Jakks Pacific Valuation Projection - Mark Moore
Jakks Pacific Valuation Projection - Mark Moore
Jakks Pacific Valuation Projection - Mark Moore
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<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> <strong>Valuation</strong> <strong>Projection</strong><br />
Lily Pad Analysis Group<br />
Guyanka Chandrasena<br />
Jonathan Haralson<br />
Ben Tollerene<br />
Joshua Yueng<br />
1
Table of Contents<br />
Executive Summary ................................................................................................ 6<br />
Industry Analysis ................................................................................................. 7<br />
Accounting Analysis ............................................................................................. 8<br />
Financial Analysis ................................................................................................ 9<br />
<strong>Valuation</strong> Analysis .............................................................................................. 10<br />
Business and Industry Analysis .............................................................................. 11<br />
Company Overview ............................................................................................ 11<br />
Industry Overview ............................................................................................. 14<br />
Five Forces Model ................................................................................................. 17<br />
Rivalry Among Existing Firms .............................................................................. 18<br />
Industry Growth ............................................................................................. 18<br />
Concentration ................................................................................................ 18<br />
Degree of Differentiation ................................................................................ 19<br />
Switching Costs .............................................................................................. 20<br />
Scale Economies ............................................................................................ 21<br />
Learning Economies ....................................................................................... 22<br />
Fixed to Variable Costs ................................................................................... 22<br />
Excess Capacity ............................................................................................. 23<br />
Exit Barriers ................................................................................................... 23<br />
Threat of New Entrants ...................................................................................... 24<br />
Economies of Scale ........................................................................................ 25<br />
First Mover Advantage .................................................................................... 26<br />
Channels of Distribution .................................................................................. 26<br />
Legal Barriers ................................................................................................ 27<br />
Threat of Substitute Products ............................................................................. 27<br />
Relative Price and Performance ....................................................................... 27<br />
Buyers Willingness to Switch ........................................................................... 28<br />
Bargaining Power of Customers .......................................................................... 29<br />
Bargaining Power of Suppliers ............................................................................ 31<br />
2
Value Creation ...................................................................................................... 32<br />
Economies of Scale ............................................................................................ 32<br />
Input Costs and Production ................................................................................ 33<br />
Quality and Variety ............................................................................................ 34<br />
Brands and <strong>Mark</strong>eting ........................................................................................ 35<br />
Creativity and Development ................................................................................ 36<br />
Firm Competitive Advantage Analysis ..................................................................... 37<br />
Economics of Scale ............................................................................................ 38<br />
Input Costs and Production ................................................................................ 39<br />
Quality and Variety ............................................................................................ 40<br />
Brand and <strong>Mark</strong>eting ......................................................................................... 41<br />
Creativity and Development ................................................................................ 42<br />
Flexible Delivery ................................................................................................ 43<br />
Customer Service .............................................................................................. 44<br />
Formal Accounting Analysis ................................................................................... 45<br />
Key Accounting Policies ......................................................................................... 46<br />
Goodwill ........................................................................................................... 48<br />
Advertising Expense .......................................................................................... 52<br />
Research and Development ................................................................................ 54<br />
Capital and Operating Leases ............................................................................. 56<br />
Currency Risk .................................................................................................... 57<br />
Quantitative Analysis ............................................................................................. 60<br />
Sales Manipulation Diagnostics ........................................................................... 61<br />
Net Sales/Cash from Sales .............................................................................. 62<br />
Net Sales/Account Receivables ........................................................................ 63<br />
Net Sales/Inventory ........................................................................................ 65<br />
Net Sales/Unearned Revenue .......................................................................... 67<br />
Net Sales/Warranty Liabilities .......................................................................... 67<br />
Expense Manipulation Diagnostics ....................................................................... 69<br />
Asset Turnover .............................................................................................. 69<br />
3
Cash Flow from Operations / Income from Operations ...................................... 70<br />
Cash Flow from Operations / Net Operating Assets ........................................... 72<br />
Total Accruals / Net Sales ............................................................................... 74<br />
Pension Expense / SG&A ................................................................................. 76<br />
Other Employment Expenses / SG&A ............................................................... 76<br />
Potential Red Flags ............................................................................................... 78<br />
Undo Accounting Distortions .................................................................................. 87<br />
Financial Analysis .................................................................................................. 91<br />
Liquidity Ratio Analysis .......................................................................................... 91<br />
Current Ratio .................................................................................................... 91<br />
Acid Test .......................................................................................................... 93<br />
Accounts Receivable Turnover ............................................................................ 94<br />
Days Sales Outstanding ..................................................................................... 95<br />
Inventory Turnover ............................................................................................ 95<br />
Days Supply of Inventory ................................................................................... 96<br />
Working Capital Turnover ................................................................................... 97<br />
Profitability Analysis .............................................................................................. 99<br />
Gross Profit Margin ............................................................................................ 99<br />
Operating Profit Margin ..................................................................................... 100<br />
Net Profit Margin .............................................................................................. 101<br />
Asset Turnover ................................................................................................. 102<br />
Return on Assets .............................................................................................. 103<br />
Return on Equity .............................................................................................. 104<br />
Capital Structure Analysis ..................................................................................... 106<br />
Debt to Equity Ratio ......................................................................................... 106<br />
Times Interest Earned ...................................................................................... 108<br />
Debt Service Margin ......................................................................................... 111<br />
Altman Z Scores ............................................................................................... 112<br />
Sustainable Growth Rate ................................................................................... 114<br />
Financial Statement Forecast ................................................................................ 117<br />
4
Goodwill Adjustment ......................................................................................... 117<br />
Income Statement ............................................................................................ 118<br />
Balance Sheet .................................................................................................. 125<br />
Statement of Cash Flows ................................................................................... 134<br />
Cost of Capital ..................................................................................................... 140<br />
Cost of Equity .................................................................................................. 140<br />
Cost of Debt ..................................................................................................... 141<br />
Weighted Average Cost of Capital ...................................................................... 142<br />
<strong>Valuation</strong> Analysis ................................................................................................ 144<br />
Method of Comparables .................................................................................... 145<br />
Price to Earnings (Trailing)............................................................................. 146<br />
Price to Earnings (Forward)............................................................................ 147<br />
Price to Book ................................................................................................ 148<br />
Price Earnings Growth ................................................................................... 149<br />
Price to EBITDA ............................................................................................ 150<br />
Price to Free Cash Flows ................................................................................ 151<br />
Price to Free Cash Flows ................................................................................ 152<br />
Intrinsic <strong>Valuation</strong> Models ................................................................................. 153<br />
Free Cash Flows Model .................................................................................. 153<br />
Residual Income Model .................................................................................. 155<br />
Long-Run Residual Income Model ................................................................... 157<br />
Abnormal Earnings Growth Model ................................................................... 159<br />
Analyst Opinion ................................................................................................ 161<br />
Appendix............................................................................................................. 162<br />
References .......................................................................................................... 185<br />
5
Executive Summary<br />
Investment Recommendation: Fairly Valued – Hold (6/1/2008)<br />
JAKK - NYSE (6/1/2008) $22.79 Altman Z-Scores<br />
52 Week Range $18.19 - $31.42 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
Revenue $857.09 M Initial 2.53 2.52 3.25 2.75 3.06<br />
<strong>Mark</strong>et Capitalization $652.35 M Adjusted 2.25 2.23 3.00 2.47 2.81<br />
Shares Outstanding<br />
28.62 M<br />
<strong>Mark</strong>et Price (6/1/2008) $22.79<br />
Initial Adjusted<br />
Book Value per Share $24.14 $21.67<br />
ROE 14.61% 7.47% Method of Comparables Initial Adjusted<br />
ROA 10.09% 4.97% P/E (Trailing) $49.12 $22.27<br />
P/E (Forward) $55.13 $28.96<br />
Cost of Capital P/B $66.63 $59.81<br />
Estimated R-Squared Beta Ke P.E.G. $65.40 $29.65<br />
3-Month 0.1360 1.33 0.1648 P/EBITDA $35.77 $35.77<br />
6-Month 0.1361 1.33 0.1647 P/FCF $21.14 $29.82<br />
1-Year 0.1361 1.33 0.1641 EV/EBITDA $35.28 $35.28<br />
5-Year 0.1363 1.33 0.1620<br />
10-Year 0.1364 1.33 0.1580<br />
Intrinsic <strong>Valuation</strong>s Initial Adjusted<br />
Alt. Cost of Equity Estimate 14.38% Free Cash Flows Model $44.53 $61.73<br />
Published Beta 0.28 Residual Income Model $24.67 $14.23<br />
Long Run Residual Income Model $25.17 N/A<br />
Initial Adjusted Abnormal Earnings Growth Model $22.39 $25.15<br />
Cost of Debt 7.04% 7.04%<br />
WACC (BT) 13.20% 13.00%<br />
6
Industry Analysis<br />
Industry Analysis<br />
Rivalry Among Existing Firms<br />
Threat of New Entrants<br />
Threat of Substitute Products<br />
Bargaining Power of Customers<br />
Bargaining Power of Suppliers<br />
High<br />
Average<br />
High<br />
High<br />
Average<br />
In this analysis, the industry was deemed to be highly competitive due to the<br />
array of companies that design, develop, and market consumer goods. These goods<br />
include traditional toys for children of all ages, pet toys, writing utensils, and related<br />
items for each category. However, in the case of some leaders in this industry, game<br />
consoles and game software have been added to the business activities in an effort to<br />
diversify product lines. In the toy and game industry, there is a high amount of rivalry<br />
among the existing firms with very low industry growth. Overall, the degree of<br />
differentiation in the toy and game industry is very low. Since many products are very<br />
similar, firms have to find other means of gaining competitive advantages. Companies<br />
in this industry are not able to change the type of products they produce without<br />
incurring high costs. Manufacturing companies, like the toy industry, that invest heavily<br />
in capital equipment can run the risk of not being able to exit easily. But, they can<br />
become profitable by keeping variable costs down and managing the overhead<br />
expenses associated with manufacturing facilities. The potential for abnormal profits in<br />
7
this industry are low due to the large number of companies meaning there are few<br />
entry barriers. But, these companies enter at a disadvantage due to smaller economics<br />
of scale. A first mover advantage is difficult to obtain and can only be achieved by<br />
designing a new or innovative toy that either dramatically changes the way toys are<br />
made or sets a new standard in the market trend of toys.<br />
The toy and games industry is highly competitive. The largest firms are battling<br />
for market share and to win customers they must implement strategies that create<br />
value and competitive advantages. In this, differentiation is offering something<br />
superior, be it unique products, customer service, variety, or brand image, at a cost less<br />
than what the customers is willing to pay for it. In addition, cost leadership revolves<br />
around minimizing costs and maximizing efficiency to allow them to sell the product for<br />
the same price as their competitors and make a greater profit. In the toy industry a<br />
mixture of differentiation and cost leadership strategies is effective.<br />
Accounting Analysis<br />
Accounting Analysis Flexibility Disclosure<br />
Goodwill Low High<br />
Advertising Expense Low Low<br />
Research and Development Low None<br />
Capital and Operating Leases High Low<br />
Currency Risk Low Average<br />
The accounting analysis will look into how well the firms in the industry are<br />
managing their accounting policies. In addition, the accounting policies are items within<br />
the financial statements that directly relate to success factors identified in the five<br />
forces model. In comparing the disclosure of the company with the guidelines provided<br />
by GAAP, we can make an assessment as to whether or not the firm misused the<br />
flexibility in GAAP. Each accounting policy will be assessed based on disclosure<br />
requirements as defined by GAAP, based upon the level of disclosure, they will be<br />
8
indentified as conservative or aggressive. In conservative accounting, managers do not<br />
want to overstate income. In aggressive accounting, managers are reporting items in<br />
such a way that they might lead to higher reported earnings. In this analysis, we can<br />
determine from the information presented if the company is disclosing the information<br />
that is useful to making proper investment decisions. Jakk has a high level of disclosure<br />
with an aggressive accounting policy in regards to goodwill. <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, Inc. is a<br />
company of low disclosure when it comes to advertising expenses and in regards to<br />
GAAP there is low flexibility in what they can do. In terms of Research and<br />
Development, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> did not provide any information on the cost involved in the<br />
R&D of their products but Hasbro and Leapfrog treated it like an operating expense.<br />
In the quantitative analysis, we will use sales manipulation diagnostics and<br />
expense manipulation diagnostics to determine if the numbers reported in the financial<br />
statements are accurate (reflects true value of the firm) or distorted (more profitable<br />
than it actually is). In general, we found several red flags but in terms of accounting the<br />
only real issue was goodwill which accounted for about 36% of total assets, this was<br />
addressed in the undo accounting distortions section, and was included in our<br />
forecasting.<br />
Financial Analysis<br />
In the financial analysis, we look into ratios such as liquidity, profitability, and<br />
capital structure. Liquidity deals with how fast the company can convert assets into<br />
Cash. In analyzing the Profitability of the toy and games industry, we looked at how<br />
efficient each company is at generating sales. Capital Structure determines how the<br />
firms are financing their activities. Altman Z Score is treated as part of the capital<br />
structure ratios and is a method of calculating a company’s risk of bankruptcy.<br />
We will use these ratios along with patterns from previous years, industry<br />
knowledge, and knowledge of the firm itself to forecast items on the balance sheet,<br />
income statement, and statement of cash flows. In this, we are using our knowledge<br />
and understanding of what the company is and does to reasonably predict what might<br />
9
happen in the future. In doing so, we are able to determine if the company is fairly<br />
valued through the use of valuation models which are discussed later. In forecasting,<br />
we will focus on the raw statements (what the company provided) and then on<br />
adjusted statements (if we accounted for goodwill). Goodwill was deemed a red flag in<br />
the accounting section, not only have we accounted for it impairment in the ratios<br />
mentioned earlier, but we have included it in the forecasting, and valuations models<br />
discussed later. In addition to this, we will estimate the cost of capital to gain insight on<br />
how operations are funded and to increase our knowledge of the value of the firm. The<br />
cost of equity is defined as the minimum rate of return that shareholders require to be<br />
compensated for the time waiting for returns and the risk involved.<br />
<strong>Valuation</strong> Analysis<br />
In this report, we seek to determine the true value of the firm by using the method of<br />
comparables and the intrinsic valuation models. In the first, we use the industry<br />
average of ratios (price to earnings, etc) to calculate a share price for the company and<br />
will compare that price to the stated price to determine if the company is fairly valued.<br />
In the comparables, we found the company to be undervalued, but this methodology is<br />
not known for its reliability, therefore, the intrinsic valuation models are more relevant<br />
in determining the firm’s value. The intrinsic models used for our valuation were the<br />
Free Cash Flows Model (FCFM), Residual Income Model (RIM), Long Run Residual<br />
Income Model (LRIM) and the Abnormal Earnings Growth Model (AEGM).<br />
In using the intrinsic valuation models we found that in the free cash flow model<br />
that the company was undervalued both prior to the goodwill adjustment and after. In<br />
the more reliable and less sensitive residual income model, we found that the company<br />
was fairly valued prior to the goodwill adjustment. In the long-run residual income<br />
model we found that the company was again fairly valued. Lastly, the abnormal<br />
earnings growth model supported the company being fairly valued. In closing, we,<br />
based on the intrinsic valuation models, have concluded that the company is fairly<br />
valued.<br />
10
Business and Industry Analysis<br />
Company Overview<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, Inc. was founded in 1995 by Jack Friedman, Chairman and Chief<br />
Executive Officer, and Stephan G. Berman, President and Chief Operating Officer. <strong>Jakks</strong><br />
<strong>Pacific</strong>’s Headquarters are located on the <strong>Pacific</strong> Coast Highway in Malibu, California and<br />
their products are manufactured in Asia. <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>’s product lines feature traditional<br />
toys, electronic products (EyeClops Bionic Eye and Laser Challenge), wheels division<br />
products (toy and activity vehicles), action figures and accessories (WWE, Pokemon,<br />
Dragon Ball Z, and Hannah Montana), Dolls, Junior Sports Products (Paintball Products),<br />
Crafts with popular kid characters, pet products, and WWE games (<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, Inc<br />
2007 10-K).<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> is ranked in the top five in the United States based on their market<br />
share. Their stated goal is to “engage children in creative play with products that<br />
encourage learning, interaction, and fun” and “to be a billion dollar company through<br />
organic growth of its core product lines, dynamic partnerships, strategic alliances as<br />
well as through strategic acquisitions” (www.jakkspacific.com). In this statement, they<br />
speak of creating toys that appeal to children and of seeking ways of expanding the<br />
business. In the toy industry, companies fight to acquire licenses for popular or lasting<br />
brands to gain the approval of their customers and to gain the edge over competitors.<br />
In this regard, it is important to get the most out of those brands by creating products<br />
that target a wider range of consumers. In keeping to those goals, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong><br />
acquired the license for WWE and formed a joint venture with THQ Inc. (first title<br />
release in 1999) to gain the right to publish and market video games based on the<br />
11
popular brand. In addition, they have acquired licenses from Nickelodeon, Disney ®,<br />
and Warner Bros ® and have created products based on characters from Marvel and<br />
Pokemon. In the global market, their foreign sales accounted for 14.7% of total sales<br />
(2007), to expand on those sales they intend to capitalize “on their experience and<br />
relationships with foreign distributors and retailers” (<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, Inc. 2007 10-K).<br />
The major competitors for <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> are Hasbro Inc. (HAS), Mattel Inc.<br />
(MAT), and Leapfrog Enterprises Inc. (LP). <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> has a <strong>Mark</strong>et Cap of 646.38<br />
Million, Leapfrog, founded in 1995 (same as <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>), has a <strong>Mark</strong>et Cap of 525.26<br />
Million. Hasbro, founded in 1923, and Mattel, founded in 1945, have <strong>Mark</strong>et Caps of<br />
5.02 Billion and 7.29 Billion respectively. <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> is a small company compared to<br />
the larger and older companies (Hasbro and Mattel) that dominated the market for a<br />
longer period of time. In spite of this, they push forward and became a strong<br />
competitor in the toy industry.<br />
In 2004, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> found a demand for videogames that plug into the<br />
television, created games based on the world poker tour and marketed cabbage patch<br />
kids and care bear stuffed animals, which were popular at the time (online.wsj.com). It<br />
is due to that popularity that sales growth was recorded at 81.86%, which was the<br />
highest recorded in the chart below. <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> had better sales growth between<br />
2004 and 2006 than other firms in the industry but was beaten by Hasbro in 2007. It is<br />
interesting to note that sales growth for the industry tends to be favorable. In truth,<br />
this is expected for kids may never lose interest in their desire to have toys. In the<br />
chart, two contradictions to the positive growth can be noted, one was by Hasbro in<br />
2004 and the other was by Leapfrog.<br />
Sales Growth<br />
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> 1.86% 81.86% 15.20% 15.70% 11.98%<br />
Hasbro 11.45% ‐4.50% 3.01% 2.07% 21.77%<br />
Mattel 1.53% 2.88% 1.49% 9.10% 5.66%<br />
Leapfrog 27.88% ‐5.84% 1.48% ‐22.70% ‐11.94%<br />
Total Industry 6.45% 2.42% 2.82% 5.13% 10.31%<br />
12
In actual sales, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> performed admirably but was outperformed by<br />
Hasbro and Mattel. Leapfrog, on the other hand, showed a negative 34.96% decrease<br />
in sales between 2003 and 2007. In the industry, sales have grown from 9.1 billion in<br />
2003 to 11.1 billion in 2007.<br />
Sales (in thousands)<br />
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> $315,776 $574,266 $661,537 $765,386 $857,085<br />
Hasbro $3,138,657 $2,997,510 $3,087,627 $3,151,481 $3,837,557<br />
Mattel $4,960,100 $5,102,786 $5,179,016 $5,650,156 $5,970,090<br />
Leapfrog $680,012 $640,289 $649,757 $502,255 $442,271<br />
Total Industry $9,094,545 $9,314,851 $9,577,937 $10,069,278 $11,107,003<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> grew steadily with respect to asset value but was beaten by Hasbro<br />
and Mattel. In truth, they can catch up, but to do so, may take them a few years.<br />
Leapfrog, on the other hand, shrank by negative 31.12% in asset value from 2003 to<br />
2007. In thinking back, it seems ironic on what happened to Leapfrog, prior to 2004,<br />
they were a promising company with signs of favorable growth, but after that year,<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> started to gain larger assets (from 2004) and stronger sales (from 2005).<br />
Total Asset Value (in thousands)<br />
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> $529,997 $696,762 $753,955 $881,894 $982,688<br />
Hasbro $3,163,376 $3,240,660 $3,301,143 $3,096,905 $3,237,063<br />
Mattel $4,510,950 $4,756,492 $4,372,313 $4,955,884 $4,805,455<br />
Leapfrog $552,659 $559,794 $605,829 $450,441 $380,153<br />
Total Industry $8,756,982 $9,253,708 $9,033,240 $9,385,124 $9,405,359<br />
13
Industry Overview<br />
There are about 900 companies in the toy and game industry with combined<br />
annual revenues of $5 billion (www.<strong>Mark</strong>etResearch.com). In this analysis, the industry<br />
was highly competitive due to the array of companies that design, develop, and market<br />
consumer goods. These goods include traditional toys for children of all ages, pet toys,<br />
writing utensils, and related items for each category. However, in the case of some<br />
leaders in this industry, game consoles and game software have been added to the<br />
business activities in an effort to diversify product lines. Growth in both demand and<br />
profitability is influenced by children of ages twelve and under. That is, the growth in<br />
revenues is dependent upon the children that demand their products.<br />
The chart above compares stock returns for <strong>Jakks</strong> (red line), Hasbro (green line),<br />
and Mattel (orange line) to the S&P 500 index (blue line). As you can see, Mattel and<br />
Hasbro have outperformed the S&P 500 index for the past eight years by a considerable<br />
amount. <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> has been on par with the S&P 500 index. This chart shows how<br />
resilient the toy and game industry is to the rest of the market. Even though other<br />
industries in the consumer goods sector might be affected by the current recession,<br />
parents seem to sacrifice to keep their children happy by buying them toys. According<br />
to the sales growth among <strong>Jakks</strong>, Hasbro and Mattel, the industry does not appear to<br />
be slowing down. In defining the industry with these companies, we can conclude that<br />
14
the toy and game industry has outperformed the market on average and will continue<br />
to do so.<br />
In order to hold value in the toy manufacturing industry, the value drivers that<br />
make a company profitable have been identified. First, a company must be able to<br />
identify market trends. Finding the market trends, in this context, is defined by the<br />
ability to identify potential popular toys that will generate revenues in the long term.<br />
By recognizing these early, companies will be able to achieve a first mover advantage<br />
within that particular product line through the creation of toys and games or by gaining<br />
licensing rights. Note however, that this industry is very careful in that each company<br />
prefers product lines that are long lasting unlike fads. Second, companies must be able<br />
to market effectively. Advertising in this field is the key to gaining customers. Also, the<br />
ability to show product superiority through marketing will help achieve more shelf space<br />
and therefore more sales. Finally, companies in the toy and game industry must be in<br />
the business of cost leadership. With about 900 companies producing similar products,<br />
it is essential to maintain low input cost, while upholding product quality to be able to<br />
compete with competitors pricing. These three things are what drive value in this<br />
industry. Later we will take a look at how <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> Inc. stands in relation to the<br />
rest.<br />
Toy and Games Industry Sales Growth<br />
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 1.82% 45.01% 13.19% 13.57% 10.70%<br />
Hasbro 10.27% ‐4.71% 2.92% 2.03% 17.88%<br />
Mattel 1.51% 2.80% 1.47% 8.34% 5.36%<br />
Note: Green cells mark increases in sales from the previous year, Red cells<br />
denote a sales decrease.<br />
Traditional toy manufacturers are facing increasing amounts of competition with<br />
the rise of electronic entertainment for children. Video games, however, are only a<br />
small part. Television, as well as advances in the Internet, contributes to this<br />
competition, which makes it harder to get a company’s product noticed. Anyone, who<br />
has the means to design and create a toy, can be considered a potential competitor.<br />
15
Although the majority of concentration is in the hands of Mattel, Hasbro, and <strong>Jakks</strong><br />
<strong>Pacific</strong>, entering this industry is fairly straightforward.<br />
Wal-Mart, Target, and Toys ‘R’ Us are the three main customers for the toy<br />
manufacturing industry. New entrants to this industry will find it very hard to establish<br />
relationships among these customers. Finding other means of distributing a new<br />
company’s product will be necessary.<br />
Research and Development in this industry is valuable, if the company is able to<br />
make a product that the market sees as creative and innovative, it will secure demand<br />
for it. However, in the case of <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> and other companies, inventing new<br />
products is not part of their stated strategy. For those able to design and create toys<br />
will be popular in the market. In addition, sales along with licensing rights to use brands<br />
will generate revenues.<br />
The main raw materials used in the industry for production purposes include<br />
plastics, zinc alloy, plush, printed fabrics, paper products and electronic components.<br />
Changes in the market for any of these raw materials would affect each company in the<br />
industry. Although there are numerous companies in this industry, only the biggest<br />
companies will be able to gain an advantage by buying raw materials in bulk and thus<br />
receiving a discount.<br />
16
Five Forces Model<br />
Rivalry Among Existing Firms<br />
Threat of New Entrants<br />
Threat of Substitute Products<br />
Bargaining Power of Customers<br />
Bargaining Power of Suppliers<br />
High<br />
Average<br />
High<br />
High<br />
Average<br />
Rather than using conventional forms of examining a company, this analysis will<br />
use the Five Forces Model because of its specific application to the context of valuing a<br />
company. This model observes the industry as a whole including competition, potential<br />
entrants, substitute products, and the bargaining power of customers and suppliers.<br />
The importance of identifying these is to find value drivers which are the things that<br />
make a company profitable in the industry. Without recognizing these we would not be<br />
able to make an accurate hypothesis on the future performance of <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> Inc.<br />
With the amount of companies in the industry, toy and game companies are<br />
highly competitive. Whether designing new products or acquiring licenses is the<br />
business strategy, each company seeks brands that are profitable now as well as in the<br />
future. Because of this, it was determined that the level of competition was high. This<br />
is misleading since each company has its own set of principle brands and the pricing of<br />
products is not typically based on just licensing and patents.<br />
In the case of perfect competition, each company would be pursing an economic<br />
business strategy by producing toys to achieve equality among marginal revenue and<br />
marginal cost. This would ensure maximum potential profits. Even though perfect<br />
competition does not exist, switching costs disallow companies to price their licensed<br />
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and patent products at any price. Furthermore, if companies want to gain market share<br />
they must engage in price wars. The sources of competition analyzed are rivalry<br />
among existing firms, threat of new entrants, threat of substitute products, bargaining<br />
power of customers, and bargaining power of suppliers.<br />
Rivalry Among Existing Firms<br />
In this section, the basic sources of competition within the industry will be<br />
covered. Profitability can generally be predicted by the level of rivalry among the<br />
existing firms. In this industry, there is an aggressive focus on cost control to maximize<br />
revenues.<br />
Industry Growth<br />
In the short run, the growth in the toy industry has declined mainly due to the<br />
current recession. In the long run, growth is almost non-existent. The main reason for<br />
this is because the industry is well established. This gives rise to the competition in<br />
market share. In rapidly growing industries, gaining market share is not a problem<br />
because of the high demand. However, in the case of the toy and game industry, we<br />
can expect price wars. Another reason behind the declining growth rate is the rate of<br />
growing competitors in other forms of entertainment such as electronic and video<br />
games. Children, growing up in our current state of economy, are able to easily adapt<br />
to technology. As this developing field continues to grow into the future, the demand<br />
for electronic entertainment amongst children will grow as well. In order for current toy<br />
companies to not get left behind, they will have to adapt to this form of technology.<br />
Concentration<br />
The number of firms and there sizes defines the degree of concentration within a<br />
particular industry. The higher the concentration, the more monopolistic that industry<br />
is. In this industry, the level of competition is highly concentrated: the top 50<br />
companies hold 75 percent of the market (<strong>Mark</strong>etResearch). As noted earlier, anyone<br />
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with the ability to design and produce a toy can be considered a competitor. The level<br />
of concentration in this industry can be explained by the total number of companies<br />
(about 900). The <strong>Mark</strong>et<br />
Share column chart shows<br />
the publicly traded<br />
competitors and their<br />
market share for the past six<br />
years.<br />
This is a more<br />
accurate representation of<br />
what we would expect the<br />
industry to be composed of<br />
81.07%<br />
Common Size <strong>Mark</strong>et Cap<br />
Hasbro<br />
Mattel<br />
65.61% 66.95% 60.09%<br />
66.49% 62.06%<br />
31.26% 28.53% 33.48% 29.41% 31.32%<br />
16.83%<br />
2.10% 3.14% 4.53% 6.43% 4.10% 6.62%<br />
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
since most of the smaller companies license their products (or the company itself is<br />
acquired by another). Among these companies Hasbro and Mattel combined own 86%<br />
of the market. The spread between the two larger companies and smaller cap<br />
companies makes it difficult to gain market share, considering all the resources that<br />
Mattel and Hasbro own. Even as this is the case, Mattel’s market share has had a<br />
decreasing trend. <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> has had an increasing trend and Hasbro has stayed<br />
roughly the same throughout the six years. With this information we know that it is<br />
possible to gain market share, but a company in this industry must have the resources<br />
to compete. In conclusion, the high level of concentration in the toy and games<br />
industry makes it very difficult to gain market share.<br />
Degree of Differentiation<br />
The toy and game industry has a low degree of differentiation. Each company<br />
produces the same type of toys under different brands. For example, Mattel, Hasbro,<br />
and <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> all produce similar action figures, dolls, etc. Since each firm in the<br />
industry is producing very similar products, firms have to find other ways to gain a<br />
competitive advantage. One of these ways is to reduce costs to gain a higher gross<br />
profit. Since the differentiation is low in this industry, firms have to compete on price.<br />
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Spreading the gap between cost of goods sold and profit is very important in order to<br />
create value for shareholders. Below is a graph showing the operating profit margins<br />
between <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> and its top two competitors.<br />
Operating Profit Margin<br />
18.00%<br />
16.00%<br />
14.00%<br />
12.00%<br />
10.00%<br />
8.00%<br />
6.00%<br />
4.00%<br />
2.00%<br />
0.00%<br />
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong><br />
Hasbro<br />
Mattel<br />
Firms in this industry license products and acquire as many products as viable in<br />
order to get costs as low as possible. As you can see from the graph above, Mattel has<br />
consistently had the highest degree of profit margins. This means that they are<br />
incurring greater profits out of their sales compared to Mattel and <strong>Jakks</strong>. However, for<br />
the past three year, <strong>Jakks</strong> has been matching its percent of profit margins to its<br />
competitors that hold most of the market share in the industry. The lower firms in the<br />
toy and game industry can keep their costs down and can use the excess money to<br />
acquire other product lines or gain licenses. Overall, the degree of differentiation in the<br />
toy and game industry is very low. Since many products are very similar, firms have to<br />
find other means of gaining competitive advantages.<br />
Switching Costs<br />
Switching costs refer to how expensive it is for a company to switch industries.<br />
If switching costs are low, companies are able to enter and leave different industries<br />
(creating different products) at relatively low costs. In the case of the toy and game<br />
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industry, switching costs are high. Companies in this industry are not able to change<br />
the type of products they produce without incurring extremely high costs. For example,<br />
firms like <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> are able to produce variations in products and make design<br />
changes, but cannot use the same equipment to produce furniture. With switching<br />
costs being high, firms in this highly competitive industry have to become very<br />
specialized in their business activities. This means keeping costs down with a tight cost<br />
control system while maintaining product quality with little defects.<br />
Scale Economies<br />
The size of a company in this industry determines its ability to compete in the<br />
price wars of high competition. Scale economies refer to the advantage a company can<br />
gain in cost leadership due to expansion. Bigger firms are able to buy raw materials in<br />
bulk, making them cheaper. They are also able to spread their cost over a greater<br />
range of output (for example, marketing costs). For smaller firms, similar business<br />
activities become way more expensive because they are not able to spread their costs<br />
over the same scale of operations. To be a successful company in this industry, it is<br />
very important to achieve economies of scale. Since high competition is accompanied<br />
with low selling costs, having a high gross profit margin will show which companies are<br />
the most successful with cost control.<br />
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70.00%<br />
Gross Profit Margin<br />
60.00%<br />
50.00%<br />
40.00%<br />
30.00%<br />
20.00%<br />
10.00%<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong><br />
Hasbro<br />
Mattel<br />
Leapfrog<br />
0.00%<br />
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
Learning Economies<br />
Learning economies refers to the amount of knowledge that a company needs to<br />
be successful. Most of what companies need to know about being successful in an<br />
