DISTRIBUTION<br />
Field<br />
Development<br />
10-20%<br />
Liquefaction<br />
25-35%<br />
Shipping<br />
15-25%<br />
Receiving<br />
Terminal<br />
5-15%<br />
Power<br />
Generation &<br />
Gas Distribution<br />
25-35%<br />
1
IMPORT STATISTICS 2004<br />
51 EXISTING ONSHORE TERMINALS (+ 1<br />
OFFSHORE) (14 COUNTRIES)<br />
United <strong>King</strong>dom 1<br />
Belgium 1<br />
France 2<br />
Turkey 2<br />
Japan 25<br />
United States 5*<br />
Portugal 1<br />
Korea 4<br />
Puerto Rico and DR 2<br />
Spain 4<br />
Italy 1<br />
Greece 1<br />
India 2<br />
Taiwan 1<br />
• Terminals opened during 2004-2005: Japan, U.S., India, and UK<br />
2
IMPORT TERMINALS<br />
Elba, USA berth (opened 2005)<br />
40+ PROPOSED <strong>LNG</strong> TERMINALS<br />
Poland<br />
Canada<br />
Netherlands<br />
Romania<br />
United States<br />
United <strong>King</strong>dom<br />
Germany<br />
France<br />
Cyprus<br />
China<br />
Taiwan<br />
Thailand<br />
Mexico<br />
Spain<br />
El Salvador<br />
Italy<br />
Brazil<br />
India<br />
Singapore<br />
Chile<br />
Indonesia<br />
* Terminals under construction: Mexico, China, US, UK, etc.<br />
New Zealand<br />
3
PROPOSED TERMINALS<br />
FREEPORT <strong>LNG</strong>, TEXAS<br />
4
PROPOSED TERMINALS:<br />
LARGE ONSHORE IN LOUISIANA<br />
(CHENIERE)<br />
PROPOSED TERMINALS<br />
FREEPORT <strong>LNG</strong>, TEXAS<br />
5
OFFSHORE <strong>LNG</strong> TECHNOLOGY<br />
OPTIONS<br />
• Regasification vessels (e.g. “Energy<br />
Bridge”)<br />
– typical <strong>LNG</strong> carrier modified to enable<br />
vessel to discharge regasified <strong>LNG</strong> into<br />
a subsea pipeline, via an internal turret<br />
connected to offshore mooring buoy<br />
• Platform based import terminals -<br />
– converting existing oil and gas platform<br />
structures to accommodate <strong>LNG</strong><br />
deliveries, along with other berthing<br />
OFFSHORE <strong>LNG</strong> TECHNOLOGY<br />
OPTIONS<br />
• Offshore gravity based structures (GBS)<br />
– - concrete or steel caissons located on the<br />
seabed. Self-supporting infrastructure (e.g.<br />
operation, utilities and power generation)<br />
• Floating storage regas units (FSRU) -<br />
– purpose built, permanently moored structure<br />
with <strong>LNG</strong> vessels shuttling between loading<br />
port and import terminal<br />
6
TYPES OF PROPOSED TERMINALS:<br />
ENERGY BRIDGE ON-BOARD<br />
REGASIFICATION TERMINAL<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> Tanks<br />
Traction Winch<br />
Boiler<br />
HP Pumps<br />
Vaporizers<br />
Turret & Buoy<br />
TYPES OF PROPOSED TERMINALS:<br />
OFFSHORE MASSACHUSETTS (HOEGH(<br />
-<br />
SUEZ)<br />
7
TYPES OF PROPOSED TERMINALS: BHP<br />
BILLITON’S<br />
FLOATING OFFSHORE STORAGE AND<br />
UNLOADING VESSEL<br />
TYPES OF PROPOSED TERMINALS:<br />
HILOAD OFFSHORE<br />
8
<strong>LNG</strong> SAFETY ISSUES<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> SAFETY ISSUES<br />
• At first, some critics claimed <strong>LNG</strong> is “Frozen<br />
Fire” - a “lethal gamble” capable of destroying<br />
an entire city<br />
9
LOCAL ISSUES<br />
EXAMPLE OF ANTI-<strong>LNG</strong> LOBBY<br />
• http://www.timrileylaw.com/<strong>LNG</strong>.htm<br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
DANGER To our Communities<br />
ALERT . . .<br />
“<strong>LNG</strong> has tried locating in the City of Oxnard,<br />
California, before, so we already know how massive its<br />
destruction can be. In 1977, Oxnard opposed an <strong>LNG</strong><br />
project after the city’s Environmental Impact Report<br />
(EIR) showed up to 70,000 casualties resulting from an<br />
offshore <strong>LNG</strong> tanker accident.”<br />
10
ANTI-<strong>LNG</strong> LOBBY<br />
(www.lngwatch.com)<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> IS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS Fiery <strong>LNG</strong> disasters in Algeria (2004) and<br />
Cleveland (1944) are real examples of the potential for death and injury in the vicinity of<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> facilities. No telling what a major storm or tsunami will do to the planned floating<br />
terminal, it will be the first of its kind in the world.<br />
THREAT TO OUR COAST Importing <strong>LNG</strong> would require a large industrial facility off the<br />
coast and a pipeline to carry the gas to shore. Coastal <strong>LNG</strong> terminals will lead to the<br />
continued industrialization of an already crowded coastline.<br />
A DANGER TO OUR COMMUNITIES Maryland began importing <strong>LNG</strong> three years ago,<br />
where the gas is eroding pipeline seals, causing dangerous leaks and $144 million in<br />
damage. Now Maryland ratepayers are being asked to foot the bill to fix the damage.<br />
A TERRORIST TARGET Anti-terrorist experts, like former national security advisor<br />
Richard Clarke, say <strong>LNG</strong> tankers and facilities are major terrorist targets.<br />
WE DON'T NEED IT The US Department of Energy says we have adequate domestic<br />
natural gas supplies to meet current demand for at least the next 60 years.<br />
IT CONTRIBUTES TO GLOBAL WARMING Because of processing and transportation,<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> produces 20% to 40% more greenhouse gases than domestic natural gas. California<br />
should invest in clean, renewable energy — not more polluting, expensive fossil fuels.<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> IS SAFE AND RELIABLE<br />
• But, to date:<br />
– 45,000+ <strong>LNG</strong> cargoes<br />
– almost 100 million<br />
miles<br />
with no fatalities or<br />
serious incidents<br />
• 40+ years of experience<br />
• Proven technical designs<br />
and high standards of<br />
operation and<br />
maintenance (supported<br />
by SIGTTO)<br />
Fujian, China<br />
11
LESSONS FROM HISTORY<br />
• Two examples<br />
show major impacts<br />
on <strong>LNG</strong> trade<br />
caused by approval<br />
failures<br />
• 1970s and 1980s in<br />
California<br />
• 1990s in Italy<br />
TERMINAL REJECTION - CALIFORNIA<br />
• 1973 Indonesian contract to supply Western <strong>LNG</strong><br />
terminal sites near Los Angeles<br />
• Environmental / safety / economic reviews led to<br />
differing views from State/Federal agencies<br />
• 1977 California <strong>LNG</strong> Terminal Siting Act gave<br />
authority to only one State agency<br />
• 82 sites found, but 81 eliminated for military,<br />
population, weather or other reasons<br />
• U.S. court rejected last site for seismic reasons<br />
• By 1981 W<strong>LNG</strong> abandoned the proposal, but<br />
Indonesia found alternative market in Japan<br />
• Fortunately, no contractual dispute occurred<br />
12
TERMINAL APPROVAL - ITALY<br />
• Nigerian contract to supply ENEL Tuscany terminal<br />
• 1996 ENEL canceled contract claiming force majeure<br />
due to withdrawal of approval by newly-elected<br />
“greener” Italian government<br />
• Nigeria filed $13 billion claim, reportedly largest ever<br />
brought under English law<br />
