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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE<br />

NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND<br />

FOR ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA<br />

JUAN ORTIZ,<br />

Petitioner,<br />

v. CASE NO.: 2009-CA-33536-O<br />

WRIT NO.: 09-43<br />

STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT<br />

OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR<br />

VEHICLES, BUREAU OF DRIVER<br />

IMPROVEMENT,<br />

Respondent.<br />

/<br />

Petition for Writ <strong>of</strong> Certiorari<br />

From <strong>the</strong> <strong>Florida</strong> Department <strong>of</strong><br />

Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles,<br />

Donna Petty, Hear<strong>in</strong>g Officer.<br />

Mat<strong>the</strong>ws R. Bark, Esquire,<br />

for Petitioner.<br />

Kimberly A. Gibbs, Esquire,<br />

for Respondent.<br />

Before THORPE, MCDONALD, and J. ADAMS, J.J.<br />

PER CURIAM.<br />

FINAL ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI<br />

Petitioner Juan Ortiz (“Ortiz”) timely filed this petition seek<strong>in</strong>g certiorari review <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>Florida</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles’ (<strong>the</strong> “Department”) “F<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong><br />

Fact, Conclusions <strong>of</strong> Law and Decision,” susta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> suspension <strong>of</strong> his driver’s license<br />

pursuant to section 322.2615, <strong>Florida</strong> Statutes, for refus<strong>in</strong>g to submit to a breath test. This <strong>Court</strong><br />

has jurisdiction pursuant to section 322.2615(13), <strong>Florida</strong> Statutes, and <strong>Florida</strong> Rule <strong>of</strong> Appellate


Procedure 9.030(c).<br />

Facts and Procedural History<br />

On August 12, 2009, Officer Bradley Bakeman, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Orlando Police Department<br />

(“OPD”), arrested Ortiz for DUI and transported him to <strong>the</strong> DUI test<strong>in</strong>g center. At <strong>the</strong> DUI<br />

test<strong>in</strong>g center, Officer Steven Adams, also <strong>of</strong> OPD, assisted Officer Bakeman <strong>in</strong> subdu<strong>in</strong>g and<br />

observ<strong>in</strong>g Ortiz because Ortiz was combative and uncooperative. Officer Bakeman requested<br />

that Ortiz submit to a breath test, and Ortiz refused to cooperate. Therefore, <strong>the</strong> Department<br />

suspended Ortiz’s driv<strong>in</strong>g privilege.<br />

Pursuant to section 322.2615, <strong>Florida</strong> Statutes, Ortiz requested a formal review <strong>of</strong> his<br />

license suspension. On September 16, 2009, Hear<strong>in</strong>g Officer Donna Petty held a formal review<br />

at which Ortiz did not appear but was represented by counsel. Prior to <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>of</strong>ficer issued subpoenas for Officers Bakeman and Adams, as well as one o<strong>the</strong>r OPD <strong>of</strong>ficer.<br />

Officer Bakeman and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong>ficer appeared for <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g, but Officer Adams failed to<br />

appear.<br />

Ortiz’s counsel called Officer Adams as a witness, and upon confirm<strong>in</strong>g that Officer<br />

Adams was not present, <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer asked whe<strong>the</strong>r Ortiz could produce an Affidavit <strong>of</strong><br />

Service. After Ortiz’s counsel produced <strong>the</strong> Affidavit <strong>of</strong> Service, <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer asked him to<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>fer <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> Officer Adams’s appearance. Ortiz’s counsel pr<strong>of</strong>fered <strong>the</strong> relevance <strong>of</strong><br />

Officer Adams’s testimony; specifically, that he was a witness to Ortiz’s condition on <strong>the</strong> night<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> arrest, and <strong>the</strong>refore he would be able to corroborate or dispel <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong>ficers’<br />

testimonies concern<strong>in</strong>g Ortiz. The hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer commented that she did not f<strong>in</strong>d Officer<br />

Adams to be a “critical” witness, but she would allow <strong>the</strong> record to rema<strong>in</strong> open for two bus<strong>in</strong>ess<br />

days for Officer Adams to show just cause for fail<strong>in</strong>g to appear. She stated that, if Officer Adams<br />

2


were to show just cause, <strong>the</strong>n she would cont<strong>in</strong>ue <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g. However, if he did not show just<br />

cause, <strong>the</strong> suspension would not be <strong>in</strong>validated based on his non-appearance. She <strong>the</strong>n advised<br />

Ortiz’s counsel that he could choose to seek enforcement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subpoena through <strong>the</strong> <strong>circuit</strong><br />

