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Animacy, Generalized Semantic Roles, and Differential Object Marking

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<strong>Animacy</strong>, <strong>Generalized</strong> <strong>Semantic</strong> <strong>Roles</strong>, <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>Differential</strong> <strong>Object</strong> <strong>Marking</strong><br />

Beatrice Primus, University of Cologne<br />

Abstract This chapter addresses the role of case <strong>and</strong> animacy as interacting cues<br />

to role-semantic interpretation in grammar <strong>and</strong> language processing. <strong>Animacy</strong> is<br />

interpreted as a cue to agentivity taken as a multidimensional, generalized<br />

semantic role. In this view, several agentivity properties entail or strongly<br />

correlate with animacy on the part of the respective participant. In contrast, none<br />

of the patient characteristics presuppose an animate participant. By abductive<br />

reasoning animacy is used as a probabilistic cue to agentivity. The empirical focus<br />

of this chapter lies on animacy-driven differential object marking (DOM). The<br />

selection of the case marker in the DOM-patterns under consideration, which was<br />

assumed to be triggered by the animacy of the second argument in previous<br />

approaches, is explicable by role-semantic constraints tied to agentivity. This view<br />

explains some DOM-related phenomena that remain unexplained in other<br />

approaches. The close connection between animacy <strong>and</strong> role-semantic<br />

interpretation is also manifest in language processing. This chapter reports<br />

experimental studies showing that the brain areas <strong>and</strong> the neuronal patterns that<br />

react to animacy effects are also involved in the interpretation of semantic roles.<br />

On a more general level, taking animacy as a cue to agentivity contributes towards<br />

a better underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the basic notions that characterize agentivity.<br />

1. INTRODUCTION<br />

This chapter 1 explores the connection between animacy <strong>and</strong> semantic roles in<br />

patterns of case selection where the animacy of the noun phrase referent is<br />

assumed to trigger differential object marking (DOM) in previous approaches. In<br />

this traditional view, which will be criticized below, case marking is considered to<br />

be a cue to animacy. The basic DOM-patterns <strong>and</strong> some facts that are still<br />

unexplained in alternative approaches will be presented in section 2 of this<br />

chapter.<br />

1 I thank Marco García García for his help with the Spanish data, Thomas Anzenhofer <strong>and</strong> Jana Koshy<br />

for their help with the Malayalam data, <strong>and</strong> the editors of this volume <strong>and</strong> an anonymous reviewer for<br />

their comments on a previous version of this chapter.


2<br />

By using generalized semantic roles, i.e. decomposing a few general roles into<br />

more basic notions, I take a different view on the DOM-patterns under<br />

consideration. The interaction between animacy <strong>and</strong> semantic roles turns out to be<br />

closer than usually assumed. Many agentive properties – volition (or control),<br />

sentience, alienable possession, <strong>and</strong> certain patterns of motion – imply the<br />

involvement of a higher animate participant. By contrast, no patient-like concept<br />

implies animacy on the part of the respective participant. This will be shown in<br />

section 3 of this chapter. This type of approach to semantic roles offers a<br />

straightforward explanation for phenomena connected to DOM that remain<br />

unexplained in previous approaches. Taking case in DOM-patterns as a cue to<br />

animacy, as in previous approaches, fails to explain why the same case may be<br />

used for certain inanimate patients, why it may be missing for animate patients<br />

with ditransitive verbs, why it may be conditioned by the semantic verb type or by<br />

individual verb lexemes, <strong>and</strong> finally, why it is used as a cue to semantic roles in<br />

other contexts of use (section 4). I will show for Spanish that case selection in<br />

animacy-driven DOM is explicable by role-semantic case constraints tied to<br />

agentivity (section 5). The present approach takes a role-functional view on<br />

animacy for the phenomena under discussion: animacy is only relevant as a cue to<br />

role-semantic interpretation. This view does not eliminate animacy from linguistic<br />

explanation. On the contrary, a better underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the basic notions that<br />

characterize semantic roles may be achieved by taking animacy into account<br />

(section 6).<br />

2. ANIMACY-BASED DIFFERENTIAL OBJECT MARKING<br />

In some languages certain direct objects are marked by an object marker, while<br />

other objects remain unmarked. In the traditional view, this pattern of variation is<br />

assumed to be driven by semantic features of the noun phrase such as animacy,<br />

definiteness or specificity, or a combination of these factors. I will focus on<br />

animacy-based variation. Definiteness <strong>and</strong> specificity will be addressed later<br />

(sections 3 <strong>and</strong> 6). I will illustrate DOM by examples from Spanish, an accusative<br />

language, in (1a, b) <strong>and</strong> from Hindi, an ergative language, in (2a, b). These are<br />

two languages that have been considered to have a typical DOM-pattern.<br />

Spanish (García García 2007: 63)<br />

(1) a. Conozco *este actor / a este actor.<br />

know:PRS.1SG this:M.SG actor / OBJ this:M.SG actor<br />

‘I know this actor.’<br />

b. Conozco esta película / *a esta película.<br />

know:PRS.1SG this:F.SG film / OBJ this:F.SG film<br />

‘I know this film.’<br />

Hindi (Mohanan 1994: 80)


3<br />

(2) a. Ilaa-ne bacce-ko / *baccaa ut h aayaa.<br />

Ila-ERG child-OBJ / child lift.PRF<br />

‘Ila lifted the / a child.’<br />

b. Ilaa-ne haar-ko / haar ut h aayaa.<br />

Ila-ERG necklace-OBJ / necklace lift.PRF<br />

‘Ila lifted the / a necklace.’<br />

In St<strong>and</strong>ard European Spanish, which is discussed in this chapter, animacy seems<br />

to be the most important factor. (1b) shows that a definite or specific object is not<br />

marked by the differential object marker, the preposition a, unless the referent is<br />

human or at least animate, as in (1a). In Hindi, definiteness plays a more important<br />

role. The differential object marker, the postposition ko, must be used with human<br />

noun-phrase referents, which can be interpreted as definite or indefinite, as shown<br />

in (2a). If an inanimate participant is marked, it is interpreted as definite, if it is<br />

unmarked, it is indefinite, as shown in (2b). 2 In both languages, animacy, more<br />

specifically a human participant in Hindi, seems to be a sufficient condition for<br />

overt marking. With indefinite or unspecific noun phrases, animacy (or being<br />

human) is also a necessary condition for DOM. 3 In Hindi <strong>and</strong> other Indic<br />

languages, the ergative marker is only used in the perfect. In other tenses the<br />

respective argument is zero-marked. This leads to case ambiguity if the patient is<br />

zero-marked as well.<br />

The animacy criterion turns out to be less reliable than usually assumed,<br />

if one takes more data into consideration. In Spanish, animacy is not a necessary<br />

condition, as DOM occurs with certain inanimate, as shown in (3):<br />

Spanish (García García 2007: 64)<br />

(3) En esta receta, la leche puede sustituir al huevo.<br />

in recipe the:F.SG milk can:PRS.3SG replace OBJ:DEF.M.SG egg<br />

this:F.SG<br />

‘In this recipe, egg can be replaced by milk.’<br />

As we will see later (cf. section 4), the verbs showing DOM with inanimate form a<br />

uniform group in terms of role semantics. This indicates that role semantics<br />

strongly influences DOM.<br />

Furthermore, animacy is not a sufficient condition in Spanish, as there is no<br />

DOM with animate patients of ditransitive verbs, as shown in (4a, b):<br />

2 In ergative languages, the zero-marked patient can be interpreted either as a direct object or as a<br />

morphosyntactic subject, depending on the language <strong>and</strong> the phenomenon under discussion (cf. Dixon<br />

1994, Primus 1999). The zero-marked patient will be treated as an object in this chapter, for<br />

convenience only, following commonly used terminology.<br />

3 These observations are rough estimates. Acceptability judgements vary considerably in some cases.


4<br />

(4) a. La madre le da *al niño al padre.<br />

the:F.SG mother CLT.3SG.DAT give:PRS.3SG OBJ:DEF.M.SG child OBJ:DEF.M.SG father<br />

‘Mother gives the child to the father.’<br />

b. La madre le da el niño al padre.<br />

the:F.SG mother CLT.3SG.DAT give:PRS.3SG the:M.SG child OBJ:DEF.M.SG father<br />

‘Mother gives the child to the father.’<br />

The lack of DOM in ditransitives in Spanish (<strong>and</strong> in some other languages with<br />

DOM) is explicable by the fact that the animate object marker is identical with the<br />

recipient marker, i.e. the dative. The recipient takes the dative leaving the animate<br />

patient unmarked, as double datives are prohibited in St<strong>and</strong>ard European Spanish.<br />

This is another type of construction in which role selection (the recipient)<br />

influences DOM.<br />

In some languages, DOM is extended to ditransitive constructions with two<br />

animate objects (cf. Kittilä 2006). This is illustrated in (5) by examples from<br />

