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Uttl I 11/1L IN I LLLILatIlL.C. HUCIll•T<br />
INFORMG1013EPORT•<br />
ntrvrir.rfa&c,gy ..4...Fyip'<br />
•<br />
CD. NO. •<br />
OUNTRY Germ<br />
.*1<br />
47.<br />
•<br />
•.,<br />
DATE- DISTI2'."., 22 Sept. 19.56<br />
UBjECT<br />
. •<br />
• `.- -<br />
'PLACE'<br />
'ACQUIRED<br />
Miscellaneous 19145 Seventh Army 1,<br />
Report4 on Germany<br />
GerManyA Frankfurt<br />
.DATE. OF INFO. 1930 - 19115<br />
ACQUIRED<br />
COMPLETELY<br />
RELIABLE .<br />
USUALLY<br />
REUABLE<br />
NO. OF PAGE'S .1: •<br />
NO. OF ENCLS. 3 -6<br />
(LISTED BELOW)<br />
SUPPLE:Mk TOv't<br />
REPORT NO..<br />
GRADING OF SOURCE COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY CIRADINGVF.CONTeNT<br />
FAIRLY •<br />
CANNOT. -,<br />
NOT<br />
. glAgto PROBABLY POSSIBLY; I, ivii • ..'id . .*egg<br />
tEUABLE<br />
illgUALLY ,<br />
..•<br />
REUABLE , RELIABLE gc. i.<br />
JLIDOw.D SOURCES • TRUE TRUf .<br />
,.,,F t:1 .n r.l. ..`- 1.) *VI'<br />
44100<br />
I A. - X • it. . C. 0. E. F. 1.- 2. L . X DIEMEMS-a. 4,4<br />
•••••:••:<br />
:<br />
11111 DOCUNSN1 CONTAINS I 1101I AFFECTING Mt NATIONAL<br />
OF. .THE UNITEL TTTTT S WITHIN THE NEARING OF THE UPI AAAAA AC1 110<br />
U.S.<br />
C.. 31 *NI 32. AS I MISSION OR ION<br />
Of ITS CONTENTS IS AN/ AAAAAA 10 AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS 11110•I<br />
.11111110 ST LAU. AAAAAA UCTION OF TNIS FOR. IS PROHIBITED.<br />
- 7" ■ ' • •<br />
•<br />
I<br />
re-7.1<br />
IS-OU§CE<br />
1.)<br />
,<br />
" • ..•;. $1 , 0.e<br />
The attached miscellaneous U.S. Seventh.Arigy reports an the interrogatioh,<br />
• ,<br />
4.<br />
of various prominent Nazis are sent to you <strong>for</strong> retention.<br />
NAM WAR CRIMF-S DISCL<br />
4.2°4<br />
gAGT 10<br />
IT EAS AR EffeL3S113E,Atriell<br />
'<br />
OORDINATION WITH<br />
cr,<br />
=,*<br />
c=)<br />
D<br />
ECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY<br />
CENTRAL INT<br />
ELLIGENCE AGENCY<br />
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT ION 3132B<br />
NAZI WAR CR IMES DISCLOSURE ACT<br />
DATE 2001 2007<br />
rN,<br />
RETURN TO ARCHIVES & RECORD 'S CENT*.t.. ,••<br />
IMMEOIRIELY AFTER USE<br />
JOB f-'4-,10-1301, „<br />
I STATE<br />
ARMY<br />
CLASSIFICATION SEC:ET IA/ISO<br />
a 4-
THIS IS AM ENCLOSURE<br />
: DO HOT DETACM<br />
.sAoR . E T
yellow colored cards were <strong>for</strong> German nationals,<br />
Tha.in<strong>for</strong>mation contained in these cards is at the same time to be found in<br />
bc'Jk <strong>for</strong>m 1n the FAHNDUNGSBUCH. This is a monthly publication of the RSHA in<br />
which all wanted .persons are listed with their personal descriptions. The in-<br />
:<br />
<strong>for</strong>mation is transferred from the book to the cards.<br />
ii) HAUPTKARTEI (Main Index File)<br />
. The cards of ABT II wore blue, while the files were llow, indicating that<br />
they contain a list of politioir crimes and suspocts.<br />
Theords ofLBTIIIwsreLorfmga, and the files were green, indicating that they<br />
contain aA•ist of espionage crimes 07 uspocts: • •<br />
The _above color system pertaining to both the SUCH UND SPEZIALKARTEI and the<br />
'HAUPTKARTEI is prescribed by the RSHA in BERLIN and applies to the whole of Germany.<br />
iii) A-EARTEI (Riders)<br />
This index file contained a list of political criminals or of those people<br />
:whO ' hact not:adopted the National-Socialist point of view. Most of the people<br />
indexed wore in concentration camps. On these cards green, blue, and rod riders<br />
were used.: ::a.ource believes that greon rofOrrod to "Marxism" and rod to "comMun-<br />
. ism",b4t:ignores the moaning of thO blue rider.'<br />
' Theindox was always kopt looked and stored away in a safo. Only one person<br />
was handling the indox and nobody was supposed to see The contonts of thoso cards.<br />
The filo6<strong>for</strong> the green, blue and rod . cards woro only in two colors, green and<br />
All pntrios on the index cards wore aado in plain languago and not in cod°,<br />
.1<br />
iv) GESTAPO Files in DARMSTADT,<br />
All records of the GESTAPO in DARMSTADT wore complotoly destroyed by fire dur7<br />
ing . a-bombing attack on . 11 Sept 44. ' Whon this Hq was movod to BENSHEIM• now , rocords<br />
and files had to be compiled. Thoy wore <strong>for</strong>ced to start again from scratch.<br />
III. GESTAPOUSSENDIENSTSTELLE (nreign Branch), DARi vISTADT B-2 (Source:--GOTNER)<br />
.A . n0Mbor-,.of . pooplo who wore arrested by the GESTAPO . wore transferred from BENS-<br />
HEIMAO ,DARMST'ADT <strong>for</strong> a socallod special treatment (SONDERBEHANDLUNG). KOMMISAR<br />
WANGEMANN:was • • . in . chargo of this dopart. Source was rosponsiblo <strong>for</strong> filling<br />
outthOtrairel.papor's. At one timo sho noticed on ene-ofthe papers that the person<br />
invOlvedWas rapidly dying of a disease, which, sourco claimed, could not have<br />
boon tho<br />
IV. FORGED SOLDBUEOHER FOR THE VAFFEN SS B-2 (Source: GANTNER)<br />
-<br />
'AJSCHAFMOSCH was obsorvod by source one ovening in tho process of <strong>for</strong>ging SOLD-<br />
' BUTCHER<strong>for</strong>tho- WAFFEN SS <strong>for</strong> REG RAT GIRKE, KRIM RAT HELLENBROICH, BAU4EIST7A, •<br />
and a drivar..<br />
V. CONCENTRATION CAMPS . B-2 (Souroo: GINTNER)<br />
.Persohsarrostod by tho BENSHEIM GTSTAPO Hq Woro shippod to the following institutiOns:<br />
•<br />
0 Male golitical convicts and <strong>for</strong>eign, workers who had soxual rolations with German<br />
women 'wore sont to DACHAU (major affonsos),BUCHENWALD (minor offonsos), and<br />
FLOSSENBUERG (minor offonsos).
Fomale political convicts and<br />
'<br />
women who had soxual rolationa with <strong>for</strong>eign<br />
workers waroahippod to RAVENSBRUECK and..FLOSSENBUERG.<br />
iii) porsons convieted.of sabotago, of failing to apoar <strong>for</strong> work, of prohibited<br />
cloxuaV.rolatiOns which did not result in'prognancy, at al, wore sont to DARMSTADT<br />
Re<strong>for</strong>matory (<strong>for</strong> tho SAarpfalz Region); MAINZ Re<strong>for</strong>matory (RHINE Rogion); REDDEN-<br />
HEIM; andiHIRZENHEIM. ' The maximum punishmont was 56 days,<br />
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION morq<br />
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI,<br />
Commanding.<br />
2 . E T
Appendix<br />
Name<br />
SECRET<br />
GESTAPO PERSONALITIES<br />
Civilian AILGERTINE .<br />
Title I artment .Section Hal ht DescriDtion<br />
GESTAPO HQ BENSHEIM, ADOLF HITLELSTR 52<br />
- (Responsible <strong>for</strong> District HESSEN)<br />
GInk; Fritz<br />
REG RAT STUBAF Chief of Hq<br />
32<br />
1.70m<br />
Stocky build, broad<br />
shoulders, dark hair,<br />
scar behind right<br />
• ear (3 cm)<br />
HELLENBROICH ERIN RAT STUBAF • Deputy LEITLa IV 39<br />
SCHWINN; Peter POI RAT OSTUF Persor.ael LETTER I 45<br />
1.75m<br />
1.75 in<br />
Speaks English, goodlooking,<br />
brown eyes,<br />
black. hair, gocd<br />
teeth.<br />
Very pl_ender, blue<br />
eyes, dark blond hair,<br />
nervous eye twitch.<br />
STEIN, Ernst POI OB INS HSTUF Finance LEITER II 55<br />
1.72 in<br />
Broad shoulders,<br />
grey eyes, grey<br />
hair.<br />
BENEWITZ, Ger- POL INS OSTUF Transp to IV 6 a&b 32 1.75 in Medium blond rehard<br />
Cionc camps, ceding hair, blue<br />
visas, pas-<br />
eyes, wears glasses,<br />
ses'<br />
thick lips.<br />
BATZ, Joachim POL SEK<br />
EIDNANN, Julius<br />
(+) Estimated<br />
Report Ref NO SAIC/1<br />
32?<br />
Preventiv. IV 6 a&b 37?<br />
detention;<br />
filing<br />
SECRET<br />
Dark hair', brown<br />
eyes, very nervous.<br />
Bald, grey eyes,<br />
right leg stiff,<br />
healthy complexion.
Appendix<br />
Name<br />
EWALb<br />
(Cant 'd)<br />
- Cfvilian<br />
Title -.‘<br />
SECRET<br />
ALIGEMEINE<br />
SS'Rank artment .Section A•e + Height( ) Description<br />
- .<br />
-7-Interpreter:. -"AST IV<br />
Grey hair, stocky,<br />
- lc 2<br />
wears civ,clothes,,<br />
.Latvian dialect. .<br />
MUS CH OSCHAF - Personnel<br />
KLEIN, 'sold°.<br />
APPEL, Wilhelmine<br />
Typist<br />
30? 1.70 m Blond, blue eyes,<br />
stocky, broad face.<br />
24 1-.68 in Dark blondo,bluogrey<br />
-eyes, protruding<br />
teeth.<br />
Wail 24, 1.58 in Dark hair, blue eyes,<br />
quiet disposition.<br />
:AI ,BRECHT , Hans • POL . SEX<br />
FREUMNBERGER, - POL SEE<br />
Fritz<br />
AMSTUZ<br />
Finance 42? 1.75 in Blond hair, grey<br />
eyes, slender, bony<br />
• face.<br />
Administration<br />
Admin; food<br />
30?<br />
1.69m<br />
29? 1.80 in<br />
Dark blond, dark<br />
complexion, unstable<br />
disposition, indis<br />
ti-net prOnunciation.<br />
Dark blond, 'grey<br />
eyes, slender,<br />
wears glasses.-<br />
• *GIESS, 'Fritz<br />
Admin<br />
37<br />
1.78m<br />
Light blond hair,<br />
light blue eyes;<br />
strong, energetic<br />
disposition.<br />
WEISS, Gertrud<br />
(47) Eptimated<br />
Report Ref No SAIC/1<br />
Mess Hall<br />
SECRET<br />
32<br />
1.65m<br />
Black hair, blue<br />
eyes, -stout, energetic<br />
manners.<br />
2
Appendix Cont<br />
Name<br />
1.2TZGER,<br />
(1 4 7,414 ,...,<br />
V.L. V .1.-1-J-a1-1.<br />
S-Rank<br />
.SECREf<br />
Section<br />
i ht( .Descri tion<br />
Taack hair, dark eyes,.,' ,<br />
beautiful-te-th';del<br />
cate<br />
ing Manners. -<br />
Black hair, remarka7-<br />
. bly . biue eyes,. long<br />
eyelashes, very slim.<br />
GAI\JITER, Miss<br />
Transp to CC<br />
JENGIER<br />
STATTMAYN ERIE SEK<br />
B6-DIEGER, Helmi<br />
WARLICH; use<br />
(+) Esti:s.ated<br />
Re-pert Ref . /To SAIC/1<br />
Jews iv 5 37 l.73 m Black hair(greying),<br />
black eyes, pointed<br />
face, Swabian dialect.<br />
Jews IV 5 32 1.75.m Greying hair, black<br />
-eyes, fine face,<br />
Viennese_ dialect,<br />
cordial manners.<br />
Jews (typist) IV 5, 22 1.69 m Brunette, blue eyes,<br />
noticeable large mole<br />
on left <strong>for</strong>ehead,<br />
stout.<br />
SECRET<br />
IV 6a & b 23 1.70 m Black.hair, blue<br />
eyes,fine appearance,very<br />
intelligent,<br />
GIRKE's<br />
_girlfriend.
(nnr171,31<br />
SECRET<br />
Civilian ALLGEMEINE<br />
Name<br />
SS Rank- Dc arthcnt -Section A•e Hei•ht Des cri .tion<br />
LABNER,Andreas KRIM OB'SEK -STUSCHLF -1VETAUSLANDER IV :lb 53 1:68 in Almost bald, black cycs,ouc -<br />
of upper • tecth missing,thick<br />
pronunciation.<br />
GTZ,Karl KRIM ASST HSCHAF -TEST:OK:ANDER IV lc 1<br />
29 1.76 in Blond hair,blue cycs,frcsh<br />
complexion,artificial right<br />
leg.<br />
2.7d. I CHBIER,Karl KRIM SEK STUSCHLF W2STiXSLA1'DER IV 1 c 1 41 1.70 in .Dark hair,dark eyes, scar on<br />
back of head, exceptionally<br />
broad hits.<br />
SPIEGEL,Laver STUSCH.LF WESTLUSLANDER IV lc 1 42 1.69 in Bald, exceptiondlly black eyes,<br />
sick appcaranco,Bavarian dialcct<br />
Miss .Intorpreter IV lc 1<br />
KNOLL, Erika<br />
Interpretcr IV lc 1 al 1.70 m Dark blond, hair, blue-eyes,<br />
slonder,bad complexion, two<br />
gold teeth.<br />
wLITHES,Georg KRIM SEX STUSCHLF ORTSLUSLANDER IV lc 2 46 1.75 in Black hair, grey eyes, thick<br />
eyebrows, healthy complexion,<br />
strongly built.<br />
RaY,Michel KRIM SEK 0RTSLUS'IJANDER IV lc 2 -34 1.69 in<br />
Dark blond hair, grey cycs<br />
slim appearanco,pale complexion.<br />
WA.GNER; Karl<br />
40 1.69 t Dark hair,blue eyes,red complexion,scar<br />
on facc,stout.<br />
RETZLR;Seppel • IV lc 2 38 ? 1.75.m Wavy black hair,grey oyes,<br />
(+) Estimated slim,Bavarian dialect.<br />
Report Ref No SIIIC/1<br />
SECRE.T
Lppendix.<br />
••Y''<br />
‘-••••<br />
- EBERT'. •<br />
GLOCE51-2R-,_ Hans<br />
HEUSEL,Georg<br />
BEATHOLD,Hcinrcich<br />
ILLCKS, Heinrich<br />
LEONHLRD, Miss<br />
BRUBACH, Martin<br />
WEBER, LudWiE OB SEK<br />
• (+).Estimatod:<br />
Report Ref No SAIb/1<br />
KRIM OB SEK<br />
Counterespionage<br />
IV 3a & b 1<br />
IV ;a & b 48?<br />
IV 3p & b 26?<br />
Typist "IV 3a & b<br />
Capt(Lrmy) C ountcrespi- IV 3c<br />
onago.War industries<br />
IISTUF<br />
Gird & es- IV la &b<br />
cape;: Communism,-<br />
Marxism:.<br />
:<br />
1.68n,<br />
1.70m<br />
tion<br />
rcying black hai<br />
,- -strong,wears'an'eic4tionally-<br />
: beautifUl-diamend ring on<br />
small finger of lcft-,hand:<br />
1.70 . m - Black hair, dark eycS,scat on<br />
right corner of mouth,<br />
1.70 m- Grey hair,grcs cycs,mustache,-<br />
scar on back of.right.hand,<br />
fficndly disposition.<br />
1.75 m<br />
49.? 1.72 in<br />
Grey hair, grey cycs,pro<br />
, nounced bcllystrongly built,<br />
plump appcarancc.•<br />
Dark -hair, grey cycs,wcars •<br />
glasscs,slin,quict disposition.<br />
Straw-colored hair,dark oyes<br />
slender,stomach ailment,hollow<br />
chccks,ESSEN dialcct.<br />
Dark blond,somcwhat bald,bluc<br />
cycs,round face.<br />
1.70 in<br />
.Black hair,grey eyes,heart<br />
mcnt,strongly built,qdict dis<br />
position.
ECHEL;Meriechen<br />
im'Dark blond,grey e<br />
.Black hair, black<br />
plexion, slim.<br />
Blond bair,bluc<br />
complexion.<br />
:IIJ GESTAPO AU SSENDIENSTELLE (Foreign Scrvica Post); DARMSTADT/<br />
eyes,light corn-<br />
ayes<br />
Grey hair, grey oyes, stocky, tip of<br />
_right hand middle finger missing.<br />
Dark blond hair,<br />
Dark blond hair, protruding teeth,<br />
.Brunettc, grey eyes, strong appearance,<br />
energetic manners.<br />
- Black hair, dark eyes, palci slendei,
- „ - ,<br />
.. ..<br />
. : - 1. ::- r.r..-__•-.1=7,-,:- -,.- -' - *.l' e , • : :7f•-...:;•1` .74'' .,-..%.3iir.•;•!•trnr.:...- t;:.-4<br />
• .-"7:ii D 11 e nd i * '.7 I -,.Cciriti-ril-,7,;,,;.AZ:•:fr,...eviN4ar;:fiz,-;<br />
4WigVCI:iiiItiiiii<br />
4••••<br />
'•<br />
a..rikt;* -thae<br />
•<br />
,<br />
• -<br />
• '• -<br />
•<br />
,:s:•--"-*4;. • - - - - ,E-re -<br />
• -8-ri; • - ,<br />
.<br />
4-DeScri<br />
-<br />
r • -<br />
1,1 -<br />
;<br />
black - _<br />
rif:a hair,<br />
4fac-e-check -<br />
-<br />
c3:.~Dark hair, flat nose i s--stout. .<br />
3 r<br />
• •<br />
-F,E-PPAL<br />
ICES CH<br />
T_IMIKUHIM<br />
V.T EGER<br />
AgEti ,<br />
S<br />
:<br />
Helthch<br />
FRIA! SEE<br />
• • • ■ ' • •<br />
11Tif . Not SS..<br />
• itRiia. SE•••<br />
,<br />
,.GEST.LPO - AUSSINDIENSTSTELLE (Foreign Service Post), GIESSEN<br />
,HSTUF - - 45<br />
•7as relieved by 56 1.67 M<br />
PEL •<br />
.45 1.75 in<br />
V., GE S T.1.20 1.IISSENKOMMI,NDO (Foreign Service Lig) , WORMS<br />
HS TUF<br />
45 1.58 III<br />
- -<br />
GEST.LPO LUSSENDIENSTSTEME (Foreign Service Post)<br />
. , .<br />
•<br />
• .<br />
-- 33 1,66 m<br />
Greying heir, fat -, -.rears<br />
-glasses. -<br />
. Dark hair, slender.<br />
• • •<br />
•<br />
• . "<br />
•<br />
•<br />
1.63 -m, Brunette, dark eyes,- high -<br />
cheek bones , slander.<br />
Dark hair, grey eyes, fat,<br />
stocky.<br />
HISLU<br />
•<br />
Dark blond hair, stocky.<br />
43? ' 1.70 m Dark blond hair, slender.<br />
- 1.75_ - Black hair, slender.<br />
slender.<br />
'<br />
•<br />
•<br />
.<br />
•••<br />
••.•.,<br />
. , •<br />
,•••'-‘•<br />
w•;..• • 'TT:a; „. , •<br />
-• .
