Volume 3 No 4 - Air Power Studies

PRODUCTION BALANCE
The simple answer is that losses were never greater
than production. Deliveries to the operational
squadrons actually exceeded wastage throughout
the Battle (Figure 10). This disguises, however, the
crucial role played by the CRO. 49 While the
sustained efforts of the aircraft industry were vital to
maintaining the frontline, repair provided 40% of the
total output received by the operational squadrons,
Figure 11 : Hurricane & Spitfire Production vs
Repair July - December 1940
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Figure 10 : Fighter Command - Aircraft Issued
July - December 1940
Total Wastage
Fighters Issued
Jul-40 Aug-40 Sep-40 Oct-40 Nov-40 Dec-40
31
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Production
Deliveries
CRO Repair
Output
Jul-40 Aug-40 Sep-40 Oct-40 Nov-40 Dec-40
as Figure 11 illustrates. At the height of the Battle, the
CRO was achieving repair turn round times of under 6
weeks for Hurricanes and Spitfires, employing a
combination of depot, fly-in and on-site repair. The
Luftwaffe had no capability on this scale. In fact, until as
late as 1942, repair output was no more than 25% of
production. 50 Germany had entered the war with
reserves of 900 aircraft, equivalent to 25% of front line
strength, compared to reserves of 2,200 aircraft, some
115% of front line strength, held by the Royal Air Force.