small arms and light weapons among pastoral groups in the kenya ...

African Affairs, 106/422, 47–70
doi:10.1093/afraf/adl002
© The Author [2006]. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal African Society. All rights reserved
Advance Access Publication 28 July 2006
SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS
AMONG PASTORAL GROUPS IN THE
KENYA–UGANDA BORDER AREA
KENNEDY AGADE MKUTU
ABSTRACT
Recent decades have seen an escalation in interethnic resource conflicts
and banditry among pastoralists in the Kenya-Uganda border region,
fuelled by a growing number of small arms. State management has been
largely unsuccessful and often counterproductive in reducing numbers of
small arms. The creation of paramilitary institutions in rural Kenya and
Uganda are an example of how legal arms are entering communities and
intensifying the conflicts further. Understanding the sources and mechanisms
of arms acquisition is a significant step in curbing the violence. The
main sources and routes, and the current costs of arms and ammunition
are provided. More important however is to appreciate the complex reasons
behind the demand for small arms. Relationships with states, alienation
of pastoral land, cultural issues and questions of livelihood are all
examined, using empirical evidence collected by the author between 2001
and 2005.
IN JANUARY 2000, at the height of a drought in the Kenya–Uganda border
region, Karimojong warriors from Nakapiripirit manyatta in Uganda killed
60 Pokot pastoralists in a conflict over pasture. A total of 11 children and
16 women were killed in the battle and several more injured. The guns of
the dead and 5,000 heads of cattle were taken. 1 The incident is illustrative
of a larger trend which has seen an escalation in the numbers of light weapons
and violence in the area.
The Kenya–Uganda border is one of East Africa’s most severely affected
areas in terms of firearm-related insecurity. Over the last three decades,
small arms and light weapons (SALW) have entered the cross-border
regions in unprecedented numbers. This is evidenced in part by the frequent
reports of violent cattle-raiding activities, banditry on roads and
attacks on the Ugandan army. In Karamoja, on the Ugandan side of the
Kennedy Agade Mkutu is a former lecturer with the Kenya Institute of Administration and is
currently a consultant with Peace and Conflict Transfomation.
1. Interview with Rev. John Lodinyo, pastor of Baptist Church, Kiwawa, 31 May 2001. The
officer-in-charge of the police noted that the number of Pokot looking for pasture had
increased because of the dry spell in the district at the time.
47

48 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
border, estimates of the number of arms in circulation range from 40,000,
for a population of 950,000 men, women and children, 2 to 80,000, or even
200,000 in some media estimates. 3 To put it in another way, interviews
with the community noted ‘Out of a family of ten, which is quite typical in
pastoral areas on the border, three are often men and each is in ownership
of a small arm, with boys as young as fourteen years of age’. 4 In Kenya,
there are possibly 50,000 guns in civilian hands. 5
The region is ethnically diverse. On the Kenyan side, the 933-km
boundary traverses the homelands of the Samia, Teso, Pokot, Sabaot and
Turkana, dividing these groups from the Ugandan Karimojong (comprising
Matheniko, Bokora and Pian) and also the Upe (Ugandan Pokot),
Dodoth, Jie and mountain groups. 6 At its northernmost point, the border
adjoins Sudan. Most communities are largely nomadic and pastoral, with
cattle herding providing the main economy in this very arid region. Cattle
rustling is a traditional activity among all plains pastoralists. Historically, it
has been a method of wealth redistribution to ensure that all were fed at
times of scarcity and also a means of payment for bride price and the making
of alliances with other groups. For centuries, spears, bows and arrows
were used in raids, deaths were treated seriously and compensated with
cattle, and warriors rarely harmed women, children or the elderly. However,
the last 25 years have seen a transformation of raiding into large-scale
armed conflict, resulting in many deaths and the emergence of racketeers
and bandits. 7 Recent conflicts in the cross-border area have been characterized
by a number of worrying developments. First, there have been an
2. Mustafa Mirzeler and Crawford Young, ‘Pastoral politics in the northeast periphery in
Uganda: AK47 as change agent’, Journal of Modern African Studies 38, 3 (2000), pp. 407–30;
Action for Development of Local Communities (ADOL), ‘The Karimojong response to disarmament:
six months later’, (Unpublished report, ADOL/Pax Christi, Netherlands and
Kampala, 2002); Kennedy Mkutu, ‘Pastoralist Conflict and Small Arms: The Kenya–Uganda
border region’ (Consultancy for Saferworld, London, 2003).
3. Interview with former resident district commissioner in Kotido, 2 February 2003.
4. Interviews with victims of small arms injuries including a 15-year-old victim in Kanwata,
Karamoja, 2001–4.
5. How the figure is arrived at is unclear: see ‘Disarm them’ East African Standard (30 August 2005).
6. Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBO), ‘National Population and Housing Census’, (Government
report, Kampala, 2003).
7. For details, see David Anderson, ‘Stock theft and moral economy in colonial Kenya’,
Africa 56, 4 (1986), pp. 399–416; Richard Hogg ‘The new pastoralism: poverty and dependence
in northern Kenya’, Africa 56, 3 (1986), pp. 319–32; Kennedy Mkutu, Pastoral Conflict,
Governance and Small Arms in the North Rift, Northeast Africa (University of Bradford, Unpublished
PhD thesis, 2005); Kennedy Mkutu, ‘Pastoralist Conflict in the Horn of Africa’ [Consultancy
for African Peace Forum (APFO)/Saferworld/University of Bradford, 2001]; Derrick
Belshaw and Joshua Malinga, ‘The Kalashnikov economies of the Eastern Sahel: cumulative
or cyclical differentiation between nomadic pastoralists’ (Unpublished report, Development
Studies Association, South Bank University of East Anglia, 1999); Suzette Heald, ‘Tolerating
the intolerable: cattle raiding among the Kuria’ in G. Aijmer and J. Abbink (eds), Meanings of
Violence: A cross-cultural perspective (Berg, Oxford, 2000), pp. 101–21. Bruno Novelli, ‘Karimojong
Traditional Religion’ (Comboni Missionaries, Kampala, 1999); Augusto Pazzaglia,
The Karimojong: Some aspects (Camboni Missionaries, Bologna, 1982).