Appendix (CuilL.'d)<br />
Civilian _ALLGEMEINE<br />
Nanib Title . SS Rank Department Section Lge (4- ) Hc ight (-0 Descri_ptimi<br />
BRANER<br />
SOMMER<br />
ERIKSEK<br />
rim _SEX<br />
•<br />
1.70 m,<br />
Blackliair,-dark brown eyes<br />
slender, self-assured;<br />
Black hair, brown oyes, stout,<br />
fresh complexion, good appearance.<br />
ZORN, Lulu<br />
Typist<br />
23 1.60 m Red hair,-blue eyes, stout,<br />
wears glasses.<br />
VIII. REITJEAT N - GEGNER N_ICHaICHTENDIENST (Enemy Signals), BENSHEIM, LEMLIMPLLTZ (Lgents recruited by Ref N<br />
:--<br />
worked in ILINZ, BINGEN, WORMS, DARMSTADT, and GROSS UMSTEDT)<br />
BHA, Bruno _KRIM SEK<br />
.36 1.68 m Light blond hair, light blue<br />
oyes, nervous, flat nose,<br />
Saxon dialect.<br />
KNORZER, Erna lately in FRANKFURT 31 1.71 m<br />
FRISCH<br />
SNTLIK<br />
HEERWAGEN -<br />
KRIM SEK<br />
KRIM SEX<br />
SECRET<br />
X. REF= N, Sub-Sec WORMS<br />
33? -<br />
•<br />
45?<br />
IX. REFERAT N, Sub-Sec BINGEN<br />
43<br />
33<br />
45 1.65 in<br />
•<br />
1.73 in<br />
1.70 in<br />
Black hair, black eyes, long<br />
pale face, arrog-Int manners.<br />
Dark blond hair, strong build.<br />
Black hair, dark eyes, Polish<br />
citizen, speaks sote German.<br />
arev hair, slmder, ver y intolligOnt,<br />
speaks French; rurniture<br />
store KARLSTR 1, DARMSTLDT.<br />
PETRI KRIM ASST 29 1.76 m Dark blond hair, grey eyes, slim.<br />
XI. INSPECTOR FOR RSHA, BERLIN, PRINZ ALBRECHT STR. 8-9<br />
ACHMER-PIEFRADER,<br />
(+) Estimated<br />
Report Ref No SAI<br />
Dx (<strong>for</strong>merly Chief of GESTAPO Hq, DARMSTADT 48<br />
and INSPECTEUR WIESBADEN)<br />
C/1<br />
SECRET<br />
• 1.80 in Dark blond hair, very good<br />
appearance.<br />
8
Lppendix Cont l d)<br />
• Civilian-<br />
Name .<br />
SECRE T.<br />
Descri<br />
STRLUCH<br />
brown-_oyes,scar<br />
On left part af.face,healthy<br />
teeth,good appearance,very lively.<br />
FRIEDRICHS<br />
-STUBL<br />
1.78 m<br />
Dark blond,slender,quiot person.<br />
ISSELHORST,, Erich<br />
Dr<br />
EHRLINGER,Erich<br />
SCHILLING, Dr.<br />
MHLHEI1IZR,XPT1<br />
MUILER,Llfred<br />
MILIIR,Gerhard<br />
GEHB,Earl REG 0 INSP<br />
WILEE,Lrtur<br />
DIRLEWLNGER<br />
C-0: Estimated<br />
Report Ref Ne RtTr1/1-<br />
•<br />
OSTUBLF 38 1.75 m<br />
STLF Now in BERLIN, RSHL 32 1.80 m<br />
LETSCHEF<br />
STUBLF<br />
Lator chief investigator<br />
at GESTLPO Hq, WIESBLIEN<br />
37 1.70m<br />
08TUBLF 35 1..65 m<br />
"USTUF 46 1.60 m<br />
—USTUF<br />
35 1.65 m<br />
HSTUF 45 1.70.m<br />
ESTUF<br />
SONDERZOWILNDO leader<br />
against , partisans<br />
34 1..70 m-<br />
OSTUF SD 38 . 1.73 m<br />
Greying hair,light blue oyes,stout,<br />
very intelligent ,hard worker, good<br />
appearance.<br />
Black hairidark eyes,slender,<br />
good.appearence,ambitious.<br />
Dark blond,wears glasses,scar on<br />
left part of face,very intelligent,<br />
•<br />
Light blond hair,light blue eyes,<br />
slender, energetic.<br />
Bald,dark complexion,wears glasses,<br />
fat ,quiet disposition.<br />
Dark blond,stout,good looking.<br />
Black hair,dark eyestslender,<br />
quiet disposition..<br />
Black hair,dark eyes ,tall,slendo,<br />
heavy drinker.<br />
•<br />
Dark hair, slendor;sne.ppy appearance.<br />
9
NA WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT<br />
20t* 0 /<br />
' Reif No SAIO/2<br />
10 Apr 45<br />
I. SOURCE.:<br />
SECRET THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE 1.115—°4°E.74Q9,7<br />
DO NOT DETACH<br />
• SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER<br />
APO 758 1<br />
US ARMY<br />
THE 20 JULY PUTSCH<br />
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY<br />
CENTRAL INTELL IGENCE AGENCY<br />
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT I °NMI)<br />
NAZI WAR CRINESDISCLOGIIRE AC1<br />
DATE 2001 2007<br />
VON PFUHLSTEIN, Alexander, GENMAJ a.D. (retired) has been a professional soldier<br />
since 1917, but he acts and talks like a bubinessman rather than a German<br />
general. He iø related by birth and marridge.to many k faMily of German high<br />
nobility. However, he is not A land owner, does not have independent sources<br />
of income, and has been living on his soldiers' pay. He sesms to be strongly under<br />
the influence of his wife. He has six cllildren, all of whom are being<br />
brought up not to believe in the ideas of soldiering or of Netional Socialism.<br />
At the time of the interviews source was highly nervous and excited, due to<br />
the fact, he explained, that he had gone tl-srough a great deal Of suffering and<br />
that, at last, he considered himself oitt of danger. He talked freely and without<br />
hesitation Or 'doubt en any subject, and his otory is believed to be accurate<br />
and to the best of his knowledge.<br />
Gen VON PFUHLSTEIN is extremely ar...aue to be employed by the Allies in any<br />
capacity. .<br />
RatinK: . 43-2, Date of In<strong>for</strong>aation: See Text Interrogator: W.M.B.<br />
II. P IWONAL HISTORY<br />
17 Dec 1899 Born in Danzig.<br />
1912 7 1917 KADETTENANSTALT (Military . Academy) P02SD.;ss.1-LICHTERFELDE.<br />
19 Mar 1917 Entered Army as FAEHNRICH with 4 Guard Regt.<br />
14 Dec 1917 Commissioned LT.<br />
1918 In 100,000-man Army.<br />
1 Apr 1925 Promoted to 0/LT.<br />
1 Apr 1933 Promoted to HPTM.<br />
1933 Secondary General Staff position to the Arty FUR III, BERLIN.<br />
1935 CO, JAEGER Co in HIRSCHBERG/Silesia.<br />
1936- 1937 Ic,XI Corps, HANOVER.<br />
1937 Promoted to 03STLT.<br />
1938 Ia, 19 Div.<br />
1939 ,Ia, 58 Div<br />
1941 00,154 Inf Regt, Eastern Front.<br />
1 Feb 1942 Promoted to OBST.<br />
1 Feb 1943 CO,BRANDEN3URG Div.<br />
1 Jul 1943 Promoted to GENMAJ.<br />
1 Apr 1944 Relieved of command because of political unreliability.<br />
1 Jul 1944 CG,50 Div, Eastern Front.<br />
18 Jul 1944 Wounded.<br />
1 . Aug 1944 CG in charge of defensive <strong>for</strong>tifications, H0HENSTEIN-0RTELS3URGER-<br />
1JALD, East Prussia, order of Gen GUDERIAN.<br />
1 Sep 1944 Arrested by SD because of participation in plot against HITLER<br />
on 20 July 44.<br />
14 Sep 1944 Officially dismissed from Army and imprisoned in BERLIN.<br />
24 Nov 1944 Transferred from BERLIN Prison to KUESTRIN Prison (Concentration<br />
Camp <strong>for</strong> officers politically unfavorable to HITLER).<br />
30 Jan 1945 Dismissed froa prison, whore he was under HIi ,LLER's custody as<br />
a political prisoner.<br />
2 Apt 1945 Suriendered voluntarily to an American .unit at WERTHEIM.<br />
Present address: KREUVERTHEIM, near WERTHEIM/Main. In the castle of his<br />
cousin TUERST zu LOVENSTEIN-ITRTHEIM-FRELIDENBERG.<br />
SECRET<br />
1
: • .<br />
FrI STZ eepe.-O4al,ly .shocked by the fact that losses in men which ran into.'::.<br />
1.12" ci .r. d va tili;i4siaide ' as ...it STALINGRAD, did not make the slightest impreiiiion,<br />
:H-IlTse.L.**. 4<br />
■•<br />
v.,,■ ZEITZLEB; Yearned within those short weeks to recognize • HITLER' s• • :<br />
x '..- to :'',e • .<br />
. • . . and . to hate. and despise . him because of his Personal char —s,-<br />
. ,<br />
q. .:0":pf,12,4t.X8 .4)1.4 ,3'6hC..was., not yet thinking about the overthrowing of the FUEMEA'.<br />
Heratthet4c74,iis,idelije'cl-It his .duty, 'dome what ram, to remain at his Post..<br />
'fii',:aiii:BSC:i ..3:t'aiIity' of the Collapse was . painfully clear to him and to the ()fel-.<br />
ko, Cor:E.I .:9±.'0.110,Pers:-.4:onS] ,<br />
Sea. . They continued to work out of a sense .of dUty; , '<br />
,e..nd.,..withOu'Veinyi,hope<br />
'41ommtunc)<br />
i ..<br />
itt.:Oita'thie ' ..impression to Admiral CANARIS; the ,decision<br />
*VP/ ,..»,,;;"' vAti .. - -,.. . . . • • —,<br />
VIELE1 reache d<br />
, .<br />
..t.toi,/ ,;.41 o 'tEITZL 1.3Bdt. the plans. .<br />
A .,1X-<br />
.4,.4%;•:, •<br />
-let) :141.1`'4:• l'.....'.%::.':. ' . , '<br />
....Intt: 'et ..egir,s'skifIxthe4,.y.ear 1943, particularly in the fall and winterithe,<br />
M '• i '11q1::?14iii:P.i,t0;ii, li I T I, 71 ,' . ripened: There were various .idese.":.9,e'',-ta . 't,hei,,-;$<br />
'344.001.44,41,Y,i,lr, =0..p.2 . . .For a long time it was hoped . that 4.4.:..ropo-tz:4..i,<br />
i4114441.7.4.Vg .,i,Pne•.'0±" HITLER i s so-called' "visits to theifiorit",..,.'<br />
, ITLER ! e.:,tVisits'usually carried him only as<br />
•-,11!^ ' 3.'.:' ' ' , , • . i fir. as<br />
.<br />
,,,121:4i;dOU<br />
'q,iii to.i:; a e well as at 4.rri,y oGroup SOUTH preparations<br />
'11'<br />
' .<strong>for</strong><br />
, .waiti<br />
in<br />
did'r:' not 'come co pass, because HITLER 'O'Ould,::ne.ii<br />
Ti<br />
41;,,,:41,O).'.12e.kee. visit to l'. the front', Thus the decieion::Wee:i,:gridi477.,,,,k,„.6:,,,,<br />
., 4.21g441.iaut,:,the : overthrow of HITLER, and if possibl.e.,led,lith1/4,A.A.V,i,i'.:'<br />
,<br />
v. ■ r.)<br />
, ,,...c.,A. .<br />
11,04ii.,,,,41,46i..,,:<br />
.:51.eteriV.on 7 .<br />
,<br />
I had ocoasiOn to<br />
,t_<br />
speak to thei--fdllowing-<br />
lef.:4„\aol„.:ealv „.prisOners, like myself:: OBST VON OANNPT,g.P.4,-:;06*-ein7-;k:'•i_<br />
SION744.5:B11043, 7.11G;:.: MAJ VON•HASSELT, eon of the<br />
11P-...<br />
diplomat, and MAJ44<br />
?,ai.,f;,, t,.„.0.,.:,ri,e, - f , d. :ii;4' i.. ‘a.reh,a3,., '<br />
T hese ise • thre e officers<br />
. wore, apprehended:140),<br />
• w- I . 0 vf. 8,3<br />
rereltlirp-4.,d';gi,,Ve,:isadetailed ad cpunt of the<br />
ilingr attempted 'ekeeUtion.?tta.,_<br />
."k4Vo'ii ..-i:,:,::p'art of the story, as far as I can<br />
VON reali;*:Tii<br />
swkiii-..,, , -- , E.1, 8 ••••:.tole: . .- "-<br />
• • , .<br />
T OF,,MBERG, as :0 of S:to the Commander of tho ReplaceMent.:.<br />
%•?:e;,.FT.I.STRFA.:1 liq,t;O: give an account on the<br />
Thip.i<br />
state'-. ..6f ..:,the ',.:<br />
../..epiirt'yreis to 1 be • delivered as part of<br />
..(<br />
'the...''66.7.C.11ed:=,,:<br />
L4,GEB.E3pRECHUNG)....in '<br />
tpel, ,,O0ip which HITLER, KEITEL, JODI4:1EIZZL:Efl,;'<br />
.e.irs. took<br />
,,,<br />
., part daily. Often' HIMi<br />
,07<br />
.v.ILER , and occasionally<br />
.xma<br />
e:vpKki3ikriV.,-.:,..7;STAUFF.WBGi:had ..*.if<br />
,i •<br />
no control over<br />
t 1..9.., 14*4,613..e...',.:::On the des thp:app0A4t11.14,ik;N<br />
ignated day STAUFFENBEG .<br />
fdiF,; .<br />
fle.w.'iin:}48;;944, ,....t,i<br />
::. to •;,,,' • ..",' ..AV<br />
li4er-fit '(:)F.UE1-LtiF4/1.;,:Hq:•at. Lotrzitrp .:1,a,st mfrsW<br />
,. t''''' 1' • ''.-:".,-; :,: %:- V • , .! • : • 7 • .. , •<br />
Prussia.'<br />
.<br />
He had<br />
alkle:rg<br />
,ilith--1114a, •large, , ,..t..,4-. CY r 4,••• 1...<br />
t'.:,-.'''4''..,,A,0'!<br />
It<br />
EwgraRhe ,' .<strong>for</strong>':;.his ri0Ort, and also a briefoase with.. eistrpng C'4' ,p<br />
1510<br />
o7:f..4f:t3i,4arriving :;!tt . the ::<br />
. ore<br />
FUEHRER<br />
ererieeN.-.40I.would .<br />
.Hq,STAUFF'DIButgl,deeia-ted'.i'iliii7-;<br />
.,$:,,,;•, have to go into the donferenca room t;o,,lay.:Oizt'..::. .:,■..,<br />
!DM BM<br />
.14,i,.. hm **At, -4..<br />
rapḥhis4i;:evy%;:pi.,,v.:,,,i,Ș.1%,..U, IT,.ENB ER. G. :'heid the opportunity, immediately..,be<strong>for</strong>e-,<br />
COnfte 4/10<br />
+04:-,re.<br />
t.,..04g0..f!...13..1gt0,iiritci,:.:t.:Iiii "edinf .<br />
„tab,le<br />
erenee rooM. He' spread his<br />
atotthe:;yiewSof:,;thet'floOr;:,: lie/loath the table was obstraCted.%<br />
miaPP;'‘pl.r.e:".'1.0''n''rFr5rzil<br />
1-m<br />
Under<br />
3ici . 9. kwa , ;it:p.:1404f In v. r.0..,..t is::0,a, 0,i4{4::6<br />
t • • ,<br />
,...1<br />
,4•FIA■4 ri 6,14:i 81 .1:1_,1 he,.•ple.oad the briefcase with the ..explosiVe"<br />
''.ht-x-74P)''an rMR.:14W,?--..,ig4f0',..,...::., .::'...:-. .. . . ...<br />
, S. inc:erth. i-t6ation'.i 4plifer.enCea usually . ..<br />
TwaIsti'A'ti'ḍ:.<br />
lasted several hours, .and ' STA,UFF ....,<br />
Ihe<br />
report-i.,:itWas not noticeable that he loft the<br />
egofkt/i.#6.6nterenCe::,y<br />
'.F.LTEHEI.I .<br />
.,WithoU.t:waiting <strong>for</strong><br />
4P11.511:<br />
the explosion he...fle.4.3idie<br />
pc *laa.:tirenVlioilkieCCte,Qtli ive . ;;;I ik;.., , , - , . ,,.):,; OLBRIOHT . that the assaesination<br />
j' '<br />
viiis,!iocOnl-,;;*,
GENOBSZ .BE0kGENOBS T BEON then said, substantially, "I aci not sufficiently , I ■• • • : ,:‘<br />
in<strong>for</strong>Medgaiding tho details of the situation in the Army Group NORTH. Howovor,;:::H.':' ';•<br />
... .,- -,<br />
" . I:esigii4n000ho following diroctions <strong>for</strong> the further conduct of tho strugglo<br />
- Take":.CarothatArmy Group NORTH under no circumstances be out off and lose oon-<br />
. tact ,),With-. ; t4oREIOH. If nocossary the Army Group front must be withdrawn towards ".:'..<br />
list Priiieialith those words the conversation ended. It can be assumod that<br />
GEkOBSTOON",:fiGEN.DER.07 OLBRIOHT, and OBST VON STAUFFENBERG.gave numorous or-<br />
. der -SAAP4rOCtives in the same vein. Thus it was oasy <strong>for</strong> the SD later / to grab'<br />
IllAWF011ta4O:of:all officers connocted with the case, since through . tho un-;:'-<br />
0,' ,i,,,. cAlz: • • •<br />
aP.P 0.13.4: the attomptod assassination practically all the cards wore on ..<br />
!tiIiii.:.=',t0k4I,d4.4;,:,•'<br />
,<br />
:••••■•,t..<br />
,',...,A=Nic. nȯ.--tmnaro w-.-'d;many officors who woro not immodirtoly approhondod, thoir norvos,<br />
8 :tra.141.0 d 1pr .:pontal uncortainty, bought and found death on tho front or through , .:. ,<br />
Bi.4400T11,0wasftho case of OBST VON VOSS, 0 of S I Army Group Oontbr,and pre'<br />
ibli51.ySs' 9 t:11734:.yoN KOEHNV and HPTM Helmut p inVIT of BRANDWBURG Div. SoMo Of,-..,.:,!,k,g7<br />
.'.. -fiSo:etp 14 :i.*I:ri4 :0i . MAJ VON HAGSELT, ara of tho opinion that a high poroontage of the ACii:.P<br />
officers involved in the plot woroVdeized by the SD and that porhaps only onoH:...:J'- 4<br />
.i fifth-Werolift; I personally know of only ono, GENLT VON ROST, 0 of 8, III Corps' 1-<br />
in,MIJINhe was definitoly involved in the preparations <strong>for</strong> the eoup. UntiA..'<br />
.recentlYhPas'OG HOOH-UND DEUTS0H --;71 Div on the Eastern front ) EAST of<br />
:II3MNA.' .., ,At:first instrumental in the plans <strong>for</strong> the ovorthrow of HITLZR, he'latol<br />
.get celd ,. foot" and stopped aside".<br />
.<br />
' 72-<br />
.<br />
• 'n::%.-"..; ',. ,-, '<br />
, '.:,,•,''• ,r, -,1...1-' - ■ . .<br />
,7t „Ism:PR isofq ;:.- BERLIN<br />
•i ! ':,,ty<br />
.."177-77 • 7"7"--" .. Alp<br />
• , •;, 4<br />
. A .,•: ,..,Onklipp;t1nLwas arrested by the SD, thrown into the AS11;1 Prison, 13.711LIN,<br />
, ALBTIA:011,014§§E) and shackled. The prison coils wore located along two cOrri4i&<br />
. 'ders141thd:7411ar.: I was confinod to Coll No 13 from 1 Sopt to 24 Nov: 30 sin<br />
-glOXceI1evWerociccupiod. In this SD prison I saw the following persons, somo.of<br />
• ••••■• • •<br />
-Whticamie'40knew personally, and others whom I knew only by sight.<br />
••• :• •
SEORET<br />
x) OBSTLT GRAF VON KIELMANNSEGG, 0 of S in tho Operations Soo, OKH. Confined<br />
nor me in Coll No 12 <strong>for</strong> six weeks, thon roloasod becauso of insuffioiont ovi -<br />
donce. Is supposed to have connand of an armd rogt now.<br />
xi) GULT SPEIDEL, 0 of S, 0BERBTFTHL6HABER WTST, under RUNDSTEDT and KLUGE.<br />
Detained only <strong>for</strong> a very fow days. I mot him again later in tho KUESTRIN For -<br />
tress.<br />
xii) My personal friond,PRINZ P,RNST AUGUST VON HANNOVER. Is supposed to have boon<br />
rclolsod subsoquontly. Ho is probably with his parents in BLikZENBURG/HARZ.<br />
xlii) The two personal adjutants of GENOBST ZEITZLER, OBSTLT SMEND and tho other,<br />
whoso namo is unknown to mo. SMEND was to be hanged or shot lator.<br />
There woro 32 Small single coils in all,ancrduring my stay at tho prison mpst<br />
of thorn wore continuously occupiod. As soon as one occupant was hangod anothor<br />
was brought in.<br />
About. 200 to 300 persons wero hold in the lirison of the Criminal Court in MOA -<br />
BIT, BERLIN. All of thoso wore confined beecvaso of participation in tho 20 July.<br />
incident. Among those 200 persons woro numerous other officers, mombers of tho<br />
Foroigh Offidor economists, merchants, intolloctuals. .1nother prison was located<br />
in FNIMSTENBERG. In all the largor citios the jails woro filled with similar<br />
porsonalitios. Those woro all somehow involved, or suspected of having bon involved<br />
in thb 20 July affair. GENOBST ZMTZLER was probably also apprehondod.<br />
His wheroaboUts aro unknown to mo. BERLIN lawyer, whoso name has escaped me,<br />
was asked <strong>for</strong> adviCo by my wifo. This lawyer, who wus woll in<strong>for</strong>med on thoso<br />
mattors, told my wife that in his estimation about 5, 2000persons had been arrested<br />
in connection with the 20 July incidont".<br />
VIII. FORTRESS OF KUESTRIN<br />
"On 24 Nov I was transferred from '„,ie RUA Prison to the KUESTRIN Fortress.<br />
Here the 3CHLOSSKASERNE was designated as a concentration camp <strong>for</strong> politically<br />
unreliable officers. 'There were about 25 persons in KUESTRIN among whom I recall<br />
the following:<br />
i) GEN DER KAV VON ESEBEOX; last assignment: Acting OG in VIENNA;<br />
ii) GTNLT SINZIGER, Commandant of VITrNA;<br />
iii) GTNMAJ VON STUELPNAGTL, Siegfried, discharged. Last assignment: Commandant<br />
of STETTIN.<br />
iv)<br />
GTNLT SPEIDTL, 0 of S, OB WEST;<br />
v) MM VON HASSELT;<br />
vi) MAJ VON KLUGE, son of the Field Marshal;<br />
v%i) OBSTLT HOEPPNER;<br />
HPTM VON PAULUS, son of the Field<br />
tx) OBST CANNSTEINx Commandant of the<br />
Marshal;<br />
Cav School, BROMBERG.<br />
When the Russians stood be<strong>for</strong>e the<br />
<strong>for</strong>tress of KUESTRIN was evacuated in<br />
in utter rashness. I myself was able<br />
gates of KUSSTRIN on 30 Jan 45, the<br />
panic, and many of the prisoners released<br />
to go home. The fate of the other officers<br />
SEORET<br />