industry comes through experience. In developing a toy all a person needs is a creative<br />
idea. The learning curve associated with producing the toy itself is not that great.<br />
Competing for market share in this industry does, however, require experience in<br />
knowing what consumers want and how to keep costs down through the product lines.<br />
There is also a great learning curve in knowing where the toy and game industry will be<br />
in the future. Since the value of a firm relies on future performance, it is essential to<br />
have an understanding of where the industry is going in order to gain market share.<br />
Fixed to Variable Costs<br />
Generally the firms in this industry have high fixed to variable cost ratios, giving<br />
them incentive to reduce prices. The fixed costs are high because companies own large<br />
amounts of manufacturing equipment to make each product line. The more equipment<br />
running to create the different products, the higher overhead costs become. One way<br />
that firms are able to keep the overhead costs down is by making bottleneck<br />
procedures within work in process enabling them to produce the same amount of<br />
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products in a smaller period of time. The cost of raw materials used in product<br />
manufacturing can become increasingly expensive. Since most of these materials can<br />
be used across multiple product lines, ordering in bulk can keep these variable costs<br />
way down. Overall, companies in the toy and games industry can become profitable by<br />
keeping variable costs down and managing the overhead expenses associated with<br />
manufacturing facilities.<br />
Excess Capacity<br />
Excess capacity, the amount of product supplied over demand, can lead to very<br />
dangerous outcomes for the toy industry. Say a company acquires a license to produce<br />
and sell the latest fad. If the product does not stay popular for long, companies can be<br />
left with piled up inventories and may be forced to sell them at a discount. When this<br />
occurs, companies must account for inventory impairments. This in fundamental nature<br />
reduces the value of the company.<br />
Exit Barriers<br />
Although there are virtually no barriers to entry, the opposite can be said for exit<br />
barriers. Exit barriers are obstacles that a firm faces when they want to quit producing<br />
or shut down. The obstacles are often financial burdens that make it more costly to exit<br />
than to continue operating. Exit barriers are important to examine because a company<br />
may be distorting accounting figures in a way that makes them look more profitable<br />
than they are in order to avoid incurring shut down costs. Manufacturing companies like<br />
the toy industry that invest heavily in capital equipment can run the risk of not being<br />
able to exit easily. Depending on each company’s manufacturing equipment, they may<br />
fall into the category of non transferable fixed assets. When this is the case, the<br />
machinery cannot be easily used for producing anything else. Since this barrier has the<br />
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potential to be very significant, it may force firms to continue competing rather that<br />
shutting down (the costlier of the two).<br />
Conclusion<br />
In the toy and game industry, there is a high amount of rivalry among the<br />
existing firms with very low industry growth (combined with high internal growth).<br />
With the consistent high to variable costs ratios in the industry, the companies in this<br />
industry compete on price. In order to compete on pricing however, companies must<br />
control their cost and keep them as low as possible. By reducing overhead expenses<br />
and excess capacity, firms should have the ability to keep the costs of production low.<br />
The concentration is very high, with 5 percent of the companies owning 75 percent of<br />
the market share. With this degree of concentration, gaining market share is very<br />
difficult. Toy and game manufacturers feature high switching cost, due to their low<br />
degree of product differentiation. These high costs mean that toy companies are not<br />
able to switch industries easily. Since the top companies are able to benefit from scale<br />
economies they own large amounts of fixed assets, which gives rise to unavoidable exit<br />
barriers.<br />
Threat of New Entrants<br />
The potential for abnormal profits in this industry are very low, mainly due to the<br />
large number of companies. As this is the case, there are very low entry barriers,<br />
giving any company the option to join. Although this is generally a key determinant of<br />
future profitability, joining this industry is not as easy as it seems. Also, the term<br />
“threat” is used loosely here in that new entrants would not be able to efficiently and<br />
effectively compete with the existing top companies.<br />
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Economies of Scale<br />
With the high levels of economies of scale outlined in the previous section, new<br />
entrants have the option to choose between large and optimum capacities. They will<br />
also enter the market at a disadvantage due to costs. For the small toy maker, not<br />
owning a large manufacturing plant will exclude them from the benefits of economies of<br />
scale.<br />
Total Assets<br />
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> $408,810 $529,997 $696,762 $753,955 $881,894 $982,688<br />
Hasbro $3,142,881 $3,163,376 $3,240,660 $3,301,143 $3,096,905 $3,237,063<br />
Mattel $4,459,659 $4,510,950 $4,756,492 $4,372,313 $4,955,884 $4,805,455<br />
Leapfrog $397,682 $552,659 $559,794 $605,829 $450,441 $380,153<br />
Common Size of Total Assets<br />
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 4.86% 6.05% 7.53% 8.35% 9.40% 10.45%<br />
Hasbro 37.38% 36.12% 35.02% 36.54% 33.00% 34.42%<br />
Mattel 53.03% 51.51% 51.40% 48.40% 52.81% 51.09%<br />
Leapfrog 4.73% 6.31% 6.05% 6.71% 4.80% 4.04%<br />
Comparing the total assets for the top four in terms of market<br />
capitalization, Mattel has the largest asset base. Even though each of these firms<br />
experience economies of scale, Mattel and Hasbro are the most likely to fully utilize this.<br />
That is because the more assets a firm has, the more potential it has to produce more<br />
efficiently. Firms entering this industry face the disadvantage of having to own a<br />
sufficient amount of assets that existing firms already have. In other words, new<br />
entrants to this industry must invest heavily in production equipment and other assets<br />
to have any opportunity at gaining market share.<br />
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First Mover Advantage<br />
A first mover advantage in defined as the initial advantage of entering a new<br />
market segment. Since this traditional toy industry is long lived, industry standards<br />
have already been set. For this reason, obtaining a first mover advantage is very<br />
difficult. In order to achieve this however, a company would have to design a new and<br />
innovative toy, which would either: (1) drastically change the way toys are made, or (2)<br />
set a new standard in the market trend of toys. When a new product is developed,<br />
licensing agreements and patents can be made. These agreements make it legally<br />
impossible for other companies to produce the toy. In some instances, a license can<br />
give only one company an exclusive right to produce the brand. Patents keep other<br />
companies from developing the same toy as well. The first mover advantage in this<br />
instance is acquiring a license to produce a toy, and therefore receiving all the sales for<br />
that particular item. New entrants to the market do not have sufficient resources to<br />
compete with existing firms in acquiring these licenses. Not only do they have to own<br />
sufficient amount of assets, firms trying to enter this industry must also have plenty of<br />
liquid assets to acquire these rights to produce new toys.<br />
Channels of Distribution<br />
New entrants in the toy and games market segment initially would have different<br />
channels of distributions than the top 50 companies. The difficulty they would face in<br />
developing a dealer network, would disallow them to get shelf space for the three main<br />
customers of toys (Wal-Mart, Target, and Toys ‘R’ Us). These relationships make it<br />
very difficult for new entrants to establish a reliable customer base. In the case of<br />
Cranium, Inc., the company found other means of distributing their board game<br />
through Starbucks. This ingenious partnership eventually got the attention of Hasbro,<br />
who bought them out.<br />
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Legal Barriers<br />
As far as legal barriers go, there is no specific set of statutes that would limit<br />
entry. This industry is however highly regulated. Laws regarding safety of products<br />
would be the only concern of new entrants. However, these do not take away the<br />
ability for companies to enter at will.<br />
Conclusion<br />
For companies to enter the market effectively, it will be difficult for them to<br />
obtain economies of scale that the larger companies are currently achieving. First<br />
mover advantages will be granted to the companies that come out will a truly new<br />
product. Although legal barriers do not prevent firms from entering the industry, they<br />
will have to find other means distributing their products to consumers.<br />
Threat of Substitute Products<br />
Substitute products in this sense are not necessarily those products that are<br />
similar, but other products that would take the place of the existing toys. This industry<br />
faces a big threat in this area because toy and games compete with all types of<br />
entertainment among children. One of the biggest factors here is the consumer’s<br />
willingness to switch products.<br />
Relative Price and Performance<br />
The biggest threat to the toy and games industry is the electronic gaming market<br />
segment. As price of technology goes down, traditional toy manufacturers will find it<br />
increasing difficult to compete with electronic games. Depending on the consumer, if<br />
the relative price and performance of the alternative increases enough to where they<br />
value the product more, they will most likely switch.<br />
There are many competing products among the current selection of toys. Even<br />
as this is the case, brand image and identity play a very big role in what products<br />
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children want. For example, even though there are many different action figures,<br />
children demand the characters that are currently being marketed the heaviest via<br />
television or other media outlets. A knock-off product in this example simply will not do<br />
for the child. They want what is popular without regard or knowledge of the price.<br />
With a highly marketed product, producers can charge a premium for having the “best”.<br />
Having this marketed toy effect has different results in different product categories.<br />
Toys without a character or television show to associate them with are much easier for<br />
other producers to compete with. An example of this would be remote controlled cars.<br />
Although there are different styles, they all have the same functions without a relation<br />
to another area of a child’s entertainment.<br />
Buyers Willingness to Switch<br />
In the highly marketed toys, children simply do not want the substitute product.<br />
Only the “best” toy will suffice. This makes buyers (parents) willingness to switch<br />
products very low. In this instance, parents would most likely rather spend the extra<br />
premium for the toy wanted than to get a substitute that has very little value to the<br />
child. Toys with a more general purpose and not related to a child’s favorite television<br />
show can be substituted without question.<br />
The buyers willingness to switch in general purpose toys is very high in which<br />
case the cheaper product with similar features will most likely be bought.<br />
Conclusion<br />
With increases in technology surely headed our way, traditional toy makers are<br />
going to have to make investment decisions based on the direction of electronic<br />
entertainment. Another option would be to invest in brand image, making a company’s<br />
product a must-have toy for any generation. Premiums can be charged for these<br />
marketed toys, resulting in higher profit margins. With general purpose toys producers<br />
cannot charge a premium, but must compete on lower prices. The children who<br />
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demand the toys are the ultimate decision makers however, in which products must<br />
stay and which products must go.<br />
Bargaining Power of Customers<br />
The firm’s ability to have bargaining power to influence price and cost over<br />
customers can give them an advantage in any industry. Price sensitivity and relative<br />
bargaining power are two indicators that determine the level of bargaining power over<br />
customers. Price sensitivity refers to the competitive switching cost. Relative bargaining<br />
power is the firm’s ability to set a price for the customers.<br />
Switching cost is the customer’s or firm’s ability to find similar products or raw<br />
material at other stores and suppliers, respectively. Toy “R” Us, for instance, has the<br />
ability to purchase a similar toy from LeapFrog, Mattel, and Hasbro. The switching cost<br />
is high because each company has its own trademarks and licensing rights. <strong>Jakks</strong> has<br />
the licensing rights to World Wrestling Entertainment® and Hannah Montana®. Hasbro<br />
has the licensing rights to Spider Man 3® and Star Wars: Revenge of the Sith®. Toys<br />
‘R’ Us, Wal-Mart, and other toy retailers must decide what mix of trademark toys they<br />
want in their sales floor. The cost to make a toy is not too expensive, but the cost to<br />
purchase trademarks and licensing rights can be. Gross Profit divide by cost of goods<br />
sold can give an idea of how much profit can be made.<br />
Incremental Profit<br />
2007 Hasbro Jakk LeapFrog Mattel<br />
Gross Profit 2,260,936 323,650 173,306 2,777,300<br />
COGS 1,576,621 533,435 268,965 3,192,790<br />
GP per<br />
COGS 1.43 0.61 0.64 0.87<br />
Hasbro made $1.43 for every item sold in 2007. They earned the highest profit<br />
per sold item among the competitors, which was double what Jakk’s had. Media can be<br />
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a switching cost factor. The media advertise the next big movie, book, and television<br />
show. The media influences the toy industry to buy trademark rights that consumers<br />
are more fascinated with because of the “hype” that the media instills upon the public.<br />
Three of the four toy companies make some kind of doll, action figure, and dress-up<br />
accessory with a different logo or physical characteristic. LeapFrog is more into making<br />
educational products with a “fun twist.” The variety of products with unique<br />
trademarks among toy companies has created a degree of differentiation. Product<br />
differentiation in firms is the ability to make a product stand out over other similar<br />
products.<br />
The toy industry has medium to high price sensitivity because switching costs<br />
can change due to season, media, trademarks, and licensing rights. The industry<br />
follows media trends such as video games, actors, books, movies, and television shows.<br />
Relative bargaining power is the firm’s ability to set a price to the customers. Wal-Mart,<br />
Toy ‘R’ Us, and Target are the major customers in the U.S. and have the ability to<br />
dictate price because they account for a majority of the sales in the toy industry. The<br />
volume of sales will make toy firms want to negotiate prices because there are no other<br />
retailers that can replace those high purchase amounts. The foreign market makes up<br />
approximately less than 50 percent. In this market, there are no dominating retailers to<br />
buy large portions of products. In this regard, the toy industry does have relative<br />
bargaining power with foreign customers. Toy industry customer leverage will have<br />
medium to high competition in unique commodity goods.<br />
The high cost for trademarks are spread out with the high volume of sales in the<br />
U.S. and the increase of international sales. Media will always play a role in trends and<br />
seasonality. The big three, U.S. toy retailers, can influence toy industry pricing for toys.<br />
The pricing power for Jakk’s and their competitors is medium for their customer<br />
bargaining power.<br />
Annual Gross Profits for the Toy<br />
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
Mattel 2,360,987 2,429,483 2,410,725 2,372,868 2,611,793 2,777,300<br />
Leap 270,041 340,144 259,045 279,636 147,034 173,306<br />
Hasbro 1,717,068 1,850,695 1,745,853 1,801,356 1,847,596 2,260,936<br />
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Jakk 129,843 126,442 226,007 266,707 294,794 323,650<br />
Industry Profit 4,477,939 4,746,764 4,641,630 4,720,567 4,901,217 5,535,192<br />
Bargaining Power of Suppliers<br />
Suppliers leverage or bargaining power of suppliers is the supplier’s bargaining<br />
power over the firm. A firm that has few alternative products choices and competitors in<br />
the industry can influence prices. The supplier’s leverage allows for firms to gain<br />
advantages in operating costs which in turn increases profit.<br />
Mattel, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, LeapFrog, and Hasbro dictate leverage because of the<br />
large number of suppliers. The toy industry has third party manufacturers to perform<br />
most of the production. Mattel, Hasbro, LeapFrog have at least one or two domestic<br />
manufacturing facilities. The industry in general has a variety of third party<br />
manufactures that supply their finished products and most third party manufacturers<br />
are located in Asia.<br />
The cost for raw material is transferred to third party manufacturers. The raw<br />
materials are metal alloys, plush, fabrics, paper, and electronic components. The<br />
switching cost is low because the industry has numerous third party manufacturers. An<br />
example would be <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> that has 80 suppliers. There is very little differentiation<br />
in suppliers because most of the third party manufacturers are in China. The quality and<br />
standard are held the same. Although, each toy company has at least one testing<br />
facility to make sure products are meeting quality standards. These testing facilities are<br />
usually located in the United States. The supplier’s high competition gives a low<br />
supplier’s leverage.<br />
The operating cost for the toy industry has been lower with third party<br />
manufacturers. The third party manufacturers have taken the risk for high inventory,<br />
work in process, and low consumer demand. These factors can fluctuate at times when<br />
it is not profitable. Toy firms gain profit from outsourcing their production. Toy firms<br />
have spread the amount of production to several third party manufacturers. Toy firms<br />
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have achieved cost leadership for each invests in third party production. The toy<br />
industry is able to minimize its operation expense and invest more in trademarks.<br />
Value Creation<br />
The toy and games industry is highly competitive. The largest firms are<br />
constantly battling over market share. To win customers the companies must<br />
implement strategies that create value and competitive advantages. These advantages<br />
are grouped into two groups: differentiation strategies and cost leadership strategies.<br />
Differentiation is offering something superior, be it unique products, customer service,<br />
variety, or brand image, at a cost less than what the customers are willing to pay for it.<br />
Cost leadership revolves around minimizing costs and maximizing efficiency. This<br />
allows the company to sell the product for the same price as their competitors and<br />
make a greater profit. In the toy industry a mixture of both differentiation and cost<br />
leadership strategies is most effective. However, differentiation is heavily favored. The<br />
largest firms in the industry emphasize the cost leadership strategies of economies of<br />
scale and input costs and production, as well as the differentiation strategies of product<br />
quality and variety, brands and marketing, and a focus on creativity and development.<br />
As said by Mattel “Competition in the manufacture, marketing, and sale of toys is based<br />
primarily on quality, play value, and price” (Mattel 2007 10-K).<br />
Economies of Scale<br />
All of the major players in the toy industry use similar methods to expand and<br />
grow their business. These strategies include selling their products internationally,<br />
growing core brands, and acquiring opportunistic licenses and brands. It is important in<br />
the toy industry to expand sales and offer products to the large international markets.<br />
The largest competitors in the industry report anywhere from 10-50% net sales coming<br />
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from international operations. In efforts to expand their business, Hasbro “operated in<br />
more than twenty other countries” which included Europe, Asia <strong>Pacific</strong>, Latin America,<br />
and South America (Hasbro 2007 10-K). Similarly, LeapFrog reported international<br />
segments composing 23% of consolidated net sales in 2007 (LeapFrog 2007 10-K).<br />
Many products and brand names have already been established internationally,<br />
but there are many brands with high international potential that have not been<br />
advertised in international markets, at least not yet anyways. Brands such as<br />
Transformers, Monopoly, Barbie, Hot Wheels, and LucasArts are popular worldwide and<br />
generate value for their firms. To create additional value, firms must push the high<br />
potential products into the international markets.<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> reports that they “focus our business on acquiring or licensing wellrecognized<br />
trademarks or brand names” (<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, Inc. 10-K). The industry leaders<br />
are constantly purchasing new licenses and brands to offer the most desired products<br />
to customers. The toy industry is very sensitive to fads. If Hannah Montana is the<br />
newest doll that every girl wants then acquiring the license to make Hannah Montana<br />
dolls would be a high value creator.<br />
Input Costs and Production<br />
Minimizing input costs and maximizing production efficiency is the goal of this<br />
cost leadership strategy. Production in the toy industry is most commonly outsourced<br />
to India, China, Japan, Mexico, Indonesia, and Thailand. The reason for outsourcing is<br />
to achieve lower costs without sacrificing product quality. Some risks of outsourcing<br />
experienced by all corporations as stated by Mattel include “political instability, civil<br />
unrest, economic instability, changes in government policies” (Mattel 2007 10-K). To<br />
diversify such risks companies produce their key products in more than one facility so<br />
that they will never be without one of their leading products.<br />
A wide variety of materials are used in producing toys and games. The most<br />
commonly used materials are plastics, cardboard, fabrics, dies, molds, paper products,<br />
alloys, and electronic components. These materials are obtained both from company<br />
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owned manufacturing facilities and from a wide variety of suppliers. Several of the raw<br />
materials are subject to price fluctuations, which in return alter the profits of the<br />
companies. To use another Mattel example, “Mattel Inc., the world’s largest toymaker,<br />
said third-quarter profit fell 5.2 percent as material costs rose and the company<br />
introduced new Barbie dolls” (www.gamerscircle.net). The firm can choose to absorb<br />
these costs like Mattel did, or charge their distributors more. The distributors can in<br />
turn either absorb the costs or charge customers more.<br />
Quality and Variety<br />
Product variety involves the different toy lines manufactured, and product quality<br />
refers to the quality and safety of the items in these lines. Product quality is of great<br />
importance in the toy and games industry. Competition is based primarily on meeting<br />
consumer entertainment preferences and on the quality and play value of our products<br />
(Hasbro 2007 10-K). Due to many of the toys being designed primarily for use by<br />
children, safety is of utmost importance. If a toy that is unsafe reaches the hands of a<br />
child it would assuredly harm the firm’s reputation, and possibly create a very expensive<br />
liability. To protect against this all products are meticulously inspected with quality<br />
assurance testing. In August of 2007 Mattel was forced to recall millions of toys made<br />
in China due to high levels of lead in the paint. This same incident resulted in a class<br />
action lawsuit forcing Mattel to pay for medical tests for children who played with the<br />
lead-contaminated toys. (www.consumeraffairs.com) other leading companies have<br />
also received negative publicity over the lead paint issues including RC2. Quality is also<br />
achieved by careful and creative product designs. The industry requires the use of<br />
special parts, paints, electronics, and diligent designing to create toys and action figures<br />
that function properly and truly resemble specific characters.<br />
Product variety is a top priority in the toy industry. The leading firms are always<br />
acquiring new licenses and brand names to be used in new product lines. They are also<br />
constantly revising and improving existing products to offer a new, different, and<br />
exciting playing experience. “Mattel regularly refreshes, redesigns, and extends existing<br />
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toy product lines and develops innovative new toy product lines for all segments. Mattel<br />
believes its success is dependent on its ability to continue this activity effectively”<br />
(Mattel 2007 10-K). As mentioned earlier companies must be making predictions of<br />
what will be popular in the upcoming years. It is important that they correctly<br />
determine which licenses to acquire in order to broaden their product lines with high<br />
demand toys.<br />
Brands and <strong>Mark</strong>eting<br />
In the toy industry popular brands are highly sought after. Kids want the<br />
popular toys and the fads. They want what their friends have and what they have seen<br />
on television. A popular brand can turn a simple product into a powerful asset. Just<br />
taking a basic pencil bag and placing a popular children’s star on it immensely increases<br />
the value of the product to kids. The brand alone can determine the success or failure<br />
of a product. This is why the leading firms are always working to acquire the most<br />
popular licenses and brands.<br />
The companies use a combination of commercials, songs, billboards,<br />
magazine ads, comic books, and other media devices to market their products. The<br />
industry standard is to spend around 10%-15% of net sales in advertising expense.<br />
The following chart shows the industry leaders advertising expense as a percentage of<br />
net sales over the last 5 years. Sales are highly seasonal in the toy industry and<br />
marketing efforts tend to increase during the fourth quarter, especially around<br />
Christmas, when sales tend to be their highest.<br />
Advertising Expense as a Percentage of Net Sales<br />
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> 3.93% 4.60% 5.87% 4.80% 2.60%<br />
Mattel 12.82% 12.60% 12.15% 11.52% 11.90%<br />
Hasbro 11.59% 12.93% 11.87% 11.71% 11.33%<br />
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Creativity and Development<br />
A focus on creativity and development involves frequent changes and alterations<br />
to existing products, and keeping current products up to date with technological<br />
advances. For toys and games creativity and development plays a large role in<br />
customer satisfaction. In order to have their customers continue to buy products firms<br />
must continue to be innovative in the designs of their items. This applies even more so<br />
today with the growing use of technology in toys. Hasbro states “Our success is<br />
dependent on innovation through the continuing development of new products and the<br />
redesign of existing products for continued market acceptance” (Hasbro 2007 10-K).<br />
An example of this continuing development is the new product lines Hasbro is releasing<br />
at the same time as the biggest movie releases of the summer. “Among the traditional<br />
toy and game categories, highlights include new products in support of several<br />
upcoming blockbusters including Indiana Jones and the Kingdom of the Crystal Skull,<br />
Iron Man and The Incredible Hulk. The entertainment doesn't stop there as a stellar line<br />
of products will be released is support of the upcoming Star Wars: The Clone Wars<br />
theatrical release and animated series” (www.superheroflix.com). Hasbro predicted<br />
these toys would be in very high demand upon the movies releasing. They made<br />
acquiring the licenses and creating the toys a top priority, and then planned the release<br />
of the toys to be at the same time as the cinematic hype of the movies peaked in order<br />
to maximize sales. In an industry this competitive, no company can afford to fall<br />
behind in the advancement and development of products.<br />
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Firm Competitive Advantage Analysis<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> deals with intense competition from rivals in the toy industry. It<br />
must create new products, expand product lines, acquire licenses for popular<br />
trademarks, and market products in a timely manner to remain effective. <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> is<br />
able to hold their own against competitors with greater resources, longer histories, and<br />
larger economics of scale. In doing so, they became a leader in the toy industry and<br />
were included in the “Fortune’s 100 Fastest Growing Companies for four years” and<br />
“Forbes’ 100 Best Small Companies for three years” (www.jakkspacific.com).<br />
In differentiation, the company tries to create innovative products that are<br />
superior in quality and variety to those offered by competitors. In doing so, they are<br />
able to market products that others cannot, thereby, gaining the edge over the<br />
competition. In this regard, they must focus on creativity and development to turn<br />
fantastic ideas into fantastic products and must market them successfully to gain<br />
consumer interest.<br />
If the toy industry were to focus on differentiation alone, they may run the risk<br />
of selling products that are too expensive to hold consumer interest. In this regard, the<br />
company can pursue economics of scale, reduce input and production costs, and find<br />
ways to distribute products at a lower cost to remain effective. In the toy industry, the<br />
key to success can be found through a mixture of differentiation and cost leadership. In<br />
this regard, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> has focused on economics of scale (cost leadership), input<br />
costs and production (cost leadership), quality and variety (differentiation), brand and<br />
marketing (differentiation), creativity and development (differentiation), flexible delivery<br />
(differentiation), and customer service (cost leadership) to thrive in the toy industry.<br />
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Economics of Scale<br />
The phrase, economics of scale, can be interpreted to mean that “bigger is<br />
better”. In expanding, the company can gain resources (raw materials, people,<br />
technology, etc) that allow them to make products at a lower cost. It can achieve this<br />
by entering foreign territories (larger customer base and sources for labor and<br />
manufacturing) and through acquisitions (devouring small companies to gain people,<br />
technology, products, distribution channels, etc).<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> sells their products through retailers in the United States, Europe,<br />
Australia, Canada, Latin America, and Asia. In foreign markets, they have sent<br />
representatives, invested resources, and developed relationships with distributers and<br />
retailers to expand into those regions and to increase sales. In foreign territories, there<br />
is the opportunity to hire third party manufacturers (which they do) that can reduce the<br />
cost for products due to the lower cost they charge for their services (information on<br />
that is provided in the next section).<br />
In acquisitions, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> searches for companies with useful product lines<br />
and checks the financial condition, management ability, and distribution channels of<br />
those companies before pursuing them. In 2006, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> acquired Creative<br />
Designs International, a leading manufacturer of dress up and role play toys. In doing<br />
so, they were able to expand their product lines, improve product development, and<br />
bring new marketing talent to the company. In closing, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> pursued economics<br />
of scale by expanding into foreign territories and seeking acquisitions.<br />
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Input Costs and Production<br />
In cost leadership, the desire for lower input costs and efficient production are<br />
self explanatory, they want to make more products for less money and get them out<br />
into the market as soon as possible. <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> manufactures most of their products<br />
in China and sells them on a letter of credit or open account to customers. In doing so,<br />
they are able to reduce operating costs and working capital requirements. In addition,<br />
third party manufacturers allow the company to avoid fixed manufacturing costs while<br />
maintaining “flexibility, capacity, and production technology” (<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, Inc. 2007<br />
10-K). In fact, they have ongoing relationships with over 80 different manufacturers.<br />
The raw materials used in production are plastics, zinc alloy, plush, printed<br />
fabrics, paper products, and electronic components, that are sold at reasonable prices<br />
from a variety of sources. It is safe to assume that any fluctuation in the price of raw<br />
material will affect the price paid to the manufacturer. In regards to the risks involved,<br />
there is a chance of dealing with product defects, product delays, cost overruns, or the<br />
inability to meet orders on a timely basis. <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> may be able to secure other<br />
manufacturers in the event this occurred but doing so would hurt operations. It,<br />
therefore, realizes the importance of having strong relationships with their<br />
manufacturers and to date have experienced no significant delays in the production or<br />
delivery of their goods.<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> have also hired third parties to provide a portion of the sculpting,<br />
sample making, illustration, and package designs for their products. In addition, they<br />
(like other toy companies) license popular brands instead of purchasing them for doing<br />
so grants them “access to a far greater range of marks than would be available for<br />
purchase” (<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, Inc. 2007 10-K). In closing, by relying on and maintaining<br />
strong relations with third party manufacturers, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> is able to make their<br />
products for a lower cost and by licensing brands instead of purchasing them they are<br />
able to save money.<br />
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Quality and Variety<br />
In the toy industry, companies hunt for licenses on brands to create products of<br />
interest, the problem, however, is that multiple companies can acquire the same<br />
license, meaning that substitute products can be made. In effect, a company, that<br />
neglects to differentiate their product, will earn nothing compared to a company that<br />
invested time and effort to create something more unique. In addition, the quality of<br />
products is relevant, for toys must maintain a level of quality to avoid being rejected<br />
and need to be safe for kids for obvious reasons.<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> is involved in the design of the product prototype, production tools,<br />
dies, and molds needed to make their products. It ensures product quality by checking<br />
the production process and testing the finish goods through quality control inspectors.<br />
In 2007, toy manufacturers (Mattel, RC2, etc) received bad publicity for selling toys<br />
from China with lead paint, but <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> was able to escape this hype and assured<br />
analysts and parents of the precautions (having a testing facility in China, certified by<br />
the Chinese government, to conduct real time testing with laser equipment and by<br />
employing third party testing) they take to avoid such incidents (www.fool.com). In the<br />
article, they were not blamed for selling lead based toys due to the simple fact that<br />
they did not sell them, the steps they take to ensure the quality of products is to be<br />
commended.<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> strives to achieve a level of excellence in the products they make<br />
and develop. In this regard, they have used specialized technology, custom parts, and<br />
unique materials to create realistic action figures that appeal to children and collectors<br />
alike due to their superior quality and strong resemblance to their representative<br />
characters. In seeking new products or in expanding product lines, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> can<br />
take advantage of useful acquisitions. In June 2005, they acquired Pet Pal Corp. which<br />
expanded their product lines to include pet toys, treats, and other pet related products.<br />
In addition, the acquisition of other companies, like Creative Designs International,<br />
gives further proof as to how this company can benefit from useful acquisitions. In<br />
closing, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> strives to create products that are fun and safe for kids (product<br />
40
quality) and endeavor to find new products (product variety) through development<br />
efforts (explain later) and through meaningful acquisitions.<br />
Brand and <strong>Mark</strong>eting<br />
In brand name, people tend to recognize the company through the products they<br />
make over the name of the company itself. In truth, this is not a major issue for having<br />
their products recognized by consumers for their quality and functionality is of greater<br />
concern than the name itself. In terms of marketing, they have sales and marketing<br />
personal that make on site visits to customers to showcase their products and to<br />
acquire orders from them. It has relied on sales representatives to sell and promote<br />
products in domestic and international markets and works with retailers to test<br />
consumer acceptance of products before committing to large scale production.<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> advertize their products through magazines (along with other<br />
publications) and specialty (international, national, regional, stationary, etc) trade<br />
shows, conventions, and exhibitions. It makes use of printed ads, television ads, and in<br />
store displays to gain consumer interest. In fact, they have television commercials for<br />
most of their product lines (WWE action figures, Disney role play sets, Plug It In & Play<br />
TV Games, Puppy in My Pocket and Friends, EyeClops, Hannah Montana toys, Cabbage<br />
Patch Kids dolls, etc). In recent events, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> launched the Fancy Nancy product<br />
line (features dolls, accessories, activity items, etc) which is based on a popular<br />
children’s book that sold over 2 million copies (online.wsj.com). In marketing products<br />
for those brands, ones that are popular and capture the interest and imagination of<br />
target consumers, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> is able to gain “consumer recognition and retailer<br />
interest” (<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, Inc. 2007 10-K).<br />
In license agreements, they seek brands and trademarks that are recognized or<br />
considered evergreen (brands or trademarks with long product histories). In seeking<br />
those brands, they are able to create products that are resistant to shifting trends. In<br />
doing so, those products tend to live longer and generate greater sales than those<br />
created for the sake of a fad. In this regard, they have acquired licenses from WWE,<br />
41
Nickelodeon, Disney ®, and Warner Bros ® along with Marvel and Pokemon to name<br />
just a few. In addition, the license for WWE and the joint venture with THQ gave them<br />
the right to publish and market video games based on the WWE on a global basis. In<br />
finding ways to get the most out of a license, they had demonstrated how resourceful<br />
they can be, but by gaining success from being too creative in that regard can lead to<br />
problems as well. In 2004, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> faced a lawsuit from WWE that demanded<br />
higher royalties due to the video games <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> created through the joint venture<br />
with THQ. The lawsuit was settled and <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> can sell WWE toys till 2010 (which<br />
they will), but they will have to rely on the TNA brand after that date (www.fool.com).<br />
In closing, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> has a variety of methods that they can employ to<br />
advertize their products and will hunt for licenses (got into a little trouble with this one<br />
but otherwise did a good job) of recognized or evergreen brands to remain effective<br />
against competitors.<br />
Advertising Expense as a Percentage of Net Sales<br />
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> 3.93% 4.60% 5.87% 4.80% 2.60%<br />
Mattel 12.82% 12.60% 12.15% 11.52% 11.90%<br />
Hasbro 11.59% 12.93% 11.87% 11.71% 11.33%<br />
Creativity and Development<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> knows that kids tend to outgrow toys at younger ages “in favor of<br />
interactive and high technology products” (<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, Inc. 2007 10-K). It is due to<br />
this factor that products tend to have shorter life cycles and that expectations for those<br />
products have increased. In this regard, they must redesign and extend products and<br />
products lines to meet those demands and to gain customer approval. In pursuing this,<br />
they have used managers to help identify and evaluate products and opportunities. In<br />
addition, they employ a staff of designers to help create new ideas and concepts for the<br />
product lines. <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> has relied on third party designers to help gain the edge in<br />
this part of the business. In fact, they believe that “utilizing third party inventors gives<br />
42
them access to a wider range of development talent” (<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, Inc. 2007 10-K). In<br />
keeping this in mind, they have hired third party developers to program their Plug It In<br />
& Play TV Games. It is evident that <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> taps into a lot of third party resources,<br />
but by delegating tasks and by acquiring ideas from different sources, they are able to<br />
create more innovative and unique products, than they may have been able to if they<br />
handled things alone.<br />
In this company, proof of creativity and resourcefulness can be noted in the<br />
products they make and in the products they plan to release on future dates. In the<br />
fall, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> will release a product called EyeClops Night Vision, a powerful set of<br />
night vision goggles for kids, they were able to secure a deal for the processors<br />
required for that product at a low price, as a result, the product that might have cost<br />
$250 dollars in the past, can now be sold at a price of around $80 dollars<br />