SALW AMONG PASTORAL GROUPS 49
increased number of attacks on unarmed civilians, in particular women,
elderly people and children. 8 Second, there has been a growth in the
number of raiders and in the sophistication of the arms that they carry.
The raiders often come in armies of 100–500 people, sometimes even
thousands, thereby outnumbering the security forces. 9 The area is awash
with SALW 10 which are not the cause of these conflicts but which exacerbate
interethnic tensions, intensify violence and contribute both to the
impoverishment of the regions and to wider destabilization, as arms are
dispersed to other peaceful parts of Kenya and Uganda. 11
In the recent past, political instability related to cattle raiding has been
experienced in the northern regions of Uganda and Kenya and the countries
to their north, on a massive, even devastating scale. 12 Even in the
more politically stable regions, raiding appears more virulent because of its
integration into the market economy and the influx of SALW. 13 This
strengthening of the predatory wing of the pastoral economy has posed
obvious threats to both the subsistence base and the security of local communities.
Agencies of the state (police and courts) as well as traditional
redressive procedures under the control of elders have proved ineffective in
halting the depredations of the raiders. 14
Sislin et al. note that ‘systematic, rigorous analyses of the arms acquiring
patterns of disputing ethnic groups are lacking. Mostly, this is the product
of the shortage of reliable data’. 15 Such information is vital for security and
development interventions and in turn for poverty eradication. This article
aims to contribute evidence on the transformation brought by arms to pastoral
societies by answering three questions. First, who are the actors
involved in the small arms dynamics, and why the demand for arms? Second,
what are the patterns of accumulation and flows of arms to pastoralists?
8. Kennedy Mkutu, ‘Armed Pastoralist Conflicts and Peace Building in Karamoja: The
Role of Gender’ [Consultancy for Netherlands Development Agency (SNV), Kampala,
2005].
9. Interviews in Karamoja, various sources, 2001–4.
10. ‘50,000 guns in wrong hands, says Michuki’ Daily Nation (29 August 2005).
11. Belshaw and Malinga ‘The Kalashnikov economies’.
12. Mkutu, Pastoralist Conflict, Governance and Small Arms; Anderson, ‘Stock theft’; Natalie
Gomez and Kennedy Mkutu, ‘Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Building capacity for development
in Karamoja, Uganda’ (Consultancy for SNV/Pax Christi, Kampala, 2004); Mkutu, Armed
Pastoralist Conflict . . . the Role of Gender; Ton Dietz, Pastoralists in dire straits: survival strategies
and external interventions in a semi arid region at the Kenya/Uganda border: Western Pokot,
1900–1986 (Instituut Voor Sociale Geografie, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Unpublished
PhD Thesis, 1987); National Council of Churches of Kenya/SNV/Semi-arid Rural
Development Project (SARDEP) ‘Pacifying the valley: an analysis of the Kerio valley conflict’,
(Report NCCK/SNV/SARDEP, Nairobi, 2001).
13. Heald, ‘Tolerating the intolerable’; Michael Fleisher, ‘Cattle raiding and household
demography among the Kuria of Tanzania’ Africa 69, 2 (1999), pp. 238–55.
14. Mkutu, Pastoralist Conflict, Governance and Small Arms.
15. John Sislin, John Pearson, Jocelyn Boryczka, and Jeffrey Weigand, ‘Patterns in arms
acquisitions by ethnic groups in conflict’, Security Dialogue, 29, 4 (1998), pp. 393–408.

50 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
And third, what are the current costs of SALW and ammunition in the
cross-border region?
Methodology
The article is based on research for the author’s PhD dissertation and
also contains data collected during a research consultancy. 16 Phases of
research took place every year between 2000 and 2005 in the four districts
of Karamoja region in Northern Uganda — Moroto, Nakapiripirit, Kotido
and Kaabong (newly created) — and West Pokot (in Kenya).
Work on pastoral armed conflict and arms patterns in the pastoral areas
is complex. The instruments used included observation, in-depth interviews,
case histories located with the use of snowballing, focus group discussions
(FGDs), structured questionnaires and acquisition of public health data.
Observation was used in most areas to verify information on arms movements
and acquisition. While driving, young boys were seen carrying arms,
even while grazing their herds. The author was able to attend some of the
security meetings and peace meetings, which the warriors attended with
their arms.
More than 300 in-depth interviews were conducted with key informants
thought to be knowledgeable and involved in pastoral conflict and the diffusion
of small arms, including MPs, district officers, district commissioners
in Kenya and their equivalent in Uganda, resident district
commissioners, chief administrative officers, local council leaders, local
council members (at district, sub-county and other levels), security personnel,
militia members, cattle traders, businessmen, racketeers, former
raiders, diviners, elders, religious leaders, NGO workers, doctors, nurses,
counsellors and some widows and married and unmarried girls including
local brewers and businesswomen. Sometimes, I would randomly interview
any adult in the village. 17 Individual case histories were obtained in a
large number of villages and towns. 18
Around 26 FGDs were held with warriors, shepherds, Kenya police
reservists (KPRs)/home guards, women’s groups, elders, and chiefs with
their assistants in Moroto, Nakapiripirit, Kotido and Kaabong districts in
Uganda and West Pokot District of Kenya. A structured open questionnaire
was given between 2001 and 2003 to all administrative officers
16. Mkutu, Pastoralist Conflict, Governance and Small Arms; Mkutu, ‘Armed Pastoralist
Conflict’.
17. For example, the first time I interviewed the Honorable David Pulkol, the former external
security officer for Uganda in 2001, he was on a campaign trail.
18. Kotido, Panyangara, Nakapelimoru, Kachire, Moroto, Loputuku, Lokitelekapes,
Lokitelebu, Kalapata, Losilang, Kanwat Iriri, Namalu, Kangole, Nakiloro, Amudat, Karita,
Kotido, Rupa, Musasia and Kampala in Uganda and Kapenguria, Kachiliba, Alale,
Nauypong, Kiwawa and Kunyao in Kenya.

SALW AMONG PASTORAL GROUPS 51
undergoing the advanced public administration six-month course at the
Kenya Institute of Administration (KIA), to be completed by officers in
their own time. 19 From a total of 200 administrative officers, 180 were
completed; not all the officers are based in the field, and their comments
were excluded. 20 The Kenya National Archives (KNA) provided information
on the background of the problem and the social structure of the communities.
They also provided data on colonial policies towards cattle raids.
Prominent authors in the area were also contacted 21 and NGO reports and
books consulted. 22
Sources of arms
Data revealed that firearms in the area date at least to the colonial era
when small numbers entered Turkana in exchange for ivory. 23 European
explorers and colonial agents used guns and trained soldiers and frequently
stole from the Turkana, which incited further acquisition for selfpreservation
and raiding of other communities to replenish their stock. 24
Arms originally introduced to protect the colonial regimes found their
way into Turkana hands. The Italo-Abyssinian war was a later source.
Like Turkana, Karamoja traded ivory for arms and by 1910 was exporting
arms and ammunition to other parts of Uganda. 25 From the early
1950s onwards, the Karimojong were frequently raided by the Turkana,
Toposa and Didinga (the last two from Sudan). The state’s failure to
provide security provided an incentive to the Karimojong to acquire
more guns. 26 At this point, the state attempted to curb production, disarm
and ‘modernize’ the Karimojong. In Bokora county in 1973, a
number of Karimojong were murdered in one such clampdown. 27
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, arms were used as a tool of superpower
diplomacy, especially in the Horn, and more weapons diffused through
19. KIA is the senior institution for training upper level policy makers in Kenya. I worked
there from 1997 to 2005 (colleagues administered the questionnaire whilst I was on
sabbatical).
20. This consisted of officers based in finance, home affairs, transport, the judiciary and foreign
affairs.
21. Communications with Philip Gulliver, Ton Dietz, Michael Bollig, Ben Knighton and
John Lamphear.
22. Interviews in Karamoja, 2001–4.
23. Kenya National Archive, Turkana history, Turkana political records, miscellaneous,
1921–45 TURK 159, DC/TURK3/1, p. 90.
24. Awoundo Odegi, Life in the Balance: Ecological sociology of Turkana nomads (ACTS,
Nairobi, 1990); James Barber, Imperial Frontier (East African Publishing House, Nairobi,
1968), pp. 91–106; Augusto Pazzaglia, The Karimojong.
25. Barber, Imperial Frontier.
26. Interview with Ael Ark Lodou, Member of Parliament for Dodoth in Moroto, Uganda,
12 November 2004.
27. Interview with James Chere, former raider and Chief of Rupa in Moroto, 3 January
2003 and October 2004.