6
•
twitzj WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT<br />
^<br />
THIS Is 44 rri.li'yP445-1k1B0 —e0/25';37'<br />
DO t:CT<br />
1" . ;<br />
Ref N SAIO/5<br />
11 Apr 45<br />
6 E R-E T<br />
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER<br />
APO 758 US ARMY<br />
HIGH-RANKING GERMAN ARMY PERSONALITIES<br />
SECRET<br />
:Auth: CO SAIO<br />
:Init:<br />
:bate:<br />
SOURCE<br />
VO STEI,N, Alexander, GENMAJ a.D. (retired). Involved in the 26 July<br />
incident and imprisoned by HIMMLER, source considers himself at last out of<br />
danger and talks freely on.any subject. He is anxious to cooperate with the<br />
Allies (See Report Ref No SAI0/2).<br />
Ratin B-2 Date of In<strong>for</strong>mation: Beg 45 Interrogator: W.M.B.<br />
a) Field Marshals and Generals<br />
LIST OF GERMAN ARMY PERSONALITIES<br />
i) Field Marshal KEITELr GENOBST JODL, GENIT WARLIMONT - According to PW the<br />
three most important personalities in the WEHRMAORT,-are well known to source.<br />
, They are . unscrupulous men, cowardly, lazy, InAtilling to sacrifice themselves.<br />
They worship HITLER to the last and have betrayed the Army to him.<br />
JODL -Very narrow-minded, a typical, armchair general; he never realized<br />
that his orders were impossible to ....-ecute; held his unit commanders responsible<br />
<strong>for</strong> all setbacks and denounced xliem to HITLER; his main shortcoming was<br />
the inability to see the incompetence of HITLER as a military leader.<br />
WARLIMONT - A good society man, knows languages fluently, a "smooth operator<br />
!' (AALGLATT); if necessary he can work with people of every political belief;<br />
he has no fixed line and changes his mind very easily. .<br />
ii) VON'BRAWHITSCH, Field Marshal - Opposed to HITLER but not outspokenly anti-<br />
HITLER; Jfe , Waa undOubtedlyeuspeCted.of sympathizing with . the generals of the<br />
20 July plot. . However, he emphatically denounced the 20 July affair in a newspaper'<br />
article and hailed the apPointmont of HIMMLER as Chief of the Replacement<br />
Army, thuasa4ing hia life.<br />
iii) VONNANNSTEIN, Field Marshal - Probably the most gifted military leader, in<br />
Germany $aa no clear-cut political beliefti. Afraid to take part in the 20 July<br />
events; •he now pretends that he knew nothing about them.<br />
iv) FREIHERR VON WEICHS, Field Marshal - At heart an enemy of HITLER, he clearly<br />
recognizes the crimes which HITLER committed against the German people. Yet,<br />
against his principles and beliefs, he was the first to sign a written oath of -<br />
loyalty t6-,HITLER:.<br />
v) BUSOH, Field Marshal . - Of little importance as a military personality; a<br />
typical:100% Nazi general; worships HITLER completely.<br />
vi) VON BOOK, Field Marshal - At heart against HITLER, he is too ill with stomach<br />
trouble and too cautious to take an active part in the elimination of the<br />
FUEHRER.<br />
vii) MODEL, Field Marshal - An evil, ambitious and characterless person, whose<br />
actions are dictated solely by his personal ambitions. He has an incredible<br />
lack of consideration <strong>for</strong> his subordinates. Worships HITLER.<br />
viii) KESSELRING, Field Marshal - There is consAderable doubt as to his military<br />
ability. ROMMEL and many other generals in'Africa hated him or laughed at the<br />
military measures he took. His incredible optimism did not reflect the actual<br />
SECRET<br />
4ECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED 0;<br />
CENTRAL 1NTELLIENCE ASPIC,<br />
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT! OHM?,<br />
NAN . WAR CR ImES DISCLOSURE ACT<br />
DA1E . 2001 2007
SECRET<br />
state of affairs. He sent optimistic reports regarding the situation in Africa<br />
to HITLER from ROME; the troops in Africa suffered 'considerably as a result of<br />
his leadership.<br />
•<br />
ix) ZEITZLER, GENOBST - Took over the post of 0 of S, Army High Command, full<br />
p f idealism and confidence in HITLER, but within a few weeks he learned to recognize<br />
HITLER's incompetence as a military leader and his mean bharaoter.<br />
ZEITZLER was particularly shocked to find that HITLER was eompletelyindiffernt<br />
to the death and misery of hundreds of _thousands of German.soldiers.-:He<br />
hated and despised the FUEHRER, but could not bring himself to the decision to<br />
overthrow him.<br />
b),General Staff Officers (Of GERMAN GENERAL STAFF OFFICERS, MIRS(b)/RL/haS/18/44)<br />
Note: (*) indicates promotion known to sourco since publidatiolyof.<br />
Seniority List of 1 May 44.<br />
(#) indicates that the name does NCT appoar, in the above<br />
publication.<br />
:. ) . ALDINGER, MAJ<br />
Son of Gen LADINGER who livos in FREUDENSTADT,<br />
Black Forest.<br />
* ii.) VON BENTIVEGYI, GENMAJ Div commander. Previously he was active in the<br />
A/MHR.<br />
iii) VON BILA, OBSTLT<br />
* iv) BIRCK, OBST<br />
v) VON BOEHMER, OBSTLT<br />
# vi) TREUSCH VON BUTTLAR-<br />
BRANDENFELD, GENAAJ<br />
(Believed NOT to be the<br />
one on the list)<br />
vii) BRENDEL, .joaOhiM;<br />
OBSTLT<br />
viii) BRUDERMUELLER, MAJ<br />
BUCHER, ()BST<br />
x, SCHULZE-BUETTGER, OBST<br />
xi) GRAF ZU OASTELL-<br />
• CA'JTELL, OBSTLT<br />
Probably Ia of a div.<br />
Related to BLOMBERG. He is in the•QUARTIERAEISTER<br />
ABT of an army. •<br />
Related to HUGENBERG; ho was seriously injurod,on<br />
the Eastern Front and is probably. no with<br />
a combat units •<br />
Since a few years it tho•ArmY'Oporations See, ,Joint<br />
Operations Staff,. and an important collaborator<br />
with JODL. Very Olovor and about<br />
tho WEHRMACHTSFUELRUNG, he sees all'its.woak -<br />
points and thoso or HITLER, but is too clever and<br />
cautious to state bloarly his opinions.<br />
Ia bffi410t with no .<br />
•<br />
In the:ArmyApotations Sec, Joint Oporaiibns Staff.<br />
Export 'on Balkan affairs. .Born inWUERZBURG,. is<br />
known to haVo democratic ideas; his opinion of<br />
HITLER unknown.<br />
Killed in 1944 on the Eastorn Front Whorb ho . was<br />
Rogtl CO.<br />
Hanged as a roiult of his patticipation in the<br />
20 July plot. Last assignmont: Ia, Army Group<br />
SOUTH,<br />
/a of a 3IC -0=MS it thd EAST. Nickname:<br />
uTOENT'.<br />
•<br />
SE.Q.RET'
.3 E. C R. E T<br />
•<br />
xii) COSSMAN, OBST ..,For , a long time C of S to GEN STUELPNAGEL; now<br />
of . 3 of a corps.<br />
xiii) VON GROLLMANN (Rank un-<br />
# known) (NOT the one on .<br />
the list)<br />
Marriod; . has six childron. Previously C of S,<br />
Second Pz . Army. in the Balkans; lately 0 of S,<br />
Armyproup SOUTH, under VON WEICHS.<br />
xiv)<br />
ON HOBE, Heinz, OBSTLT Relative of GENOBST HiLDER; probably loads the remnants<br />
of 4 div pn the Western front.<br />
xv) KEITEL, MAJ . Son of the Field Marshal; unimportant as a military<br />
figure; Is on tho Gonoral Staff Officors' list<br />
solely bocauso of tho position of his father.<br />
xvi) KLEIKAMP, OBST Important personality. He works in the HEERESPER-<br />
. SONALAMT (Army Personnel Office) and is concerned<br />
with the General Ei,aff Officers' files.<br />
rvii) LAHOUSEN, GENMAJ Austrian, active officer of the Austrian Army who<br />
was absorbed by the German Army after the, occupation<br />
of Austria. Worked in ABWEHR both <strong>for</strong> the Austrian<br />
and German Armies. Lately sec chief in the ABWEHR,<br />
now CG of an inf div.<br />
ndii) LASSEN, Ernst August, Ia to GEN WEISS, OG Second Army; probably captured in<br />
OBST East Prussia.<br />
xix) VON LINSTROM, OBST<br />
Hanged because of his participation in the 20 July<br />
plot. Successor to COSSMANN, C of S to . the C in<br />
C, Franco. His wife and two children are living in<br />
MUNIOH.<br />
xx) BARON FREYTAG VON ' . ComMitted suicide after the 20 July plot. Was AB-<br />
LORINGHOVEN, MAJ WEHR se6 chief. His wife and three children are<br />
living in SALZBURG.<br />
xxl VON LOSSBERG, OBST Son of the well-known GENOBST VON LOSSBERG Of the<br />
World War. C of S of a corps in Norway. He fell<br />
into disgrace . because of some political remarks<br />
and his promotion was held back.<br />
xii) NIEFOLD, OBSTLT Killed on the Eastern front in 1944.<br />
xiii)GRAF VON NOSTITZ, OBST 0 of S of the Division Commanders' School in HIRSCH-<br />
BERG.<br />
xiv) OSTER, MM Son of GENMAJ OSTER. He is Is. of a div on the Italian<br />
front.<br />
xxv) PALTZO, OBST Was ABWEHRSTELLEFLEITER in DRESDEN until 1939.<br />
xvi) RADKE, OBST<br />
In the OKH. Was HAUPTREFERENT (Chief Adviser) <strong>for</strong><br />
Nazi indoctrination in the Army, directed the NSFO .<br />
School. A confirmed Nazi, he was nevertheless<br />
suspected of having been connected with the 20 July<br />
plot. He was imprisoned <strong>for</strong> four weeks in the<br />
RSHA Prison, and then released, reportedly completely<br />
SECR2 T<br />
3
SECRET<br />
Xxvii) RAMER, OBST<br />
xxviU0 REINHARDT, Hellmuth,<br />
'OBSTxxix)<br />
SASS, OBSTLT,<br />
xxx) SAUERBRUCH; OBSTLT<br />
xxxi) SOHOENE, OBST<br />
xxxii) SCHROETTER, OBSTLT<br />
xxxiA) SCHWATLO-GESTERDING,<br />
OBST<br />
xxxiv) SEMPER, MAJ<br />
xxxv) SMEND, OBSTLT<br />
xxxvi) UIAS, OBST<br />
xiXvii) VON vpss, OBSTLT<br />
', Sapply expert in the QUARTIERMEISTERABT of: an army<br />
..group.<br />
' Was'4 of S to Gen.OLBRICHT, Who had him relieved<br />
• • .bild6u6e he was not euitable <strong>for</strong>.taktng.part'in<br />
the 20 July plot. GRAF STAUFFENBERGAook his<br />
place.<br />
Lately Ia of 58 . Inf Div, he was seriously wounded<br />
in Russia. He lost a leg and is probably no longer<br />
in the service.<br />
Son of the famous physician; holder of Knights'<br />
Cross. Was <strong>for</strong> some time Ic (G-2) of Second Pz<br />
• Army. in the Balkans. Seen by source in .the.RSHA<br />
• Prison, BERLIN, where he remained <strong>for</strong> a few days.<br />
Source be11evo9, however, that SAUERB7 was at<br />
the Prison ae witness rather than suspect.<br />
In General Staff position in PRAGUE.<br />
For some time in the HEERESPERSONALAMT as adviser<br />
(REFERFNT) <strong>for</strong> the personnel files of the General<br />
Staff Officers' list under OBST XLEIKAMP (See<br />
xvi; above). • •<br />
•<br />
Author of some military pamphlets. In 19351 Chief<br />
of ABWEHRSTELLE HANNOVER.<br />
In the QUARTIERMEISTERABT, OXH. Ilmportant collaborator<br />
of GENMAJ STIEF.<br />
Personal - , djutant to ZEITZLER. Dead (Of Report Ref<br />
No SALJ,2).<br />
Cot S of a corps on the Eastern Front in 1944..<br />
'Committed suicide after the 20 July plot (Of Report<br />
Ref No SAIC/2).<br />
Il April 1945.<br />
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER •<br />
i(-(17-4A-/<br />
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI,<br />
Commanding.<br />
. • '<br />
SECRET
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT<br />
DECLASS IFIEG AND RELEASED BY<br />
. . -<br />
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TnIS/S 4N fuloctrlorVie-‘,2%%6-1<br />
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT! 0N3B28 D o hei<br />
NA2 I WAR CRIMES 0 I SCLOSURE ACT<br />
DATE 2001 2007<br />
SE7ORET<br />
Ref No SAI0/4<br />
11 Apr 45 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER<br />
APO 758 1 US ARMY<br />
I. SOURCE<br />
CHEMICAL PLANTS<br />
: SECRET:<br />
sAuths 00, SAIO<br />
:Init:<br />
:Date: 11 Apr 45 :<br />
HENDRICKS, Fred, a civilian who lived in the US <strong>for</strong> almost sixteen years,running<br />
a contracting business in IOC} S, N.Y. He was very observant, and gave all<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation willingly. He has been giving voluntary assistance to OW in BUCHEN.<br />
Rating . : B-2 Date of In<strong>for</strong>mation: Feb 45 Interrogator: F.J.S.<br />
II.<br />
PLANT NEAR 1COENIGS-4USTERHAUSEN<br />
. Source claims to have worked <strong>for</strong> three years as a maintenance man and "trouble<br />
shooteril at a large chemical plant located seven km NORTH of NIEDTRLAHi4E, GSGS 4072/<br />
NE 52/10, Third Edition/V-03, a subfl'b of KOEFIG6-WUST2RHAU6EN. He states that this<br />
plant manufaotured <strong>for</strong>maldehyde, hexa, hexalol; and a po vierful high explosive (hexogen<br />
?), from methanol brought from . a nea.rby plant at '4ILDAU, The factory employs<br />
approx 300 French and German workers. .1<br />
The buildings are placed among tall -ptne trees, in an area 'a:pprox 1200x 1,000m,<br />
(See Sketch). Each building is of brown bricL: and has a sixteen-inch concrete , roof<br />
built to hold earth; and planted with small t .russ. Wire trellises are affixed to<br />
each building to support vines. However, all these ef<strong>for</strong>ts at camouflage are of no -<br />
avail, because the plant's two "smokeless" chimneys emit poisonous fumes which turn<br />
all nearby vegetation brown. The lOcationls also given away by a large pile of<br />
lime waste, white against the light brown of the blighted surrounding terrain.<br />
Chemical produots ara carried from building to building in overhead pipes,<br />
supported by conspicuous concrete piers. All buildings are oonnected by paths 2 m<br />
wide, in addition to the service roads showa on st&atch, which are approx 4 m wide.<br />
The water supply, which is essential to the operation of the plant, is carried in<br />
pipes laid approx .4 feet underground.<br />
III. ALTERNATE PLANTS<br />
,<br />
According to souree; two similar factories' intended <strong>for</strong> use as alternates in<br />
case the NIEDERLAHZ2 plant should be destroyed, have been built at SCHROBENHAUSEN,<br />
.1aVaria,•GSGS 4416/5/6002, and at P''' ITNF rnDE/v/Eilii:R 1 aCie, 4416/Q-4/2559. These<br />
plants are laid out in the same manner as the one at NIEDERLOME, and the same<br />
blighting of vegetation is caused by chemical fumes from the chimneys. Source .<br />
states that .these . sitos would also be easily detected from the air due to the large<br />
piles of line waste.<br />
IV: LIST OF INSTALLATIONS AT NIEDERLAHME PLANT<br />
(WO.T.el Numbers refer to Sketch on following page).<br />
1. Workmen's living quarters; not camouflaged;<br />
looks like country house.<br />
2.. Garage.<br />
5 s Und6),ground chemical storage tanks.<br />
4. Main ' electric ' switchboard shod.<br />
5. Filling .station <strong>for</strong> methanol.<br />
6. Office building.<br />
7. Officials ! livtng quar-pers.<br />
8. Workers' mess and kitchen.<br />
9: Washrooms.<br />
10. Steam power plant, with 55-foot<br />
1. 1 empkelees" chimney.<br />
11:Electric power house.<br />
12. Truk ripairehop.<br />
13. Formaldehyde plant.<br />
14. Laboratories.<br />
15. Hexa plant, with 16-foot tower.<br />
16. Storage room <strong>for</strong> machinery.<br />
17. Storage <strong>for</strong> finished products.<br />
18. Storage building.<br />
19. Chemical . processing building.<br />
20. Repair shop.<br />
21. Electric power building; quarters.<br />
22. 'last° disposal building.<br />
23. Concrete air raid bunker.<br />
24. Pipe lino tool shed.<br />
25. Wooden tower. <strong>for</strong> drying hoses.<br />
S'E 0RET<br />
1
SEORET<br />
• • :<br />
26. Electric switchboard building.<br />
27. FormaldeliYde processing building.<br />
28. Hexalol plant.<br />
29. Ooncrete air raid bunker.<br />
30. Chemical processing building. <strong>for</strong><br />
. .high explosives.<br />
31. Pump house <strong>for</strong> water system.<br />
32. Small pond.<br />
V. SKETCHi.CHEMICAL PLANT AT NIEDIIILAHME NOT to scale.<br />
r:q<br />
0<br />
E-4<br />
26<br />
13 io j<br />
11<br />
24 Ecl<br />
270<br />
19n<br />
14 d<br />
7.) 192o h<br />
28 j,a23- ?.<br />
ci<br />
31<br />
18<br />
12<br />
iiD •<br />
2 0<br />
6çf<br />
2V 025<br />
32 /k\i<br />
1<br />
0<br />
10<br />
01<br />
2 =I<br />
4<br />
Lime<br />
waste pile<br />
11 Aril 45 SEVENTH AR INTERROGATION CENTER<br />
41 re. e<br />
PAUL KUBA1<br />
Commandir<br />
4kr<br />
, Maj, ME,(S4<br />
2<br />
S F, 0 Ft T
!<br />
.SECRET<br />
xii) COSSMAN, OBST time 0 of S to GEN STUELPNAGEL; now<br />
of ' S of a corps.<br />
xiii) VON GROLLMANN (Rank un-<br />
# known) (NOT the one on<br />
the list)<br />
xiv) yoN HOBE, Hoinz, OBSTLT<br />
xv) KEITEL, MAJ<br />
xvi) KLEIKAMP, OBST<br />
xvii) LAHOUSEN, GENMAJ<br />
AAarriod;.has six children. Previously 0 of S,<br />
Second Pzmi In the Balkans; lately 0 of S,<br />
. ..i5.rmy ,Group SOUTH, under VON WEIOHS.<br />
Relative of GENOBST HILDER; probably leads the remnants<br />
of 4 div pn tho Western front.<br />
Son of the Field Marshal; unimportant as a military<br />
figure; Is on the General Staff Officers' list<br />
solely because of the position of his father.<br />
Important personality. He works in the HEERESPER-<br />
. SONALAMT (Army Personnel Offioe) and is concerned<br />
with the General Etaff Officers' files.<br />
Austrian, active officer of the Austrian Army wbo<br />
was absorbed by the German Army after the, occupation<br />
of Austria. Worked in ABVEHR both <strong>for</strong> the Austrian<br />
and German Armies. Lately sec chief in the ABWEHR,<br />
now OG ' of an inf div.<br />
Ia to GEN WEISS, CG Second Army; probably captured in<br />
East Prussia.<br />
xix) VON LINSTROM, OBST<br />
xx) BARON FRE/TAG VON<br />
LORINGHOVEN, MAJ<br />
xxi VON LOSSBERG, OBST<br />
Hanged because of his participation in the 20 July<br />
plot. Successor to OOSSMANN, 0 of S to the C in<br />
0, Franco. His wife and two children are living in<br />
MUNIOH.<br />
Committed suicide after the 20 July plot. .Was.AB-<br />
WEHR.see chief. His wife and three children are<br />
living in SALZBURG.<br />
Son of the well-known GErOBST VON LOSSBERG Of the<br />
World War. C of S of a corps in Norway. . He fell<br />
into disgrace ' 'because of some political remarks<br />
and his promotion was held back.<br />