Punjabi:<br />

Punjabi (Bhatia 1993: 89)<br />

(5) a. mãi mãã nüü kaake nüü dittaa.<br />

I mother DAT child DAT give.PST<br />

‘I gave the child to the mother.’<br />

b. mãi mãã nüü kaake dittaa.<br />

I mother DAT child give.PST<br />

‘I gave the child to the mother.’<br />

c. *mãi mãã kaake nüü dittaa.<br />

I mother child DAT give.PST<br />

‘I gave the child to the mother.’<br />

d. mãi kuRii nüü vekhiaa.<br />

I girl DAT see.PST<br />

‘I saw a girl.’<br />

If a ditransitive sentence has a recipient object <strong>and</strong> an animate patient object, then<br />

both objects can receive the dative marker nüü in some dialects of Punjabi, as<br />

shown in (5a). 4 An animate object of a monotransitive clause receives the same<br />

4 In Kittilä’s (2006) cross-linguistic survey, the animate patient usually inherits the marker of the<br />

recipient. Languages with DOM in ditransitives vary with respect to recipient-marking. In some<br />

languages, the recipient retains its marking yielding double dative constructions, as shown in the<br />

Punjabi example (5a). In other languages the recipient looses its canonical marker in favour of the<br />

animate patient <strong>and</strong> takes another oblique marker (e.g. Sahaptin).


marker, cf. (5d). This means that the DOM pattern of monotransitive clauses is<br />

extended to ditransitive clauses as well. The ambiguity resulting from the double<br />

dative marking is resolved by word order (Bhatia 1993: 89): the recipient has to<br />

precede the direct object.<br />

In the Majhi dialect of Punjabi it is only the recipient that takes the dative, as<br />

shown in (5b) <strong>and</strong> (5c). This pattern was also illustrated with Spanish examples in<br />

(4) above. A similar situation is found in Hindi (cf. Mohanan 1994: 85).<br />

The fact that DOM is conditioned by the semantic verb type or by individual<br />

verb lexemes is another indicator that animacy <strong>and</strong> role subcategorization are<br />

interrelated. Hindi is illustrative in this respect (cf. Mohanan 1994: 81f.). The<br />

objects of the verbs lik h ‘write’, banaa ‘make’, pad h ‘read’, gaa ‘sing’, <strong>and</strong> pii<br />

‘drink’, which subcategorize for inanimate objects in Hindi, do not allow the<br />

postposition ko even if the object is definite. Conversely, verbs that subcategorize<br />

for animate objects such as piit ‘beat, spank’, maar ‘kill’, <strong>and</strong> bulaa ‘call’ tolerate<br />

only the postposition ko. Thus, a verb may impose an animacy restriction on its<br />

object, suspending the other conditions for alternation.<br />

Likewise, the diachronic development of DOM in Spanish is conditioned by<br />

the semantic class of the verb (cf. von Heusinger 2008). Verbs with a high<br />

preference for human objects such as matar ‘kill’ <strong>and</strong> herir ‘hurt’ were the first to<br />

acquire DOM with full noun phrases.<br />

Another type of evidence suggesting that role semantics <strong>and</strong> animacy are<br />

closely related is the choice of the animacy marker. This marker encodes semantic<br />

roles in other contexts of use (cf. Bossong 1985, 1998, Lazard 2001). In most of<br />

the Indic, Iranian, Semitic, Tupi-Guarani, <strong>and</strong> Romance languages, the animacy<br />

marker is the same as that used for the recipient, addressee, <strong>and</strong> benefactive (i.e.<br />

the dative) in ditransitive constructions, as illustrated above. In many Romance,<br />

Iranian <strong>and</strong> Indic languages the animate patient marker also codes the experiencer<br />

of certain psychological predicates. In some Iranian languages (e.g. Jaghnobi) it<br />

indicates the agent of transitive clauses (i.e. the ergative). In sum, animacy<br />

markers <strong>and</strong> role-semantic markers are formally related in a systematic way. The<br />

semantic roles that donate their marker to the animacy-based function are<br />

restricted to roles that include agentive components in approaches using<br />

generalized semantic roles, as will be shown in the next section. Such roles are<br />

recipients, addressees, benefactives, <strong>and</strong> experiencers.<br />

The close connection between role-semantic interpretation <strong>and</strong> animacy is<br />

also manifest in language processing. Neurolinguistic research has established that<br />

the brain areas <strong>and</strong> the neuronal patterns that react to animacy effects are also involved<br />

in the interpretation of semantic roles. Research using event-related potentials<br />

has found the N400 component, a central-parietal negativity at approximately<br />

400 ms post onset of the verbal stimulus, whenever the subcategorization frame of<br />

a head is violated (cf. Friederici 1999). This component occurs, for instance, with<br />

role-semantic interpretation problems <strong>and</strong> with certain case violations in German.<br />

In addition, N400 was elicited as a reaction to certain animacy effects (cf. Frisch<br />

<strong>and</strong> Schlesewsky 2001, Schlesewsky <strong>and</strong> Bornkessel 2004, for German; Bornkessel-Schlesewsky<br />

<strong>and</strong> Schlesewsky 2009, for other languages, Wang et al., this<br />

volume, for Chinese). Pertinent German data are shown in (6):<br />

5


6<br />

(6) a. welchen Mönch der Bischof begleitete<br />

which:ACC monk the:NOM bishop accompany:PRT.3SG<br />

‘which monk the bishop accompanied’<br />

b. welchen Mönch der Zweig streifte<br />

which:ACC monk the:NOM twig brush:PRT.3SG<br />

‘which monk the twig brushed’<br />

c. welcher Mönch der Bischof begleitete<br />

which:NOM monk the:NOM bishop accompany:PRT.3SG<br />

‘which monk the bishop accompanied’<br />

d. welcher Mönch der Zweig streifte<br />

which:NOM monk the:NOM twig brush:PRT.3SG<br />

‘which monk the twig brushed’<br />

The ungrammatical condition with two animate, identically case marked<br />

arguments (6c) triggered a N400 at the point of the second argument in<br />

comparison to the control condition (6a). Bornkessel, Frisch, <strong>and</strong> Schlesewsky<br />

interpret their findings as follows. N400 in (6c) reflects the inability to hierarchize<br />

the arguments with respect to one another in terms of semantic roles. By contrast,<br />

in sentences with two identically case-marked arguments that differ in animacy, as<br />

in (6d), the language processing system takes animacy as a cue for a role-semantic<br />

hierarchization of the arguments. Hence, there is no N400 effect in (6d) in<br />

comparison to (6b). A parietal positivity (P600), which occurs in both<br />

ungrammatical conditions, indicates a case reanalysis of the second NP.<br />

Neuroimaging research also indicates that animacy <strong>and</strong> role-semantic<br />

interpretation are closely connected. Grewe <strong>and</strong> colleagues (Grewe 2006, Grewe<br />

et al. 2005, 2006, 2007) have observed that deviations from co-argument<br />

distinctness in terms of animacy, as in (7b), correlate with activation in the<br />

posterior portion of the left superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) in comparison to the<br />

control sentence (7a), in which the co-arguments show a canonical animacy<br />

asymmetry. This effect is independent of the relative word order of the coarguments.<br />

(7) a. Wahrscheinlich hat der Mann den Garten gepflegt.<br />

probably have:PRS.3SG the:NOM man the:ACC garden takecare.PART.PRF<br />

‘The man has probably taken care of the garden.’<br />

b. Wahrscheinlich hat der Mann den Direktor gepflegt.<br />

probably have:PRS.3SG the:NOM man the:ACC director takecare.PART.PRF<br />

‘The man has probably taken care of the director.’