52 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
the region. 28 Arms’ supplies were augmented again when Idi Amin was
overthrown in April 1979, and the Matheniko Karimojong broke into the
Moroto barracks and looted guns that had been left behind by the
retreating regime. 29 A further process of acquisition of SALW occurred
in 1986 when hordes of Karimojong warriors were recruited into the
Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) to fight for the failing Obote
II regime. When the National Resistance Army defeated the UNLA in
1986, the demobilized Karimojong soldiers fled with all their arms back
to Karamoja. 30 With the fall of the regime, militias set up by Obote II
to protect the Iteso from Karimojong raiding were also disbanded, and
the result was widespread Karimojong raids that left the area virtually
without livestock. Cattle rustling reached heights never seen before in the
history of the region. 31
Turning to the contemporary scene, many actors are currently involved
in the movement, sale and acquisition of arms; the process is a complex
web to disentangle. Guns arrive illegally from outside the country via rebel
groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Allied Defence Force
or Toposa Militia from Sudan. Indisciplined government soldiers and also
deserting Local Defence Unit (LDU) personnel have sold arms to
Karamoja; Karimojong returning from the Democratic Republic of Congo
have also run gun rackets. 32 Arms may be carried by long-distance traders
who barter with cattle, cash or electronic items, and their diffusion may be
facilitated by powerful local figures, racketeers and pastoralist warriors. 33
Cappon notes from his research in Baringo, Kenya, that ‘The political,
economic and cultural dynamics are being manipulated by certain local
elders, regional traders and politicians, who make use of the communities’
armed youth, and the police reservists to enrich themselves’. 34 Pastoralists
may also acquire arms through raids and attacks and even have gun-making
skills. Pastoralist women may also be involved in buying arms and have a
particular role in ammunition trading and trafficking (discussed later). In
the ethnic clashes of 1992 in Western Kenya and other parts, there was
28. Samuel Makinda, ‘Conflict and superpower in the Horn of Africa’, Third World Quarterly,
4, 1 (1982), pp. 93–103; For analysis of countries supplying arms to the Horn of Africa
during the cold war, see also Jeffrey Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn: U.S. security policy in Ethiopia
and Somalia 1953–1991 (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1991).
29. Interviews with eyewitnesses and others in Karamoja, 2001–4.
30. Interviews in Panyangara, Kotido, Moroto and Namalu, 2001–4.
31. Charles Ocan, ‘Pastoral crisis in Northern Uganda: the changing significance of cattle
raids’, (Report, Centre for Basic Research, Kampala, 1992).
32. Interviews 2001–4. I did meet some young men who had fought in DRC but were now
jobless and originated from the Karimojong area.
33. Ibid.
34. Jan Cappon, ‘Why do communities want arms? Controlling the demand for small arms,
the search for strategies in the Horn of Africa and in the Balkans’, (Report, The Hague/Pax
Christi, Netherlands, 2003). There is increasing evidence of racketeers, but more work needs
to be done on this secretive area. Some evidence exists in Kennedy Mkutu, Guns and Governance:
Pastoralist conflict and small arms in the North Rift (James Currey, Oxford, forthcoming).

SALW AMONG PASTORAL GROUPS 53
evidence that some communities may have been armed by the state. 35 In
the last 15 years, Kenya has also experienced flows of arms mainly from
the countries in conflict in the Horn, which border the pastoral areas. 36
Insecurity has triggered further arming of communities, sometimes with
official support or complicity.
Arms may also originate from legal sources, such as official security
forces and militias armed for the defence of the community. Security in
these regions is characterized by quasi-formal security arrangements, such
as vigilantes, 37 Anti Stock Theft Units, LDUs and militias in Uganda, and
by police reservists on the Kenyan side. In Uganda, several armed groups,
both legal and illegal, are in operation. In 1992, as security conditions in
Karamoja continued to deteriorate, Moroto District Council decided to
take matters into its own hands, organizing a local community security
force recruited from among the armed warriors, with the responsibility of
tracking raided cattle, answering alarms and securing roads. Members of
this force came to be known as ‘The Vigilantes’. Initially, they were supported
by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and churches, and
President Museveni gave his support, putting them under the authority of
the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF). 38
In 1995, the Uganda government expanded the concept, and gun
owners were told to register their weapons and become part of an increased
vigilante force. Recruits grew from ten to 1000 for each of the eight counties
trained and equipped by the government and under the command of
the national army. 39 In return, the government undertook to give each vigilante
10,000 Ugandan shillings (UgSh) ($6.50) each month. More
recently, the amount has been increased to 30,000 ($19.50). 40 Initially,
there was success in reducing the levels of insecurity, thereby gaining community
support. By the end of 1993, raiding and road thuggery were
reduced to isolated petty criminal activities involving a few people. Armed
criminals, once arrested, were prosecuted and their guns confiscated.
Raided cattle, looted property and sometimes even money were recovered
by vigilantes and returned to their rightful owners. 41 Unlike the official
35. National Assembly of Kenya, Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee to Investigate
Ethnic Clashes in Western and Other Parts of Kenya, (National Assembly, Nairobi, Government
Press, 1992).
36. Mkutu, Pastoralist Conflict and Small Arms.
37. The term vigilante here refers to a self-appointed body of citizens organized to maintain
order in their local community. For more on vigilantes, see Les Johnston, ‘What is vigilantism?’
British Journal of Criminology 36, 2 (1996), pp. 220–36. For the metamorphosis of vigilante in
Karamoja region and its current status, see Mkutu, Pastoral Conflict, Governance and Small Arms.
38. Interviews with Father John Bosco in Amudat, and others, 2001–4.
39. Interviews in Karamoja, 2001–4.
40. Interviews in Karamoja, November 2004. By the end of 1995, the Ugandan government
was spending over 60 million UgSh per month to pay vigilante in Karamoja alone. See
‘Government spends Sh.60m on Karamoja vigilantes’, Daily Monitor, 9 October 1995.
41. Gomes and Mkutu, ‘Breaking the Cycle of Violence’.

54 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
security forces, which robbed the locals of their cattle and were corrupt,
one feature that distinguished the original vigilantes was that they were not
influenced by corruption.
There were questions of who should have control of such a paramilitary
group, particularly with regard to finances. Interviews with the vigilante
noted that for months they were not paid, such that, with their families
starving, many deserted and reverted to warriorhood, cattle rustling and
banditry. Locals noted that the security situation was now worse, because
the deserting warriors were now better trained and were able to train others:
In 1997 people were paraded in their counties and they were being paid. However the
management deteriorated and they allowed these people (the vigilantes) to operate
illegally. It became a channel of settling personal scores. The police then demanded to
handle the money so in 1998 their money was taken back to the police. The police at
some point said the money was being misappropriated so it went back to the army.
The same thing happened with the army and the issue with the money has never been
sorted out to date. To me, what killed them was corruption. If they are taken care of
well, they should do a better job than the military. 42
‘The Vigilantes’ were entirely a Karamoja creation. Thus, districts ravaged
by cattle rustling, which neighboured Karamoja, demanded the creation of
a more cosmopolitan paramilitary unit that would extend to them. With
the start of the disarmament in 2001, LDUs were recruited; some of which
came from the vigilante groups and some from the karachunas (warriors). 43
But the conditions for those recruited did not improve. With the initial
understanding that they would reside in the community and be able to protect
their own cattle and people and with money to feed their own families,
they were disappointed to discover that they would often be used away
from home, residing in barracks and fighting the LRA in the north. A resident
district commissioner noted:
Since mid 2002, LDUs became discounted because of poor conditions of service.
The army misunderstood the presidential directive of recruiting and using the
LDUs as a reserve force, but now they are used as regular army and taken to fight
Kony with very little pay and work as slaves, so most of them have ended deserting
with their guns. 44
There were other reasons why the LDUs worsened the SALW problem.
Their creation was not imbedded in law, and it was unclear to whom they
were answerable. The police, the military and the elders were all able to
give commands. One must understand that, within their own communities,
these men had been used to prompt reaction, not to wait for orders
from a distant chain of command to which they felt little allegiance. Therefore,
42. Interview, name withheld, in Kampala, 17 May 2003.
43. Interviews in Karamoja, 2001–4.
44. Interview with resident district commissioner, name withheld, in Karamoja, 2004.