xii) NIEPOLD,. OBSTLT Killed on the Eastern front in 1944.<br />
xiii) GRAF VON NOSTITZ, OBST . 0 of S of the Division Commanders' School' in HIRSCH-<br />
BERG.<br />
xiv) OSTER, MM<br />
xxv) PALTZO, OBST<br />
xvi) RADKE, OBST<br />
Son of GENMAJ OSTER. Ho is Ia. of a div on the Ital-<br />
. .ian front.<br />
' Was ABWEHRSTELLEnJEITER in DRESDEN until 1959.<br />
In the OKH, Was HAUPTREFERENT (Chief Adviser) <strong>for</strong><br />
Nazi indoctrination in the Army, directed the NSFO<br />
School. A confirmed Nazi, he was nevertheless<br />
suspected of having been connected with the 20 July<br />
plot. He was imprisoned <strong>for</strong> four weeks in the<br />
RSHA Prison, and then released, reportedly completely<br />
3
SECRET<br />
xxvii) RAMER, OBST 'SUppiy experts 'in the QUARTIERMEISTERABT of: an army<br />
group.<br />
xxviL) REINHARDT, Hallmuth, ' ' Wes'0, of S to Gen.OLBR•CHT, Who had shim relieved<br />
'OBST .•becauso he was not suitable <strong>for</strong>.taking.part'in<br />
the 20 July plot. GRAF STAUFFENBERG.t.00k his<br />
place.<br />
xxix) SASS, OBSTLT Lately Ia of 58 , Inf Div, he was seriously wounded<br />
in Russia. He lost a leg and is probably no longer<br />
in the service.<br />
•<br />
xxx) SAUERBRUCH,. OBSTLT<br />
Son of the famous physician; holder of Knights'<br />
Oros°. Was <strong>for</strong> some time To (G-2) of Seoond Pz<br />
' Army in the Balkans. Seen by source in.theRSHA<br />
Prison, BERLIN, where he remained <strong>for</strong> alew days.<br />
Source bel1evo9, however, that SAUERBRUCH was at<br />
the Prison RE vltnesa rather than suspect.<br />
xxxi) SCHOENE, OBST<br />
xxxii) SCHROETTER, OBSTLT<br />
SCHWATLO-GESTERDING,<br />
OBST<br />
In General Staff position in PRAGUE.<br />
For some time in the HEERESPERSONALAMT as adviser<br />
(REFERFICT) <strong>for</strong> the personnel files of the General<br />
Staff Officers . ' list under OBST KLEIKAMP (See<br />
xvi, above). .<br />
Author of some military pamphlets. In 1.939 Chief<br />
of ABWEHRSTELLE HAFrOVER.<br />
xxxiN) SEMPER, MAJ<br />
xXxv . ) SMEND, OBSTLT<br />
In the QUARTIERMEISTERABT, OKH.<br />
orator of GENMAJ STIEF.<br />
Personal -djutant to ZEITZLER.<br />
No SAI72).<br />
Important collab-<br />
Dead .(Of Report Ref<br />
xxxvi) ULMB, OBST<br />
xiXvii) VON vpss, OBSTLT<br />
of S of a corps on the Eastern Front in 1944.<br />
Committed suicide after the 20 July Plot (Of Report<br />
Ref No SAI0/2).<br />
11 April 1945. SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER<br />
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI,<br />
Commanding.<br />
••<br />
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY<br />
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY<br />
Ref • No Si075.-s'<br />
12 Ap1-45---<br />
SEORET<br />
SOURCESMETHODS EXEMPT ION3921.<br />
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT<br />
DATE 2001 2007 •• n .<br />
09/1*-C-7<br />
THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE TO<br />
DO NOT DETACH<br />
SEVENTH ARMi INTERROGATION OENTER<br />
AFO 758 US ARMY<br />
• •<br />
: SECRE'.!<br />
lAuth:CG 7th Amv<br />
:Init:<br />
:Date:12 Apr Z5:<br />
INDEX<br />
I. SOURCE Page No 1<br />
II. LOCATION OF OKH AND OKW 1<br />
III.<br />
IV.<br />
KURIERSTELLE (Courier HT) OKH<br />
KRIEGSAKADEMIE<br />
1<br />
1<br />
V. THE GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY UNE<br />
' VI. NATIONAL REDOUBT<br />
2<br />
2<br />
(See SHAEF) German Army Questionnaire No 24, 2 Apr 45.)<br />
I. SOURCE.'<br />
' ' •<br />
MESSEN, Hans, 0/LT, Courier Officer at Oourier Hq, OKH, BERLIN. A 31-year<br />
old bank employee from KISSINGEN. He is of Dutch descent, but had to accept German<br />
citizenship in order to keep his work. 'Anti4lazi, source.gaVe hliself.up'to<br />
Allied troops on 7 Apt . 45.. Source was cöoperativg during interrogation.<br />
,Rag: 13,3 .Date of In<strong>for</strong>mation: See Text Interrogator: W.K.<br />
I. LOCATION OF AND OKW<br />
Source knoWS of the following tic' locations, as of 25 Mar 45:<br />
a) OM (FELD) and OKW (FELD): ZOSSEN, approx 40 km SOUTH of BERLIN. All mall •<br />
• <strong>for</strong> front:unite, <strong>for</strong> armies and lower echelons, is delivered to OKH (FELD). •<br />
11 OKH.(ERSATZ) . and OKW (ERSATZ), with most of its departments, moved to WEIMAR.<br />
Chief,of.theGeneral Staff, OGRUF (Lt Gen) JUETTNER, is still in BERLIN, BEND-<br />
LER:BTRASSE. All preparations are made to move the entire OKH and OKW to an<br />
urdiecloSed loes:tion in Southern Germany. Upon receipt of the order "OLGA 1°<br />
the advanced Of these Hq will move to the new location: When the order<br />
°OLGkOwill . . . , be , given, the entire staffs -of OKH and OKW will move.<br />
HIMMLER-andjap Opetatione Section no longer have, a permanent Hq. They operate<br />
frOM:an f arMOted train named 8 PANZERZUG STEIERMARK". • .<br />
.Part-of ,the;REIGHSFUEHRUNG SS is still located in BERLIN, KAISERALLEE (ATRIUM),<br />
aniArr.GRIMEWALD. The remainder has moved to the METTEN Monastery, nearA)EGGEN-<br />
DOAF/DANUBE.<br />
XURIERSTELLE OKH (Courier Hq 04H)<br />
".7hieHu at'first under the ZENTRAL ART (commanded by GENERALSTABSINTENDANT<br />
KUEHLE),. twaS?pnt'under . the ALLGEMEINES REERESAMt (AMA) in Oct 44. In charge of<br />
the AMA iii0ENLT.OREINER, a .Nazi. OBERSTLT BRUOHMANN, who went through an SS<br />
tra3,ning .i4Orielis in charge of the XURIERSTELLE. By his command all non-Nazi<br />
offidereOiclading source, were removed from the Post. In all, 30 officers belong<br />
to th° ,KURIERSTELLE.<br />
6<br />
IV, ERIEGSAKADEMIE<br />
' 0 AVrP4,J-1..<br />
'Ont23 Meir.45 the KRIEGSAKADEMIE (GENERALSTABSLEHRGAENGE - General Staff Classes)<br />
wasAlove4 .4rom.;:SAU:KISSINGEN'to the TRUPPENUEBUNGSPLATZ GRAFENWOEHR, GSGS 4416/<br />
U-6,I'i'rstTEdition/P-0651. Source spoke with the CG of the School, GEN DER IN?<br />
SPAETHP:inCrwith . his ad j MAJ VON LOCHWITZ, be<strong>for</strong>e the AKADEMIE had moved. He<br />
was told ,that-i.t' vas planned to move the KRIEGSAKADEMIE to Southern Bavaria at<br />
a .later,...:ditiik:'ian-d: ho was asked to suggest a nice, quiet place <strong>for</strong> its location.<br />
Source suggested BAD TOELZ, approx 50 km SOUTH of MUNICH.<br />
NA21 WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT<br />
2001 SFORET<br />
•<br />
1<br />
45')
V. GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY LINE<br />
A certain . lit ZIMMERMW, Weapone and .Ann Officer at Seventh .Army'Hq, told saarce<br />
on 2 Apr 45 that'Seventh Army intended to move to defensive positions in the 003URG-<br />
LIOHTENFELS4AMBERG-FORCHHEIM area and that digging was already going on in thio<br />
goneral area. Lt ZIMMJEMANN's task was to blow up all emn dumpe.between the thenhold<br />
lines and the above-amentioned positions.<br />
VI. NATIONAL REDOUBT<br />
Although unable to furnish definite in<strong>for</strong>mation on the planned National Redoubt,<br />
souroo recalls talks in the Officers' Casino at the OKH to the effect that<br />
KTLER and hie elite SS troops intended to retreat into the mountains, and that<br />
<strong>for</strong>tifications aro being built there. The moving of the OKH and the KRIEGSAKA-<br />
DEMIE i-nto the neighborhood is also significant of those planii, source thinks.<br />
12 April 1945. SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER<br />
etwt "COLA,<br />
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MIf<br />
Commanding.
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY .<br />
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENtY<br />
SOURCUMETNOUSEXEMPTION3121<br />
NAZI WARCRINESOISCLOGUNEAti<br />
DATE 2001 2007<br />
Sa44/g% .f/f7<br />
THIS IS AN ENCLOSPRE ------ -<br />
0\ DO HOT DEAL! !! •<br />
Eef No SAI0/6<br />
13 Apr.45<br />
SECRET<br />
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER<br />
APO 758 US ARMY<br />
11-2 EXPERIMENTS AT PEENEMUENDE<br />
SECRET<br />
:Authl":5G776-Lrmy:<br />
:Init:<br />
:Date: l Apr<br />
AUTOMATIC RANGE-CONTROL'DEVICE.<br />
t.<br />
flOURCE<br />
•<br />
BUCHOLD, Prof Dr, Technical Institute of DARMSTADT, a 45-year old DARMSTADT<br />
ccientist employed by the BROWN-BOVERI Works, MANNHEIM, from 1923 to 1954, when<br />
he accepted a professorehip at the TECHNISOHE HOOHBOHULE, DARASTADT. Reluctant<br />
to give any in<strong>for</strong>mation when first interrogated (not at this Center), source now<br />
claims to have been authorized by the rector of the school to disclose the details<br />
of his research work to the Allies. He was cooperative during interrogation and<br />
is ready to collaborate with the Allies. . •<br />
Rating: p-2 Date of In<strong>for</strong>mation: Spring 45 Interrogato r : A.Z.<br />
I. INTRODUCTION<br />
In Sept 39 the PEENEMUENDE Experimental Center ordered several scientists of<br />
tle Technical Institute of DARASTADT to meet at PEENEAUENDE. During the meeting<br />
these'icientists • were in<strong>for</strong>med of the intended large-scale experiments with<br />
rocket-;propelled Missiles. Each was given specific assignments <strong>for</strong> developing<br />
variOlie 'parts of the experimental projectiles.<br />
SoUred'Was ‘ assigned.the following:<br />
• . .<br />
. • •<br />
0-A."CiOice . maintaining a constant frequency of 500. cycles in a 27-vOlt current -<br />
of seconaary'importance to the 11-2, according to source.<br />
b) The aUtomatie ' V-2 range-control unit (See III, below).<br />
c) Later, source had the task of developing measuring instruments <strong>for</strong> the HEIDEL-<br />
BERG cyclotrons:<br />
II. 11-2 EXPERIMENTS AT PEENEMUEFDE<br />
The father of V-2, source states, was Prof VON BRAUN, an engineer of little<br />
im?ortance.be<strong>for</strong>e the war who had carried out some rocket experiments in the poet-<br />
World War years together with OPEL Jr. When he proposed his V-2 ideas to the<br />
German General Staff in 1939, he was put in oharge of the PEENEKUENDE laboratories.<br />
Dr STEINHOFF, only recently given the title of professor, and described'by:sourdas<br />
being . exceptionally able, was assigned to work on the axparimento :ad-especialis(<br />
in electrical matters. • •<br />
The reeee.roll ' op V-2 proceeded very slowly at first. In spring:43, Ilth(ever;.<br />
ordere'to'Ispeed Up the experiments arrived. Most of the component parts of 11-2<br />
were built and tried at PEENEAUENDE; only •a few devices were given 'to scidntiets<br />
<strong>for</strong> development outside the Experimental Center. These were given to the DARM-:<br />
STADT Technical School professors <strong>for</strong> the most part, because Prof Dr STEINHOF<br />
was a <strong>for</strong>mer student at that School.<br />
3ource ' success fully completed the automatic range-control devices <strong>for</strong> the V-2<br />
by the end of 43; but he was still trying to improve it, as well as finding orsat:<br />
& materials <strong>for</strong> some of its parts.<br />
Gen DORNBERGER, Knighte' Cross holder, was,OG of the PEENEMUENDE Experimental<br />
0ervIer:<br />
:II. aTOMATIC RANGE-CONTROL DEVICE FOR V-2<br />
Eine° the explosions giving the V-2 missile its <strong>for</strong>ward thrust are irregular,<br />
NAZ1WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT<br />
2001<br />
SECRET<br />
1
3.?"-ORET<br />
it ±8 impossible' o to predetermine the time at which the combustion ,should. .be stopped.<strong>for</strong>.any<br />
.given.range . The Only way to increase the range accuracy of the missile<br />
is, there<strong>for</strong>e ., to cut off the fuel combustion NOT at a time set in advance,<br />
but only after the - missile attains a definite velocity, calculatedin advance.<br />
This, in turn, can be deduced through the well-known integration <strong>for</strong>mula by coneidering<br />
the ,aooploration at the moment of each explosion, i.e., at the instant<br />
or. each . <strong>for</strong>ward thrust of the miesile. P.<br />
a) Principles Involved<br />
In iource l s device, the thruit of the missile at the instant of the explosion<br />
is trans<strong>for</strong>med into a direct current , which is 'proportional to this <strong>for</strong>ward . thrust<br />
This current is directed through an electrolytic condenser previously charged<br />
with a capacity caloulated . to correspond to the velocity of the missile at . which<br />
the fuol combustion is to be stopped. During tho flight of the missile, the generated<br />
current builds up a charge equalizing that of the condenser. As soon as<br />
the charge thus built up reaches the proportion of the condenser ohargo the resulting<br />
rupture of voltago operates a mochanical devico which stops the fuel colmbustion.'<br />
• b) Operation (See Schematic Diagram, Appendix)<br />
A rotating coil B is placed in the magnetic field A. In front of the coil,<br />
and placed eccentrioally with it, is a copper plato C, which, in turn, is plaood<br />
in the contor of the field originatod by two coils, D' and D u , through which .<br />
passes an induction current of 500 cycles.<br />
• - When, the missile is given a <strong>for</strong>ward thrust at the instant of each oxploeion,<br />
the Mass of the ooppor plate 0 tends to move. By doing so, tho plato disturbs<br />
the constant magnotic field crpatod by tho collo D' and D. The current created<br />
in the and D' I originates in thesecondary of the trans<strong>for</strong>mor E an alternating<br />
. qurrent which is appliod to thp grid of tube R i . This current flows<br />
through the trans<strong>for</strong>mer'? into the copper oxido roctifipr G, and from here, as<br />
(pulsating) D.0, 'it ohargos spooial oloctrolytio condenser H and nowt back to<br />
the rotating coil B. Hero it uroatos a rupture of voltage which nullifies tho<br />
original,offeat of thp <strong>for</strong>ward thrust of the missile on the copper plate O.<br />
• ' . As soon a the curront flowing through the valve H b000mos equal to the prodetorminod<br />
charge storod thoro, a discharge of voltage occurs, which is impressed<br />
on tho • grid - of tube Ris.<br />
. A rolay J, placed in the plate circuit of tuba R 11 , is operated by this grid<br />
reaction and, in turn, oporatos the mochanieal device which steps the fuol combustion,.<br />
PW states that an accuracy of .001 is obtained by this dovice.<br />
In order to charge tho oloctrolytic condonsor H, sourco developod . an instrument<br />
(KONTAXTUHR) whioh operated on a 50-cyolo current. This spocial current was<br />
created by a buzzer working on 50 cyclos, also dovolopod by source.<br />
13 April 1945. SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER<br />
/171L„,e<br />
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI, A<br />
Commanding.<br />
SECRET<br />
2<br />
A.- 1. •
SECRET<br />
Appendix<br />
V-2 AUTOMATIC RANG-CONTROL DEVICE<br />
(SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM)<br />
Direction of<br />
IAcceleration<br />
D I<br />
04I<br />
--Ia4LLA.r<br />
.--, 40 y ;500 c r-re<br />
rrryrt<br />
D<br />
F7A7:<br />
Legend<br />
A - Magnet<br />
- Rotating Coil (DRTHSPULT)<br />
O - Copper Plate<br />
Di )- Coils<br />
D" )<br />
E - Trans<strong>for</strong>mer (GITTERUEBERTRAGTR)<br />
F - Trans<strong>for</strong>mer.<br />
G - Copper Oxide Rectifier (TROCONGLEICHRICHTER)<br />
H Special Electrolytic Condenser (ELEKTROLYTISCHT ZELLE)<br />
J - Relay<br />
al ) - Tubes<br />
R")<br />
Feport Ref No SAIC/6, SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER<br />
SECRET
Ref No SA10/7<br />
13 Apr 45-<br />
SECRET<br />
THIS IS<br />
AN ENCLOSURE TO<br />
DO NOT WAR<br />
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER<br />
APO 758 US ARMY<br />
-.4<br />
SOO ? 7<br />
. SECRET.<br />
:Auth:0G,7th Army .<br />
:Init: rff,t<br />
:Dato: i Apr-45<br />
1. SOURCE<br />
-GENERALARZT (GEN OF MEDICAL CORPS) PROF DR ERNST RODENWALD<br />
Dr RODENWALD is a 66-yoar old HEIDELBERG University professor who is aoquaintod<br />
with leading medical scientists " throughout the world. Ho appears to have an open,<br />
honest charactor, and to abhor falsehood. Although he admires HITLER's social policy,<br />
he disagrees with most of the National Socialist principles because of his<br />
religious beliefs (Roman Catholic) and his humanitarian sentiments, and ho cannot<br />
understand why the Gorman loadors do not stop the war, since it is obviously lost<br />
fn . Germany. Nevertheless ho still considors himsolf bound to the Present govornmant<br />
by his military oath of allegiance to HITLER.<br />
The Profossor- bocamo a Party =mbar in 1932, while living in BATAVIA, Java,<br />
but whoa ho discovered that the Party was trying to <strong>for</strong>ce a political policy on<br />
tho "BUND DER AUSLANDSDEUTSCHEN", he quit. the Party, novor to ontor it again.<br />
Tlis attitude was hold against him, andlieohcountorod difficulties Wheh ho roturno0<br />
to Gormahy, although ho was permitted to cbritinuo his scientific research without<br />
molestation&<br />
•<br />
Dr RODENWALD is proparod to contribute his services as a hygiene scientist<br />
ausist the Allied authorities, and is also willing to place his laboratory and<br />
roeoarch center completely at their dispoeal. It is possible that he has boon influenced<br />
in making this decision by his anxiety to reinstate himeolf:in tho'good<br />
*graces - of tho•Notherlapds'Gavt, which was paying him h pomsion bo<strong>for</strong>o the war._<br />
RFting: B-3 Dato of In<strong>for</strong>mation: Mar 45 Interrogator: A.Z. •<br />
II. HISTORY AND MOVEMENTS<br />
1897 Student at the Military Medical Academy, BERLIN.<br />
1907 . Student at the Institue <strong>for</strong> Marine and Tropical Dieeaaes, HAMBURG.<br />
10 *Official govt doctor in Togoland, Africa: .<br />
15 Medical advisor on hygiene to the Fifth Turkish Army, with TurkiSh rank<br />