7<br />

Activation in this brain area was also observed in studies investigating the neural<br />

correlates of agency <strong>and</strong> motion patterns that are attributed to animates (cf.<br />

Pelphrey et al. 2004, Schultz et al. 2004, Schultz et al. 2005, Thompson et al.<br />

2005). Activation in the pSTS, as observed for (7b), is not likely a lexical<br />

phenomenon due to the intrinsic animacy of the noun phrase referent. Animate vs.<br />

inanimate nouns at the word (or picture) level lead to activation differences in<br />

regions other than the left pSTS (cf. Bornkessel-Schlesewsky <strong>and</strong> Schlesewsky<br />

2009). In sum, neuroimaging studies also support the view that animacy <strong>and</strong> rolesemantic<br />

interpretation are closely connected.<br />

Another pertinent study shows that animacy asymmetries in co-ordinated<br />

noun phrases do not trigger reliable effects when the animate-before-inanimate<br />

constraint is violated in language production (cf. Branigan et al. 2008). Our<br />

interpretation of this finding is that the semantic roles of co-ordinated noun<br />

phrases are identical. As a result, animacy asymmetries in co-ordinated noun<br />

phrases cannot be used to retrieve role-semantic information.<br />

In sum, there is both grammatical <strong>and</strong> neurolinguistic evidence that animacy<br />

is closely connected to sentence interpretation in terms of semantic roles. Patterns<br />

of case variation that are assumed to be determined by animacy in previous<br />

approaches may occur with inanimate objects <strong>and</strong> are absent with animate objects<br />

in ditransitive constructions in some languages. The semantic class of the verb<br />

influences this type of case variation. The case marker found in DOM is also used<br />

for semantic roles that show an affinity to agents. Neurolinguistic research has<br />

established that the brain areas <strong>and</strong> the neural patterns that react to animacy<br />

violations are also involved in the interpretation of semantic roles. When semantic<br />

role distinctions are absent, as in co-ordinated noun phrases, animacy ceases to<br />

influence noun phrase word order. In order to reveal the close interaction between<br />

animacy <strong>and</strong> semantic roles we need an approach that uses generalized semantic<br />

roles.<br />

3. GENERALIZED SEMANTIC ROLES AND ANIMACY<br />

ENTAILMENTS<br />

Earlier work on semantic roles, notably Fillmore (1968), used animacy as a<br />

characteristic property of several roles, deep cases in his terminology. For him, the<br />

agentive is the typically animate instigator of the action, the dative is characterized<br />

as the animate being affected by the state or action, while the instrumental is the<br />

inanimate force or object causally involved in the action or state (1968: 24). The<br />

main critical argument against Fillmore’s view was that animacy is a categorial<br />

semantic distinction, an intrinsic (or inherent) property of a noun phrase referent,<br />

whereas semantic roles are relational concepts determined by the semantic<br />

subcategorization frame of a predicate. In reaction to this criticism, Fillmore<br />

(1977) <strong>and</strong> subsequent research on semantic roles have discarded animacy as a


8<br />

role-semantic criterion. Unsurprisingly, correlations between animacy <strong>and</strong> certain<br />

semantic roles, including agent <strong>and</strong> recipient (Fillmore’s dative), are often noted<br />

only in passing (cf. VanValin <strong>and</strong> LaPolla 1997, de Swart et al. 2008).<br />

The interaction between animacy <strong>and</strong> semantic roles turns out to be closer<br />

than usually assumed in approaches that decompose semantic roles into more<br />

basic notions (cf. Lakoff 1977, Dowty 1991, Primus 1999, Ackerman <strong>and</strong> Moore<br />

2001). <strong>Semantic</strong> decomposition reduces the inventory of superordinate,<br />

generalized roles dramatically without neglecting finer-grained distinctions.<br />

Dowty’s account, which needs only proto-agent <strong>and</strong> proto-patient as generalized<br />

roles, will be taken as a theoretical starting point in this chapter. In this kind of<br />

approach, nearly all agentive properties but none of the patient-like properties<br />

entail the involvement of a higher animate participant, as will be shown below.<br />

The agent proto-role is characterized by Dowty (1991: 571-572) <strong>and</strong> Primus<br />

(1999, chap. 4) as follows:<br />

(8) Proto-agent entailments:<br />

a. x does a volitional act: John refrains from smoking.<br />

b. x is sentient of or perceives another participant: John knows / sees /<br />

fears Mary.<br />

c. x causes an event or change of state in another participant: His<br />

loneliness causes his unhappiness.<br />

d. x is moving autonomously: Water filled the boat.<br />

e. x is a possessor of another entity: Peter has a new car.<br />

Although most verbs select more than one proto-agent property for their subject<br />

argument (e.g. murder, nominate, or give), each of these properties can occur in<br />

isolation as shown by the subject argument in the examples in (8a) – (8e). The<br />

properties mentioned in (8a) – (8d) are Dowty’s proposal (1991: 572). 5 Possession<br />

is included as an agentive component following, among others, Jackendoff (1990).<br />

Each of these characteristics is semantically independent. Nevertheless, some of<br />

them tend to co-occur (e.g. volition or causation <strong>and</strong> movement) <strong>and</strong> one property<br />

may unilaterally imply another. Thus, for instance, volition implies sentience (cf.<br />

Dowty 1991: 606).<br />

The concepts defining proto-agent are nothing new to the linguistic<br />

community: volition or control, causation, movement, sentience, <strong>and</strong> possession.<br />

Volition is used by Dowty in the sense of intentionality: the participant in question<br />

intends this to be the kind of act named by the verb. In von Wright’s (1963)<br />

approach intentionality is a teleological causal concept that defines the notion of<br />

action.<br />

Sentience is used as a cover term for a cognitive state, emotion, or perception.<br />

Including sentience in the list of proto-agent properties is uncommon within<br />

linguistic tradition, but it is in conformity with neuroscientific research (Ochsner<br />

5 Tentatively Dowty also mentions independent existence as a proto-agent entailment. This means that<br />

the participant exists independently from the situation denoted by the verb. This property is omitted<br />

here because it is a reference-related property that should be treated separately.


<strong>and</strong> Gross 2005, Gross 2007). This line of research assumes that a particular<br />

mental state is produced by the experiencer in reaction to an external stimulus <strong>and</strong><br />

that emotions, in particular, can be cognitively controlled by the experiencer.<br />

Movement is a proto-agent property only if it is autonomous, i.e. not caused<br />

by another participant (cf. Dowty 1991: 574). This is in conformity with cognitive<br />

linguistic research that demonstrates the relevance of the concept of self-propelled<br />

movement for the cognitive development of the notion of agentivity <strong>and</strong> causation<br />

(cf. Leslie 1995, Premack <strong>and</strong> Premack 1995). If movement is caused by another<br />

participant, it will be considered a proto-patient property in the present approach.<br />

Thus, for instance, in John threw the ball both entities move, but only John, the<br />

proto-agent, moves in a self-induced way. The ball, the proto-patient, moves as a<br />

response to John’s movement.<br />

As to possession, Premack <strong>and</strong> Premack (1995: 193f.) point to a crucial<br />

difference between the notion of group <strong>and</strong> that of possession. Both notions imply<br />

that two or more objects are physically or spatially connected <strong>and</strong> capable of comovement.<br />

But only possession is characterized by the ability of the possessor to<br />

control the possessed object. Alienable possession has this agentive quality, as<br />

shown by Folli <strong>and</strong> Harley (2008). Thus, for instance, Peter has three cars, is<br />

perfectly acceptable as opposed to *The garage has three cars in a possessive<br />

reading. With inalienable possession, potential control <strong>and</strong> the correlating animacy<br />

contrast are irrelevant: Peter has black hair. The garage has a front window.<br />

The most important departure of the present approach from Dowty is the<br />

central status given to the various manifestations of causation, including<br />

psychological concepts related to volition <strong>and</strong> control, <strong>and</strong> to the distinction<br />

between independent <strong>and</strong> dependent involvement (cf. Primus 1999, 2006, Lamers,<br />

this volume). In this view, a general role-semantic dependency notion is the<br />

underlying criterion that distinguishes proto-agents from proto-patients. The<br />

patient proto-role is defined in this approach as follows: its kind of involvement is<br />

dependent on the kind of involvement of another participant, the proto-agent.<br />

Consequently, the list of properties characterizing the proto-patient is derived<br />

from the basic notions in the definition of the proto-agent. Thus, for instance,<br />

causal affectedness as a proto-patient property is the converse of the causer notion<br />

in the proto-agent list. In this approach, the converse relation is generalized over<br />

all involvement properties: controller vs. controlled, causer vs. causally affected<br />

(“changed”), mover vs. moved, experiencer vs. experienced (“stimulus”), <strong>and</strong><br />

possessor vs. possessed. This view on proto-patient departs from Dowty’s<br />

approach. Dowty’s proto-patient entailments are change of state, incrementally<br />

affected (i.e., incremental theme), causally affected, <strong>and</strong> either stationary or<br />

moving as a result of being causally affected. The two views on proto-patient have<br />

in common that none of the proto-patient properties entail the involvement of an<br />

animate participant. The co-argument dependency model of Primus (1999, 2006)<br />

is better suited to incorporate different types of co-argument dependencies.<br />

Pertinent to DOM is the connection between role-semantic <strong>and</strong> reference-related<br />

co-argument dependencies that will be discussed further below in this section.<br />

Furthermore, this model is in line with the neurolinguistic Argument Dependency<br />

Model of Schlesewsky <strong>and</strong> Bornkessel (2004, cf. also Wang et al., this volume).<br />