SALW AMONG PASTORAL GROUPS 55
they often used their guns in their own battles, not only to protect but also
to raid and sell arms and ammunition. 45
Teso and Lango have created their own vigilantes to defend themselves
against the Karimojong. These are known as Arrow boys and Amuka boys.
On 22 March 2000, an assortment of weapons was given by the government
to the people (youth) of Teso District to defend themselves against
Karimojong raiders. 46 It was also reported that each district had been
required to provide 700 youths for training by the army. At a workshop
held in Uganda, one participant commented: ‘When there is trouble the
government will come with guns and distribute them, also, government
administration and chiefs are involved, it is well known some get 10 per
cent of the loot, and so will not expose the culprits no matter how much
the community identifies them’. 47 In November 2004, a Karimojong
elder claimed that they were fearful of these vigilante groups, because
the government was planning to use them disguised as UPDF to disarm
the Karimojong. This caused a reactionary increase in small arms in
Karamoja. 48
There are other examples of the government arming warriors. After the
failed first disarmament 2001–3, 49 insecurity escalated as the Pian found
themselves victims. The Uganda government responded by re-arming the
Pian home guards. Interviews noted that nearly 650 guns were handed out.
This was done for the purpose of building confidence among the Pian
home guards who were considered vulnerable to attacks from neighbouring
ethnic groups. This is a worrying scenario given that the purpose of disarmament
was to remove the weapons from the society. Arming one
community triggers others to demand arms from the state and leads to
more diffusion and weaponization of the communities. Furthermore, any
arms collected should have been destroyed to avoid the same arms returning
to the community.
On the Kenyan side of the border, the government has provided arms to
the KPRs who are under the control of the police and district commissioners.
The KPRs were established in 1948 to augment the activities of the
regular police force and in pastoral areas of Kenya, and the force has been
45. Mkutu, Pastoral Conflict, Governance and Small Arms (chapter 4).
46. The Monitor, 22 March 2000.
47. Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (IBAR) and Organisation of African Unity
(OAU) pastoral community harmonization meeting held at Mount Elgon Hotel, Mbale,
Uganda, May 2001.
48. These were recognized by their language especially in Bokora: interviews in Lotome,
November 2004.
49. For more on the disarmaments, see Mkutu, ‘Guns and Governance’; Kennedy Mkutu,
‘Pastoralist conflict and small arms: the challenges of small arms and insecurity and attempts
at management in Karamoja, Uganda’ (Paper presented at the Northeast Africa Seminar,
Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology, University of Oxford, 30 January 2004); From
2004 to January 2006, 1,068 arms have been recovered forcibly and voluntarily in the four
districts of Karamoja. See Daily Monitor, 9 January 2006.

56 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
a key element in the fight against insecurity. Nearly 2,000 of these are in
the North Rift and the North Eastern Province. They tackle insurgents and
cattle rustlers from the neighbouring countries. KPRs are hired on a voluntary
basis with no allowances or benefits. They are given only minimal
training, but nonetheless, in pastoral areas, they are supplied with arms
and ammunition by the authorities. In the Laws of Kenya Cap.14, section
5 (1), it is stated that a licensed officer should issue all firearms, but in practice,
reservists simply obtain their firearms from the senior police officer in
the district. 50
KPRs appear to retain significant community support, being a visible
community security force. The system allows the local elders to use ameto
(traditional punishment in Karimojong through whipping and fines) and
lapai (compensation) in Pokot to punish villagers who have transgressed
the law without handing them to the mistrusted modern judiciary system.
They have good local knowledge of the areas in which they are operating,
which helps them to predict when and where raids will take place, and the
ability to navigate and traverse the difficult terrain. They are well motivated,
because they are protecting their own cattle and communities. 51
However, it emerged that it is easy for them to be compromised: guns
issued to the reservists are frequently hired out or used in banditry and
raiding. This subsequently undermines the security they are supposed to
protect and creates instability, dissuading investment and development.
In 2003, because of the corruption and misuse of the arms under their
custody, 600 KPRs were disarmed in Tana River, and in most urban areas
of Kenya, they were disbanded as of 18 April 2004. Among the reasons
given was that officers had become a threat to the national security instead
of defending it. In some areas, the officers commanding police divisions
did not know the number of men they had, even though they were issued
with firearms, ammunition and walkie-talkies. 52 One key advantage of
groups like KPR is the cost savings of using unpaid local people. Although
a cheap option for the exchequer, in the long run, they may be costly for
the country. However, they have shown their worth as an effective early
warning mechanism, which could be utilized.
Arms are also acquired through attacking enemies. Pastoralists capture
weapons from military forces, particularly the UPDF. Examples of this are
numerous. A UPDF soldier in Namalu noted, ‘The warriors just attack
any UPDF on patrol and take their AK47, the warriors have instituted the
AK47 as their official fighting weapons’. 53 In Namalu in January 2003, the
50. Confirmed by interviews in Karamoja, 2001–4.
51. Interviews in kraals in Karamoja, 2003–4.
52. ‘Protests as state disarms homeguards over clashes’, Daily Nation, 29 November 2004;
‘Police reserves were a threat to security’, Kenya Times, 21 April 2004; ‘Kenya Police reserve
force is disbanded,’ Daily Nation, 10 April 2004.
53. Interview with UPDF soldier in Namalu, 28 January 2003.