Of Major.<br />
19 Left the Army to finish his doctorate at HEMELBERO.UMiversity<br />
21 Medical advisor on hygiene in Netherlands East Indies.<br />
26 . Medical Inspector, East Java.<br />
34 Returned to Germany as Prof of Hygiene at HEIDELBERG.<br />
39 Called to XII Army Corps.<br />
40- CO - of the inetitute <strong>for</strong> Tropical Medicine, BERLIN,<br />
45 but continued as professor at,HEIDELBERG. •<br />
41 With an anti-malaria mobile laboratory train in Italy and the Balkans.<br />
43 Promoted to GENERALARZT.<br />
III. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE<br />
Source claims that he never heard of any experiments-in this field. He mnphasizeu<br />
that he was strictly a specialist in hygiene and tropical diseases. He states<br />
that when the question of BW was raised at an official dinner <strong>for</strong> Army dootors in<br />
1945, all present agreed that this type of warfare was impracticable owing to the<br />
danger of contaminating friendly troops... In this connection he cites the case<br />
of Australian troops who brought dysentery to the Allied units attacking the DAR-<br />
DANELLES in 1917 ... The resulting epidemic <strong>for</strong>ced the Allies to withdraw, but the<br />
Gernsm troops were also contaminated, and they lost half their numerical strength.<br />
Source states that none of his fellow university profossor with whom he is acquainted<br />
would be willing to lend aseistance in the field of BW. -;<br />
. • 1<br />
3 -du ---z<br />
NAZJWARCRIMESDISCLOSUREACE CRET<br />
203i,<br />
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY<br />
CENTRAL INTELLIBENCE ABENCY<br />
SOURCSMETNODS EXEMPT 0N3828<br />
NAZI 0+.RCRIMESDISCLOSUREACT<br />
DATE 2001 2001
SECRET<br />
IV, POSSIBLE BW EXPERIMENTAL CENTERS<br />
In BERLIN/MALCHOW eouroe directed a station where anopheles mosquitoes were<br />
bred at the rate of 8,000 per month. In 1944 a girl was sent there from an SS<br />
zoological research institute in Bavaria, in order to study the breeding opera —<br />
tons. Source states that there are several institutes of this nature, known<br />
• at. "SS AHNENERBE INSTITUT", but he does not know where . they are located. He sugeste<br />
that these SS research institutes would be the moat likely centers <strong>for</strong> any<br />
e yperimental work in BW.<br />
V. PARA TYPHUS<br />
Source states that the bacillus of pare. typhua "0". can be carried by human<br />
beings <strong>for</strong> months without harm to the carrier. But should the carrier contract<br />
malaria, the bacillus becomes virulent and is then. fatal.<br />
VI. ATOM SMASHING<br />
At HEIDELBERG . Univereity source knew a Chinese girl who had been making sue -<br />
oessful experiments in this field. After the commencement of the Allied offen -<br />
sive, most of her laboratory equipment was moved to TAUBERBISCHOFSHEIM (now in<br />
friendly hands). Source cannot recall the girl's name, except that she belongs<br />
to the GO family.<br />
VII. ORGANIZATION OF WEHRMACHT SANITAETSINSP (GERMAN ARMY MEDICAL INSPECTORATE)<br />
CO of the Inspectorate is GENERAL 0/STABSABZI Dr HANDLER.<br />
There are four sub—inspectorates:<br />
A. Ground Forces Inepectorate, CO Dr WALTER.<br />
1. Personnel Department.<br />
2. Science Department (Statistics and dissemination of sanitary regulations).<br />
3. Organization Department (T/0 and T/E <strong>for</strong> medical and sanitary unite). •<br />
4. Administration and Finance Department.<br />
B. Air Forces In g poctorate; CO ' Dr SCHROEDER.<br />
0. Navy Inepeotorate, CO Dr GREUL.<br />
D. WAFFEN SS Inspectorate, CO not known to source.<br />
VIIL GERMAN MILITARY MEDICAL ACADEMY<br />
CO of the Academy is GENERALARZT Dr ASALT, a Nazi.<br />
The Academy is composed as follows:<br />
A. Teaching-Section, also . called . "PEPINIERE", where military doctors receive<br />
instruction.<br />
B. Research Section (00 GENERALARZT Prof Dr. SCHREIBER) made up of the following<br />
LEHRGRUPPEN (Institutes):<br />
1. Hygiene, CO - Prof Dr ZEISS.<br />
SECRET<br />
2
S E OR E T<br />
2. Tropical Diseases, CO Prof Dr RODENWALD (Sept 43 part of this Institute was<br />
movod to the WILLIAM KERKHOFF INSTITUT in BAD YAUHEIM).<br />
3. Toxicology, CO Prof Dr WIRTH, who is also a OW specialist.<br />
4. Pharmacology, CO . Col GEMEINHARD.<br />
5. Physiology:<br />
a) Bio-climatic Section: Prof RANKE.<br />
b) Alimentation Section: Prof LANG.<br />
6. Pathology and Anatomy: Prof ANDERNATH.<br />
7. Photography and Training Films: (9)<br />
8. Air Technics: Prof STRUCHHOLD. (This is no longer a part of the Research<br />
Sootion.)<br />
IX. GERMAN GENERALARZTE<br />
The only German medical officers of general rank (all university professors)<br />
are:<br />
Prof Dr SAUERBRUCH<br />
HABERER<br />
" " LAEVEN<br />
BERLIN (surgeon)<br />
COLOGNE (surgeon)<br />
KOENIGSBERG (surgeon)<br />
BERLIN (orthopedist)<br />
" (surgeon)<br />
" (bygionist)<br />
BRESLAU (internal diseases)<br />
BERLIN (dermatology)<br />
WUERZBURG (pharmacology)<br />
(*Prof Dr FLURY is one of the key German scientists in tho field of OW.) 1<br />
13 April 1945.<br />
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER<br />
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI, P<br />
Commanding.<br />
SECRET
•<br />
contained in this report is required <strong>for</strong>. further.<br />
distribu:<br />
p araphrased that no mention is made of tha'prisoneW..naMiis<br />
which the in<strong>for</strong>mation has been obtained.<br />
rie'following are the names and secret numbers of the prisoners • ,<br />
this report:<br />
mentiohedAn.. ,<br />
• ,<br />
Ep AND RELEASED.DY<br />
T ELL.! G E.. N .0 p.45 F ,kc y<br />
HODS EXE1prIo3øt<br />
IMESDIshaiultri'cl<br />
:W<br />
2007
• SECRET.<br />
I. SOURCES:<br />
a) GENMAJ (Brig Gen) Heinrich GAEDE, CG 719 Inf Div, a 47-year old General<br />
Staff Officer, intelligent, arrogant, very Prussian, and violently anti-<br />
American. From 1942-1944 he was in Bulgaria as Chief of the German Training<br />
Staff attached to the Royal Bulgarian Army Staff.<br />
b) GENMAJ (Brig Gen) Paul STEINBACH, FUEHRERRESERVE OKH (German Army<br />
Officers' Replacement Pool), a 58-year old professional soldier with a non-<br />
Nazi attitude.<br />
e) OBSTLT (Lt Col) Hermann MILTZOW, Ia, 719 Div, a 55-year old General<br />
Staff Officer of typical Prussian caliber.<br />
1. Personalities<br />
M: They seem to have respect <strong>for</strong> KEITEL.<br />
G: KEITEL is only a messenger boy; whon the FUEHRER calls, he runs.<br />
G: I wrote to Gon SEIFFERT in HAMBURG to do something about my wife, and I<br />
(also wrote to) the General of III Corps in BERLIN.<br />
* * * * * * *<br />
G: I was with the 'Arty Inspectorato in BERLIN bc<strong>for</strong>o the war.<br />
S : With HASE 1<br />
G: Yes.<br />
S : I made HASE's acquaintance in NUERNBERG whon he was CG of a di g , the jrd.<br />
Then he became Arty Inspector.<br />
S: ROMMEL and RUNESTEDT are supposed to havo told the FUEHRER on 25 July, i.e.<br />
after the invasion, that the war could no longer bo won.<br />
M: HIAMIER's train was always marked SZH.<br />
G: What does that mean ?<br />
M: SONDERZUG HIMMLER (Spotial Train HIMMLER). It was always well guarded.<br />
* * * * * * *<br />
M: Did you know LATTMANN (?) at the War College in DRESDEN ?<br />
G: Recently ho was a colonel with MODEL; an efficient fellow.<br />
G: . Are you the same ago as SEIDOWSKI (?), he was also Ia under.mo, and so<br />
was ROTHA (?).<br />
CI R E T<br />
2
M: SEIDOWSKI (?) was fat and blond 7<br />
SECRET<br />
G: No, tall and thin; he is engaged to be married now.<br />
M: VON ROTHA (?) was in my class; we were together in STUTTGART with the MT<br />
troops.<br />
G: They were all with me in SOFIA.<br />
Mt SaDLITZ was always a blabbermouth, and so was his wife.<br />
G: PFELSOH (?) was first lb with Army Group, then he was Id (?), then tie WaS<br />
transferred.<br />
M: And Gen MERK (?) 7<br />
G: Gen MERK (?),was first with (Army) Group BLAOK SEA, then he was together<br />
with us.<br />
2. Miscellany<br />
G: The General Staff is the only good thing still left in Germany, and it will<br />
certainly still have a great influence on the oivilian population.<br />
G: As soon as the Party joined in the conduct of the war, the course of the<br />
war could be <strong>for</strong>eseen.<br />
G: If this thing collapse°, and we lose the war, we will have to work <strong>for</strong> the<br />
people with all our strength. The German people just cannot be destroyed. Many<br />
things that were done are difficult to defend, <strong>for</strong> example the mase . murdar , of<br />
the Jews. As an officer it was sometimes difficult to participate in theseraotions.<br />
They should have solved the problem in another way: Sometimes it was<br />
horrible the way they shot women and children.<br />
G: They want to sound out our attitude now; they expect usat any rate to support<br />
the _military government.<br />
G: We were sold out by Dutch and Russian workers.<br />
S: That was bound to end badly, what with 25-30 nations running around in Germany.<br />
* * * * * * *<br />
S: Why do you dislike the Navy so much 7<br />
G: Because they gorged themselves with hundreds of thousands of youths (int)..<br />
S: And the Luftwaffe, too. Young fellows, classified LA, who never heard a<br />
shot fired; they were on duty with searchlight units.<br />
SECRET<br />
3
-S ECRET<br />
All the men in the Navy are young kids, while we had only 47 and 48-year<br />
olds.<br />
G: They are all in flight at the approach of the Russians. The fields are not<br />
taken care of anymore, and we have to feed ourselves again. The SEYDLITZ government<br />
is su p posed to be already--on German soil. The Ruesians are rebuilding<br />
German industry <strong>for</strong> them, and after that the war against England will follow.<br />
S:<br />
The war in the EAST has taken a shameful course. Women have been raped.<br />
The Germans are no better than the others. In the beginning the Germans'ehot<br />
all commfsears who were taken prisoner. Plenty of Russian prisoners have simply<br />
been beaten to death.<br />
S: How long does it take until a request <strong>for</strong> a decoration goes through?<br />
G: 24 hours by telephone, throe weeks by mail. I had an UFFZ in charge of a<br />
pillbox; he received the Knight's Cross and a lieutenancy immediately by order<br />
of the FUEHRER. He never went to 006.<br />
S<br />
I was always horrified about concentration camps.<br />
0: Well now, that depends on how you look at it, one could also consider them<br />
as penitentiaries.<br />
4: * * * * * *<br />
5: Wore the Bulgarians only committed to combat partisans?<br />
G: They wore not committod at all. They ware used as guards along the rail-<br />
:road lines. They wore only provisional dive, and not regular ones.<br />
* * *<br />
I was Chief of the Training Staff in Bulgaria. I had 20,000 men under me. I<br />
had a combat school. All the shipping on the Danube, security of mines, all<br />
:.,hat was under my control, the entire ABWEHR (Intelligence Service).<br />
II. SOURCES:<br />
a) GENLT (Maj Gen), GENERALSTABSINTENDANT (Quarterm'aster Gen), a.D. ( retired)<br />
Friedrich PAUER, a 70-year old Bavarian who is too old to worry about politics<br />
and too senile to do anything oleo.<br />
b) GENARZT (Medical Corps Gon) Prof Dr Ernst RODENWALD, a 66-year old<br />
DERG Professor, ono-time head of the Institute <strong>for</strong> Tropical Diseases<br />
/rho is woll acquainted with scientists all over tho world. (See Repot<br />
SAIC/7, 13 Apr 45).<br />
0 LT (2nd Lt) Hans SCHREIBER, ASS ISTENTARZT (Junior Medical Officer)<br />
EEWAEHRUNGSBTL (Punishment Bn), a 28-year old medical officer who did<br />
research in connection with criminal investigations in civilian life.<br />
HEIDEL&.<br />
in BERLIN,<br />
t Ref No<br />
Luftwaffe<br />
medical<br />
SECRET<br />
4
SECRE1-•••<br />
1. Bacteriologd.cal Warfare<br />
R: My personal opinion is that bacteriological warfare is impossible'. I do not<br />
know anything about it, and do not think that a German scientist Will permit<br />
himself to be used <strong>for</strong> that, especially <strong>for</strong> ethioal-reaeone.<br />
P: If there had been any preparations made <strong>for</strong> bacteriological warfare, then we<br />
people' from the Housing Administration would also have known about. it, since we<br />
would have to make preparations <strong>for</strong> the protection of the population.<br />
R: The following motto is valid in this case: what you yourself are working on,<br />
: rou do not talk about, and what others are working on, you do not ask about. I<br />
have received no indications of bacteriological warfare. What I worked on myself<br />
- malaria control - I will gladly tell them about.<br />
P: I knew the man in charge of the Hygiene Dept in the OKH, Prof SOHREIBER.<br />
R: Yee, he's now head of Training Group 0, at present in POTSDAM. I myself<br />
sm from the Institute <strong>for</strong> Tropical Hygiene, and also consultant of the SANIr2AETSINSPEKTOR<br />
(Medical Inspector) <strong>for</strong> tropical hygiene. Besides that I had<br />
ny work at the University of HEIDELBERG.<br />
* * * * * * *<br />
S: Wasn't there a bacteriological institute in LEMBERG? •<br />
R: No, I think you are mistaken. It is in KRAKOW.<br />
S: I knew a GENERALSTABSARZT (Surgeon Gen) who had worked as a bacteriologist,<br />
but I can't remember his name.<br />
R: There is nobody outside of Prof ZEISS and myself. Altogether there are<br />
only 10 GENERALSTABSAERZTE (Surgeon Generals) in the Germany Army.<br />
R: I bred 80,000 mosquitoes (anopheles) in a mosquito breeding station near'<br />
BERLIN <strong>for</strong> experiments with sprays.<br />
III. SOURCES'<br />
E) GENMAJ'(Brig Gen) Hubert LUETKENHAUS, a 54-year old professional soldier,<br />
ex-WEHRMACHTSKOMMANDANT (Army Commandant)MANNHEIM-LUDWIGIHAFEN, who was put<br />
en the retired list on 31 Mar 45.<br />
b) OBSTLT (Lt Col) Ernst HACKEMANN, Battle Group GERSFELD, a reserve officer,<br />
uho was employed at I.G. FARBEN be<strong>for</strong>e the war.<br />
1. Er ILGNER; Director of I.G. FARBEN<br />
(Note: Dr ILGNER was a detainee at the Seventh Army Ir.terrogation banter durinethe<br />
same . poriod as sources above.)<br />
H: Dr ILGNER, the plant manager of I.G. should not remt n unpunished either.<br />
A Democrat until 1930, he then changed horses, a real 1 ofiteering Nazi. When<br />
I saw him again in 1940, 10 years later, he greeted me ith "BEM HITLERP,.m<br />
SECREa<br />
•■•• •••• •••■• ••■• ..411•<br />
5
Nazi from top to bottom. These swine!' People like us have to sit here, and they<br />
run around free. (See note above).<br />
H: You know, of course, that I.G. is a great concern with many branches in <strong>for</strong>eign<br />
countries. During the war these branches are not in direot contact with<br />
FRANKFURT. If, <strong>for</strong> instance, the branch in,Argentina has a lot of <strong>for</strong>eign ourrency,<br />
and the branch in Chile daes not have any, but needs money to build a<br />
branch office, then Argentina can send the money to Chile, and ILGNER supervises<br />
and approves these transmissions. For that purpose he travelled all over<br />
the world. He was the central financier.<br />
This ILGNER is a miserable character, completely uninteresting as a person.<br />
He lets everybody down if it is to his own advantage:<br />
2. Planning <strong>for</strong> the Future<br />
It would be funny if I were to work <strong>for</strong> the military government now.<br />
H: It would be a neat trick to be sent to BERLIN by the Amerioans. Then you<br />
would have something to eat, and you could still do what you wanted.<br />
But we still have to feed ourselves.<br />
H: We'll get something out of them yet. And imagine what freedom of movement<br />
you would have. You could travel again through all the countries.<br />
H: Did you hear anything about the partition of Germany ? As far as I know,<br />
Southern Germany, Baden, etc, will be occupied by the Americans. That's a good<br />
thing; we will be safe that way. All Northern Germany will supposedly be occupied<br />
by the British, and the root will be given to the Russians. Well, that's<br />
terrible, and quite unthinkable.<br />
L: Yes, the so-called ELBE Line <strong>for</strong> the Russians. There will be a mixed ooculation<br />
<strong>for</strong> BERLIN.<br />
H: What will happen to Austria and the Tyrol ?<br />
L: We shall soon see.<br />
L: (Re Nazis) The responsible persons must bo hanged, and the others must be<br />
put in labor battalions whore thoy will have to pay <strong>for</strong> their guilt.<br />
3. Miscellany<br />
H: Shortly be<strong>for</strong>e Christmas I was a member of an Honour Court. A paymaster made<br />
some typical remarks. HIMMLER did not sanction the verdict. We acquitted the<br />
man shertly.be<strong>for</strong>e Christmas, which had a resounding effeot (KNALLEFFEKT)..A<br />
miserable Party wench excused herself. She was ono of the worst kind. Thank.<br />
heaven the prosecutor and the <strong>for</strong>eman of the jury wore docent people..<br />
Then there was another case where a medical oapt in the Army, a Party member,<br />
wls supposed to have said, "the FUEHRER should stick to architecture instead of<br />
trio conduct of the war n . That follow was also acquitted; but HIMMLER rovers<br />
Vac) verdict; with the demand that ho to condemned to doetti:'<br />
SECRET
SECRET<br />
—<br />
L: (Talking about his days as WEHRMACHTSKOMMANDANT, MANNHEIM). A few months<br />
ago I officially invitod a bishop <strong>for</strong> dinner. Tho bishop appeared, and 80 did<br />
