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Complete 2008 Annual Report - Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

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Principles <strong>of</strong> Sound Central <strong>Bank</strong>ing<br />

central bank expects will happen in the economy.<br />

Transparency increases the public’s understanding<br />

<strong>of</strong> monetary policy, which in turn increases the<br />

credibility and effectiveness <strong>of</strong> monetary policy.<br />

Financial Stability — Transparency is also important<br />

in communicating the policy and actions that the<br />

central bank takes on financial stability. This is an<br />

important part <strong>of</strong> reducing the uncertainty and<br />

making the “rules <strong>of</strong> the game” clear as the central<br />

bank responds to a crisis.<br />

Another reason to ensure clear and transparent<br />

communications when policymakers take extraordinary<br />

actions to ensure financial stability is that<br />

such actions can create moral hazard. Indeed,<br />

the mere act <strong>of</strong> creating the Fed’s special lending<br />

programs over the course <strong>of</strong> the past year has created<br />

moral hazard. To the extent that market participants<br />

now feel more comfortable asking for the<br />

central bank’s support when they get into trouble,<br />

they may be inclined to take on more risk than<br />

would otherwise be prudent — thus sowing the<br />

seeds for the next crisis.<br />

Intervening too <strong>of</strong>ten or expanding too broadly the<br />

set <strong>of</strong> institutions that have access to the central<br />

bank’s credit facilities not only creates moral hazard<br />

but also distorts the market mechanism for allocating<br />

credit, thus increasing the probability and<br />

severity <strong>of</strong> a future financial crisis.<br />

Clarifying the criteria under which we will intervene<br />

in markets or extend credit, including defining<br />

what constitutes the “unusual and exigent”<br />

circumstances that form the legal basis for the<br />

Fed’s nontraditional lending, will be essential if we<br />

are to mitigate the moral hazard we have created<br />

and reduce uncertainty about future actions.<br />

Of course, announcing the central bank’s criteria<br />

in advance does not commit it to act as stated in<br />

every case, but it does raise the costs <strong>of</strong> deviating<br />

from the criteria. We should be prepared to<br />

stay the course once our policy is set and clearly<br />

communicate the lending policy and the actions<br />

we take in our capacity as lender <strong>of</strong> last resort.<br />

Ensuring the<br />

4 Independence <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Central <strong>Bank</strong><br />

The fourth principle <strong>of</strong> sound central banking is<br />

independence. A central bank’s independence<br />

has many dimensions; however, it does not mean<br />

that central bankers or other policymakers should<br />

not be accountable to the public. The importance<br />

<strong>of</strong> transparency and the communication <strong>of</strong> clearly<br />

articulated goals as guiding principles are keys to<br />

ensuring the legitimacy <strong>of</strong> our public institutions.<br />

Monetary Policy – Research has suggested that<br />

countries with more independent central banks<br />

have benefited from lower rates <strong>of</strong> inflation,<br />

on average, without sacrificing real economic<br />

growth. 11<br />

One <strong>of</strong> the primary reasons independence is so<br />

essential is that monetary policy works with long<br />

lags. So, central bankers must take a longer-term<br />

view <strong>of</strong> their policies. This need to take a long-run<br />

view is undoubtedly one <strong>of</strong> the reasons that more<br />

central banks around the world have been given<br />

greater independence from their nations’ treasury<br />

departments or finance ministries and the political<br />

process. History is replete with examples <strong>of</strong> the<br />

dangers <strong>of</strong> central banks being used as an arm <strong>of</strong> a<br />

country’s fiscal authority. The result is <strong>of</strong>ten high<br />

levels <strong>of</strong> inflation.<br />

Freeing central bankers from the short-term<br />

pressures that inevitably manifest themselves in the<br />

political arena helps monetary policymakers better<br />

balance the short- and long-term factors inherent<br />

in their decisions. This independence, though,<br />

underscores the need for accountability and,<br />

therefore, transparency, which further illustrates<br />

that these four principles are mutually reinforcing.<br />

Financial Stability – Just as we know that<br />

independence leads to more effective monetary<br />

16 <strong>2008</strong> <strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Report</strong> www.philadelphiafed.org

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