• Case settled, with settlement calling for shipment of<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> to France in exchange for Russian gas diverted<br />
by French buyers to Italy<br />
AGREEMENTS FOR <strong>LNG</strong> TERMINAL<br />
SERVICES:<br />
13
<strong>LNG</strong> TERMINAL DEVELOPMENT<br />
• Historically <strong>LNG</strong> terminals have been developed<br />
by and for the end-user<br />
• Third party access to terminal capacity either not<br />
relevant or not permitted<br />
• If available, third party access allowed where<br />
user did not compete in downstream gas market<br />
with terminal owner<br />
A MULTITUDE OF NAMES….<br />
• Terminal Use Agreement (“TUA”)<br />
• Terminal Services Agreement<br />
• Firm Service Agreement<br />
• Tolling Services Agreement<br />
• Firm Storage Services Agreement<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> Terminalling Capacity Subscription Agreement<br />
• Specific Terms Agreement<br />
• Throughput Agreement<br />
14
ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES OF<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> TERMINAL MODELS<br />
100% Owner - 100% User Terminal<br />
Maximum operating flexibility within<br />
terminal’s capacity to co-ordinate<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> sales volumes and deliveries<br />
Flexibility for expansions<br />
BUT<br />
• Responsibility for 100% funding<br />
• No third party user to mitigate financial risk<br />
• Operating costs may be very expensive<br />
100% THIRD PARTY USER TERMINAL<br />
• Third party user’s financial risk only linked to its<br />
contracted capacity<br />
• Its capacity portfolio should be easier to manage - will<br />
only contract for what it needs at one or more <strong>LNG</strong><br />
terminals<br />
• Should be able to agree favourable terms for its use of<br />
capacity if too much terminal capacity in the market<br />
BUT<br />
• Competing with capacity with other users<br />
• Full access to ship berthing facilities at <strong>LNG</strong> terminal<br />
may be difficult<br />
• Commercial viability of <strong>LNG</strong> terminal may be dependent<br />
on financial creditworthiness of a number of unrelated<br />
companies<br />
15
MIXED OWNER - THIRD PARTY USE<br />
• Owner’s do not have 100% of the financial risk - terminal<br />
use charge should reduce owner’s operating costs<br />
• Third party user’s financial risk likely to be limited to its<br />
contracted capacity - no up front capital payments.<br />
• Third party can obtain comfort from owner’s<br />
creditworthiness.<br />
• No one entity will have complete flexibility regarding<br />
capacity use<br />
• Reduced flexibility if expansions are needed<br />
• Reduced access to ship berthing facilities<br />
TREND IN EUROPE AND US IS FOR SEPARATE<br />
TERMINAL OWNER TO PROVIDE TERMINAL<br />
SERVICES TO MULTIPLE PARTIES<br />
Transporter<br />
Terminal<br />
Owner<br />
Ex Ship<br />
FOB<br />
Terminal Use Agreement(s)<br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
Seller(s)<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> Sales<br />
Contract<br />
<strong>LNG</strong><br />
Buyer<br />
Gas Sales<br />
Agreement<br />
Gas<br />
Buyer(s)<br />
Sole Use Terminal<br />
16
TYPICAL DEAL STRUCTURE<br />
• Fee structure supporting financing (e.g. need rated<br />
customer), with Terminal not exposed to volume / price risk<br />
• Typical service fee components:<br />
– Reservation – fixed, with portion perhaps tied to index<br />
– Operating Costs – fixed or actual<br />
– Retainage for Fuel – fixed or actual (with cap?)<br />
• Few fee adjustments if services unavailable (i.e. “hell or<br />
high water” basis)<br />
• “Use-it-or-lose it” basis (e.g. Customer bears upstream risk)<br />
• Termination right if extended FM or services unavailability<br />
• Terminal Owner enjoys limited liability<br />
• 20+ year term, with possible extension rights and options<br />
TUA BASICS<br />
• Regulations may affect approach<br />
• Traditional TUA services:<br />
– Vessel berthing and unloading<br />
– <strong>LNG</strong> storage<br />
– Regasification of <strong>LNG</strong><br />
– Transportation to redelivery point<br />
(with redelivery of gas on a<br />
commingled stream basis)<br />
• Example models:<br />
–3 rd party usage only<br />
– Mixed 3 rd party / terminal owner<br />
usage<br />
17
SOME KEY TUA ISSUES<br />
• Scheduling of vessel berthing and<br />
gas offtake<br />
– especially if owner is also a<br />
terminal user<br />
• Inventory management (including<br />
effects of using larger vessels)<br />
• Assignment and subletting of<br />
services (especially re financing)<br />
• Remedies for:<br />
– owner’s failure to provide<br />
services; and / or<br />
– damage to <strong>LNG</strong> terminal<br />
SCHEDULING – A FOCUS OF DISCUSSION<br />
• Scheduling is a major customer<br />
focus<br />
– though almost every terminal has<br />
multiple <strong>LNG</strong> suppliers<br />
• Grant one customer a priority over<br />
other customers? Examples:<br />
– Establishing or changing <strong>LNG</strong><br />
berthing schedule<br />
– Force majeure or other terminal<br />
shutdown<br />
• If a priority given, how determined?<br />
– Contracted services<br />
– Duration of TUA<br />
18
RECENT EUROPEAN TUAs<br />
1. Fluxys <strong>LNG</strong>: (Belgium)<br />
‣ Qatar / Exxon (2004)<br />
‣ Distrigas (2004)<br />
2. Dragon <strong>LNG</strong>: (UK)<br />
‣ BG (2004)<br />
‣ Petronas (2004)<br />
3. Grain <strong>LNG</strong> (National Grid Transco): (UK)<br />
‣ BP / Sonatrach (2004)<br />
‣ Gaz de France (2005)<br />
‣ Centrica plc (2005)<br />
RECENT NORTH AMERICAN TUAs<br />
4. Sabine Pass [Cheniere]: (Louisiana)<br />
‣ Total (2004)<br />
‣ Chevron (2004)<br />
5. Freeport <strong>LNG</strong>: (Texas)<br />
‣ Dow Chemical (2004)<br />
‣ ConocoPhillips (2004)<br />
‣ Mitsubishi (2005)<br />
6. Energía Costa Azul: (Mexico)<br />
‣ Shell (2004)<br />
‣ Sempra (2004)<br />
7. Sempra - Cameron (Louisiana) - ENI (2005)<br />
19
ACCESS TO <strong>LNG</strong> TERMINALS<br />
IN EUROPE<br />
SECOND GAS DIRECTIVE<br />
• Second Gas Directive recognised importance of<br />
effective national regulation in guaranteeing<br />
non-discriminatory access<br />
• Regulator’s competence to fix/approve tariffs (or<br />
the calculation methodology) for access to <strong>LNG</strong><br />
facilities<br />
• Tariffs should be published to avoid uncertainty<br />
and costly disputes<br />
ACCESS TO <strong>LNG</strong> TERMINALS<br />
IN EUROPE<br />
SECOND GAS DIRECTIVE<br />
European Commission introduced number of<br />
directives designed to facilitate competition and<br />
create a single gas market in Europe<br />
From 1 st July 2004 Second Gas Directive<br />
(2003/55/EC) requires open access to gas<br />
storage, transmission and distribution (this<br />
includes <strong>LNG</strong> terminals)<br />
Access should be “Non-discriminatory transparent<br />
and fairly priced”<br />
20
ACCESS TO <strong>LNG</strong> TERMINALS<br />
IN EUROPE<br />
Exemptions from third party access provisions may be<br />