(online.wsj.com). In closing, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> relies on talent from internal sources (people<br />
from the company) and external sources (third party sources) and are able to create<br />
better products in more timely fashion as a result.<br />
Flexible Delivery<br />
In differentiation, the distribution of products at the right time and place is the<br />
key to understanding the idea of flexible delivery. In general, they have sold products<br />
to toy retail stores, department stores, office supply stores, drug stores, and toy<br />
specialty stores. In this regard, the largest customers for them are Wal-Mart, Target,<br />
and Toys ‘R’ Us. In addition, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> has sold products through e-commerce sites<br />
(Toysrus.com and Amazon.com). In the acquisition of Pet Pal, they gained access to pet<br />
supply retailers such as Petco and Petsmart. It was stated in the financials that retailers<br />
tend to avoid dependency on large toy companies giving smaller companies like <strong>Jakks</strong><br />
<strong>Pacific</strong>, the opportunity to grow by granting them access to distribution channels. In<br />
gaining those channels, the company is able to reach a wider range of customers and<br />
may be able to increase sales as a result.<br />
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<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> delivers products to customers within three to six months for orders<br />
shipped F.O.B. China or Hong Kong and within three days for orders shipped<br />
domestically. In terms of seasonality, the first quarter sales tend to be the lowest, but<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> is able to counter that loss through sales of their writing instrument and<br />
activity products during the second quarter. In the spring and summer, where they sell<br />
most of the seasonal products, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> believes “that the low retail price of most<br />
of their products may be less subject to seasonal fluctuations than higher priced toy<br />
products” from competitors (<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, Inc. 2007 10-K). In closing, flexible delivery<br />
(right time and place) is achieved by selling products on the basis of seasonality or<br />
popularity (right time) and through the distribution channels they employ (right place).<br />
Customer Service<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> “is an aggressive and passionate company with a commitment to<br />
customers and a dedication to growing their business” (www.jakkspacific.com). It is not<br />
directly stated in their financials but they do have a variety of methods to help their<br />
customers should problems arise. In terms of product issues, they have a guide on their<br />
website that provides tips on what can be done. In addition, they provide information<br />
on removal remedies for messy products. <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> has provided information on how<br />
to contact them by phone, by letter, or by email to more directly address the concerns<br />
or problems that customers may face. In their website, there is also information with<br />
respect to the warranty on products and of course on the products themselves. In<br />
closing, this section highlights on the methods that <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> employs to help their<br />
customers with their problems. In truth, it could have been left out, but was included<br />
for the sake of gaining a more complete understanding of the company.<br />
Conclusion<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> strives to expand by entering into foreign markets, seeking<br />
acquisitions, and by pursuing licenses for lasting brands. It has created innovative<br />
products of superior quality and worked to develop product lines to gain customer<br />
approval and recognition. It has reduced cost and created products by relying on the<br />
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skills they have and in the talent of third party groups and individuals. In being<br />
resourceful and creative (important traits for any industry), they were able to get more<br />
of what they had, and in spite of a few bumps along the way (lawsuit with WWE), they<br />
have done a fantastic job in pursuing competitive advantages and are likely to remain<br />
successful in their industry for many years to come.<br />
Formal Accounting Analysis<br />
The accounting analysis will look into how well the firms in the industry are<br />
managing their accounting policies and will seek to determine if potential manipulation<br />
exists with respect to <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>. This analysis will be done by examining and<br />
thoroughly evaluating the Key Accounting Policies (KAPs). We have identified and<br />
broken the KAPs down into the following groups: goodwill, advertising, research and<br />
design. Additionally, the company’s handling of capital and operating leases and<br />
currency risk will be covered as well. We will assess potential accounting flexibility for<br />
each of these items using knowledge of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles<br />
(GAAP) and the disclosure of the firms in the industry. Next, the actual accounting<br />
strategies used by the firm will be discussed by looking into disclosure as well as the<br />
firm’s level of conservatism or aggression. After the level of disclosure is determined<br />
we will evaluate and inspect the quality of the disclosure to determine if the company<br />
satisfies our decision making information needs. Then we will move onto a quantitative<br />
analysis which will include cross sectional and time series analysis using diagnostic<br />
ratios. Next potential “red flags” will be identified by examining any unexplained or<br />
unusual changes present in the financial statements. Finally, should we find any<br />
45
accounting distortions that significantly alter our insights on the company we will<br />
restate the numbers to reduce the distortion as much as possible.<br />
Key Accounting Policies<br />
The industry characteristics along with each company’s own competitive strategy<br />
determine the key value drivers for a particular firm. A firm’s key accounting policies<br />
are items within financial statements that directly relate to these key success factors,<br />
which were identified for the toy and games industry in the five forces model. Our goal<br />
in this part of the accounting analysis is to evaluate the extent to which <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong><br />
discloses the information pertaining to the key success factors we have identified. The<br />
principle items that we identified to drive value in this industry are the ability to control<br />
costs, economies of scale, creativity, and marketing. The process used in this section of<br />
the accounting analysis was to first identify the accounting measure that the company<br />
used to capture the key success factors. Then we assessed the policies that determine<br />
how the accounting measures are implemented. Lastly, we identified the estimates<br />
used in these polices. By comparing the disclosure of the company with the guidelines<br />
provided by GAAP, we can make an assessment as to whether or not the firm misused<br />
the allowed flexibility.<br />
Accounting Flexibility<br />
Accounting flexibility is a firm’s ability to use accounting methods to show its<br />
financial performance. Firms have some discretion on how they depreciate assets,<br />
expense accounts, and recognize liabilities. Firms do not have equal accounting<br />
flexibility because some accounting methods can be treated as conservative or<br />
aggressive. Firms, being aggressive or conservative with accounting policies, may deny<br />
outsiders the ability to capture the firm’s true financial performance. The flexibility in<br />
accounting allows firms to hide or reveal financial data to the public.<br />
46
Financial Accounting Standard Board sets the accounting flexibility through<br />
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Jakk’s key accounting policies and FASB’s<br />
guidelines should be parallel. Looking at Jakk’s key accounting policies will allow us to<br />
determine if the key success factors are really adding value to the firm.<br />
Accounting Strategy<br />
The amount of flexibility that managers have in reporting the key accounting policies<br />
that we have analyzed leads to indentifying accounting strategy that the firm uses. Out<br />
of the range of possibilities allowed by GAAP, we will assess which method chosen by<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> and how it effects the financial statements. This is important to<br />
investigate and infer whether the firm is using this flexibility to accurately communicate<br />
their firm’s economic situation or if they are hiding true performance. If the company is<br />
engaged in earning management, the transparency of the company is greatly reduced.<br />
This can make it difficult to evaluate to true performance of the firm, considering that<br />
managers would be making accounting policy choices not based on representing the<br />
actual business activities.<br />
Each of the principle accounting policies will be assessed based on disclosure<br />
requirements as defined by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Based upon the<br />
level of disclosure, the key accounting policies will be indentified as conservative or<br />
aggressive. In conservative accounting, managers do not want to overstate income. If<br />
the company were labeling items based on their historical values rather than their<br />
market value, this would signify a potential red flag. In aggressive accounting,<br />
managers are reporting items in such a way that they lead to higher reported earnings.<br />
This would occur for example, if the firm did not want to violate loan covenants.<br />
Quality of Disclosure<br />
We will examine the amount of flexibility that managers have when reporting the<br />
key accounting policies. The amount of disclosure required is defined in the Generally<br />
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), which is the standard framework for financial<br />
47
accounting. For each key accounting policy, we looked at what the minimum<br />
requirements were as defined by GAAP and then compared the quality information from<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> in relation to the industry. Even though GAAP has a minimum<br />
requirement, we are looking to see if <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> or other competitors went beyond<br />
this notion, to express to investors the true underlying economic status of the business<br />
activities. Some of the items analyzed were footnotes, Management Discussion and<br />
Analysis, and whether or not accounting rules prevent the company from measuring its<br />
key success factors appropriately. Basically, we determined from the information<br />
presented if the company disclosing the information that is useful in making investment<br />
decisions.<br />
Goodwill<br />
[GAAP Flexibility = Low, Disclosure = High]<br />
Goodwill is a significant part of Jakk’s balance sheet and accounts for about 36%<br />
of their total assets. Assessing the accounting policy and disclosure associated with<br />
goodwill can help reveal the benefit of having goodwill in the accounting book.<br />
Goodwill is the purchase price minus fair market value of net asset. Goodwill is<br />
an intangible asset. Firms create goodwill with the presumption that future cash flows<br />
of the purchase (acquisition or patent) will be greater than the goodwill itself.<br />
Reputation, product line, and location are some reasons why firms pay extra for<br />
trademarks, patents, and companies. Jakk’s large investment in intangible assets allows<br />
Jakk to compete with larger market share than competitors.<br />
Goodwill (thousands)<br />
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
Jakk 190728 258331 269298 337999 353340<br />
Hasbro 463680 467061 469726 469938 471177<br />
LeapFrog 19549 19549 19549 19549 19549<br />
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Mattel 722249 735680 718069 845324 845649<br />
The chart shows the growth in goodwill for toy companies over the past five<br />
years. Jakk’s goodwill has increased every year without any impairment. Hasbro and<br />
Mattel’s goodwill has grown at a slow pace because of their larger market share in the<br />
toy industry. Hasbro and Mattel’s slow growth in goodwill could be caused by acquiring<br />
fewer companies or purchasing fewer trademarks over time. Leapfrog has not changed<br />
in the past five years with respect to goodwill. LeapFrog could be overstating goodwill<br />
and understating the impairment. A comparison of intangible assets and total assets in<br />
the toy companies may give an indication of how much of the intangible asset<br />
(goodwill) is important or not.<br />
Goodwill / Total Assets<br />
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
Jakk Goodwill 190728 258331 269298 337999 353340<br />
Total Asset 529997 696762 753955 881894 982688<br />
35.99% 37.08% 35.72% 38.33% 35.96%<br />
Hasbro Goodwill 463680 469726 467061 469938 471777<br />
Total Asset 3163376 3240660 3301143 3096905 3237663<br />
14.66% 14.49% 14.15% 15.17% 14.57%<br />
LeapFrog Goodwill 19549 19549 19549 19549 19549<br />
Total Assets 45595 54303 53727 58529 53727<br />
42.88% 36.00% 36.39% 33.40% 36.39%<br />
Mattel Goodwill 722249 735680 718069 845324 845649<br />
Total Assets 4510950 4756492 4372313 4955884 4805455<br />
16.01% 15.47% 16.42% 17.06% 17.60%<br />
Jakk’s goodwill takes up 35.67% of all total assets in 2007 (<strong>Jakks</strong> 2007 10-K).<br />
Hasbro’s goodwill takes up 14.57% of total assets. LeapFrog’s goodwill takes up<br />
36.97% of total assets. Mattel’s goodwill takes up 17.60% of total assets. In truth,<br />
these percentages are a bit misleading because <strong>Jakks</strong> and LeapFrog are small compared<br />
49
to Mattel and Hasbro. Mattel and Hasbro have large goodwill accounts but their<br />
goodwill is small compared to their total assets. On the other hand, Jakk’s and<br />
LeapFrog’s goodwill is large compared to their total assets.<br />
Goodwill’s accounting policy for Jakk is important because goodwill counts for<br />
more than a third of all total assets. The acquisition of companies over time has made<br />
goodwill a large factor in the accounting book. <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> has designed and<br />
researched some of their products, but they have claimed to have gained a competitive<br />
edge by buying companies with better products and known brands.<br />
Jakk’s disclosure for goodwill has detailed descriptions on what has been<br />
acquired. <strong>Jakks</strong> puts dollar amount to acquisition cost. For example, <strong>Jakks</strong> purchased<br />
Creative Design and shows the acquired fair value of net total assets, recognized total<br />
liabilities, and the account for the goodwill in a chart for the acquisition. <strong>Jakks</strong> also<br />
adjusted sales based on what was contributed from Creative Design.<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> listed its products as being traditional toys, creative toys, activity toys,<br />
writing toys, and pet toys and adjusted goodwill through “performance criteria” for each<br />
product line. Jakk’s competitors talk about the procedures and guidelines and puts<br />
goodwill in their balance sheet, but, competitors never go into discussion about the<br />
value of the goodwill acquired through their purchases. The competitors probably do<br />
not go into detail because their strategy does not rely heavily on acquisitions.<br />
Goodwill is tested for impairment annually. First, the manager needs to<br />
determine the fair value of net assets for the current year. Second, the manager needs<br />
to calculate the previous year carrying value of the firm for goodwill. If the current fair<br />
value of the entity is greater than the historic carrying value of net assets then goodwill<br />
has not been impaired. If the current carrying value of the entity is less than the<br />
previous carrying value, then goodwill has been impaired. Managers need to find the<br />
implied goodwill, which is found by taking the current fair value of the entity minus the<br />
current carrying value without goodwill. Lastly, managers need to adjust implied<br />
goodwill to the current carrying value of goodwill [debit to the impairment account<br />
(expense) and credit to contra asset account (accumulated goodwill)].<br />
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The accounting flexibility for goodwill has changed to allow for more judgment in<br />
indicating the impairment of goodwill. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)<br />
has allowed goodwill to be amortized over a maximum of 40 years. GAAP did not allow<br />
any leeway in the impairment of goodwill. If goodwill exists during a purchase then<br />
accountants mark the book for the fair value of the entity and count the excess as<br />
goodwill. Then, the accountants amortize the goodwill over several years. Nowadays,<br />
FASB allows accountants to calculate the fair value and test for impairment. The recent<br />
procedures to determine goodwill has a pitfall and that is the judgment of the manager.<br />
Manager’s judgment can manipulate the asset and expense accounts due to the<br />
accounting flexibility in goodwill. If goodwill is never impaired, expenses will be<br />
understated, assets will be overstated, and net income is going to be higher every year.<br />
The balance sheet will have higher retained earnings due to the adjusted net income<br />
balance. If impairment does occur then net income will be smaller. Total assets and<br />
retain earnings on the balance sheet will gradually decrease in dollars. In either case,<br />
liabilities will not be affected by the change. Goodwill impairment should be recognized<br />
so that the cost of doing business is recognizable to investors. If goodwill stays constant<br />
or has incremental growth then it can overstate total assets.<br />
Jakk has a high level of disclosure with an aggressive accounting policy in<br />
regards to goodwill, but there are some doubts, based on how large it is on the balance<br />
sheet. Overall transparency of <strong>Jakks</strong> 10K is not so clear but is good enough to meet<br />
FASB guidelines. <strong>Jakks</strong> does a good job in showing how they take in a company’s net<br />
assets and net liabilities. But, the management has enough accounting flexibility to<br />
misjudge the true value of goodwill. The annual impairment may not be enough to keep<br />
goodwill current. Jakk’s competitors are not big on acquisitions and do not reveal<br />
goodwill as well as Jakk does. But, when <strong>Jakks</strong> debits goodwill for “performance<br />
criteria”, analysts should be worried. The “performance criteria” could raise some red<br />
flags. The future benefit of goodwill can be difficult to determine without any consistent<br />
impairment. Jakk’s 10K gives sufficient information to the public to enable them to<br />
predict and forecast Jakk’s performance.<br />
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Advertising Expense<br />
[GAAP Flexibility = Low, Disclosure = Low]<br />
In the toy industry, the largest companies all use extensive advertising<br />
campaigns to promote their product lines. These campaigns include advertisements in<br />
magazines, television commercials, billboards, newspapers, and online ads. <strong>Jakks</strong><br />
charges the cost of commercials and programming to operations in the year in which<br />
the production first aired. Other advertisements are charged to operations in the year<br />
incurred (<strong>Jakks</strong> 2007 10-K). The Mattel, Hasbro, and LeapFrog 10-Ks each directly<br />
state that they use these same accounting policies to record advertising expenses.<br />
As can be seen in the chart below, <strong>Jakks</strong> has spent far less of a percentage of<br />
their net sales on advertising than its competitors. <strong>Jakks</strong> partially explains this in their<br />
10-K by stating that there was a “decrease of advertising and promotional expenses of<br />
$6.4 million in 2006 to support several of our product lines” and that “from time to<br />
time, we may increase or decrease our advertising efforts, if we deem it appropriate for<br />
52
particular products” (<strong>Jakks</strong> 2007 10-K). While this explains some of the discrepancy<br />
between <strong>Jakks</strong> and its competitors, suggesting a rather low year in advertising costs,<br />
there is still a large difference in present. If the $6.4 million is added to the $36.7<br />
million total <strong>Jakks</strong> spent in 2006, <strong>Jakks</strong> would still only reach 5.6% of net sales spent on<br />
advertising. From this research we are able to conclude that <strong>Jakks</strong> implements a less<br />
extensive advertising campaign relative to the industry standard.<br />
Advertising Expense [Percentage of Net Sales]<br />
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> 3.93% 4.60% 5.87% 4.80% 2.60%<br />
Mattel 12.82% 12.60% 12.15% 11.52% 11.90%<br />
Hasbro 11.59% 12.93% 11.87% 11.71% 11.33%<br />
All of the firms are recording their advertising expenses in the same way. This is<br />
because there is very little flexibility allowed. The Generally Accepted Accounting<br />
Principles (GAAP) has clear and specific standards addressing the recording of<br />
advertising expenses. The requirements of GAAP are documented in Statement of<br />
Position (SOP) 93-7, which applies to any promotional activity intended to stimulate,<br />
directly or indirectly, a customer’s purchase of goods or services. This includes but is<br />
not limited to: commercials, mailings, catalogues, brochures, billboards, and other<br />
means of advertisement (www.sec.gov). SOP 93-7 commands that all advertising costs<br />
must be handled in one of two ways. They may either be expensed as incurred or<br />
deferred until the advertising program commences. The exception to this rule is direct<br />
response advertising, such as catalogs and mailing costs, which are capitalized and<br />
amortized over the period of expected benefits. Of the four major competitors in the<br />
industry only Mattel has categorized any advertising as direct response. This is due to<br />
very strict criteria to qualify advertising as direct response, and the fact that the amount<br />
of expense to be deferred from catalogues and mailing expenses is immaterial in the<br />
big picture. In summary, <strong>Jakks</strong>, Mattel, Hasbro, and LeapFrog are all in accordance<br />
with GAAP. Each company directly states how advertising expenses are being recorded,<br />
and they are all within the boundaries outlined by SOP 93-7.<br />
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<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, Inc. is a company of low disclosure when it comes to advertising<br />
expenses. The only information is a short paragraph informing the reader that <strong>Jakks</strong> is<br />
in compliance with GAAP. The only other piece of information provided by the<br />
paragraph is the amount of advertising expenses for 2005, 2006, and 2007. <strong>Jakks</strong> has<br />
reported just above the bare minimum to satisfy GAAP. Since there is almost no<br />
flexibility with the subject of advertising expense, <strong>Jakks</strong> doesn’t have the ability to be<br />
aggressive or conservative on this topic. Their earnings cannot be skewed up or down<br />
by changing the recording of advertising expense, because doing so would quickly<br />
violate SOP 93-7.<br />
Overall, the information provided by <strong>Jakks</strong> is not transparent. All we know is<br />
how much has been spending on advertising, and that they are in compliance with<br />
GAAP. <strong>Jakks</strong> disclosed just above the minimum amount of information required. Our<br />
information needs are not nearly satisfied. More specifics would be very useful. How<br />
much money is being spent on each product line? How much money is put into each of<br />
the advertising mediums? What are the differences in quarterly advertising costs?<br />
Answers to these questions would greatly increase our understanding of <strong>Jakks</strong><br />
advertising strategy.<br />
Research and Development<br />
[GAAP Flexibility = Low, Disclosure = None]<br />
In terms of accounting, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> did not provide any information on the cost<br />
involved in the research and development of their products. In contrast, Hasbro and<br />
Leapfrog treated it like an operating expense. In the definition, “research” refers to the<br />
task of getting information and “development” deals with using that knowledge to<br />
create or improve something. In that regard, it is important to note that lasting<br />
development requires investing in research (keep up with the times or lose to the<br />
competition). In <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, they may have included research and development in<br />
operating expenses [SG&A] or treated it as part of cost of sales, but the reason as to<br />
why may provoke some concerns in the red flags section. In reality, it is difficult to<br />
54
determine what the company did but talking about this section is nonetheless<br />
important.<br />
In the first case, R&D can be charged to SG&A due to GAAP (SFAS No. 2) which<br />
requires that R&D be expensed as incurred. In general, both, IFRS and GAAP, require<br />
that research be expensed as incurred but differ on their treatment of developmental<br />
cost. In either aspect, the treatment of R&D seems to violate the matching principle of<br />
accrual accounting that requires that expenses be recognized alongside the revenues<br />
they create, but with R&D, the effect on revenue is not easy to determine, which is why<br />
it is expensed when incurred and treated the way it is.<br />
In the second case, the IFRS, International Financial Reporting Standards, stated<br />
in IAS 38.45, that research costs can be classified as cost of sales and that the<br />
amortization of development costs after it has been capitalized as an intangible asset<br />
and amortized over its useful life can be included to that cost as well (www.pwc.com).<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> relies on manufacturing facilities in Asia (China and Hong Kong) and may<br />
be able to use IAS 38.45 to include their R&D in cost of sales.<br />
In relation to R&D, if an acquisition is involved in the R&D of products in the<br />
process of being developed (not yet sold) then GAAP allows the acquirer to capitalize an<br />
amount of IPR&D (In Process R&D) as part of the acquisition price. In terms of IPR&D,<br />
the acquirer can distort earnings by manipulating the “fair value” perceived for the<br />
IPR&D of the acquisition, leading to lower earnings in the current year but “minimizing<br />
earnings changes in future periods due to the lower value associated with goodwill”<br />
(findarticles.com). In regards to that, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> (if they treat R&D as a operating<br />
expense) did not seem to have manipulated their earnings in such a way for they have<br />
a lot of goodwill on the balance sheet and because earnings seem to grow consistently<br />
from year to year, except between 2003 and 2004, but that was stated in the company<br />
overview section as being attributed to selling the right product at the right time.<br />
In logical terms, we can think of this company as having treated R&D as part of<br />
SG&A or cost of sales based on the competition and what is permissible by accounting<br />
standards. In that regard, there is no disclosure with respect to research and<br />
development, which is disappointing and can be considered a red flag for the company.<br />
55
In closing, there is some flexibility (regarding GAAP) in recording R&D expense, but<br />
they must abide by a strict set of rules in doing so.<br />
Capital and Operating Leases<br />
[GAAP Flexibility = High, Disclosure = Low]<br />
Capital and operating leases are used in the toy industry. <strong>Jakks</strong> uses operating<br />
leasing for their fixed assets. Their operating leases incorporate “office, warehouse,<br />
showroom facilities, and certain equipment” (Jakk 2007 10-K). In <strong>Jakks</strong> 10-K from<br />
2003-2007, they estimated operating leases for 5 years for each of them. For instance,<br />
if 2003 operating lease was $4.2 million, then they will estimate it for 2004, 2005, 2006,<br />
and 2007. Operating lease in 2007 was $10.2 million. Rent expense in 2007 was 4.2<br />
million out $10.2 million.<br />
The other competitors in the industry use a mixture of capital and operating<br />
leases in their books. Hasbro gives the same amount of information as <strong>Jakks</strong> does<br />
about their operating leases. LeapFrog has a mixture of capital and operating leases.<br />
Mattel also has a mixture of capital and operating leases. Half of the main competitors<br />
use operating leases, and the other half uses a mixture of capital and operating leases.<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> separate their operating leases values from the income statement. They<br />
put the amount of the operating lease cost in the disclosure and show a future chart for<br />
operating leases. Only the companies that use capital leases put their value in the<br />
balance sheet. These companies hide the values in the general expense account. It may<br />
be that operating leases account for the majority of general expenses.<br />
There is plenty of accounting flexibility to distinguish between capital leases and<br />
operating leases. In the United States, accounting standards allow for four possible<br />
conditions to create a capital lease. If the firm does not meet one of these guidelines,<br />
then it is an operating lease. First, ownership of the asset is transferred to the lessee at<br />
the end of the lease term. Second, the lessee has the option to purchase the asset for a<br />
bargain price at the end of the lease. Third, the lease term is 75 percent or more of the<br />
expected useful life of the asset. Last, the present value of the lease payments is 90<br />
56
percent or more of the fair value of the asset (Conditions from Palepu & Healy). These<br />
conditions make it difficult for an analyst to access a firm capitalization of a lease. The<br />
risk in accounting flexibility comes from the managers in the firm that can collude on<br />
hiding the distinction between the two types of leases.<br />
The actual accounting implementation in <strong>Jakks</strong> 10-k is low disclosure. They<br />
follow exactly what Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) requires. GAAP does<br />
not require you to have an account for operating leases. The operating lease expense is<br />
mixed with all other operating expense. Operating method does not need to recognize<br />
an obligation or asset in the accounting book. <strong>Jakks</strong> is conservative in their report on<br />
the operating lease cost. The estimation for the future operating lease cost in the 10-K<br />
is lower compared to the actual cost. For example, <strong>Jakks</strong> 10-K between 2003 through<br />
2007 has operating lease estimation that is always less than the actual incurred. The<br />
difference between estimation and actual is large and increases as time passes. For<br />
example, <strong>Jakks</strong> 10-K from 2003 to 2007 has operating lease estimations. The<br />
estimations are always less than the actual operating leases incurred. As time passes,<br />
the difference in these numbers (estimation and actual operating leases) increases. The<br />
estimate and actual operating leases may create distortion over long periods of time.<br />
The overall transparency is good enough to meet GAAP guideline. Jakk could<br />
make operating lease clearer by giving out who they lease from and for how long. In<br />
addition, they could also make their estimation for future lease more accurate. The<br />
managers know when they are going acquire a new company and renew a lease. Mattel<br />
does exactly what is recommended. <strong>Jakks</strong> 10-K gives enough to see how much<br />
operating lease are in operating expenses under the Income Statement.<br />
Currency Risk<br />
[Flexibility = Low, Disclosure = Average]<br />
Currency risk is associated with the change in price from one currency to<br />
another. This is a very important factor to examine considering that all of <strong>Jakks</strong><br />
product line production is outsourced to another country. In our current state of the<br />
57
economy (recession), the value of the dollar has declined in relation to other foreign<br />
currency. This would indicate bad news for <strong>Jakks</strong> considering that with a weak dollar<br />
means more expensive imports. However this is not the case for <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>. “The<br />
exchange rate of the Hong Kong dollar to the U.S. dollar has been fixed by the Hong<br />
Kong government since 1983 at HK$7.80 to US$1.00 and, accordingly, has not<br />
represented a currency exchange risk to the U.S. dollar” (<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> Inc., 10-K). This<br />
fixed rate between the two currencies ensures that the company will not be affected by<br />
the current U.S. recession.<br />
According to the Generally Accepted Accounting Principle (GAAP), companies are<br />
to, “inform investors of the nature and extent of the currency risks to which the<br />
registrant is exposed and to explain the effects of changes in exchange rates on its<br />
financial statements.” It also states that managers should describe any material effects<br />
of changes in currency exchange rates on reported revenues, costs, and business<br />
practices and plans. The flexibility that GAAP offers managers in the area of currency<br />
risk is small. If a company is exposed to operations outside of the country, they<br />
basically include every detail that is valuable to investors. Managers must include any<br />
material effects in currency, as well as discuss their strategies for the management of<br />
currency risk (ex. Hedging). The disclosure of <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> in this area meets the<br />
minimum requirements but does not go into further detail.<br />
Even though the requirements of GAAP extensively cover foreign transactions,<br />
we would like to be able to acquire more information on <strong>Jakks</strong> foreign operations. For<br />
example, Mattel lists the forward exchange contracts that were used to hedge firm<br />
foreign currency commitments in every country of their dealing. In <strong>Jakks</strong> defense<br />
however, they have chosen not to enter into foreign currency hedging transactions<br />
because they do not believe that changes in these exchange rates will result in a<br />
material effect on their future earnings, fair values, or cash flows. Therefore, they have<br />
less information to disclose than what their competitors do. Compared to the industry,<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> is very cautious when it comes to accepting unnecessary risk. This is the<br />
most likely reason as to why the third party producers are located in China and Honk<br />
Hong (fixed currency exchange rate for the latter).<br />
58
JAKKS PACIFIC, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES<br />
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OTHER COMPREHENSIVE INCOME<br />
Years Ended December 31,<br />
2005 2006 2007<br />
(In thousands)<br />
Other comprehensive income:<br />
Net income $63,493 $72,375 $88,991<br />
Foreign currency translation adjustment ($1,042) ($638) ($19)<br />
Other comprehensive income $62,451 $71,737 $88,972<br />
Translation adjustment to Net Income 1.64% 0.88% 0.02%<br />
In the table above, note that the item labeled, “foreign currency translation<br />
adjustment” shows the translation differences arising from changes in foreign currency<br />
rates with respect to the U.S. Dollar. As you can see, they have incurred a loss in the<br />
past three years resulting from currency risk exposure. According to the percentage of<br />
net income that this risk affects, we have concluded that this business activity does not<br />
account for a potential red flag. Seeing as the differences in currency exchange rates<br />
hasn’t had a material effect on net income for <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> of at least ten percent in the<br />
past three years, we consider this information to not be distorted.<br />
59
Quantitative Analysis<br />
In the quantitative analysis, we will use sales manipulation diagnostics and<br />
expense manipulation diagnostics to determine if the numbers reported in the financial<br />
statements are accurate (reflects true value of the firm) or distorted (more profitable<br />
than it actually is). In accounting, the flexibility in recording information along with the<br />
level of disclose, can allow companies to manipulate their reported numbers to seem<br />
more profitable to investors. In using diagnostics ratios, we attempt to see if<br />
manipulations exist (spotting red flags) and may be able to determine the true value of<br />
the company as a result. In the sales manipulation diagnostics, we look into the factors<br />
related with sales (cash, accounts receivables, inventory, etc). In the expense<br />
manipulation diagnostics, we look into the factors related with expenses. In these<br />
ratios, we will look for irregularities (should the ratio be that high or low?) and for<br />
inconsistencies in how it stacks up to the competition (does it follow the general trend<br />
or have a unique pattern of its own). In addition, the charts for the ratios will be<br />
represented in “raw” form (value for the ratio in each year) and “change” form (how<br />
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often that ratio fluctuates in each year), doing so lets us see if the numbers for the<br />
ratios are favorable and if they are consistent on a yearly basis.<br />
Sales Manipulation Diagnostics<br />
In this diagnostic, we are assessing the credibility of reported sales and will be<br />
using these ratios to do so: cash from sales (selling products is good but getting paid is<br />
better), account receivables (how much do creditors owe), unearned revenues<br />
(received the money before the product is exchanged or the service is performed),<br />
warranty liabilities (how much is reserved to compensate customers for faulty<br />
products), and inventory (goods available for sale now and goods on hand to save for a<br />
later period). In comparing the revenue diagnostic ratios across companies for a period<br />
of five years, we will be able to more easily determine where <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> stands in<br />
relation to the industry. Not only will the ratios review the differences in operating<br />
activities, but they will show if changes were industry wide or company specific.<br />
61
Net Sales/Cash from Sales<br />
The net sales divided by cash from sales is a ratio used to determine the amount<br />
of sales that are supported by the cash collected from sales. Cash from sales is<br />
determined by the difference in net sales and the change in accounts receivable. This<br />
is an important ratio because it shows how much cash a company is receiving from its<br />
sales. If the ratio were to go below one, this would be signal that the company is<br />
having trouble collecting on accounts receivable. A ratio in net sales divided by cash<br />
from sales equal to one would be a good indicator that a company is collecting on sales<br />
made in a reasonable amount of time. In regards to the ratios given in the graph<br />
above, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> seems to be moving with the industry. Leapfrog on the other<br />
hand, would signal a red flag because of the unpredictability from year to year within<br />
the ratio. Although <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> tends to fluctuate slightly, the level of change gives no<br />
cause for concern. This could simply be explained by any minute changes within the<br />
components of the ratio.<br />
In terms of the variation in the ratio, Leapfrog is the only company that had a<br />
significant change. The great change in Leapfrog compared to its competitors was<br />
62
cause by their 45% decrease in accounts receivable as well as a 23% decrease in sales.<br />
The rest of the industry has had relatively consistent net sales to cash from sales ratios.<br />
Δ Net Sales / Δ Cash from Sales 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> ‐0.28 0.95 0.74 4.54 0.67<br />
Hasbro 1.28 2.36 0.77 ‐2.59 1.11<br />
Mattel ‐0.49 ‐7.36 0.26 1.63 0.70<br />
Leapfrog 1.61 ‐0.32 ‐0.13 73.35 0.35<br />
Net Sales/Account Receivables<br />
The accounts receivable turnover ratio shows what quantity of sales where sold<br />
on account. Not only does this show the portion of sales made on account, it<br />
determines if accounts receivables support changes in net income. In 2005, <strong>Jakks</strong><br />
<strong>Pacific</strong> had a 14.7% decrease in accounts receivable from 2004. Other than that,<br />
increases in net sales have been supported by comparable increases in accounts<br />
receivable.<br />
63
With respect to the fluctuations in the accounts receivable turnover ratio, the<br />
obvious variance occurs with Mattel. Because sales and accounts receivable both went<br />
up by small increments, it caused a larger ratio. In this context, this is not a concern.<br />
However, slight changes in sales compared to the industry in 2005 for Mattel would be<br />
alarming in a company specific valuation. Although <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> has inconsistencies in<br />
this ratio from 2003 to 2005, the company has been on par with the industry for the<br />
past three years.<br />
64
Δ Sales / Δ Accounts Receivables 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 0.19 16.01 ‐5.79 1.58 4.30<br />
Hasbro 6.15 4.89 ‐1.62 1.93 6.97<br />
Mattel 1.41 0.66 47.35 2.57 6.75<br />
Leapfrog 1.34 0.77 0.32 1.27 11.56<br />
Net Sales/Inventory<br />
Due to spoilage, theft, storage, and other costs of inventories, holding an excess<br />
amount can be very costly for the company. This is why it is important to assess the<br />
net sales to inventory ratio, to get a sense of whether or not the inventory of a<br />
company supports their sales. For the past four years, the industry with the exception<br />
of Leapfrog has had comparable ratios for net sales to inventory. Note however that<br />
Hasbro and Mattel have had a recent declining trend, whereas <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> and<br />
Leapfrog have had increasing trends. Although the <strong>Jakks</strong> and Leapfrog both have lower<br />
inventory turnover than the other competitors, they are become increasingly efficient.<br />
65
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> and Mattel had a greater variability in their ratios. In the scope of<br />
the past five years, it is not uncommon to have variability in reported inventories from<br />
year to year in the toy and games industry. Because of this, greater changes in these<br />
ratios are allowable.<br />
66
Net Sales/Unearned Revenue<br />
In spite of tireless efforts, we could not find unearned revenue for the company<br />
or competitors, therefore, we cannot compute this ratio.<br />
Net Sales/Warranty Liabilities<br />
In spite of tireless efforts, we could not find warranty liabilities for the company<br />
or competitors, therefore, we cannot compute this ratio.<br />
Conclusion<br />
The revenue diagnostic ratios did not raise any concerns, or “red flags”, for <strong>Jakks</strong><br />
<strong>Pacific</strong>. We determined that <strong>Jakks</strong> moved with the industry with the net sales to cash<br />
from sales and the accounts receivable turnover ratios. However, on net sales to<br />
inventory the company is not performing as well as their competitors, but it is becoming<br />
more efficient in turning over inventory (we would expect this ratio to increase in the<br />
years immediately following).<br />
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Sales Manipulation Diagnostics<br />
Net Sales / Cash from Sales 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 1.10 1.03 0.98 1.09 1.03<br />
Hasbro 1.02 0.99 0.98 1.01 1.03<br />
Mattel 1.01 1.04 1.00 1.03 1.01<br />
Leapfrog 1.19 0.93 1.05 0.81 0.99<br />
Δ Net Sales / Δ Cash from Sales 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> ‐0.28 0.95 0.74 4.54 0.67<br />
Hasbro 1.28 2.36 0.77 ‐2.59 1.11<br />
Mattel ‐0.49 ‐7.36 0.26 1.63 0.70<br />
Leapfrog 1.61 ‐0.32 ‐0.13 73.35 0.35<br />
Sales / Account Receivables 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 3.67 5.62 7.59 5.00 4.91<br />
