Volume 3 No 4 - Air Power Studies
Volume 3 No 4 - Air Power Studies
Volume 3 No 4 - Air Power Studies
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Foreword<br />
The Royal <strong>Air</strong> Force Strategic Plan, launched by the Chief of the <strong>Air</strong> Staff earlier this year, tasked the Director of Defence <strong>Studies</strong> (RAF)<br />
with, amongst other things, ‘leading in the development of air power doctrine within the military and academic communities’. With air<br />
power increasingly taking centre stage in modern conflict, it is essential that our doctrine is up to date, relevant and understood by all<br />
our people; it is also vital that it is situated within the joint and multinational arena. Yet doctrine inevitably means different things to<br />
different people. In the first article, therefore, I have sought to explain the nature of doctrine and examine the methodology used in the<br />
UK to produce joint doctrine. I then look at the unique features of air power in contemporary warfare before suggesting a more radical<br />
critique of how the doctrinal process may be seen to work.<br />
One doctrinal lesson that can be drawn from any conflict is that we ignore or under-resource Sustainability at our peril. In the second<br />
article, the last in a trilogy of pieces commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Battle of Britain, <strong>Air</strong> Commodore Peter Dye graphically<br />
illustrates the part played by logistics in the Battle of Britain and how it shaped the outcome. He contends that the Battle was<br />
essentially an attritional struggle that tested the logistic systems of the RAF and the Luftwaffe as much as it tested their aircrew, aircraft<br />
and tactics. Production, storage, repair and salvage may not be as glamorous in the public eye as the heroism shown by ‘the Few’,<br />
but they were just as important.<br />
The third article has been contributed by the eminent aviation historian Dr Alfred Price. His subject is the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka, the<br />
legendary German dive-bomber famous for its gull-winged profile and screaming siren. The Stuka has come to epitomise the<br />
operational doctrine of Blitzkrieg employed so successfully by German forces early in the Second World War. Dr Price examines the<br />
aircraft’s service record in detail: its stunning impact in Poland and France; its limitations exposed during the Battle of Britain; its<br />
success against shipping in the Mediterranean; its role on the Eastern Front and the countermeasures devised by the Red Army; and<br />
finally its reinvention as a tank-buster. As one of the few aircraft types in action from the first day of the War to the last, the Stuka has<br />
earned its place in history.<br />
If the advocates of Information Warfare (IW) had their way, history is where weapons such as ships, tanks and aircraft would be<br />
consigned; to them, modern warfare has become a conflict of ‘systems’. In the next article, Squadron Leader Andrew Coller<br />
discusses the developments in both the philosophy and technology of IW and one of its major components, Electronic Warfare<br />
(EW). He argues that control of the electromagnetic spectrum is essential for modern forces, and that the utility of conventional<br />
weapons is being challenged by new EW systems such as Directed Energy Weapons (DEWS). He concludes that, in order to exploit<br />
these new developments, the RAF must adopt a radically different approach to EW to produce an offensive doctrine of ‘electronic<br />
fire’.