given for new gas infrastructure if:<br />
• the investment enhances competition in gas supply and<br />
security of gas supply<br />
• risk attached to investment is such that there would be<br />
no investment without exemption<br />
• legal entity owning infrastructure separate from system<br />
operator<br />
• charges levied on infrastructure users<br />
• exemption not detrimental to competition or effective<br />
functioning of internal gas market or applicable regulated<br />
system<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> TERMINAL ACCESS IN BRITAIN<br />
SECOND GAS DIRECTIVE<br />
OFGEM (Office for Gas and Electricity Markets)<br />
is the regulator for Britain’s gas and electricity<br />
industries.<br />
OFGEM’s role is to promote effective competition<br />
and to regulate the gas and electricity industries<br />
to ensure adequate investment in the networks.<br />
OFGEM’s responsibility to grant exemptions on a<br />
case by case basis pursuant to Gas (Third Party<br />
Access) Regulations 2004.<br />
21
<strong>LNG</strong> TERMINAL ACCESS IN BRITAIN<br />
SECOND GAS DIRECTIVE<br />
• Third party exemption may cover all or part of the<br />
new infrastructure.<br />
• Exemption may be subject to conditions relating to<br />
term of exemption depending on:<br />
- duration of contracts<br />
- additional capacity to be built/modification of<br />
existing capacity<br />
- term of the project<br />
- national circumstances<br />
• OFGEM may decide upon the rules and<br />
mechanisms for managing and allocating capacity<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> TERMINAL ACCESS IN BRITAIN<br />
Ofgem obliged to notify Commission of all relevant<br />
information regarding exemption decision.<br />
- Within 2 months of notification, Commission may<br />
request amendment/ withdrawal of decision to grant<br />
exemption.<br />
- Commission has veto rights.<br />
In Britain, 3 <strong>LNG</strong> terminals have been granted an<br />
exemption - Grain <strong>LNG</strong>, Dragon <strong>LNG</strong> and South Hook<br />
<strong>LNG</strong>.<br />
22
CONCLUSION<br />
• US / European terminals are<br />
offering services to their sponsor<br />
companies and 3 rd parties<br />
• Experience shows TUAs can raise<br />
challenging issues; in particular,<br />
if:<br />
– multiple customers are users,<br />
especially if they have differing<br />
rights of service; or<br />
– regulatory regime overlooks<br />
unique needs of the <strong>LNG</strong> trade<br />
• Contract form continues to evolve<br />
as we learn from more experience<br />
23
Islamic Finance<br />
An additional source of finance in<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> Projects<br />
May 4, 2006<br />
Jawad I. Ali<br />
Contents<br />
• Islamic Finance at a Glance<br />
• Islamic Finance tranches in Gas and <strong>LNG</strong> Projects<br />
• Islamic Financing structures utilized in <strong>LNG</strong> projects<br />
• The main difference between Conventional Finance and<br />
Islamic Finance<br />
• Enforceability of Islamic Finance documents and<br />
governing law issues<br />
• The reasons for the late arrival of Islamic tranches in<br />
Gas & <strong>LNG</strong> project financing & new trends<br />
1<br />
1
Islamic Finance at a glance<br />
What is Islamic Finance?<br />
• Islamic finance is any financing that is compliant with the<br />
principles of Islamic Shari’ah.<br />
2<br />
Islamic Finance at a glance.. (cont’d)<br />
What is Islamic Shari’ah?<br />
• The principles of Islamic Shari’ah derive from five<br />
sources:<br />
‣ Qur’an -- the holy book revered by Muslims;<br />
‣ Sunna -- the practice and traditions of the prophet<br />
Muhammad;<br />
3<br />
2
Islamic Finance at a glance.. (cont’d)<br />
‣ Qiyas -- a comparison, used to make a judgement on<br />
issues which have no clear-cut ruling in the Qur’an or the<br />
Sunna, by consideration of similar issues which do have<br />
clear ruling;<br />
‣ Ijtehad -- the diligent judgement of the scholars through<br />
reasoning and logic; and<br />
‣ Ijmaa -- a consensus or agreement used for issues which<br />
require Ijtehad.<br />
4<br />
Islamic Finance at a glance.. (cont’d)<br />
Who decides that a financing structure and the<br />
documentation effecting the same are Shari’ahcompliant?<br />
• The Shari’ah board or Supervisory committee<br />
• Review of the structure and documentation<br />
• Issuance of the fatwa<br />
• Fatwa’s (persuasive not binding).<br />
5<br />
3
Islamic Finance at a glance.. (cont’d)<br />
Who populates the Shari’ah boards/supervisory<br />
committees?<br />
• Religious scholars, lawyers, economists and others.<br />
• A Shari’ah board/supervisory committee is more akin to<br />
a compliance officer of a banking institution as opposed<br />
to member of corporate board.<br />
6<br />
Islamic finance tranches in Gas and <strong>LNG</strong><br />
Projects<br />
• The Dolphin Gas Project -- Closed September 2005<br />
‣ Project description: Gas Extraction and processing in<br />
Qatar and the construction of a pipeline to the UAE.<br />
‣ Financing: $3.45 billion, $1.0 billion of which was financed<br />
on a Shari’ah-compliant basis utilizing an Istisna’a-Ijara<br />
financing structure.<br />
‣ Tenor: 4 years<br />
‣ Islamic Mandated lead arrangers: ABN Amro, BNP<br />
Paribas, Citibank, Dubai Islamic Bank and Gulf<br />
Investment Bank.<br />
7<br />
4
Islamic finance tranches in <strong>LNG</strong> Projects<br />
• Qatargas II <strong>LNG</strong> -- Closed December 2004<br />
‣ Project Description: Upstream infrastructure<br />
development, including offshore gas platforms and a twotrain<br />
onshore <strong>LNG</strong> processing facility.<br />
‣ Financing: $4.5 billion, $530 million of which was financed<br />
on a Shari’ah-compliant basis (Istisna’a-Ijara financing).<br />
‣ Tenor: 15 years<br />
‣ Islamic Mandated lead arrangers: Dubai Islamic Bank,<br />
Kuwait Finance House, BNP Paribas, Gulf International<br />
Bank and HSBC.<br />
8<br />
Islamic financing structures utilized in<br />
Gas and <strong>LNG</strong> projects<br />
• Istisna’a – the word Istisna’a means manufacturing/<br />
building. An Istisna’a contract is used to finance the<br />
acquisition of a built to order project or asset, where the<br />
acquisition price of the underlying project or asset is<br />
paid in installments pursuant to an agreed schedule and<br />
milestones.<br />
9<br />
5
Islamic financing structures utilized in<br />
Gas and <strong>LNG</strong> projects<br />
• Istisna’a contracts are frequently used to finance the<br />
construction of projects, ship and aircraft building and<br />
other similar assets.<br />
• Ijara – the word Ijara means lease. In an Ijara<br />
transaction, the lessor (bank) would purchase and lease<br />
the underlying asset to the prospective lessee<br />
(borrower), for an agreed term and rent.<br />
10<br />
Islamic financing structures utilized in<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> projects (cont’d)<br />
• An Ijara is usually coupled with a call and put options.<br />