<strong>court</strong>. She concluded by ask<strong>in</strong>g Ortiz’s counsel if he had any o<strong>the</strong>r issues or evidence. In<br />

response, Ortiz’s counsel raised a separate objection, unrelated to Officer Adams’s nonappearance,<br />

which <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer denied.<br />

Then, <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer asked aga<strong>in</strong>, “[D]o you have any o<strong>the</strong>r issues?” 1 Ortiz’s counsel<br />

answered, “Not an objection, it’s just a question.” 2 Ortiz’s counsel <strong>the</strong>n began to ask <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>of</strong>ficer questions concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> process that would occur <strong>in</strong> attempt<strong>in</strong>g to compel Officer<br />

Adams to appear and render<strong>in</strong>g a decision regard<strong>in</strong>g Ortiz’s license suspension. Ortiz’s counsel<br />

emphasized his concern regard<strong>in</strong>g whe<strong>the</strong>r his client would be granted a temporary driv<strong>in</strong>g<br />

permit dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> pendency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> petition for enforcement <strong>of</strong> Officer Adams’s subpoena. The<br />

hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer’s responses are summarized as follows. If Officer Adams shows just cause for his<br />

failure to appear, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g will be cont<strong>in</strong>ued. If he does not show just cause, <strong>the</strong> license<br />

suspension will not be <strong>in</strong>validated due to his non-appearance. None<strong>the</strong>less, Ortiz can petition <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>circuit</strong> <strong>court</strong> for enforcement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subpoena. However, <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer will not await <strong>the</strong><br />

decision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>circuit</strong> <strong>court</strong> before enter<strong>in</strong>g her decision because her decision is not based on <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>circuit</strong> <strong>court</strong>. F<strong>in</strong>ally, Ortiz may be eligible for a temporary permit <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terim, but that<br />

decision could not be determ<strong>in</strong>ed at that time.<br />

After <strong>the</strong> series <strong>of</strong> questions and answers, Ortiz’s counsel responded, “Okay” and “I’m<br />

just try<strong>in</strong>g to get <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation so that I can do what’s <strong>in</strong> my client’s best <strong>in</strong>terests, that’s all.” 3<br />

The hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>the</strong>n concluded <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g by confirm<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> evidentiary portion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

1 See Petition for Writ <strong>of</strong> Certiorari, Exhibit 1 at page 21, l<strong>in</strong>e 23.<br />

2 See Petition for Writ <strong>of</strong> Certiorari, Exhibit 1 at page 21, l<strong>in</strong>es 24-25 (emphasis added).<br />

3 See Petition for Writ <strong>of</strong> Certiorari, Exhibit 1 at page 25, l<strong>in</strong>es 11-15 (emphasis added).<br />

3


proceed<strong>in</strong>gs would rema<strong>in</strong> open for two days to allow Officer Adams to show just cause, and if<br />

he failed to do so, a f<strong>in</strong>al order would be rendered no later than seven work<strong>in</strong>g days from <strong>the</strong><br />

close <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> review.<br />

Officer Adams did not show just cause for fail<strong>in</strong>g to appear. Therefore, <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>of</strong>ficer entered her decision on September 23, 2009, susta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> suspension <strong>of</strong> Ortiz’s driver’s<br />

license. Ortiz never petitioned <strong>the</strong> <strong>circuit</strong> <strong>court</strong> for enforcement <strong>of</strong> Officer Adams’s subpoena.<br />

Discussion <strong>of</strong> Law<br />

The <strong>Court</strong>’s review <strong>of</strong> an adm<strong>in</strong>istrative agency decision is governed by a three-part<br />

standard <strong>of</strong> review: 1) whe<strong>the</strong>r procedural due process was accorded; 2) whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> essential<br />

requirements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> law were observed; and 3) whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> decision was supported by competent<br />

substantial evidence. Broward County v. G.B.V. Int’l, Ltd., 787 So. 2d 838, 843 (Fla. 2001)<br />

(cit<strong>in</strong>g City <strong>of</strong> Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. 1982)). “It is nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong><br />

function nor <strong>the</strong> prerogative <strong>of</strong> a <strong>circuit</strong> judge to reweigh evidence and make f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs [<strong>of</strong> fact]<br />

when [undertak<strong>in</strong>g] a review <strong>of</strong> a decision <strong>of</strong> an adm<strong>in</strong>istrative forum.” Dep’t <strong>of</strong> Highway Safety<br />

& Motor Vehicles v. Allen, 539 So. 2d 20, 21 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).<br />

In a case where an <strong>in</strong>dividual’s license is suspended for refus<strong>in</strong>g to submit to a breath,<br />

blood, or ur<strong>in</strong>e test, “<strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer shall determ<strong>in</strong>e by a preponderance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> evidence<br />

whe<strong>the</strong>r sufficient cause exists to susta<strong>in</strong>, amend, or <strong>in</strong>validate <strong>the</strong> suspension.” § 322.2615(7),<br />

Fla. Stat. (2009). The hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer’s scope <strong>of</strong> review is limited to <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g issues:<br />

1. Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> law enforcement <strong>of</strong>ficer had probable cause to believe that<br />

<strong>the</strong> person whose license was suspended was driv<strong>in</strong>g or <strong>in</strong> actual physical<br />

control <strong>of</strong> a motor vehicle <strong>in</strong> this state while under <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>of</strong><br />

alcoholic beverages or chemical or controlled substances.<br />

2. Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> person whose license was suspended refused to submit to<br />

any such test after be<strong>in</strong>g requested to do so by a law enforcement <strong>of</strong>ficer<br />

or correctional <strong>of</strong>ficer.<br />

3. Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> person whose license was suspended was told that if he or<br />

4


she refused to submit to such test his or her privilege to operate a motor<br />

vehicle would be suspended for a period <strong>of</strong> 1 year or, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> a<br />

second or subsequent refusal, for a period <strong>of</strong> 18 months.<br />

§ 322.2615(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009).<br />

In his petition, Ortiz argues that his right to due process was violated when <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>of</strong>ficer entered her decision, susta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> suspension <strong>of</strong> Ortiz’s driv<strong>in</strong>g privilege, before Ortiz<br />

had <strong>the</strong> opportunity to petition <strong>the</strong> <strong>circuit</strong> <strong>court</strong> for enforcement <strong>of</strong> Officer Adams’s subpoena.<br />

Ortiz also argues that <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer failed to observe <strong>the</strong> essential requirements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> law<br />

when she applied a “critical” standard, as opposed to <strong>the</strong> “relevant” standard, to determ<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong><br />

admissibility <strong>of</strong> Officer Adams’s testimony.<br />

On <strong>the</strong> contrary, <strong>the</strong> Department argues that due process was accorded because <strong>the</strong><br />

hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer expla<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> procedure to Ortiz’s counsel, counsel did not object to <strong>the</strong><br />

procedure, and it was Ortiz’s burden to seek enforcement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subpoena <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>circuit</strong> <strong>court</strong>,<br />

which he never did. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> Department asserts that this <strong>Court</strong> should not consider<br />

Ortiz’s due process argument because he failed to raise it dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> formal review.<br />

Procedural Due Process Accorded<br />

Because Ortiz failed to object, dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> formal review, to <strong>the</strong> procedure proposed and<br />

performed by <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer, this <strong>Court</strong> would not normally consider <strong>the</strong> argument that <strong>the</strong><br />

procedure amounted to a violation <strong>of</strong> his due process rights. See Garnetti v. State, Dep’t <strong>of</strong><br />

Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 28a (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. June 4, 2004)<br />

(hold<strong>in</strong>g that an argument not raised dur<strong>in</strong>g an adm<strong>in</strong>istrative hear<strong>in</strong>g will not be considered<br />

upon petition for writ <strong>of</strong> certiorari, <strong>the</strong>reby apply<strong>in</strong>g to certiorari review <strong>of</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istrative<br />

proceed<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>the</strong> familiar rule <strong>of</strong> law that matters not raised before a trial <strong>court</strong> should not be<br />

considered on appeal) (cit<strong>in</strong>g Sup<strong>in</strong>ski v. Omni Healthcare P.A., 853 So. 2d 526, 532 n.2 (Fla.<br />

5


5th DCA 2003)). However, Ortiz argues that he never had <strong>the</strong> opportunity to object because he<br />

assumed that he would be notified as to whe<strong>the</strong>r Officer Adams showed just cause, and he<br />

assumed that <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer would not render a decision until he had <strong>the</strong> opportunity to<br />

petition <strong>the</strong> <strong>circuit</strong> <strong>court</strong> for enforcement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subpoena. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, Ortiz compla<strong>in</strong>s that <strong>the</strong><br />

hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer never <strong>of</strong>fered him a cont<strong>in</strong>uance.<br />

First, at no time dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> formal review did <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer suggest that <strong>the</strong><br />

Department would take <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itiative to <strong>in</strong>form Ortiz as to whe<strong>the</strong>r Officer Adams showed just<br />

cause, and Ortiz has failed to demonstrate any reasonable basis for such an assumption. Ortiz’s<br />

counsel asked several questions concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> procedure, and <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer answered all<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m. Counsel never asked whe<strong>the</strong>r he would be notified concern<strong>in</strong>g Officer Adams’s<br />

show<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> just cause, though he had every opportunity to do so. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong>re is no<br />

evidence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> record, nor does Ortiz argue, that he made any attempt to ascerta<strong>in</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r<br />

Officer Adams showed just cause.<br />

Second, <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer clearly and unequivocally stated that <strong>the</strong> evidentiary portion<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g would rema<strong>in</strong> open for two days and, if Officer Adams failed to show just cause,<br />

<strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer would render a decision no later than seven work<strong>in</strong>g days from <strong>the</strong> close <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> review. Ortiz did not object to this procedure. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong>re is no evidence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> record,<br />

nor does Ortiz argue, that he took any action after two days had past to determ<strong>in</strong>e whe<strong>the</strong>r<br />

Officer Adams showed just cause, to request a cont<strong>in</strong>uance, or to petition <strong>the</strong> <strong>circuit</strong> <strong>court</strong> for<br />

enforcement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subpoena. In fact, Ortiz never requested a cont<strong>in</strong>uance for <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong><br />

compell<strong>in</strong>g Officer Adams to attend, and he never petitioned <strong>the</strong> <strong>circuit</strong> <strong>court</strong> for enforcement <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> subpoena.<br />

Ortiz failed to utilize any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> several measurers available to exercise his due process<br />

6


ights. At no time dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> formal review did he object to <strong>the</strong> proposed procedure. He never<br />

requested a cont<strong>in</strong>uance for <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> seek<strong>in</strong>g enforcement <strong>of</strong> Officer Adams’s subpoena.<br />

He never attempted to ascerta<strong>in</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r Office Adams showed just cause, and he never<br />

petitioned <strong>the</strong> <strong>circuit</strong> <strong>court</strong> for enforcement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subpoena. None<strong>the</strong>less, he now claims that <strong>the</strong><br />

procedure violated his due process rights. He now faults <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer for not <strong>of</strong>fer<strong>in</strong>g him a<br />

cont<strong>in</strong>uance, and he now blames <strong>the</strong> Department for not prompt<strong>in</strong>g him to petition <strong>the</strong> <strong>circuit</strong><br />

<strong>court</strong> for enforcement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subpoena. We f<strong>in</strong>d that it is not <strong>the</strong> Department’s duty to advocate<br />

for Ortiz’s best <strong>in</strong>terests, but ra<strong>the</strong>r, it is his attorney’s duty. Therefore, we f<strong>in</strong>d that due process<br />

was accorded when <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer expla<strong>in</strong>ed a procedure to Ortiz’s counsel, Ortiz’s counsel<br />

did not object, and <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer performed <strong>the</strong> procedure exactly as she expla<strong>in</strong>ed it.<br />

“Critical” vs. “Relevant”<br />

Contrary to Ortiz’s argument <strong>in</strong> his petition, <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer did not apply a “critical”<br />

standard to determ<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> admissibility <strong>of</strong> Officer Adams’s testimony. In fact, she never rendered<br />

any decision as to whe<strong>the</strong>r Officer Adams’s testimony was admissible, nor did she quash <strong>the</strong><br />

subpoena. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, she clearly stated her position that, if Officer Adams’s were to show just cause<br />

with<strong>in</strong> two days, she would cont<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>the</strong> formal review and hear his testimony. Therefore, <strong>the</strong><br />

hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer’s statement that she did not f<strong>in</strong>d Officer Adams to be “critical” is moot and<br />

<strong>in</strong>effective, as Ortiz admits <strong>in</strong> his Reply. 4 Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, Ortiz failed to raise this objection dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>the</strong> formal review, and thus he is barred from rais<strong>in</strong>g it before this <strong>Court</strong>. See Garnetti, 12 Fla. L.<br />

Weekly Supp. 28a. Therefore, we f<strong>in</strong>d that <strong>the</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficer observed <strong>the</strong> essential<br />

requirements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> law.<br />

Based on <strong>the</strong> forego<strong>in</strong>g, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that <strong>the</strong> Petition for<br />

Writ <strong>of</strong> Certiorari is DENIED.<br />

4 See Ortiz’s Reply at page 13.<br />

7


DONE AND ORDERED <strong>in</strong> Chambers, at Orlando, Orange County, <strong>Florida</strong> on this <strong>the</strong><br />

____22______ day <strong>of</strong> ____February________________, 2011.<br />

__/S/_________________________<br />

JANET C. THORPE<br />

<strong>Circuit</strong> Judge<br />

_/S/___________________________<br />

ROGER J. MCDONALD<br />

<strong>Circuit</strong> Judge<br />

_/S/__________________________<br />

JOHN H. ADAMS, SR.<br />

<strong>Circuit</strong> Judge<br />

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE<br />

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> forego<strong>in</strong>g Order has been<br />

furnished via U.S. mail to: Mat<strong>the</strong>ws R. Bark, Esq., Jaeger & Blankner, 217 East Ivanhoe<br />

Boulevard North, Orlando, <strong>Florida</strong> 32804 and Kimberly A. Gibbs, Esq., Department <strong>of</strong><br />

Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles – Legal Office, Post Office Box 570066, Orlando, <strong>Florida</strong><br />

32857 on <strong>the</strong> _____22_____ day <strong>of</strong> _______February_____________, 2011.<br />

_/S/_________________________<br />

<strong>Judicial</strong> Assistant<br />

8

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