Volume 9, Number 1 - Space and Missile Defense Command - U.S. ...
Volume 9, Number 1 - Space and Missile Defense Command - U.S. ...
Volume 9, Number 1 - Space and Missile Defense Command - U.S. ...
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Why is this a critical task? <strong>Space</strong> is clearly a contested<br />
<strong>and</strong> congested domain. Consider these reports:<br />
• North Korea has detonated a nuclear weapon underground<br />
<strong>and</strong> is testing missiles that could someday carry nuclear warheads.<br />
Iran says their nuclear ambitions are for peaceful energy<br />
purposes, but they resist inspections to verify their claims.<br />
The electro-magnetic pulse from a nuclear warhead aboard<br />
a missile could disable our satellites along with those of<br />
our allies.<br />
• China disavowed its air force comm<strong>and</strong>er Xu Qiliang’s statement<br />
last fall that called the militarization of space a “historical<br />
inevitability.” 3 Yet, China has recently demonstrated<br />
a proven anti-satellite capability.<br />
• Aside from a direct threat from a nation-state, American onorbit<br />
technology faces threats from debris <strong>and</strong> out-of-control<br />
satellites like the defunct Russian satellite that smashed into<br />
<strong>and</strong> destroyed an Iridium satellite in February 2009.<br />
• Since the cyber domain links space assets to the ground,<br />
<strong>and</strong> because that domain inherently relies upon space assets<br />
as a component of Department of <strong>Defense</strong> networks, we<br />
must acknowledge the threat our systems, networks, <strong>and</strong><br />
forces face in this realm. Reports from the Government<br />
Accountability Office, other reports to Congress, <strong>and</strong> statements<br />
by the comm<strong>and</strong>er, U.S. Strategic Comm<strong>and</strong> assert that<br />
the country’s commercial, private <strong>and</strong> government sectors<br />
are constantly under cyber attack <strong>and</strong> the number of attacks<br />
on our networks continue to grow: from 24,097 attacks in<br />
2007 to 72,065 in 2008. 4 These attacks come “from the least<br />
sophisticated – what I would say the bored teenager – all the<br />
way up to the sophisticated nation-state, with some petty<br />
criminal elements s<strong>and</strong>wiched in between,” says Gen. Kevin<br />
Chilton, Comm<strong>and</strong>er, U.S. Strategic Comm<strong>and</strong>. 5<br />
Because of the threats to on-orbit assets <strong>and</strong> the challenges<br />
facing Army forces in D3SOE, the Chief of Staff of the Army<br />
listed this as one of the Army’s Title 10 Wargame Unified Quest<br />
2010 key tasks: “Determine how to protect or mitigate the loss<br />
of space, cyber, <strong>and</strong> network-related capabilities.” To that end,<br />
U.S. Army <strong>Space</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Missile</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> Comm<strong>and</strong>/Army Forces<br />
Strategic Comm<strong>and</strong>’s Future Warfare Center Wargames Division<br />
launched a series of events to feed into Unified Quest 2010<br />
which will be held at Carlisle Barracks this May. The results of<br />
each of these events will be published in this <strong>and</strong> future Army<br />
<strong>Space</strong> Journals. The final reports will lead to a better underst<strong>and</strong>ing<br />
of the space dependencies <strong>and</strong> vulnerabilities of strategic<br />
<strong>and</strong> tactical warfighters <strong>and</strong> will identify mitigation strategies<br />
in a denied, degraded, disrupted space operational environment<br />
to ensure delivery of critical enablers.<br />
What follows are preliminary<br />
findings from the first two events.<br />
In December 2009 the USASMDC Future Warfare Center<br />
Wargames Division met with Soldiers assigned to 4th Infantry<br />
Division <strong>and</strong> 10th Special Forces Group to gain insight into<br />
how warfighters use space. Who better to know how they <strong>and</strong><br />
their units are impacted by access, or non-access, to space-based<br />
capabilities than recently returned Soldiers who had been directly<br />
engaged in ground force missions. Not surprisingly, in this<br />
Warfighter Forum these warriors identified satellite communications<br />
<strong>and</strong> positioning, navigation <strong>and</strong> timing as their most critical<br />
space-based capabilities along with assured access to space<br />
capabilities. (Read the full report starting at page 34).<br />
The findings from the Warfighter Forum were incorporated<br />
into the most recent event this past February called the <strong>Space</strong><br />
Power Seminar Wargame on D3SOE. This seminar brought<br />
together senior FA40s; reps from the intelligence community,<br />
U.S. Army Training <strong>and</strong> Doctrine Comm<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the signal<br />
community; senior advisors; <strong>and</strong> representatives from industry.<br />
Their task was to underst<strong>and</strong> the Warfighters’ space needs,<br />
dependencies, <strong>and</strong> vulnerabilities <strong>and</strong> then identify strategies to<br />
prevent or mitigate the loss of space, Cyber or network-related<br />
capabilities. The findings <strong>and</strong> recommendations from this will<br />
be rolled into Unified Quest 2010 to be tested <strong>and</strong> validated.<br />
In his article on the 21st Century Army 6 , the Army Chief<br />
of Staff GEN George W. Casey Jr writes that l<strong>and</strong> forces need<br />
to be versatile, tailorable, networked, <strong>and</strong> trained <strong>and</strong> ready for<br />
full spectrum operations. When the Army Chief of Staff talks<br />
about versatility, he is referring to being capable of operating<br />
across the spectrum of conflict. We must ask ourselves whether<br />
our units, be they space, infantry, field artillery, etc, are versatile<br />
enough to go from extensive reliance on space capabilities to<br />
a situation where they must continue to operate in an environment<br />
where space enabled capabilities are severely degraded or<br />
do not exist. I suggest we have a long way to go.<br />
As we wait for the published results of this wargame<br />
series, members of our space community can implement at<br />
least one of the recommendations: train as we expect to fight.<br />
You can prepare your Soldiers, their units, <strong>and</strong> the ones they<br />
support to operate, survive, <strong>and</strong> win in a degraded, denied<br />
or disrupted space operational environment. To do this,<br />
<strong>Space</strong> Operations Officers <strong>and</strong> <strong>Space</strong> Enablers must underst<strong>and</strong><br />
exactly how their units rely on space. This is a critical<br />
task. Map the organization’s use of space. Less battlespace –<br />
more time required to complete mission – more uncertainty –<br />
greater casualties – more fog of war) on your unit’s ability to<br />
accomplish its mission essential tasks. The next step is to determine<br />
for each space system what the primary, alternate, contingency,<br />
<strong>and</strong> emergency backups, redundancies <strong>and</strong> pathways are<br />
<strong>and</strong> to develop solid battle drills using them which will allow<br />
Protecting <strong>Space</strong> >> page 15<br />
2010 Winter/Spring Edition Army <strong>Space</strong> Journal 9