• Unlike a conventional finance lease, in an Ijara<br />
transaction, the lessor is responsible for the structural<br />
maintenance and insurance of the underlying asset and<br />
will not be entitled to receive any rent after the<br />
termination of the lease.<br />
• Ijara structures are frequently used to finance the<br />
acquisition of various types of projects (including <strong>LNG</strong>)<br />
and equipment.<br />
11<br />
6
Islamic financing structures utilized in<br />
project financings (cont’d)<br />
• Murabaha – a bank funds the purchase of a given asset<br />
by charging a mark-up for the goods.<br />
• Unlike a conventional financing, rather than advance the<br />
money to the prospective borrower (the party seeking<br />
financing on a Shari’ah compliant basis), the bank would<br />
buy the goods from a third party and sell those goods on<br />
to the party seeking financing for a pre-agreed price on<br />
a deferred payment basis.<br />
12<br />
Islamic financing structures utilized in<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> projects (cont’d)<br />
• Murabahas are frequently used to finance the<br />
acquisition of various commodities and assets.<br />
Murabaha structures have also been utilized to provide<br />
working capital facilities to Shari’ah compliant<br />
companies.<br />
13<br />
7
Main differences between conventional<br />
finance and Islamic finance<br />
• Riba -- Interest<br />
• Gharar -- Uncertainty or speculation<br />
• Prohibited activities -- conventional banking, insurance,<br />
hotels, gambling and entertainment, liquor, tobacco,<br />
offensive weapons and arms related sectors,<br />
manufacturing, processing of pork and related products<br />
14<br />
Reasons for the late arrival of Islamic<br />
Finance tranches in Gas and <strong>LNG</strong><br />
Projects<br />
• Small balance sheet of the Gulf based Islamic banks<br />
• Mismatch between assets and liabilities (short tenor)<br />
• slim margins<br />
• inter-creditor issues<br />
15<br />
8
New Trends<br />
• Conventional Banks leading Islamic Tranches<br />
(eliminating the mismatch issue)<br />
• New Islamic Banks being set up (bigger balance sheets)<br />
• Hybridising Istisna’a and Ijara financing instruments to<br />
achieve longer tenors<br />
• Pragmatic Shari’ah-compliant solutions for inter-creditor<br />
issues<br />
16<br />
Enforceability of Islamic Finance<br />
documents and governing law issues<br />
• The principles of Islamic Shari’ah are not a codified set<br />
of rules which one can point out to with any degree of<br />
certainty.<br />
• Therefore, it is not advisable to subject the Islamic<br />
finance documents to Shari'ah law. Shamil Bank of<br />
Bahrain v Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and others<br />
17<br />
9
<strong>LNG</strong> TRANSPORTATION:<br />
REVIEW OF RECENT TRENDS IN SHIPPING PROJECTS<br />
AND CONTRACTS<br />
Philip Weems and Daniel Rogers<br />
Tower of London<br />
May 4, 2006<br />
• Overview of <strong>LNG</strong> Vessel Types<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> Shipping Costs<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> Fleet Size, Costs and<br />
Future Capital Requirements<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> Vessel Construction<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> Transportation Contract<br />
Types and Issues<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> Tanker Time Charter<br />
Parties<br />
• Maritime Liabilities and<br />
Limitations<br />
Discussion Outline<br />
1
Basic <strong>LNG</strong> Vessel Types<br />
Spherical (Moss-Rosenberg Design) Tanker<br />
2
Membrane Containment System Tanker<br />
What’s Driving the Need for Innovation in <strong>LNG</strong><br />
Shipping?<br />
“<strong>LNG</strong> Shipping still remains the most<br />
important element in the [<strong>LNG</strong>] cost<br />
structure.”<br />
H.E. Abdullah bin Hamad Al Attiyah<br />
Second Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Energy and Industry, Qatar<br />
June 2005<br />
3
Cost Distribution<br />
Along the <strong>LNG</strong> Chain<br />
Field<br />
Development<br />
10-20%<br />
Liquefaction<br />
25-35%<br />
Shipping<br />
15-25%<br />
Receiving<br />
Terminal<br />
5-15% Power<br />
Generation &<br />
Gas Distribution<br />
25-35%<br />
Current & Anticipated <strong>LNG</strong> Fleet Size<br />
• Approx. 198-202 <strong>LNG</strong> vessels currently in service<br />
– Ages range from
<strong>LNG</strong> Fleet Capital Needs<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> vessel capital costs:<br />
– “Average” vessel (145,000 - 160,000 cbm) cost is<br />
approx. US$215-230MM<br />
– New 210,000-216,000 cbm <strong>LNG</strong> ships expected to<br />
cost approx. US$275-280MM<br />
– Next-generation <strong>LNG</strong> “superships” (260,000 cbm+)<br />
expected to cost in the US$285-300MM range<br />
• Total capital needs for <strong>LNG</strong> vessel construction over the<br />
next 5 years: US$15-20 billion<br />
• Total capital needs by 2020 estimated at US$40 billion<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> Vessel Construction<br />
• Typical <strong>LNG</strong> export project<br />
requires up to 8 newbuild<br />
vessels<br />
• Only about 15 shipyards<br />
worldwide with experience and<br />
capabilities to construct <strong>LNG</strong><br />
vessels<br />
• Most of the newbuild contracts<br />
will go to the 6 major Japanese<br />
and Korean yards<br />
5
<strong>LNG</strong> Vessel Construction (cont’d.)<br />
• Newbuilds are being tendered for competitive bid with increasing<br />
frequency<br />
• Typical newbuild program takes 36 months, but 4 year construction<br />
periods now reportedly occurring due to shipyard capacity<br />
shortages<br />
• Usually built under a lump-sum “turnkey” construction contract,<br />
but steel price escalators and foreign exchange adjustments<br />
becoming more prominent<br />
• Building contracts require 5-6 installment payments, but title to<br />
vessel does not transfer to owner / buyer until final delivery and<br />
acceptance; as such shipbuilder’s refund guarantee is critical to<br />
vessel construction financing<br />
The New Trend: “Super-Size Size Me”<br />
6
<strong>LNG</strong> Transportation Contract Types<br />
and Issues<br />
Types of Transportation Agreements<br />
• Contract of Affreightment (COA)<br />
– BTU quantity carried between specific points by<br />
various ships in owner’s fleet<br />
• Typically only requirements as to general vessel<br />
size and characteristics<br />
• Choice of specific vessel(s) used for each<br />
voyage left to owner<br />
– Freight (often on a per-unit basis) paid to vessel<br />
owner on a periodic basis<br />
– Shipowner force majeure only if an event impacts<br />
the designated vessel for the particular voyage<br />
7
Types of Transportation Agreements (cont’d.)<br />
• Bareboat (or Demise) Charter of Named Vessel<br />
– True owner (“head owner”) is merely a financial<br />
owner<br />
– Bareboat charterer effectively becomes the<br />
“owner” for purposes of operation, control and<br />