9


10<br />

A specific trait of the generalized role approach that makes it particularly<br />

suitable to explain DOM is that it allows for arguments having a combination of<br />

proto-agent <strong>and</strong> proto-patient properties. Independently of DOM, roles such as<br />

recipient, addressee or benefactive are mixed. They are selected by verbs denoting<br />

a transfer in possession (x gave y something z, x baked y a cake z) or a caused<br />

sentience (x told y a story z, x showed y a picture z). As a possessor or an<br />

experiencer of the entity z, the argument y in these examples is a proto-agent<br />

relative to the entity z. At the same time it is a proto-patient relative to the first<br />

argument x, which causes the situation denoted by the verb <strong>and</strong> causally affects y.<br />

<strong>Animacy</strong>-driven DOM involves a similar role overlap. It occurs whenever a noun<br />

phrase subcategorized for patient properties acquires potential agent properties<br />

due to its intrinsic meaning (cf. (10) in section 4 of this chapter).<br />

In sum, what characterizes agentive participants is that they are capable of<br />

producing the activity or state described by the predicate by themselves. The<br />

capacity to control the situation or other entities involved in the situation captures<br />

a common trait of several agentive notions that were subsumed under volition,<br />

sentience <strong>and</strong> alienable possession. These three agentive properties entail the<br />

involvement of a higher animate participant. By contrast, none of the patient-like<br />

properties entails animacy on the part of the respective participant, no matter what<br />

type of approach to the patient-role one favours (e.g. Dowty 1991 or Primus 1999,<br />

2006).<br />

As to the agentive notion of autonomous movement, a certain type of<br />

autonomous motion implies an animate participant. A moving object – a spot of<br />

light or a geometric figure in the pertinent neuroscientific experiments – can create<br />

the subjective impression that it is alive, based on its pattern of movement, when<br />

this pattern suggests that it is caused by an internal rather than an external source<br />

of energy (cf. Gelman et al. 1995, Tremoulet <strong>and</strong> Feldman 2000, Scholl <strong>and</strong><br />

Tremoulet 2000, Opfer 2002). As mentioned above, neuroimaging studies also<br />

confirm the close neural connection between the detection of agency <strong>and</strong> the<br />

attribution of certain motion patterns to animates (cf. Pelphrey et al. 2004, Schultz<br />

et al. 2004, Schultz et al. 2005, Thompson et al. 2005). A remarkable result of<br />

these experimental studies is that they report an impression of animacy despite the<br />

fact that the entity presented in the experiments had no resemblance to an animate<br />

being except for its abstract movement pattern. This result supports the<br />

assumption defended here that animacy has to be regarded in role-functional<br />

terms: anything that has an agentive behaviour that is associated with higher<br />

animate beings, i.e. volition, a ‘biological’ motion pattern, sentience or alienable<br />

possession, is treated cognitively as a higher animate entity.<br />

The co-argument dependency model defended here contributes to a better<br />

underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the connection between animacy-based <strong>and</strong> reference-related<br />

DOM. The basic assumption is that a clear-cut asymmetric co-argument<br />

dependency is preferred in grammar <strong>and</strong> language processing. This means in rolesemantic<br />

terms that one argument has only agentive properties <strong>and</strong> the other<br />

argument only patient-properties. I will argue that in both types of DOM, an<br />

animate or definite second argument blurs maximal distinctness in terms of coargument<br />

dependency. Recall that in Hindi, for instance, an animate argument or a


11<br />

definite (possibly inanimate) argument is overtly case-marked (cf. example (2b) in<br />

section 2). As mentioned above, in my view, the patient proto-role is defined by<br />

its co-argument dependent status relative to the proto-agent. Under this<br />

assumption, the role hierarchy proto-agent > proto-patient is based on an<br />

asymmetric co-argument dependency. In animacy-based DOM, the animacy of the<br />

proto-patient leads to a situation in which asymmetric co-argument dependency<br />

cannot be established unequivocally.<br />

Reference-related distinctions, i.e. definite > indefinite or specific > nonspecific,<br />

have a similar basis as role-related asymmetries. The reference of a<br />

definite or specific noun phrase is established independently of that of a coargument<br />

in a context-dependent way: the referent is identified by contextual<br />

information or by the mutual knowledge of the speaker <strong>and</strong> hearer. By contrast,<br />

the interpretation of an indefinite, non-specific noun phrase is determined by a<br />

local binder that is structurally more prominent than it, i.e. c-comm<strong>and</strong>s it (cf.<br />

Heim 1982). This means that the reference of an indefinite, non-specific argument<br />

is determined locally by a structurally superior noun phrase. This explains why a<br />

definite, specific, structurally superior subject <strong>and</strong> an indefinite, non-specific,<br />

structurally inferior object are favoured in grammar <strong>and</strong> language processing. This<br />

constellation is shown in (9):<br />

(9) Every woman loves a man / the man.<br />

In the indefinite, non-specific reading of the object (‘every woman loves some<br />

man’), the referent of the object is determined by that of the subject. In this<br />

reading, the number of men that are loved by at least one woman in the situation is<br />

determined by the number of women that love at least one man in the situation.<br />

However, in the definite or specific reading of the object (‘there is a particular<br />

man that every woman loves’), the referent is established independently from that<br />

of the subject. In this reading, the referents of the co-arguments are established<br />

independently from one another. In sum, the connection between animacy-based<br />

<strong>and</strong> reference-related DOM is that an animate or definite, specific object leads to a<br />

departure from a uniform asymmetric co-argument dependency.<br />

A generalized co-argument dependency notion that subsumes role-related <strong>and</strong><br />

reference-related dependencies is supported by neurolinguistic evidence<br />

(Bornkessel-Schlesewsky <strong>and</strong> Schlesewsky 2009). Activation differences in the<br />

left pSTS, which were discussed in connection with animate vs. inanimate objects<br />

in (7a, b) above, are also manifest in manipulations of definiteness <strong>and</strong> specificity.<br />

This effect occurs in German sentences with an indefinite, non-specific subject<br />

<strong>and</strong> a definite (specific) object in comparison with sentences with a definite<br />

(specific) subject <strong>and</strong> an indefinite, non-specific object (cf. also Kretzschmar et al,<br />

this volume).


12<br />

4. GENERALIZED SEMANTIC ROLES AND DOM<br />

With the results of the last section in mind, let us return to DOM. The rolefunctional<br />

view of DOM is formulated in (10) in terms of a licensing condition for<br />

a differential object marker.<br />

(10) Working hypothesis: A differential object marker is licensed by an object<br />

whose intrinsic meaning properties qualifies it as a proto-agent in the<br />

situation denoted by the predicate.<br />

(10) is a working hypothesis as it is formulated too liberally to yield appropriate<br />

descriptive results for individual languages. First, there are languages without<br />

DOM, in which (10) does not operate: the intrinsic meaning of a noun phrase does<br />

not influence case selection. Furthermore, languages may also vary with respect to<br />

the nature of intrinsic properties that trigger DOM. DOM may be obligatory with<br />

humans only, as in Malayalam, or with all higher animates, as in Spanish. An<br />

explanation of the various patterns of variation is beyond the scope of this chapter.<br />

For convenience, I assume that the licensing condition in (10) is grammaticalized<br />

in various ways yielding patterns of DOM that need further explanatory steps.<br />

Distinguishing meaning properties from world knowledge is a notoriously difficult<br />

problem that is left aside here. Therefore, ‘meaning’ is used in a very broad sense<br />

in (10).<br />

On order to see how (10) works, let us take a closer look at DOM with<br />

inanimate objects in Malayalam. In Malayalam, direct objects of transitive verbs<br />

are obligatorily marked with a specific case, the suffix –e, if they are human. This<br />

also holds for most, but not all animates. Definiteness is an additional factor that<br />

influences the selection of the animate object marker. This distribution is similar<br />

to that illustrated in section 2 above by examples from Spanish <strong>and</strong> Hindi. When<br />

both arguments are inanimate in Malayalam, it is possible to mark the inanimate<br />

object in order to resolve potential ambiguity, as shown in (11a, b).<br />

Malayalam (Asher <strong>and</strong> Kumari 1997: 204)<br />

(11) a. Kappal tiramaalakaÒ-e bheediccu.<br />

ship waves-OBJ split.PST<br />

‘(The) ship broke through (the) waves.’<br />

b. TiramaalakaÒ kappal-ine bheediccu.<br />

waves ship-OBJ split.PST<br />

‘(The) waves split (the) ship.’<br />

With the verb bheediccu ‘split’ in (11a, b), both the ship <strong>and</strong> the waves qualify as<br />

proto-agents due to their intrinsic meaning: ship <strong>and</strong> wave refer to an entity with<br />

its own source of energy that enables one to split the other. In Dowty’s terms, both<br />

the ship <strong>and</strong> the waves have intrinsic meaning properties that qualify them as<br />

autonomous movers <strong>and</strong> causers of the event denoted by the predicate. This


13<br />

situation licenses a differential object marker, as stated in (10).<br />

In the next pair of examples only the subject referent is capable of causing the<br />

respective event. Cf. (12a, b) from Asher <strong>and</strong> Kumari (1997: 204):<br />