Hasbro 5.17 5.18 5.90 5.67 5.86<br />
Mattel 9.12 6.72 6.81 5.99 6.02<br />
Leapfrog 2.43 2.81 2.52 3.54 3.24<br />
Δ Sales / Δ Accounts<br />
Receivables 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 0.19 16.01 ‐5.79 1.58 4.30<br />
Hasbro 6.15 4.89 ‐1.62 1.93 6.97<br />
Mattel 1.41 0.66 47.35 2.57 6.75<br />
Leapfrog 1.34 0.77 0.32 1.27 11.56<br />
Net Sales / Inventory 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 7.11 11.49 9.91 9.97 11.35<br />
Hasbro 18.57 15.39 17.21 15.50 14.81<br />
Mattel 12.76 12.19 13.74 14.75 13.93<br />
Leapfrog 7.48 4.88 3.84 6.88 8.44<br />
Δ Net Sales / Δ Inventory 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 0.90 46.16 5.22 10.32 ‐70.43<br />
Hasbro ‐15.23 ‐5.47 ‐5.86 2.67 12.31<br />
Mattel 1.49 4.76 ‐1.83 75.36 7.02<br />
Leapfrog 23.03 ‐0.99 0.25 1.54 2.91<br />
68
Expense Manipulation Diagnostics<br />
In this diagnostic, we assess the credibility of reported expenses to see if<br />
potential expense manipulation exists. The following ratios link business activities to<br />
incurred expenses: asset turnover (are we generating revenue from our assets?), cash<br />
flow from operations divided by income from operations (does the cash we generate<br />
from operations equal the cash we earned from them?), cash flow from operations<br />
divided by net operating assets (are we generating revenue from our property and<br />
equipment?), pension expense divided by SG&A (selling, general and administrative<br />
expenses), and other employment expenses divided by SG&A (do we care about the<br />
workers?).<br />
Asset Turnover<br />
The asset turnover is found by dividing net sales by total assets. In doing so, we<br />
can determine if assets were manipulated for the sake of distorting expenses. In this<br />
ratio, we expect it to be consistent with no significant increases or decreases over time.<br />
In review, the ratio has been stable for <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, except for 2003, and tends to be<br />
the most consistent compared to the competition. In addition, we examined the size of<br />
the ratio and compared it to the competition to look for irregularities. In this, we found<br />
that <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> had the lowest ratio and found their assets to be larger than their<br />
sales. In a prior section, we found that goodwill accounted for 36% of total assets,<br />
which we deemed to be a red flag and is likely the reason why the ratio is so low for<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>. In this ratio, along with improper impairment (assets like goodwill) there<br />
is also the possibility that a company did not depreciate their assets (like property and<br />
equipment). In the chart, Hasbro, had a ratio below one, but that only held true for<br />
three years. At present, their ratio falls in line with other competitors such as Mattel and<br />
Leapfrog. It did not seem to be the case, but it would be a red flag if the ratio were too<br />
high (or suddenly became too high for one year) for this might indicate that the<br />
company was trying to overstate expenses for the purpose of understating net income.<br />
This could be done (once again) through improper impairment or depreciation, meaning<br />
69
they impaired or depreciated too much, leading to smaller total assets, which results in<br />
overstated expenses (recording that impairment or depreciation expense), which in turn<br />
leads to a smaller net income. In closing, this ratio confirmed prior analysis regarding<br />
goodwill for it is definitely a red flag for <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> that needs to be addressed in the<br />
undo accounting distortions section.<br />
Cash Flow from Operations / Income from Operations<br />
The CFFO (cash flow from operations) divided by OI (income from operations)<br />
should be close to one (cash we get for operations matches income we earned from<br />
operations). In this ratio, there was stability for most years, except in 2004, for <strong>Jakks</strong><br />
<strong>Pacific</strong>. In 2004, CFFO increased by 1677% and OI increased by 371.73%, this led to a<br />
high ratio for that year, which may be an indication that expenses were overstated for<br />
the purpose of understating net income. In 2003, CFFO decreased by 89.67% and OI<br />
decreased by 54.47% (lowest in the time considered) which may indicate that the<br />
company had a less productive year but recovered in 2004. In terms of the competition,<br />
except for Leapfrog, they seem to follow the same basic trend, meaning that for <strong>Jakks</strong><br />
<strong>Pacific</strong>, the values reported in their ratio, at least from an industry perspective, does not<br />
defy expectations (except for 2004) or provoke serious concern. In addition, the<br />
companies, except for Hasbro (2003 to 2005) and Leapfrog, tend to have ratios that are<br />
70
close to one. On a side note, if we were analyzing Leapfrog, we would be concerned for<br />
not only does their ratio defy the industry trend, but the losses in CFFO and OI, would<br />
be a red flag, not just in terms of accounting, but for the company itself. In closing,<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> did not raise significant concern in the CFFO to OI ratio (except for 2004)<br />
and seems to be doing a reasonable job in this ratio.<br />
In the chart, negative values arise from decreases in CFFO or OI and positive<br />
values arise from increases in CFFO and OI or decreases in CFFO and OI (negatives<br />
cancel each other out). In truth, an increase or decrease in OI should be followed by an<br />
increase or decrease in CFFO (meaning they have a direct relationship) and should<br />
therefore be greater than zero. In most cases the fluctuations are small but in some<br />
cases the difference in the ratio can be far greater or far lower than that of the previous<br />
year. In this regard, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> did a good job for the fluctuations in their ratio tend<br />
to be stable over time (except for 2004) and the only competitor that showed better<br />
stability was Leapfrog (but their ratio is far from favorable otherwise). On a side note,<br />
the reason we excluded Mattel for 2007 was because it was different from the previous<br />
year (far too small) and including it would distort our analysis. In 2007, CFFO for Mattel<br />
decreased by 36.01% and OI for Mattel increased by only 0.17%, resulting in a<br />
71
negative 250.33 change in their ratio for that year. In <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, it seems that the<br />
company did a good job and seemed to be following the basic trend of the industry<br />
leader (Hasbro).<br />
Δ CFFO / Δ OI 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 4.71 2.93 ‐1.77 ‐1.66 1.63<br />
Hasbro ‐0.15 1.85 7.89 ‐2.67 1.97<br />
Mattel ‐10.57 0.63 1.56 6.37 ‐250.33<br />
Leapfrog 0.11 0.22 ‐0.71 ‐0.79 ‐4.50<br />
Cash Flow from Operations / Net Operating Assets<br />
NOA refers to long term assets that are used in operations (property, plant, and<br />
equipment). The ratio determines if CFFO is supported by NOA and if NOA is properly<br />
accounted for (properly depreciated). In this ratio, if CFFO is equal to NOA then a dollar<br />
invested in NOA leads to a dollar increase in CFFO. In addition, if the ratio were greater<br />
than one, each dollar invested in NOA leads to greater dollar increases in CFFO. In the<br />
same way as the asset turnover ratio, if NOA were not depreciated (properly) then it<br />
could lead to overly high or overly low ratios and would be an indication of a red flag. If<br />
the ratio, were overly high (general terms or one year discrepancy) that might indicate<br />
72
that they depreciated too much, leading to smaller total assets, which results in<br />
overstated expenses (recording the depreciation expense), which in turn leads to a<br />
smaller net income. In 2004, the large CFFO (largest in the time frame considered)<br />
resulted in a large ratio being reported for that year (<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>), which may be an<br />
indication that expenses were overstated for the purpose of understating net income. In<br />
other years, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> seems to follow the industry trend (similar to Hasbro in 2005<br />
to 2007) and tend to have higher ratios than the competition. In regards to the<br />
competition, Hasbro and Mattel showed greater stability over time, whereas Leapfrog<br />
and <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> (prior to 2005) were a bit more erratic. In closing, <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> did<br />
not raise significant concern in the CFFO to OI ratio (except for 2004) and seems to be<br />
doing a reasonable job in this ratio, getting on average $4.5 dollars for every dollar<br />
invested in NOA.<br />
The “change” form for this ratio shows that fluctuations tend to be erratic. In the<br />
chart, negative values arise from decreases in CFFO or NOA and positive values arise<br />
from increases in CFFO and NOA or decreases in CFFO and NOA (negatives cancel each<br />
other out). In 2004, the change in the ratio for <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> was so large (negative)<br />
that including it would distort the analysis of this chart. It was due to the 1677%<br />
73
increase in CFFO and the 6.67% decrease in NOA that this ratio ended up the way it did<br />
for that year. In regards to the “raw” form of the ratio and that of the “change” form,<br />
the drastic change in 2004 does provoke some concern.<br />
Δ CFFO / Δ NOA 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 20.68 ‐158.56 ‐34.38 ‐1.76 5.29<br />
Hasbro 1.39 ‐13.51 ‐3.22 ‐9.95 45.10<br />
Mattel ‐20.97 0.87 2.63 ‐39.52 17.39<br />
Leapfrog 14.06 ‐6.27 25.06 28.94 ‐17.01<br />
Total Accruals / Net Sales<br />
The total accruals are found by taking cash flow from operations (CFFO) and<br />
subtracting out net income (NI). In this ratio, any distortion in expenses might be noted<br />
in this ratio for if expenses were understated this ratio would be too small (smaller<br />
expenses = larger NI = smaller accruals) and if expenses were overstated this ratio<br />
would be too large (larger expenses = smaller NI = larger accruals). In this ratio, <strong>Jakks</strong><br />
<strong>Pacific</strong>, seems to follow the industry trend and tends to be fairly stable over time<br />
(except for 2004). In Leapfrog, we find it to be the only company to display such erratic<br />
behavior, which from analysis involving prior ratios, is not surprising. In general terms,<br />
74
it seems that companies in the toy industry have values for this ratio that are close to<br />
zero, which indicates to us that accruals have a negligible effect for companies in the<br />
toy industry and may not be a good indicator of whether expenses were manipulated.<br />
In the chart, negative values arise from decreases in CFFO or NOA and positive<br />
values arise from increases in CFFO and NOA or decreases in CFFO and NOA (negatives<br />
cancel each other out). It seems that fluctuations tend be small and the biggest<br />
changes can be noted by <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> and Mattel in 2003. In truth, aside from that,<br />
there is little to be said, other than that what was stated in the “raw” form, that<br />
accruals do not seem to play a big part for companies in the industry.<br />
75
Pension Expense / SG&A<br />
In spite of tireless efforts, we could not find pension expense for the company or<br />
competitors, aside from the contributions made by <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> to the retirement plan,<br />
therefore, we cannot compute this ratio.<br />
Other Employment Expenses / SG&A<br />
In spite of tireless efforts, we could not find warranty liabilities for the company<br />
or competitors, therefore, we cannot compute this ratio.<br />
Conclusion<br />
The expense diagnostic ratios did raise a few concerns (2004) but nothing too<br />
serious aside from the goodwill issue that will be discussed later. The CFFO to OI ratio<br />
though low is close to one, but does not show signs of drastically changing in the next<br />
year. The CFFO to NOA is where this company has distinctly outperformed the<br />
competitors, meaning they are able to get the most out of their operating assets, which<br />
does make sense, if you consider the firm competitive advantage analysis, which details<br />
upon the efforts they take to get the most out of what they have.<br />
76
Expense Manipulation Diagnostics<br />
Asset Turnover 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 0.60 0.82 0.88 0.87 0.87<br />
Hasbro 0.99 0.92 0.94 1.02 1.19<br />
Mattel 1.10 1.07 1.18 1.14 1.24<br />
Leapfrog 1.23 1.14 1.07 1.12 1.16<br />
CFFO / OI 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 0.65 2.45 0.81 0.69 0.82<br />
Hasbro 1.32 1.22 1.60 0.85 1.16<br />
Mattel 0.77 0.78 0.70 1.20 0.77<br />
Leapfrog 0.24 ‐0.01 ‐1.18 ‐0.73 0.15<br />
Δ CFFO / Δ OI 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 4.71 2.93 ‐1.77 ‐1.66 1.63<br />
Hasbro ‐0.15 1.85 7.89 ‐2.67 1.97<br />
Mattel ‐10.57 0.63 1.56 6.37 ‐250.33<br />
Leapfrog 0.11 0.22 ‐0.71 ‐0.79 ‐4.50<br />
CFFO / OI 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 0.63 12.01 5.60 3.77 4.09<br />
Hasbro 2.27 1.73 3.03 1.76 3.20<br />
Mattel 0.97 0.97 0.85 1.63 1.08<br />
Leapfrog 1.30 0.00 ‐1.04 3.25 ‐0.45<br />
Δ CFFO / Δ OI 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 20.68 ‐158.56 ‐34.38 ‐1.76 5.29<br />
Hasbro 1.39 ‐13.51 ‐3.22 ‐9.95 45.10<br />
Mattel ‐20.97 0.87 2.63 ‐39.52 17.39<br />
Leapfrog 14.06 ‐6.27 25.06 28.94 ‐17.01<br />
Accruals / Net Sales 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> ‐0.027 0.153 0.011 ‐0.011 ‐0.002<br />
Hasbro 0.094 0.054 0.092 0.029 0.070<br />
Mattel 0.014 0.000 0.010 0.050 ‐0.007<br />
Leapfrog ‐0.067 0.010 ‐0.065 0.469 0.194<br />
Δ Accruals / Δ Net Sales 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> ‐9.05 0.37 ‐0.92 ‐0.16 0.08<br />
Hasbro ‐1.08 0.95 1.35 ‐3.04 0.26<br />
Mattel ‐11.49 ‐0.49 0.68 0.50 ‐1.01<br />
Leapfrog ‐0.17 ‐1.32 ‐5.16 ‐1.88 2.49<br />
77
Potential Red Flags<br />
As noted in the Accounting Analysis Introduction, step 5 in the<br />
implementation of an accounting analysis is to identify potential red flags. We outlined<br />
the following items as initial potential red flags: unexplained changes in accounting,<br />
unexplained transactions boosting profitability, unusual increases in certain asset<br />
balances in relation to sales increases, increased gap between profits and cash flow<br />
from operations, unexpected large asset write-offs or year-end adjustments, qualified<br />
audit opinions or unexplained changes in independent auditors, executive compensation<br />
incentive to enhance reported profits, litigation marked by potential outcomes<br />
degrading profits and subsequent events. We conducted a review of <strong>Jakks</strong> 2007 10-K<br />
filing accordingly. Additionally, we reviewed <strong>Jakks</strong> 1 st quarter 2008 10-Q as well as<br />
various business articles.<br />
Items Not Resulting in Suspicion<br />
Our review did not reveal any unexplained changes in accounting or the<br />
application of accounting principles. <strong>Jakks</strong> 10-K for 2007 contained no unexplained<br />
transactions, nor were any unusual transactions serving to materially enhance<br />
profitability in existence. <strong>Jakks</strong> has received a clean opinion in all years presented and<br />
there have been no unexplained changes in independent auditors. The Company did<br />
not record any large asset write-offs, nor did it make any sizeable year-end adjustments<br />
in any of the periods represented in its 2007 10-K.<br />
Unusual Increases in Certain Asset Balances In Relation To Sales Increases<br />
The following chart examines the relative increase in Net Sales vs. Accounts<br />
Receivable, vs. Inventory for the 3-year periods ending December 31, 2005, 2006 &<br />
2007, respectively. All amounts are in thousands.<br />
78
2005 2006 2007<br />
Net Sales $661,536 $765,386 $857,085<br />
% Increase from ‘05 N/A 15.7% 29.6%<br />
Accounts Receivable 100,231 153,116 174,451<br />
% Increase from ‘05 N/A 52.8% 74.0%<br />
Inventory 68,436 76,788 75,486<br />
% Increase. from ‘05 N/A 12.2% 10.3%<br />
The chart reveals a possible red flag regarding the growth in accounts receivable<br />
relative to the growth in net sales. We see that net sales have experienced a 29.6%<br />
increase from 2005 versus a 74.0% increase in accounts receivable over the same<br />
period. Further analysis into accounts receivable turnover indicates a turnover of 6.04<br />
or every 60 days for 2006, as compared to 5.23 or every 70 days. The Company has<br />
disclosed that it performs ongoing credit evaluations of its top customers and maintains<br />
an allowance for potential credit losses. However, further analysis is in order to help<br />
understand the almost 17% increase in the collection period from 2005 to 2007.<br />
Increased Gap between Profits and Cash Flow from Operations<br />
The information in the chart below summarizes the growth in net income versus<br />
the concurrent increase in cash flow from operations from 2005 to 2007.<br />
2005 2006 2007<br />
Net Income $63,493 $72,375 $88,991<br />
% Increase from ‘05 N/A 14.0% 40.2%<br />
Cash Flow from Operations 71,001 63,710 87,660<br />
% Incr./-Decr from ‘05 N/A -10.3% 23.5%<br />
Obviously, cash flow from operations is not keeping pace with the expansion of<br />
net sales. This is most probably due to the rising accounts receivable balance caused<br />
by the inequitable increase in <strong>Jakks</strong> collection period as noted above. Therefore, the<br />
increased gap between profits and cash flow from operations serves to substantiate the<br />
need to further investigate the Company’s credit policy on a larger bisection of its<br />
customer base than just the major customers as indicated in <strong>Jakks</strong> 2007 10-K.<br />
79
Executive Compensation Incentive to Enhance Reported Profits<br />
Compensation for the Chief Executive, Jack Friedman, and Chief Operating<br />
Officer, Stephen Berman, includes a cash bonus tied to earnings per share. A<br />
compensation committee sets the target level and the maximum payout if the target is<br />
achieved is purportedly limited to 200% of base salary. However for 2007, EPS was<br />
almost 22%, far exceeding set target levels thereby invoking a cash bonus for each of<br />
the two executives at 250% base, for a combined total of $2,662,500 (<strong>Jakks</strong> 2007 10-<br />
K). Most certainly, these executives have tremendous incentive to enhance reported<br />
profitability.<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> has a recent history where compensation of top executives has received<br />
much publicity. A 2005 article states that “top executives at the Malibu-based toy<br />
maker received $13.6 million in stock-related compensation last year, to go along with<br />
their already healthy salaries. The report didn't say who received the awards, but in<br />
the past such payments have been limited to three officials: Chairman and Chief<br />
Executive, Jack Friedman, Chief Operating Officer, Stephen Berman, and Chief Financial<br />
Officer, Joel Bennett. The pretax payments amount to about 22 percent of 2004<br />
operating profits of $62 million, at a time the company is fighting a federal bribery,<br />
money-laundering and racketeering lawsuit that threatens to undo one of its most<br />
lucrative income streams” (goliath.ecnext.com). This is not the only case of executive<br />
compensation being scrutinized. “<strong>Jakks</strong> has long been criticized for pay doled out to its<br />
executives. In 2003, Friedman and Berman each earned a salary of $965,000 plus a<br />
bonus of $1.3 million and $2.5 million in restricted stock” (goliath.ecnext.com). These<br />
three men are still in their respective positions with the company. It seems that the<br />
owners of the company have too much of their personal interests in mind when making<br />
financial decisions. Additionally, <strong>Jakks</strong> was found violating GAAP in 2002-2004. The<br />
same article reads “<strong>Jakks</strong> also was forced by the Securities and Exchange Commission<br />
to restate both its 2002 and 2003 earnings. Its 2004 earnings were issued on a<br />
preliminary basis, after an SEC review found that the company failed to abide by<br />
generally accepted accounting principles.” These greedy actions combined with a<br />
failure to abide by GAAP in earnings reports should make investors wary of putting their<br />
80
money into the company. It is natural to believe that if these men have been<br />
unscrupulous in the past, then they will continue to do so in the future.<br />
Heavy Litigation <strong>Mark</strong>ed By Potential Outcomes Degrading Profits<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> is involved in several ongoing legal disputes, the outcomes of which could<br />
have a material adverse effect on revenues, results of operations, and cash flows.<br />
Accordingly, it is prudent in our analysis to review these matters as part of our<br />
observance of potential red flags. The following review encompasses our opinion as to<br />
the significance of each of these matters presently under litigation.<br />
Class Action Suit<br />
A class action lawsuit commenced in the United States District Court for the<br />
Southern District of New York on behalf of purchasers of JAKKS <strong>Pacific</strong>, Inc. ("JAKKS")<br />
(NASDAQ:JAKK) common stock during the period between February 17, 2004 and<br />
October 19, 2004 (the "Class Period"). In this suit, Plaintiff sought damages on behalf<br />
of all purchasers of JAKKS common stock during the Class Period. The complaint<br />
charged JAKKS and certain of its officers and directors with violations of the Securities<br />
Exchange Act of 1934 (2004 Business Wire). Although a motion to dismiss the Class<br />
Actions was granted January 2008, an amended complaint has been filed and a briefing<br />
schedule established for October 2008. Round one has favored the Company, but the<br />
following details of the suit bring into question the ethics of the Company’s major<br />
players, namely the CEO, COO and CFO.<br />
The complaint alleged that throughout the period from February 17 th through<br />
October 19, 2004, defendants issued numerous positive statements concerning the<br />
increasing sales of Jakk’s products licensed through the World Wrestling Entertainment<br />
Inc. ("WWE"). As alleged in the complaint, these statements were materially false and<br />
misleading because defendants knew but failed to disclose: (a) that the WWE was<br />
contending that the WWE licenses had been obtained through a pattern of commercial<br />
bribery; (b) that the company's relationship with the WWE was being negatively<br />
impacted by the WWE's contention that the licenses it had granted to the Company<br />
81
were improperly obtained; and (c) given the foregoing, the Company was subject to the<br />
heightened risk that the WWE would seek some modification to its WWE licensing<br />
agreements or complete nullification of those agreements, which would negatively<br />
impact the Company's future financial results (www.action-figure.com).<br />
It wasn’t until October 19, 2004, that JAKKS issued a press release announcing<br />
that it was "engaged in discussions with WWE concerning the restructuring of its toy<br />
license and with WWE and THQ with respect to the restructuring of the JAKKS THQ<br />
Joint Venture video games license agreement with WWE. In response to the<br />
announcement of the problems with the WWE licenses, the price of JAKKS stock<br />
declined from $24.15 per share to $18.81 per share. Then, after the market closed for<br />
trading, it was reported that the WWE had just filed a lawsuit against JAKKS, which<br />
alleged that the videogame license and certain toy licenses that the WWE previously<br />
granted to JAKKS were obtained through a pattern of racketeering and commercial<br />
bribery and seeking, among other things, that the licensing agreements should be<br />
declared void. Following this announcement, on the next day of trading, the price of<br />
JAKKS common stock continued to fall to close at $12.96 per share on extremely heavy<br />
trading volume (www.action-figure.com).<br />
Subsequent to the filing of the complaint, on November 16, 2004, JAKKS issued<br />
a press release announcing that it entered into a worldwide licensing agreement with<br />
WWE to develop and market WWE(R) TV Games. The press release gave the<br />
impression that JAKKS and WWE had resolved their differences. However, it was later<br />
disclosed, by WWE, that the deal was only an amendment to an earlier agreement that<br />
was later found to be in dispute and where litigation between the two companies was<br />
occurring.<br />
A motion was granted in January 2008 to the extent that the Class Actions were<br />
dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiffs’ right to seek leave, to file an amended<br />
complaint based on statements that the WWE licenses were obtained from the WWE as<br />
a result of the long-term relationship with WWE. A motion seeking leave to file an<br />
amended complaint was granted and an amended complaint was filed. A briefing<br />
schedule has been established, with respect to a motion for dismissal, which is<br />
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scheduled for argument in October 2008. While THQ has come out on top, in this bit of<br />
WWE related litigation to date, the ethics and integrity of the Company’s management<br />
are certainly questionable. Additionally, yet another licensing abuse is under scrutiny<br />
by the wrestling organization's attorneys.<br />
WWE Claims Publisher Illegally Sublicensing Out Rights<br />
(Gamespot News, October 23, 2006)<br />
In October 2006, the WWE filed suit regarding the Publisher's sublicensing of<br />
Asian distribution rights to SmackDown franchise developer Yuke's (details follow).<br />
WWE is claiming that THQ sublicensed out the rights to games based on the wrestling<br />
organization for at least the last five years when it didn't have the rights to do so. For<br />
one thing, WWE says that THQ never had any kind of a license agreement with the<br />
wrestling company in the first place; its deals were made with THQ-<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, a<br />
separate joint venture half owned by the publisher and half owned by WWE's toy<br />
license-holder <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>.<br />
Furthermore, WWE says that the licensing agreement it does have with THQ-<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> specifically forbids sublicensing to any company that is not wholly owned<br />
by the joint venture without prior written consent from WWE. WWE said that it never<br />
received a request for nor granted any such written consent. As to whom, THQ was<br />
licensing the rights to, WWE claims it was, SmackDown! Franchise developer, Yuke’s (of<br />
which THQ is only a part owner), which handles the distribution of WWE games in<br />
Japan and other Asian countries. The wrestling organization also claims that THQ was<br />
collecting royalties from Yuke’s that should have gone straight to the WWE instead.<br />
As to why the WWE had not brought the issue to court before now, the company<br />
claims that THQ concealed the sublicensing agreements from them. It says that when<br />
THQ submitted package approval request forms in 2004 for a game to be sold in Japan,<br />
the publisher listed Yuke's as "THQ's regional distributor," and not a sub licensee. THQ-<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> has held the WWE game license since June of 1998, according to the suit,<br />
and the agreement currently extends throughout 2009. THQ-<strong>Jakks</strong> also holds the<br />
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option to extend that by another five years "provided that certain conditions are met."<br />
Those conditions are not specified in the lawsuit.<br />
The WWE is asking for a declaration that it is entitled to terminate its licensing<br />
agreement with THQ-<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, for THQ to give up whatever money it made from<br />
the sublicensing agreement, and for monetary damages with interest. When WWE first<br />
brought the charges to THQ's attention earlier this year, the publisher denied them as<br />
follows. "The WWE had been aware and had consented to the manner of distribution in<br />
Japan and the payment of royalties with respect to such sales and, in addition, had<br />
separately released the joint venture from any claims with respect to such matter as a<br />
result of a settlement of a royalty audit of the THQ/JAKKS joint venture." This dispute<br />
again brings into question the ethics of the company’s major players, as well as the<br />
potential effect on future operating results. Per <strong>Jakks</strong>, “this action is in its preliminary<br />
stage, we cannot assure you as to the outcome, nor can we estimate the range of our<br />
potential losses, if any” (Form S-SA, Registration Statement of the Securities Act of<br />
1933 for <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, Inc. as filed March 5, 2008).<br />
Exclusive License to Publish WWE Video Games Uncertain<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> joint venture with THQ, a developer, publisher and distributor of interactive<br />
entertainment software for the leading game platforms in the video game market is on<br />
shaky ground. The joint venture entered into a license agreement with the WWE,<br />
under which it acquired the exclusive worldwide right to publish WWE video games on<br />
all hardware platforms. The terms of the license agreement expires on December 31,<br />
2009, and the joint venture has a right to renew the license for an additional five<br />
years provided that there is an absence of a material breach of the license agreement<br />
and that certain royalty minimums are met. Although those minimums have been met,<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> and the joint venture are named as defendants in lawsuits commenced by WWE,<br />
pursuant to which WWE is claiming that there have been material breaches with respect<br />
to the video game license and is seeking treble, punitive and other damages (including<br />
disgorgement of profits) in an undisclosed amount and a declaration that the video<br />
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game license with the joint venture and an extension of our toy licenses with WWE are<br />
void and unenforceable (“Legal Proceedings”, <strong>Jakks</strong> 2007 Form 10-K)).<br />
On December 21, 2007 the Court dismissed the WWE Action with prejudice (the<br />
"December 2007 Order") based on (1) the failure to plead RICO injury; (2) the bar of<br />
the RICO statute of limitations; (3) the denial of WWE’s motion for reconsideration of<br />
the Sherman Act claim; and (4) the lack of subject matter jurisdiction with respect to<br />
the pendent state law claims. Thereafter, WWE filed an appeal to the Second Circuit<br />
Court of Appeals (Form S-SA, Registration Statement of the Securities Act of 1933 for<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, Inc. as filed March 5, 2008). An adverse outcome against <strong>Jakks</strong>, THQ or<br />
the joint venture in the lawsuit commenced by WWE would adversely impact the<br />
company’s rights under the joint venture’s single license, which would in turn adversely<br />
affect the joint venture and <strong>Jakks</strong>: business, financial condition, and results of<br />
operation.<br />
Preferred Returns on Joint Venture Net Sales Unsettled<br />
The joint venture agreement with THQ provides for <strong>Jakks</strong> to have received<br />
guaranteed preferred returns through June 30 th , 2006 at varying rates of the joint<br />
ventures net sales, depending on the cumulative unit sales and platform of each<br />
particular game. The preferred return was subject to change after June 30 th , 2006 and<br />
was to be set for the distribution period beginning July 1 st , 2006 and ending<br />
December 31 st , 2009 (the “Next Distribution Period”). The agreement with THQ<br />
provides for the parties to agree on the reset of the preferred return or, if no<br />
agreement is reached, for arbitration of the issue. No agreement had been reached and<br />
the preferred return for the Next Distribution Period is to be determined through<br />
arbitration. The preferred return is accrued in the quarter in which the licensed games<br />
are sold and the preferred return is earned. Based on the same rates as set forth under<br />
the original joint venture agreement, an estimated receivable of $37.9 million has been<br />
accrued for the twenty one months ended March 31, 2008, pending the resolution of<br />
this outstanding issue (Form 10-Q, Quarterly Period Ended March 31, 2008) up from<br />
$35.3 million for the eighteen months ended December 31, 2007 (<strong>Jakks</strong> 2007 Form 10-<br />
85
K). Any adverse change to the preferred return for the next distribution period may<br />
result in the Company experiencing reduced net income, which would adversely affect<br />
results of operations.<br />
Subsequent Events<br />
Our review for red flags also included a search for any events in the last few<br />
months that might have a material influence on <strong>Jakks</strong> revenues, results of operations or<br />
cash flows. Our review revealed the following:<br />
Mattel Takes Toy Rights to WWE in Multi-Year Licensing Agreement<br />
Mattel has taken toy rights to World Wrestling Entertainment in a multiyear<br />
licensing agreement covering all global territories upon the expiration of WWE’s current<br />
toy license with <strong>Jakks</strong> expiring January 2010. Under the terms of the agreement, Mattel<br />
will develop and market products in a wide variety of categories, including action<br />
figures, accessories and play sets, games and puzzles, activity toys, plush products,<br />
vehicles (including R/C) and role-play products. The first line of products will be<br />
available in 2010 (playthings.com, 02/13/2008). Certainly, it is practical that this<br />
subsequent event will have an adverse effect on company revenues and operating<br />
results. However, <strong>Jakks</strong> announced in February 2008 of a new 5 year contract to<br />
produce toys based on competing pro wrestling league, TNA Wrestling. The toymaker’s<br />
master toy license includes rights for action figures, play sets, accessories and role-play<br />
toys, as well as collectible items based on TNA Wrestling’s top talent. While having<br />
nowhere near WWE’s name recognition, TNA has experienced increasing popularity<br />
since its inception in 2002 (playthings.com, 02/13/2008).<br />
It is not ascertainable what the offsetting effect of TNA rights will be, but it is<br />
certainly feasible that without the degree of brand recognition of the WWE, revenue<br />
from this line of toy action figures will suffer, as well as operating income and cash<br />
flows from this product line.<br />
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Undo Accounting Distortions<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> invests a great deal of money into companies and puts the net assets of an<br />
acquired firm into their accounting book. Jakk stockpiles goodwill over time through the<br />
purchase of these firms. <strong>Jakks</strong> does not have to recognize impairment if the impairment<br />
test does not fail. The GAAP impairment test gives leeway to allow for the judgment of<br />
managers. <strong>Jakks</strong> has a “performance criteria” clause where they pay additional money<br />
to former owners of the company. The payment is added to goodwill, but should be a<br />
fee that is expensed as a cost of doing business. If their goodwill increases without fair<br />
and reasonable impairment then it would create large overstatements for total assets.<br />
We impaired goodwill by 20 percent per year because a new acquisition tends to<br />
have a five years life span and we used straight line depreciation (1 over 5 is twenty<br />
percent). Jakk’s goodwill accounts for about 36 percent of total assets. The balance<br />
sheet and income statement will be affected by any change to goodwill. We believe<br />
taking into account the impairment of goodwill will give realistic and fair values in the<br />
financial statements.<br />
In looking at the consolidated statement of operation data, we see how<br />
operation expense has increased with the adjustment to goodwill. The “goodwill effect”<br />
will change the income from operation and reduce net income. We first analyzed the<br />
consolidated statement of operations because it is the most transparent in seeing if<br />
changes occurred. The change in the income statement will also affect the other<br />
financial statements.<br />
Income Statement: Expense<br />
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
Gross profit 129,843 126,442 226,007 266,707 294,794 323,650<br />
SG&A 98,111 113,053 172,282 178,722 202,482 216,652<br />
Acquisition Shut Down and Product<br />
Recall Costs 6,718 2,000<br />
Income from Operations 25,014 11,389 53,725 87,985 92,312 106,998<br />
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Restated Income Statement: Expense<br />
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
Gross profit 129,843 126,442 226,007 266,707 294,794 323,650<br />
SG&A 98,111 113,053 172,282 178,722 202,482 216,652<br />
Acquisition Shut Down and Product<br />
Recall Costs 6,718 2,000<br />
Impairment for Goodwill 37,867 38,146 51,666 53,860 67,600 70,668<br />
Income from Operations (12,853) (26,757) 2,059 34,125 24,712 36,330<br />
We suspect that net income would decrease for all years. The impairment<br />
account increased operation expenses for each year. Before the adjustment, the<br />
operation expense over sales was about 33.8% in 2002. After the adjustment,<br />
operation expense over sales rose to 46% in 2002. The only amortizing they did was<br />
for trademarks and licensing. These numbers were hidden in the “SG&A”. The<br />
amortization for these indefinite assets was less than ten percent of operating<br />
expenses.<br />
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
Net sales 310,016 315,776 574,266 661,536 765,386 857,085<br />
Between 2003 and 2004, <strong>Jakks</strong> has leapt in sales. If the 2003 net income loss<br />
occurred (after adjusting for goodwill) <strong>Jakks</strong> may not have been aggressive with its<br />
growth strategy. Their growth strategy includes several elements. For example, some of<br />
them were “expanding core products, entering new product category, and pursing<br />
strategic acquisitions (Jakk’s 10-K)”. The growth strategy has a lot of money flowing<br />
around to expand in all areas. The growth strategy would be less aggressive in buying<br />
trademarks, licenses, and acquisitions if they had recognized the impairment in all these<br />
items.<br />
We are concerned with two components in the balance sheet: goodwill and<br />
retaining earnings. We need to look at how significantly the “goodwill effect” will<br />
change goodwill. Retaining earnings is found by taking the previous year’s retained<br />
88
earnings adding net income for the year and subtracting dividends for the year (<strong>Jakks</strong><br />
does not have dividends so it is just RE previous year + NI this year). In this analysis,<br />
we wanted to see if the drop in net income has a noticeable change in retain earnings.<br />
Balance Sheet<br />
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
Goodwill 189,336 190,728 258,331 269,298 337,999 353,340<br />
Trademarks 11,568 15,468 17,768 17,768 19,568 19,568<br />
Total Non Current Assets 232,017 245,187 324,223 328,638 430,156 456,605<br />
Total Assets 408,810 529,997 696,762 753,955 881,894 982,688<br />
Restated Balance Sheet<br />
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
Goodwill 189,336 190,728 258,331 269,298 337,999 353,340<br />
Accumulated Goodwill 37,867 38,146 51,666 53,860 67,600 70,668<br />
Adjusted Goodwill 151,469 152,582 206,665 215,438 270,399 282,672<br />
Trademarks 11,568 15,468 17,768 17,768 19,568 19,568<br />
Total Non Current Assets 194,150 207,041 272,557 274,778 362,556 385,937<br />
Total Assets 370,943 491,851 645,096 700,095 814,294 912,020<br />
The balance sheet has a new account called “accumulated goodwill” that they<br />
never used in their accounting book. Accumulated goodwill is a contra asset account<br />
that deals with the impairment for the year (we used a 20% rate). Goodwill has grown<br />
every year. In 2004, goodwill jumped because acquisitions increased. In 2007, goodwill<br />
accounted for 36% of total assets before the adjustment but accounted for 31% of<br />
total assets after the adjustment. Goodwill changed by five percent with the<br />
adjustment.<br />
In retained earnings, it has dropped by a significant amount for a few years but<br />
dropped by a smaller amount in later years. In 2004, Jakk starts to get a positive net<br />
income. In 2005, retained earnings over total equity was 45.7% before the adjustment<br />
and after the adjustment, it was 39.5%. Dividends did not have any effect because the<br />
company has not paid dividends during their business life span.<br />
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Preferred Stock<br />
Equity<br />
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
Common Stock 24 25 26 27 28 28<br />
Additional Paid-In Capital 240,102 246,008 276,642 287,356 300,255 312,127<br />
Retained Earnings 120,451 133,005 176,564 240,057 312,432 382,288<br />
Deferred Compensation Form (789)<br />
Accumulated Other Comprehensive<br />
Loss (349) (1,747) (2,789) (3,427) (3,446)<br />
Total Shareholder Equity 360,577 377,900 451,485 524,651 609,288 690,997<br />
Preferred Stock<br />
Restated Equity<br />
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
Common Stock 24 25 26 27 28 28<br />
Additional Paid-In Capital 240,102 246,008 276,642 287,356 300,255 312,127<br />
Adjusted Retained Earnings 82,584 94,859 124,898 186,197 244,832 311,620<br />
Deferred Compensation Form (789)<br />
Accumulated Other Comprehensive<br />
Loss (349) (1,747) (2,789) (3,427) (3,446)<br />
Total Shareholder Equity 322,710 339,754 399,819 470,791 541,688 620,329<br />
“Goodwill effect” did not have a big change in the balance sheet compared to the<br />
income statement. Balance sheet is the accumulation of total assets, liabilities, and<br />
owner’s equity over years. Goodwill might be proportional to other accounts in the<br />
accounting formula. Income statement is a year by year dollar amount. “Goodwill<br />
effect” did affect net income significantly. Overall impairment of goodwill gave fair and<br />
reasonable values to assume for the financial statements. The twenty percent<br />
adjustment did impact the financial statements. The income statement was transparent<br />
to see how significant “goodwill effect” would be as an expense account. The balance<br />
sheet showed slight effect for the adjustment. In the forecasting section, the<br />
adjustment for goodwill and its effect on the balance sheet, income statement, and<br />
statement of cash flows can be noted.<br />
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Financial Analysis<br />
We will begin this section by computing and analyzing many different financial<br />
ratios for <strong>Jakks</strong> and its competitors. These ratios can be broken down into three<br />
sections: liquidity ratios, profitability ratios, and capital structure ratios. Next, we will<br />
be using these ratios, patterns from previous years, industry knowledge, and our<br />
knowledge of the firm to forecast certain items on the balance sheet, income<br />
statement, and statement of cash flows ten years into the future. Finally, we will<br />
estimate cost of capital for <strong>Jakks</strong> to gain insight on how operations are funded, and to<br />
increase our knowledge of the value of the firm.<br />
Liquidity Ratio Analysis<br />
The firm’s ability to sell off assets for cash is liquidity. Cash, market securities,<br />
account receivables, and inventory are the most liquid of assets. The liquidity ratios<br />
can evaluate a firm’s credit risk and the firm’s ability to pay off liabilities. In this analysis<br />
, we look at the current ratio, inventory turnover, and working capital turnover for Jakk<br />
and its competitors.<br />
Current Ratio<br />
Current ratio equals current assets divided by current liabilities. Current ratio is<br />
one of the liquidity ratios that can help analyze how well recent obligations can be paid<br />
through liquid assets. The ratio should be at least 1 or greater. If the ratio is less than<br />
1, the firm may have to borrow money to pay off current or long-term debt when it is<br />
due. In addition, lenders, potential investors, and financial analysts want the ratio to be<br />