the Party big shots (PARTEIBONZEN) — the bishop came in full rogalia. Evorything<br />
wont off smoothly, but aftor a fow weeks I received a notice saying that<br />
it was <strong>for</strong>bidden to invite bishops to official receptions. Well, I mm a Catholic,<br />
but I let it go anyway.<br />
H: (Re the hopeless situation near FULDA) There were no maps of the sector in<br />
which we wore fighting; we made our retreat by moans of an old atlas.<br />
14 April 1945. SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER<br />
—<br />
/ PAUL KUBAL Maj, MI,<br />
Commanding.<br />
SECRET<br />
7
. THIS IS AN unMOT<br />
,<br />
DO VET .: i. ' .„<br />
•<br />
Rof No ;AI0/8<br />
18 Apr 45<br />
SECRE T<br />
NA<br />
. I<br />
V: • S.. E C*4' .; ,;;: .<br />
. . i.Autii t ; Arz yt<br />
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER . *Init. : : .• • fri,•AY.'!:2: :1,..4..;:i<br />
APO 758 • . US ARMY . :Date: 18 Apr445 •••:.:.:. s,. • •<br />
I ' ' " " 1:: . • 6 :`. s' ' ...<br />
ELECTROLYTIC CONDENSER FOR 11-2 RANGE-00NTROL DEVICE •<br />
(This report should be read in conjunction with Report Ref'NO 3A10/0.<br />
SOURCE<br />
WAGNER, Karl, Prof Dr, a 43-year old scientist, prof at the DARMSTADT Technical<br />
Institute. Source is a close-mouthed, lonely individual who is interested solelY in ' •<br />
his research work. He talked rather reluctantly at first, but onoe an the subject.<br />
of his scientific developments he did not hesitate anymore. Source claims to be at.<br />
the Allies' disposal, but his sincerity is open to some doubt.<br />
Source was assigned the task of compiling evaluation tables of rocket fuels by<br />
the PE12:7:1411 ,3NDE Exporimontal Contor. Tight days be<strong>for</strong>e tho Allied oocupation of<br />
DARMSTAZT, howovor, he was ordered to destroy thorn.<br />
sating: B-3 Dato of In<strong>for</strong>mation: Mar 45 Interrogator: A.Z.<br />
ELECTROLYTIC CONDENSER FOR V-2 RANGE-CONTROL DEVICE<br />
Source dovolopod the oloctrolytic condonsor <strong>for</strong> Prof Dr BUCHOLD I s V-2 automatic•<br />
range-control dovico (of Roport Rof No SLIC/6). Ho used a sodium chloride solution,<br />
(Boo bolow) as oloctrolyto, and silver <strong>for</strong> one olootrodo; the other eloctrodo, also<br />
of silver, was covorod by a thin layor of silver ohlorido. .<br />
While loading tho condenser, the current is sont through it in such a way. that<br />
the silvor chlorido layer is moved from ono silver oloctrodo to the othert • . 4<br />
Ag+ ci+ e" Ag°4-01-<br />
_<br />
Tho amount of silver ohlorido used <strong>for</strong> the layor is prodotorminod by tho charge<br />
with which tho condenser is to be loaded. By rovorsing tho polarity of tho cotichineer<br />
(during the flight of tho V-2 missilo), the silver chlórido layer is moved baok.t6'<br />
the first oloctrodo. As soon as the silvor chlorido has boon completely moved to the -<br />
other electrode, a suddon incroaso of voltage from .1 v to 1.0 v is produced, duo'<br />
to the hydrogen layer <strong>for</strong>med around the silvor. This voltage is improseed upon tho<br />
grid of an amplifier tube which activates a relay (Rolay J, Roport Rof NO SAIO/Ok<br />
tho relay, in turn l • oporatos the mechanical devico which stops the fuol combustion.<br />
in the ,x7ojoctilo.<br />
'<br />
r, •<br />
The oxact composition of tho solution is imol of sodium ohlorido, 1 mol of<br />
acotic acid, and 1 mol of sodium acetate. Souroo omphasizod that most of tho difficulties<br />
woro oncountorod in obtaining a pure solution.<br />
Tho actual condenser was built in a containor 2 cm in diamotor and 6 cm high. Tho<br />
accuracy of the fInal., signal was .0015 under laboratory conditions, but loss in<br />
actual operation.<br />
• •<br />
18 April 1945.<br />
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER<br />
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI, DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY<br />
Commanding. CENTRAL • INTELL IGENCE A.ENCY<br />
ers-1"<br />
SECRET<br />
NAM WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT<br />
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT<br />
I ON.38213<br />
NAZI WAR CRIMES DI SCLOSURE ACT<br />
DATE 2001 2007<br />
.11
- AUGSBliRCI<br />
,NA4 WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT<br />
•<br />
• 2002<br />
• DECLASS !Fir° AND fiELEASti<br />
CENTRAL INTELL I BENCE AG ENC<br />
S OURCES M ETHODS EXEMPT I0N382<br />
NAZI WAR CRIMESD ISCLOSURE AC<br />
DATE 2001 2007
Third Corps! Seventh Div - DOFAUESCHIXGEk:<br />
Eighth Div — KARLSRUH$<br />
Ninth Div - ,WIESBADEN..<br />
. .<br />
I The div boundaries proposed by the General correspOncrto:.the'zptebabl<br />
•<br />
tions.:. capacity of each district. The boundariee'areqizieithati6V.er<br />
AUTOBAHNEY (super-highways), highways, rivereetc-<br />
' Source thinks it neither Practical not necessary l yr:Airiatteithp4.14,m.4,<br />
,troop p :in.dispersed and 'broken-up groups,.. he balieveseentraig0411.00.0.,e<br />
:visablel Thio' s. would facilitate the operation and e<br />
an''arranganaf4ould, furthermore,'perimit'ihe(Uf.e**46i4i;dat<br />
part, recently constructed barracks. The denea:Det'OfY040.:r.0Wwb4.1.<br />
quick shifting of troops, should the /vied<br />
R<br />
•<br />
, Li) HAMqLBURG<br />
iii) MUENSINGEN<br />
iv)-WILDFLECKEN<br />
v) 9OI TTHOFEN - First Corps, primarily <strong>for</strong> Me.untalp.,<br />
'<br />
it<br />
• . •<br />
• ! a ;T'v*.<br />
If the use of armorad dive <strong>for</strong> occupation troops i's'Apteridede<br />
advisable to • '4+ • nre P.■<br />
locate them, in he immediate . proxinaltyofthsikeltna<br />
n4or.dar:to' decrease the damage to the crops 'caused by mivW<br />
-<br />
404
t 4
-<br />
“oucta5150<br />
21 Apr 45<br />
Copy No .3O<br />
SECRET<br />
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER<br />
AP0 . 758 US ARMY<br />
SEOR2 T:<br />
:Auth: CG th Arm<br />
:Init: ?1,<br />
Prof of Physics<br />
45/987 HEIDELBERG - - Beg 'Apr 45<br />
. • ,1<br />
Univ<br />
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSUREACT ,<br />
2001<br />
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY •<br />
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY:.<br />
SOURCESMETNOOSEXEMPTION3O2O.'<br />
NAZI WAR CRINESOISCLOSURE AC1:<br />
DATE 2001 2007<br />
S 2CRET
,i) GiNARZT. .(Medical Corti° , Gen) Prof Dr Ernst RODENWALD, a 66-year 01 4_HEIDEL 7<br />
• IISRG:prefessorone-time head of the Institute <strong>for</strong> Tropical Diseases' in.BER-7.<br />
L,IN.:*ho4S;:.:well::aciquaintedWith s cientists all over the world. (Of<br />
RepoAS,<br />
V. .;flefll'iieTSAIbilM:Air .45-and<br />
''Y.:tVfis.', :'„: S<br />
'1 .....,<br />
AIOA/1; 14 Apr<br />
'<br />
45)<br />
, H<br />
.- . '..'' ::.■ ::<br />
):GENMAU;:(Brig Gen) Hubert L U ETKEIMUS,<br />
0i7i*RKACHTs1atImANDANT<br />
4<br />
54-year old professional<br />
eoldier,<br />
(Army Oommandant) MANNHELM-LUDWIGSHAFEN, who.wa's,put<br />
_<br />
• -7<br />
:Y.On:the,:r4Ored list<br />
,,4WPW<br />
on 31<br />
. Mar. 45. Of IiIttilli vin.Ce<br />
Reports<br />
B ulletin MFIU Ref Noe<br />
5/751, 18 Apr sitic/k/i, 14<br />
45)<br />
Apr 45P'i<br />
'—..4:(2.&.::. --,.<br />
-.,:prof-q/repUtlY(447WESOH, lit,physios professor from the University<br />
,,j;;WhO';,.Wei6lipgiged?-fif'rettearch - . , ,<br />
work on secret weapons.<br />
.<br />
-1 ti,,:of.EIDEI,BERai:,<br />
.., ... _ „<br />
,<br />
. ... .<br />
_.1<br />
: * * * * *<br />
,<br />
... ..<br />
*<br />
;': ..;.,r:,...7,,.....7r„.,,:..,......,.......T......,......... and.'Other S cientific ...2s221.3t,e<br />
E<br />
,,iigif,,;.*e.'' . :.%:,'!: . , " : . ' . , •<br />
..<br />
..,..,...i,,JalpBigpi0h.e.11..the work ol_s has done will be<br />
•<br />
deed nC,',..'-,A'4;•,pa..,2.-0,fa, experiments, 'which. were s to •say, wasted.<br />
---,,--0,;'' , wii-a<br />
„Ihavelaade<br />
a "fitness tests of officials conaluded: They<br />
7JMieyetf,v,ppo.s,e,dtobepUt d ,<br />
into estined to work<br />
4,i*OrdAALIAGO*4nVdrything -practice with the 'in the:t-C;P<br />
acq was uisition of the Oadie,<br />
_<br />
prepared to the last detail:' The:mili=:„.<br />
,t:4<br />
tbrg01,1*Ier0:ihne<br />
n1 '1.?„10k06,004i0r medical instal lations <strong>for</strong> the troops Were such<br />
aicititterke /W 'pciufin0nt; f14<br />
organic transportation <strong>for</strong>.six4eOpie. tnit,:„<br />
-Zedin' tropical<br />
iII:!;ge,t4v d erything. : iseased and ch ftioals.. In thoee days We<br />
,. cpUld'<br />
,.<br />
,<br />
*<br />
0,,p42,-W*7.fri.a Negro prison z"0.<br />
.sm#dtUd.ies., and .camp in the ,<br />
neighb<br />
./ wanted to go te'STARGARD,,I orhoOd of where we.:<br />
.0en0f0i!OHT4pinee,executed)...',Ihiti'S1Weye took had.to,:gett ?<br />
he;sig::::-<br />
-<br />
,v,0(<br />
_dohnICal .kesistints<br />
,_.,:iArMy;,,dectorajpb STELLEN)<br />
<strong>for</strong><br />
C 8 t L. , d' . 08<br />
n0 f<br />
• , /<br />
- technical officers<br />
4-ii1Nr iL,)11 1 personnel (<br />
"<br />
r<br />
Prof FLIEGE (?), zo ng<br />
,<br />
were:—<br />
rsity<br />
ologiet U<br />
o f "<br />
ratty. of MARBURG.<br />
MARBURG; Prof LENZ (LINt4L entomOlo„<br />
pagpysiajr);,,0taff . . .<br />
member,.."(DOZENT); R3GIERUNGSRAT.,(Government:'<br />
.‘13AURAT opnetrii:o:tion eng ineer) .; . MAJ.Dr<br />
.41‘,114iTtBsl(s?)'tf'20010gist u
4<br />
SEOR,ET<br />
A few weeks ago I received an order stating that research work was to be.<br />
carried on only in connection with vital war-decisive weapons. This rescinded<br />
an order I had received ajew months be<strong>for</strong>e. Nothing but contradictions. -<br />
TheSame confusion reigned , in the quebtion of SONDERFUEHRERS. There, too,<br />
±hey'ne'ver'found a proper solution. In the EAST in the occu p ied territories<br />
all kinds of people were 2ut into SONDERFUERER uni<strong>for</strong>ms.<br />
e•*e*e**<br />
R: The,entemological station MALO:i0W, KIRLIN, where I was, and whero 40,000<br />
mosquitoes2! Were being bred was directed by a Dr MEIER (?). He was an exterminatō<br />
2•.:ISIN.GSBEKAZIPFER) 'and the Station was the in<strong>for</strong>mation office<br />
'fOrAhs:Army.:Me was shipped to the front as a lieutenant.<br />
WI:', 5,:PqRs-X :ZS:Institute) At that time it was vary interesting (at the Instiate.<br />
.<br />
)iiNdricedith ' ultraviolet and inorganic light-rays.. rcured 85-90%<br />
'
SECRET<br />
W:<br />
. .<br />
I have given all my employees permission to talk about:theirWerk..,:<br />
wonder if they know (tho Americans) that I wae at the 'KREBS , dnstitute.rom<br />
1929-1934. At that time I was together with 4ERNER (?), Istham s I h'elPecLecin*<br />
sidorably in 1953. He came from the HULTS3HINER LAENDOEZN'arid had:a,ljewish<br />
grandmother. After tha.'!, heleft <strong>for</strong> BRUMT. He was a very docon-LWan;',,ho 4,<br />
wo:kod on chemical and physical therapy.<br />
W: I have been active in the REIDELBERGER TEUTOVEN,.a LANDSAANNSCHAFT(etUdent<br />
fraternity).<br />
. „<br />
W: The Party 4 n HEIDELBERG was quite moderate, not like in Saxoy an ./. huiingia.<br />
In our town (HEIDELB2RG) they never shot anybody.' Do you remelibee:AMBERRE4 ,<br />
a <strong>for</strong>mer Social-Democrat, and STAFFERT (?)? The latter was a elear:;1114.0';'-<br />
4 standing person, who recently was the mediator, between . th'so AMericans;itie , ,<br />
_civilian population.<br />
. • • ..<br />
.74,i •<br />
R: I had some Dutch stocks Inclich were very low. I'wanted:to sellthem,<br />
The government received next to nothing .frorajt, ,9r only a ridiculous,<br />
amcunt.. You Could not get along with the RM 10.06 whichwere-.;peSatk:&:<br />
private <strong>for</strong>eign travels. Had I not visited so many eonferencee410.04ROUON<br />
DOY and PARIS I could not have escaped the mouse 'tra.p.;,.., -<br />
ways had ,a little more money.<br />
W:<br />
• •<br />
I married into a somewhat questionable democratic familwOri“-accoUnkf,W,WhUh.<br />
_I had difficulties with the Nazis. My wife's uncle, <strong>for</strong>,instin*C(4*:401/7.-<br />
munist and interned in the concentration camp at 0RANIE1'BURG,P144-4Wili<br />
• -,l'ore<br />
A v.<br />
very much resented in Party circles. •<br />
•<br />
L: Have you been across (the ocean)?<br />
. . .<br />
V: , -No, but I hold many American patents. I also worked <strong>for</strong><br />
. . .(7) I maintained an experimental station <strong>for</strong> I. G:.:',FARE)ENIMY0OtV.hst,<br />
verr little connection with military things; it was mainiike/ipar.04*'<br />
* * *<br />
. •<br />
11 am glad, after all, to have declined the inyitatlon40/110014<br />
It is better <strong>for</strong> the present, and besides, a proposed salary of 50 .;00.0.:;Maricewould<br />
be insecure and without a firm basis.<br />
r-<br />
•..* • :c *<br />
R: I had a conference with the Dean of the University, SCE4IDT (?) (of STRA.S-<br />
B(URG?) t'lialast January, together with STEIN and . . • At the time the taking<br />
over of the BUERGERROSPITAL (STRASBCURG) by the University clinic was under<br />
way. STEM was involved in this affair, <strong>for</strong> which he is being reproached<br />
severely in Alsace. The faculty became very rich through the acquisition'.<br />
Besides, STEIN ie rumored to be receiving salaries amounting to 300,00Q . REICHS-<br />
MARK. He is a somewhat romantically inclined person'.<br />
* * I:: • t *
-I. remaine0 faithful to Sciepco everiAs:a'Party;mgMb:<br />
.not kill anybody:<br />
:<br />
Have you taken an active part in Army or<br />
, No, I had a serious eperation, and,waa:upable-tó404'<br />
* * *<br />
„ * *<br />
III.' Clov(p2Lrg i the Retreat<br />
..<br />
-R:<br />
. .<br />
It was a crime that all the bridges in HEIDELBERG.werefilOwnt,<br />
couldn't talk the general out of it Since the<br />
soared to :ilErMAGalkaffair,:thpetifilkti 1'<br />
death. You couldn't get:Over"th.W:NECORPOnAh0I<br />
. bot ,<br />
;led'up. Not even boat transportationaS-prePare**p, t....<br />
general at least not to blow up the..old<br />
bridge ,. .but-hsaf.<br />
•t-41- -"f. *t ,ri'',<br />
calved orders from 'nigher up<br />
-dil.thatl" liadVere<br />
, to blow up . all ! e<br />
.ies<br />
bridies.<br />
...- — - : tr<br />
,A-ils,<br />
f' -4;4 sl !1., ‘<br />
vi q<br />
r eceived'ordere from the armament<br />
inspactorate _CRIUSTNNGSINSit • .<br />
savc, the equipment, since it was the only equipment:Of0A*4W<br />
GEHEIMRAT LENGERSTAL (?) was<br />
,<br />
also still with mo ... .I.,.fiaeiiiO40M44'<br />
,<br />
regimental commander that ha shoul not erect a readblea'ek'anPiiAilW<br />
. I finally succeeded. .t , • .,., "'••• -",:<br />
\.<br />
0'49 ' ,tliti . '.<br />
-Shortly be<strong>for</strong>e the Americans arrivod, an officer from th, armai 4<br />
torato came to see me. I turned over the•estab<br />
instrumCnts are i<br />
li<br />
r<br />
eementtcphbaba<br />
. . .• , -<br />
• • :Xt,<br />
replaceable and must:not be dostroye(0,41<br />
HM1TTELHAUSEN<br />
. *<br />
was dofended <strong>for</strong> four days by<br />
liavyr-patty<br />
only with PANZTRFAEUSTEN, without any heavy<br />
...Of. 4 .0.1*<br />
weapons<br />
two 'Ioldors of tho Knights' Cross.'<br />
abOU.t11.20.<br />
-<br />
Finally only<br />
offi two,.<br />
-, :ere'came from a school in MoiiiiroW,<br />
HITTELHAUSEW.<br />
11':, ' , It has boon loarned that tha •<br />
''thOsia; •<br />
Russians<br />
..and that thoy manufact a<br />
urOd;gases', o<br />
xperimantad .auxiolanaos:r<br />
with them in<br />
actually used them, %Owevor.<br />
factorieeThey<br />
ovorN<br />
R: :Wo Germans aro'very much afraid of it (gas)? and<br />
, - • ,<br />
woul&<br />
oureeves. Nono of my colleagues would mako himself noar:maka use of it<br />
thing - p available rimarily on ethical grounds and also bacatiso it <strong>for</strong> ''such a'<br />
p1R 2.Y EISCH<br />
mightboOmerang:.(11.14-Ell.<br />
NIDIGXEIT). My friend ZEISS has novor mentionedanyViingabout•<br />
'to mo, and that is proof that it does not.exist,.<br />
A
• Tho *origami conducted thomsolvouquité<br />
i':iodiótod' .that they would. They arrivedin<br />
cl ostroy , anything, did not etoal or repo, but<br />
"'AMOi ■icans arc, of course, to A largo ojctont<br />
7, 14040SBAGH -havo boon issuod and overything<br />
•<br />
•,<br />
t<br />
_..:•,, . ,I. /.:)I.<br />
voinor ( SCH MIFaRMEISTER) BRAUN in MOSBAOH, a<br />
tz<br />
: <strong>for</strong>mOr . 46MediatPli•<br />
Of the gasworks, They (the AmoriCans) kept<br />
- ablo , follow•■<br />
hiM, • bboitUi01 6iWingii<br />
. ,<br />
.,4<br />
•<br />
•VI Post-War• Gornany<br />
Iho .f144ro looks dark to mo. Thp Allies<br />
' iil takeaway,t, . em<br />
2of told;Wo .<br />
havoloft - and all tho-troaeUres'WO'rebbft,<br />
courtry will bo occupied and einco it is impoeSi bl<br />
is bottor to givo up.<br />
'Olidkhitein,Ah<br />
:-Mhat'. ,dc'you think the pooplo frain'tho'W,STANDARTZk<br />
do?<br />
•••,••; :5;••<br />
'<br />
peasants keep their mouths shut, many4Ooli1ogi<br />
tho :BAYRISOH.EN WALD or In the valloys of thoAlps..'..Thiii.<br />
it's being •carried• out in practico.<br />
• t<br />
Toro Is a-price of fourAnillion dollami:ohAMMLER<br />
him qvg r t6 tho Allios, if I know 'whoro ho was.: ••.'<br />
* * * *.*• * *<br />
. •<br />
• -':Wo must not think about futurp dovoloiamont e .ye<br />
mooting(r1IDELBERG University) that wo'woiild:have EdriiTtt ,0,1;<br />
of tho British and Americans. Porhaps wo can<br />
in this way.<br />
got : :tho'Uni vor eitgOitiae<br />
W:<br />
Porhape tho stone plaque 4ith the namoe of the Jowieh founders such as<br />
BURG is still thoro. That Aght areo help to somo oxtont.<br />
* * * *<br />
t li/AR-<br />
•<br />
W: Ncw tho question Rrisos, how l can / : holp the Fatherland bruaking<br />
cath of allegiance? I holi vo that the bpst thing to do isga. • t4Orato.<br />
with tho Americans. I can holp ormany that way very much<br />
any 1-..arm.
