Examining Crack Cocaine Sentencing in a Post- Kimbrough World
Examining Crack Cocaine Sentencing in a Post- Kimbrough World
Examining Crack Cocaine Sentencing in a Post- Kimbrough World
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08-CASSIDY.DOC<br />
1/29/2009 3:29:23 PM<br />
130 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:105<br />
B. <strong>Kimbrough</strong>’s and Gall’s Effect on <strong>Crack</strong> <strong>Coca<strong>in</strong>e</strong> <strong>Sentenc<strong>in</strong>g</strong><br />
The Supreme Court <strong>in</strong> <strong>Kimbrough</strong> explicitly authorized the district<br />
courts to consider the crack/powder disparity when sentenc<strong>in</strong>g an<br />
offender. 213 After Gall, appellate courts may only review the sentence<br />
for reasonableness, “i.e., whether the District Judge abused his discretion<br />
<strong>in</strong> determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g that the § 3553(a) factors supported [the sentence<br />
imposed] and justified a substantial deviation from the Guidel<strong>in</strong>es<br />
range.” 214 Absent a f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g of abuse of discretion, appellate courts must<br />
now yield to the district courts’ judgments. 215 Under this new system,<br />
the potential for excessive disparity <strong>in</strong> crack coca<strong>in</strong>e sentenc<strong>in</strong>g may be<br />
greater than ever.<br />
Judges—even those with<strong>in</strong> the same courthouse—are likely to<br />
differ <strong>in</strong> op<strong>in</strong>ion as to what crack/powder ratio is proper when<br />
sentenc<strong>in</strong>g an offender. Indeed, the <strong>Kimbrough</strong> Court stated “some<br />
departures from uniformity [are] a necessary cost of the remedy we<br />
[have] adopted.” 216 The Court cont<strong>in</strong>ued, “district courts must take<br />
account of sentenc<strong>in</strong>g practices <strong>in</strong> other courts” and the “disparities must<br />
be weighed aga<strong>in</strong>st the other § 3553(a) factors.” 217 Follow<strong>in</strong>g this<br />
reason<strong>in</strong>g, does the Court expect district court judges to know what<br />
ratios all other district courts are apply<strong>in</strong>g? Assum<strong>in</strong>g these judges had<br />
this <strong>in</strong>formation, are they then expected to impose the Guidel<strong>in</strong>es ratio<br />
even if they f<strong>in</strong>d a departure is warranted, simply to avoid disparity<br />
among the courts? It is not hard to imag<strong>in</strong>e this practice result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><br />
deviations <strong>in</strong> crack sentenc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> cases decided soon after <strong>Kimbrough</strong>—<br />
before the level of disparity is realized—and judges decid<strong>in</strong>g cases years<br />
from now follow<strong>in</strong>g the Guidel<strong>in</strong>es more closely, <strong>in</strong> an effort to remedy<br />
what will have become a disparate system. If that is the case, the<br />
discretion afforded to judges post-<strong>Kimbrough</strong> becomes moot.<br />
It seems unlikely that judges from different districts will give<br />
deference to the ratios be<strong>in</strong>g applied <strong>in</strong> other districts when consider<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the § 3553(a) factors <strong>in</strong> a case before them. The more logical outcome is<br />
that judges will beg<strong>in</strong> to pursue their own policy agendas. This will<br />
undoubtedly result <strong>in</strong> offenders with identical records who are charged<br />
213. <strong>Kimbrough</strong> v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 575 (2007).<br />
214. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 600 (2007).<br />
215. See id. at 597 (“[T]he appellate court . . . must give due deference to the district court's<br />
decision that the §3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance. The fact that the<br />
appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is<br />
<strong>in</strong>sufficient to justify reversal of the district court.”).<br />
216. <strong>Kimbrough</strong>, 128 S. Ct. at 574.<br />
217. Id.