(12) a. Tiiyyə kuˇil naSippicu.<br />

fire hut destroy.PST<br />

‘Fire destroyed (the) hut.’<br />

b. VeÒÒam tiiyyə keˇutti.<br />

water fire extinguish.PST<br />

‘Water extinguished (the) fire.’<br />

Part of the meaning of fire is that it may cause the destruction of a hut <strong>and</strong> part of<br />

the meaning of water is that it may cause the extinction of a fire, but not vice<br />

versa. In (12a, b), the interpretation of the subject as a proto-agent, specifically as<br />

a causer, <strong>and</strong> the interpretation of the object as a proto-patient, i.e. as causally<br />

affected, is unequivocal. In this event, the animate object marker is usually<br />

omitted in Malayalam, particularly if the object is interpreted as indefinite. In sum,<br />

the data in (11) <strong>and</strong> (12) support the view defended here that animacy-based DOM<br />

is motivated by role-semantic interpretation, as stated in (10). Additionally, we<br />

have to assume that Malayalam has incorporated (10) in its grammar in ways that<br />

have to be specified in greater detail in order to capture further intricacies<br />

pertaining to the optionality of the object marker <strong>and</strong> its reference-related<br />

occurrence (p.c. Thomas Anzenhofer).<br />

In the next step, we will take a closer look at DOM in Spanish. The data<br />

in (13) – (15) are taken from García García (2007). Let us begin with the<br />

straightforward case illustrated in (1) above as a typical specimen of DOM. It is<br />

repeated in (13) for convenience:<br />

(13) a. Conozco *este actor / a este actor.<br />

know:PRS.1SG this:M.SG actor / OBJ this:M.SG actor<br />

‘I know this actor.’<br />

b. Conozco esta película / *a esta película.<br />

know:PRS.1SG this:F.SG film / OBJ this:F.SG film<br />

‘I know this film.’<br />

My interpretation of this pattern is that an animate object but not an inanimate one<br />

has intrinsic meaning properties that qualify it as a proto-agent in the situation<br />

denoted by the predicate. Part of the meaning of actor ‘actor’ is that it denotes a<br />

human being that is capable of knowing something or somebody. This is the agent<br />

component of sentience. Thus, actor licenses DOM in (13a). In contrast, the<br />

meaning of película ‘film’ does not allow an interpretation as an experiencer (or a<br />

cognizer). Accordingly, DOM is not licensed in (13b).<br />

The instances involving inanimate objects in Spanish can be explained in a


14<br />

similar way. A remarkable minimal pair is offered in (14a, b):<br />

(14) a. El profesor reemplaza el libro.<br />

the professor replace.PRS.3SG the book<br />

‘The professor replaces the book (with something else).’<br />

b. El profesor reemplaza al libro.<br />

the professor replace.PRS.3SG OBJ:DEF.M.SG book<br />

‘The professor takes the place of the book.’<br />

As noted by García García (2007), among others, there is a subtle, but<br />

nevertheless crucial meaning difference between (14a) <strong>and</strong> (14b). The sentence<br />

(14a) without a-marking means that the professor replaces the book with another<br />

book or with something else, for instance, in a shelf. In this reading the book lacks<br />

proto-agent properties, since the capability to replace things in the sense conveyed<br />

by (14a) it is not part of the meaning of books. The sentence (14b) with a-<br />

marking, however, means that the professor takes the place of the book: he fulfils<br />

the didactic, entertaining or whatever function is attributed to the book in the<br />

situation expressed by this sentence. Part of the meaning of books is that they<br />

share with humans the capacity of inform, entertain or bore us. Thus, (14b)<br />

implies that the professor <strong>and</strong> the book have the capability to act as proto-agents in<br />

an equivalent way. Since reemplazar does not specify the exact nature of the<br />

activity in which the professor gets involved instead of the book, we cannot<br />

specify the proto-agent entailments with certainty. If, for example, the implicit<br />

activity in (14b) is related to tuition, the professor causes that somebody gets to<br />

know something <strong>and</strong> so does the book in other circumstances.<br />

The example offered in (3) above <strong>and</strong> repeated here in (15) is similar:<br />

(15) En esta receta, la leche puede sustituir al huevo.<br />

in recipe the:F.SG milk can:PRS.3SG replace OBJ:DEF.M.SG egg<br />

this:F.SG<br />

‘In this recipe, egg can be replaced by milk.’<br />

The interpretation of (15), where object a-marking is obligatorily required, is<br />

similar to that in (14b): the subject participant <strong>and</strong> the object participant have the<br />

capability to behave in an equivalent way in the situation denoted by the verb<br />

sustituir. Since sustituir does not specify the exact nature of the event in which the<br />

milk gets involved instead of the egg, we cannot specify the proto-agent<br />

entailments out of context, but a plausible interpretation is that eggs <strong>and</strong> milk<br />

cause a change in the food: it will contain more protein <strong>and</strong> fat. 6<br />

6 Instead of causing a problem to a generalized approach to semantic roles (as suggested by a reviewer<br />

of this chapter), underspecified verbs such as sustituir <strong>and</strong> reemplazar rather support this approach.<br />

Strict entailments are that both participants have the capacity to exhibit an equivalent proto-agent<br />

behaviour, with the difference that only the subject participant is actually involved instead of the object<br />

participant. These entailments suffice to licence the a-marker on the object. Specifications regarding


15<br />

The verbs reemplazar <strong>and</strong> sustituir, whose meanings entail that both<br />

participants have the capacity to exhibit an equivalent proto-agent behaviour, are<br />

typical for the class of verbs that are frequently used with an inanimate a-marked<br />

object. Such verbs denote an interaction or a symmetrical situation (x is / acts like<br />

y), for example, acompañar ‘accompany’, preceder ‘precede’, seguir ‘follow’,<br />

<strong>and</strong> corresponder ‘correspond’. Verbs of classification <strong>and</strong> identification are<br />

semantically similar <strong>and</strong> also occur with inanimate a-marked objects, e.g.<br />

considerar ‘consider’, clasificar ‘classify’, caracterizar ‘characterize’, concretar<br />

‘make specific’, designar ‘designate’, definir ‘define’, distinguir, diferenciar<br />

‘distinguish’, especificar ‘specify’, <strong>and</strong> llamar ‘call, consider to be’ (cf. García<br />

García 2007 for more details). 7<br />

The data with inanimate objects taking the differential object marker<br />

support the role-functional view defended here. It is not animacy per se that<br />

counts but rather the semantic function of the object. It must be a potential protoagent<br />

in the situation denoted by the predicate.<br />

Previous studies have acknowledged the agentivity-related function of<br />

DOM. Closest to the present approach is García García (2007). This study is based<br />

on generalized semantic roles (e.g. Primus 1999). In his view, it is only DOM with<br />

an inanimate object that is correlated primarily with the role-semantic relation<br />

between subject <strong>and</strong> object: when the direct object is equally or more agentive<br />

than the subject a-marking is required according to García García. My treatment<br />

differs from his in some respects. It treats an animate <strong>and</strong> an inanimate object as<br />

on a par <strong>and</strong> explains the distribution of the dative prepositional marker in all<br />

types of constructions, as will be shown below.<br />

In his cross-linguistic study, Kittilä (2006) also assumes that the function<br />

of DOM is to distinguish between two potential agents. Regarding Spanish,<br />

Delbecque (1998, 2002) assumes that the a-marker indicates in dynamic processes<br />

that they involve potential agents as their objects. For Delbecque, these are<br />

participants susceptible to trigger an action in reaction to their own way of being<br />

or behaving. Kittilä’s <strong>and</strong> Delbecque’s approaches are very close to the approach<br />

presented here but the scope of their explanation is unduly narrowed as a result of<br />

using a traditional agent concept that is restricted to volitional processes. As a<br />

consequence, DOM with stative verbs in Spanish, including conocer ‘know’,<br />

illustrated in (1) <strong>and</strong> (13) above, as well as the high number of stative verbs<br />

selecting the a-marker for inanimate objects cannot be explained. There is in fact<br />

no language where DOM is restricted to verbs that subcategorize for volition.<br />

DOM in ditransitive constructions with two animate objects also pose a<br />

problem for approaches using the traditional agent notion. Such approaches lack<br />

the theoretical means to treat a recipient as a proto-agent, a move that is necessary<br />

in order to explain DOM in ditransitive clauses. By contrast, in my approach, a<br />

the type of involvement are added by the context <strong>and</strong> are not part of the verb meaning in a narrow<br />

sense.<br />

7 Locative verbs select the a-marker according to the original locative meaning of this preposition <strong>and</strong><br />

fall beyond the scope of the present discussion, e.g. colocar ‘place’, poner ‘put’, situar ‘locate’, llegar<br />

‘reach’.