v4111(7'r,..r-,<br />
4<br />
Ile have to <strong>for</strong>got the pr st and we have to work with tho.no'WlscUitorso<br />
, •<br />
/<br />
W: lOs, that l e right, that is the only way to . ,prosoryo • tho Gormaivpoo<br />
and we have to do it as good Gormans. •<br />
'..• .rt "<br />
R:<br />
W:<br />
I believe that our chemical industry will bo thd only,..ono•te7rpmainIsi<br />
existence; also possibly tho optical industry iincp wO:,arofOofar4a<br />
that field. Whether the heavy industry will remain'ia:Ver5OldUbtfUl<br />
* * * *<br />
4;f<br />
_ No other nation has accomplished what . Gormany has .don,,A9,-,fqp*fr<br />
Northern tip of Norway (NCRDCA?) to the SUM Canal, from th0140::.<br />
MOSCOW. We introduced German art, culture, and waY of—livinihatnho,4<br />
bo <strong>for</strong>gotten. And surely we shall become and shall bo a'grOot_natisongTbe<br />
Gorman idea will live, even if it takes twenty-fivo or fifty.4-OareGq1#01y<br />
will be victorious. What can America do against ii-? They w41<br />
factories and get industry into high goar. But they aro'stillkWaAW41h:1,'<br />
out culture and barbaric. They can still learn from us. IMaginlaf.<br />
havo accomplishA in the l!ar against malaria. Prof MARTINI and;tiWoOlMYis-f'<br />
sietants havo achieved great things during the war. And on tho It4ia'47rrOlt<br />
people such as medical Capt STIa3Eli (?) workod splendidly.<br />
• • .<br />
I am a confirmod National Socialist and a Gorman. It ' is wOndotfU<br />
at R time liko this. FSDAP, NSKX, NSV, are all marvelous insti u o •<br />
BUTTEN (?) in PRAGUE is tho only colleague in my field who comow:U '<br />
standards.<br />
•••••• •<br />
The . lost.wae has shown Germany that she is a nation' of:lekeret.,,<br />
will become a nation of leaders again, and that-She-4dd<br />
Of course when the white flags hang out in i:IEIDZLTTRG,• and whenA2,(00.14PN<br />
around with Red Cross armbands, it looks ridiculous to the Ameri.OaniiiWlt<br />
is degrading <strong>for</strong> us.<br />
•<br />
R: ne,British want to take revenge, but they'll have to<strong>for</strong>g4:44bOutthat<br />
-<br />
We'll surely have it luch easier under Ameriaan'ocoupatton in,Southerrn .<br />
many.<br />
.“,->A*14MW*0<br />
-<br />
Viii. German Occupational and Foreign Policy<br />
R: In Belgium the Flemish expected great things .• - - _<br />
. frourswhencame Outte,<br />
were outsmarted by the Walloons; we wanted to . unif)i4heAitlgie:n0Iii4'In<br />
• , • -?*•<br />
the medical faculty in BRUSSELS we wanted to woik tegether with Wal oons am; =••<br />
Flemish alike but it never got beyond the experimental stage ? Whom did we
send as our representative? A German district physician (KREISARZT) to represent<br />
the German medical profession.<br />
W: Yes, the Department of Education (KULTUSAIISTERIUM) and the <strong>for</strong>eign policy<br />
(AUSSENPOLIT1K) have been beyond all description (UNTER ALL .LR KANONE) in Germany<br />
lately.<br />
21 April 1945. SEVENTH ARAY INTERROGATICN CENTER<br />
PAUL KUBALA,<br />
Maj,<br />
Commanding.<br />
SECRET _<br />
9
EVENTS NG. _ ' UP TO) • 20 :JULV<br />
• Te-port Ref No S L:1 -2;:i 10 (A<br />
,• .<br />
'<br />
. •<br />
EAF11 , UNDERGROUND 140VVENTS<br />
: E1CUACE" .<br />
•<br />
piElIC,Aet villIDELBERG, . .<br />
KAISUSTRASSE '33,01<br />
- *have considerable .- yea.pkild4geo<br />
ooniotione knowledge of•intiNaW,i404A4'<br />
by being<br />
•<br />
imprisoned'.<br />
elitical ,•<br />
936 ), (. ,: i:ffte'':?tri•ring . to o r eate'an underground orgaLl15j0<br />
i4 ; •<br />
' • 7 •<br />
• -Date Of In<strong>for</strong> mations' See ::Tb2Ct<br />
•••!'<br />
"<br />
.u.1 ANrI.. NAzI GROUPS<br />
:..ii...1<br />
kt*i`t ehoUlk<br />
• . •<br />
'tui doratood •<br />
?Pitt,he.,iiidergi"Onrid that only the „se ,..cilred movement° mentioned<br />
Ante<br />
were<br />
. in' this<br />
to have • <strong>for</strong>med a : eMall .cadre<br />
PUteci.<br />
•<br />
• :<br />
organi4,9441<br />
•<br />
... <strong>for</strong>mer,<br />
i..<br />
Minister of the<br />
AW1V*<br />
.jsii;"e! : in'f-,tfilji..;i-epOrt , had by 1941.<br />
Interior.:•of ,,Heis.401)1,<br />
become . ., ..the<br />
• , .<br />
farmer trade<br />
iz l<br />
1#;.3.14<br />
Cad 02'1 . !Ofiii<br />
union chief. a p . • 1..;:t'0,Aztiee:iiirit dOERDELEIVo<br />
taken in . 'f.6 ..-""''''<br />
aotiire•.part<br />
: pr .iiiiii.Piilii . 11.iti a On• man . b<br />
' An',.th<br />
r • 4e4<br />
. , etwe -<br />
•<br />
on the • gen<br />
4a+XN:.6<br />
er al sr:..and,'.:th the '''.4"t141-i.11'<br />
--eiinae<br />
y;i;rOi.indigiOVethent to •<br />
• O. ,<br />
giyo -::<br />
413,44 s r him a.<br />
'0<br />
paraonai'" iiicicAxidfikrtp.sci,<br />
'<br />
irj.iiiiiirited .:,-1'..../,.f.t:r..*.dditioii. •:'*1.;th the •• gonere Is , who • had:<br />
•,<br />
to teeki,'piotting<br />
, ,<br />
the o 1 iqu la littaitlitio<br />
•.•,`- 4•• ;Or:th'•-er,.'• small'ArOUP led by • LEUSOHN.;'`'..:90Sikbarikka<br />
' : had '1.'.0,=.8.i14:113:: bean .<br />
•;:itioordi,i4 to<br />
<strong>for</strong>med : which Mat :'at'06;iur'04.14OL'iff<br />
, , .•!,,,,,I.e.n...4.:•.,1 :4; .4 .:-..„:,• ...,,,::; '.'.., . •<br />
s ouz'Oe,<br />
. - the loading'<br />
'<br />
• ' . , ,. i, .!::';''.:,..".... .. '. 4:ilfti‘fti 1<br />
' • ,__<br />
• ,<br />
The first preparatioṇ5<br />
<strong>for</strong><br />
• an<br />
.....,::.y• ,-- i . ‘ ,<br />
,the • .rrinitor ‘<br />
insurreetiOn a gains, .... . NR1i4e<br />
., .,,., •••••...,.,:a m*lier; of of • armored 1939, when .GMERALFELDM4RSOHALli. VON:f...B14,ii0H•Titglik<br />
dlvie ions in the BEALP, ..a.t.7ea_i(..r,•;.Holti, 544,.7e.<br />
'',' hi. a ',n;)riegi • ! ,eit the last Atomo4t 9 ■ And<br />
. the . ifh6 14'inidi f,iki'' 4<br />
IY4..- 4 : '<br />
(This Story was told to source by LT,US<br />
the'''n.rixt try . . so far<br />
.0)pr)T40.i!..<br />
as is known to<br />
'VON BitiiiitraliltOkrif souibo, ṭ b7ras ready to 'iiiii.'ziiiiitiiiii*<br />
,. •..., incll liq<br />
an lkdvanood<br />
stage that tho<br />
uide,to . Hiittit,'.andAlii1401F44,,<br />
, Fold , Afarbil i • :i.,*:b<br />
. .. .. - asked4, 71M ,<br />
1." jt•ri I.: N 0 WAR CRIMES DISCLOSUREAEI 2 E. 1 Nv.<br />
.1‘<br />
•2000.<br />
• DErLASSIFIE0 AND MEASED Y<br />
CENiNAL MM. ISENCE,.049.01tt,,:<br />
SIIIIRCESNETHODS<br />
NAZI VAN CR. INES Di StL eattlif<br />
NM 2881 7O7
p rominent .r -Ntizis'whoM It wae essential , to kilt<br />
. . - .<br />
. Chr is.t.mas • 1 l, . at . ,-11.;-'<br />
but VON Co i ts' -i .:(,T o:016:Pilp 'd-ir<br />
BRAUCHITSCH was relieved<br />
cc0.1aps ed . , ... . . of -hi tait'6iiiiiiitiit:4 ••1, l ' •"<br />
, .•. " .''-- •''. ,<br />
r-1.2..i'Tv,i<br />
. . • .. ...,...--<br />
,-:'<br />
.- ' .. In 42, . ,LEUSOHNER<br />
.:••::::./t:.:.i 'ii•is; ..<br />
f ' e:',.,.. 'Zer ‘ .<br />
. ..,<br />
MASS ', :, another .. SOciallet<br />
chief ••..titii:Pri<br />
. of the Catholic unions ,• reached c<br />
".':.LOS:diir---qind''<br />
• k.', (imp I ottesiiiieeiiiiint<br />
..:,1,,, .-. ,...<br />
taken'' , ".11,1A.,h ,CTOER,DELER acting as<br />
.4.'ati.tt'il t ilia*:<br />
• intermediarii ..<br />
' gonerEL16 ,. w). ; i1AUS.Okl■TERiezeitb i'sh<br />
.o.'....3,,tozore ropresented by Gon-, VON .BECIC...0ther*.z.'ieniiri.t-<br />
''.<br />
part in the 7t,alka . w, ore Gen FALKENHAUSEN . and GO:n ME<br />
:<br />
' take 'part; ,<br />
. OH.<br />
stating that ho was d eoldior, not a pOlitiCiiUi.<br />
.:;, , •_Th€,:: thir d .at ...'''.;.,•• :.,1441.‘4 .,!...,,,,,,;;;111 .,....4„.:<br />
,..,. . tempt was planned <strong>for</strong> April 4<br />
Nand DI 3,••• but -d in..<br />
,<br />
•14I ' MEN.<br />
sput bORF.F . and HAUBACH, at source's a'thoàting bowoo4<br />
ti<br />
00.d0(i's'i .' ..<br />
. a 6 c idc•cl that :a putsch in 1943 would be s liofie . in ' OBERS001110-,:Al-1.4a0{:i•<br />
..,...„ , ..<br />
•and . untisiely.: The . t.1-,oir political intontions wore 'Unknown; , while Rua s iiiiiii::,.,. .reik:a.,....•4:::,<br />
.. . •• .<br />
not yOt had anY.-i.mportant<br />
•<br />
military or .:the -•Abier.tPe' .iiii:•'sifiidAii.'d politiO41'.:sucoOe<br />
B14:kishAf.'d, •<br />
S .:::: • LitifYgOifS, OM, IllittVyii.,f;,'•:3,..,<br />
• had to face `"troiiltoildOue problom'<br />
i. The i.... ...ir re et ien'i''.'iiiiii;:itlidROA,;.- 81i -4,-,, .7, .eȯri<br />
,,. _ ..y.1 •<br />
' . VON B IT CI( had been ' net ' if ied ..■ •.-•:through • Oount 'MOLI'KE -•••' - -'' fia-41.,;":i' - 0 ...0:11...,Ct' .<br />
• "" . -'-• ' "'---;;-4-4;44).''' '' '' • '' In tho , satite year i. „ GOERDELER , LEUSCHNER f and ..the'..fotMO14.71Mtittiiie 's ,. i;: : I..411. -,' . '',,p,, ,,... '...-..,:<br />
• '"?..?"-:=-%,:'<br />
VON DER S OWLENBURG , drew up a plan to os ta b 1 iih<br />
WO Oilii<br />
liiitOi:-. contact,..'..'. .tho. '<br />
•;, ,Rusaian ;fith:'''.tho''.• Hritish a nd lanor lean govr<br />
.4.-47$3 fii t.ttiitt4:-..<br />
o nmont,s ... Cotirit, SCI,II.J.LEPpi#1 .,....<br />
."1:',..1.in.os in . . . . .<br />
,i Gon• .KUECHLER's Army sector, . b Ut71.11 :4;;Y".4,4*,411,tc,Fil,P,T.,04q,z<br />
-oflasso 1 .-j-.)y; . the ', Cl .<br />
,Ia,., bocaus o tho fact: 3bh0 . -.;44, - .C,t,,;*3.441 enls<br />
. could ..•orir.lca..4 erA,<br />
\ , t• ,' not .hair .<br />
ol d<br />
.,.,..tii ck;boOn'lii .-'''' fs. Li.<br />
,,..,.<br />
' a o ltir 6o '.:..,.<br />
by . LEUSCHITF,R and MITA ENDOR ,41-:.9 .,,,,_ 1.•,.<br />
pp , . .i.t.''''if. .<br />
..fr,Om who had ;4()}01.3,14BURG to 'HITLER, writton in May ,41,<br />
•aloe ... Eilikii,",i,•;,.., ',''' V.E6<br />
• FOEB;REA ` not.f •'-in; ..ẇhidh .tt,1-r,ii47,0iiii.,,<br />
.tio go. to war against •Russia Sipco ihe,vaSt- , 4,2'<br />
. pr..° 0 .-:.0,;1:... i;r1qurt41 0untab 2. 0 .d .iff eptioiie.:44<br />
i oul t los )).<br />
.,cit%<br />
........ in ... ,ho :.<br />
• • - • i-kla.,-,•••-..i• --,:i !:<br />
,iumiticir..of 43,<br />
, a the.. generals do °lax.<br />
ibIcti•:.b.t.it ,,that, they would, ' pd. , that .e.,<br />
. . w.elc<br />
Suppo rt..•-•Tho :<br />
orao a revcilution<br />
j<br />
. , 0-14-... woupd<br />
„,,1,-,-'6iirt-i..<br />
;i441<br />
P.Itt ;i<br />
oeuita, who had oncour aged the _und .yo',;:a.t .L„' . car n.<br />
1 OrTkipu<br />
'diat9<br />
WOro..oit61...i.0<br />
4-,,...1.46 ..itask nd''''iidie4e Of' ' conducting a pill of ,titi ..., . P pop,i4<br />
.,<br />
, cie CJC..4 ) 64 '.e ..negative reaction ovorywhord oxcept 'in iii.;,...'eCilti-miiiit";:(ii'''''''' .. .. , .<br />
oluded that a l' IXI,9,4!"..114q .;111KEii,N: ,4'.:.1.<br />
to b<br />
popular r ob Oil i on - wa s out of '''the 'cli'ie'etiOn.i.•;."O;iid..<br />
t7,1<br />
e;_cvorbhrown by mon with political and mil itary: .s!st}i,a-0;liIT12$<br />
Itpli;::',:at t. bilipiciti to . establish an ontento with peWo.r • ' Seiti. -6O''''.0.tat`41:t„—Er,<br />
rii0r.-,,7.0-.r) a It is sourco L<br />
, r EUSCHINTER ': during s.thel?ciO'UT..<br />
. s Opinion that - ho was BU,<br />
..k8l'Oft<br />
. .<br />
46.1tasot . . , .<br />
.wit h IEUsOfillER rrOme<br />
09 OS Of1,14 /.1...if:.1914!i.;::.Q21,4.44iKirl..f A.<br />
•,, . . - .... . . .. . that . t imo oriward... .! :.'' . ' ., ' I ''-'.': :•.','••••=7.-C.':..`lp." .:"41., .,-1,....; .zod,T.;<br />
..-.V.V.‘,..<br />
;',....,pciurlt.,,mol,,TKE! 8.. . 0 2aque<br />
'-t•U<br />
,613.1:0::;hakd': and the group<br />
6' 'orkcain<br />
'<strong>for</strong>med, by GOERDA'.4,i.LEU§piglEf.kr, ,..0., .11 ••-<br />
• •<br />
tiril po litical d iff or onCes , 1: %lut.. . by , 'early . -, avr ',.. • .,<br />
aMor; ..4.4,.`.',40.ii:C. ii.<br />
,,,:,,,,,,„ ..,......:<br />
tb. .cii7.-:t....%rl.d hav o.boon frig! 'OOnóerning -the propos od p OrS o nriô l -'6,P-. a; -ri6i,/ ioii6ii#6ii., ,....<br />
...Ptimb Mi ./lister at :Ais, it • .,.' 413 iCt11 43,^7 ..!•.."0.T . .<br />
t40';- '= -, „it' 166.St se' LEOSCHNER, was first, led ,butI,JEUSONEB.Wak'%6:.S4'0.,67:i..otni.itil ‘,..4m..-fri<br />
, moLTicV,s circa() . . claiks . to bcliciVP.',.stii,ir6.6;"'•;ithi;T:cr*Fii.j.1.74<br />
to . have boon<br />
which' Ha' .<br />
Oi''<br />
oft.u3Od<br />
&lid tho gPvernor.s-hip 5;.64:filit<br />
.<br />
4;; i,irp .1.<br />
y44...,,f,.....<br />
Ocauso he did not want •<br />
t6 hold<br />
e rmama<br />
attribUtQB<br />
the faot that ho is still alive. publib ' offieO:'.-7'.i01.iiiii31,1tolii121-a.-P.Ii0<br />
24 Aust7ia .. . r •.: '' . .f .. J ',,,r1:r:''7,..:i.VO4;:k.‘,..<br />
was to rOmain' a •- ;*. 4.1...1‘j.Vi:-Y.1.-, „1,,<br />
Germany, but a<br />
,.'..,-..,-1,3„,:.;..6.• ' ...T<br />
. which includod.<br />
provinco of ,<br />
'••• - •-'1 w. ---40'• 04. P # 4,,....i.i. 4,4 Ow, Ntrc.,11',:ii,ir, .‘•••• v ..$. , ... ., ..• • , ,. 4 ,,<br />
, • NEFV,:i.',•;.a S OHUS CBNIGG, • SEITZ, the fermor Mayor sóPtrotogovoiskont4fasmRlanneciii:5' ei' ,.. .':,..<br />
Social-Domocrat. ;<br />
S Ị EITZ had roluotantly ,agrood . t.OP..'paiti:63,piit'6$inirth .:.:V.XENIV ,. ...,4..ḳ<br />
. :!i?il4S-07',''C''-'- 0.:. speing •• .-....'v '''''''''4.:''''::;2: 1 ,<br />
• ..,..s.: . .<br />
.7'',..,, •<br />
-,,?..,,.#.:io4,417.404` '<br />
..,-. . -•<br />
, . . , .,<br />
'4.=,.1....Aị......:.;'*„<br />
:•:•:',..i...;;O::::60.4.;'.--'.<br />
',2<br />
.:..`:; ....":„'-,.. ..„..<br />
. ,,, ,:., .!. .... ....., .. . ..,...1.<br />
IV'. .2.,..:.,4; .:..V,<br />
.<br />
4-<br />
, THE ---.„ 20 -.-- JULY PUTSCH<br />
' , • . ' "' . :... • '.. . : 't ė ''';'..:.'2'...!<br />
:<br />
.<br />
• ,..) ,. :. ,,, . . il'!,,,<br />
..' Early , in July 44; LEBER got in touch with, the threo-imaii",:'Obriirdl"..:.06441:t'<br />
Communist .Party. Source bolievos that ono of those. mon<br />
LEBER an d REICHWEIN, , was::.p: .)iiitil.<br />
be?'*.Ofi'4.14..le .<br />
togothor ficgOritj';E:A,...Tarv with tho members '. of the Central . ..:,::rato .<br />
tad shortly thor. (oa.f-tor . :•qPineatit'O'444iiiie0iir:rids. At one , of thos o meetings the nailici-;:e_e;.•061.7.0P.I$N7,,S#4:001',1 ,••-•-:<br />
montioriod, and source thinks that tho<br />
: possibility .that sho;:i.hik<br />
:f0 '...flii5..<br />
GESTAPO may /lava in.fl U one od VON<br />
...<br />
ST AUFFENBERG t6 '<br />
beePei0,f.liniO.iinISOA .iiȮ.),i advance the '`nios<br />
•" 7. ;- ' -<br />
a ....fdr'....:.ii.45ifiii*011'4..;•,'.'...:<br />
.. . . ..<br />
NA Z WAR CRIME2Soce DISCLOSURE ACT<br />
1 ■<br />
,,,,<br />
,,.: ,..• ,,,,:,..ti:10:?). : •c:,44,41.:÷<br />
4.1v4F- '<br />
.-41.14, 4,0<br />
:':,11..JP,'<br />
• • ., . ..1 . •,,<br />
• ..... - :...:-;‘,,' .. %<br />
2 -
EC •R E<br />
P-T,RBONALITIES<br />
Som. co boliovoe that tho following porsonalitios connOctoclyi:tht.<br />
aptiyitlos doscribod above may still bo alivoi<br />
• , •<br />
Dr GLEISSNER FALTERWEG 11, $ER4I14.Montionod:ab.Oirc;<br />
'Mrs SCHUAMB BURGFELD.243, or c/o WEBER, MITRAbSiRA,ibS,<br />
MAIN. Hor husband was one of LEUS0HNERI..8<br />
and sourco'boliovos that she mEiy .: low. 1:1<br />
sonalitios who Might bo usofuls,<br />
B. 'CONSUL MOTT:MITT<br />
I. sbudE<br />
LINDEMANN, Reinhold MOritz, 0/GEFA (41. ), 639 B0Hd FLAK 'ABT ! 144,.<br />
yoar-Old nativo of ROACH, nor COBURG. His rocords‘ show that41.0,, oi Net<br />
Party .in 1952, and that ho hold the rank of T1UPPFUtHH7R /,q, s0 ' 13 %<br />
wasi , couorativo during intorrogation, but it is aivarent<br />
who is anxious to ingratiato himself with the winning sido,..144,t,N)40-i414W94,,<br />
GENLT. (kGon) Fritz LINDEMANN, was implicated in . tho ,20 July:puteckpoltob,.<br />
having had any 'connection with tho affair himself.<br />
Rating, i C =, Dato of In<strong>for</strong>mation: Soo Text IntorregatoralRAE.T.-andeZ.<br />
THTIMOVEMENT<br />
,<br />
lt k<br />
bolioyos that tho attompt.on HITLER of„ . 0_4 -1.34Aha, 4t.sjnooptioN,<br />
tho CaSUL Movomont,,which.was foUndod during '4 whiciOgiOlidr<br />
. an 1112,emmunist'organization of the parly 201s.,Tho:grou.p,wasad<br />
pconomiqtS, and high7ran)cing Army officers,, and itS,idop.,IstiOd04144544,A,<br />
woro,domocratic. Its purposo was to overthrow HITLER, and to 'ondiij;i■ti<br />
ing:.about an insurrection.<br />