at least 2 to cover any unexpected financial crisis. The current ratio is a good indicator<br />
of solvency.<br />
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Jakk’s current ratio average is 2.67 between 2002 and 2007. The current ratio<br />
for Jakk’s fluctuated between 2.6 and 5.5 from 2002 to 2007. Current liabilities jumped<br />
from about 52 million to 142 million in 2003 to 2004, respectively. Jakk’s current ratio<br />
fell between 2003 and 2004. Jakk’s account payables increased. Current assets<br />
increased by 58 million during this time. The increase in account payable was greater<br />
than the increase in current assets. Hasbro and Mattel have lower current asset ratios in<br />
the toy industry. Both firms have slightly favorable positions to pay off liabilities. Hasbro<br />
and Mattel’s consistent solvency can be due to its longevity in the industry compared to<br />
Jakk and LeapFrog. Hasbro and Mattel’s current liabilities and assets have grown at a<br />
slow rate without any significant jumps in the numerator or denominator in the current<br />
ratio. Jakk has inconsistent solvency. The inconsistent solvency is shown in the<br />
movement of the graph. The inconsistent solvency can be due to acquisitions because<br />
Jakk has to put acquisition liabilities and assets in their accounting book. Jakk and<br />
LeapFrog have small current liabilities (denominator) making their ratio. Jakk and<br />
LeapFrog are managing their liabilities well compared to other competitors. But,<br />
LeapFrog has done a better job overall.<br />
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Acid Test<br />
The acid test ratio, also called the quick asset ratio, is a ratio that only includes<br />
quick assets and current liabilities. Quick assets include cash, marketable securities, and<br />
account receivables. The acid test equals quick assets divided by current liabilities. Acid<br />
test ratio is more liquid compared to the current ratio. Acid test ratio excludes prepaid<br />
expenses, inventory, and other current assets that may not be very “liquid”. Account<br />
receivables are the exception to the acid test ratio because it might be difficult to collect<br />
on them. Acid test ratio is a good indicator for the liquidity of current assets owned by<br />
the firm.<br />
Acid test ratio for <strong>Jakks</strong> had a range of 2.1 to 4.3 during the past six years. The<br />
acid test ratio is lower than the current ratio, which was expected. The solvency for<br />
Jakk is still strong in the toy industry. Jakk has enough cash, marketable investments,<br />
and account receivables to pay any current or long term obligation without any<br />
problem. Mattel and Hasbro have no favorable change in their solvency. LeapFrog’s<br />
acid test ratio is unpredictable but still has high solvency. Palepu and Healy mention<br />
“mean revert”. “Mean revert” is supposed to be the industry average over a period of<br />
time. Mattel and Hasbro have been in the toy industry for a long time and their ratios<br />
93
are consistent year by year. Jakk and LeapFrog will probably “mean revert” to Mattel<br />
and Hasbro. In this, we mean to say that over time the ratio for Jakk and LeapFrog may<br />
become similar to that of Hasbro and Mattel.<br />
Accounts Receivable Turnover<br />
Receivable turnover can allow us to see how promptly cash is collected.<br />
Receivable turnover is found by dividing net sales by account receivables. The cash<br />
received from account receivables can increase the liquidity and solvency of a firm. A<br />
prompt cash collection can be used to help operations, such as buying large volumes of<br />
inventory at a lower price and might allow the firm to pay out dividends to<br />
shareholders.<br />
Jakk’s receivable turnover ratio has fluctuated over time, but has smoothed out<br />
during the last two years. Mattel has decreased its receivable turnover and smoothed<br />
out in the last two years. It seems that all four companies are “smoothing” out in the<br />
last two years, but at different levels. Sales growth did not change as much during the<br />
last two years. U.S. toy retailer may be cutting back purchases because the holiday<br />
sales have decreased over the past 3 or4 years.<br />
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Days Sales Outstanding<br />
It is computed by taking 365 (number of days in the year) and dividing it by the<br />
accounts receivable turnover. It is an indication of how quickly a company is able to<br />
collect on its accounts receivables.<br />
Jakk needs to worry about the number of days sales outstanding because it may<br />
create insolvency. LeapFrog also needs to change its credit term to decrease the<br />
number of days needed to collect receivables. The industry in general must wait sixty<br />
days to collect on receivables, which needs to decrease to around 30 to 45 days.<br />
Decreasing the days sales outstanding will make the “cash merry go round” spin fast.<br />
Account receivable will be more liquid if they decreased the days’ sales outstanding.<br />
Inventory Turnover<br />
Inventory turnover can help us see if the firms are selling their products versus<br />
holding it in inventory. Inventory turnover can be calculated by cost of goods sold (or<br />
cost of sales) divided by inventory. A firm wants to have enough inventory to meet their<br />
customer needs and operations. Overstocked inventory, however, can reduce solvency<br />
95
y stalling the company’s ability to convert products into cash. Increased inventory with<br />
a low turnover may lead to increased storage costs, insurance expenses, property<br />
taxes, and other indirect expenses. The analysis of inventory turnover can indicate how<br />
efficient the firm is.<br />
Jakk’s inventory turnover had a range from 4.3 to 7.1 over time. Jakk has<br />
climbed up in the inventory turnover ratio to compete with the top competitors and<br />
made their operations more efficient in doing so. Mattel and Hasbro have kept steady<br />
between 6 and 8. Their fluctuation has been more stable and predictable. Although,<br />
LeapFrog’s turnover is low compared to competitors, they have changed their product<br />
strategy to focus on educational products, instead of traditional toys.<br />
Days Supply of Inventory<br />
It is computed by taking 365 (number of days in the year) and dividing it by the<br />
inventory turnover. It tells us how quickly the company is able to get rid of their<br />
inventory and may be an indication of the level of management in the firm.<br />
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The day’s supply of inventory seems to be between 55 and 80 days, which is<br />
long compared to companies in other industries, but may be the result of relying on<br />
third party manufacturers, which many of them tend to do. Jakk decreased their days<br />
supply of inventory after 2003. This could mean they have a good relationship with<br />
suppliers and may have been able to reduce the number of days supply of inventory as<br />
a result. Hasbro and Mattel have kept a smooth number of days supply of inventory.<br />
LeapFrog increased its number of days supply of inventory. This could mean that<br />
LeapFrog is becoming more insolvent.<br />
Working Capital Turnover<br />
Working capital turnover is a measure of sales divided by excess capital, this<br />
capital (working capital) is found by taking the difference in current assets minus<br />
current liabilities. This ratio allows us to see if working capital is generating sales. The<br />
working capital can help a firm invest into their company, such as getting new<br />
equipment, trademarks, inventory, and acquisitions. An increase in working capital<br />
turnover is a good sign.<br />
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Jakk and LeapFrog have low working capital turnovers compared to Hasbro and<br />
Mattel, but this may be due to the fact, that Hasbro and Mattel have double the assets<br />
and sales compared to Jakk and LeapFrog. <strong>Jakks</strong> has been consistent in its working<br />
capital turnover. This could be a good sign that excess capital is being used in a positive<br />
manner.<br />
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Profitability Analysis<br />
In analyzing the profitability of the toy and game industry, we looked at how<br />
efficient each company is at generating sales. To measure this, ratios relating items<br />
such as gross profit, operating income, and net income to sales were used. Also, for<br />
each company in the industry, we calculated the return on assets, return on equity and<br />
the asset turnover to determine asset productivity as well. These ratios will allow sideby-side<br />
comparisons of each company on the profitability of their core business<br />
activities using the same scale. That is, we can distinguish between which companies<br />
are doing well in the industry and which companies are not competing at industry<br />
standards.<br />
Gross Profit Margin<br />
The gross profit margin is calculated by dividing the gross profit (sales minus<br />
cost of goods sold) of a company by their sales. After a company has covered<br />
manufacturing cost from their products, the money left over is their gross profit. This<br />
ratio helps determine what percentage of sales that companies can use to pay<br />
additional expenses or retain for future savings.<br />
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The first and most obvious observation from this table is that Leapfrog has a<br />
gross profit margin way under the industry average. The drop in 2006 was caused by a<br />
29% decrease in sales followed by an incredible 90% decrease in gross profit. This<br />
may be evidence of a big bath considering it is highly improbable that the cost of goods<br />
sold truly went up by that proportion. Mattel and Hasbro have leveled out their gross<br />
profit margin over the past five years. <strong>Jakks</strong> on the other hand has had a declining<br />
ratio over the past four years. This means that even though sales may be going up,<br />
they are not able to keep costs down where they should be.<br />
Operating Profit Margin<br />
Operating profit margin can be viewed as how much a company makes on each<br />
dollar of sales. It is calculated by dividing a company’s operating income by their sales<br />
of the same year. Not only does this ratio show efficiency in operating activities, it<br />
clues us in on a company’s pricing strategy. If a firm has too low of an operating profit<br />
margin, it may be an indication that the company is pricing their items lower in order to<br />
compete within the industry. The negative effect of this however is that it affects the<br />
company’s overall profitability.<br />
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In the graph on the previous page, the industry is converging to an operating<br />
profit margin of about 13%. Leapfrog is again way off industry standards. Three of<br />
the past four years, they had a negative operating profit margin. This again may be an<br />
indication of Leapfrog taking a big bath.<br />
The restated operating profit margin accounts for impairments in goodwill for<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> and their competitors. The biggest difference in this ratio with restated<br />
financials is with <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>. In the first year, <strong>Jakks</strong>’ operating profit margin dropped<br />
from 3.61% to -5.45%. The reason behind this is the greater effect that goodwill has<br />
on reported assets (almost 30%) for this company. Although the impairment greatly<br />
affects this ratio, it does not materially affect our view of the company. For 2005,<br />
2006, and 2007, sales for <strong>Jakks</strong> has increased by 13%, 14%, and 11% respectively.<br />
Because of this increase in sales, we are confident in the company’s abilities to continue<br />
to generate revenue into the future.<br />
Net Profit Margin<br />
The net profit margin is a ratio that is used to determine the amount of dollars<br />
that a company actually keeps in earnings. It is calculated by dividing the net income<br />
by sales. A higher profit margin indicates a company with a higher profitability. In<br />
general, companies that are able to benefit through economies of scale have a higher<br />
profit margin than competitors who are smaller. By looking at the trends in this number<br />
over time, we will be able to see if the company has improved their profitability or not.<br />
If this ratio goes down for a company, it may indicate that their recent business<br />
activities have diminished their profit margin. The net profit margin for the toy and<br />
game industry shows convergence at 10%. Leapfrog, like in operating profit margin, is<br />
way below the industry average. This significant decrease is caused by their reductions<br />
in sales on average, along with increasing costs since 2004.<br />
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In the restated for net profit margin, the major difference lies within <strong>Jakks</strong>. With<br />
a negative ratio in 2002 (not shown), 2003, and 2004, this greatly affects our view of<br />
the company. Although the trend is increasing, the negative ratios hint at a not so<br />
promising future. This ratio unlike operating profit margin does in fact materially affect<br />
our view of <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>. The restated net profit margin indicates that <strong>Jakks</strong> is not able<br />
to control their cost as well as the industry. In this case, goodwill may be overstated to<br />
prevent this view of the company from being revealed.<br />
Asset Turnover<br />
Asset turnover is a measure of the amount of sales generated by every dollar<br />
that a company has in assets. In other words, how productive is a company at using<br />
their assets to create sales. The ratio is calculated by dividing sales in one year by the<br />
total assets of the previous year. The higher the asset turnover, the better the<br />
company is at using their assets to generate sales.<br />
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In the chart above, there are no significant abnormal findings. The average<br />
asset turnover ratio in 2007 is 1.1, up from 1.02 in 2006. <strong>Jakks</strong> is slightly below this<br />
industry average with a .97 in 2007. Although Leapfrog has been highly volatile, they<br />
have held a higher average asset turnover than <strong>Jakks</strong>. The restated ratios for each year<br />
of the four companies show no significant changes. They are higher than the originals<br />
because total assets have decreased as a result of the impairment on goodwill. With<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong>’ restated asset turnover increasing by an average of .07 every year, this does not<br />
affect our view of the company. This is a favorable restatement for both companies.<br />
Return on Assets<br />
Return on assets (ROA) is a ratio used by investors and financial analysts to get<br />
an idea of how effective a company is at converting its investments in assets to<br />
earnings. It is measured by dividing net income in one year by total assets of the<br />
previous year. This lag in time of the calculation is used to show what assets were<br />
invested at the beginning of the year and how well they were used throughout the<br />
year. Similar to asset turnover, ROA shows how efficient management is at using the<br />
company’s assets to generate earnings. A higher ROA for a company means it is<br />
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investing less money in assets to generate a higher return in earnings, therefore, the<br />
bigger the return on assets the better (less risk for a higher return).<br />
The industry is meeting together at about 11%. <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> is showing really<br />
good signs in return on assets with increasing figures since 2003. Hasbro has been<br />
increasing every year as well. The line representing Leapfrog shows how bad the<br />
company has been doing in the past several years. The low ratios show that the<br />
company is investing in assets that are not producing sales.<br />
With restated financials for the four companies in the graph above, our position<br />
on <strong>Jakks</strong> changes greatly. Not only is the ratio negative for 2003, it does not go above<br />
2.01%. At this rate of return, we recommend investing in risk-free Treasury Bonds.<br />
Return on Equity<br />
Return on equity is the relationship between net income and owners equity. It<br />
shows shareholders how much profit that the company is generating with the money<br />
that they have invested. Again this ratio is calculated with a lag effect, representing the<br />
amount invested by shareholders at the beginning of the year and relating that to how<br />
management used these investments throughout the year.<br />
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For the companies in the graph above, each have a resemblance to their returns<br />
on assets. There does appear to be a predictable convergence within the industry, but<br />
the returns are still somewhat volatile among the top three. Leapfrog is way below the<br />
standard, for in consecutive years they had negative net income. They have a lot of<br />
ground to cover for investors to regain confidence.<br />
Hasbro still maintained a high return on equity with the impairment in goodwill.<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> on the other hand topped out in 2007 at 2.95%. Without the restatement,<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> had a return of 12.88%. This affects their return by nearly 10%, which materially<br />
changes our view on the company.<br />
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Capital Structure Analysis<br />
The first objective of the Capital Structure Analysis is to determine how the firms<br />
are financing their activities. There are two ways for corporations to raise funds. One<br />
method is debt financing, which consists of long-term liabilities. The other method is<br />
equity financing, involving the issuance of common and/or preferred stock. Capital<br />
structure affects leverage, which, in turn, affects the expected return and risk facing<br />
owners and creditors (www.cbdd.wsu.edu). Our analysis will include these ratios<br />
indicative of capital structure: debt to equity, times interest earned, debt service<br />
margin, sustainable growth rate, and altman z score. Analysis of these ratios will give<br />
insight on how the firms are raising money, and inform us of how efficiently each<br />
method is being used.<br />
Debt to Equity Ratio<br />
The debt to equity ratio is a measure of a company’s financial leverage,<br />
calculated by dividing total liabilities by stockholder’s equity. It indicates what<br />
proportion of equity and debt the company is using to finance its assets<br />
(www.investopedia.com). A higher ratio means greater use of debt.<br />
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As indicated by the chart above, the 2003 relative ranking of the use of debt for<br />
the companies researched from highest to lowest is Hasbro, Mattel, <strong>Jakks</strong> and Leapfrog.<br />
By 2007, Leapfrog surpassed <strong>Jakks</strong> in the relative usage of debt. Hasbro and Mattel<br />
use 2 to 3 times more debt in their capital structure than <strong>Jakks</strong> and Leapfrog. Note<br />
that <strong>Jakks</strong>’ debt to equity ratio gently swayed up and down over the 5-year period, but<br />
never changed more than .14 in 1 year. The largest increase was 2003 to 2004 when<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> purchased almost all of Play Along. The total purchase price was $85.7 million.<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> funded the acquisition by paying $70.8 million in cash, and issuing 749,005<br />
shares of common stock valued at $14.9 million. Along with this increase in equity,<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> also assumed liabilities of $32 million (<strong>Jakks</strong> 2003 10-K). This large increase in<br />
liabilities contributed to the increase in the ratio. Although <strong>Jakks</strong>’ ratio never changed<br />
too drastically, the overall amount of both debt and equity financing used increased<br />
over the period. This tells us that <strong>Jakks</strong> is expanding their operations and growing as a<br />
corporation.<br />
Mattel moved even less than <strong>Jakks</strong>, never wavering more than .09 in a single<br />
year. This is partially due to Mattel being a much larger and mature company than<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong>. It would take a very large amount of financing to alter its ratio. Hasbro’s capital<br />
structure over the same timeframe was a bit more volatile. The decrease from 2003 to<br />
2004 was due to Hasbro’s repurchase of an aggregate of $55,658 in principal amount of<br />
long-term debt, as part of management’s goal to reduce the Company's debt-tocapitalization<br />
ratio and improve its liquidity situation by decreasing cash required to<br />
service outstanding debt. The ultimate reason behind this strategy was to enhance the<br />
ability of the Company to obtain additional financing should the need to do so arise<br />
(Hasbro 2003 10-K). The increase in debt to equity in 2007 was due to the issuance of<br />
$350,000 of notes due in 2017, for which the majority of the proceeds were used to<br />
repay short-term debt resulting from repurchases of common stock as well as<br />
outstanding warrants. The repurchase activity showed evidence of Hasbro’s initiative at<br />
that time to return excess cash to its shareholders through share repurchases and<br />
dividends (Hasbro 2007 10-K).<br />
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LeapFrog’s debt to equity ratio was very steady until 2007, where it increased<br />
by .21. This is largely due to an almost $20 million increase in liabilities caused by<br />
employee-related costs, which included severance and bonus of over $10 million.<br />
These severance and bonus amounts were associated with the resignation of former<br />
corporate officers and reduction in LeapFrog’s school segment workforce (LeapFrog<br />
2007 10-K).<br />
The adjusted debt to equity ratio shows the same patterns but adjusts the<br />
entries to decrease equity by the amount of goodwill impairment that should have been<br />
recorded.<br />
Times Interest Earned<br />
The Times Interest Earned (TIE) ratio is calculated by dividing Net Income<br />
Before Interest and Taxes (NIBIT) by interest expense. “TIE represents an ability to<br />
meet debt obligations, and an indicator of how many times a company can cover its<br />
interest charges on a pretax basis” (www.investopedia.com). A lower TIE ratio means<br />
less earnings are available to meet interest payments and that the business is more<br />
vulnerable to increases in interest rates. Ensuring interest payments to debt holders<br />
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and preventing bankruptcy depends mainly on a company's ability to sustain earnings<br />
(www.financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com).<br />
LeapFrog has been graphed separately, given the quite different performance of<br />
TIE relative to the other three companies. First, we will compare the other companies<br />
and address LeapFrog later independently. From the first chart, we see that <strong>Jakks</strong> TIE<br />
starts out comparable to Mattel and Hasbro, but by 2004 it is more than double the<br />
other two and the gap remains relatively constant through 2007, when Jakk’s TIE<br />
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eaches 25. While Hasbro’s TIE experiences a steady incline over the 5-year period<br />
from about 5 to almost 15, Mattel’s remains relatively flat, not venturing too far from 10<br />
in any given year. All three company ratios are healthy, but LeapFrog’s TIE is faltering<br />
endlessly. 2003 and 2005 are the exceptions. 2003 is explained mostly by dramatic<br />
annual sales growth of 28%, from $532 million in 2002 to $680 million in 2003<br />
(LeapFrog 2003 10-K). Also, LeapFrog’s initial public offering wasn’t until 2002, so<br />
equity financing was more predominant than debt financing prior to 2005.<br />
2005 TIE approximated 500 due to increased revenues, specifically the more<br />
than doubling of revenue from screen-based products (LeapFrog 2005 10-K). LeapFrog<br />
experienced negative NIBIT in 2004, 2006 and 2007. In 2004, negative NIBIT was due<br />
largely to decreased revenue of $39.7 million and approximately a 10% drop in gross<br />
margin from 2003 (LeapFrog 2004 10-K). In 2006, the company suffered from a<br />
decline in revenue, coupled with a 13.7% decline in gross margin owing significantly to<br />
the write-off of obsolete inventory. 2007 was plagued with further erosion of revenue,<br />
down to $442 million from $502 million in 2006. Clearly, LeapFrog has not<br />
demonstrated the ability to sustain earnings, thus causing doubt as to its ability to meet<br />
ongoing debt service requirements.<br />
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The adjusted times interest earned ratios show the changes to decrease NIBIT<br />
by the amount of goodwill impairment that should have been recorded.<br />
Debt Service Margin<br />
Debt service margin (DSM) is calculated by taking operating cash flows and<br />
dividing it by the previous year’s current notes payable. This ratio represents a<br />
company’s ability to pay back its long term debt. A higher number represents a greater<br />
ability to repay debt. So, bigger is better in this case.<br />
300<br />
Debt Service Margin<br />
T<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
Mattel<br />
Hasbro<br />
0<br />
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
Mattel 3.32 10.91 2.47 8.76 8.72<br />
Hasbro 2.25 268.95 1.53 9.78<br />
Time<br />
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Current portion of notes payable was nonexistent on <strong>Jakks</strong> and LeapFrog’s<br />
balance sheets for the 5-year period. Therefore, only Hasbro and Mattel are charted<br />
above. Generally, we see that the two companies’ debt service margins are<br />
comparable, with the exception of 2004 and 2007. Excluding 2004 and 2007, the range<br />
for Hasbro is between 1.5 and 9.8, whereas it is 2.5 to 10.9 for Mattel. The spike up to<br />
269.0 for Hasbro in 2004 is due to the repayment of over $200,000 in principal on<br />
7.95% notes due March 2003. Similarly, in 2006 Hasbro had $0 current notes payable,<br />
yielding an undefined result for DSM.<br />
Altman Z Scores<br />
The Altman Z-Score is a method of calculating a company’s risk of bankruptcy.<br />
Scores below 1.81 are considered poor and represent a higher risk, and scores between<br />
1.81 and 2.67 lie in the grey area. A score above 3 is considered healthy. The lower a<br />
company’s risk of bankruptcy (higher Z-Score) the better interest rate they will receive<br />
on loans. Likewise, the higher the risk of bankruptcy (lower Z-Score) the higher the<br />
interest rate will be. The model uses 5 variables in this calculation. The formula is 1.2<br />
(working capital / total assets) + 1.4 (retained earnings / total assets) + 3.3 (operating<br />
income / total assets) + .6 (market value of equity / book value of liabilities) + .1 (sales<br />
/ total assets). We have graphed the Z-Scores of the leaders of the toy industry and<br />
they are plotted in the graph below.<br />
112
<strong>Jakks</strong> has performed in the high end of the grey area, or just above it for the last<br />
6 years, and with sales and operating income steadily increasing by 11% to 20% for<br />
each of the last three years they seem to be on their way up. Likewise, Mattel has<br />
consistently scored well always landing between 3.05 and 3.89 during the sample.<br />
Hasbro has been as low as 1.78 in 2002, but has recovered since and has scored<br />
between 2.69 and 3.53 since. Hasbro’s increase can be attributed to gradual increases<br />
in operating income and net revenues over the past 5 years. LeapFrog has been very<br />
sporadic, ranging between 5.5 and 0.36 during the sample. They have scored very<br />
poorly in the past two years and are now considered at high risk for bankruptcy. This is<br />
explained by LeapFrog’s net sales having declined from (in thousands) 649,757 in 2005,<br />
to 502,255 in 2006, to 442,271 in 07, a total of a 32% decrease in two years. During<br />
this same period operating expenses have increased from 258,683 in 2005, to 271,697<br />
in 2006, to 274,476 in 2007.<br />
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The adjustment for goodwill affected retained earnings, operating income, and total<br />
assets, how this affected each company is shown in the chart above. In this chart, we<br />
see that <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> is (in terms of financial stability) “okay but not great” for 2003 to<br />
2007 (except for 2004) which defers from the non adjusted z score in that were<br />
considered “great” for three years, instead of the two seen here. Leapfrog, as was<br />
expected based on prior analysis of the industry and the firms therein, is considered<br />
both for this year and the one before as being in “financial distress” for having a score<br />
below 1.81, of course this measurement is not perfect, but it does not seem too far off<br />
based on what was already noted.<br />
Sustainable Growth Rate<br />
The IGR and SGR are methods of calculating a company’s potential for growth.<br />
The IGR is defined as being equal to ROA (1 – dividends / net income), and is the<br />
highest level of growth achievable without outside financing (www.investopedia.com).<br />
The SGR is the maximum growth rate that a firm can sustain without having to increase<br />
financial leverage (www.investopedia.com), calculated as being equal to IGR (1 + debt<br />
previous year / equity previous year). The SGR represents how much a firm can grow<br />
on their own; without borrowing more money. To pass this rate the firm must borrow<br />
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funds from outside sources. Since <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> does not pay dividends their IGR is<br />
simply equal to return on assets (discussed in the profitability analysis section). Due to<br />
this fact we will only be discussing SGR.<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> has shown a very consistent SGR ranging from 11.43% to 14.61%, except for<br />
2003 which is an outlier at 4.41%. This outlier is due to Jakk’s having only (in<br />
thousands) 48,223 total liabilities in 2002, as opposed to 151,414 in 2003. Hasbro is<br />
consistently between 12.93% and 21.65%, except for the beginning of the graph in<br />
2002. Mattel also follows a very steady path, never veering outside of 13.24% to<br />
28.21%. LeapFrog once again is very sporadic, showing a hard decline from 53.15% in<br />
2002 all the way down to -30.34% in 2007. This is due to LeapFrog having a net loss<br />
in 2006 and 2007 of (in thousands) 145,092 and 101,315, while having total<br />
stockholder’s equities of 19,034 and 22,438, respectively. These numbers yield returns<br />
on equity of approximately -762% in 2006 and -452% in 2007. Since LeapFrog has no<br />
dividends these large, negative returns on equity are the multipliers in the SGR<br />
equation, bringing their total SGR way down.<br />
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SGR ‐ Goodwill Adj 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> ‐1.22% ‐5.91% 1.61% 7.03% 5.56% 7.47%<br />
Hasbro ‐19.75% 8.29% 9.53% 9.60% 10.23% 18.36%<br />
Mattel 8.36% 23.54% 21.80% 14.52% 22.79% 20.13%<br />
Leapfrog 53.01% 26.51% ‐2.99% 3.40% ‐32.03% ‐29.59%<br />
The adjustment for goodwill affected ROA for it changed net income and total<br />
assets. In addition, it also affected total equity through the impact it had on retained<br />
earnings. In taking away the “excess” goodwill, we find that <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> performed<br />
differently than what was seen before (meaning a whole lot worse). In fact, it seems<br />
that the company would not have been able to sustain themselves through internal<br />
financing for 2002 and 2003.<br />
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Financial Statement Forecast<br />
In this, we are using our knowledge and understanding of what the company is and<br />
does to reasonably predict what might happen in the future. In doing so, we are able to<br />
determine if the company is fairly valued through the use of valuation models which are<br />
discussed later. Our task is to use logic and reason to find patterns in items in the<br />
financial statements and to make educated decisions as to what those items will be in<br />
the future. In making such assumptions, it is important to note that the income<br />
statement tends to be the easiest to forecast and that the statement of cash flows<br />
tends to be the hardest due to the amount of the things that can affect it and due to<br />
the relative inconsistency of the items reported there in. The balance sheet is<br />
somewhere in between these two as far as difficulty in forecasting goes.<br />
Goodwill Adjustment<br />
In forecasting, we will focus on the raw statements (what the company<br />
provided) and then on adjusted statements (what would happen if we accounted for<br />
goodwill). In terms of what is affected: income from operations is decreased by the<br />
impairment of goodwill, which decreases net income, which in turn decreases retained<br />
earnings, which leads to a decrease in total equity, this decrease, however is countered<br />
by the decrease in total non-current assets (which houses goodwill), which in turn<br />
decreases total assets to match the decrease in total equity. In order to keep things<br />
simple, we shall first forecast the raw statements (including predictions on goodwill)<br />
and then based on how the impairment of goodwill affects financials (which we outlined<br />
above) we will make those adjustments accordingly to create the “adjusted<br />
statements”.<br />
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Income Statement<br />
Sales<br />
Sales in prior years indicate growth but that growth is unstable. If the growth<br />
found in 2005 to 2007 is an indication of future performance, then it seems probable<br />
that growth will be about 13.7% for future years [(15.7% + 15.2% + 11.98% +<br />
11.98%)/4]. In 2005 and 2006, we felt that sales growth had reached a stable point<br />
but found that it dropped by 3.7% in 2007. In 2007, they may have had a slower year<br />
or it may have been a side effect of having to deal with legal issues regarding the WWE<br />
brand. In either case, this fluctuation is small compared to the changes in sales growth<br />
for 2003 and 2004. We, therefore, assumed that the 11.98% sales growth in 2007 was<br />
the “lower limit” for possible sales growth in future periods, whereas the growth seen in<br />
2005 and 2006 can be treated as the “upper limit”. In using this logic, we took the<br />
growth seen in 2005 and 2006 and averaged it with the growth seen in 2007 (we<br />
counted it twice to counter balance the “upper limits” used in the calculation).<br />
Cost of Sales<br />
The cost of sales growth, except for 2005, tends to be 1.37% to 3.49% more<br />
than growth in sales for those years. In reviewing the quarters, it was revealed that the<br />
difference in these rates tends to be around ±0.6% in the remaining quarters (first<br />
quarter excluded) for these years, which is relatively small, and allows us to make a<br />
reasonable approximation as to what the cost of sales might be for the rest of 2008.<br />
This was calculated to be 0.3% (average of the cost of sales growth minus sales growth<br />
for the remaining quarters in those years) more than sales growth for quarters after the<br />
first quarter in 2008. In simpler terms, this means that we took the sales growth in<br />
“2008 rest”, which was 15.1% [(843571 - 733023) / 733023] and added 0.3% to that<br />
value to get cost of sales growth in “2008 rest”, which was 15.4% (15.08% + 0.3%),<br />
then after that, we computed the cost of sales for “2008 rest” using that growth rate,<br />
and added that value to “2008 Q1” (first quarter, which was given to us) to get our<br />
118
total cost of sales for the year. In terms of what cost of sales will be for years after<br />
2008, please read the section below on gross profit.<br />
Gross Profit<br />
If we look into the gross profit margin (profitability ratio) for this company, we<br />
find that after 2004, this ratio has dropped from 40.32% in 2005 to 38.52% in 2006 to<br />
37.76% in 2007, and in 2008 (based on forecasting) this ratio was 37.5%. If we<br />
consider the difference in the ratio we found that it decreased by 1.8% in 2006, by<br />
0.76% in 2007, and by 0.26% in 2008. This indicated to us that the gross profit margin<br />
(gross profit divided by sales) may be reaching a sort of “stable point” (due to the<br />
smaller decreases in this ratio over time), which by our reasoning should be a little<br />
smaller than the ratio for 2008. In seeking that value (or rather a close approximation)<br />
we estimated the future gross profit margin to be 37.1% [37.17% - 0.26%*0.2%]<br />
where the “0.2% times 0.26%” is an estimate based on the difference in gross profit<br />
margin over time. In relation to what was stated in the cost of sales section, we can<br />
predict cost of sales based on our prediction for sales minus this prediction for the gross<br />
profit.<br />
SG&A<br />
In “acquisition shut down and product recalls”, this played a part in calculating<br />
the income for 2002 and 2003, but was negligible in later years, which is why we are<br />
ignoring it in our analysis. In SG&A (selling, general and administrative expenses), it<br />
has increased over time but tends to fluctuate between 15.23% and 3.74% (excluded<br />
2004). In this item, the variation seems to have no discernable pattern, making it<br />
difficult to make an accurate forecast. In terms of income from operations (which along<br />
with gross profit can be used to find SG&A), we found that it increased over time, but<br />
demonstrated a far greater volatility than SG&A expenses. In this, we are forced,<br />
despite the level of uncertainty, to determine a growth for SG&A in 2008, for it is for all<br />
intents and purposes more stable than the growth in income from operations. In<br />
discussing this matter over, we have agreed that a simple average for the growth for<br />
119
SG&A in prior years (excluding 2004) may be the best approach in determining a<br />
“reasonable” growth for 2008, this was calculated to be 9.8% [(15.23% + 3.74% +<br />
13.29% + 7%) / 4]. In reviewing income from operations, we noticed that the first<br />
quarter yielded a negative result, but given the volatility in growth for this item in prior<br />
quarters and due to the unstable growth in income from operations in general, we have<br />
assumed that the “2008 rest” (excludes first quarter) for 2008, will make up for the loss<br />
found in the “2008 Q1” (first quarter). In terms of years after 2008, we simply used our<br />
prediction for gross profit and subtracted out income from operations to find SG&A for<br />
future periods.<br />
Income from Operations<br />
In the common size, we found that income from operations showed relative<br />
consistency between 2005 and 2008, because these years are recent, we used them as<br />
a basis for finding this item in future periods (excluded 2003 and 2004). In doing so, we<br />
have calculated that income from operations would be equal to 12.56% [(13.30% +<br />
12.06% + 12.48% + 12.76%) / 4] times net sales, this of course, does not apply to<br />
2008, where we had determined income from operations in a different manner (gross<br />
profit minus SG&A).<br />
Profit from Joint Venture<br />
The profit from the joint venture has increased in prior years and that growth<br />
tends to become larger in each year (except for 2003). In this growth, it has increased<br />
by 12.7% from 2004 to 2005, by 20.8% from 2005 to 2006, and by 19.65% from 2006<br />
and 2007. If 2005 to 2007 are an indication, then it seems reasonable to assume that<br />
growth in this item should increase by 20.2% [(20.8%+19.65%)/2] to 80.3% for 2008.<br />
In truth, it is expected that the return from the venture will decrease over time due to<br />
the legal issues regarding WWE and the loss of their brand in later years. In this, we<br />
have concluded that the growth should decrease in later years (after 2009). But by how<br />
much is difficult to determine, therefore for the sake of simplicity, the prediction for this<br />
120
item in future periods will be found by taking the income before income taxes<br />
subtracting off the income from operations and adding the net interest.<br />
Income Before Income Taxes [Includes Information on Net Interest]<br />
Except for 2003, growth in this item, though positive, is extremely unstable. In<br />
order to predict it, we decided to take the income from operations add the profit from<br />
the joint venture and subtract the net interest (for 2008). In regards to this, the growth<br />
in net interest is similar to this item, in that both are extremely unstable. In seeking<br />
some common ground for an analysis, we took net interest and divided it by income<br />
from operations. In doing so, we found that in recent years (2005, 2006, and 2007)<br />
that net interest decreased income from operations by 0.8% [(0.73% + 0.43% +<br />
1.27%) / 3], and though the fluctuations are volatile in this ratio, they are small. In<br />
this, we assumed that net interest is equal to 0.8% of income from operations, which is<br />
reasonable, for both 2008 and years after. In summary, taking income from operations<br />
adding the profit from the joint venture and subtracting the estimated net interest gives<br />
us a prediction for income before income taxes for 2008. In looking at the common size<br />
for this item (including 2008) we see (excluding 2002) that the ratio has steadily grown<br />
(except for 2006) over time (from 5.49% in 2002 to 16.78 in 2008). The difference in<br />
this ratio was 4.8% in 2004, 4.32% in 2005, 0.5% in 2007 (with respect to 2005), and<br />
1.61% in 2008. It is evident that this ratio has increased over time (excluded 2003 and<br />
2004) but that increase has been relatively small, which to us has indicated that the<br />
ratio may be on average close to 17.8% in future periods [which we estimated based<br />
on the differences in that ratio over time].<br />
Provision for Taxes<br />
Income tax for 2002 was 18.9%, for 2003 was 8.3%, for 2004 was 26.3%, for<br />
2005 was 34.3%, for 2006 was 31.7%, and for 2007 was 31.3% for this company. It is<br />
difficult to determine what the income tax will be in future years for it does vary and is<br />
not consistent with the tax rates used by competitors.<br />
121
Income Tax 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong><br />
<strong>Pacific</strong> 18.90% 8.30% 26.30% 34.30% 31.70% 31.30%<br />
Hasbro 27.90% 28.30% 24.60% 31.80% 32.60% 28.00%<br />
Mattel 26.80% 27.40% 17.70% 36.00% 13.30% 14.70%<br />
Leapfrog 39.90% 37.00%<br />
‐<br />
47.60% 26.50% 22.46% 3.80%<br />
In reviewing the tax rate for 2005 to 2007 for <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, the rate tends to be<br />
around 31% and has shown slight decreases over time. In considering this, we have<br />
taken the average for the rates in 2005 to 2007 along with 2004, to make a reasonable<br />
guess as to what the income tax rate might be in future years for this company, which<br />
we calculated to be 30.5% for future years.<br />
Net Income<br />
Since we have the other pieces of the puzzle, all that is required to “predict” net<br />
income, is to take “income before income taxes” and subtract the “provision for income<br />
taxes”. In minority interest, we ignored this factor, for it only played a part in<br />
calculating net income in 2002.<br />
122
Income Statement [Raw]<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> - Income Statement - (in thousands) Actual Financial Statements Average Assume Forcasted Financial Statements<br />
Ended 12/31 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017<br />
Net sales<br />
310,016 315,776 574,266 661,536 765,386 857,085 974,506 1,108,013 1,259,811 1,432,405 1,628,644 1,851,768 2,105,461 2,393,909 2,721,874 3,094,771<br />
Cost of sales<br />
180,173 189,334 348,259 394,829 470,592 533,435 60.35% 608,341 62.90% 696,940 792,421 900,983 1,024,417 1,164,762 1,324,335 1,505,769 1,712,059 1,946,611<br />
Gross profit<br />
129,843 126,442 226,007 266,707 294,794 323,650 39.65% 366,165 37.10% 411,073 467,390 531,422 604,227 687,006 781,126 888,140 1,009,815 1,148,160<br />
SG&A<br />
98,111 113,053 172,282 178,722 202,482 216,652 29.37% 237,884 24.54% 271,906 309,158 351,512 399,669 454,424 516,680 587,465 667,948 759,457<br />
Acquisition Shut Down and Product Recall Costs<br />
6,718 2,000 1.40%<br />
Income from Operations<br />
