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52 AFRICAN AFFAIRS the region. 28 Arms’ supplies were augmented again when Idi Amin was overthrown in April 1979, and the Matheniko Karimojong broke into the Moroto barracks and looted guns that had been left behind by the retreating regime. 29 A further process of acquisition of SALW occurred in 1986 when hordes of Karimojong warriors were recruited into the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) to fight for the failing Obote II regime. When the National Resistance Army defeated the UNLA in 1986, the demobilized Karimojong soldiers fled with all their arms back to Karamoja. 30 With the fall of the regime, militias set up by Obote II to protect the Iteso from Karimojong raiding were also disbanded, and the result was widespread Karimojong raids that left the area virtually without livestock. Cattle rustling reached heights never seen before in the history of the region. 31 Turning to the contemporary scene, many actors are currently involved in the movement, sale and acquisition of arms; the process is a complex web to disentangle. Guns arrive illegally from outside the country via rebel groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Allied Defence Force or Toposa Militia from Sudan. Indisciplined government soldiers and also deserting Local Defence Unit (LDU) personnel have sold arms to Karamoja; Karimojong returning from the Democratic Republic of Congo have also run gun rackets. 32 Arms may be carried by long-distance traders who barter with cattle, cash or electronic items, and their diffusion may be facilitated by powerful local figures, racketeers and pastoralist warriors. 33 Cappon notes from his research in Baringo, Kenya, that ‘The political, economic and cultural dynamics are being manipulated by certain local elders, regional traders and politicians, who make use of the communities’ armed youth, and the police reservists to enrich themselves’. 34 Pastoralists may also acquire arms through raids and attacks and even have gun-making skills. Pastoralist women may also be involved in buying arms and have a particular role in ammunition trading and trafficking (discussed later). In the ethnic clashes of 1992 in Western Kenya and other parts, there was 28. Samuel Makinda, ‘Conflict and superpower in the Horn of Africa’, Third World Quarterly, 4, 1 (1982), pp. 93–103; For analysis of countries supplying arms to the Horn of Africa during the cold war, see also Jeffrey Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn: U.S. security policy in Ethiopia and Somalia 1953–1991 (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1991). 29. Interviews with eyewitnesses and others in Karamoja, 2001–4. 30. Interviews in Panyangara, Kotido, Moroto and Namalu, 2001–4. 31. Charles Ocan, ‘Pastoral crisis in Northern Uganda: the changing significance of cattle raids’, (Report, Centre for Basic Research, Kampala, 1992). 32. Interviews 2001–4. I did meet some young men who had fought in DRC but were now jobless and originated from the Karimojong area. 33. Ibid. 34. Jan Cappon, ‘Why do communities want arms? Controlling the demand for small arms, the search for strategies in the Horn of Africa and in the Balkans’, (Report, The Hague/Pax Christi, Netherlands, 2003). There is increasing evidence of racketeers, but more work needs to be done on this secretive area. Some evidence exists in Kennedy Mkutu, Guns and Governance: Pastoralist conflict and small arms in the North Rift (James Currey, Oxford, forthcoming).
SALW AMONG PASTORAL GROUPS 53 evidence that some communities may have been armed by the state. 35 In the last 15 years, Kenya has also experienced flows of arms mainly from the countries in conflict in the Horn, which border the pastoral areas. 36 Insecurity has triggered further arming of communities, sometimes with official support or complicity. Arms may also originate from legal sources, such as official security forces and militias armed for the defence of the community. Security in these regions is characterized by quasi-formal security arrangements, such as vigilantes, 37 Anti Stock Theft Units, LDUs and militias in Uganda, and by police reservists on the Kenyan side. In Uganda, several armed groups, both legal and illegal, are in operation. In 1992, as security conditions in Karamoja continued to deteriorate, Moroto District Council decided to take matters into its own hands, organizing a local community security force recruited from among the armed warriors, with the responsibility of tracking raided cattle, answering alarms and securing roads. Members of this force came to be known as ‘The Vigilantes’. Initially, they were supported by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and churches, and President Museveni gave his support, putting them under the authority of the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF). 38 In 1995, the Uganda government expanded the concept, and gun owners were told to register their weapons and become part of an increased vigilante force. Recruits grew from ten to 1000 for each of the eight counties trained and equipped by the government and under the command of the national army. 39 In return, the government undertook to give each vigilante 10,000 Ugandan shillings (UgSh) ($6.50) each month. More recently, the amount has been increased to 30,000 ($19.50). 40 Initially, there was success in reducing the levels of insecurity, thereby gaining community support. By the end of 1993, raiding and road thuggery were reduced to isolated petty criminal activities involving a few people. Armed criminals, once arrested, were prosecuted and their guns confiscated. Raided cattle, looted property and sometimes even money were recovered by vigilantes and returned to their rightful owners. 41 Unlike the official 35. National Assembly of Kenya, Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and Other Parts of Kenya, (National Assembly, Nairobi, Government Press, 1992). 36. Mkutu, Pastoralist Conflict and Small Arms. 37. The term vigilante here refers to a self-appointed body of citizens organized to maintain order in their local community. For more on vigilantes, see Les Johnston, ‘What is vigilantism?’ British Journal of Criminology 36, 2 (1996), pp. 220–36. For the metamorphosis of vigilante in Karamoja region and its current status, see Mkutu, Pastoral Conflict, Governance and Small Arms. 38. Interviews with Father John Bosco in Amudat, and others, 2001–4. 39. Interviews in Karamoja, 2001–4. 40. Interviews in Karamoja, November 2004. By the end of 1995, the Ugandan government was spending over 60 million UgSh per month to pay vigilante in Karamoja alone. See ‘Government spends Sh.60m on Karamoja vigilantes’, Daily Monitor, 9 October 1995. 41. Gomes and Mkutu, ‘Breaking the Cycle of Violence’.
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