16<br />

recipient (or a recipient-like role) is characterized by a combination of proto-agent<br />

<strong>and</strong> proto-patient components, as stated in the previous section. This explains why<br />

in ditransitive constructions, two animate objects may receive the same marker<br />

(cf. the Punjabi example in (5a) above). An additional explanation is needed for<br />

the suppression of DOM in ditransitive clauses, as shown in the Spanish example<br />

(4a) above. This may be due to a higher-ranking constraint that bans multiple<br />

datives in St<strong>and</strong>ard Spanish (as in some other languages). Under these<br />

circumstances, two roles compete for the dative: the recipient <strong>and</strong> the animate<br />

patient. In St<strong>and</strong>ard Spanish, the competition is resolved in favour of the protoagent<br />

components that are entailed by the meaning of the verb, i.e. subcategorized<br />

for by the verb. This means that the dative is used for the recipient <strong>and</strong> blocked for<br />

the animate patient (cf. also fn. 9 below).<br />

The polyfunctionality of the animate object marker can be straightforwardly<br />

explained in the present approach. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, in most of<br />

the Indic, Iranian, Semitic, Tupi-Guarani, <strong>and</strong> Romance languages, the animate<br />

object marker is also used for the recipient, addressee, <strong>and</strong> benefactive (i.e. the<br />

dative) in ditransitive constructions. In some Romance, Iranian <strong>and</strong> Indic<br />

languages it also codes the experiencer of certain psychological predicates. In<br />

some Iranian languages (e.g. Jaghnobi) it also indicates the agent of transitive<br />

clauses (i.e. the ergative). In Malayalam the object marker is used, besides the<br />

dative <strong>and</strong> comitative, with the addressee or recipient of a few ditransitive verbs,<br />

e.g. pahippiccu ‘taught’ <strong>and</strong> eelpiccu ‘entrusted’ (cf. Asher <strong>and</strong> Kumari 1997:<br />

108). All these roles include agentive components <strong>and</strong> all the above-mentioned<br />

cases, specifically the dative <strong>and</strong> the ergative, are regularly linked to roles with<br />

agentive components.<br />

5. AN OPTIMALITY-THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF<br />

DOM IN SPANISH<br />

In order to demonstrate the features of the present approach in more precise terms,<br />

I will offer an optimality-theoretical treatment of DOM in Spanish. Optimality<br />

Theory (OT) views grammar as an optimization procedure. For a given input the<br />

grammar generates a set of output c<strong>and</strong>idates by means of a generator. These<br />

c<strong>and</strong>idates are evaluated with respect to a set of constraints, which are violable,<br />

potentially conflicting, <strong>and</strong> ranked with respect to one another. The output<br />

c<strong>and</strong>idate with the best constraint violation profile is the optimal c<strong>and</strong>idate. OT is<br />

a convenient method of capturing the competition between functional<br />

transparency, i.e. faithfulness to the role-semantic input in our discussion, <strong>and</strong><br />

formal economy, specifically avoidance of overt case marking. A faithful<br />

expression of meaning (BE PRECISE) is optimal for the hearer, formal economy (BE<br />

BRIEF) is optimal for the speaker.<br />

In the DOM patterns under discussion, overt case marking of the object is<br />

restricted to situations in which the meaning of the object is marked. <strong>Semantic</strong>ally


17<br />

unmarked objects are linked to patients, but in DOM, the patient referent has also<br />

properties that qualify it for the agent role. Assuming that objects with mixed role<br />

properties have marked meanings, the DOM patterns under discussion are<br />

instances of constructional iconism. Constructional iconism means that unmarked<br />

forms have unmarked meanings, <strong>and</strong> conversely, that marked forms are associated<br />

with marked meanings.<br />

In st<strong>and</strong>ard OT, syntax <strong>and</strong> semantics are disconnected. The independent<br />

application of syntax <strong>and</strong> semantics does not yield a model that assigns the<br />

consistent relation between form <strong>and</strong> meaning that is found in constructional<br />

iconism. Bidirectional OT, an extension of regular (unidirectional) OT, is an<br />

appropriate method to capture the form-meaning relation found in constructional<br />

iconism. 8 In bidirectional OT, the input <strong>and</strong> the c<strong>and</strong>idates consist of formmeaning<br />

pairs . For our discussion we need case-role pairs. There are<br />

different possibilities for comparing pairs of form <strong>and</strong> meaning. The one we need<br />

for the Spanish data (<strong>and</strong> for variation due to constructional iconism in general) is<br />

weak bidirectional OT. In this model, the notion of superoptimality plays an<br />

important role <strong>and</strong> is defined as follows (cf. Jäger 2002, Krifka 2002):<br />

(16) A pair of a set of c<strong>and</strong>idates is superoptimal iff:<br />

i. There is no superoptimal in the c<strong>and</strong>idate set such that <br />

is more optimal than .<br />

ii. There is no superoptimal in the c<strong>and</strong>idate set such that <br />

is more optimal than .<br />

The notion of superoptimal pairs is restricted to those pairs that have no<br />

competitor on the expression level or on the meaning level that is itself<br />

superoptimal. Pairs that do not share an identical form or meaning are not<br />

competitors. As a result, more than one c<strong>and</strong>idate may emerge as superoptimal.<br />

The two competing violable constraints that are needed to capture DOM in<br />

Spanish are given in (17) <strong>and</strong> (18):<br />

(17) ECONOMY (BE BRIEF): Overt case is not used.<br />

(18) EXPRESS ROLE (BE PRECISE): The dative is used for an argument with a<br />

low number of proto-agent properties that are i) subcategorized by the<br />

verb or ii) assigned according to the intrinsic meaning of the direct object<br />

referent.<br />

The economy constraint is explicitly or tacitly formulated in this or in a similar<br />

way by many approaches to cases in various lines of research.<br />

The dative constraint is taken from Primus (1999, chap. 4) where it is used for<br />

various typological data. In (18) it is adapted to capture the dative as a differential<br />

8 Another version of bidirectional OT has been successfully applied to DOM in de Swart (2007).<br />

However, in this approach animacy <strong>and</strong> traditional semantic roles are taken as distinct factors for case<br />

selection.


18<br />

object marker along the lines of the more general working hypothesis in (10)<br />

above. In DOM-languages using the dative as a differential object marker, the<br />

dative is sensitive to the intrinsic meaning of the object referent, as discussed in<br />

the previous section. This is achieved in (18) by taking both subcategorized<br />

properties (condition (18i)) <strong>and</strong> intrinsic properties (condition (18ii)) into account.<br />

In languages with DOM, condition (18ii) holds in addition to condition (18i),<br />

which is the basic condition holding irrespective of DOM in all languages with an<br />

agentive function of the dative. 9 This in accordance with the assumption that<br />

subcategorization is a universal condition for case selection. The restriction to a<br />

low number of proto-agent properties is meant to exclude dative volitional agents.<br />

Volitional agents must surface as nominative subjects in the basic (active)<br />

construction in Spanish as in many other accusative languages.<br />

If the dative preposition a is selected for subcategorized roles in Spanish, the<br />

respective argument is usually cross-referenced by the dative clitic (e.g. le for<br />

masculine, singular, as in the examples in this paragraph). In DOM, the dativemarked<br />

argument is usually taken up by an accusative clitic (lo for masculine,<br />

singular). The verbs that select the dative in Spanish are very similar to the dative<br />

verbs in other languages (e.g. German). These are experiencer verbs (e.g. al<br />

artista le gusta la cerveza ‘the artist (DAT) likes the beer’), verbs of alienable<br />

possession (e.g a Pedro le pertenece esta casa ‘this house belongs to Peter’),<br />

verbs denoting an involuntary action (e.g. a Pedro se le ha roto el vaso ‘Pedro<br />

(DAT) broke the glass inadvertently’), verbs denoting an interaction or a<br />

symmetrical situation such as ayudar ‘help’, seguir ‘follow’, <strong>and</strong> parecer<br />

‘resemble’, <strong>and</strong> last but not least, ditransitive verbs selecting a recipient, an<br />

addressee or a benefactive (cf. the examples given in (4a, b) earlier in this<br />

chapter).<br />

For illustrative purposes I restrict the number of OT c<strong>and</strong>idates to those<br />

that have a chance to win the competition imposed by the two constraints under<br />

discussion. I take the options for conocer <strong>and</strong> reemplazar, see (13) – (14) above,<br />

as illustrations. The potential winners fall into four form-meaning pairs, which are<br />

discussed in turn.<br />

In the first type of c<strong>and</strong>idates, the object lacks overt case <strong>and</strong> has no intrinsic<br />

agentive property. This form-meaning pair is abbreviated as . The<br />

c<strong>and</strong>idates are conozco esta película <strong>and</strong> el profesor reemplaza el libro in the<br />

patient reading ‘the professor replaces the book with something else’. They<br />

perfom best relative to their competitors with respect to ECONOMY <strong>and</strong> EXPRESS<br />

ROLE. They have no overt case <strong>and</strong> fulfill the dative constraint vacuously since the<br />

object lacks agentive properties. This type emerges as superoptimal.<br />

The second type is characterized as follows: the object bears dative marking<br />

<strong>and</strong> has no intrinsic agentive property. This type is abbreviated as . The<br />

c<strong>and</strong>idates are conozco a esta película <strong>and</strong> el profesor reemplaza al libro in the<br />

9 The interaction between the subcategorization condition (18i) <strong>and</strong> the DOM-condition (18ii) can be<br />

captured in OT-terms, in principle. In case of conflict, (18i) is higher ranked than (18ii) in Spanish.<br />

This is illustrated by the ditransitive construction (4a, b) in section 2 of this chapter. In this<br />

construction, the animate patient looses is marker in favour of the subcategorized recipient.