25,014 11,389 53,725 87,985 92,312 106,998 9.81% 128,281 12.56% 139,166 158,232 179,910 204,558 232,582 264,446 300,675 341,867 388,703<br />
Profit from Joint Venture<br />
8,004 7,351 7,865 9,414 13,226 21,180 1.98% 38,188 5.14% 56,933 64,732 73,601 83,684 95,149 108,184 123,005 139,857 159,018<br />
Other Expense<br />
(1,401)<br />
Net Interest<br />
Interest Income<br />
Interest Expense<br />
Total Net Interest<br />
Income Before Income Taxes<br />
Provision for Income Taxes<br />
Income Before Minority Interest<br />
Minority interest<br />
Net income<br />
2,052 5,183 4,930 6,819 0.65%<br />
(4,550) (4,544) (4,533) (5,456) -0.68%<br />
(1,141) 1,405 2,498 (639) (397) (1,363) 0.03% (1,026) -0.10% (1,127) (1,282) (1,457) (1,657) (1,884) (2,142) (2,435) (2,769) (3,148)<br />
34,159 17,335 59,092 96,637 105,935 129,541 11.73% 167,495 17.80% 197,226 224,246 254,968 289,899 329,615 374,772 426,116 484,494 550,869<br />
6,466 1,440 15,533 33,144 33,560 40,550 3.23% 51,086 5.43% 60,154 68,395 77,765 88,419 100,533 114,305 129,965 147,771 168,015<br />
27,693 15,895 43,559 63,493 72,375 88,991 8.50% 116,409 12.37% 137,072 155,851 177,203 201,480 229,082 260,467 296,150 336,723 382,854<br />
(237)<br />
27,930 15,895 43,559 63,493 72,375 88,991 8.51% 116,409 12.37% 137,072 155,851 177,203 201,480 229,082 260,467 296,150 336,723 382,854<br />
Common Sized - Income Statement 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017<br />
Sales Growth Percentage N/A 1.86% 81.86% 15.20% 15.70% 11.98% 25.32% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70%<br />
Net sales<br />
Cost of sales<br />
Gross profit<br />
SG&A<br />
Acquisition Shut Down and Product Recall Costs<br />
Income from Operations<br />
Profit from Joint Venture<br />
Other Expense<br />
Net Interest<br />
Interest Income<br />
Interest Expense<br />
Total Net Interest<br />
Income Before Income Taxes<br />
Provision for Income Taxes<br />
Income Before Minority Interest<br />
Minority interest<br />
Net income<br />
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%<br />
58.12% 59.96% 60.64% 59.68% 61.48% 62.24% 60.35% 62.43% 62.90% 62.90% 62.90% 62.90% 62.90% 62.90% 62.90% 62.90% 62.90% 62.90%<br />
41.88% 40.04% 39.36% 40.32% 38.52% 37.76% 39.65% 37.57% 37.10% 37.10% 37.10% 37.10% 37.10% 37.10% 37.10% 37.10% 37.10% 37.10%<br />
31.65% 35.80% 30.00% 27.02% 26.45% 25.28% 29.37% 24.41% 24.54% 24.54% 24.54% 24.54% 24.54% 24.54% 24.54% 24.54% 24.54% 24.54%<br />
2.17% 0.63% 1.40%<br />
8.07% 3.61% 9.36% 13.30% 12.06% 12.48% 9.81% 13.16% 12.56% 12.56% 12.56% 12.56% 12.56% 12.56% 12.56% 12.56% 12.56% 12.56%<br />
2.58% 2.33% 1.37% 1.42% 1.73% 2.47% 1.98% 3.92% 5.14% 5.14% 5.14% 5.14% 5.14% 5.14% 5.14% 5.14% 5.14% 5.14%<br />
-0.21% -0.21%<br />
0.36% 0.78% 0.64% 0.80% 0.65%<br />
-0.79% -0.69% -0.59% -0.64% -0.68%<br />
-0.37% 0.44% 0.43% -0.10% -0.05% -0.16% 0.03% -0.43% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10%<br />
11.02% 5.49% 10.29% 14.61% 13.84% 15.11% 11.73% 17.19% 17.80% 17.80% 17.80% 17.80% 17.80% 17.80% 17.80% 17.80% 17.80% 17.80%<br />
2.09% 0.46% 2.70% 5.01% 4.38% 4.73% 3.23% 5.24% 5.43% 5.43% 5.43% 5.43% 5.43% 5.43% 5.43% 5.43% 5.43% 5.43%<br />
8.93% 5.03% 7.59% 9.60% 9.46% 10.38% 8.50% 11.95% 12.37% 12.37% 12.37% 12.37% 12.37% 12.37% 12.37% 12.37% 12.37% 12.37%<br />
-0.08% -0.08%<br />
9.01% 5.03% 7.59% 9.60% 9.46% 10.38% 8.51% 11.95% 12.37% 12.37% 12.37% 12.37% 12.37% 12.37% 12.37% 12.37% 12.37% 12.37%<br />
123
Income Statement [Adjusted]<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> - Income Statement - (in thousands) Actual Financial Statements Average Assume Forcasted Financial Statements<br />
Ended 12/31 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017<br />
Net sales<br />
310,016 315,776 574,266 661,536 765,386 857,085 974,506 1,108,013 1,259,811 1,432,405 1,628,644 1,851,768 2,105,461 2,393,909 2,721,874 3,094,771<br />
Cost of sales<br />
180,173 189,334 348,259 394,829 470,592 533,435 60.35% 608,341 62.90% 696,940 792,421 900,983 1,024,417 1,164,762 1,324,335 1,505,769 1,712,059 1,946,611<br />
Gross profit<br />
129,843 126,442 226,007 266,707 294,794 323,650 39.65% 366,165 37.10% 411,073 467,390 531,422 604,227 687,006 781,126 888,140 1,009,815 1,148,160<br />
SG&A<br />
98,111 113,053 172,282 178,722 202,482 216,652 29.37% 237,884 24.54% 362,316 411,954 468,391 532,561 605,522 688,478 782,800 890,043 1,011,979<br />
Acquisition Shut Down and Product Recall Costs<br />
6,718 2,000 1.40%<br />
Impairment for Goodwill<br />
37,867 38,146 51,666 53,860 67,600 70,668 79,516 90,410 102,796 116,879 132,892 151,098 171,798 195,335 222,095 252,522<br />
Income from Operations<br />
(12,853) (26,757) 2,059 34,125 24,712 36,330 0.06% 48,765 12.56% 48,756 55,436 63,031 71,666 81,484 92,648 105,340 119,772 136,181<br />
Profit from Joint Venture<br />
8,004 7,351 7,865 9,414 13,226 21,180 1.98% 38,188 5.14% 56,933 64,732 73,601 83,684 95,149 108,184 123,005 139,857 159,018<br />
Other Expense<br />
(1,401)<br />
Net Interest<br />
Interest Income<br />
Interest Expense<br />
Total Net Interest<br />
Income Before Income Taxes<br />
Provision for Income Taxes<br />
Income Before Minority Interest<br />
Minority interest<br />
Net income<br />
2,052 5,183 4,930 6,819 0.65%<br />
(4,550) (4,544) (4,533) (5,456) -0.68%<br />
(1,141) 1,405 2,498 (639) (397) (1,363) 0.03% (1,026) -0.10% (1,127) (1,282) (1,457) (1,657) (1,884) (2,142) (2,435) (2,769) (3,148)<br />
(3,708) (20,811) 7,426 42,777 38,335 58,873 1.98% 87,979 17.80% 106,816 121,450 138,089 157,007 178,517 202,974 230,781 262,398 298,347<br />
(702) (1,729) 1,952 14,672 12,145 18,429 0.92% 26,834 2.94% 32,579 37,042 42,117 47,887 54,448 61,907 70,388 80,031 90,996<br />
(3,006) (19,082) 5,474 28,106 26,191 40,444 1.05% 61,145 6.70% 74,237 84,408 95,972 109,120 124,069 141,067 160,393 182,367 207,351<br />
(237)<br />
(2,769) (19,082) 5,474 28,106 26,191 40,444 1.07% 61,145 6.70% 74,237 84,408 95,972 109,120 124,069 141,067 160,393 182,367 207,351<br />
Common Sized - Income Statement 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017<br />
Sales Growth Percentage N/A 1.86% 81.86% 15.20% 15.70% 11.98% 25.32% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70%<br />
Net sales<br />
Cost of sales<br />
Gross profit<br />
SG&A<br />
Acquisition Shut Down and Product Recall Costs<br />
Impairment for Goodwill<br />
Income from Operations<br />
Profit from Joint Venture<br />
Other Expense<br />
Net Interest<br />
Interest Income<br />
Interest Expense<br />
Total Net Interest<br />
Income Before Income Taxes<br />
Provision for Income Taxes<br />
Income Before Minority Interest<br />
Minority interest<br />
Net income<br />
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%<br />
58.12% 59.96% 60.64% 59.68% 61.48% 62.24% 60.35% 62.43% 62.90% 62.90% 62.90% 62.90% 62.90% 62.90% 62.90% 62.90% 62.90% 62.90%<br />
41.88% 40.04% 39.36% 40.32% 38.52% 37.76% 39.65% 37.57% 37.10% 37.10% 37.10% 37.10% 37.10% 37.10% 37.10% 37.10% 37.10% 37.10%<br />
31.65% 35.80% 30.00% 27.02% 26.45% 25.28% 29.37% 24.41% 32.70% 32.70% 32.70% 32.70% 32.70% 32.70% 32.70% 32.70% 32.70% 32.70%<br />
2.17% 0.63% 1.40%<br />
-4.15% -8.47% 0.36% 5.16% 3.23% 4.24% 0.06% 5.00% 4.40% 4.40% 4.40% 4.40% 4.40% 4.40% 4.40% 4.40% 4.40% 4.40%<br />
2.58% 2.33% 1.37% 1.42% 1.73% 2.47% 1.98% 3.92% 5.14% 5.14% 5.14% 5.14% 5.14% 5.14% 5.14% 5.14% 5.14% 5.14%<br />
-0.21% -0.21%<br />
0.36% 0.78% 0.64% 0.80% 0.65%<br />
-0.79% -0.69% -0.59% -0.64% -0.68%<br />
-0.37% 0.44% 0.43% -0.10% -0.05% -0.16% 0.03% -0.43% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10%<br />
-1.20% -6.59% 1.29% 6.47% 5.01% 6.87% 1.98% 9.03% 9.64% 9.64% 9.64% 9.64% 9.64% 9.64% 9.64% 9.64% 9.64% 9.64%<br />
-0.23% -0.55% 0.34% 2.22% 1.59% 2.15% 0.92% 2.75% 2.94% 2.94% 2.94% 2.94% 2.94% 2.94% 2.94% 2.94% 2.94% 2.94%<br />
-0.97% -6.04% 0.95% 4.25% 3.42% 4.72% 1.05% 6.27% 6.70% 6.70% 6.70% 6.70% 6.70% 6.70% 6.70% 6.70% 6.70% 6.70%<br />
-0.08% -0.08%<br />
-0.89% -6.04% 0.95% 4.25% 3.42% 4.72% 1.07% 6.27% 6.70% 6.70% 6.70% 6.70% 6.70% 6.70% 6.70% 6.70% 6.70% 6.70%<br />
124
Balance Sheet<br />
Total Current Assets<br />
In 2003 to 2006, growth in current assets decreased from 61.1% to 6.21%,<br />
however, in 2007, it increased to 16.46%. In the prior section, we found a negative<br />
growth in 2006 for cash and cash equivalents (current asset) that made it difficult to<br />
forecast expected growth for future periods (if we had not excluded it). In current<br />
assets, the same thing can be said, for the decrease in cash and cash equivalents<br />
(2006) did affect the growth in current assets (total) for that year. In this, we excluded<br />
2006 and looked at growth for 2005 (growth of 14.17%) and 2007 (growth of 16.46%)<br />
the difference is remarkably small, compared to the decreases in growth seen in 2003<br />
and 2004. In using the simplest route to forecast growth for current assets, we took the<br />
average of 14.17% and 16.46% to give us (for 2008) a growth of 15.3%. In the<br />
common size, we find (except for 2002), that the ratio of current assets to total assets<br />
is consistent over time, with the range being less than 5% in most cases, therefore, in<br />
seeking to predict the future growth in this ratio (years after 2008), we took the<br />
average seen in prior years (2003 to 2008) and found it to be 54.37% [(55.84% +<br />
53.54% + 51.22% + 56.41% + 53.47% + 55.74%) / 6].<br />
Accounts Receivable<br />
In seeking a pattern, we found growth to be inconsistent over time, in one<br />
instance, growth decreased by 62% in 2007 and increased by 90% the year before. In<br />
the common size, except for 2006 and 2007, the ratio was unstable. In discussion, we<br />
determined that using 2 years of stability was reasonable since they were the most<br />
recent in our analysis. In forecasting, we predicted that the ratio (accounts receivable<br />
over total assets) might be 17.56% [(17.36% + 17.75%) / 2] for future years.<br />
Inventory<br />
In seeking a pattern, we found growth to be inconsistent over time, in one<br />
instance, growth decreased by 18.38% in 2006 and increased by 20.85% the year<br />
125
efore. In the common size, except for 2002, the ratio fluctuated between 8.85% and<br />
7.68%, meaning there was less than a 1.2% difference, which is reasonable. In<br />
forecasting, we decided to take the average of prior years (except 2002) to determine<br />
what the ratio might be for future years, which we calculated to be 8.16% [(8.38% +<br />
7.18% + 8.85% + 8.71% + 7.68%) / 5].<br />
Property and Equipment<br />
In seeking to forecast this item, we considered three factors: the growth in<br />
property and equipment over time, the difference in growth over time, and the portion<br />
of total assets that are taken by property and equipment over time (common size). In<br />
reviewing those factors, a reasonable forecast for property and equipment can be made<br />
by using the ratio of property and equipment over total assets. In this ratio, the number<br />
fluctuated between 2.21% and 1.57%, which is small, and allowed us to approximate<br />
the property and equipment to total asset ratio for future years by using the average of<br />
that ratio in prior years, which we found to be 1.91% [(2.18% + 1.91% + 1.68% +<br />
1.57% + 2.21%)/5].<br />
Goodwill<br />
In seeking to forecast this item, we considered three factors, the growth in<br />
goodwill over time, the difference in growth over time, and the portion of total assets<br />
that are taken by goodwill. In reviewing those factors, a reasonable forecast for<br />
goodwill can be made by considering the ratio of goodwill over total assets. In this<br />
ratio, the number fluctuated between 38.33% and 35.99%, which is small, and allowed<br />
us to approximate the goodwill to total asset ratio for future years (2008 and later<br />
years) by using the average of this ratio for prior years (2003 to 2007), which we found<br />
to be 36.6% [(35.96% + 38.33% + 35.72% + 37.08% + 35.99%) / 5]. In retrospect,<br />
it is alarming that property and equipment is so small compared to goodwill and in that<br />
regard it is shocking that goodwill can be so high for this company. In the adjusted<br />
forecasted statements, we impaired goodwill to get a more accurate view of the<br />
126
company, the effect this has on the financial statements can be noted in the “adjusted<br />
financial statements”.<br />
Trademarks<br />
In the common size, the ratio for trademarks (trademarks/total assets) has<br />
(except for 2002) steadily decreased by about 9% {1 – [(2.55% / 2.92%) + (2.36% /<br />
2.55%) + (2.22% / 2.36%) + (1.99% / 2.22%) / 4]} from the year before, therefore,<br />
we can assume (within reason) that the ratio will continue to decrease by 9% for each<br />
forecasted year.<br />
Total Non Current Assets<br />
This item can be found by subtracting forecasted total assets by forecasted total<br />
current assets for the year in question.<br />
Total Assets<br />
There is way too much volatility in the yearly and quarterly values to make an<br />
accurate assessment of what total assets might be, therefore, we have taken look at<br />
the ratio for asset turnover (expense diagnostic and profitability ratio) which despite<br />
showing some volatility tends to be close to one. In this, we have assumed that for<br />
2008 and future years, that an average of those ratios (except 2003) would be<br />
appropriate (which was calculated to be 1.02). In 2008, we looked at the forecasted<br />
sales for 2009 (which totaled $1,108,013) and divided this value by 1.02, giving us<br />
forecasted total assets as being $1,113,065 (in thousands).<br />
Accounts Payable and Accrued Expenses<br />
In seeking to forecast this item, we considered three factors, the growth in this<br />
item over time, the difference in growth over time, the portion of total current liabilities<br />
taken by this item, and the portion of total liabilities taken by this item. In reviewing<br />
these factors, the ratio for this item over current liabilities and the ratio for this item<br />
over total liabilities, seems consistent over time (excluded 2003). In comparison of the<br />
127
difference in value for those ratios over time, the one that divided the item by total<br />
liabilities was deemed the most consistent (difference was 3.02% versus the 6.49%<br />
seen in the other ratio). In the same way that we approached forecasting items with<br />
relatively small ranges (but inconsistent as far as whether it may increase or decrease<br />
slightly for the next year), we took the average and found that the item over total<br />
liabilities may be about 42.98% [(44.43% + 41.41% + 44.11% + 41.95%)/4] for 2008<br />
and future years.<br />
Total Current Liabilities<br />
The volatility in the yearly and quarterly values makes it difficult to make a<br />
reasonable assumption over a long period of time. In forecasting this item, we shall use<br />
the working capital turnover (instead of current ratio for it is inconsistent). In this ratio,<br />
except for 2003, the values tend to range between 2.73 and 2.40, which is reasonable<br />
and in determining the ratio for future years, we used the average (except 2003) of<br />
previous ratios, which was calculated to be 2.45 (by dividing sales by this ratio and<br />
subtracting current assets, we can find current liabilities). But, we adjusted it for each<br />
year to better accommodate noncurrent liabilities, which we felt would have at least<br />
$98,000 (in thousands) in them, based on values noted in “convertible senior notes” in<br />
prior years.<br />
Total Non Current Liabilities<br />
This item can be found by subtracting forecasted total liabilities by forecasted<br />
total current liabilities for the year in question. In forecasting, our concern is equity,<br />
therefore the estimations for liabilities, except for total liabilities, are less “accurate”<br />
compared to the estimations for equity.<br />
Total Liabilities<br />
This item can be found by subtracting forecasted total assets by forecasted total<br />
equity for the year in question.<br />
128
Retained Earnings<br />
The retained earnings for the current year is equal to the retained earnings for<br />
the previous year plus the net income for the current year, this allows us to calculate<br />
retained earnings for future years with a degree of certainty.<br />
Total Equity<br />
The total equity for the current year is equal to the total equity for the previous<br />
year plus the net income for the current years and this allows us to calculate total<br />
equity for future years with a degree of certainty.<br />
129
Balance Sheet [Raw]<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> - Balance Sheet - (in thousands) Actual Financial Statements Average Assume<br />
Ended 12/31 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017<br />
Cash and Cash Equivalents 68,413 118,182 176,544 240,238 184,489 241,250 23.62%<br />
<strong>Mark</strong>etable Securities 19,345 19,047 210 218 1.61%<br />
Accounts Receivable 56,195 86,120 102,266 87,199 153,116 174,451 15.23% 190,752 17.56% 216,885 246,598 280,382 318,795 362,470 412,128 468,589 532,786 605,778<br />
Inventory 38,010 44,400 50,000 66,729 76,788 75,486 8.35% 88,641 8.16% 100,785 114,592 130,292 148,141 168,437 191,513 217,750 247,582 281,500<br />
Deferred Income Taxes 4,446 6,161 13,618 10,592 12,945 1.26%<br />
Prepaid Expenses and Other 9,729 16,763 18,521 17,533 26,543 21,733 2.62%<br />
Total Current Assets 176,793 284,810 372,539 425,317 451,738 526,083 51.94% 606,574 54.37% 671,529 763,528 868,131 987,065 1,122,293 1,276,047 1,450,866 1,649,634 1,875,634<br />
Office Furniture and Equipment 5,932 6,563 6,823 7,619 8,299 9,961 1.11%<br />
Molds and Tooling 31,069 34,481 28,818 26,948 36,600 44,333 5.08%<br />
Leasehold Improvements 2,464 2,429 2,572 3,522 4,882 5,186 0.50%<br />
Less Accumulated Depreciation and Amortization 24,640 31,751 27,273 25,394 32,898 38,073 4.48%<br />
Total Property and Equipment 14,825 11,722 10,940 12,695 16,883 21,407 2.20% 20,748 1.91% 23,591 26,822 30,497 34,675 39,426 44,827 50,968 57,951 65,890<br />
Intangibles and Others 8,169 18,172 27,368 18,512 40,833 26,200 3.18%<br />
Investment in Video Game Joint Venture 8,119 9,097 9,816 10,365 14,873 36,090 1.97%<br />
Goodwill 189,336 190,728 258,331 269,298 337,999 353,340 38.23% 397,581 36.60% 452,050 513,981 584,396 664,458 755,489 858,991 976,673 1,110,477 1,262,612<br />
Trademarks 11,568 15,468 17,768 17,768 19,568 19,568 2.48% 19,684 20,367 21,073 21,803 22,559 23,341 24,151 24,988 25,854 26,751<br />
Total Non Current Assets 232,017 245,187 324,223 328,638 430,156 456,605 48.06% 479,713 46.36% 563,580 640,790 728,579 828,394 941,884 1,070,922 1,217,639 1,384,455 1,574,125<br />
Total Assets 408,810 529,997 696,762 753,955 881,894 982,688 1,086,287 1,235,109 1,404,318 1,596,710 1,815,459 2,064,177 2,346,969 2,668,504 3,034,089 3,449,760<br />
Accounts Payable 8,994 31,610 59,569 50,533 65,574 52,287 21.29%<br />
Accrued Expenses 19,394 10,805 49,407 44,415 54,664 70,085 21.82%<br />
Accounts Payable and Accrued Expenses 28,388 42,415 108,976 94,948 120,238 122,372 43.11% 119,863 42.98% 124,913 130,654 137,183 144,605 153,044 162,640 173,550 185,955 200,060<br />
Reserve for Sale Returns and Allowances 13,579 7,753 23,173 25,123 32,589 26,036 12.42%<br />
Current Portion of Long Term Debt 18 19 0.02%<br />
Income Tax Payable 5,625 2,021 10,847 3,792 18,548 21,997 5.57%<br />
Total Current Liabilities 47,610 52,208 142,996 123,863 171,375 170,405 61.11% 158,969 162,602 184,879 210,207 232,070 247,645 252,567 287,168 320,047 348,979<br />
Convertible Senior Notes [Long Term Debt, Net of Current Po 60 98,042 98,000 98,000 98,000 98,000 36.14%<br />
Other Liabilities [Deferred Rent Liability: Till 2007] 995 854 6,432 0.98%<br />
Income Tax Payable 11,294 3.87%<br />
Deferred Income Taxes 563 1,847 4,281 6,446 2,377 5,560 1.62%<br />
Total Non-Current Liabilities 623 99,889 102,281 105,441 101,231 121,286 38.89% 119,912 128,028 119,110 108,971 104,378 108,438 125,842 116,625 112,608 116,492<br />
Total Liabilities 48,233 152,097 245,277 229,304 272,606 291,691 278,881 290,630 303,989 319,178 336,447 356,083 378,409 403,793 432,655 465,471<br />
Preferred Stock<br />
Common Stock 24 25 26 27 28 28 0.01%<br />
Additional Paid-In Capital 240,102 246,008 276,642 287,356 300,255 312,127 57.03%<br />
Retained Earnings 120,451 133,005 176,564 240,057 312,432 382,288 43.34% 498,697 635,769 791,620 968,823 1,170,303 1,399,385 1,659,852 1,956,002 2,292,725 2,675,579<br />
Deferred Compensation Form (789) -0.21%<br />
Accumulated Other Comprehensive Loss (349) (1,747) (2,789) (3,427) (3,446) -0.35%<br />
Total Shareholder Equity 360,577 377,900 451,485 524,651 609,288 690,997 807,406 944,478 1,100,329 1,277,532 1,479,012 1,708,094 1,968,561 2,264,711 2,601,434 2,984,288<br />
Total Liabilities and Shareholders Equity 408,810 529,997 696,762 753,955 881,894 982,688 1,086,287 1,235,109 1,404,318 1,596,710 1,815,459 2,064,177 2,346,969 2,668,504 3,034,089 3,449,760<br />
Retained Earnings for the Current Year = Retained Earnings for the Previous Year + Net Income for the Current Year<br />
Total Equity for the Current Year = Total Equity for the Previous Year + Net Income for the Current Year<br />
130
Common Sized - Balance Sheet 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017<br />
Cash and Cash Equivalents 16.73% 22.30% 25.34% 31.86% 20.92% 24.55% 23.62% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%<br />
<strong>Mark</strong>etable Securities 3.65% 2.73% 0.02% 0.02% 1.61%<br />
Accounts Receivable 13.75% 16.25% 14.68% 11.57% 17.36% 17.75% 15.23% 17.56% 17.56% 17.56% 17.56% 17.56% 17.56% 17.56% 17.56% 17.56% 17.56% 17.56%<br />
Inventory 9.30% 8.38% 7.18% 8.85% 8.71% 7.68% 8.35% 8.16% 8.16% 8.16% 8.16% 8.16% 8.16% 8.16% 8.16% 8.16% 8.16% 8.16%<br />
Deferred Income Taxes 1.09% 0.88% 1.81% 1.20% 1.32% 1.26%<br />
Prepaid Expenses and Other 2.38% 3.16% 2.66% 2.33% 3.01% 2.21% 2.62%<br />
Total Current Assets 43.25% 53.74% 53.47% 56.41% 51.22% 53.54% 51.94% 55.84% 54.37% 54.37% 54.37% 54.37% 54.37% 54.37% 54.37% 54.37% 54.37% 54.37%<br />
Office Furniture and Equipment 1.45% 1.24% 0.98% 1.01% 0.94% 1.01% 1.11%<br />
Molds and Tooling 7.60% 6.51% 4.14% 3.57% 4.15% 4.51% 5.08%<br />
Leasehold Improvements 0.60% 0.46% 0.37% 0.47% 0.55% 0.53% 0.50%<br />
Less Accumulated Depreciation and Amortization 6.03% 5.99% 3.91% 3.37% 3.73% 3.87% 4.48%<br />
Total Property and Equipment 3.63% 2.21% 1.57% 1.68% 1.91% 2.18% 2.20% 1.91% 1.91% 1.91% 1.91% 1.91% 1.91% 1.91% 1.91% 1.91% 1.91% 1.91%<br />
Intangibles and Others 2.00% 3.43% 3.93% 2.46% 4.63% 2.67% 3.18%<br />
Investment in Video Game Joint Venture 1.99% 1.72% 1.41% 1.37% 1.69% 3.67% 1.97%<br />
Goodwill 46.31% 35.99% 37.08% 35.72% 38.33% 35.96% 38.23% 36.60% 36.60% 36.60% 36.60% 36.60% 36.60% 36.60% 36.60% 36.60% 36.60% 36.60%<br />
Trademarks 2.83% 2.92% 2.55% 2.36% 2.22% 1.99% 2.48% 1.81% 1.65% 1.50% 1.37% 1.24% 1.13% 1.03% 0.94% 0.85% 0.78%<br />
Total Non Current Assets 56.75% 46.26% 46.53% 43.59% 48.78% 46.46% 48.06% 44.16% 45.63% 45.63% 45.63% 45.63% 45.63% 45.63% 45.63% 45.63% 45.63% 45.63%<br />
Total Assets 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%<br />
Accounts Payable 18.65% 20.78% 24.29% 22.04% 24.05% 17.93% 21.29%<br />
Accrued Expenses 40.21% 7.10% 20.14% 19.37% 20.05% 24.03% 21.82%<br />
Accounts Payable and Accrued Expenses 58.86% 27.89% 44.43% 41.41% 44.11% 41.95% 43.11% 42.98% 42.98% 42.98% 42.98% 42.98% 42.98% 42.98% 42.98% 42.98% 42.98% 42.98%<br />
Reserve for Sale Returns and Allowances 28.15% 5.10% 9.45% 10.96% 11.95% 8.93% 12.42%<br />
Current Portion of Long Term Debt 0.04% 0.01% 0.02%<br />
Income Tax Payable 11.66% 1.33% 4.42% 1.65% 6.80% 7.54% 5.57%<br />
Total Current Liabilities 98.71% 34.33% 58.30% 54.02% 62.87% 58.42% 61.11% 57.00% 55.95% 60.82% 65.86% 68.98% 69.55% 66.74% 71.12% 73.97% 74.97%<br />
Convertible Senior Notes [Long Term Debt, Net of Current Po 0.12% 64.46% 39.95% 42.74% 35.95% 33.60% 36.14%<br />
Other Liabilities [Deferred Rent Liability: Till 2007] 0.43% 0.31% 2.21% 0.98%<br />
Income Tax Payable 3.87% 3.87%<br />
Deferred Income Taxes 1.17% 1.21% 1.75% 2.81% 0.87% 1.91% 1.62%<br />
Total Non-Current Liabilities 1.29% 65.67% 41.70% 45.98% 37.13% 41.58% 38.89% 43.00% 44.05% 39.18% 34.14% 31.02% 30.45% 33.26% 28.88% 26.03% 25.03%<br />
Total Liabilities 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%<br />
Preferred Stock<br />
Common Stock 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%<br />
Additional Paid-In Capital 66.59% 65.10% 61.27% 54.77% 49.28% 45.17% 57.03%<br />
Retained Earnings 33.41% 35.20% 39.11% 45.76% 51.28% 55.32% 43.34% 61.77% 67.31% 71.94% 75.84% 79.13% 81.93% 84.32% 86.37% 88.13% 89.66%<br />
Deferred Compensation Form -0.21% -0.21%<br />
Accumulated Other Comprehensive Loss 0.00% -0.09% -0.39% -0.53% -0.56% -0.50% -0.35%<br />
Total Shareholder Equity 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%<br />
131
Balance Sheet [Adjusted]<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> - Balance Sheet - (in thousands) Actual Financial Statements Average Assume<br />
Ended 12/31 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017<br />
Cash and Cash Equivalents 68,413 118,182 176,544 240,238 184,489 241,250 23.62%<br />
<strong>Mark</strong>etable Securities 19,345 19,047 210 218 1.61%<br />
Accounts Receivable 56,195 86,120 102,266 87,199 153,116 174,451 15.23% 190,752 18.95% 216,885 246,598 280,382 318,795 362,470 412,128 468,589 532,786 605,778<br />
Inventory 38,010 44,400 50,000 66,729 76,788 75,486 8.35% 88,641 8.00% 100,785 114,592 130,292 148,141 168,437 191,513 217,750 247,582 281,500<br />
Deferred Income Taxes 4,446 6,161 13,618 10,592 12,945 1.26%<br />
Prepaid Expenses and Other 9,729 16,763 18,521 17,533 26,543 21,733 2.62%<br />
Total Current Assets 176,793 284,810 372,539 425,317 451,738 526,083 51.94% 606,574 58.66% 671,529 763,528 868,131 987,065 1,122,293 1,276,047 1,450,866 1,649,634 1,875,634<br />
Office Furniture and Equipment 5,932 6,563 6,823 7,619 8,299 9,961 1.11%<br />
Molds and Tooling 31,069 34,481 28,818 26,948 36,600 44,333 5.08%<br />
Leasehold Improvements 2,464 2,429 2,572 3,522 4,882 5,186 0.50%<br />
Less Accumulated Depreciation and Amortization 24,640 31,751 27,273 25,394 32,898 38,073 4.48%<br />
Total Property and Equipment 14,825 11,722 10,940 12,695 16,883 21,407 2.20% 20,748 2.06% 23,591 26,822 30,497 34,675 39,426 44,827 50,968 57,951 65,890<br />
Intangibles and Others 8,169 18,172 27,368 18,512 40,833 26,200 3.18%<br />
Investment in Video Game Joint Venture 8,119 9,097 9,816 10,365 14,873 36,090 1.97%<br />
Goodwill 189,336 190,728 258,331 269,298 337,999 353,340 38.23% 397,581 452,050 513,981 584,396 664,458 755,489 858,991 976,673 1,110,477 1,262,612<br />
Accumulated Goodwill 37,867 38,146 51,666 53,860 67,600 70,668 79,516 90,410 102,796 116,879 132,892 151,098 171,798 195,335 222,095 252,522<br />
Adjusted Goodwill 151,469 152,582 206,665 215,438 270,399 282,672 318,065 31.59% 361,640 411,184 467,517 531,566 604,391 687,193 781,338 888,381 1,010,090<br />
Trademarks 11,568 15,468 17,768 17,768 19,568 19,568 2.48% 19,657 20,367 21,073 21,803 22,559 23,341 24,151 24,988 25,854 26,751<br />
Total Non Current Assets 194,150 207,041 272,557 274,778 362,556 385,937 48.06% 400,197 41.34% 473,170 537,994 611,700 695,502 790,786 899,124 1,022,304 1,162,360 1,321,603<br />
Total Assets 370,943 491,851 645,096 700,095 814,294 912,020 1,006,771 1,144,699 1,301,522 1,479,831 1,682,568 1,913,079 2,175,171 2,473,170 2,811,994 3,197,237<br />
Accounts Payable 8,994 31,610 59,569 50,533 65,574 52,287 21.29%<br />
Accrued Expenses 19,394 10,805 49,407 44,415 54,664 70,085 21.82%<br />
Accounts Payable and Accrued Expenses 28,388 42,415 108,976 94,948 120,238 122,372 43.11% 119,863 42.98% 167,187 198,311 233,699 273,936 319,685 371,701 430,844 498,090 574,548<br />
Reserve for Sale Returns and Allowances 13,579 7,753 23,173 25,123 32,589 26,036 12.42%<br />
Current Portion of Long Term Debt 18 19 0.02%<br />
Income Tax Payable 5,625 2,021 10,847 3,792 18,548 21,997 5.57%<br />
Total Current Liabilities 47,610 52,208 142,996 123,863 171,375 170,405 61.11% 158,969 162,602 184,879 210,207 232,070 247,645 252,567 287,168 320,047 348,979<br />
Convertible Senior Notes [Long Term Debt, Net of Current Po 60 98,042 98,000 98,000 98,000 98,000 36.14%<br />
Other Liabilities [Deferred Rent Liability: Till 2007] 995 854 6,432 0.98%<br />
Income Tax Payable 11,294 3.87%<br />
Deferred Income Taxes 563 1,847 4,281 6,446 2,377 5,560 1.62%<br />
Total Non-Current Liabilities 623 99,889 102,281 105,441 101,231 121,286 38.89% 119,912 226,385 276,524 333,533 405,287 496,154 612,257 715,261 838,840 987,800<br />
Total Liabilities 48,233 152,097 245,277 229,304 272,606 291,691 278,881 388,987 461,403 543,740 637,356 743,799 864,824 1,002,429 1,158,887 1,336,779<br />
Preferred Stock<br />
Common Stock 24 25 26 27 28 28 0.01%<br />
Additional Paid-In Capital 240,102 246,008 276,642 287,356 300,255 312,127 57.03%<br />
Adjusted Retained Earnings 82,584 94,859 124,898 186,197 244,832 311,620 372,765 447,003 531,411 627,382 736,502 860,572 1,001,638 1,162,031 1,344,398 1,551,749<br />
Deferred Compensation Form (789) -0.21%<br />
Accumulated Other Comprehensive Loss (349) (1,747) (2,789) (3,427) (3,446) -0.35%<br />
Total Shareholder Equity 322,710 339,754 399,819 470,791 541,688 620,329 681,474 755,712 840,120 936,091 1,045,211 1,169,281 1,310,347 1,470,740 1,653,107 1,860,458<br />
Total Liabilities and Shareholders Equity 370,943 491,851 645,096 700,095 814,294 912,020 960,355 1,144,699 1,301,522 1,479,831 1,682,568 1,913,079 2,175,171 2,473,170 2,811,994 3,197,237<br />
Retained Earnings for the Current Year = Retained Earnings for the Previous Year + Net Income for the Current Year<br />
Total Equity for the Current Year = Total Equity for the Previous Year + Net Income for the Current Year<br />
132
Common Sized - Balance Sheet 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017<br />
Cash and Cash Equivalents 18.44% 24.03% 27.37% 34.32% 22.66% 26.45% 25.54% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%<br />
<strong>Mark</strong>etable Securities 3.93% 2.95% 0.03% 0.02% 1.73%<br />
Accounts Receivable 15.15% 17.51% 15.85% 12.46% 18.80% 19.13% 16.48% 18.95% 18.95% 18.95% 18.95% 18.95% 18.95% 18.95% 18.95% 18.95% 18.95% 18.95%<br />
Inventory 10.25% 9.03% 7.75% 9.53% 9.43% 8.28% 9.04% 8.80% 8.00% 8.80% 8.80% 8.80% 8.80% 8.80% 8.80% 8.80% 8.80% 8.80%<br />
Deferred Income Taxes 1.20% 0.96% 1.95% 1.30% 1.42% 1.36%<br />
Prepaid Expenses and Other 2.62% 3.41% 2.87% 2.50% 3.26% 2.38% 2.84%<br />
Total Current Assets 47.66% 57.91% 57.75% 60.75% 55.48% 57.68% 56.20% 60.25% 58.66% 58.66% 58.66% 58.66% 58.66% 58.66% 58.66% 58.66% 58.66% 58.66%<br />
Office Furniture and Equipment 1.60% 1.33% 1.06% 1.09% 1.02% 1.09% 1.20%<br />
Molds and Tooling 8.38% 7.01% 4.47% 3.85% 4.49% 4.86% 5.51%<br />
Leasehold Improvements 0.66% 0.49% 0.40% 0.50% 0.60% 0.57% 0.54%<br />
Less Accumulated Depreciation and Amortization 6.64% 6.46% 4.23% 3.63% 4.04% 4.17% 4.86%<br />
Total Property and Equipment 4.00% 2.38% 1.70% 1.81% 2.07% 2.35% 2.38% 2.06% 2.06% 2.06% 2.06% 2.06% 2.06% 2.06% 2.06% 2.06% 2.06% 2.06%<br />
Intangibles and Others 2.20% 3.69% 4.24% 2.64% 5.01% 2.87% 3.45%<br />
Investment in Video Game Joint Venture 2.19% 1.85% 1.52% 1.48% 1.83% 3.96% 2.14%<br />
Goodwill<br />
Accumulated Goodwill<br />
Adjusted Goodwill 40.83% 31.02% 32.04% 30.77% 33.21% 30.99% 31.59% 31.59% 31.59% 31.59% 31.59% 31.59% 31.59% 31.59% 31.59% 31.59% 31.59%<br />
Trademarks 3.12% 3.14% 2.75% 2.54% 2.40% 2.15% 2.68% 1.95% 1.78% 1.62% 1.47% 1.34% 1.22% 1.11% 1.01% 0.92% 0.84%<br />
Total Non Current Assets 52.34% 42.09% 42.25% 39.25% 44.52% 42.32% 43.80% 39.75% 41.34% 41.34% 41.34% 41.34% 41.34% 41.34% 41.34% 41.34% 41.34% 41.34%<br />
Total Assets 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%<br />
Accounts Payable 18.65% 20.78% 24.29% 22.04% 24.05% 17.93% 21.29%<br />
Accrued Expenses 40.21% 7.10% 20.14% 19.37% 20.05% 24.03% 21.82%<br />
Accounts Payable and Accrued Expenses 58.86% 27.89% 44.43% 41.41% 44.11% 41.95% 43.11% 42.98% 42.98% 42.98% 42.98% 42.98% 42.98% 42.98% 42.98% 42.98% 42.98% 42.98%<br />
Reserve for Sale Returns and Allowances 28.15% 5.10% 9.45% 10.96% 11.95% 8.93% 12.42%<br />
Current Portion of Long Term Debt 0.04% 0.01% 0.02%<br />
Income Tax Payable 11.66% 1.33% 4.42% 1.65% 6.80% 7.54% 5.57%<br />
Total Current Liabilities 98.71% 34.33% 58.30% 54.02% 62.87% 58.42% 61.11% 57.00% 41.80% 40.07% 38.66% 36.41% 33.29% 29.20% 28.65% 27.62% 26.11%<br />
Convertible Senior Notes [Long Term Debt, Net of Current Po 0.12% 64.46% 39.95% 42.74% 35.95% 33.60% 36.14%<br />
Other Liabilities [Deferred Rent Liability: Till 2007] 0.43% 0.31% 2.21% 0.98%<br />
Income Tax Payable 3.87% 3.87%<br />
Deferred Income Taxes 1.17% 1.21% 1.75% 2.81% 0.87% 1.91% 1.62%<br />
Total Non-Current Liabilities 1.29% 65.67% 41.70% 45.98% 37.13% 41.58% 38.89% 43.00% 58.20% 59.93% 61.34% 63.59% 66.71% 70.80% 71.35% 72.38% 73.89%<br />
Total Liabilities 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%<br />
Preferred Stock<br />
Common Stock 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%<br />
Additional Paid-In Capital 74.40% 72.41% 69.19% 61.04% 55.43% 50.32% 63.80%<br />
Retained Earnings<br />
Goodwill Effect<br />
Adjusted Retained Earnings 25.59% 27.92% 31.24% 39.55% 45.20% 50.23% 54.70% 59.15% 63.25% 67.02% 70.46% 73.60% 76.44% 79.01% 81.33% 83.41%<br />
Deferred Compensation Form -0.23% -0.23%<br />
Accumulated Other Comprehensive Loss 0.00% -0.10% -0.44% -0.59% -0.63% -0.56% -0.39%<br />
Total Shareholder Equity 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%<br />
133
Net Income<br />
Derived from the Income Statement<br />
Statement of Cash Flows<br />
Cash flows from Operations<br />
In spite of employing various ratios and methodologies, we were unable to find a<br />
truly consistent pattern for the growth of CFFO. In selecting the ratio demonstrating the<br />
least erratic behavior, we went with CFFO divided by Net Sales, which is an expense<br />
manipulation diagnostic ratio. In this ratio, we looked for some degree of consistency<br />
and found that in 2002 and 2004 that the ratio was 23.08% and 22.88% (0.2%<br />
difference), respectively, and that in 2005 and 2007 this ratio was at 10.74% and<br />
10.23% (0.51% difference). It seems that the ratio, though erratic, has “declined” by<br />
54.4% {[(23.08% + 22.88%) / 2 – (10.74% + 10.23%) / 2] / (23.08% + 22.88%)}<br />
every 3 years. But if we made that assumption and applied it to forecasting then the<br />
total adjustments to net income would be far too large and far too inconsistent with<br />
previous year adjustments. In that regard, let us consider the ratio from 2005 to 2007<br />
and assume that what we see here is the “stable point” for the company. The reason<br />
we may be able to assume that this is the “stable point” is because the difference<br />
between the highest and lowest ratios is only 2.4%, therefore, let us take the average<br />
of the highest and lowest in determining an estimate for this ratio in future periods<br />
(which is equal to about 10%). The problem with this however is that adjustments<br />
become too high and that too is inconsistent with what is seen in prior years. In a last<br />
attempt, let us take the average between the highest and lowest ratios across the<br />
years, this ratio would be 12.7% [(23.08% + 2.34%)/2]. In applying this average<br />
across the years, we find that the “prediction” is more reasonable and for the sake of<br />
simplicity, we shall assume that it holds true for the intent of forecasting.<br />
134
Cash flows from Investing Activities<br />
In spite of employing various ratios and methodologies, we were unable to find a<br />
truly consistent pattern for the growth of CFFI. In selecting the ratio demonstrating the<br />
least erratic behavior, we went with CFFI divided by Net Sales (same as with CFFO). To<br />
avoid needless strain in attempting to forecast inconsistent item with no stable pattern<br />
to be found, which regrettably we must do, in the case of CFFO and CFFI. In our<br />
approach to “predicting” CFFO, we will simply say that the latest year holds true (other<br />
methods failed to give something reasonable), meaning that for future years, the CFFI,<br />
will be equal to predicted sales for that year times -3.93%.<br />
135
Statement of Cash Flows [Raw]<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> - Statement of Cash Flows - (in thousands) Actual Financial Statements Average Assume Forcasted Financial Statements<br />
Ended 12/31 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017<br />
Net income<br />
27,930 15,895 43,559 63,493 72,375 88,991 116409 137072 155851 177203 201480 229082 260467 296150 336723 382854<br />
Depreciation and Amortization<br />
15,456 16,029 21,518 15,527 26,166 26,663<br />
Share Based Compensation Expense<br />
(1,308) 8,370 13,641 3,424 6,482 9,054<br />
Compensation for Fully Vested Stock Options<br />
(1,308) 6 5,365 (1,706)<br />
Restricted stock compensation<br />
8,364 8,276 5,130<br />
Acquisition Earn Out<br />
494<br />
Investment in Joint Venture<br />
(225) 79 (719) (548) (5,147) (21,856)<br />
Loss on Disposal of Property and Equipment<br />
1,096 104 48 1,781<br />
Forgiveness of Officer Note Receivable<br />
285<br />
Write-Off of Investment in Chinese Joint Venture 1,401<br />
Minority interest<br />
(237)<br />
Changes in Operating Assets and Liabilities<br />
Net Sale (Purchase) of <strong>Mark</strong>etable Securities<br />
37,119<br />
Accounts Receivable<br />
(3,307) (28,224) (4,333) 16,697 (52,885) (21,334)<br />
Inventory<br />
(10,996) (2,654) 784 (13,272) (8,352) 1,329<br />
Prepaid Expenses and Other<br />
507 (5,643) (3,613) 1,088 (8,293) 4,817<br />
Accounts Payable and Accrued Expenses<br />
(13,232) 13,005 38,934 (11,352) 14,490 1,432<br />
Accounts payable<br />
(3,698) 16,264 19,192 (9,437) 12,608 (13,061)<br />
Accrued expenses<br />
(9,534) (3,259) 19,742 (1,915) 1,882 14,493<br />
Income taxes payable<br />
7,056 (1,397) 5,945 (2,936) 14,756 (891)<br />
Reserve for sales returns and allowances<br />
8,626 (5,827) 13,289 1,732 5,253 (6,489)<br />
Deferred rent liability<br />
995 (140) 1,519<br />
Deferred income taxes<br />
3,879 (2,240) 795 (5,292) (1,043) 2,644<br />
Total Adjustments<br />
43,623 (8,502) 87,831 7,568 (8,665) (1,331) 7353 2.59% 3645 4145 4713 5358 6092 6927 7876 8955 10182<br />
Net Cash from Operating Activities<br />
71,553 7,393 131,390 71,061 63,710 87,660 123762 140718 159996 181915 206838 235175 267394 304026 345678 393036<br />
Purchases of property and equipment<br />
Change in Other Assets<br />
Sale (Purchases) of Deposits<br />
Purchases of Other Assets<br />
Cash Paid for Net Assets<br />
Net (Purchases) Sales of <strong>Mark</strong>etable Securities<br />
Notes Receivable — Officers<br />
Net Cash from Investing Activities<br />
(6,594) (4,472) (5,917) (8,270) (11,204) (18,116)<br />
(123) 46 (6)<br />
241 (701) 17<br />
(21,159) (4,936) (26,863) 118 (655) 11<br />
(66,232) (19,676) (41,438) (20,362) (109,845) (15,605)<br />
(19,345) 967 19,047 (210) (7)<br />
861 1,113<br />
(93,124) (47,316) (73,251) (9,467) (121,914) (33,717) (38298) (43545) (49511) (56294) (64006) (72775) (82745) (94081) (106970) (121625)<br />
136
Common Sized - Statement of Cash Flows 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017<br />
Net income<br />
39.03% 215.00% 33.15% 89.35% 113.60% 101.52% 98.61% 94.06% 97.41% 97.41% 97.41% 97.41% 97.41% 97.41% 97.41% 97.41% 97.41% 97.41%<br />
Depreciation and Amortization<br />
21.60% 216.81% 16.38% 21.85% 41.07% 30.42% 58.02%<br />
Share Based Compensation Expense<br />
-1.83% 113.22% 10.38% 4.82% 10.17% 10.33% 24.52%<br />
Compensation for Fully Vested Stock Options<br />
-1.83% 0.08% 4.08% -2.40% -0.02%<br />
Restricted stock compensation<br />
113.13% 6.30% 7.22% 42.22%<br />
Acquisition Earn Out<br />
0.38% 0.38%<br />
Investment in Joint Venture<br />
-0.31% 1.07% -0.55% -0.77% -8.08% -24.93% -5.60%<br />
Loss on Disposal of Property and Equipment<br />
0.83% 0.15% 0.08% 2.03% 0.77%<br />
Forgiveness of Officer Note Receivable<br />
0.40% 0.40%<br />
Write-Off of Investment in Chinese Joint Venture 1.97% 1.97%<br />
Minority interest<br />
-0.33% -0.33%<br />
Changes in Operating Assets and Liabilities<br />
Net Sale (Purchase) of <strong>Mark</strong>etable Securities<br />
Accounts Receivable<br />
Inventory<br />
Prepaid Expenses and Other<br />
Accounts Payable and Accrued Expenses<br />
Accounts payable<br />
Accrued expenses<br />
Income taxes payable<br />
Reserve for sales returns and allowances<br />
Deferred rent liability<br />
Deferred income taxes<br />
Total Adjustments<br />
Net Cash from Operating Activities<br />
51.88% 51.88%<br />
-4.62% -381.77% -3.30% 23.50% -83.01% -24.34% -78.92%<br />
-15.37% -35.90% 0.60% -18.68% -13.11% 1.52% -13.49%<br />
0.71% -76.33% -2.75% 1.53% -13.02% 5.50% -14.06%<br />
-18.49% 175.91% 29.63% -15.98% 22.74% 1.63% 32.58%<br />
-5.17% 219.99% 14.61% -13.28% 19.79% -14.90% 36.84%<br />
-13.32% -44.08% 15.03% -2.69% 2.95% 16.53% -4.26%<br />
9.86% -18.90% 4.52% -4.13% 23.16% -1.02% 2.25%<br />
12.06% -78.82% 10.11% 2.44% 8.25% -7.40% -8.89%<br />
1.40% -0.22% 1.73% 0.97%<br />
5.42% -30.30% 0.61% -7.45% -1.64% 3.02% -5.06%<br />
60.97% -115.00% 66.85% 10.65% -13.60% -1.52% 1.39% 5.94% 2.59% 2.59% 2.59% 2.59% 2.59% 2.59% 2.59% 2.59% 2.59% 2.59%<br />
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%<br />
Purchases of property and equipment<br />
Change in Other Assets<br />
Sale (Purchases) of Deposits<br />
Purchases of Other Assets<br />
Cash Paid for Net Assets<br />
Net (Purchases) Sales of <strong>Mark</strong>etable Securities<br />
Notes Receivable — Officers<br />
Net Cash from Investing Activities<br />
7.08% 9.45% 8.08% 87.36% 9.19% 53.73% 29.15%<br />
1.30% -0.04% 0.02% 0.43%<br />
-2.55% 0.57% -0.05% -0.67%<br />
22.72% 10.43% 36.67% -1.25% 0.54% -0.03% 11.51%<br />
71.12% 41.58% 56.57% 215.08% 90.10% 46.28% 86.79%<br />
40.88% -1.32% -201.19% 0.17% 0.02% -32.29%<br />
-0.92% -2.35% -1.64%<br />
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%<br />
137
Statement of Cash Flows [Adjusted]<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> - Statement of Cash Flows - (in thousands) Actual Financial Statements Average Assume Forcasted Financial Statements<br />
Ended 12/31 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017<br />
Net income<br />
(2,769) (19,082) 5,474 28,106 26,191 40,444 61,145 74,237 84,408 95,972 109,120 124,069 141,067 160,393 182,367 207,351<br />
Depreciation and Amortization<br />
15,456 16,029 21,518 15,527 26,166 26,663<br />
Goodwill Effect<br />
37,867 38,146 51,666 53,860 67,600 70,668 79,516 53.72% 90,410 102,796 116,879 132,892 151,098 171,798 195,335 222,095 252,522<br />
Share Based Compensation Expense<br />
(1,308) 8,370 13,641 3,424 6,482 9,054<br />
Compensation for Fully Vested Stock Options<br />
(1,308) 6 5,365 (1,706)<br />
Restricted stock compensation<br />
8,364 8,276 5,130<br />
Acquisition Earn Out<br />
494<br />
Investment in Joint Venture<br />
(225) 79 (719) (548) (5,147) (21,856)<br />
Loss on Disposal of Property and Equipment<br />
1,096 104 48 1,781<br />
Forgiveness of Officer Note Receivable<br />
285<br />
Write-Off of Investment in Chinese Joint Venture 1,401<br />
Minority interest<br />
(237)<br />
Changes in Operating Assets and Liabilities<br />
Net Sale (Purchase) of <strong>Mark</strong>etable Securities<br />
Accounts Receivable<br />
Inventory<br />
Prepaid Expenses and Other<br />
Accounts Payable and Accrued Expenses<br />
Accounts payable<br />
Accrued expenses<br />
Income taxes payable<br />
Reserve for sales returns and allowances<br />
Deferred rent liability<br />
Deferred income taxes<br />
Total Adjustments<br />
Net Cash from Operating Activities<br />
37,119<br />
(3,307) (28,224) (4,333) 16,697 (52,885) (21,334)<br />
(10,996) (2,654) 784 (13,272) (8,352) 1,329<br />
507 (5,643) (3,613) 1,088 (8,293) 4,817<br />
(13,232) 13,005 38,934 (11,352) 14,490 1,432<br />
(3,698) 16,264 19,192 (9,437) 12,608 (13,061)<br />
(9,534) (3,259) 19,742 (1,915) 1,882 14,493<br />
7,056 (1,397) 5,945 (2,936) 14,756 (891)<br />
8,626 (5,827) 13,289 1,732 5,253 (6,489)<br />
995 (140) 1,519<br />
3,879 (2,240) 795 (5,292) (1,043) 2,644<br />
81,490 29,644 139,497 61,428 58,935 69,337 86869 55.89% 94055 106941 121592 138250 157190 178725 203210 231050 262704<br />
78,721 10,562 144,971 89,533 85,125 109,781 148015 168293 191349 217564 247370 281259 319792 363603 413417 470055<br />
Purchases of property and equipment<br />
Change in Other Assets<br />
Sale (Purchases) of Deposits<br />
Purchases of Other Assets<br />
Cash Paid for Net Assets<br />
Net (Purchases) Sales of <strong>Mark</strong>etable Securities<br />
Notes Receivable — Officers<br />
Net Cash from Investing Activities<br />
(6,594) (4,472) (5,917) (8,270) (11,204) (18,116)<br />
(123) 46 (6)<br />
241 (701) 17<br />
(21,159) (4,936) (26,863) 118 (655) 11<br />
(66,232) (19,676) (41,438) (20,362) (109,845) (15,605)<br />
(19,345) 967 19,047 (210) (7)<br />
861 1,113<br />
(93,124) (47,316) (73,251) (9,467) (121,914) (33,717) (38298) (43545) (49511) (56294) (64006) (72775) (82745) (94081) (106970) (121625)<br />
138
Common Sized - Balance Sheet 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017<br />
Net income<br />
-3.52% -180.67% 3.78% 31.39% 30.77% 36.84% -13.57% 41.31% 44.11% 44.11% 44.11% 44.11% 44.11% 44.11% 44.11% 44.11% 44.11% 44.11%<br />
Depreciation and Amortization<br />
19.63% 151.77% 14.84% 17.34% 30.74% 24.29% 43.10%<br />
