KFOR case study - Polity

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Interior forces also established a presence in the region (Bull 2008: 164-5). The paramilitaries also spied on, attacked and intimidated Mitrovica’s Albanian community, sparking sporadic violent riots by Kosovar Albanians. Concerned about the migration of Serbs from Kosovo, KFOR’s French regional command opted against confronting the paramilitaries directly, choosing to monitor their activities instead. It was not until 2002 that KFOR persuaded the Serbs to permit the opening of the bridge under international supervision and in 2003, Kosovo’s prime minister, Bajram Rexhepi, and a group of World Bank officials were attacked in northern Mitrovica, demonstrating the paramilitary’s persistence (Dziedzic 2006: 352). Matters came to a head in March 2004 when rumours that a group of Serbs had caused the deaths of three Kosovar Albanian boys led to three days of rioting and armed fighting across the province’s Serb enclaves that left nineteen civilians dead and UN property destroyed (Søbjerg 2006: 67). KFOR and the UN police were initially slow to react to the violence and outnumbered. Moreover, where peacekeepers confronted rioters they were often unsure about how to respond, allowing public order to break down almost entirely at times. Although order was restored after a few days, the rioting represented a significant setback to the peace process. In its analysis of NATO’s ‘failure to protect’ Kosovo’s civilian population during the March 2004 riots, Human Rights Watch identified six principal problems. They are worth recounting in full because they highlight some significant problems faced by peacekeepers in even well-equipped and supported peace support operations with broad public security mandates: 1. The violence took Kosovo’s security institutions by surprise and they were unprepared to deal with such large-scale and generalised violence. Although the specific crisis could not have been predicted in advance, KFOR should
have been aware of the potential flashpoints around Mitrovica and French peacekeepers in the area should have had both the plans and capability to deploy rapidly to the Mitrovica bridge in order to stem inter-communal violence. 2. KFOR and the UN police had insufficient capacity to respond effectively to the violence. As we noted earlier, by 2004 KFOR had downsized significantly and peacekeepers reported that they simply lacked the capacity to respond to violent riots erupting across the province. 3. KFOR peacekeepers were inadequately trained and equipped (shields, water cannons, protective clothing, tear gas etc.) to deal with riot situations. Most KFOR troops were trained for combat had little or no riot control experience. Many thought that riot control was a matter for the UN police, but the UN police clearly lacked the capacity to maintain order (see chapter 18). Where specialised riot control units were deployed, however, they had a dramatic and positive impact. 4. There was no coordinated response from KFOR, UN police, and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) primarily due to significant degrees of distrust between the three organizations. 5. UNMIK and KFOR themselves came under attack and were forced to divert resources to protect themselves. Among those wounded were 65 UN police officers, 58 KPS officer and 61 KFOR soldiers. More than 100 UNMIK vehicles were destroyed in the violence. 6. The Kosovo Police Service was not sufficiently trained and equipped to respond to the riots. Many officers participated in the violence and others
Page 1 and 2: KFOR in Kosovo Kosovo (1999-present
Page 3: permanently stationed KFOR forces.
Page 7 and 8: support operations, impartiality in
Page 9: O’Neill, W.G. (2002), Kosovo: An

KFOR case study - Polity

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