Identity-Based Encryption Protocols Using Bilinear Pairing
Identity-Based Encryption Protocols Using Bilinear Pairing
Identity-Based Encryption Protocols Using Bilinear Pairing
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
aborts if F (v ∗ ) ≠ 0 and outputs a random bit. Otherwise, S chooses a random bit γ ∈ {0, 1}<br />
and gives A the tuple C ′ = 〈Z × M γ , cP, J(v ∗ )cP 〉.<br />
If 〈P, aP, bP, cP, Z〉 given to S is a valid DBDH tuple, i.e., Z = e(P, P ) abc then C ′ is a<br />
valid encryption for M γ . Since,<br />
e(P, P ) abc = e(aP, bP ) c = e(P 1 , P 2 ) c<br />
and using F (v ∗ ) = p − mk + x + ∑ l<br />
i=1 x iv ∗ i ≡ 0 mod p we have,<br />
J(v ∗ )cP = c(y +<br />
l∑<br />
y i vi ∗ )P<br />
i=1<br />
= c((p − mk + x +<br />
l∑<br />
x i vi ∗ )P 2 + (y +<br />
i=1<br />
= c((p − mk + x)P 2 + yP +<br />
= c(U ′ +<br />
= cV<br />
l∑<br />
vi ∗ U i )<br />
i=1<br />
l∑<br />
y i vi ∗ )P )<br />
i=1<br />
l∑<br />
vi ∗ (x i P 2 + y i P ))<br />
Note<br />
∑<br />
that, this condition is satisfied as long as F (v ∗ ) ≡ 0 mod p, which holds if x +<br />
l<br />
j=1 x jvj<br />
∗ = km. Otherwise, Z is a random element of G 2 and C ′ gives no information<br />
about S’s choice of γ.<br />
Phase 2: This phase is similar to Phase 1, with the obvious restriction that A cannot ask<br />
for the private key of v ∗ . We note that the total number of key extraction queries together<br />
in Phase 1 and 2 should not exceed q.<br />
Guess: A outputs a guess γ ′ of γ. Then S outputs 1 ⊕ γ ⊕ γ ′ .<br />
Suppose the adversary has not aborted up to this point. Waters introduced a technique<br />
whereby the simulator is allowed to abort under certain condition. The simulator samples<br />
the transcript it received from the adversary during the attack phase. <strong>Based</strong> on the sample,<br />
it decides whether to abort and output a random string. The rationale for such “artificial<br />
abort” is the following: The probability of abort during the attack phase depends on the<br />
adversarial transcript and can be different for different transcripts. The purpose of artificial<br />
abort is to ensure that the simulator aborts with (almost) the same probability for all<br />
adversarial queries. This ensures that the adversary’s success is independent of whether the<br />
simulator aborts or not. The probability analysis performed by Waters in [89] requires this<br />
independence. For details of this method see [89]. Here we just note that the artificial abort<br />
stage requires an additional χ = O(ɛ −2 ln(ɛ −1 )λ −1 ln(λ −1 )) time. Further, it is independent<br />
of the parameter l which defines the generalisation over Waters [89] that we introduce here.<br />
54<br />
i=1