Machiavelli's Mistake - Santa Fe Institute

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Why separability fails: being and becoming • Framing • Information about intent, task or type • Self determination • Endogenous preferences • Exploitation aversion • These studies are surveyed in “Policies designed for self intersted citizens may compromise the ‘moral sentiments’” Bowles, Science, 2008. • A unifying thread: Economic activity is not only about getting and having things; it is also about becoming and being a particular kind of person in ones own eyes and the eyes of others.
Incentives and intentions • Why does punishment by peers in the public goods game increase contributions (Fehr- Gaechter), but punishment by “investors” in a principal agent game decrease contributions? • In the first case the punishment is altruistic, in the second it is an attempt to divert the surplus to the employer. • In the trust game (Fehr and Rochenbach) the negative effect of incentives (-38%) occured when investors demanded a back transfer that would give them most of the surplus and much less (-8%) otherwise. Fehr & Rochenbach Fehr & Gaechter
Page 1 and 2: Machiavelli’s Mistake: Why polici
Page 3 and 4: • In some of the Haifa day care c
Page 5 and 6: A revolution in political philosoph
Page 7 and 8: Hume and Bentham: constitutions for
Page 9 and 10: • Mandeville’s conjecture: the
Page 11 and 12: Kenneth Arrow Kenneth Arrow: In the
Page 13 and 14: The word • The material interests
Page 15 and 16: Dynamic crowding out by explicit in
Page 17 and 18: Fines are signals as well as incent
Page 19: Dynamic crowding out • A gift exc
Page 23 and 24: Machiavelli’s mistake will matter
Page 25 and 26: The news about the global village
Page 27 and 28: Conclusion • The bad news: The co
Page 29 and 30: Related papers at http://www.santaf

Machiavelli's Mistake - Santa Fe Institute

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