Switzerland and Gold Transactions in the Second World War

Interim Report on Gold
16
Introduction
In early 1996, a new debate arose in Switzerland about the role played by its financial
institutions during the war, and with the Cold War successfully concluded, this debate gained
in intensity. 34 Various journalists and publicists made their views known, and a number of
books were rapidly published. 35 From an academic standpoint these books are of varying,
sometimes dubious, quality. They present certain new information in a fragmentary manner and
also contain items of pure conjecture, sometimes melodramatically juxtaposed with information
already known. There are a few exceptions, but generally these publications do not cite their
sources properly. They present information that cannot be verified or used for academic
research. Nevertheless, they did increase public awareness of the issue.
The two Rifkind Reports published by the British Foreign Office in September 1996 and May
1997 made a useful contribution to research, 36 and in May 1997, the first Eizenstat report
appeared. Based on the appraisal of extensive sources in the US National Archives, it
demonstrated that victim gold (i.e. gold from concentration camps and extermination camps)
found its way to Switzerland. Sydney Zabludoff’s short study, which came out in October
1997, also contains interesting general remarks about the Reichsbank’s gold operations. 37
Vigorous new impetus for research is also to be attributed to official Swiss agencies. For
instance, the SNB has completed the task of putting information concerning wartime gold
reserves on computer, and has now presented a complete overview of all incoming and
outgoing gold bars and other forms of monetary gold. 38 Drawing on this material, Jean-Pierre
Roth, the Vice-Chairman of the SNB has prepared an in-depth study of his bank’s history. 39
A recent article by Harold James addresses, among other things, the «credulity trap» into
which decision-makers at the SNB fell. Against their better judgement, they felt they could rely
on the false assurances proffered by the Germans, and were unwilling to change their views
when the Allies confronted them with the truth. 40 Another recent study, by Michel Fior, is
based on the data prepared by the SNB and on Fior’s own research. It asks how much the
decision-makers at the SNB knew and shows that by 1941 the SNB was well aware of the
circumstances in which the Reichsbank was obtaining Belgian and Dutch gold. Fior argues that
the SNB received gold from the Reichsbank to help stave off a German invasion of
Switzerland. 41 Thomas Maissen’s study, only part of which has appeared so far, is also of
interest concerning some aspects of Dutch gold. 42
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
Picard 1996; Hug/Perrenoud 1997; Picard 1997.
Balzli 1997a in particular came up with new information. The following were also of interest: Vincent 1987; Speich et
al. 1997; Bower 1997; and Lebor 1997. See also Koch 1997; Ziegler 1998.
Rifkind 1996; Rifkind 1997a; Rifkind 1997b. See also The Holocaust Educational Trust 1997a.
Zabludoff 1997.
SNB Archives, Inventory accounting for customers’ custody accounts for gold 1939–1945, 4 March 1997; SNB
Archives, Gold transactions for own account 1939–1945, 4 March 1997.
Roth 1997.
James 1996; James 1998.
Fior 1997; we discuss the «dissuasion thesis» in Chapter 2 and the Summary.
Maissen 1997a; Maissen 1997b.