liabilities<br />
– Bareboat charterer is required to crew, insure,<br />
operate and maintain the vessel in order to place<br />
it into service<br />
– Bareboat hire is essentially paid on a “hell or high<br />
water” basis<br />
Types of Transportation Agreements (cont’d.)<br />
• Time Charter of Named Vessel<br />
– Essentially a service contract: owner retains control and is<br />
responsible for crewing, operation and maintenance; time<br />
charterer instructs vessel where to load and discharge, and<br />
speed at which to proceed<br />
– Hire is usually paid on a hell-or-high water basis, monthly in<br />
advance<br />
• Capital cost element<br />
• Operating cost element<br />
– Voyage costs (port charges, bunker fuel, etc.) paid directly by<br />
charterer<br />
– Project or <strong>LNG</strong> SPA-related force majeure typically does not<br />
excuse charterer from payment<br />
8
Types of Transportation Contracts (cont’d.)<br />
• Voyage Charter of Named Vessel<br />
– Usually a single voyage arrangement, but can<br />
provide for consecutive voyages<br />
– BTU quantity carried between specific points by<br />
specific ship<br />
– Similar to a time charter in that owner retains control<br />
and is responsible for crewing, operation and<br />
maintenance; voyage charter contract specifies<br />
where vessel is to load and discharge<br />
– Freight (often on a lump-sum basis) paid to vessel<br />
owner upon completion of voyage and delivery of<br />
cargo; ballast voyage is for owner’s account<br />
Vessel Ownership vs. Chartering<br />
9
Why Be a Shipowner?<br />
• Ownership Pros:<br />
– Possibly less expensive overall<br />
– Retention of residual value of vessel<br />
– Limited liability (per conventions), supported by P&I<br />
insurance<br />
– Negotiation of building contact on standard terms<br />
less time consuming than chartering<br />
• Ownership Cons:<br />
– Limited risk management - “standard shipbuilding<br />
contract” places few risks on shipbuilder<br />
– Responsible for vessel crewing & management<br />
– Liability as shipowner for accidents<br />
Why Be a Vessel Charterer?<br />
• Chartering Pros:<br />
– Some risk sharing by vessel owner<br />
– Only obligation is to pay hire<br />
– Detailed charter allows for significant control<br />
– Can obtain charterer’s liability insurance<br />
• Chartering Cons:<br />
– Can be more expensive than owning (bidding<br />
process may achieve most competitive price)<br />
– Charter negotiations can be more time consuming<br />
– Liability for cargo may exceed shipowner’s exposure<br />
in certain cases<br />
10
<strong>LNG</strong> Vessel Time Charters<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> Time Charter Parties<br />
• Long term charters<br />
for <strong>LNG</strong> vessels<br />
involve unique issues<br />
and risk sharing (20-<br />
25 years)<br />
• “Standard” crude<br />
oil/LPG tanker time<br />
charter forms do not<br />
adequately address<br />
these issues<br />
11
<strong>LNG</strong> Time Charter Party Forms<br />
• Models<br />
– Modified Mobiltime<br />
– Shell<strong>LNG</strong>Time1<br />
– bp Time<br />
– ExxonMobil 2000<br />
– GIIGNL (International Group of <strong>LNG</strong><br />
Importers)<br />
• Some forms are quite shipowner “friendly”<br />
• Choice of English law vs. U.S. law<br />
Standard Time Charter Approach<br />
• Does not typically relieve Charterer from<br />
paying hire during sales contract force<br />
majeure<br />
• Exposure to Charterer could be high<br />
• Charterer may be unable to reallocate such<br />
vessel non-utilisation costs under <strong>LNG</strong> sales<br />
contract<br />
12
Recommendations for Time Charterers<br />
ADDRESS THE RISK: <strong>LNG</strong> time charter should<br />
anticipate underlying trade interruption due to<br />
force majeure<br />
ONE CONTRACTUAL SOLUTION:<br />
‣Short-term force majeure reduces hire<br />
‣Long-term force majeure enables Charterer<br />
to terminate charter upon payment of fee<br />
BE REALISTIC: Right to terminate may cause<br />
difficulties in vessel financing<br />
Time Charters -<br />
“Mature Vessel” Issues<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> ship’s physical capabilities (service<br />
speed, pumping rate, boil-off rate, etc.) may<br />
become at risk as ship ages<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> vessels’ “maximum useful life” still being<br />
determined<br />
• Performance warranties modified as agreed if<br />
expected to adversely affect ship’s<br />
performance<br />
• Life extension survey as a condition to charter<br />
period extension or renewal<br />
13
Time Charterer -- Payment & Performance Security<br />
• Historically, most shipping companies have<br />
had a small capital base<br />
• Financial security is usually necessary to<br />
support <strong>LNG</strong> project and vessel financing<br />
• Parent Guarantees<br />
– Limits and credit rating<br />
– Reorganization and substitution<br />
• Standby letters of credit<br />
– Failure to issue<br />
– Annual renewal<br />
Time Charters -- Default Rights<br />
• For <strong>LNG</strong> trade, charterer needs default<br />
definition that is not solely limited to physical<br />
condition or performance of vessel<br />
• Need capability to correct shipowner’s repeated<br />
failures to perform voyages, loadings or<br />
discharges with right to:<br />
– replace vessel manager / operator<br />
– convert charter into bareboat charter for remainder<br />
of charter period<br />
14
New Timecharter Trends<br />
• Tanker pooling / optimisation of vessel<br />
scheduling<br />
• More aggressive charter terms<br />
– Example: offhire if vessel misses daily<br />
Suez canal convoy window<br />
• Charterer’s termination / cancellation for<br />
convenience rights<br />
• Allocation of cost increases due to change in<br />
laws<br />
New <strong>LNG</strong> Transportation Issues & Trends<br />
• Physical ship - shore compatibility issues<br />
due to much larger standard vessel sizes<br />
• Pooled tanker non-utilization costs -- passed<br />
along under <strong>LNG</strong> SPAs?<br />
• Strains on onshore <strong>LNG</strong> / gas storage<br />
capacity<br />
• “Routine” <strong>LNG</strong> ship-to-ship transfers<br />
• Onboard regasification<br />
– 2 existing tankers with onboard regasification<br />
– 8 more on order for delivery between 2006-2010<br />
15
Maritime Liabilities and Limitation Conventions<br />
Why Discuss Liability Issues?<br />
• Despite <strong>LNG</strong>’s critics in early years…<br />
• … the excellent safety record of <strong>LNG</strong> marine<br />
transport is now well established<br />
• Even so, …..<br />
16
Collision Risks<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> Operations in Port Areas (SIGTTO, 2003):<br />
“Nevertheless, this [<strong>LNG</strong>] safety record<br />
notwithstanding, the risk profile of <strong>LNG</strong><br />
tankers presents a very serious residual<br />
hazard in port areas if the vital structure of the<br />
tanker is penetrated.”<br />
“…Yet it is clear, their inherently robust<br />