19<br />

patient reading ‘the professor replaces the book with something else’. These<br />

c<strong>and</strong>idates violate both ECONOMY <strong>and</strong> EXPRESS ROLE, i.e. the dative constraint,<br />

<strong>and</strong> are eliminated. This happens because they loose against a legitimate<br />

competitor. i.e. , that has the same meaning but incurs no violation.<br />

They also loose against the fourth type of c<strong>and</strong>idate, i.e. , which has the<br />

same case but a better meaning for this case.<br />

In the third type, the object lacks overt case <strong>and</strong> has intrinsic agentive<br />

properties. This type is abbreviated as . The c<strong>and</strong>idates are conozco<br />

este actor <strong>and</strong> el profesor reemplaza el libro in the agentive reading ‘the professor<br />

takes the place of the book’. These c<strong>and</strong>idates violate EXPRESS ROLE, i.e. the<br />

dative constraint, <strong>and</strong> are eliminated. This happens because they loose against<br />

their legitimate competitors. has the same form but a better meaning<br />

for this form; has the same meaning but a better form for this meaning.<br />

Finally, in the fourth type, the object bears dative marking <strong>and</strong> has intrinsic<br />

agentive properties. This type is abbreviated as . The c<strong>and</strong>idates are<br />

conozco a este actor <strong>and</strong> el profesor reemplaza al libro in the agentive reading<br />

‘the professor takes the place of the book’. These c<strong>and</strong>idates violate ECONOMY,<br />

but fulfill EXPRESS ROLE, i.e. the dative constraint. They loose only relative to<br />

c<strong>and</strong>idates that are not winners, so that turns out to be superoptimal as<br />

well.<br />

The tableau in (19) illustrates the evaluation procedure for the input<br />

conocer(x,y) that entails SENTIENCE(x,y). The arguments x <strong>and</strong> y are specified in<br />

the input as follows: x is the first person singular (the speaker) <strong>and</strong> y is esta<br />

película or este actor. The evaluation considers both ranking options of the two<br />

constraints under discussion since their relative ranking is not crucial. This is<br />

indicated by the dotted line. The winner is the c<strong>and</strong>idate that has the smallest<br />

number of violations of the relevant highest constraint. A h<strong>and</strong> () points to the<br />

winner. The plus sign (+) indicates the c<strong>and</strong>idate that does not compete with the<br />

winner. Recall that pairs that do not share an identical form or meaning are not<br />

competitors in this model. According to the logic of weak bidirectional OT, the<br />

winner <strong>and</strong> the non-competitor come out as superoptimal.<br />

(19) Evaluation for the input conocer(x,y); x = 1SG; y = esta película or este<br />

actor<br />

ECONOMY EXPRESS ROLE<br />

1 conozco esta película <br />

2 conozco a esta película * *<br />

3 conozco este actor *<br />

4 +conozco a este actor *<br />

would be the only winner in unidirectional OT. In weak bidirectional<br />

OT is also a winner (i.e. a superoptimal c<strong>and</strong>idate) because there is no<br />

direct competitor that is superoptimal. does not compete with the<br />

superoptimal c<strong>and</strong>idate because it has a different form <strong>and</strong> a different<br />

meaning. Since these two c<strong>and</strong>idates do not compete, they emerge as superoptimal<br />

in this model. This result is independent of the assumed ranking. The bidirectional


20<br />

model captures the fact that a marked form (i.e. the dative) may be optimal<br />

provided it expresses a marked meaning (i.e. a patient with agentive properties).<br />

The OT treatment highlights the claims that characterize the present<br />

approach in more explicit terms. Case selection based on animacy (DOM) <strong>and</strong> role<br />

semantics are captured by one faithfulness constraint in Spanish. This explains the<br />

polyfunctionality of the differential object marker. <strong>Semantic</strong> subcategorization, i.e.<br />

semantic-role information that is anchored in the meaning of the predicate, is the<br />

basic condition for case-selection. In DOM-languages such as Spanish, intrinsic<br />

meaning properties of the object referent are interpreted in terms of semantic roles<br />

<strong>and</strong> influence case selection as an additional condition. The close connection<br />

between subcategorized <strong>and</strong> intrinsic properties also explains why the semantic<br />

verb class may influence DOM. The appeal of the present proposal is that the<br />

constraints are not restricted to DOM, but needed on independent grounds. The<br />

present proposal incorporates most of the explanations of DOM offered in the<br />

literature but captures more data in more precise terms.<br />

First, as already mentioned above, it accommodates the claim of previous<br />

proposals that the function of DOM is to mark potential agents (cf. Kittilä 2006,<br />

Delbecque 1998, 2002). As mentioned, the scope of these approaches is unduly<br />

restricted to traditional agents <strong>and</strong> to verbs that select an agent.<br />

Furthermore, the present proposal incorporates the markedness view on DOM<br />

(cf. Comrie 1989, Aissen 2003). It is formulated by Comrie (1989: 128) in terms<br />

of the grammatical functions used in typological research – A for transitive subject<br />

<strong>and</strong> P for object – as follows: “In a st<strong>and</strong>ard transitive scenario, A is animate <strong>and</strong><br />

definite while P is inanimate/ indefinite (or at least less animate <strong>and</strong> definite than<br />

A), so any deviation from this scenario should be marked”. This account correctly<br />

predicts that animate objects should be case-marked, while inanimate objects need<br />

not be marked. The advantage of the present approach is that it explains the<br />

correlations of the st<strong>and</strong>ard transitive scenario. <strong>Roles</strong> that are canonically linked to<br />

A fall under proto-agent <strong>and</strong> entail animacy in most cases, whereas roles<br />

canonically reserved for P are proto-patients that lack animacy entailments. 10 A<br />

further appeal of the present approach is that it also explains the st<strong>and</strong>ard<br />

ditransitive scenario, in which recipients are also preferably animate. Their bias<br />

towards animacy results from the fact that they have proto-agent properties that<br />

entail animacy, e.g. alienable possession or sentience. Taking recipients into<br />

account is particularly useful in view of the fact that many animate object markers<br />

are also recipient markers.<br />

Finally, there are recent approaches that explain DOM by the<br />

distinguishability <strong>and</strong> characterizing function of cases (e.g. de Hoop <strong>and</strong> Lamers<br />

2006, de Swart 2007, Malchukov 2008). The two functions of cases are described<br />

10 Corpus studies support the correlations between animacy <strong>and</strong> grammatical or semantic functions.<br />

Subjects of transitive clauses (A), which bear an agentive role, are predominantly animate. This<br />

percentage varies according to the language or the language variety under investigation, for example,<br />

from 69% in Norwegian (Øvrelid 2004) to 93% in spoken Swedish (Dahl 2000). In contrast, objects,<br />

which bear a patient-like role, refer predominantly to inanimate entities (89% of the direct objects in<br />

Dahl’s corpus, 90% in Øvrelid’s sample).