SALW AMONG PASTORAL GROUPS 57
Upe Pokot assisted by their Kenyan Pokot cousins raided a newly created
Pian settlement, which hosted some cows from Pian relatives in Nabilatuk.
They came at around 11 p.m., took 600 cows and killed two karachunas
(warriors) and two shepherd boys. 54 Apparently, this was a revenge raid
after Pian from Nabilatuk had raided Pokot kraals in Achorichor a month
before, taking an estimated 60–200 cows. To follow up the January
revenge raid, a group of UPDF, LDUs and elders from Namalu tracked
the footmarks to Karita in Upe Pokot, planning to recover the cattle. On
the way, a Pian emuron (diviner) foresaw problems and the elders did not
continue. Meanwhile, an Upe Pokot diviner had also foreseen the situation
and informed the Pokot warriors. The Pokot then combined with the
Pokot LDU and ambushed the recovery party on their journey killing an
estimated 60–72 soldiers, confirmed by interviews with medical practitioners
at Amudat. 55 A Catholic father interviewed confirmed the incident and
argued that ‘Out of 120 soldiers, 72 were killed and this meant that the
warriors are now 72 guns richer’. 56 In another example, from Nyaupong, a
border town, the UPDF were pursuing the Kenyan Pokot for carrying
arms into Uganda. Once over the border, the Pokot acquired reinforcements,
and the two sides exchanged fire for nearly three hours. The UPDF
lost 28 personnel, and reliable local sources revealed that a good number of
arms were captured. 57 The author had the opportunity to visit the site a
few days later and collected 20 empty cartridges as evidence. A karachuna
interviewed in Kangole said ‘We get some guns in raiding. The people
killed are sources of guns to raiders’. 58 A shuffling of arms back and forth
between ethnic groups was noted by an elder: ‘As you raid lives are taken,
the number of guns in the areas is reduced because of the several deaths. But
in the raiding county, the arms are increased hence the rotating of arms’. 59
Routes of arms acquisition
Figure 1 shows the routes used by arms traders to move small arms into
the Kenya–Uganda border area; information was obtained through interviews
of provincial administrators and community members, including
warriors, elders, racketeers and businessmen. The routes used are not fixed
54. Interviews in Namalu, January 2004. The author personally visited the kraal where
the animals were raided and witnessed the graves of the children who had been killed in the
crossfire.
55. Interview with Amudat hospital personnel, January 2003; interviews with several members
of the Karimojong and Upe Pokot community concurred in 2004.
56. Interview with Roman Catholic Father in Karamoja, name withheld, Karamoja 2004.
57. Interviews with elders in Alale, Kenya, August 2002, and visit to the scene. This was not
reported in any press.
58. Interview with karachunas in Kangole, July 2001; interviews in Musasia, Nakaplimoru
and Pangayangara in September–November, 2004, confirmed this.
59. Interview with elder Koritantoyo in Nakiliro, 2 February 2003.

58 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Figure 1. Routes of arms’ flows on the Kenya–Uganda border
[Source: Mkutu (2003, 2005); field interviews 2001–5]
but may be variable with circumstances and the level of official security.
This is particularly the case on the Kenyan side, where the security forces
regularly mount checkpoints on routes and patrol randomly. Any sale of
arms by soldiers on the Kenyan side is subject to heavy punishment,
including dismissal. In Uganda, since the launch of the third phase of disarmament
in Uganda 2004, the government has become stricter with the
conduct of security, but because of lack of resources, the routes have
become more established. 60
60. Interview in Karamoja, November 2004.

SALW AMONG PASTORAL GROUPS 59
There are four main routes for the movement of small arms into the border
area. The first and the most commonly used route is into Karamoja from
Sudan. The second is the Karenga–Lopoch–Kotido route which is a tributary
from the first route, supplying Karamoja via the Jie peoples. The
Acholi–Jie route is a new emerging source to the Jie and is considered in
the same section. The third route considered is the route from Sudan into
Lokichogio in Kenya. The fourth route is the ‘north-eastern route’ into
Kenya from Somalia. There used to be a route originating in Ethiopia and
connecting to Uganda via Sudan, but the eviction of the Sudan People’s
Liberation Army (SPLA) from Ethiopia led to its decline.
Large quantities of small arms are brought across the Sudan border from
Namule and Kopeta directly into Kotido town and surrounding villages.
From there, some are taken on to Pokot and Samburu areas in Kenya.
Others are taken on to Moroto and Nakapiripirit districts in Uganda.
Interviews indicated that businessmen were involved in transporting arms
and miraa (khat) from Kotido district in Uganda to Kachiliba town, West
Pokot district, in Kenya. 61 Evidence from interviews with Sudanese refugees
and high-placed sources have revealed that, during 1993–4, the SPLA
laid off several hundred officers, giving them varying quantities of small
arms as a kind of retirement package. The officers sold many of these to
sustain themselves at gun markets on the Ugandan side of the border. The
practice continues today:
[The] SPLA come in to Uganda with donkey loads of ammunition and guns and they
exchange them for grain and livestock. Livestock captured with the use of arms are
sold or exchanged for arms, which actually increases the quantities of small arms in
the hands of traders/warlords or warriors. The arms are then traded for more cattle.
The SPLA army needs food, and that is how they are getting part of their food. 62
When interviewed, the SPLA personnel denied trading arms for food or
cattle, arguing that they have no link to the arms traders moving into
Uganda. 63 With the comprehensive peace agreement signed recently
between the SPLA and the government of Sudan, this route may be coming
to a close; although without investment in security and development,
people would be looking for ways to capitalize on the huge number of arms
still in the war-torn pastoral areas, and the arms flow may continue.
The Karenga–Lopoch–Kotido route is a tributary from the above and
a major route to the Jie who are believed to then sell them to the other
Karimojong ethnic groups. 64 Interviews in Jie revealed other sources to the
61. Interviews in Karamoja, Uganda and in West Pokot, Kenya, 2001–4, and phone and
e-mail communications, 2005. In Namalu and Kangole in Karamoja, warriors could be seen
chewing miraa (Khat).
62. Interview with a SPLA soldier, name withheld, Moroto, 20 June 2001.
63. Ibid.
64. Interview with James Chere, former raider and now chief of Rupa in Rupa, 2003 and 2004.

60 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Jie, including those from Didinga in Sudan and near Kidepo on the Sudan
border. There is also a route from Sudan through Labalangit, in Dodoth.
In 1995, it was reported that there were six major small arms markets
along the Sudan–Uganda border, including those at Lobolanget, Kapedo,
Kathile, Kangole, Moroto and lastly Karenga, which is a major open market
for small arms. 65 Small arms continue to be shuttled between such
markets, although markets are often closed by security clampdowns. 66
Field interviews in september 2004 noted that a new source of arms was
Acholi through Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army. Interviews
informed the author that LRA rebels, often deserting, sell the guns to the
Jie kraal leaders and karachunas stationed in Acholi during dry seasons. 67
Also, it was noted that rusty arms are coming in from this source, suggesting
that these are arms buried during past wars, which are now being
recovered and sold on as opportunities for sale open up. 68
Evidence from the field indicated that, from the same route, after arms
have reached the Dodoth and Jie, they percolate to other Karamoja areas,
such as Pian and Matheniko. Interviews also indicated that the source of
arms to the Turkana is the Jie who are their cousins.
The north-eastern route begins in Somalia, moving through the Merille
area in Ethiopia and then onto the Karamoja region in Uganda. From there,
small arms move through Upe Pokot areas in Uganda and across the border
into Turkana and Pokot areas on the Kenyan side. This route is very costly,
because the arms have to pass through a series of brokers over a long distance.
For this reason, relatively few arms currently come through this route. In
addition, the trademark gun of the Karimojong as noted early is now the
AK47, whereas the guns that come through this route are G3 rifles, considered
outdated. However, if the Sudan–Karamoja route was to be more effectively
policed, the north-eastern route could quickly become more important.
Somalis are very influential in the Kenya–Uganda border area. Their involvement
in the small arms trade may also be facilitated by the fact that they operate
the main bus transport system from Sudan to Uganda and also that they
control the mining of marble in Rupa areas. 69 One respondent asserted:
The best arms smugglers are Somali, they carry guns on donkeys and they exchange them
for oxen. They do not follow roads. They take miraa (khat) to Kachiliba in Kenya, Iriri,
Karenga, Namulu in Uganda; sometimes they transport the guns in miraa. 70
65. ADOL ‘Arms trafficking in the border regions of Sudan, Uganda and Kenya’ (Unpublished
report ADOL, Kampala, 2001), pp. 202–10.
66. Interview with elder in Moroto, 20 June 2001.
67. In the field in October 2004, reliable sources in Karamoja indicated that Kony was spotted
in Lira. Interviews in Kotido with various people, including Local Council Fives, and in
Kanawat, February 2003, also confirmed Kony as a source of weapons to pastoralists.
68. Interviews in Losilang and Kachile, Jie, October–November 2004.
69. Interviews with Somali businessmen who own mines in Karamoja, 2003–4; interviews in
Moroto, Nikloro and Namalu and visits to mining areas.
70. Interviews in Namalu and Mbale, name withheld, 20 June 2001.