constructions notwithstanding, that <strong>LNG</strong><br />
tankers are vulnerable to penetration by<br />
collisions with heavy displacement ships at all<br />
but the most moderate of speeds.”<br />
Liabilities Generally<br />
- IF an <strong>LNG</strong> accident occurs, ship owner may<br />
be exposed to liability - for injuries to third<br />
parties and property damage - under law<br />
where accident occurred<br />
- <strong>LNG</strong> cargo owner and/or terminal may also<br />
face potential liabilities<br />
- Liability normally based on negligence (i.e.<br />
fault), with ability of some parties to limit<br />
liability<br />
- Strict liability and increased limits coming<br />
17
Typical <strong>LNG</strong> Liability Limits Under ‘57, ‘76 & ‘96 Conventions<br />
(Prior to HNS Convention)<br />
350<br />
300<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> Shipowner Limitations (million US$) [138,000 m 3 ]<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> NATIONS: : (12) ALGERIA, BELGIUM, FRANCE,<br />
GREECE, INDIA, EG, EGYPT, MEXICO, NIGERIA,<br />
TRINIDAD, TURKEY, UAE & *JAPAN (*until Aug. ’06)<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> NATIONS: (5) AUSTRALIA, NORWAY, RUSSIA,<br />
SPAIN & UK<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> NATION: PORTUGAL<br />
100<br />
50<br />
0<br />
Amended<br />
1957 Brussels<br />
Convention<br />
1976 LLMC<br />
Limitation<br />
Convention<br />
1996 LLMC<br />
Amendment<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> Liability Limits Under HNS Convention<br />
350<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> Shipowner Limitations (million US$) [138,000 m 3 ]<br />
Cargo Title Holder Limitations (million US$)<br />
300<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
0<br />
Amended<br />
1957 Brussels<br />
Convention<br />
1976 London<br />
Convention<br />
1996 London<br />
Convention<br />
Amendment<br />
HNS<br />
Convention<br />
18
HNS Convention - Basics<br />
• Covers damage occurring in a State Party<br />
caused by HNS at Sea<br />
• “Strict liability” - Claimant need only show<br />
HNS caused the injury, irrespective of who is<br />
to blame (i.e., proof of causation only)<br />
• Liability may be shared between:<br />
ship owner of the vessel (1 st Tier); and<br />
pool of certain <strong>LNG</strong> cargo title holders<br />
(2 nd Tier) via separate “<strong>LNG</strong> Account”<br />
Two-Tiered System – 1 ST Tier<br />
• Ship owners strictly liable, with limits based on vessel<br />
tonnage<br />
• Maximum liability is 100m SDR, unless caused by<br />
Owner’s intentional / reckless act<br />
• P&I insurance supporting 1 st Tier liability required for<br />
vessel to enter a State Party<br />
• No ship owner 1 st Tier liability if caused by:<br />
– act of war, etc.;<br />
– intentional act of a third party; or<br />
– negligence of governmental agency responsible<br />
for lights / navigational aids<br />
19
Query: Will increased liability limits and strict liability<br />
increase P&I insurance costs for <strong>LNG</strong> ships?<br />
350<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> Shipowner Limitations (million US$) [138,000 m 3 ]<br />
300<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
Most common limit will<br />
increase almost 3 times<br />
Ship owners now<br />
strictly liable<br />
100<br />
50<br />
0<br />
Amended<br />
1957 Brussels<br />
Convention<br />
1976 London<br />
Convention<br />
1996 London<br />
Convention<br />
Amendment<br />
HNS<br />
Convention<br />
Thank You!<br />
20
Critical Issues for Sponsors in the Design and<br />
Construction of <strong>LNG</strong> Projects<br />
Scott A. Greer<br />
Tower of London - May 4, 2006<br />
Critical Issues<br />
1. Selection of Contractor<br />
2. Cost<br />
3. Change Orders<br />
4. Schedule<br />
5. Quality of Work and Performance<br />
6. Liability Limitations<br />
7. Financial Security<br />
8. Insurance<br />
1
1- Selection of Contractor<br />
Who should I select as the EPC contractor?<br />
• Contractor with <strong>LNG</strong> experience<br />
• Financially strong<br />
• Ability to perform within budget, on time<br />
and with quality work<br />
Selection of Contractor<br />
Sample List of <strong>LNG</strong> Contractors<br />
• Bechtel<br />
• Technip<br />
• Saipem<br />
• KBR<br />
• JGC<br />
• Tractebel<br />
• CBI<br />
2
Selection of Contractor<br />
• But no matter how good the contractor, the<br />
success of your project depends on the<br />
individuals<br />
• Must specify contractor key personnel<br />
Selection of Contractor<br />
• However, it is a very tight construction<br />
market for <strong>LNG</strong> projects.<br />
• Contractors are becoming choosy.<br />
– at least one currently declines most terminal<br />
work<br />
• Therefore, currently more difficult to choose<br />
contractors.<br />
3
• FEED Stage<br />
Selection of Contractor<br />
• It’s become challenging even at the FEED<br />
stage<br />
• Contractor wants:<br />
– guarantee of EPC work, or<br />
– termination fee<br />
• Why?<br />
– Not want to tie up key people<br />
Selection of Contractor<br />
• Beware of Contractor Tricks at FEED Stage<br />
• ownership of drawings and specs<br />
• confidentiality<br />
• guarantee of EPC work<br />
4
Selection of Contractor<br />
• 2 Ways to Contract for EPC Work<br />
• 1 – Bid<br />
• 2 – Open-Book Sole Source Negotiation<br />
• If Bid . . .<br />
• Recommended Approach<br />
– FEED by one contractor<br />
– Bid of EPC not include FEED contractor<br />
• Advantages/Disadvantages<br />
– Time<br />
– Competition<br />
– Flexibility<br />
Selection of Contractor<br />
• But Bidding less common in tight market<br />
– may be possible only in larger projects<br />
5
• If Open-Book Sole Source Negotiation . . .<br />
• More common currently for <strong>LNG</strong> terminals<br />
• Advantages/Disadvantages<br />
– Time<br />
– Competition<br />
– Flexibility<br />
Selection of Contractor<br />
• Recommended Approach<br />
– Competitively negotiate MOU for FEED and<br />
EPC, setting out key terms, including<br />
markups (profit, etc.)<br />
2- Cost<br />
6
• Cost of <strong>LNG</strong> Projects Have Increased<br />
• Historically, prices dip due to improved<br />
technology<br />
• Now, due to (1) contractor demand and (2)<br />
increasing costs in raw materials, cost of<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> projects has significantly increased<br />
• Example Liquefaction Plants (Poten &<br />
Partners)<br />
• Recently (2004) - $200 tonnes/year<br />
• Now - $250 - 350 tonnes/year<br />
Cost<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> projects typically lump sum<br />
– with maybe exception for nickel steel<br />
Cost<br />
• But now see exceptions for other raw<br />
materials<br />
– Contractors have hard time holding prices, or<br />
charge for the risk<br />
– e.g., carbon steel<br />
– ways to mitigate<br />
• contractor hedge<br />
• tie to index<br />
• limit time of variability<br />
7
3- Change Orders<br />
What contractual measures can you<br />