21<br />

in the typological literature as follows (cf. Comrie 1989: 117f., Song 2001: 156f.):<br />

In their distinguishing function, cases are used for discriminating concomitant<br />

constituents with different semantic or syntactic properties. This function explains<br />

the fact that the subject of a one-place predicate is generally marked by the same<br />

case, the nominative or absolutive, irrespective of its semantic role. Ideally, a<br />

second case is only used with predicates selecting at least two roles <strong>and</strong> a third<br />

case is only required by predicates with at least three roles. The second broad<br />

function of cases is the characterising one. Ideally, a case has this function if it is<br />

used for all <strong>and</strong> only the noun phrases with a certain type of semantic role or<br />

syntactic function. The explanation of DOM in terms of distinguishability is that<br />

two animate participants have to be distinguished formally. A distinction is not<br />

needed if agents <strong>and</strong> patients are distinguished by animacy. The present approach<br />

captures both functions of cases by combining economy <strong>and</strong> role faithfulness<br />

constraints. As shown by de Swart (2007) <strong>and</strong> Malchukov (2008), these two<br />

factors do not compete in DOM-patterns. This is also the result of the present<br />

treatment. Recall that the DOM-pattern emerges as a winner, irrespective of the<br />

ranking of the two constraints proposed in (17) <strong>and</strong> (18). The advantage of the<br />

present approach is that it pins down the characterizing function in more precise<br />

terms. It suffices to repeat here that the dative constraint explains subcategorized<br />

datives as well as datives used for animate patient objects in Spanish.<br />

6. EXPLAINING THE INTERACTION BETWEEN<br />

ANIMACY AND SEMANTIC ROLES<br />

The previous sections were focussed on the claim that animacy <strong>and</strong> role semantics<br />

are closely connected. They have presented grammatical <strong>and</strong> processing evidence<br />

for this claim as well as a formal treatment in optimality-theoretic terms. This last<br />

section will address the deeper question regarding the nature of this connection.<br />

Given the fact that animacy is unilaterally implied by most of the agentive<br />

basic notions, such as volitional causation, sentience, alienable possession, <strong>and</strong><br />

certain patterns of autonomous movement, I still need to explain why the<br />

inference is reversed from animacy to agentivity. A plausible explanation is<br />

abductive reasoning (cf. Levinson 2000). This is a st<strong>and</strong>ard type of pragmatic<br />

inference by which a unilateral implication or conditional is reversed. As a result,<br />

a unilateral implication is pragmatically strengthened to a bilateral implication<br />

thereby increasing the informative content of an utterance. This tendency to<br />

increase the informativity of a linguistic expression explains why animacy is used<br />

as a cue for agentivity in language processing.<br />

The pragmatic inference from animacy to agentivity has not gone unnoticed<br />

in role-semantic approaches. An intriguing aspect of agentivity is that volition or<br />

control is not subcategorized for as often as expected from its prime status in role<br />

semantics. Take for example the verbs in (20):


22<br />

(20) a. John / the stone rolled down the hill.<br />

b. This medicine / Jogging / Rebecca helped Jamaal.<br />

The most straightforward analysis of the meaning of roll <strong>and</strong> help is that these<br />

verbs are semantically underspecified for volition. This captures the range of uses<br />

illustrated in (20). As assumed by Foley <strong>and</strong> Van Valin (1984) <strong>and</strong> Engelberg<br />

(2005), among others, volition is assigned by default interpretation if the subject<br />

argument is animate (or human).<br />

The pragmatic explanation is in compliance with the principle of incremental<br />

language processing, which is adopted by many neurolinguistic investigations (cf.<br />

Friederici 1999, Schlesewsky <strong>and</strong> Bornkessel 2004, de Hoop <strong>and</strong> Lamers 2006<br />

with a focus on language comprehension, <strong>and</strong> Branigan et al. 2008 for language<br />

production). According to this principle, linguistic information is parsed as soon<br />

as possible, thereby maximizing processing efficiency. Incremental processing is<br />

maximized under the assumption that language users make probabilistic syntactic<br />

choices based on violable principles of grammar <strong>and</strong> multidimensional<br />

information (Bresnan et al. 2001). Turning to our topic, this means that there is an<br />

advantage in making role-semantic interpretation immediately available by using<br />

grammatical principles <strong>and</strong> any type of relevant information, including case, word<br />

order, verb agreement, <strong>and</strong> animacy (cf. de Hoop <strong>and</strong> Lamers 2006).<br />

Harmonically aligned asymmetries pertaining to semantic roles, cases, word order,<br />

<strong>and</strong> animacy maximize processing efficiency. Disharmonic alignments are costly<br />

(cf. Bornkessel-Schlesewsky <strong>and</strong> Schlesewsky 2009, Lamers, this volume). This<br />

happens, for instance, when semantic-role prominence (e.g. agent > patient) does<br />

not match animacy prominence (e.g. animate > inanimate).<br />

The link that is still missing in the previous argumentation is provided by the<br />

assumption that grammar is based on processing preferences to a considerable<br />

degree. This assumption is shared by many recent approaches of different<br />

provenience (cf. Hawkins 1994, Bybee <strong>and</strong> Hopper 2001, Bresnan et al. 2001,<br />

Culicover <strong>and</strong> Jackendoff 2005, Newmeyer 2005). In this view, grammatical<br />

structures emerge in proportion to their preference in processing. This also means<br />

that soft constraints, i.e. tendencies or preferences, in one language may be<br />

inviolable hard constraints in another language (Bresnan et al. 2001). Taking a<br />

pertinent example, in many languages, a second noun phrase is interpreted as a<br />

patient object per default. If this noun phrase refers to an animate being, its<br />

intrinsic meaning is incongruous with its default interpretation as a patient. This is<br />

a situation that is dispreferred in processing, as mentioned in section 2 above. In<br />

OT terms (cf. de Hoop <strong>and</strong> Lamers 2006), animacy is a low-ranked, soft constraint<br />

that only kicks in, if case <strong>and</strong> word order do not disambiguate semantic roles.<br />

However, in languages with DOM, such as Hindi <strong>and</strong> Spanish, there are<br />

grammatical means to express the dispreferred correlation.<br />

So far, I have pinned down the mechanisms by which animacy, an intrinsic<br />

property of a noun phrase referent, is interpreted in terms of agentivity. But I have<br />

not yet addressed the question of why agentivity implies animacy. This question<br />

leads us to the nature of semantic roles. According to Dowty (1991: 561), protorole<br />

features are those semantic features that are relevant for argument (subject or


23<br />

object) selection. This is a good criterion but still leaves one fundamental question<br />

unanswered. Why is argument selection sensitive to notions such as volition,<br />

motion <strong>and</strong> sentience, <strong>and</strong> not to basic geometric features (e.g. being a circle) or<br />

basic physical notions (e.g. being fluid)?<br />

A deeper insight into the nature of semantic roles can be extracted from<br />

Dahl’s <strong>and</strong> Fraurud’s assumptions about the nature of animacy (cf. Dahl <strong>and</strong><br />

Fraurud 1996, Dahl 2008). In their view, animacy is at the bottom a question of<br />

the distinction between ‘‘persons, that is, essentially human beings perceived as<br />

agents, <strong>and</strong> the rest of the universe [...] Indeed, the notion of ‘‘personhood’’ seems<br />

to embody what is quintessential to animate beings, both the roles as agent <strong>and</strong><br />

experiencer, <strong>and</strong> the focus on the individual” (Dahl 2008: 145-146). This view<br />

supports the present assumption that animacy <strong>and</strong> agentivity are closely<br />

connected.<br />

The additional appeal of this type of explanation is that it ties animacy to<br />

individuation, i.e. reference types (Dahl 2008: 149). Dahl assumes that animates<br />

are easier to grasp as individuals than inanimates. Within the class of animates the<br />

self <strong>and</strong> other individuals who can perceive the world <strong>and</strong> act upon it as myself are<br />

central. For Dahl, this means that we use ourselves as models for others. In this<br />

way, we obtain a finer grained cognitive scale, corresponding to a more elaborate<br />

nominal hierarchy: the self with his / her properties (e.g. proto-agent, human, 1 st<br />

person, definite, singular, countable, etc.) is the model for others. The position of a<br />

category on this scale is determined by the grade of its similarity to the self, i.e. by<br />

the number of properties it shares with the self. This is a promising first step<br />

towards a better underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the interaction between reference types <strong>and</strong><br />

animacy in grammar <strong>and</strong> language processing.<br />

If Dahl’s claim is correct that animacy is a phylogenetically deeply anchored,<br />

fundamental (ontological) category, then proto-agent properties are arguably<br />

dependent on individuation <strong>and</strong> animacy. I therefore hypothesize that proto-agent<br />

properties 11 can be explained as those cognitive-semantic properties that<br />

characterize how a human individual, in particular oneself, is involved in<br />

situations.<br />

Dahl’s (2008: 145-146) claim that ANIMATE <strong>and</strong> INANIMATE are ontological<br />

types (in the strict philosophical sense) has another interesting consequence. For<br />

Dahl, one feature of ontological types is the common lack of natural ways of<br />

referring to them. For instance, English seems to have no generic noun for<br />

‘animate being’. Even words for ‘human’ tend to be identical to or derived from<br />

words meaning ‘male being’. Rather, ontological types work behind the scene,<br />

channeling the ways we speak about entities in the world. In my view, Dahl’s<br />

assumptions explain why animacy per se is not crucial in grammars, as argued in<br />

this chapter. Instead, manifestations of animacy, particularly proto-agentivity <strong>and</strong><br />

individuation, are relevant in language.<br />

11 Recall that proto-patient properties are derivative in my approach <strong>and</strong> involve the same basic<br />

notions that are needed to define proto-agent.


24<br />

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