SALW AMONG PASTORAL GROUPS 61
There appears to be a growing trend for the chewing of miraa by young
warriors 71 in many small towns in border areas, a habit that has spread from
Somalis. Miraa grows wild on Mount Kadama and Mount Napa in Iriri,
Uganda. Evidence suggests that it is one of the best miraa in the region and
that the harvesters are Somali. This trend then facilitates the small arms
trade. Traders from Sudan sometimes pass through Turkana villages in
Kenya and sell small arms to them directly. Turkana traders then often take
the arms into Upe Pokot areas in Karamoja region in Uganda for sale. From
there, arms may once again be taken back across the border and re-sold in
Kenya. Because of the rivalry between the Turkana and the Samburu, most
arms that reach the latter come directly from Sudan to Lokichogio.
Some characteristics of the demand for and use of small arms
Close examination of the demand for arms reveals a complex interplay of
environmental, cultural, historical and governance issues. Remoteness and
environmental scarcity have contributed to the difficulties of pastoral peoples
and their dependence upon a mobile, cattle-rearing lifestyle and to
marginalization, underdevelopment and insecurity. In former times, pastoralists
had coping mechanisms for times of extreme scarcity, which
included mobility into other areas, alliances and agreements with other
groups, and raiding. Raiding was usually small-scale and did not involve
modern weapons, and cattle circulated between groups in the area. 72 However,
colonial and postcolonial governments have gazetted large tracts of
pastoral land such that pastoralists compete for increasingly small areas of
pasture and scarce sources of water. From the 1950s, both the Kenyan and
Ugandan governments sought to introduce private land tenure, which discriminated
against non-settled peoples who were not adapted to owning
land. Pressure on land and other resources has increased since independence,
partly because of the regularity and severity of droughts. From 1999
to 2000, drought affected West Pokot, and severe drought affected
Karamoja in 2003. Raids escalated as a result. 73 From 2005 to 2006, West
Pokot was again facing severe droughts, and the pastoralists have moved
across the border to Uganda. 74 To date, pastoral land in Nakapiripirit in
Karamoja is still under threat, having been offered to private investors
for agriculture and ranching. This land is vital to pastoralists in times of
drought, and the issue has led to arming by the Karimojong. 75 Karamoja is
71. Observed in Namalu and Kangole in Uganda and in Alale in Kenya.
72. Sandra Gray, ‘A memory of loss: ecological politics, local history, and the evolution of
Karimojong violence’, Human Organization 59, 4 (2000), pp. 401–18.
73. Mkutu, ‘Pastoralist Conflict and Small Arms’, p. 11.
74. Father Joachim Omolo Ouko, ‘Clearly famine caught govt napping’, Kenya Times,
5 January 2006 (5 January
2006).

62 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
also an area of interest for private mining companies, of which there
are now six, all of them foreign. This is a major source of conflict between
the pastoralists and the government and has increased the acquisition of
weapons. 76
Pastoralist internal political organization promotes bravery and, if necessary,
violence — for example, for the ascension of young men through the
age-set system from shepherd boys to warriors. Bridewealth is another
major factor with prices ranging from 20 heads of cattle in West Pokot up
to 160 in Jie. High prices are maintained partly by the need to replenish
cattle lost to raiding. In the past when pastoral societies were more prosperous,
parents would provide the cattle for their sons when they marry,
but now young men need to arm themselves and raid. 77
The minister for Karamoja noted ‘Guns are an economic investment
and a convertible currency’. 78 A Catholic father concurred: ‘The people
have come to depend on it as their source of livelihood’. 79 The introduction
of arms into the pastoral areas has allowed influential businessmen or
elders to gain control of the cattle raiding equation, sell cattle out of the
district and thus impoverish the region. Arms are then necessary to enable
one to have a livelihood working for a racketeer.
Marginalization and insecurity
District officers surveyed in Kenya stated that pastoralists mainly
demand arms for protection of animals and people from attacks by neighbouring
groups. A few respondents mentioned the inability of the government
to adequately protect the people, in a situation of porous
international borders through which small arms are flowing, such that
there is a localized inter-communal arms race. 80
Pastoral areas have historically been the victims of marginalization
(political, economic and social isolation), with the absence of effective
governance or, in some places, with the total absence of government and
judicial systems. 81 Colonial governments often appeared to be seeking
not just to end cattle raiding but pastoralism itself, on the grounds that it
was a backward way of life. This contributed to a process of growing
75. Interviews in Nakapiripirit, Moroto and Nikoloro and observation, 2003.
76. Riamiriam, ‘The policy advocacy role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Karamoja:
The challenges and successes’ (Unpublished report, Riamiriam, Moroto, 2005).
77. Mkutu, ‘Pastoralist Conflict and Small Arms’, pp. 17–18; for numbers of cows paid for
brides, see Mkutu, ‘Pastoralist Conflict, Governance and Small Arms’, p. 167; ADOL, ‘Karamoja
response to disarmament’.
78. Interview with Peter Lokeris, Minister for Karamoja, in Kampala, January 2003.
79. Interview with Father John Bosco who is a victim of a gunshot in the knee, St Joseph’s
Mission, Amudat, 28 January 2004.
80. Interviews in Karamoja and West Pokot in Kenya, 2001–4.
81. Interviews, visits and observations.

