Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms ...
Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms ...
Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms ...
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where r i is agent i's most preferred level of the public good. We can represent these singlepeaked<br />
preferences by the r i instead of the v i . The optimal output level of the public good<br />
satisfying (4.1) is given by y( r1, r2 ) = (r 1+r 2 )/2. In this case any SCF f meeting (4.1) and (4.2)<br />
satisfies the rectangular property and is therefore securely implementable (Saijo et al., 2003).<br />
Consider an example that will be used in our experimental design later, in which h i = 0.<br />
Then,<br />
u ( ~ r , ~ r ) = v ( y( ~ r , ~ r )) + t ( ~ r , ~ r ) = − (( ~ r + ~ r )/ 2− r ) − (( ~ r + ~ r )/ 2 −~ r )<br />
1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2<br />
{ }<br />
=− ( ~ r − r ) + ( ~ r −r<br />
) /<br />
1 1 2 2 1 2 2<br />
1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2<br />
where r 1 is player 1’s true peak and ( ~ r1, ~ r2 ) is a vector of reported peaks. Clearly agent 1’s<br />
payoff is maximized at r 1 . Since the payoff function is quadratic, no other maximizers exist.<br />
Furthermore, the payoff is maximized at r 1 regardless of ~ r 2 . Figure 3 shows agent 1’s payoff<br />
when r 1 = 12. If ~ r2 = 4 , the maximizer is a, and if ~ r 2 = 12 , it is b. Both are maximized at r 1 = 12.<br />
Therefore, the best response curve is a line parallel to the ~ r 2 axis. This indicates that truthtelling<br />
is the dominant strategy. In fact, it is strictly dominant. However, this is true only as long<br />
as the public goods level is continuously variable. In our experiment, we will discretize the<br />
public goods level and the payoff functions, and truth-telling will not be strictly dominant even<br />
though preferences are single-peaked. 8 However, with single-peaked preferences<br />
implementation will still be secure, because there will be a unique dominant strategy<br />
equilibrium which is also a unique Nash equilibrium (Treatment S). When preferences are not<br />
single peaked, there will be multiple Nash equilibria and implementation is not secure<br />
(Treatment P).<br />
8 In general, with a discrete public good, single-peaked preferences will not assure the existence of a strictly<br />
dominant strategy. However, secure implementation will be assured.<br />
16