implement to reduce Change Orders?<br />
Change Orders<br />
Actions Before Contract Signed?<br />
• Good Scope of Work<br />
– Both parties work diligently on scope<br />
– Performance based specifications, to the<br />
extent possible, but with sufficient detail to<br />
describe requirements.<br />
– Owner should fully vet scope of work,<br />
particularly if FEED contractor is same as<br />
EPC contractor<br />
8
Change Orders<br />
• Soil Issues - key area<br />
of claims<br />
• Risks<br />
– unknown soil<br />
– piles<br />
• Mitigation - drive test<br />
piles before signing<br />
EPC<br />
Contract Measures?<br />
Change Orders<br />
• Get Contractor contractual “buy-in” to scope<br />
• Tight change order clauses:<br />
– Change only by change order<br />
• Unilateral by Owner or mutual<br />
– Monthly lien & claim waivers<br />
– No “cumulative” impact claims<br />
9
4- Delay<br />
• What measures can<br />
you take to reduce<br />
your chances of<br />
having a late<br />
project?<br />
• If it is late, what are<br />
your remedies?<br />
Delay<br />
Scheduling<br />
Obligations<br />
• Good, detailed CPM<br />
Schedule<br />
• Strong contract rights<br />
re: scheduling<br />
obligations<br />
10
Delay<br />
Identification of Milestones/Damages<br />
• Milestones:<br />
• RFCD<br />
• Delivery of <strong>LNG</strong> ships<br />
• Partial Operation?<br />
• Substantial Completion<br />
• Operation<br />
• Final Completion<br />
• Others?<br />
Delay<br />
Delays Caused by Owner, Force Majeure, etc.?<br />
• Clear definition of force majeure<br />
• Clear definition of when schedule extension<br />
is justified<br />
11
Late delivery?<br />
Delay<br />
• Recovery rights<br />
• Acceleration rights<br />
• Delay LD’s at Substantial Completion<br />
– Daily liquidated damage amounts<br />
– Caps<br />
– Exceptions to caps<br />
• willful misconduct, gross negligence<br />
Delay<br />
• What if there is a delay at RFCD for a<br />
terminal?<br />
• Contractual protection ---<br />
– indemnification for demurrage charges<br />
– Liquidated damages<br />
12
5- Performance Guarantees and<br />
Warranties<br />
Key Issues with Performance Guarantees and<br />
Warranties<br />
Performance Guarantees/Warranties<br />
Performance Guarantees<br />
• Tie Contractor obligations to<br />
commercial obligations<br />
• If inadequate performance, what is the<br />
sponsor’s remedy against contractor?<br />
– Liquidated damages?<br />
– Fix?<br />
– Examples: send-out rate<br />
13
Performance Guarantees/Warranties<br />
• Do I specify performance guarantees for all<br />
key performance issues?<br />
• It depends ….<br />
• Examples:<br />
– Tank heat leak<br />
Performance Guarantees/Warranties<br />
Other Critical Issues Re: Performance<br />
Guarantees<br />
• New technologies - ex: regasification<br />
• Availability of ships for terminals<br />
• Downstream capacity<br />
• Who operates prior to Substantial<br />
Completion?<br />
14
Performance Guarantees/Warranties<br />
Warranties<br />
• Length of warranty - usually 18 months to 2<br />
years<br />
• Owner right to correct<br />
• Assignment of Subcontractor warranties<br />
6- Limitation of Liability<br />
• Cap amount<br />
• Exceptions to cap:<br />
Aggregate Liability Cap<br />
• Willful misconduct & gross negligence<br />
• Contract specified exceptions<br />
• Common law exceptions<br />
• Insurance proceeds<br />
• Obligation to finish work<br />
• Indemnification obligations<br />
15
Limitation of Liability<br />
Delay & Performance Liquidated Damages<br />
• Exceptions to cap<br />
• Applicability in the event of termination<br />
• Combined cap?<br />
7- Financial Security<br />
What financial security should<br />
I get from the Contractor?<br />
16
Financial Security<br />
1. Parent Guarantee<br />
2. Letter of Credit/Bank Guarantee or<br />
Payment/Performance Bonds<br />
1. general sponsor preference - letter of<br />
credit/bank guarantee<br />
2. amount of letter of credit/bank guarantee =<br />
10- 15% of contract price<br />
3. Retainage -<br />
1. Trend: letter of credit/bank guarantee taking<br />
the place of retainage in many cases<br />
8 - Insurance<br />
Are there insurance products other than<br />
those traditionally provided by a<br />
contractor, which may provide better<br />
protection for the owner?<br />
17
Insurance<br />
• Issues:<br />
Contractor Provided Insurance<br />
Insurance<br />
• Amount of coverage and coverage gaps<br />
• Cost<br />
18
Insurance<br />
Alternatives<br />
• OCIP or “wrap up” policies<br />
– Potential advantages:<br />
• Lower cost<br />
• Better and greater coverage<br />
• CCIP<br />
Builder’s Risk Insurance<br />
• Who gets? Sponsor or contractor?<br />
– Sponsor/lender preference: sponsor<br />
• Risk of loss - depends on who procures<br />
insurance<br />
Insurance<br />
– Contractor obtained - should bear all risk of loss<br />
except possibly a few risks which are not obtainable<br />
• Sponsor/lender should be the loss payee<br />
– Sponsor obtained - At a minimum, if Contractor is<br />
involved in the procurement of the insurance,<br />
Contractor should bear the risk of loss for damages<br />
caused by its fault and which are not covered by<br />
insurance<br />
19
THANK YOU<br />
Scott A. Greer<br />
20
KEY ISSUES IN THE ARBITRATION OF<br />
<strong>LNG</strong> DISPUTES<br />
May 4, 2006<br />
Anthony Wilson<br />
TYPES OF <strong>LNG</strong> DISPUTE<br />
• General Commercial e.g. dispute over price<br />
adjustment clause in <strong>LNG</strong> Supply Contract.<br />
• Construction e.g. responsibility for delay to<br />
completion of <strong>LNG</strong> Project; force majeure claims.<br />
• Shipping e.g. dispute over supply of ships to<br />
transport <strong>LNG</strong> from Seller to overseas Buyer.<br />
2<br />
1
EXAMPLES OF RECENT <strong>LNG</strong> ARBITRATIONS<br />
• UNCITRAL arbitration in London between a <strong>LNG</strong><br />
supplier and its U.S. customer concerning <strong>LNG</strong> Sale<br />
and Shipping Agreements.<br />
Amount in dispute: > US $300 million.<br />
• Arbitration in London between Nigeria <strong>LNG</strong> Limited and<br />
ENEL SpA arising from alleged repudiation of <strong>LNG</strong> Sale<br />
Agreement by ENEL.<br />
Amount in dispute: US$ 13 billion (settled).<br />
3<br />
EXAMPLES OF RECENT <strong>LNG</strong> ARBITRATIONS (CONT)<br />
• Dabhol Arbitrations.<br />
Expropriation claim and related disputes.<br />
Amount in dispute: several hundred million US$.<br />
• ICC arbitration in Paris between Yemen Exploration<br />
and Production Co. and the Government of Yemen<br />
arising from a Production Sharing Agreement.<br />
Amount in dispute: unknown.<br />
4<br />
2
EXAMPLES OF RECENT <strong>LNG</strong> ARBITRATIONS (CONT)<br />
• AAA arbitration in New York between US terminal<br />
owner and US terminal user arising out of a Terminal<br />
User Agreement and commodity sale and purchase<br />
arrangement.<br />
Amount in dispute: declaratory judgment sought.<br />
5<br />
MORE TO COME?<br />
• Expropriation claims - Bolivia / Venezuela?<br />