SALW AMONG PASTORAL GROUPS 63
marginalization. In 1945, the district commissioner for West Suk 82 noted
that:
West Suk, after (I think) 34 years administration, ranks as one of the most backward
districts in Kenya . . . This lag is attributable solely to the fact that geographically they
are, so to speak, on the edge of the world and West Suk has come to be regarded as a
Cinderella district where nothing much happens and to which no great attention need
to be given so long as they behave themselves. This is in consonance with the policy
which appears to have been adopted by Government, possibly without fully appreciating
the implications, viz. ‘To him that hath shall be given’ . . . thereby ever widening
the gap between the ‘advanced’ and the ‘backward’ areas. 83
It must be said that not much appears to have changed in West Suk (West
Pokot) in 60 years, and a similar picture exists in the other cross-border
areas. Similarly, there is inadequate security, absence of security, or corruption
of the security. The illicit arms trade persists, despite the knowledge
of security personnel who know all the routes and entry points of
arms. 84 The inadequacy of the state in maintaining security, law and order
brings it into conflict with communities who are trying to fill the security
void themselves. Knighton deplores the manner in which confiscated livestock
are stolen by the government officers and calls the state ‘a raider’. 85
The plunder creates at one level destitution and demoralization in the society.
The result is the communities seeing SALW as their only protection.
State brutality
The Kenyan and Ugandan authorities have often used force against pastoral
communities, sometimes in the context of efforts at disarmament. 86
Since 1979, there have been 12 operations by the Kenyan army to try and
retrieve unlicensed arms from the Pokot, with a further attempt in 2005. 87
Okudi notes that the coercive arm of the state was taken to Karamoja to
tame pastoral society. 88 From 2001 to 2005, the government has been
82. West Pokot was formerly known as West Suk.
83. KNA, District Commissioner West Suk, Annual Report, 1945, pp. 2–3.
84. Interviews and observations, 2001–4.
85. Ben Knighton, ‘The state as raider among the Karimojong: where there are no guns
they use the threat of guns’, Africa 73, 203 (2003), pp. 427–55.
86. Knighton, ‘The state as raider’, pp. 443–46; ‘Residents plead for army bases at border’,
Daily Nation, 7 June 2002 (7 June 2002); the government of Kenya was accused of killing residents
under the guise of ‘security operations’. Other examples include the Wagalla, Malkamari and
Garissa massacres, where thousands of people were killed and property worth millions
destroyed.
87. See ‘Leaders foiling guns surrender plan, says DC’, Daily Nation, 19 September 2004
(20 September 2004). The DC noted that, of the 2,600 arms surrendered, the majority were
defective, and some residents were still withholding those in good condition.
88. Ben Okudi, ‘Causes and effects of the 1980 famine in Karamoja’ (Report, Center for
Basic Research, Kampala, 1992).

64 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
attempting to retrieve arms from Karamoja using the UPDF. 89 According
to local community representatives, these operations have often been
unduly harsh and heavy-handed, leading to a paradoxical increase in arms
acquisition. The cross-border pastoralists have always seen themselves as
enemies of the state, with the Karimojong word for state, ‘anyang’, meaning
the same as enemy! A case in point occurred on 12 January 2003, when Jie
raided both Iteso and Bokora in Aheket (Katakwi district), securing 75 animals.
The same night, Jie raided three Bokora herds in Kirik and killed
four people. A joint team of Iteso LDUs and Bokora warriors traced the
footmarks of the animals to Morulem in Labwor. In the evening, they
reported to the UPDF detachment so as not to be confused with raiders
and to seek assistance. However, the military asked the warriors to surrender
their illegal guns, and they even disarmed the Iteso LDUs. Two warriors
who ran to the barracks to take their guns back were shot dead by the
UPDF. In the confusion, nine other warriors and LDUs were killed. 90 The
use of brutality which Knighton 91 details can be attributed to poor coordination
and communication and indiscipline within the security hierarchy
and local administration. 92 Furthermore, the repressive approach by the
UPDF/LDU is a backlash against insecurity because of the large number
of arms and because the warriors, sometimes with LDUs alongside, target
UPDF. Finally, the UPDF often uses violent measures to assist in tasks
because of inadequate facilities such as vehicles, equipment, housing and
other basic needs.
Militaristic approaches by the states like forced disarmament stimulate
an arms trade among the local communities because the bullets and arms
increase in value, encouraging other communities to trade their arms. For
example, as the disarmament was started in Uganda, the Acholi started
selling arms to the Karimojong, whereas the Pokot were getting arms
directly from the Matheniko. 93
Costs of small arms and ammunition
Arms are now prolific, easily available and a relatively cheap investment
for a pastoralist. For Karamoja, the price of a gun has come down
89. Interviews and phone communications Karimojong, NGOs and government officials in
Karamoja, 2004–6; Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), ‘Karamoja integrated disarmament
and development programmes: creating conditions for promoting human security and recovery
in Karamoja, 2005–2008’ (Government report, Kampala, June 2005).
90. Interviews with warriors in Panyangara, Kanawat and Kotido in Karamoja, February
2003 and November 2004.
91. Knighton, ‘The state as raider’, pp. 426–55.
92. Not all the UPDF are raiders, in my experience in the field since 2000, I found a lot of
them to be very helpful; the conditions in which they operate need to be considered.
93. Interviews in Panyangara, Kacheri, Kotido, Musisia, Loputuk and Moroto, November
2004.

SALW AMONG PASTORAL GROUPS 65
enormously since the late-1970s because of increased supply. At that time,
a gun could cost up to 70–150 cows, as noted by a Jie:
When my family got our gun, we paid 25 heads of cattle. Then the guns were very
rare, we bought from dealers from Labalangit. Before 1979 Moroto barracks intervention,
we used to get the guns from the Turkana during peacetime at 150 cattle. 94
During the 1990s, the cost of a gun was between 10–30 cows. By May–
June 2001, at the start of the research, guns were being exchanged for five
to ten cows in Upe Pokot and three bulls at the source. In 2003–4, an
AK47 cost two to three cows at the source. A Jie who got guns directly
from Sudan stated ‘We are very happy to buy the gun at two cows because
it makes it easy to own a gun’. Consultation with the elders and some
members of the community noted that 40–50 goats are also equivalent to a
gun. In Kenya, prices have reduced from 30–100 cows in the 1970s,
depending on the area, to three to six cows more recently. Prices at the
source are lower because of availability. In Moroto, the current price of a
gun will be at most five bulls if sold to a fellow Karimojong resident within
Matheniko and Bokora. But, at the cross-border level, if sold to a Turkana,
the Turkana will have to pay five to eight oxen or more for an original
Russian AK47.
The weekly markets at Kangole (Mondays) and Moroto (Thursdays) are
different in that cash is the means of exchange rather than barter. Those
who use these markets are looking to generate cash, which is required to buy
certain consumer goods. At these markets, the going rate for a gun in 2001
was around 150,000 UgSh, which is equivalent to approximately UK£45.
The price in 2003–4 was between 200,000 and 400,000 UgSh per gun. At
Nakapelimoru and Panyangara in Kotido, which are near the source, the
2005 prices ranged from 250,000 to 350,000 UgSh or three to five bulls. 95
The recent increases may be explained by the disarmament attempts in
2001 and since September 2004 till date. One must ask the question whether
this is explained by reduced supply because of the collection of guns or by
increased demand because of the community’s perceived need to re-arm.
The type of guns also determines the price. The commonest gun is the
AK47. The SAR (Chinese made) is however cheaper, costing 150,000–
200,000 UgSh or one to two cows at the source. The G3 is more expensive,
because it does not get hot and because it is rare, which is to the credit
of the Kenya government which is the main source! With the introduction
of cash sales, arms traders can buy highly desirable goods such as radios,
mobile phones (a network was placed in Karamoja in 2003), and general
94. Interviews in Karamoja, 2001–4.
95. Interviews with warriors and others, Nakapelimoru and Panyangara, August 2005.