Goodwill Effect<br />
48.10% 361.17% 35.64% 60.16% 79.41% 64.37% 53.72% 53.72% 53.72% 53.72% 53.72% 53.72% 53.72% 53.72% 53.72% 53.72% 53.72%<br />
Share Based Compensation Expense<br />
-1.66% 79.25% 9.41% 3.82% 7.61% 8.25% 17.78%<br />
Compensation for Fully Vested Stock Options<br />
-1.66% 0.06% 3.70% -1.91% 0.05%<br />
Restricted stock compensation<br />
79.19% 5.71% 5.73% 30.21%<br />
Acquisition Earn Out<br />
0.34% 0.34%<br />
Investment in Joint Venture<br />
-0.29% 0.75% -0.50% -0.61% -6.05% -19.91% -4.43%<br />
Loss on Disposal of Property and Equipment<br />
0.76% 0.12% 0.06% 1.62% 0.64%<br />
Forgiveness of Officer Note Receivable<br />
0.36% 0.36%<br />
Write-Off of Investment in Chinese Joint Venture 1.56% 1.56%<br />
Minority interest<br />
-0.30% -0.30%<br />
Changes in Operating Assets and Liabilities<br />
Net Sale (Purchase) of <strong>Mark</strong>etable Securities<br />
47.15% 47.15%<br />
Accounts Receivable<br />
-4.20% -267.23% -2.99% 18.65% -62.13% -19.43% -56.22%<br />
Inventory<br />
-13.97% -25.13% 0.54% -14.82% -9.81% 1.21% -10.33%<br />
Prepaid Expenses and Other<br />
0.64% -53.43% -2.49% 1.22% -9.74% 4.39% -9.90%<br />
Accounts Payable and Accrued Expenses<br />
-16.81% 123.13% 26.86% -12.68% 17.02% 1.30% 23.14%<br />
Accounts payable<br />
-4.70% 153.99% 13.24% -10.54% 14.81% -11.90% 25.82%<br />
Accrued expenses<br />
-12.11% -30.86% 13.62% -2.14% 2.21% 13.20% -2.68%<br />
Income taxes payable<br />
8.96% -13.23% 4.10% -3.28% 17.33% -0.81% 2.18%<br />
Reserve for sales returns and allowances<br />
10.96% -55.17% 9.17% 1.93% 6.17% -5.91% -5.48%<br />
Deferred rent liability<br />
1.11% -0.16% 1.38% 0.78%<br />
Deferred income taxes<br />
4.93% -21.21% 0.55% -5.91% -1.23% 2.41% -3.41%<br />
Total Adjustments<br />
103.52% 280.67% 96.22% 68.61% 69.23% 63.16% 113.57% 58.69% 55.89% 55.89% 55.89% 55.89% 55.89% 55.89% 55.89% 55.89% 55.89% 55.89%<br />
Net Cash from Operating Activities<br />
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%<br />
Purchases of property and equipment<br />
Change in Other Assets<br />
Sale (Purchases) of Deposits<br />
Purchases of Other Assets<br />
Cash Paid for Net Assets<br />
Net (Purchases) Sales of <strong>Mark</strong>etable Securities<br />
Notes Receivable — Officers<br />
Net Cash from Investing Activities<br />
7.08% 9.45% 8.08% 87.36% 9.19% 53.73% 29.15%<br />
1.30% -0.04% 0.02% 0.43%<br />
-2.55% 0.57% -0.05% -0.67%<br />
22.72% 10.43% 36.67% -1.25% 0.54% -0.03% 11.51%<br />
71.12% 41.58% 56.57% 215.08% 90.10% 46.28% 86.79%<br />
40.88% -1.32% -201.19% 0.17% 0.02% -32.29%<br />
-0.92% -2.35% -1.64%<br />
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%<br />
139
Cost of Capital<br />
Cost of Equity<br />
The cost of equity is defined as the minimum rate of return that shareholders<br />
require to be compensated for the time waiting for returns and the risk involved. The<br />
components of the return for a particular company are derived from dividends and<br />
increases in stock prices. The higher the cost of equity, the higher the returns that<br />
investors would expect to receive from their investments. This required rate of return<br />
varies from company to company depending on the specific business risk. We<br />
computed the cost of equity by using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This<br />
model was used to determine the appropriate rate of return for <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> assets.<br />
These assets (in any company or industry) are put at risk in business activities to<br />
generate revenues.<br />
The CAPM model has three main components; the risk-free rate of return,<br />
market risk premium, and the beta of the firm. The risk-free rates were taken from the<br />
3 month, 6 month, 1 year, 5 year, and 10 year treasury constant maturity rates. The<br />
difference in maturity rates served to calculate the most accurate beta for the firm<br />
within different time spans. Taking returns for the S&P 500 index for the past 7 years,<br />
we calculated monthly market returns. By subtracting the risk-free rates from the<br />
market returns, we obtained the market risk premium for each month. To calculate<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> returns, we used the monthly stock prices for the past 7 years. Beta for<br />
the firm was computed by running a regression analysis with different numbers of<br />
observations. The numbers observations we used for each of the market risk premiums<br />
were 72, 60, 48, 36, and 24 (representing the number of months). The beta chosen<br />
was 1.33. This was derived from the regression results using the 10-year risk free rate<br />
(3.88%) with 72 observations because it had the highest explanatory power. Below is a<br />
summary of our regression results for <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>.<br />
140
Cost of Debt<br />
The cost of debt is the rate at which the firm borrows money. To calculate this<br />
rate, we computed the weighted average of each line item liability. The interest rates that<br />
were not listed in <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>’s 10-K where found on the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank’s<br />
website using comparable commercial paper rate’s. The weight of each line item was<br />
found by dividing that number by total liabilities. By adding all the weighted rates<br />
together, we calculated <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>’s cost of debt to be 7.04%. Below is the summary of<br />
this computation.<br />
141
Cost of Debt<br />
Current Liabilities<br />
Weight<br />
Rate<br />
Weighted<br />
Rate<br />
Accounts Payable 52,287 0.179 0.0261 0.47%<br />
Accrued Expenses 70,085 0.240 0.0261 0.63%<br />
Reserve for sales returns & allowances 26,036 0.089 0.0261 0.23%<br />
Incomes taxes payable 21,997 0.075 0.3500 2.64%<br />
Total current liabilities 170,405 0.584<br />
Long Term Liabilities<br />
Convertible senior notes 98,000 0.336 0.0463 1.55%<br />
*Other liabilities 6,432 0.022 0.0425 0.09%<br />
Incomes taxes payable 11,294 0.039 0.3500 1.36%<br />
Deferred income taxes 5,560 0.019 0.0388 0.07%<br />
Total Long Term Liabilities 121,286 0.416<br />
Total Liabilities 291,691 1.000<br />
Weighted Average Cost of Debt<br />
= 7.04%<br />
*average of convertible senior notes and deferred income taxes<br />
The 3-month non-financial commercial paper was the interest rate used for<br />
accounts payable, accrued expenses, and reserve for sales returns and allowances. The<br />
interest rate for other liabilities was found by taking the average of the long term<br />
liabilities rates (income taxes payable was not including in this computation).<br />
Weighted Average Cost of Capital<br />
The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is calculated by considering the<br />
weights of a company’s capital structure (debt and equity). This is the minimum rate that<br />
a firm must earn to satisfy the requirements of owners and creditors. In this model, we<br />
used the cost of equity and cost of debt that were explained above in the previous<br />
sections. Below are tables showing the computations for before and after tax weighted<br />
average costs of capital.<br />
142
Weighted Average Cost of Capital<br />
K d BVL/MVA Tax K e BVE/MVA WACC<br />
Before Tax 7.04% 0.297 15.80% 0.703 13.20%<br />
After Tax 7.04% 0.297 31.3% 15.80% 0.703 12.55%<br />
Adjusted Weighted Average Cost of Capital<br />
K d BVL/MVA Tax K e BVE/MVA WACC<br />
Before Tax 7.04% 0.320 15.80% 0.680 13.00%<br />
After Tax 7.04% 0.320 31.3% 15.80% 0.680 12.29%<br />
As you can see, the rates did not change much when accounting for impairments<br />
to goodwill. The difference between the before-tax WACC’s is .2%, whereas the change in<br />
before tax is .25%. These variations between the stated and restated weighted average<br />
cost of capital are caused by the changes in book value of equity.<br />
143
<strong>Valuation</strong> Analysis<br />
In this report, we seek to determine the true value of the firm by using the<br />
method of comparables and the intrinsic valuation models. In the first, we use the<br />
industry average of ratios (price to earnings, etc) to calculate a share price for the<br />
company and will compare that price to the stated price to determine if the company is<br />
fairly valued. In truth, this is easy to compute but it is not a reliable method for we are<br />
basing our analysis on competitor values (what others believe hold true) and not the<br />
company itself. In addition, it is not very sound from a financial perspective and does<br />
not offer a fair interpretation of the firm in question. It is only for the sake of<br />
conducting a complete analysis that we have included it in this report. In the second,<br />
the intrinsic valuation models, we are using our forecasted numbers along with theory<br />
and methodology to analyze the firm. In this, we are using our assessment of the<br />
company and not a “consensus” to calculate a share price. In truth, some intrinsic<br />
valuation models are more reliable than others, but overall, these models give a fairer<br />
and more detailed assessment of the company than the method of comparables and<br />
will be the primary basis for our valuation.<br />
144
Method of Comparables<br />
In this, we are using the industry average of ratios (price to earnings, etc) to<br />
calculate a share price and determine if the company is fairly valued. It is not a reliable<br />
method (as stated before) and it is a simple thing for any individual to do. It is not<br />
based on sound financial theory and does a poor job in analyzing the company. In this<br />
method, we will use the ratios of Hasbro, Mattel, and Leapfrog to calculate a share<br />
price and compare it to the actual share price as of June 2 nd , 2008 for <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> (we<br />
would have used June 1 st , 2008 if it were available). In reality, using ratios for Hasbro<br />
and Mattel, older and larger firms, is not a fair basis for valuing a company like <strong>Jakks</strong><br />
<strong>Pacific</strong> (which is younger and smaller), nor is using Leapfrog, a company (though the<br />
same age as <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>) is showing signs of financial instability, but they are the only<br />
ones that can reasonably be used for this analysis (please keep in this mind when<br />
reviewing the ratios discussed later). In these ratios, we will exclude any negative<br />
values reported by competitors. In addition, we will use a 10% margin, meaning if the<br />
calculated share price is between $25.06 and $20.51 or equal to $22.79 (actual share<br />
price) then the company is fairly valued, if the calculated price is below the range it is<br />
undervalued, and if it is above that range it is overvalued.<br />
145
P / E Trailing PPS EPS P / E<br />
Price to Earnings (Trailing)<br />
Industry<br />
Average<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 22.79 3.11 7.33 15.80 49.11<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong><br />
(Restated) 22.79 1.41 16.13 15.80 22.32<br />
Hasbro 36.18 2.06 17.56<br />
Mattel 19.92 1.42 14.03<br />
Leapfrog 8.47 (1.55) (5.46)<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> Calculated<br />
PPS<br />
In this ratio, we used the price per share (June 2 nd , 2008) and divided it by the<br />
earnings per share from yahoo finance to calculate the P to E (price to earnings) ratio<br />
for the competitors. In addition, we calculated the EPS for <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> by dividing the<br />
net income for 2007 (both raw and adjusted) by the total number of shares outstanding<br />
(based on the 2007 10-K). In this ratio, we found that Leapfrog had a negative EPS, so<br />
that company was excluded from our calculation of the industry average. The average<br />
(15.8) was multiplied with the EPS for <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> to give us a calculated share price<br />
of $49.11 (before the goodwill adjustment) and $22.32 (after the adjustment). In using<br />
the margin of safety, we find that the firm is undervalued (prior to goodwill adjustment)<br />
and fairly valued (after the adjustment for goodwill). In this ratio, the problem is that it<br />
looks into the past, but in valuing the company we are concerned with the future.<br />
146
P / E Forward PPS EPS P / E<br />
Price to Earnings (Forward)<br />
Industry<br />
Average<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 22.79 4.07 5.60 13.56 55.13<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong><br />
(Restated) 22.79 1.41 16.13 13.56 28.96<br />
Hasbro 36.18 2.29 15.77<br />
Mattel 19.92 1.76 11.34<br />
Leapfrog 8.47 0.39 21.50<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> Calculated<br />
PPS<br />
It is found the same way as the trailing P to E ratio, except this time, we are<br />
using the one year ahead EPS (forecast). In this ratio, we used the forward P to E ratio<br />
from yahoo finance for the competitors along with the PPS from June 2 nd , 2008. In<br />
addition, we calculated the forward EPS for the competitors by dividing the PPS by the<br />
forward P to E ratio, and calculated the forward EPS for <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> by dividing the<br />
forecasted net income for 2008 (both raw and adjusted) by the total number of shares<br />
outstanding (based on the 2007 10-K). In this ratio, we excluded Leapfrog (inconsistent<br />
with the other companies) from our calculation of the industry average. The average<br />
(13.56) was multiplied with the forward EPS for <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> to give us a calculated<br />
share price of $55.13 (before the goodwill adjustment) and $28.96 (after the<br />
adjustment). In using the margin of safety, we find that the firm is undervalued (both<br />
prior to goodwill adjustment and after the adjustment for goodwill). In closing, this ratio<br />
is more reliable than the trailing P to E, because it involves forecasted numbers, but is<br />
still not an accurate measure of the value of the firm.<br />
147
Price to Book<br />
P / B PPS BPS P / B<br />
Industry<br />
Average<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 22.79 24.14 0.94 2.76 66.63<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong><br />
(Restated) 22.79 21.67 1.05 2.76 59.81<br />
Hasbro 36.18 8.68 4.17<br />
Mattel 19.92 6.73 2.96<br />
Leapfrog 8.47 3.31 2.56<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> Calculated<br />
PPS<br />
It is found by taking the price per share and dividing it by the book value of<br />
equity per share. In this ratio, we used the P to B ratio from yahoo finance for the<br />
competitors along with the PPS from June 2 nd , 2008. In addition, we calculated the BPS<br />
for the competitors by dividing the PPS by the P to B ratio, and calculated the BPS for<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> by dividing total equity for 2007 (both raw and adjusted) by the total<br />
number of shares outstanding (based on the 2007 10-K). In this ratio, we excluded<br />
Hasbro (inconsistent with the other companies) from our calculation of the industry<br />
average. The average (2.76) was multiplied with the BPS for <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> to give us a<br />
calculated share price of $66.63 (before the goodwill adjustment) and $59.81 (after the<br />
adjustment). In using the margin of safety, we find that the firm is undervalued (both<br />
prior to goodwill adjustment and after the adjustment for goodwill).<br />
148
Price Earnings Growth<br />
PEG PPS P to E EGR PEG<br />
Industry<br />
Average<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 22.79 7.33 13.70 0.53 1.54 65.40<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong><br />
(Restated) 22.79 16.16 13.70 1.18 1.54 29.65<br />
Hasbro 36.18 17.56 10.04 1.75<br />
Mattel 19.92 14.03 10.63 1.32<br />
Leapfrog 8.47 (5.46)<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> Calculated<br />
PPS<br />
It is found by taking the P to E ratio and dividing it by the EGR (five year<br />
earnings growth rate). In this ratio, we used the PEG ratio (price earnings growth) from<br />
yahoo finance for the competitors along with the PPS from June 2 nd , 2008. In addition,<br />
we calculated the EGR for the competitors by dividing the P to E ratio (calculated prior<br />
to this section) by the PEG ratio and calculated the EGR for <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> by using the<br />
five year growth rate noted in the forecast for net income. In this ratio, we excluded<br />
Leapfrog (negative EPS) from our calculation of the industry average. The average<br />
(1.54) was multiplied with the EPS and EGR for <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> to give us a calculated<br />
share price of $65.40 (before the goodwill adjustment) and $29.65 (after the<br />
adjustment). In using the margin of safety, we find that the firm is undervalued (both<br />
prior to goodwill adjustment and after the adjustment for goodwill).<br />
149
Price to EBITDA<br />
P / EBITDA PPS <strong>Mark</strong>et Cap Shares EBITDA<br />
P /<br />
EBITDA<br />
Industry<br />
Avg<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 22.79 646 28.62 128.18 5.04 7.99 35.77<br />
Hasbro 36.18 5270 145.66 682.33 7.72<br />
Mattel 19.92 6970 349.90 844.39 8.25<br />
Leapfrog 8.47 (67.15)<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> Cal.<br />
PPS<br />
It is found by dividing market cap (price multiplied by the number of shares<br />
outstanding) by EBITDA (earnings before interest, depreciation, tax, and amortization).<br />
In this ratio, we used EBIDTA and <strong>Mark</strong>et Cap from yahoo finance for the competitors<br />
along with the PPS from June 2 nd , 2008. In addition, we calculated P to EBITDA for the<br />
competitors by dividing <strong>Mark</strong>et Cap by EBITDA and calculated the EBITDA for <strong>Jakks</strong><br />
<strong>Pacific</strong> by taking net income and adding back interest, taxes, and amortization. In this<br />
ratio, we excluded Leapfrog (negative EBITDA) from our calculation of the industry<br />
average. The average (7.99) was multiplied with the EBITDA for <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> to give us<br />
a calculated market cap of 1024 (in millions) and we divided that by the number of<br />
shares outstanding (in millions) based on the 2007 10-K to get a share price. The price<br />
was calculated to be $35.77 and in using the margin of safety we find that the firm is<br />
undervalued.<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> NI Interest Taxes Amortization EBITDA<br />
Raw 88991 (1363) 40550 N/A 128<br />
Adjusted 40444 (1363) 18429 70668 128<br />
150
P / FCF PPS Shares FCF<br />
Price to Free Cash Flows<br />
FCF /<br />
Share<br />
P / FCF<br />
Industry<br />
Avg<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 22.79 28.62 53.94 1.88 12.09 11.22 21.14<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong><br />
(Restated) 22.79 28.62 76.06 2.66 8.58 11.22 29.82<br />
Hasbro 36.18 142.60 489.33 3.43 10.54<br />
Mattel 19.92 361.36 275.24 0.76 26.15<br />
Leapfrog 8.47 35.90 25.56 0.71 11.90<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> Cal.<br />
PPS<br />
It is found by taking the price and dividing it by the FCF (free cash flows) of the<br />
firm, which was divided by the number of shares outstanding to get it on a per share<br />
basis. In this ratio, we got FCF (cash flows from operations minus cash flows from<br />
investing activities) and number of shares outstanding from the 2007 10-K of the<br />
companies along with the PPS from yahoo finance for June 2 nd , 2008. In this ratio, we<br />
excluded Mattel (inconsistent with other companies) from our calculation of the industry<br />
average. The average (11.22) was multiplied with the FCF per Share for <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> to<br />
give us a calculated a price of $21.14 (before the goodwill adjustment) and $29.82<br />
(after the adjustment). In using the margin of safety, we find that the firm is fairly<br />
valued (before the goodwill adjustment) and undervalued (after the goodwill<br />
adjustment).<br />
151
EV / EBITDA PPS Shares EBITDA<br />
Price to Free Cash Flows<br />
EV /<br />
EBITDA<br />
Industry<br />
Avg<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 22.79 28.62 128.18 5.20 7.99 35.28<br />
Hasbro 36.18 142.60 682.33 7.72<br />
Mattel 19.92 361.36 844.39 8.25<br />
Leapfrog 8.47 35.90 (67.15)<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> Cal.<br />
PPS<br />
It is found by dividing EV (enterprise value) by EBITDA (earnings before interest,<br />
depreciation, tax, and amortization). In this ratio, we used the EV to EBITDA ratio from<br />
yahoo finance for the competitors along with the PPS from June 2 nd , 2008. In this ratio,<br />
we excluded Leapfrog (negative EBITDA) from our calculation of the industry average.<br />
The average (7.99) was multiplied with the EBITDA for <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> and the book value<br />
of liabilities was subtracted from this number, afterwards cash (cash and cash<br />
equivalents) along with financial investments (found by taking <strong>Mark</strong>etable Securities<br />
[Current Asset] and adding it to the Investment in Joint Venture [Non Current Asset])<br />
was added to the number and finally this number was divided by the number of shares<br />
outstanding (2007 10-K) to calculated a share price. The price was calculated to be<br />
$35.28 and in using the margin of safety we find that the firm is undervalued.<br />
Conclusion<br />
In the comparables, we found that <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> was undervalued (prior to<br />
goodwill adjustment) for the P to E (trailing and forward), P to B, PEG, P to EBITDA, P<br />
to FCF, and EV to EBITDA and found it to be fairly valued for the P to FCF ratio. In<br />
addition, we found that <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> was undervalued (after the goodwill adjustment)<br />
for the P to E (forward), P to B, PEG, and P to FCF and found it to be fairly valued for<br />
the P to E (trailing). In closing, it seems based on this method that the company is, for<br />
the most part, undervalued. In contrast, keep in mind that this methodology is not<br />
known for its accuracy but rather its simplicity. In order to get a fairer understanding of<br />
whether this firm is fairly valued, overvalued, or undervalued<br />
152
Intrinsic <strong>Valuation</strong> Models<br />
The intrinsic models used for our valuation of <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> were the Free Cash<br />
Flows Model (FCFM), Residual Income Model (RIM), Long-Run Residual Income Model<br />
(LRIM) and the Abnormal Earnings Growth Model (AEGM). Intrinsic valuation models<br />
give us a more precise value of the firm compared to the method of comparables.<br />
These models are computed using forecasted information whereas the method of<br />
comparables uses historical information. Since these models use forecasted<br />
information, we will be valuing the company based on our predictions future free cash<br />
flows to the firm, residual income, and net income. Additionally, a sensitivity analysis<br />
will be done to show how much the stock price would change as a result of changes in<br />
our predictions of cost of equity, growth rates, and weighted average cost of capital.<br />
Once all of the models have been computed we will have a better understanding of the<br />
true value of the firm.<br />
Free Cash Flows Model<br />
The free cash flows model values the firm by taking the present value of the<br />
forecasted free cash flows along with the perpetuity after 2010. Forecasted free cash<br />
flows are calculated by taking forecasted cash flows from operations (CFFO) minus cash<br />
flows from investing activities (CFFI). Then we discount the free cash flows back to<br />
2007 using the before tax WACC. Next, we add to this the present value of the<br />
terminal value perpetuity which is found by taking the free cash flows for 2018, dividing<br />
it by the WACC minus the growth rate, then dividing that value by (1+WACC)^10. We<br />
then subtract the book value of debt from this number and divide by total number of<br />
shares to calculate the intrinsic share price. We then adjust the calculated share price<br />
to get the time consistent value using the formula [share price*(1+WACC)^(5/12)].<br />
We can then compare actual and estimated share prices to determine whether we<br />
believe the company is under or overvalued. We used a 20% sensitivity, meaning that<br />
if the calculated price is within 20% of the actual share price of $22.79 (as of 6/1/08)<br />
then it is still considered fairly valued.<br />
153
Discounted Free Cash Flow Sensitivity Analysis<br />
Growth Rates<br />
0.00% 1.00% 2.00% 3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00%<br />
10.56% 60.43 64.51 69.54 75.91 84.22 95.51 111.76<br />
11.44% 53.44 56.64 60.52 65.31 71.39 79.36 90.25<br />
12.32% 47.54 50.08 53.11 56.79 61.36 67.17 74.83<br />
WACC (BT) 13.20% 42.49 44.53 46.94 49.81 53.32 57.67 63.24<br />
14.08% 38.14 39.80 41.73 44.01 46.74 50.07 54.23<br />
14.96% 34.35 35.71 37.27 39.10 41.27 43.86 47.04<br />
15.84% 31.03 32.15 33.43 34.92 36.65 38.70 41.17<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
Using the growth rate of 1%, and the before tax weighted average cost of<br />
capital, which we found to be 13.20%, the discounted free cash flows model gives us a<br />
share price of $44.53. When compared to the original share price of $22.79 and using<br />
a sensitivity of 20% we have determined that the company is undervalued. In our<br />
analysis, we have found that <strong>Jakks</strong> is undervalued for all growth rates from 0% to 6%,<br />
and for all before tax weighted average costs of capital from 10.56% to 15.84%, which<br />
is within 20% of 13.20%.<br />
Adjusted Discounted Free Cash Flow Sensitivity Analysis<br />
Growth Rates<br />
0.00% 1.00% 2.00% 3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00%<br />
10.40% 82.40 87.88 94.67 103.30 114.62 130.14 152.71<br />
11.27% 73.25 77.54 82.77 89.26 97.53 108.44 123.49<br />
12.13% 65.60 69.02 73.12 78.11 84.34 92.31 102.88<br />
WACC (BT) 13.00% 58.98 61.73 64.98 68.88 73.65 79.61 87.27<br />
13.87% 53.28 55.51 58.12 61.21 64.92 69.48 75.19<br />
14.73% 48.37 50.20 52.33 54.81 57.76 61.31 65.67<br />
15.60% 44.02 45.53 47.27 49.28 51.64 54.45 57.84<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
After adjusting for goodwill we noticed that the calculated share prices were<br />
higher. This is because the adjustment for goodwill increases CFFO which is used to<br />
calculate free cash flows.<br />
154
Residual Income Model<br />
The residual income model has the most powerful explanatory power of all the<br />
models. It also has a lower sensitivity to changes in the growth rates and costs of<br />
equity. The model is less sensitive because it puts less stock into the terminal<br />
perpetuity, and more stock into the values of annual residual income and book value of<br />
equity. A potential drawback is the fact that the model uses accounting information<br />
that could be skewed and misleading.<br />
In the residual income model we value the company based on the current book value of<br />
equity and the present value of the value added or destroyed by the firm. Value added<br />
or destroyed is calculated by taking the previous year’s net income minus the<br />
benchmark (cost of equity X previous year’s book value of equity). Another name for<br />
this value is the residual income. If net income for the current year is larger than the<br />
benchmark, then value has been created, and there is a positive residual income. If net<br />
income for the current year is less than the benchmark, then value has been destroyed,<br />
and residual income is negative.<br />
Residual Income Sensitivity Analysis<br />
Growth Rates<br />
0.00% -5.00% -10.00% -15.00% -20.00% -25.00% -30.00%<br />
12.64% 38.75 37.21 36.35 35.80 35.42 35.14 34.93<br />
13.69% 32.75 32.15 31.80 31.57 31.41 31.29 31.20<br />
Cost 14.75% 27.83 27.85 27.85 27.86 27.87 27.87 27.87<br />
of 15.80% 23.82 24.24 24.50 24.67 24.79 24.89 24.96<br />
Equity 16.85% 20.50 21.17 21.60 21.89 22.10 22.26 22.38<br />
17.91% 17.70 18.53 19.06 19.43 19.70 19.91 20.08<br />
18.96% 15.37 16.28 16.88 17.30 17.62 17.86 18.05<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
As seen in the chart above a 30% change in the growth rate only moves the<br />
share price from $23.82 to $24.96 at 15.80% cost of equity. This is an example of how<br />
changes in cost of equity or growth rates have a minimal effect on our calculated share<br />
price. Using our cost of equity of 15.80% and the growth rate of -15% resulted in a<br />
155
share price of $24.67, which is within the 20% range of our stated share price $22.79,<br />
and is therefore fairly valued.<br />
Adjusted Residual Income Sensitivity Analysis<br />
Growth Rates<br />
0.00% -5.00% -10.00% -15.00% -20.00% -25.00% -30.00%<br />
12.64% 20.61 20.66 20.68 20.70 20.71 20.72 20.73<br />
13.69% 17.40 17.83 18.08 18.24 18.35 18.44 18.50<br />
Cost 14.75% 14.76 15.43 15.82 16.09 16.27 16.41 16.52<br />
of 15.80% 12.62 13.41 13.90 14.23 14.47 14.65 14.79<br />
Equity 16.85% 10.84 11.70 12.25 12.62 12.89 13.09 13.26<br />
17.91% 9.35 10.23 10.80 11.19 11.49 11.71 11.89<br />
18.96% 8.10 8.98 9.56 9.96 10.26 10.50 10.68<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
The adjusted residual income analysis varies greatly from our initial analysis.<br />
Using the same cost of equity of 15.80% and the growth rate of -15% we calculated a<br />
share price of $14.23, which is below the range of our stated share price of $22.79, and<br />
is therefore overvalued. It seems that after the adjustment for goodwill is implemented<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> becomes overvalued. This is because the goodwill adjustment decreases net<br />
income and the book value of equity, the two main components that are used in the<br />
residual income valuation.<br />
156
Long-Run Residual Income Model<br />
The long-run residual income model is computed by using book value of<br />
equity, return on equity, cost of equity and forward earnings growth rate. The model<br />
begins with finding the long run return on equity. This is computed by taking the<br />
average of net income and dividing it by the book value of equity for the forecasted<br />
years. Our estimated return on equity for <strong>Jakks</strong> was 15.80%. We then estimated that<br />
our earnings are going to grow by 13.70% per year. Our forecasted return on equity is<br />
15.76%. The formula to compute the share price is found by using the market value of<br />
equity [MVE = BVE*(1+ (ROE – Ke) / (Ke-G))] and dividing by the number of shares<br />
outstanding. We then adjust the calculated share price to get the time consistent value<br />
using the formula [share price*(1+Ke)^(5/12)]. In using these values we calculated<br />
the share price to be $25.17. Based on our sensitivity of 20% the company is fairly<br />
valued. The charts below show how the calculated share price changes when two<br />
variables are changed while one is left constant. The variables are return on equity,<br />
growth rate, and cost of equity.<br />
Long Run Residual Sensitivity Analysis<br />
Growth Rates<br />
9.00% 10.00% 11.00% 12.00% 13.00% 14.00% 15.00%<br />
16.00% 24.85 24.97 25.15 25.41 25.86 26.82 30.18<br />
16.25% 25.74 26.01 26.40 27.00 28.02 30.18 37.72<br />
Return 16.50% 26.63 27.05 27.66 28.59 30.18 33.53 45.26<br />
on 16.75% 27.51 28.09 28.92 30.18 32.33 36.88 52.81<br />
Equity 17.00% 28.40 29.13 30.18 31.76 34.49 40.23 60.35<br />
17.25% 29.29 30.18 31.43 33.35 36.64 43.59 67.89<br />
17.50% 30.18 31.22 32.69 34.94 38.80 46.94 75.44<br />
Cost of Equity = 15.80%<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
157
Long Run Residual Sensitivity Analysis<br />
Growth Rates<br />
9.00% 10.00% 11.00% 12.00% 13.00% 14.00% 15.00%<br />
15.50% 25.11 25.28 25.54 25.93 26.65 28.32 36.69<br />
15.75% 24.18 24.18 24.19 24.20 24.23 24.28 24.46<br />
Cost 16.00% 23.31 23.17 22.98 22.69 22.21 21.24 18.35<br />
of 16.25% 22.51 22.25 21.89 21.36 20.50 18.88 14.68<br />
Equity 16.50% 21.76 21.39 20.89 20.17 19.04 16.99 12.23<br />
16.75% 21.06 20.60 19.98 19.11 17.77 15.45 10.48<br />
17.00% 20.40 19.86 19.15 18.15 16.66 14.16 9.17<br />
Return on Equity = 15.76%<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
Long Run Residual Sensitivity Analysis<br />
Cost of Equity<br />
15.50% 15.75% 16.00% 16.25% 16.50% 16.75% 17.00%<br />
15.50% 24.14 20.79 17.43 14.08 10.73 7.38 4.02<br />
15.75% 27.08 24.14 21.20 18.25 15.31 12.36 9.42<br />
Return 16.00% 29.39 26.76 24.14 21.52 18.89 16.27 13.64<br />
on 16.25% 31.24 28.87 26.51 24.14 21.77 19.41 17.04<br />
Equity 16.50% 32.76 30.61 28.45 26.30 24.14 21.98 19.83<br />
16.75% 34.03 32.06 30.08 28.10 26.12 24.14 22.16<br />
17.00% 35.11 33.28 31.46 29.63 27.80 25.97 24.14<br />
Growth Rate = 13.7%<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
The follow charts show what changes occur when we adjust for goodwill. When<br />
we computed the share price for this model using the adjusted return on equity, we<br />
noticed that the calculated share price was negative. This is because the new return on<br />
equity was 4% lower than the cost of equity.<br />
Adjusted Long Run Residual Sensitivity Analysis<br />
Growth Rates<br />
1.00% 2.00% 3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00% 7.00%<br />
11.00% 14.64 14.13 13.54 12.86 12.04 11.06 9.85<br />
13.00% 17.57 17.27 16.93 16.53 16.05 15.48 14.78<br />
Return 15.00% 20.50 20.42 20.32 20.20 20.07 19.90 19.70<br />
on 17.00% 23.43 23.56 23.70 23.88 24.08 24.33 24.63<br />
Equity 19.00% 26.36 26.70 27.09 27.55 28.09 28.75 29.55<br />
21.00% 29.29 29.84 30.48 31.22 32.11 33.17 34.48<br />
23.00% 32.21 32.98 33.86 34.89 36.12 37.59 39.40<br />
Cost of Equity = 15.80%<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
158
Adjusted Long Run Residual Sensitivity Analysis<br />
Growth Rates<br />
1.00% 2.00% 3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00% 7.00%<br />
9.00% 28.74 29.75 31.10 32.98 35.81 40.53 49.95<br />
10.00% 25.55 26.03 26.66 27.49 28.65 30.39 33.30<br />
Cost 11.00% 22.99 23.14 23.32 23.56 23.87 24.32 24.98<br />
of 12.00% 20.90 20.83 20.73 20.61 20.46 20.26 19.98<br />
Equity 13.00% 19.16 18.93 18.66 18.32 17.91 17.37 16.65<br />
14.00% 17.69 17.36 16.96 16.49 15.92 15.20 14.27<br />
15.00% 16.42 16.02 15.55 14.99 14.32 13.51 12.49<br />
Return on Equity = 11.61%<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
Adjusted Long Run Residual Sensitivity Analysis<br />
Cost of Equity<br />
9.00% 10.00% 11.00% 12.00% 13.00% 14.00% 15.00%<br />
8.00% 25.47 29.28 33.08 36.88 40.68 44.48 48.29<br />
8.50% 23.76 27.92 32.09 36.26 40.43 44.59 48.76<br />
Return 9.00% 21.67 26.28 30.89 35.50 40.12 44.73 49.34<br />
on 9.50% 19.09 24.25 29.41 34.57 39.73 44.89 50.05<br />
Equity 10.00% 15.81 21.67 27.53 33.39 39.24 45.10 50.96<br />
10.50% 11.51 18.29 25.06 31.83 38.60 45.37 52.15<br />
11.00% 5.62 13.64 21.67 29.70 37.72 45.75 53.78<br />
Growth Rate = 13.7%<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
Abnormal Earnings Growth Model<br />
The abnormal earnings growth model is calculated by taking forecasted net<br />
earnings, adding dividend reinvestment earnings, and subtracting normal income.<br />
Dividend reinvestment earnings are found by taking the previous year’s dividend<br />
payment and multiplying it by the cost of equity. This value is also known as “DRIP”<br />
income. The DRIP income is essentially shareholder’s reinvesting their earnings at their<br />
cost of equity. When dividends are reinvested the indirect earnings are considered a<br />
component of the abnormal earnings of the firm. Then we add net income to the DRIP<br />
income to find cumulative dividend income. Next, to find abnormal earnings growth we<br />
subtract from this total the benchmark income (previous years book value of equity X<br />
cost of equity). Abnormal earnings growth has a check figure that can be used to<br />
determine if the valuation was done properly. The change in the current year’s residual<br />
159
income should be similar to the same year’s abnormal earnings growth. The table<br />
below proves our valuation was performed correctly.<br />
Raw 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017<br />
Annual AEG 2271 (2879) (3273) (3721) (4231) (4811) (5470) (6219) (7071)<br />
Change in Residual Income 2271 (2879) (3273) (3721) (4231) (4811) (5470) (6219) (7071)<br />
Adjusted 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017<br />
Annual AEG 3431 (1559) (1773) (2015) (2292) (2605) (2962) (3368) (3830)<br />
Change in Residual Income 3431 (1559) (1773) (2015) (2292) (2605) (2962) (3368) (3830)<br />
Abnormal Earnings Growth Sensitivity Analysis<br />
Growth Rates<br />
0.00% -5.00% -10.00% -15.00% -20.00% -25.00% -30.00%<br />
12.64% 41.29 40.38 39.88 39.55 39.33 39.17 39.04<br />
13.69% 32.50 32.50 32.49 32.49 32.49 32.49 32.49<br />
Cost 14.75% 25.86 26.36 26.66 26.85 27.00 27.10 27.18<br />
of 15.80% 20.84 21.61 22.08 22.39 22.62 22.80 22.93<br />
Equity 16.85% 16.96 17.85 18.41 18.79 19.07 19.29 19.45<br />
17.91% 13.89 14.82 15.42 15.83 16.14 16.38 16.56<br />
18.96% 11.49 12.41 13.01 13.43 13.75 13.99 14.19<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
Using our cost of equity of 15.80% and the growth rate of -15% resulted in a<br />
share price of $22.39, which is within the 20% range of our stated share price $22.79,<br />
and is therefore fairly valued.<br />
Adjusted Abnormal Earnings Growth Sensitivity Analysis<br />
Growth Rates<br />
0.00% -5.00% -10.00% -15.00% -20.00% -25.00% -30.00%<br />
12.64% 38.41 37.92 37.65 37.47 37.35 37.26 37.20<br />
13.69% 32.48 32.48 32.48 32.47 32.47 32.47 32.47<br />
Cost 14.75% 27.86 28.14 28.30 28.41 28.48 28.54 28.58<br />
of 15.80% 24.28 24.69 24.95 25.15 25.24 25.34 25.41<br />
Equity 16.85% 21.41 21.89 22.20 22.40 22.56 22.67 22.76<br />
17.91% 19.07 19.57 19.90 20.12 20.29 20.42 20.52<br />
18.96% 17.17 17.67 17.99 18.22 18.39 18.53 18.63<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
Since <strong>Jakks</strong> does not pay dividends, net income is the primary factor for this<br />
model. After the adjustment for goodwill was made, net income decreased causing a<br />
160
decrease in calculated share prices. Using our cost of equity of 15.8% and growth rate<br />
of -15% resulted in a share price of $25.15, which is within the 20% range of our<br />
stated share price of $22.79 and is therefore fairly valued.<br />
Analyst Opinion<br />
In our analysis of the method of comparables, we concluded that the company<br />
was undervalued, but this model is unreliable. In using the intrinsic valuation models<br />
we found that when using the free cash flow model that the company was undervalued<br />
both prior to the goodwill adjustment and after. In the more reliable and less sensitive<br />
residual income model, we found that the company was fairly valued prior to the<br />
goodwill adjustment. In the long-run residual income model we found that the<br />
company was again fairly valued. Once again, the abnormal earnings growth model<br />
supported the company being fairly valued. Our overall conclusion based upon the<br />
intrinsic valuation models is that the company is fairly valued.<br />
161
Appendix<br />
Sales Manipulation Diagnostics<br />
Net Sales / Cash from Sales 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 1.10 1.03 0.98 1.09 1.03<br />
Hasbro 1.02 0.99 0.98 1.01 1.03<br />
Mattel 1.01 1.04 1.00 1.03 1.01<br />
Leapfrog 1.19 0.93 1.05 0.81 0.99<br />
Δ Net Sales / Δ Cash from Sales 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> ‐0.28 0.95 0.74 4.54 0.67<br />
Hasbro 1.28 2.36 0.77 ‐2.59 1.11<br />
Mattel ‐0.49 ‐7.36 0.26 1.63 0.70<br />
Leapfrog 1.61 ‐0.32 ‐0.13 73.35 0.35<br />
Sales / Account Receivables 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 3.67 5.62 7.59 5.00 4.91<br />
Hasbro 5.17 5.18 5.90 5.67 5.86<br />
Mattel 9.12 6.72 6.81 5.99 6.02<br />
Leapfrog 2.43 2.81 2.52 3.54 3.24<br />
Δ Sales / Δ Accounts<br />
Receivables 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 0.19 16.01 ‐5.79 1.58 4.30<br />
Hasbro 6.15 4.89 ‐1.62 1.93 6.97<br />
Mattel 1.41 0.66 47.35 2.57 6.75<br />
Leapfrog 1.34 0.77 0.32 1.27 11.56<br />
Net Sales / Inventory 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 7.11 11.49 9.91 9.97 11.35<br />
Hasbro 18.57 15.39 17.21 15.50 14.81<br />
Mattel 12.76 12.19 13.74 14.75 13.93<br />
Leapfrog 7.48 4.88 3.84 6.88 8.44<br />
Δ Net Sales / Δ Inventory 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 0.90 46.16 5.22 10.32 ‐70.43<br />
Hasbro ‐15.23 ‐5.47 ‐5.86 2.67 12.31<br />
Mattel 1.49 4.76 ‐1.83 75.36 7.02<br />
Leapfrog 23.03 ‐0.99 0.25 1.54 2.91<br />
162
Expense Manipulation Diagnostics<br />
Asset Turnover 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 0.60 0.82 0.88 0.87 0.87<br />
Hasbro 0.99 0.92 0.94 1.02 1.19<br />
Mattel 1.10 1.07 1.18 1.14 1.24<br />
Leapfrog 1.23 1.14 1.07 1.12 1.16<br />
CFFO / OI 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 0.65 2.45 0.81 0.69 0.82<br />
Hasbro 1.32 1.22 1.60 0.85 1.16<br />
Mattel 0.77 0.78 0.70 1.20 0.77<br />
Leapfrog 0.24 ‐0.01 ‐1.18 ‐0.73 0.15<br />
Δ CFFO / Δ OI 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 4.71 2.93 ‐1.77 ‐1.66 1.63<br />
Hasbro ‐0.15 1.85 7.89 ‐2.67 1.97<br />
Mattel ‐10.57 0.63 1.56 6.37 ‐250.33<br />
Leapfrog 0.11 0.22 ‐0.71 ‐0.79 ‐4.50<br />
CFFO / OI 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 0.63 12.01 5.60 3.77 4.09<br />
Hasbro 2.27 1.73 3.03 1.76 3.20<br />
Mattel 0.97 0.97 0.85 1.63 1.08<br />
Leapfrog 1.30 0.00 ‐1.04 3.25 ‐0.45<br />
Δ CFFO / Δ OI 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 20.68 ‐158.56 ‐34.38 ‐1.76 5.29<br />
Hasbro 1.39 ‐13.51 ‐3.22 ‐9.95 45.10<br />
Mattel ‐20.97 0.87 2.63 ‐39.52 17.39<br />
Leapfrog 14.06 ‐6.27 25.06 28.94 ‐17.01<br />
Accruals / Net Sales 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> ‐0.027 0.153 0.011 ‐0.011 ‐0.002<br />
Hasbro 0.094 0.054 0.092 0.029 0.070<br />
Mattel 0.014 0.000 0.010 0.050 ‐0.007<br />
Leapfrog ‐0.067 0.010 ‐0.065 0.469 0.194<br />
Δ Accruals / Δ Net Sales 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> ‐9.05 0.37 ‐0.92 ‐0.16 0.08<br />
Hasbro ‐1.08 0.95 1.35 ‐3.04 0.26<br />
Mattel ‐11.49 ‐0.49 0.68 0.50 ‐1.01<br />
Leapfrog ‐0.17 ‐1.32 ‐5.16 ‐1.88 2.49<br />
163
Liquidity Ratios<br />
Current Ratio 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 5.46 2.61 3.43 2.64 3.09<br />
Hasbro 1.62 1.50 2.01 1.90 2.13<br />
Mattel 1.63 1.53 1.65 1.80 1.65<br />
Leapfrog 3.69 4.18 4.41 3.98 2.78<br />
Quick Asset ratio 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 4.28 2.08 2.64 1.97 2.44<br />
Hasbro 1.21 1.14 1.62 1.40 1.61<br />
Mattel 1.16 1.11 1.20 1.36 1.20<br />
Leapfrog 2.38 2.44 2.54 2.15 2.01<br />
Accounts Receivable Turnover 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 3.67 5.62 7.59 5.00 4.91<br />
Hasbro 5.17 5.18 5.90 5.67 5.86<br />
Mattel 9.12 6.72 6.81 5.99 6.02<br />
Leapfrog 2.43 2.81 2.52 3.54 3.24<br />
Days Supply of Receivables 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 99.54 65.00 48.11 73.02 74.29<br />
Hasbro 70.65 70.47 61.85 64.43 62.28<br />
Mattel 40.02 54.29 53.61 60.97 60.60<br />
Leapfrog 150.33 130.08 144.79 103.06 112.76<br />
Inventory Turnover 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 4.26 6.97 5.92 6.13 7.07<br />
Hasbro 7.62 6.43 7.17 6.41 6.09<br />
Mattel 6.51 6.43 7.45 7.93 7.45<br />
Leapfrog 3.74 2.91 2.19 4.86 5.13<br />
Days Supply of Inventory 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 85.59 52.40 61.69 59.56 51.65<br />
Hasbro 47.89 56.80 50.91 56.92 59.98<br />
Mattel 56.06 56.76 49.02 46.03 49.01<br />
Leapfrog 97.62 125.60 166.73 75.03 71.13<br />
Working Capital Turnover 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 1.36 2.50 2.19 2.73 2.41<br />
Hasbro 5.42 5.26 3.36 3.88 3.84<br />
Mattel 5.35 5.61 5.46 4.46 5.84<br />
Leapfrog 1.85 1.70 1.58 1.73 2.18<br />
164
Profitability Ratios<br />
*Raw<br />
*Adjusted<br />
Gross Profit Margin 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 40.04% 46.32% 40.32% 38.52% 37.76%<br />
Hasbro 58.96% 58.24% 58.34% 58.63% 58.92%<br />
Mattel 48.98% 47.24% 45.82% 46.23% 46.52%<br />
Leapfrog 50.02% 40.46% 43.04% 29.27% 39.19%<br />
Operating Profit Margin 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 3.61% 9.36% 13.30% 12.06% 12.48%<br />
Hasbro 10.98% 9.78% 10.06% 11.94% 13.53%<br />
Mattel 15.84% 14.32% 12.83% 12.90% 12.23%<br />
Leapfrog 16.10% ‐2.18% 3.22% ‐24.82% ‐22.88%<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>* ‐5.45% 0.36% 5.16% 3.23% 4.24%<br />
Hasbro* 8.03% 6.64% 7.03% 8.96% 11.08%<br />
Mattel* 12.93% 11.44% 10.06% 9.91% 9.40%<br />
Leapfrog* 16.10% ‐2.18% 2.62% ‐25.60% ‐23.76%<br />
Net Profit Margin 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 5.03% 7.59% 9.60% 9.46% 10.38%<br />
Hasbro 5.02% 6.54% 6.87% 7.30% 8.68%<br />
Mattel 10.84% 11.22% 8.05% 10.49% 10.05%<br />
Leapfrog 10.69% ‐1.02% 2.69% ‐28.89% ‐22.91%<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>* ‐4.03% ‐1.41% 1.46% 0.62% 2.14%<br />
Hasbro* 2.62% 3.40% 3.84% 7.30% 6.22%<br />