• Forced renegotiation of <strong>LNG</strong> contracts.<br />
• Increase in Oil and Gas market prices likely to give<br />
rise to disputes regarding <strong>LNG</strong> Supply Contract<br />
pricing formulae / caps.<br />
• Failure to supply disputes.<br />
6<br />
3
DRAFTING THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE<br />
Example: <strong>LNG</strong> Import Project<br />
Multiple Contracts including:<br />
• EPC Contract<br />
• Shareholders Agreement<br />
• Lease Agreement<br />
• Services Agreement<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> Import Agreement<br />
• <strong>LNG</strong> Throughput Agreement (Conversion of <strong>LNG</strong><br />
into Natural Gas)<br />
7<br />
DRAFTING THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE (CONT)<br />
Issues to Consider<br />
• arbitration or litigation<br />
• type of arbitration - administered or ad hoc<br />
• what rules should govern the arbitration<br />
• the number of arbitrators<br />
• the seat of arbitration<br />
• consolidation of related disputes and joinder of<br />
parties<br />
8<br />
4
DRAFTING THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE<br />
(CONT)<br />
• whether to provide for ‘first tier’ methods of dispute<br />
resolution e.g. negotiation/mediation, expert<br />
determination, adjudication and dispute resolution<br />
boards.<br />
9<br />
ARBITRATION OR LITIGATION?<br />
A. Advantages of Arbitration<br />
The Principal Consideration<br />
• Neutrality<br />
• Enforcement<br />
- 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition<br />
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards<br />
- Over 150 Contracting States<br />
- No Equivalent Mechanism for Enforcement of<br />
Court Judgments<br />
• Confidentiality<br />
10<br />
5
ARBITRATION OR LITIGATION? (CONT)<br />
Other Considerations<br />
• Greater Informality<br />
• Speed?<br />
• Costs?<br />
• Finality<br />
• Simplified Procedures (e.g. no mandatory discovery)<br />
11<br />
ARBITRATION OR LITIGATION? (CONT)<br />
B. Disadvantages of Arbitration<br />
• Intervention of courts.<br />
• Disputes arising out of pathological arbitration<br />
clauses and disputes as to jurisdiction.<br />
• Joinder and consolidation issues.<br />
• Procedural uncertainty.<br />
• Costs of institutional arbitration.<br />
12<br />
6
TYPE OF ARBITRATION<br />
A. Institutional Arbitration (“Administered” or<br />
“Supervised” Arbitration)<br />
1. Major Institutions<br />
i. ICC<br />
ii. LCIA<br />
iii. SCC<br />
iv. AAA/ICDR<br />
v. ICSID (Only Investment Disputes)<br />
13<br />
TYPE OF ARBITRATION (CONT)<br />
2. Advantages of Institutional Arbitration<br />
- Tried and tested rules<br />
- Infrastructure of institution<br />
- Experienced Administrators<br />
- Separation of administrative tasks from<br />
legal tasks<br />
- Scrutiny of draft award<br />
- Enforcement<br />
14<br />
7
TYPE OF ARBITRATION (CONT)<br />
Institutional Arbitration (continued)<br />
3. Disadvantages of Institutional Arbitration<br />
- Cost.<br />
- Delay.<br />
- Sovereign States may reject institutional<br />
oversight.<br />
15<br />
B. Ad hoc Arbitration<br />
TYPE OF ARBITRATION (CONT)<br />
1. Advantages of Ad hoc Arbitration<br />
- Tailored procedure (but must be carefully<br />
drafted).<br />
- Costs.<br />
- UNCITRAL rules – a framework.<br />
2. Disadvantages<br />
- Unpredictability of resolving issues not<br />
covered by rules.<br />
- Potential for abuse and dilatory tactics.<br />
16<br />
8
TYPE OF ARBITRATION (CONT)<br />
C. Arbitration under Local Laws<br />
• Usually Based on UNCITRAL Model Law.<br />
• May Permit Appointment of Arbitrators by Local<br />
Courts.<br />
17<br />
SOLE ARBITRATOR OR TRIBUNAL?<br />
A. Sole Arbitrator<br />
• Advantages<br />
- May be more efficient.<br />
- Less risk of a ‘split the baby’ approach?<br />
• Disadvantages<br />
- Difficulties with appointment.<br />
- Large or complex dispute may be overburdensome<br />
for a sole arbitrator.<br />
- Risk of ‘rogue’ arbitrator.<br />
18<br />
9
SOLE ARBITRATOR OR TRIBUNAL? (CONT)<br />
B. Three Member Tribunal<br />
• Advantages<br />
- Parties have a say in the constitution of the<br />
tribunal.<br />
- Work load can be shared.<br />
- Avoids ‘rogue arbitrator’ risk.<br />
• Disadvantages<br />
- More cumbersome?<br />
- Likely to ‘split the baby’?<br />
NOTE: APPOINTMENT OF THREE MEMBER TRIBUNAL<br />
MAY BE PROBLEMATIC IF THERE ARE MORE THAN<br />
TWO PARTIES.<br />
19<br />
PLACE OF ARBITRATION - SEAT<br />
1. Neutrality/Role of national courts.<br />
2. Enforcement.<br />
3. Mandatory procedural requirements.<br />
4. Influence on character of arbitration.<br />
20<br />
10
CONSOLIDATION/JOINDER<br />
• Consolidation of related disputes and joinder of<br />
parties not generally permitted in arbitration.<br />
• Consider incorporation of bespoke consolidation<br />
and joinder provisions in arbitration clauses of<br />
related project agreements.<br />
21<br />
MULTI-TIER TIER DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES<br />
• Mediation/Conciliation (non-binding).<br />
• Expert Determination/Adjudication/Dispute<br />
Resolution Boards (binding* or referrable to<br />
arbitration).<br />
* Even binding expert determination may require<br />
arbitral award or court judgment for enforcement.<br />
22<br />
11
DRAFTING THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE<br />
Example: <strong>LNG</strong> Import Project - SOLUTIONS<br />
Dispute Resolution Structure:<br />
• Time-limited period of negotiation between the<br />
parties’ representatives to reach an amicable<br />
settlement of the dispute.<br />
• ‘First Tier’ expert determination of all disputes to<br />
provide expedited decision pending final resolution<br />
of the dispute by arbitration.<br />
• Binding expert determination of specified technical<br />
disputes.<br />
23<br />
DRAFTING THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE (CONT)<br />
• Final determination of all disputes by arbitration in<br />
London under LCIA rules (except for Lease<br />
Agreement - which is subject to local court<br />
jurisdiction).<br />
• Consolidation and Joinder provisions in all project<br />
agreements.<br />
• Waiver of Sovereign Immunity by state parties.<br />
24<br />
12
A. Arbitrability<br />
WHY GOVERNING LAW MATTERS<br />
B. Different Approaches to Enforcement of Contracts<br />
• strict ‘black letter’ interpretation (English/U.S.<br />
law)<br />
• good faith<br />
• law on penalties<br />
• agreements to agree/agreements to negotiate<br />
• hardship/contract adaptation e.g.<br />
- art 313 of German Civil Code<br />
- art 147 of Egyptian Civil Code<br />
25<br />
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY DISPUTES<br />
A. Protects foreign investors from state expropriation<br />
and other unlawful interference.<br />
B. Right of Arbitration under BIT is additional to<br />
contractual right of arbitration.<br />
C. To benefit from protection a contracting entity must<br />
be incorporated in a jurisdiction which has a BIT<br />
with the host state.<br />
26<br />
13