66 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
electronics from markets like Kampala, Mbale and take them to the north
to exchange for cheap guns.
The cash economy has led to changes in the pastoral society. For warriors,
the ability to raid and sell with cash introduces not only akoko raiding
(small raiding by warriors to sell) but also larger scale commercial raiding
for money and individual gain. In Namalu, I observed that raided cattle are
sold on parallel and hidden markets at a lower price and transported to
Mbale. Also, interviews alleged that road ambushes are undertaken by students
to pay their school fees.
Disarmament has affected the cost of arms as noted by a Matheniko exraider
who is now chief of Rupa,
As a raider, we used sometimes to buy guns from Jie and Dodoth . . . disarmament
made people afraid to buy, this has further pushed the price lower and caused traders
to widen their markets. 96
Bullets as a convertible currency
In Karamoja, a bullet can be used to buy a glass of ekwete (beer). The
commercialization of raiding and resulting poverty has led to the emergence of
brewing as a major economic activity, perpetuating the distribution of
ammunition. As noted by warriors interviewed in Panyangara:
When we return from raids, we often do not have money to pay the women for brew.
Each of us contributes bullets to pay for the brew. In villages, you can find women
with as many as 20–30 but it depends on how the brew is selling. These women will
sell the bullets to those who need them, but may also give them to their sons or husbands,
if they have guns. 97
Sometimes, women vending local brew accumulate many bullets, which
they barter for goats or a cow! 98 A local ekwete brewer informed the author:
Some times people need bullets and they tell me, if some one offers you bullets, take
them and keep for me . . . If it’s ten bullets, I get 5,000 UgSh. 99
It is easy to carry bullets in a food bag or milk gourds or as water in
jugs. Security forces rarely check women, making it relatively easy for
them to carry ammunition across international borders. However, security
forces have become more disciplined in common places: in Jie,
interviews noted that there was a time when one could pay for goods in
96. Interview in Karamoja, November 2004.
97. Interview with warriors in Panyangara airstrip, 7 October 2004; interviews with Lotirir
mothers’ group and women in Rupa near Moroto, September 2004.
98. Interviews in Karamoja, September–November 2004.
99. Interviews with young Ekwete brew sellers in Jie County and Loputuk, September–October
2004.

SALW AMONG PASTORAL GROUPS 67
shops with bullets, although those days are gone. 100 A Father in Panyangara
referred to instances where bullets were put in offering plates at
the church! 101
Ammunition prices
The cost of ammunition has risen dramatically. About a decade ago,
one could pay three UgSh for one bullet (ten for a penny!) In 2001 in
Moroto/Nakapiripirit area, however, the price had increased to 200
UgSh. Alternatively, one cow can be traded for a bucket full of bullets. 102
The ammunition costs seem to have increased further with the attempted
disarmament in Uganda. Before disarmament, one could get single bullets
for 200–500 UgSh (one to two pence!). 103 Currently, ammunition is
selling for 500–1000 UgSh. In Matheniko, ammunition prices increased
from 200 UgSh when the author was present in 2001 to 500–1000 UgSh
during the most recent visit in 2004. In Pian, ammunition comes from
Kaabong in Dodoth. Prices increased from 500 UgSh in 2001 to 600–
1000 UgSh in 2004. Prices are higher further away from the main routes/
sources, of which Jie is one. A former raider interviewed in Kanawat (Jie)
in 2003 stated,
I was getting my bullets by killing other raiders and some from traders. From traders,
we could buy 1000 bullets for one cow. One bullet went for 200 shillings. This was
mainly for the AK47 SMG, which is the common gun in Jie. 104
Interviews revealed that the UPDF and the LDUs are known to sell
ammunition to some pastoral groups and especially to the Karachunas
(Karimojong warriors) and Ng’idingai (Pokot warriors). A warrior interviewed
in the Karita area (Uganda) said that apart from being provided
ammunition by the UPDF for official purposes, the UPDF soldiers would
sometimes sell them extra ammunition. As one Catholic father noted, ‘Soldiers
were not paid at one moment and have access to armoury, the soldiers
were selling to their people’. 105 During disarmament, soldiers were
selling their bullets at 100 UgSh each, to pay for local brew. In November
2004, a UPDF was arrested in Kotido, with 700 rounds of ammunition in
a local beer container. 106 Ammunition is more expensive in Kenya. According
100. Interviews in Kanawat and Kotido, February 2003, and in Losilang and Kachire,
November 2004. In some places, there is no government administration.
101. Interview in Karamoja, November 2004.
102. Interview with Pastor Samuel Kotiyot, Amudat, 31 May 2001.
103. Interviews in Kachire, Panyangara and Kanawat, November 2004. Kotido also came
up with the same figures.
104. Interview with reformed raider in Kanawat, 2004.
105. Interview with Catholic Father in Karamoja, name withheld, 19 June 2001 and January
2003.
106. Interviews in Kotido town, November 2004.

68 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
to one official: ‘For ammunition, it is now 60 Kenya shillings (50 pence
sterling) for one live ammunition, since they are not readily available’. 107
This is because of the distance from the source. Guns will not be sold with
an empty magazine. It must have 20 or 30 bullets as part of the deal.
The high price of ammunition reflects its relative scarcity in the Kenya–
Uganda border area. It is interesting that disarmament has reduced the
cost of arms in places because of fear of buying, whilst the cost of ammunition
has gone up. Given that small arms are valueless without ammunition,
it may be that a coordinated strategy to control its supply and use could be
a valuable interim measure to reduce violence and insecurity, whereas the
longer-term efforts to promote complete and sustained disarmament are
pursued, but it is questionable why this has not yet been considered. Good
governance by the governments is essential in curbing the flows from the
LDUs, UPDF and KPR.
Conclusion
The ethnic pattern of acquisition of SALW in the cross-border areas
dates from the pre-colonial era, with recurring themes of communal
resource-based competition, regional instability and insurgencies, state
weakness, marginalization and confrontation with the state. The repressive,
corrupt or non-existent state security in rural areas has led to communities
taking responsibility for their own security. Communities have used
several methods to acquire arms: private purchase, attacks on government
soldiers and revenge battles. In the attempt to improve security in such
remote and difficult-to-manage areas, the states have resorted both to the use
of paramilitary forces and to the pouring of legal weapons into the areas.
While this may provide an increased sense of security in the short term, in the
long term, it would be feeding localized arms races.
The communities living along the Kenya–Uganda border are therefore
trapped in a spiral of rising violent crime and insecurity, which is being fed
by the flow of small arms into the area. Unless checked, the flow of arms
from conflict areas to non-conflict areas is likely to feed this spiral of violence
and insecurity and will ultimately lead to the creation of more violent
communities in the Horn region. The cost of guns has drastically reduced,
indicating that the region is awash with arms. Ammunition prices have
however gone up, implying that more research on ammunition is necessary,
as it could be the best approach to managing the small arms problems
in the cross-border region in the short run.
However, addressing supply without addressing demand is futile; this
article has shown that guns are now an instrument of economic subsistence
107. Interview, name withheld, in Alale, 2006.

SALW AMONG PASTORAL GROUPS 69
as well as protection. The issues of weakened governance, security needs,
development (livelihood) and access to land are all relevant in the perceived
need for arms. At the time of writing (January 2006), 1.2 million
Kenyan pastoralists were experiencing severe drought and Pokot pastoralists
were moving into Uganda in search of water and pasture. 108 Historically,
this has always led to tension and acquisition of arms. Although droughts
have become frequent, no policy yet exists for provision of adequate land
access to pastoralists within Kenya and the region. Attempts to manage
small arms’ acquisition have often been insensitive to individual lives,
livelihood and the ecological context, factors which are at the core of the
demand for arms. Militaristic approaches such as those taken during
disarmament have further ingrained the patterns of arms acquisition. The
long-term hope for resolution lies in building up accountable national
institutions that can meet the basic needs of their citizens.
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2006 (4 January 2006).

70 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
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