Mattel* 7.93% 8.34% 5.28% 7.50% 7.22%<br />
Leapfrog* 10.69% ‐1.02% 2.09% ‐29.67% ‐23.79%<br />
Asset Turnover 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 0.77 1.08 0.95 1.02 0.97<br />
Hasbro 1.00 0.95 0.95 0.95 1.24<br />
Mattel 1.11 1.13 1.09 1.29 1.20<br />
Leapfrog 1.71 1.16 1.16 0.83 0.98<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>* 0.62 1.13 1.03 1.09 1.05<br />
Hasbro* 1.03 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.28<br />
Mattel* 1.15 1.17 1.12 1.34 1.25<br />
Leapfrog* 1.73 1.17 1.17 0.83 0.99<br />
Return on Assets 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 3.89% 8.22% 9.11% 9.60% 10.09%<br />
Hasbro 5.02% 6.20% 6.54% 6.97% 10.75%<br />
Mattel 12.06% 12.70% 8.77% 13.56% 12.11%<br />
Leapfrog 18.27% ‐1.18% 3.13% ‐23.95% ‐22.49%<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>* ‐2.50% ‐1.26% 1.38% 0.59% 2.01%<br />
Hasbro* 2.68% 3.24% 3.70% 7.66% 7.60%<br />
Mattel* 9.01% 9.23% 6.47% 8.85% 9.29%<br />
Leapfrog* 13.24% ‐1.17% 2.26% ‐33.37% ‐27.97%<br />
Return on Equity 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 4.21% 9.65% 12.10% 11.88% 12.88%<br />
Hasbro 11.22% 11.95% 12.31% 14.96% 24.04%<br />
Mattel 24.26% 24.01% 19.84% 24.37% 26.01%<br />
Leapfrog 17.51% ‐1.50% 3.75% ‐43.45% ‐41.61%<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>* ‐3.56% ‐2.03% 2.05% 0.88% 2.95%<br />
Hasbro* 6.27% 6.60% 7.28% 15.93% 18.50%<br />
Mattel* 18.98% 19.01% 13.96% 18.72% 20.15%<br />
Leapfrog* 17.67% ‐1.52% 2.94% ‐45.14% ‐43.92%<br />
165
Capital Structure Ratios<br />
Debt to Equity Ratio 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> 0.4 0.54 0.44 0.45 0.35<br />
Mattel 1.04 0.99 1.08 1.04 1.08<br />
Hasbro 1.25 0.98 0.92 1.01 1.34<br />
LeapFrog 0.33 0.29 0.3 0.35 0.56<br />
Debt to Equity (Adj.) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> 0.46 0.70 1.08 0.58 0.53<br />
Mattel 1.19 1.13 1.25 1.20 1.27<br />
Hasbro 1.44 1.10 1.03 1.15 1.55<br />
LeapFrog 0.34 0.29 0.30 0.36 0.58<br />
Times Interest Earned 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> 11.34 22.66 22.27 24.37 24.74<br />
Mattel 10.19 9.95 9.53 9.56 10.91<br />
Hasbro 5.45 9.21 11.18 13.41 14.36<br />
LeapFrog 11,530.50 ‐829.47 350.96 ‐1220.45 ‐878.21<br />
Times Interest Earned (Adj.) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> ‐14.73 ‐8.72 ‐1.44 ‐5.46 ‐1.16<br />
Mattel 5.61 5.17 4.77 4.33 5.14<br />
Hasbro 3.03 3.32 4.05 6.85 9.56<br />
LeapFrog ‐10747.54 1351.77 ‐234.96 1302.07 949.65<br />
Debt Service Margin 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> NA NA NA NA NA<br />
Mattel 11.57 3.02 4.67 13.63 11.21<br />
Hasbro 340.7 1.11 12.15 NA 4.45<br />
LeapFrog NA NA NA NA NA<br />
SGR 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 4.41% 11.53% 14.06% 13.79% 14.61%<br />
Hasbro 13.23% 13.95% 12.93% 13.35% 21.65%<br />
Mattel 27.17% 25.84% 17.48% 28.21% 24.66%<br />
Leapfrog 27.04% ‐1.57% 4.03% ‐31.11% ‐30.34%<br />
SGR (Adj.) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> ‐5.91% 1.61% 7.03% 5.56% 7.47%<br />
Hasbro 8.29% 9.53% 9.60% 10.23% 18.36%<br />
Mattel 23.54% 21.80% 14.52% 22.79% 20.13%<br />
Leapfrog 26.51% ‐2.99% 3.40% ‐32.03% ‐29.59%<br />
Altman Z Scores 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 2.53 2.52 3.25 2.75 3.06<br />
Hasbro 2.69 2.73 2.94 3.53 3.22<br />
Mattel 3.26 3.36 3.05 3.89 3.25<br />
Leapfrog 5.50 2.82 3.05 1.83 0.36<br />
Altman Z Score (Adj.) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 2.25 2.23 3.00 2.47 2.81<br />
Hasbro 2.58 2.63 2.84 3.44 3.14<br />
Mattel 3.15 3.25 2.94 3.77 3.13<br />
Leapfrog 5.48 2.79 3.03 1.79 0.30<br />
166
Forecasting Computations<br />
growth in Sales<br />
Analysis - Income Statement<br />
difference in growth of Sales<br />
2002 2003 Q1 2003 Rest 2003 2004 Q1 2004 Rest 2004 2005 Q1 2005 Rest 2005 2006 Q1 2006 Rest 2006 2007 Q1 2007 Rest 2007<br />
1.86% 101.71% 81.86% 5.31% 15.20% 24.92% 15.70% 11.38% 11.98%<br />
80.00% -96.40% -66.66% 19.60% 0.50% -13.54% -3.72%<br />
Sales Growth versus Cost of Sales Growth -3.23% -2.79% -2.08% 2.15% 1.82% -4.71% -3.49% -0.25% -1.37%<br />
growth in SG&A<br />
15.23% 58.50% 52.39% -6.37% 3.74% 16.19% 13.29% 8.66% 7.00%<br />
difference in growth of SG&A<br />
37.16% -64.86% -48.65% 22.56% 9.56% -7.53% -6.30%<br />
growth in Income from Operations -54.47% 1134.30% 371.73% 54.95% 63.77% 21.21% 4.92% 15.11% 15.91%<br />
difference in growth of Income from Operations 426.20% -1079.36% -307.96% -33.74% -58.85% -6.10% 10.99%<br />
growth in Profit from Joint Venture -8.16% 4.59% 6.99% 23.44% 19.69% 34.60% 40.49% 57.87% 60.14%<br />
difference in growth of Profit from Joint Venture 15.15% 18.84% 12.70% 11.16% 20.80% 23.28% 19.65%<br />
growth in Net Interest -223.14% 28.69% 77.79% -141.50% -125.58% -86.26% -37.87% 1134.78% 243.32%<br />
Net Interest Over Income from Operations 4.56% -40.34% -12.34% -4.21% -4.65% 1.13% 0.73% 0.13% 0.43% 1.37% 1.27%<br />
growth in Income Before Income Taxes -49.25% 462.98% 240.88% 55.32% 63.54% 23.66% 9.62% 21.56% 22.28%<br />
difference in growth of Income Before Taxes 290.13% -407.66% -177.35% -31.65% -53.91% -2.11% 12.66%<br />
Analysis - Balance Sheet 2002 2003 Q1 2003 Rest 2003 2004 Q1 2004 Rest 2004 2005 Q1 2005 Rest 2005 2006 Q1 2006 Rest 2006 2007 Q1 2007 Rest 2007<br />
growth in Cash and Cash Equivalents<br />
72.75% -27.50% 49.38% 106.15% 36.08% -12.45% -23.21% -18.99% 30.77%<br />
difference in growth of Cash and Cash Equivalents -23.36% 133.65% -13.30% -118.60% -59.28% -6.54% 53.97%<br />
growth in Total Current Assets 61.10% -29.28% 30.80% -8.69% 14.17% 119.04% 6.21% 5.61% 16.46%<br />
difference in growth of Total Current Assets -30.30% 20.59% -16.64% 127.73% -7.96% -113.43% 10.25%<br />
growth in Property and Equipment -20.93% -95.27% -6.67% -2385.00% 16.04% 16.59% 32.99% 93.28% 26.80%<br />
difference in growth of Property and Equipment 14.26% -2289.73% 22.71% 2401.59% 16.95% 76.69% -6.19%<br />
Property and Equipment versus Total Assets -1.71% 2.21% -0.07% 1.57% 2.77% 1.68% 1.61% 1.91% 2.77% 2.18%<br />
growth in Goodwill 0.74% 5362.75% 35.44% -76.99% 4.25% -160.25% 25.51% -317.43% 4.54%<br />
difference in growth in Goodwill 34.71% -5439.74% -31.20% -83.26% 21.27% -157.18% -20.97%<br />
Goodwill versus Total Assets 0.75% 35.99% 33.66% 37.08% 14.21% 35.72% -4.26% 38.33% 8.24% 35.96%<br />
growth in Total Non Current Assets 5.68% 312.17% 32.23% -81.10% 1.36% 16.57% 30.89% 71.33% 6.15%<br />
difference in growth of Total Non Current Assets 26.56% -393.27% -30.87% 97.67% 29.53% 54.76% -24.74%<br />
growth in Total Assets 29.64% 22.08% 31.47% -45.46% 8.21% 101.00% 16.97% 12.32% 11.43%<br />
difference in growth of Total Assets 1.82% -67.54% -23.26% 146.47% 8.76% -88.69% -5.54%<br />
growth in Accounts Payable and Accrued Expenses 49.41% 1130.77% 156.93% -63.69% -12.87% 190.24% 26.64% -4.45% 1.77%<br />
difference in growth for Accounts Payable and Accrued Expenses 49.41% 107.52% -1194.46% -169.80% 253.93% 39.51% -194.69% -24.86%<br />
Accounts Payable and Accrued Expenses versus Total Current Liabilities 59.48% 81.24% 67.01% 76.21% 124.26% 76.66% 69.46% 70.16% 74.00% 71.81%<br />
Accounts Payable and Accrued Expenses versus Total Liabilities 4.73% 27.89% 64.88% 44.43% 106.03% 41.41% 73.10% 44.11% 68.03% 41.95%<br />
growth in Total Non Current Liabilities 15933.55% -96.90% 2.39% 2.47% 3.09% -250.22% -3.99% -258.22% 19.81%<br />
difference in growth of Total Non Current Liabilities -15931.15% 99.36% 0.69% -252.69% -7.08% -7.99% 23.80%<br />
growth in Total Liabilities 215.34% -10.23% 61.26% -77.78% -6.51% 320.99% 18.88% 2.67% 7.00%<br />
difference in growth of Total Liabilities -154.07% -67.55% -67.78% 398.77% 25.40% -318.32% -11.88%<br />
growth in Total Equity 4.80% 241.07% 19.47% 12.18% 16.21% 23.29% 16.13% 23.95% 13.41%<br />
difference in growth of Total Equity 14.67% -228.89% -3.27% 11.11% -0.07% 0.66% -2.72%<br />
Total Equity versus Total Assets 12.86% 71.30% 35.92% 64.80% 73.89% 69.59% 45.32% 69.09% 50.02% 70.32%<br />
167
Analysis - Statement of Cash Flow 2002 2003 Q1 2003 Rest 2003 2004 Q1 2004 Rest 2004 2005 Q1 2005 Rest 2005 2006 Q1 2006 Rest 2006 2007 Q1 2007 Rest 2007<br />
Total Adjustments versus CFFO<br />
60.97% -1368.89% -115.00% 64.93% 66.85% 16.82% 10.65% 1.81% -13.60% -31.47% -1.52%<br />
Net Income versus Total Adjustments<br />
64.03% -107.31% -186.96% 54.02% 49.59% 494.50% 838.97% 5415.51% -835.26% -417.73% -6686.03%<br />
Net Income versus CFFO<br />
39.03% 1468.89% 215.00% 35.07% 33.15% 83.18% 89.35% 98.19% 113.60% 131.47% 101.52%<br />
Net Income versus CFFI<br />
-29.99% -21.33% -33.59% -51.29% -59.47% 1111.02% -670.68% -574.71% -59.37% -493.17% -263.94%<br />
Additional Analysis - Statement of Cash Flows<br />
CFFO / Net Sales<br />
CFFO / Net Income<br />
CFFO / Income From Operations<br />
CFFO / Property and Equipment<br />
CFFI / Net Sales<br />
CFFI / Net Income<br />
CFFI / Income From Operations<br />
CFFI / Property and Equipment<br />
CFFI / CFFO<br />
Change in CFFI<br />
Change in Total Non Current Assets<br />
Change in Total Property and Equipment<br />
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
23.08% 2.34% 22.88% 10.74% 8.32% 10.23%<br />
256.19% 46.51% 301.64% 111.92% 88.03% 98.50%<br />
286.05% 64.91% 244.56% 80.76% 69.02% 81.93%<br />
482.65% 63.07% 1201.01% 559.76% 377.36% 409.49%<br />
-30.04% -14.98% -12.76% -1.43% -15.93% -3.93%<br />
-333.42% -297.68% -168.17% -14.91% -168.45% -37.89%<br />
-372.29% -415.45% -136.34% -10.76% -132.07% -31.51%<br />
-628.16% -403.65% -669.57% -74.57% -722.11% -157.50%<br />
-130.15% -640.01% -55.75% -13.32% -191.36% -38.46%<br />
45808 -25935 63784 -112447 88197<br />
13170 79036 4415 101518 26449<br />
-3103 -782 1755 4188 4524<br />
Analysis - Ratios 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average 2008 Assume<br />
Working Capital Turnover 2.40 1.36 2.50 2.19 2.73 2.41 2.45 2.45 2.45<br />
Gross Profit Margin 41.88% 40.04% 39.36% 40.32% 38.52% 37.76% 39.65% 37.50% 37.10%<br />
Operating Profit Margin 8.07% 3.61% 9.36% 13.30% 12.06% 12.48% 9.81% 13.09%<br />
Net Profit Margin 9.01% 5.03% 7.59% 9.60% 9.46% 10.38% 8.51% 11.90%<br />
Asset Turnover 1.09 0.77 1.08 0.95 1.02 0.97 1.02 0.99 1.02<br />
Return on Assets 9.83% 3.89% 8.22% 9.11% 9.60% 10.09% 8.46% 11.80%<br />
Return on Equity 11.43% 4.41% 11.53% 14.06% 13.79% 14.61% 11.64% 16.78%<br />
Debt to Equity 0.13 0.40 0.54 0.44 0.45 0.42 0.45 0.43<br />
168
Current Liabilities<br />
Cost of Debt<br />
Weight<br />
Rate<br />
Weighted<br />
Rate<br />
Accounts Payable 52,287 0.179 0.0261 0.47%<br />
Accrued Expenses 70,085 0.240 0.0261 0.63%<br />
Reserve for sales returns & allowances 26,036 0.089 0.0261 0.23%<br />
Incomes taxes payable 21,997 0.075 0.3500 2.64%<br />
Total current liabilities 170,405 0.584<br />
Long Term Liabilities<br />
Convertible senior notes 98,000 0.336 0.0463 1.55%<br />
*Other liabilities 6,432 0.022 0.0425 0.09%<br />
Incomes taxes payable 11,294 0.039 0.3500 1.36%<br />
Deferred income taxes 5,560 0.019 0.0388 0.07%<br />
Total Long Term Liabilities 121,286 0.416<br />
Total Liabilities 291,691 1.000<br />
Weighted Average Cost of Debt<br />
= 7.04%<br />
*average of convertible senior notes and deferred income taxes<br />
Weighted Average Cost of Capital<br />
K d BVL/MVA Tax K e BVE/MVA WACC<br />
Before Tax 7.04% 0.297 15.80% 0.703 13.20%<br />
After Tax 7.04% 0.297 31.3% 15.80% 0.703 12.55%<br />
Adjusted Weighted Average Cost of Capital<br />
K d BVL/MVA Tax K e BVE/MVA WACC<br />
Before Tax 7.04% 0.320 15.80% 0.680 13.00%<br />
After Tax 7.04% 0.320 31.3% 15.80% 0.680 12.29%<br />
169
3 Month<br />
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.384874626<br />
R Square 0.148128478<br />
Adjusted R Square 0.135958885<br />
Standard Error 0.111141208<br />
Observations 72<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.150353218 0.150353218 12.1720156 0.000843235<br />
Residual 70 0.864665769 0.012352368<br />
Total 71 1.015018987<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.008152804 0.013121884 0.621313511 0.536411486 ‐0.018017968 0.034323576 ‐0.018017968 0.034323576<br />
X Variable 1 1.329967264 0.381205977 3.488841584 0.000843235 0.569675926 2.090258601 0.569675926 2.090258601<br />
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.107822543<br />
R Square 0.011625701<br />
Adjusted R Square ‐0.005415235<br />
Standard Error 0.110397606<br />
Observations 60<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.00831467 0.00831467 0.682221954 0.412207399<br />
Residual 58 0.706882626 0.012187631<br />
Total 59 0.715197296<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.012688219 0.014442895 0.878509367 0.383292353 ‐0.016222377 0.041598815 ‐0.016222377 0.041598815<br />
X Variable 1 0.482141711 0.583729792 0.825967284 0.412207399 ‐0.686320411 1.650603832 ‐0.686320411 1.650603832<br />
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.157195636<br />
R Square 0.024710468<br />
Adjusted R Square 0.003508522<br />
Standard Error 0.117698412<br />
Observations 48<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.016145312 0.016145312 1.165481114 0.285959864<br />
Residual 46 0.637234143 0.013852916<br />
Total 47 0.653379455<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.011394823 0.017043385 0.668577482 0.507106393 ‐0.022911731 0.045701378 ‐0.022911731 0.045701378<br />
X Variable 1 0.744475053 0.689600439 1.079574506 0.285959864 ‐0.643618614 2.13256872 ‐0.643618614 2.13256872<br />
170
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.064171695<br />
R Square 0.004118006<br />
Adjusted R Square ‐0.02517264<br />
Standard Error 0.106643179<br />
Observations 36<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.001598911 0.001598911 0.140591175 0.710022835<br />
Residual 34 0.386674099 0.011372768<br />
Total 35 0.38827301<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.008632618 0.017803351 0.484887244 0.63086585 ‐0.027548144 0.04481338 ‐0.027548144 0.04481338<br />
X Variable 1 0.266906543 0.711836397 0.374954897 0.710022835 ‐1.179719057 1.713532143 ‐1.179719057 1.713532143<br />
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.040869724<br />
R Square 0.001670334<br />
Adjusted R Square ‐0.043708287<br />
Standard Error 0.111493483<br />
Observations 24<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.000457563 0.000457563 0.036808839 0.849614572<br />
Residual 22 0.273477526 0.012430797<br />
Total 23 0.27393509<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.0134021 0.022775499 0.588443779 0.562227677 ‐0.033831393 0.060635593 ‐0.033831393 0.060635593<br />
X Variable 1 0.1600628 0.83428484 0.191856297 0.849614572 ‐1.570138052 1.890263652 ‐1.570138052 1.890263652<br />
171
6 Month<br />
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.385086446<br />
R Square 0.148291571<br />
Adjusted R Square 0.136124308<br />
Standard Error 0.111130568<br />
Observations 72<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.15051876 0.15051876 12.18775067 0.000837207<br />
Residual 70 0.864500226 0.012350003<br />
Total 71 1.015018987<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.008309651 0.013117977 0.633455245 0.528500723 ‐0.017853329 0.034472631 ‐0.017853329 0.034472631<br />
X Variable 1 1.330760351 0.381186993 3.491095912 0.000837207 0.570506877 2.091013826 0.570506877 2.091013826<br />
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.108266438<br />
R Square 0.011721622<br />
Adjusted R Square ‐0.00531766<br />
Standard Error 0.110392249<br />
Observations 60<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.008383272 0.008383272 0.687917562 0.410274215<br />
Residual 58 0.706814024 0.012186449<br />
Total 59 0.715197296<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.012747564 0.014429277 0.883451279 0.380639821 ‐0.016135773 0.0416309 ‐0.016135773 0.0416309<br />
X Variable 1 0.484076928 0.583641527 0.829407959 0.410274215 ‐0.684208513 1.652362368 ‐0.684208513 1.652362368<br />
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.157878154<br />
R Square 0.024925512<br />
Adjusted R Square 0.00372824<br />
Standard Error 0.117685435<br />
Observations 48<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.016285817 0.016285817 1.175883019 0.283846574<br />
Residual 46 0.637093638 0.013849862<br />
Total 47 0.653379455<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.011506258 0.01703312 0.675522648 0.502725688 ‐0.022779633 0.04579215 ‐0.022779633 0.04579215<br />
X Variable 1 0.747929003 0.689728728 1.084381399 0.283846574 ‐0.640422896 2.136280902 ‐0.640422896 2.136280902<br />
172
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.065212162<br />
R Square 0.004252626<br />
Adjusted R Square ‐0.02503406<br />
Standard Error 0.106635971<br />
Observations 36<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.00165118 0.00165118 0.145206795 0.705529462<br />
Residual 34 0.38662183 0.01137123<br />
Total 35 0.38827301<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.008663685 0.017796785 0.486811803 0.629515348 ‐0.027503734 0.044831104 ‐0.027503734 0.044831104<br />
X Variable 1 0.27142759 0.712296025 0.381060094 0.705529462 ‐1.176132088 1.718987268 ‐1.176132088 1.718987268<br />
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.041992831<br />
R Square 0.001763398<br />
Adjusted R Square ‐0.04361099<br />
Standard Error 0.111488286<br />
Observations 24<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.000483057 0.000483057 0.038863284 0.845529712<br />
Residual 22 0.273452033 0.012429638<br />
Total 23 0.27393509<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.013414698 0.022771229 0.589107332 0.561790358 ‐0.03380994 0.060639336 ‐0.03380994 0.060639336<br />
X Variable 1 0.164593787 0.834917743 0.197137728 0.845529712 ‐1.566919626 1.8961072 ‐1.566919626 1.8961072<br />
173
1 Year<br />
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.385109516<br />
R Square 0.148309339<br />
Adjusted R Square 0.13614233<br />
Standard Error 0.111129409<br />
Observations 72<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.150536795 0.150536795 12.18946527 0.000836553<br />
Residual 70 0.864482192 0.012349746<br />
Total 71 1.015018987<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.008408857 0.013116257 0.64110185 0.523550018 ‐0.017750693 0.034568406 ‐0.017750693 0.034568406<br />
X Variable 1 1.330752735 0.381158001 3.491341472 0.000836553 0.570557083 2.090948386 0.570557083 2.090948386<br />
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.108074469<br />
R Square 0.011680091<br />
Adjusted R Square ‐0.00535991<br />
Standard Error 0.110394569<br />
Observations 60<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.008353569 0.008353569 0.685451402 0.411109605<br />
Residual 58 0.706843727 0.012186961<br />
Total 59 0.715197296<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.012781335 0.014423872 0.88612374 0.379210231 ‐0.016091181 0.041653851 ‐0.016091181 0.041653851<br />
X Variable 1 0.483558717 0.584064597 0.827919925 0.411109605 ‐0.68557359 1.652691024 ‐0.68557359 1.652691024<br />
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.157943193<br />
R Square 0.024946052<br />
Adjusted R Square 0.003749227<br />
Standard Error 0.117684196<br />
Observations 48<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.016299238 0.016299238 1.176876833 0.283645729<br />
Residual 46 0.637080217 0.01384957<br />
Total 47 0.653379455<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.011528493 0.017031398 0.676896448 0.50186161 ‐0.022753933 0.045810919 ‐0.022753933 0.045810919<br />
X Variable 1 0.748417903 0.689888111 1.084839543 0.283645729 ‐0.640254818 2.137090623 ‐0.640254818 2.137090623<br />
174
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.065865535<br />
R Square 0.004338269<br />
Adjusted R Square ‐0.0249459<br />
Standard Error 0.106631385<br />
Observations 36<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.001684433 0.001684433 0.148143825 0.702712787<br />
Residual 34 0.386588577 0.011370252<br />
Total 35 0.38827301<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.008653604 0.017796913 0.486241847 0.629915163 ‐0.027514075 0.044821283 ‐0.027514075 0.044821283<br />
X Variable 1 0.27424921 0.712530743 0.384894564 0.702712787 ‐1.173787473 1.722285892 ‐1.173787473 1.722285892<br />
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.04250543<br />
R Square 0.001806712<br />
Adjusted R Square ‐0.04356571<br />
Standard Error 0.111485867<br />
Observations 24<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.000494922 0.000494922 0.039819597 0.843666609<br />
Residual 22 0.273440168 0.012429099<br />
Total 23 0.27393509<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.013404339 0.022772247 0.588626093 0.562107504 ‐0.033822411 0.06063109 ‐0.033822411 0.06063109<br />
X Variable 1 0.166667888 0.835225029 0.199548484 0.843666609 ‐1.565482796 1.898818573 ‐1.565482796 1.898818573<br />
175
5 Year<br />
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.385281542<br />
R Square 0.148441867<br />
Adjusted R Square 0.136276751<br />
Standard Error 0.111120763<br />
Observations 72<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.150671313 0.150671313 12.20225638 0.000831689<br />
Residual 70 0.864347673 0.012347824<br />
Total 71 1.015018987<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.008836786 0.01310911 0.674095006 0.502470956 ‐0.01730851 0.034982081 ‐0.01730851 0.034982081<br />
X Variable 1 1.331014485 0.381033104 3.493172825 0.000831689 0.571067931 2.090961039 0.571067931 2.090961039<br />
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.107468284<br />
R Square 0.011549432<br />
Adjusted R Square ‐0.00549282<br />
Standard Error 0.110401866<br />
Observations 60<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.008260123 0.008260123 0.677694045 0.41375398<br />
Residual 58 0.706937173 0.012188572<br />
Total 59 0.715197296<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.012909645 0.014403452 0.896288286 0.373803884 ‐0.015921996 0.041741287 ‐0.015921996 0.041741287<br />
X Variable 1 0.481903136 0.58538679 0.823221747 0.41375398 ‐0.689875827 1.653682099 ‐0.689875827 1.653682099<br />
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.157991497<br />
R Square 0.024961313<br />
Adjusted R Square 0.00376482<br />
Standard Error 0.117683275<br />
Observations 48<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.016309209 0.016309209 1.17761523 0.283496621<br />
Residual 46 0.637070246 0.013849353<br />
Total 47 0.653379455<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.011608943 0.017026005 0.681835987 0.498761508 ‐0.022662627 0.045880514 ‐0.022662627 0.045880514<br />
X Variable 1 0.748790257 0.690014914 1.085179815 0.283496621 ‐0.640137706 2.13771822 ‐0.640137706 2.13771822<br />
176
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.067327047<br />
R Square 0.004532931<br />
Adjusted R Square ‐0.02474551<br />
Standard Error 0.106620961<br />
Observations 36<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.001760015 0.001760015 0.154821458 0.696426398<br />
Residual 34 0.386512995 0.011368029<br />
Total 35 0.38827301<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.008634555 0.017796676 0.485177986 0.630661748 ‐0.027532641 0.044801752 ‐0.027532641 0.044801752<br />
X Variable 1 0.280401034 0.712629891 0.393473579 0.696426398 ‐1.167837141 1.728639209 ‐1.167837141 1.728639209<br />
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.043672738<br />
R Square 0.001907308<br />
Adjusted R Square ‐0.04346054<br />
Standard Error 0.111480249<br />
Observations 24<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.000522479 0.000522479 0.042040962 0.839426941<br />
Residual 22 0.273412611 0.012427846<br />
Total 23 0.27393509<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.013384049 0.022774037 0.587688905 0.562725395 ‐0.033846414 0.060614512 ‐0.033846414 0.060614512<br />
X Variable 1 0.17126346 0.835272905 0.205038927 0.839426941 ‐1.560986514 1.903513435 ‐1.560986514 1.903513435<br />
177
10 Year<br />
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.385406687<br />
R Square 0.148538314<br />
Adjusted R Square 0.136374576<br />
Standard Error 0.11111447<br />
Observations 72<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.150769209 0.150769209 12.21156767 0.000828167<br />
Residual 70 0.864249777 0.012346425<br />
Total 71 1.015018987<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.009879875 0.013098264 0.754288898 0.453205812 ‐0.016243788 0.036003538 ‐0.016243788 0.036003538<br />
X Variable 1 1.330815921 0.380830986 3.494505354 0.000828167 0.571272478 2.090359363 0.571272478 2.090359363<br />
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.107206197<br />
R Square 0.011493169<br />
Adjusted R Square ‐0.00555005<br />
Standard Error 0.110405008<br />
Observations 60<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.008219883 0.008219883 0.674354256 0.414900318<br />
Residual 58 0.706977413 0.012189266<br />
Total 59 0.715197296<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.013226056 0.014353948 0.921422889 0.360646624 ‐0.015506492 0.041958605 ‐0.015506492 0.041958605<br />
X Variable 1 0.480900597 0.58561375 0.821190755 0.414900318 ‐0.691332675 1.653133869 ‐0.691332675 1.653133869<br />
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.157704944<br />
R Square 0.024870849<br />
Adjusted R Square 0.003672389<br />
Standard Error 0.117688734<br />
Observations 48<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.016250102 0.016250102 1.173238502 0.284381918<br />
Residual 46 0.637129353 0.013850638<br />
Total 47 0.653379455<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.01192905 0.017009242 0.701327577 0.486631656 ‐0.022308777 0.046166877 ‐0.022308777 0.046166877<br />
X Variable 1 0.745157767 0.687947156 1.083161346 0.284381918 ‐0.639608013 2.129923547 ‐0.639608013 2.129923547<br />
178
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.068584032<br />
R Square 0.004703769<br />
Adjusted R Square ‐0.02456965<br />
Standard Error 0.106611811<br />
Observations 36<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.001826347 0.001826347 0.160683979 0.691035605<br />
Residual 34 0.386446663 0.011366078<br />
Total 35 0.38827301<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.008709792 0.017785119 0.48972359 0.627474545 ‐0.027433918 0.044853503 ‐0.027433918 0.044853503<br />
X Variable 1 0.284423217 0.709543057 0.400854062 0.691035605 ‐1.157541757 1.726388191 ‐1.157541757 1.726388191<br />
Regression Statistics<br />
Multiple R 0.045170061<br />
R Square 0.002040334<br />
Adjusted R Square ‐0.04332147<br />
Standard Error 0.11147282<br />
Observations 24<br />
ANOVA<br />
df SS MS F Significance F<br />
Regression 1 0.000558919 0.000558919 0.04497913 0.833995005<br />
Residual 22 0.27337617 0.01242619<br />
Total 23 0.27393509<br />
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%<br />
Intercept 0.013443998 0.022762152 0.590629499 0.560787828 ‐0.033761815 0.060649812 ‐0.033761815 0.060649812<br />
X Variable 1 0.176210718 0.83085798 0.212082838 0.833995005 ‐1.546883261 1.899304698 ‐1.546883261 1.899304698<br />
179
Method of Comparables<br />
P / E Trailing PPS EPS P / E Industry Average <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> Calculated PPS<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 22.79 3.11 7.33 15.80 49.12<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> (Restated) 22.79 1.41 16.16 15.80 22.27<br />
Hasbro 36.18 2.06 17.56<br />
Mattel 19.92 1.42 14.03<br />
Leapfrog 8.47 (1.55) (5.46)<br />
P / E Forward PPS EPS P / E Industry Average <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> Calculated PPS<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 22.79 4.07 5.60 13.56 55.13<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> (Restated) 22.79 1.41 16.13 13.56 28.96<br />
Hasbro 36.18 2.29 15.77<br />
Mattel 19.92 1.76 11.34<br />
Leapfrog 8.47 0.39 21.50<br />
P / B PPS BPS P / B Industry Average <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> Calculated PPS<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 22.79 24.14 0.94 2.76 66.63<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> (Restated) 22.79 21.67 1.05 2.76 59.81<br />
Hasbro 36.18 8.68 4.17<br />
Mattel 19.92 6.73 2.96<br />
Leapfrog 8.47 3.31 2.56<br />
PEG PPS P to E EGR PEG Industry Average <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> Calculated PPS<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 22.79 7.33 13.70 0.53 1.54 65.40<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> (Restated) 22.79 16.16 13.70 1.18 1.54 29.65<br />
Hasbro 36.18 17.56 10.04 1.75<br />
Mattel 19.92 14.03 10.63 1.32<br />
Leapfrog 8.47 (5.46)<br />
P / EBITDA PPS <strong>Mark</strong>et Cap Shares EBITDA P / EBITDA Industry Avg <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> Cal. PPS<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 22.79 646 28.62 128.18 5.04 7.99 35.77<br />
Hasbro 36.18 5270 145.66 682.33 7.72<br />
Mattel 19.92 6970 349.90 844.39 8.25<br />
Leapfrog 8.47 (67.15)<br />
P / FCF PPS Shares FCF FCF / Share P / FCF Industry Avg <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> Cal. PPS<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 22.79 28.62 53.94 1.88 12.09 11.22 21.14<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> (Restated) 22.79 28.62 76.06 2.66 8.58 11.22 29.82<br />
Hasbro 36.18 142.60 489.33 3.43 10.54<br />
Mattel 19.92 361.36 275.24 0.76 26.15<br />
Leapfrog 8.47 35.90 25.56 0.71 11.90<br />
EV / EBITDA PPS Shares EBITDA EV / EBITDA Industry Avg <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> Cal. PPS<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong> 22.79 28.62 128.18 5.20 7.99 35.28<br />
Hasbro 36.18 142.60 682.33 7.72<br />
Mattel 19.92 361.36 844.39 8.25<br />
Leapfrog 8.47 35.90 (67.15)<br />
180
Intrinsic <strong>Valuation</strong> Models<br />
Discounted Free Cash Flow<br />
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018<br />
CFFO 87660 123762 140718 159996 181915 206838 235175 267394 304026 345678 393036<br />
CFFI (33717) (38298) (43545) (49511) (56294) (64006) (72775) (82745) (94081) (106970) (121625)<br />
FCF 53943 85464 97173 110485 125622 142832 162400 184649 209946 238708 271411 308595<br />
PV Factor 0.883 0.780 0.689 0.609 0.538 0.475 0.420 0.371 0.328 0.289<br />
PV FCF 75498 75832 76167 76503 76841 77181 77521 77864 78208 78553<br />
PV YBY FCF 770168<br />
Terminal Value Perp 676629 2337839<br />
<strong>Mark</strong>et Value Assets 1446797<br />
Book Value Debt 291691<br />
Discounted Free Cash Flow Sensitivity Analysis<br />
MVE per Model at 12/31/07 1155106<br />
Growth Rates<br />
Divide by Shares 28624 0.00% 1.00% 2.00% 3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00%<br />
Model Share Price 40.35 10.56% 60.43 64.51 69.54 75.91 84.22 95.51 111.76<br />
11.44% 53.44 56.64 60.52 65.31 71.39 79.36 90.25<br />
WACC(BT) 13.20% 12.32% 47.54 50.08 53.11 56.79 61.36 67.17 74.83<br />
G 0.00% WACC (BT) 13.20% 42.49 44.53 46.94 49.81 53.32 57.67 63.24<br />
14.08% 38.14 39.80 41.73 44.01 46.74 50.07 54.23<br />
14.96% 34.35 35.71 37.27 39.10 41.27 43.86 47.04<br />
Time Consistent Price 42.49 15.84% 31.03 32.15 33.43 34.92 36.65 38.70 41.17<br />
Observed Share Price 22.79<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
Adj. Discounted Free Cash Flow<br />
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018<br />
CFFO 109781 148015 168293 191349 217564 247370 281259 319792 363603 413417 470055<br />
CFFI (33717) (38298) (43545) (49511) (56294) (64006) (72775) (82745) (94081) (106970) (121625)<br />
FCF 76064 109717 124748 141838 161270 183364 208485 237047 269523 306447 348431 396166<br />
PV Factor 0.885 0.783 0.693 0.613 0.543 0.480 0.425 0.376 0.333 0.295<br />
PV FCF 97094 97696 98301 98910 99523 100139 100759 101384 102012 102644<br />
PV YBY FCF 998461<br />
Terminal Value Perp 897737 3047429<br />
<strong>Mark</strong>et Value Assets 1896199<br />
Book Value Debt 291691<br />
Adjusted Discounted Free Cash Flow Sensitivity Analysis<br />
MVE per Model at 12/31/07 1604508<br />
Growth Rates<br />
Divide by Shares 28624 0.00% 1.00% 2.00% 3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00%<br />
Model Share Price 56.05 10.40% 82.40 87.88 94.67 103.30 114.62 130.14 152.71<br />
11.27% 73.25 77.54 82.77 89.26 97.53 108.44 123.49<br />
WACC(BT) 13.00% 12.13% 65.60 69.02 73.12 78.11 84.34 92.31 102.88<br />
G 0.00% WACC (BT) 13.00% 58.98 61.73 64.98 68.88 73.65 79.61 87.27<br />
13.87% 53.28 55.51 58.12 61.21 64.92 69.48 75.19<br />
14.73% 48.37 50.20 52.33 54.81 57.76 61.31 65.67<br />
Time Consistent Price 58.98 15.60% 44.02 45.53 47.27 49.28 51.64 54.45 57.84<br />
Observed Share Price 22.79<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
Residual Income Model<br />
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018<br />
Net Income 88991 116409 137072 155851 177203 201480 229082 260467 296150 336723 382854<br />
Book Value of Equity 690997 807406 944478 1100329 1277532 1479012 1708094 1968561 2264711 2601434 2984288<br />
Annual Normal Income 109178 127570 149228 173852 201850 233684 269879 311033 357824 411027<br />
Annual Residual Income 7232 9502 6624 3351 (371) (4602) (9412) (14882) (21101) (28172) (32032)<br />
PV Factor 0.864 0.746 0.644 0.556 0.480 0.415 0.358 0.309 0.267 0.231<br />
PV of Annual Residual Income 6245 7086 4265 1863 (178) (1908) (3371) (4603) (5635) (6497)<br />
PV YBY RI (2733)<br />
Terminal Value Perpetuity (46757) (202735)<br />
MVE [12/31/07] 641508<br />
Divide by Shares 28624<br />
Model Price at 12/31/07 22.41<br />
Residual Income Sensitivity Analysis<br />
Growth Rates<br />
0.00% -5.00% -10.00% -15.00% -20.00% -25.00% -30.00%<br />
12.64% 38.75 37.21 36.35 35.80 35.42 35.14 34.93<br />
13.69% 32.75 32.15 31.80 31.57 31.41 31.29 31.20<br />
Cost of Equity 15.80% Cost 14.75% 27.83 27.85 27.85 27.86 27.87 27.87 27.87<br />
G 0.00% of 15.80% 23.82 24.24 24.50 24.67 24.79 24.89 24.96<br />
Equity 16.85% 20.50 21.17 21.60 21.89 22.10 22.26 22.38<br />
17.91% 17.70 18.53 19.06 19.43 19.70 19.91 20.08<br />
Time Consistent Price 23.82 18.96% 15.37 16.28 16.88 17.30 17.62 17.86 18.05<br />
Observed Share Price 22.79<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
181
Adj. Residual Income Model<br />
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018<br />
Net Income 40444 61145 74237 84408 95972 109120 124069 141067 160393 182367 207351<br />
Book Value of Equity 620329 681474 755712 840120 936091 1045211 1169281 1310347 1470740 1653107 1860458<br />
Annual Normal Income 98012 107673 119402 132739 147902 165143 184746 207035 232377 261191<br />
Annual Residual Income (36867) (33436) (34995) (36767) (38783) (41074) (43679) (46642) (50010) (53840) (61216)<br />
PV Factor 0.864 0.746 0.644 0.556 0.480 0.415 0.358 0.309 0.267 0.231<br />
PV of Annual Residual Income (31837) (24934) (22536) (20447) (18625) (17034) (15643) (14425) (13356) (12417)<br />
PV YBY RI (191253)<br />
Terminal Value Perpetuity (89356) (387443)<br />
MVE [12/31/07] 339721<br />
Divide by Shares 28624<br />
Model Price at 12/31/07 11.87<br />
Adjusted Residual Income Sensitivity Analysis<br />
Growth Rates<br />
0.00% -5.00% -10.00% -15.00% -20.00% -25.00% -30.00%<br />
12.64% 20.61 20.66 20.68 20.70 20.71 20.72 20.73<br />
13.69% 17.40 17.83 18.08 18.24 18.35 18.44 18.50<br />
Cost of Equity 15.80% Cost 14.75% 14.76 15.43 15.82 16.09 16.27 16.41 16.52<br />
G 0.00% of 15.80% 12.62 13.41 13.90 14.23 14.47 14.65 14.79<br />
Equity 16.85% 10.84 11.70 12.25 12.62 12.89 13.09 13.26<br />
17.91% 9.35 10.23 10.80 11.19 11.49 11.71 11.89<br />
Time Consistent Price 12.62 18.96% 8.10 8.98 9.56 9.96 10.26 10.50 10.68<br />
Observed Share Price 22.79<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
Abnormal Earnings Growth<br />
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018<br />
Net Income 88991 116409 137072 155851 177203 201480 229082 260467 296150 336723 382854<br />
Annual Normal Income 103052 134802 158730 180476 205201 233313 265277 301620 342942 389925<br />
Annual AEG 2271 (2879) (3273) (3721) (4231) (4811) (5470) (6219) (7071) (8040)<br />
PV Factor 0.864 0.746 0.644 0.556 0.480 0.415 0.358 0.309 0.267<br />
PV of AEG 1961 (2147) (2108) (2069) (2032) (1995) (1959) (1923) (1888)<br />
Change in Residual Income 2271 (2879) (3273) (3721) (4231) (4811) (5470) (6219) (7071)<br />
Core Income Perpetuity 116409<br />
PV YBY RI (14161)<br />
Terminal Value Perpetuity (13590) (50886)<br />
Total Adjusted Earnings Perpetuity 88658<br />
MVE [12/31/07] 561129<br />
Divide by Shares 28624<br />
Model Price at 12/31/07 19.60<br />
Abnormal Earnings Growth Sensitivity Analysis<br />
Growth Rates<br />
0.00% -5.00% -10.00% -15.00% -20.00% -25.00% -30.00%<br />
12.64% 41.29 40.38 39.88 39.55 39.33 39.17 39.04<br />
13.69% 32.50 32.50 32.49 32.49 32.49 32.49 32.49<br />
Cost of Equity 15.80% Cost 14.75% 25.86 26.36 26.66 26.85 27.00 27.10 27.18<br />
G 0.00% of 15.80% 20.84 21.61 22.08 22.39 22.62 22.80 22.93<br />
Equity 16.85% 16.96 17.85 18.41 18.79 19.07 19.29 19.45<br />
17.91% 13.89 14.82 15.42 15.83 16.14 16.38 16.56<br />
Time Consistent Price 20.84 18.96% 11.49 12.41 13.01 13.43 13.75 13.99 14.19<br />
Observed Share Price 22.79<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
Adj. Abnormal Earnings Growth<br />
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018<br />
Net Income 40444 61145 74237 84408 95972 109120 124069 141067 160393 182367 207351<br />
Annual Normal Income 46834 70806 85967 97744 111135 126361 143672 163355 185735 211181<br />
Annual AEG 3431 (1559) (1773) (2015) (2292) (2605) (2962) (3368) (3830) (4354)<br />
PV Factor 0.864 0.746 0.644 0.556 0.480 0.415 0.358 0.309 0.267<br />
PV of AEG 2963 (1163) (1142) (1121) (1100) (1081) (1061) (1042) (1023)<br />
Change in Residual Income 3431 (1559) (1773) (2015) (2292) (2605) (2962) (3368) (3830)<br />
Core Income Perpetuity 116409<br />
PV YBY RI (5768)<br />
Terminal Value Perpetuity (7360) (27559)<br />
Total Adjusted Earnings Perpetuity 103280<br />
MVE [12/31/07] 653674<br />
Divide by Shares 28624<br />
Model Price at 12/31/07 22.84<br />
Adjusted Abnormal Earnings Growth Sensitivity Analysis<br />
Growth Rates<br />
0.00% -5.00% -10.00% -15.00% -20.00% -25.00% -30.00%<br />
12.64% 38.41 37.92 37.65 37.47 37.35 37.26 37.20<br />
13.69% 32.48 32.48 32.48 32.47 32.47 32.47 32.47<br />
Cost of Equity 15.80% Cost 14.75% 27.86 28.14 28.30 28.41 28.48 28.54 28.58<br />
G 0.00% of 15.80% 24.28 24.69 24.95 25.15 25.24 25.34 25.41<br />
Equity 16.85% 21.41 21.89 22.20 22.40 22.56 22.67 22.76<br />
17.91% 19.07 19.57 19.90 20.12 20.29 20.42 20.52<br />
Time Consistent Price 24.28 18.96% 17.17 17.67 17.99 18.22 18.39 18.53 18.63<br />
Observed Share Price 22.79<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
182
Long Run Residual Income Model<br />
BV of Equity 690997<br />
ROE 15.76% Average Forecasted ROE 15.76%<br />
Cost of Equity 15.80% Cost of Equity 15.80%<br />
Forward Earnings Growth Rate 13.70% Earnings Growth Rate 13.70%<br />
Estimated MVE 677835<br />
Number of Shares 28624<br />
Price Per Share 23.68<br />
Time Consistent Price 25.17<br />
PPS [6/1/08] 22.77<br />
Long Run Residual Sensitivity Analysis<br />
Growth Rates<br />
9.00% 10.00% 11.00% 12.00% 13.00% 14.00% 15.00%<br />
16.00% 24.85 24.97 25.15 25.41 25.86 26.82 30.18<br />
16.25% 25.74 26.01 26.40 27.00 28.02 30.18 37.72<br />
Return 16.50% 26.63 27.05 27.66 28.59 30.18 33.53 45.26<br />
on 16.75% 27.51 28.09 28.92 30.18 32.33 36.88 52.81<br />
Equity 17.00% 28.40 29.13 30.18 31.76 34.49 40.23 60.35<br />
17.25% 29.29 30.18 31.43 33.35 36.64 43.59 67.89<br />
17.50% 30.18 31.22 32.69 34.94 38.80 46.94 75.44<br />
Cost of Equity = 15.80%<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
Long Run Residual Sensitivity Analysis<br />
Growth Rates<br />
9.00% 10.00% 11.00% 12.00% 13.00% 14.00% 15.00%<br />
15.50% 25.11 25.28 25.54 25.93 26.65 28.32 36.69<br />
15.75% 24.18 24.18 24.19 24.20 24.23 24.28 24.46<br />
Cost 16.00% 23.31 23.17 22.98 22.69 22.21 21.24 18.35<br />
of 16.25% 22.51 22.25 21.89 21.36 20.50 18.88 14.68<br />
Equity 16.50% 21.76 21.39 20.89 20.17 19.04 16.99 12.23<br />
16.75% 21.06 20.60 19.98 19.11 17.77 15.45 10.48<br />
17.00% 20.40 19.86 19.15 18.15 16.66 14.16 9.17<br />
Return on Equity = 15.76%<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
Long Run Residual Sensitivity Analysis<br />
Cost of Equity<br />
15.50% 15.75% 16.00% 16.25% 16.50% 16.75% 17.00%<br />
15.50% 24.14 20.79 17.43 14.08 10.73 7.38 4.02<br />
15.75% 27.08 24.14 21.20 18.25 15.31 12.36 9.42<br />
Return 16.00% 29.39 26.76 24.14 21.52 18.89 16.27 13.64<br />
on 16.25% 31.24 28.87 26.51 24.14 21.77 19.41 17.04<br />
Equity 16.50% 32.76 30.61 28.45 26.30 24.14 21.98 19.83<br />
16.75% 34.03 32.06 30.08 28.10 26.12 24.14 22.16<br />
17.00% 35.11 33.28 31.46 29.63 27.80 25.97 24.14<br />
Growth Rate = 13.7%<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
183
Adj. Long Run Residual Income Model<br />
BV of Equity 620329<br />
ROE 16.00% Average Forecasted ROE 11.61%<br />
Cost of Equity 15.80% Cost of Equity 15.80%<br />
Forward Earnings Growth Rate 7.00% Earnings Growth Rate 13.70%<br />
Estimated MVE 634427<br />
Number of Shares 28624<br />
Price Per Share 22.16<br />
Time Consistent Price 23.56<br />
PPS [6/1/08] 22.77<br />
Long Run Residual Sensitivity Analysis<br />
Growth Rates<br />
1.00% 2.00% 3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00% 7.00%<br />
11.00% 14.64 14.13 13.54 12.86 12.04 11.06 9.85<br />
13.00% 17.57 17.27 16.93 16.53 16.05 15.48 14.78<br />
Return 15.00% 20.50 20.42 20.32 20.20 20.07 19.90 19.70<br />
on 17.00% 23.43 23.56 23.70 23.88 24.08 24.33 24.63<br />
Equity 19.00% 26.36 26.70 27.09 27.55 28.09 28.75 29.55<br />
21.00% 29.29 29.84 30.48 31.22 32.11 33.17 34.48<br />
23.00% 32.21 32.98 33.86 34.89 36.12 37.59 39.40<br />
Cost of Equity = 15.80%<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
Long Run Residual Sensitivity Analysis<br />
Growth Rates<br />
1.00% 2.00% 3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00% 7.00%<br />
9.00% 28.74 29.75 31.10 32.98 35.81 40.53 49.95<br />
10.00% 25.55 26.03 26.66 27.49 28.65 30.39 33.30<br />
Cost 11.00% 22.99 23.14 23.32 23.56 23.87 24.32 24.98<br />
of 12.00% 20.90 20.83 20.73 20.61 20.46 20.26 19.98<br />
Equity 13.00% 19.16 18.93 18.66 18.32 17.91 17.37 16.65<br />
14.00% 17.69 17.36 16.96 16.49 15.92 15.20 14.27<br />
15.00% 16.42 16.02 15.55 14.99 14.32 13.51 12.49<br />
Return on Equity = 11.61%<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
Long Run Residual Sensitivity Analysis<br />
Cost of Equity<br />
9.00% 10.00% 11.00% 12.00% 13.00% 14.00% 15.00%<br />
8.00% 25.47 29.28 33.08 36.88 40.68 44.48 48.29<br />
8.50% 23.76 27.92 32.09 36.26 40.43 44.59 48.76<br />
Return 9.00% 21.67 26.28 30.89 35.50 40.12 44.73 49.34<br />
on 9.50% 19.09 24.25 29.41 34.57 39.73 44.89 50.05<br />
Equity 10.00% 15.81 21.67 27.53 33.39 39.24 45.10 50.96<br />
10.50% 11.51 18.29 25.06 31.83 38.60 45.37 52.15<br />
11.00% 5.62 13.64 21.67 29.70 37.72 45.75 53.78<br />
Growth Rate = 13.7%<br />
Overvalued: Less Than $18.23 $18.23 < Fairly Valued < $27.35 Undervalued: Greater Than $27.35<br />
184
References<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, Inc. (2007-2003) 10-K<br />
Hasbro, Inc. (2007 – 2003) 10-Ks<br />
Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. (2007-2003) 10-K<br />
Mattel, Inc. (2007-2003) 10-K<br />
<strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, Inc. (2008 - 2002) First Quarter 10-Q<br />
Form S-SA: Registration Statement of the Securities Act of 1933 for <strong>Jakks</strong> <strong>Pacific</strong>, Inc; March 5, 2008<br />
http://www.action-figure.com<br />
http://www.businesswire.com<br />
http://www.cbdd.wsu.edu<br />
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/<br />
http://finance.yahoo.com/<br />
http://www.financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/<br />
http://www.fool.com/retirement/manageretirement/manageretirement3.htm<br />
http://www.gamerscircle.net<br />
http://goliath.ecnext.com<br />
http://www.investopedia.com/<br />
http://www.jakkspacific.com/<br />
http://www.marketresearch.com/<br />
http://www.ncosc.net/sigdocs/sig_docs/documentation/policies_procedures/<br />
http://www.playthings.com/<br />
https://www.pwc.com/extweb/service.nsf/docid/<br />
http://www.sec.gov/index.htm<br />
When Picking Stocks Is Child's Play, Wall Street Journal, Gregory Zuckerman, December 5 th , 2004.<br />
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB110219652573091174.html<br />
Foolish Forecast: JAKKS <strong>Pacific</strong> Not Toying Around, Motley Fool, Rich Duprey, April 21 st , 2008.<br />
http://www.fool.com/investing/small-cap/2008/04/21/foolish-forecast-jakks-pacific-not-toying-around.aspx<br />
Stock of the Week: JAKKS <strong>Pacific</strong>, Motley Fool, Kristin Graham, February 29 th , 2008.<br />
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2008/02/29/stock-of-the-week-jakks-pacific.aspx<br />
185
JAKKS <strong>Pacific</strong>'s Fancy Nancy Dolls, Role-Play & Accessories Appeal to Little Girls' "Inner Nancy", Wall Street Journal, May<br />
13 th , 2008.<br />
http://online.wsj.com/public/article/PR-CO-20080513-901610.html?mod=crnews<br />
How Child's Play Got a Little Cheaper, Wall Street Journal, Nicholas Casey, March 19 th , 2008.<br />
http://online.wsj.com/public/article/PR-CO-20080513-901610.html?mod=crnews<br />
“In-Process R&D: Capitalize or Expense? - An accounting roller coaster ride - Technology Information”, FindArticles.com,<br />
Alan L. Brown, March 15 th , 1999.<br />
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EKF/is_11_45/ai_54262726<br />
“Participation Slows In 401(k)-Type Plans, Study Finds”, Wall Street Journal, Jilian Mincer, May 13 th , 2008.<br />
http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20080513-710626.html<br />
186