Switzerland and Gold Transactions in the Second World War

Interim Report on Gold
12
Introduction
international market into five categories. 6 With the help of tables, we provided information
concerning the Reichsbank’s gold holdings during the war. The main focus was on the role of
the SNB and Swiss commercial banks. The information we published in December 1997 has
been integrated in revised form into the present study.
The present interim report does not discuss general legal problems (for example, the issue of
neutrality) relating to most of the historical questions arising from our mandate. Moreover, we
have not assessed the legal implications of the actions discussed in this study. These issues will
be discussed in detail in our final report.
Research to Date
At the end of the 1930’s, gold − always a necessary currency reserve asset under the gold
standard − became much more important both to the belligerents and the neutral countries.
With the help of gold it was possible to obtain strategically important raw materials, war
materiel, or the foreign currency needed to procure such items. The Swiss franc also came to
play a special role: after continental European assets were frozen in the United States on 14
June 1941, the Swiss franc became the only globally convertible currency. It therefore took on
functions previously performed by the dollar and, before that, by the British pound. Gold and
franc operations became an important part of Switzerland’s elaborate network of financial and
economic ties with Germany and Italy, the Allied countries, and neutral countries.
The SNB acquired gold worth 1.2 billion Swiss francs from Germany, and gold worth just
under 2.2 billion Swiss francs from the United States, Great Britain, and Canada, 7 during the
war. Even during the war years, there was considerable discussion about gold purchased from
Germany’s central bank, both within and between the Axis, Allied, and neutral governments.
Indeed, by the autumn of 1940 the Governing Board of the SNB had grounds to believe that
the Reichsbank was in possession of new gold reserves which could only have originated in
countries that Germany had invaded. 8 In June 1942, the SNB considered melting down gold
bars it had acquired from the Reichsbank as it was assumed that they came from occupied
countries; SNB authorities were concerned that blocking lists issued by Belgium’s government
in exile might make them less acceptable on the international market. 9 At the end of 1943, the
head of the SNB’s legal office noted that the Germans were seizing the assets of private
individuals «including, for example, deported Jews». 10 Moreover, the Allies by then had issued
warnings against receiving further shipments of gold from Germany, and towards the end of
the war the Swiss government and the SNB became involved in a spiral of accusations and
6
7
8
9
10
Independent Commission of Experts: Switzerland – Second World War 1997.
See appendix 2, Table XX. We discuss the problem of comparability of figures in Chapter 3.
SNB Archives, no. 2245: «En marge de la crise monétaire». Manuscript of Philippe Blaser, October 1940. See also Fior
1997, p. 47.
SNB Archives, Minutes of the Governing Board, 18 June 1942, no. 450, pp. 563–564. See also Fior 1997, p. 56.
SNB Archives, extract from Minutes of the Governors Conference, 1 December 1943. See also Fior 1997, p. 89.