Machiavelli's Mistake - Santa Fe Institute

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Crowding out in a public goods game (Cardenas et al) • Subjects: rural Colombians • Public goods game with either (red) communication or (blue)fines, stage II • Top panel: deviation from selfish actions • Bottom panel: payoff sacrificed to protect the ‘forest.’ Social optimum Self regarding action Self regarding action communication fine
Fines are signals as well as incentives: Distrust (fines) by principals crowds out reciprocity by agents Investor (principal) transfers a sum to the trustee (agent). This ammount is doubled (by the experimenter). The trustee may then return (back-transfer) some to the Investor. (<strong>Fe</strong>hr Rockenbach Nature 2003)
Page 1 and 2: Machiavelli’s Mistake: Why polici
Page 3 and 4: • In some of the Haifa day care c
Page 5 and 6: A revolution in political philosoph
Page 7 and 8: Hume and Bentham: constitutions for
Page 9 and 10: • Mandeville’s conjecture: the
Page 11 and 12: Kenneth Arrow Kenneth Arrow: In the
Page 13 and 14: The word • The material interests
Page 15: Dynamic crowding out by explicit in
Page 19 and 20: Dynamic crowding out • A gift exc
Page 21 and 22: Incentives and intentions • Why d
Page 23 and 24: Machiavelli’s mistake will matter
Page 25 and 26: The news about the global village
Page 27 and 28: Conclusion • The bad news: The co
Page 29 and 30: Related papers at http://www.santaf

Machiavelli's Mistake - Santa Fe Institute

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