' ' • --fi!...N.fe<br />
, 1*.._ro s9O.iv gd hi,s-in<strong>for</strong>mation from his brothor f ,Dr . NurtlIlrmilionwwik<br />
. ., .,,,<br />
byji. b.pmb;a ow wooks ago; and from Ma) DrREUSSE,:arl'old.faglygti-fiA.<br />
'States that<br />
. nOithor . . . of those mon woroinVoivocrin the moiromOntb4WO<br />
...diroct connootionaviith "it. Ma) RTUSSE :Waa at the LUFTWAFFANFACK$ LE,<br />
..0001.),.:WU ERZBURG, whoro . ho dirootod thOltraining program:, •- ..:-.• 47...<br />
•<br />
III..PROMINZNTTERSONALITIES<br />
GRAF HELLDORF<br />
GENMAJ (Brig Son) HASSE<br />
GOTRDTLER<br />
:GENLT:(Maj Gon) Dr Fritz<br />
4INDEMANN,<br />
,_GENOBST (Col eon) H/PPTR (?)<br />
Former STADTKOMMANDAM/BERLI<br />
. , • •<br />
Sourcohi •cousin.. --,.<br />
.OBSTLT.(Lt Col) HENARDIS " Gonoral Staff tTficOr..'<br />
OBST:(dol) GRAF VON STAUFFENBERG<br />
GENOBST Fritz FROM His murdor.ef'a<br />
. , Sonoia1.4taMO.<br />
',owing 20 Julyi,gndlhiO41494001.10A4<br />
poarancorworb..reporiod,in7tW044,<br />
" . .<br />
Field Marshal VON WITZLEBEN Tried bY'a Po41.6.1S'colliaftei...22juIY:75ta<br />
Judge in tho oase.was,-kille'd;*ddithei.c<br />
nowa , was Suripioiildi4s94r8t4sity'<br />
The leading mombors aftor the founJing Of the MovoMent: wore'Field;'MarphaION':<br />
1<br />
S E' 0RET
DECLA SSIFIED AND RELEASED-,Oh<br />
CENTRAL I NTELL IGENCE AGEN•.CY,<br />
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT ION3)1d.fF<br />
NAZI WAR CR IMES DISCLOSIIREAT,'f,<br />
DATE 2001 2007
..'1,A11,1SO1, Nils,. a Swedish engineer who.hasworkedtef■A<br />
,.p,/ 'il<br />
.`',` , 2, .,<br />
„-. •<br />
•<br />
' 4..e.-O ketresearch.<br />
tiOn anti Ho appears to have a well,roUndeA.pa44010<br />
plans,,.and although ho adMitsthat:hd.i4..:0A14141* *<br />
.ho:.knOws the mon') iMportint men and<br />
where they..--caOdfiiUndZHO'74-<br />
i<br />
',<br />
41<br />
?..z.,i.,<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation :, . pub,lishod<br />
;<br />
• 0;<br />
boloWiwhioh<br />
is giiren'ined4ren4OPct : . 4,.... 7 • . :4.' -.4 -„,4 :',<br />
• riati:A: 13,2 , .<br />
s• .<br />
.!, ,!:<br />
. , Djitto of In<strong>for</strong>mation: _10 May<br />
.i .<br />
__<br />
..... s '45 .• ..,![. .<br />
41•DA),<br />
:Inteire' atbit<br />
1 i<br />
II. OHIEF FOR DEVELOPMENT M .V-WEAPONS -<br />
• • , , ; ! ;;,',,,, i. 1:75 i.. : ,<br />
, • I •<br />
b 6, I,' - A P ta, #.<br />
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.:- —7 —7r- 11.11)1 0 . Chit§f <strong>for</strong> Dovolbpmont of 7— • •:: V,Iloaponai i Gen DORN BRGJr ii<br />
• , di<br />
near OBERSTDORF,<br />
hAti .et complete sot Allgaeu,<br />
of do according to soui.cela latestinfpX4itf<br />
1O<br />
oumonts on the V,2'in-his.postie'igenV<br />
Of . theso .dooumonts, tho Gonoral should'bo I Ld ,,<br />
tha<br />
is bol ieyod.to so carrying false idehtifiChtion paPer*:::.Thei66,04*0<br />
P4*<br />
II i<br />
ad4lEablo to.havo somoone who'iznows<br />
..' . .<br />
.<br />
.<br />
him perionally'malie4kfifaq.ant<br />
y-IROCKETBOMB II-:-..;;-.10';' MATEMattPlIE<br />
.<br />
-f V.<br />
-<br />
- :..........____ 11<br />
,•__ . . ..<br />
;.„.Dr<br />
of<br />
Franz' MALSCHEUEH, who •'. ' . • : ballistics s<br />
is ono of the putstandingAathomat14, • • ■'2:''• •— „ 2( IA44'1.,,<br />
at .prosont in <strong>for</strong> rookot bombs "(AUSSENRALLISTIK,DP THAUNSTEIN, (-- Upper Bavaria. }o has With,..hiti. 13.'WifFE*;%:r<br />
roi.4'nOvily.dovelopod slido rule<br />
' . : Sei Once . of:tho VA ( Exporimental <strong>for</strong> rocket boMb04:.41.2id:j4404iV<br />
,. ..49#iir*ti.0218.(C0d0<br />
d os Station ? ), Yur.therM4r4filiV,<br />
...4-Ynamtc . ignations) comp <strong>for</strong> -odkot seiendoas).41.V'<br />
■ , P.,rrr: ,<br />
utations. . , .<br />
. :: For the furthor dei<br />
, . .<br />
iPlopment of the roeicet<br />
. . .<br />
'..:Of'thli':man as abablutoly bOMb oss ontial Ay<br />
)and it .<br />
..th e,<br />
she mq.d .*1644!<br />
16:<br />
tion ; . noted' in :tI "above. Dr uLsOHE<br />
roirtictikto-cLfrom DARZIGi and is ongagod UERIer*OArig4.W..4 to .<br />
be Mar c<br />
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BUHQRAUSEN<br />
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40 .,..Thiii.irigr4sidW-101$461."<br />
TkO 40(7.MwA.4.iilLIJAY.RISCH 241,i uptibr.gaVail4;tari410,10WOaid<br />
MAS,whO ii tho only in in Gorm ''.<br />
GA<br />
,inhtkuriont".. Hp has -<br />
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, • orders to blot..? it 4 if hp can #6.10figOr.',E40'04*ial<br />
,<br />
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'sitUited appi-ox 5 k<br />
AU TOS:AIN." I mSOUfl of tho dbtot.tr to*p!AraLipa;ft<br />
tho.0<br />
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that ho , triod to proy ot flITL 17:<br />
did, an ?,<br />
d '. 1or , ,<br />
0Ot.<br />
and Br 1 taiia i "yr. d<br />
, „. '‘. •-.02150aoofiil , aci7;tttibp,to ..•th<br />
•<br />
••<br />
e,i,wozi tidy ./lo.ng into ;Po). al a, ,<br />
through his Aar 13" . ein<br />
Whioh -t:116 I attor<br />
al....pp 9,,<br />
'OPIiiiiitaiciri•<br />
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IDA zbo<br />
-7-<br />
LOwl and Et .:<br />
mit. . g:<br />
O.,:r;'t.O . di,t,';3nillilAtl <strong>for</strong> : th0<br />
..• 4<br />
0.741.2j:.ti..t..' na . ' ... ' i<br />
pl an . Of :- iii6J.<br />
'<br />
ip<br />
.:.„. ; wa.. n t . ' d d to' i<br />
iriiiiWthiffr<br />
on. o . ny a o ri. on - * • 6.0.: ...'''....t, a .Av-milq,,.... .,.. ,,...<br />
.6t.ii-r6f.'1,93940 •<br />
i'.1(..ittfii;aṛ.- -;,g'OP,'.:i4.1i.il<br />
.: ' .. HITLER O. akod. GO ak Il!TG.::::4•0....-iirlp.. . ..,<br />
..fn . sight, . so .<br />
.... ,<br />
that tho a<br />
Iti:iil ■ y. ..st uli'.t (.-.1?-.4;':: ii.... .inr iod<br />
wiii'. 13::)...a.0.41;4tf• Ip. tiO<br />
which . was con ei iiali;;iiiic::',I;iii d :'-..1.1:inn oh . it . .p6 oi,82dikiiiiit,1<br />
wor ful o<br />
1:4i'94t4f<br />
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.....t.tigaiain i',. 81'16.4<br />
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• - • • •<br />
GOERING<br />
". • • '<br />
vaaiop<br />
.61.aimod<br />
'<br />
',-C1' that<br />
!.-. Fr aim° at ' that'' .. if.' up . . . • ' okwo.6,0Y0 ht. ""'....."''''<br />
p<br />
A.,;-'..,r1--.....-ti.; and 'euggo s-tod<br />
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- . , . , .., . • .....,,..ip,..„.. .' ladn<br />
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8 • E'..0-'i'<br />
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WAR CRIMES<br />
;<br />
PICt 1,Ԥ5 11 FINE ol PliV flAfl<br />
ttCt (F4i. 1E Et ISENCE<br />
1 011111t§t4E111008 EXEMPT [OHMIC".<br />
Olt I WAR CRIMES DI SCLOSURE ACT<br />
§Att tool 2 0 0 7
.<br />
SECRET<br />
- ...,,<br />
,,.:.4-YT,,,4144%..:.,-,<br />
was in con etant foar an through tho wintor , ..that a poried: of fino. iyo.o,t.i§, j',::214•12.4,0r"<br />
0:pita-to . trio' 6f<strong>for</strong>mivo 8.gainat Pr nnco . . •<br />
, ,.. • ;,."',.',. :,..,:' :1','‘.;,..,••<br />
, ,<br />
It ,I as 'during<br />
, • ..•<br />
tho wintor of 1939-40 that 'a: cortatn..mi•Ohap,,o.O-o4i.r,O0•4<br />
, rO Sul t-9d . in GotRING I a ond , at loas-t as a, po3,:i.t3'...Oall.f.'i guro, pl.',.114,g r,-;107<br />
:: .08paany l 8 end, if tho accidont would have boen .,'Ok.p10.,itod, pr„Ot)P.r1k,L6 ...i.;.,,,,...,,,4<br />
' CrO-tmiiii co Ur i or ...wa s givon tho comploto .plans',, f§i' .0'0 .1 iilv...9..1.494,:.if4W:9,s37`<br />
:Varid.e; ill,lich...iloro to bo dolivorod at a Gonora17' .staibf ••oon<strong>for</strong>ptioo,0:::064-<br />
' op.o't;: -according to GOING, got 10(4 " and .l. and .Od • in BELGIUM6i6;-Mi+eit' '<br />
. . . , ., • . ..... • . „. .,.<br />
I:tor:0 , , ,,promiitl.y cao-turod, but ovorybody refusod to b.o.liovo t.1,?0,.--thek,e,<br />
but . a,. fako . , Whorl, tho ooUrior di scovor op.- tho. ml stako and ' 1hdt'p:;, : .ho ploa'<br />
lOndod, net on tho destined airfiold on tho right b.onk of't,I.i.s.:::1,14i.„, ta<br />
he ..Mad o an attempt to burn -thc pore, but ho . succeeded ..onli-r..40;i101.1.Y,;VI,,'„<br />
Of -then woro capturod oither int,act,, or - at 1 es.st, • in such .'lai;g0-.`',.ii''agOtrt.., „ L.<br />
main ., gi et of the dociunont s could not bo mi stakon • Whon 'Ilia, .policikAitOkb4S,',' . "4,iy ,-.4<br />
• happoncd , HITLER ri Ei:Vod at GORING and told him, that tho •Li.0;bwo,f,.174.q40:•,Listaivapp.rj.;if<br />
fOr :±thi Ei faux pas ., GO-MING told . lai, 0 audionco how ho at at lienie,'..;bY,;•::9•10..,<br />
. papor O trying • to r o con struct what had happonod, and ho,-ov -arn"., burtit,.., hi •g.r.,4),pg ...,<br />
,tb„,:.,f-ind out whOthor: or not the courior had he.a timo to burn niti.st.7.6 .1Y4.hiP,J; if<br />
'the .^initization of hi e wi fo, ho c al 1 od in Boy ar 0.1 di v inor a 4nd...,,,goi,..4:4,17tis. 4.,i'zi*.<br />
ill:10..1y , roaohod tho cOnclusion that t,ho dotailOd . part of tho,.Plati',.:_i6/1.;11;tlii:e.4.<br />
mubt • havb boon -do stroYod •<br />
•:•; •..\The , iOsul t of all thi s was that n now plan was' dr awn up, , whi,C4 vas"'<br />
, :.,.<br />
first, 'and which was finally oxocutod, i •o • tho b<br />
4It<br />
roakthrOUgh :.:atT'SPArt: * ,<br />
i<br />
':,,,•,': ,-..-. , • .,. . , . , ,<br />
. , ... • : ',-...:,,...;:.,-,,.:c•,::,Y,c,;:.4-•.,,,tY<br />
1<br />
. 7.",GOEft,ING . Was. very enthuOiaatic about .tho way in which'. HOLI4.4.O;L•wari....;0; ....<br />
,iii . 145..pi Solf again and again, <strong>for</strong> his own ingonuity in this et■Api..5.9.1t40,/i.`:<br />
etriTi'-8 e ' .0. Dutch' first lieutenant who told about this<br />
'Gpnc<br />
ObnimandQr- of tho Dutch -Armod For co s , was called up on the te1:Pp..hciqc..1:%„.,_<br />
IriaS helii:ng .S. certain bridgo near the Albert Canal •. T'ao 1 attli3ked.'„hi%,<br />
mission , to 'blow up the bridgo because thoro wore p. ar aohuti . Eit 8 . digliP,4;fliZctfP:<br />
•iithiod .iii .:,O 1,46friity ; Gon WINKELMaIN rofu sod to boliov,o tho 'oter.Y.i•:' Egik139.,f<br />
•'re,train from blowing up the bridgo • A few minut;Os 1 ator tho L,t,:c,S.1;lid.'/?! . • rit<br />
•again* . . Gun . ' • WIls,HCELMANN . ,<br />
rofu sod to boliovo it, and adding that<br />
r<br />
he,..,..iefeiO04`..1.:6<br />
' ■<br />
:Ali<br />
• dpiion B • cut off from rot,roat, --tho so divisions wore bOinichb:446,0,,(•;,,bY, t-Op •<br />
ot,;ki, :,ittici ••'.front - -and that it was absolutely impossible that -•.0q:::i4f, 4.t.t,i"„0.P..<br />
d.:4C,g,-':-.t,"6-,'Irop behind tho linoa• A fow minutes 1 ator tho Lt Cal•Ioti,fttir.S4t:<br />
Oine r Gener al , I am about to be arrost ,.-,d" , and at that momenC,theiG:O'.'<br />
14' seePer'a,'Oaptured the Lt and the bridge intact • .<br />
• ..,<br />
._ _,,,• ;,,; ,,. ,,,.••••■:k, , '<br />
.1_12.:?::Bonibia'-:bi" t<br />
ROTTERDAM<br />
e . • -', f ,';'.<br />
.<br />
GONG ri • 8-toy of the bombing of ROTTE1DAM was vciry much!'in kliV,t46 sl•<br />
, -..,...-.:.,....i.t....T.4<br />
% ,,t, 1<br />
publi , , abod •stOrios . _. and the known facts • GOMING •claims that<br />
ii,l'ario 6 carrying , inOondiary bomb s, nono of Which oxcOoded<br />
‘ C4.5kING ' bee 'a*, • very oxcitod whon ho was asked <strong>for</strong> his ȯxpl Onati.8ii''•.144 1,;... ' . 0" f • ou<br />
1Y0i4. '.... Od f! . , ad -and . : wounded'. "What largo n ymbor s of woundOd?!'s : 711o'br.3,-,04.,) , t ,, ••<br />
, What ' hap ?onod , • tho fire brigado was so soarod to death (HAT:260 !,Y4 - .-<br />
tha-Vit • :7efu Sod ' to move out and do anything<br />
. ,, 1, ct•<br />
about the .fi,re ..:.'.Th01,.1:..i.s;/<br />
P.:iirt- of he city burnt,c,down • •The de st,ruotion could havO'heon t.rciitil.kitted'Itb'<br />
E010.11 'dr() 4 ., if the firo brigado would .have taken any . aotion . .on' it'....:;!iA"70.4.;fi,4<br />
13TOIGER/tig ?. .,<br />
.ISTOI of ROTTERDAM about that, and ho will toll you :t1.10 :ioin,C'. #,i,i.ii.k ..!i.4, .....<br />
1<br />
thboO 'otbiA,o6 ol'<br />
hundrod s or thousand ri of d oo.d and wounded ' are' juit...inen4,-Orliii:(,_., 4:.,<br />
fairy: t al. o s •( El/FT-IN/DUNGEN MD LIMO HEN) • At the mast • sometwority:.:oi.:,'.thi:17.,t;Y*)64133ik::;:<br />
. ' dOuld'' 'hri . O . died from Almos t whilo they vtoro hiding in the Col 1 •L'.<br />
- w.S.yo t' .....,),WhOii:;:$11171... . . , :13<br />
:',4 spc<br />
0,49r14,.`',,<br />
_i .,<br />
..<br />
, 4py or , Gon STUDMT • ordorod ' a rod • fl aro to bo firod to ,:pieiontith,d,-..dr05. g': .".; •<br />
'oe'tor.6•:,-,t onib a, , and this was done, and no fur thor bombs' wore dropped.• "<br />
- GOERING' c Flan For 2122 Modi-torr an oan<br />
41941 GOERING' had made plans <strong>for</strong> a massivo offonsivo in the, i'Meditori" .07. orati ,<br />
p about as folow ls; Throo Army Groups wore o to take part , 'w"hat:t.w'<br />
SECRET<br />
t<br />
'<br />
■
•<br />
1-)aso<br />
-7,7,.e;.• .:±,,, ,,N•pip-,•tV.•.47,....!, ..' , L , , . ' . ,1<br />
-<br />
,,t.-.<br />
-o. ., 4;.?<br />
119, .<br />
,,,,inr.,%. ,.,4.i-,,,,,: ....1,-,.,',:::','.<br />
, ,...r., yi t,,,- A: v ;<br />
4 ;. 1`.!. it.,!Itt. lw<br />
•<br />
v910on-V.oporKtion „.. ‘,. ...<br />
,.., . . ... .. ' - On o ltr<br />
:'1:1■11.:itt. le% 3 3 '<br />
,,te<br />
'' -(0.41,t,4.49)0.0o,',,, 0314' 2*.9?. .. f .'<br />
PA! ...,:4p4,. ' '':', i.<br />
it‘c7c.ittisi546:!.',itcili.', dn,4 :rii.e5,.§1.1.:Pf<br />
1: • ;17,7 , .,.....<br />
l'itili tt: 0 . .P;,.. t.01a1,41.4:614id:ctr(3.0.0:14-..*.,<br />
•- ••!qt Nit,.. g 1 ttSro.$61sirxit!poilit.)...;‘T.tipOri : .tho '5 .p.,:g<br />
;:,V,.t. • W • ...0...<br />
steel ,4 0400.:40Wniv4rOPO.04'.-i.toGrOit'Akio,<br />
1;14 liti-TWO:tilifiOld4AQtr,016a2.140./SCOgi,<br />
. t 0 r •<br />
111 9441t. ' ifSkfiiii! 41.:41;i1.3..i.thOrn:spiirO:o-,■4;th<br />
. ;:e;,. . :t —Ii 11,ikiiRtt*ti:ift 111'0 €0 '6.- h ;••• .'.i. ?'$5.1 1'a 1. - Pt,9,44)1. ,(.-<br />
iiiaOTT166otho .:Moditorropril::4401* .isid- : •<br />
.1.94:i s., '.:„;)':.,..'... l '; - ''... ''?....-; '., i P:,-,`:/!.'.-S::ic,ii: ':,''' :.r.,,,,*4•',,,,k-<br />
, ,,i1.;.)#:?-;iAL.‘ ■filt)tiii1:1:* , . .!Ii.disi*inal,:1310n,i<strong>for</strong> ;tho 0..<br />
• . • til;,Ci;1-13i`ifi6,-.t,;:!:o'v,Or5r.thin .g, .:1-itto Pt' PPO 64..;!f,'0,y.i.,4,<br />
p ivPfsi:tt:Ooi) , divi sionsi , inolud.inetWO .hiSi*o (1,<br />
11iOdA..1i<strong>for</strong> ' thi,s . p ur pi) so , ... Ap pro k 7. 60048*.k; .<br />
IL:(1Y14on'Otruatod-flOcia<br />
- . ,<br />
pioco Eli plUe...a:,.ni.;MhinOf<br />
lii4,:tial:Grapt,LT.A.A until it Was pulvorizo'd l'.;,4.',.-{),1wii 440. fP , i<br />
,,I;tiel otP : in'...tht) ..gallori oft und or , such00 . . g '-<br />
ir /siiisizriVoili Rtz ' I. "mil oar 0 . and word road.y.,/,....to0i01Ciii.itd.i.tih,<br />
. P iiivr?p, ', o coupi 04 . <strong>for</strong> ' ritilrOal ' ' - ' +, "Or ' '''' rIn :•:P. 2<br />
'6'fiti<br />
1; 140 7 fiftoonl.div a t woro hold in . rbadin,4,0Fto 1,1., f<br />
0.'Ok:','Or• GIBRALTAR • .GOEIRING boli.svo is 1i-that 440<br />
o'OnPPOOO-ssa ry; .sin co ) tho bomb ardomont, bYi‘‘'..i4.1'''‘'f,lio.,:o ...getiii ,.: ;P, ',, c.. Jp4 7<br />
.)4 20:adduro,... P.iititad havo brought tho. garririon . to `.'.'ito...1c1.1 .os,<br />
rt.%.<br />
Xtiet . minuto HITLER r op.% sod i to<br />
iillr;• irritiO ' ! Portugal <strong>for</strong> rtho purpo oo . of'•iscOurii(g7,:-.6.11.ON)"<br />
1?pa...; 1 9.- tio,i'sula sti uto or auppl anont -.t;446;i0oi-144Ili.ont<br />
t/i 'fit :H1T14FCi'a4ofu8al to a wry. out , tho .., pl 0.11 ii:',Iyiffie!:: Evli ' 4 .<br />
;S.,4 . )1 i:.!..r, ' =': ,' . .< '. , . 2 o .. . ...).:,,..:iiti'1f'i'l<br />
rill-ii thlRu 6 kio,. ‘.. . ,, . , ;;;,:,..,, ..!.,),.- . P , ,r! 'r1 .i?.k.;'•-:;,'<br />
•<br />
••, : '.... •)'' ', Y ' i !i ,-..i?, ..;<br />
, i -1. .•::.'..,r;;-. != -:?.--4,1)Y.<br />
iitv'ti:t.thrt ono of . hi se gr o cito. nho.c1.0'3,1.6.43.•4?.;13,00<br />
Ce.k1far;:p40.z,fat . Ruda a •••. 'GOERING told ,hp t 1444t'<br />
aij to ,whnt ho h4,4wrj toxt ., 1004, '<br />
414TI■ER .7.-tO1d.' him , that i t was A*. too 14,0 1.:,#i)iititokị I:<br />
'1:44...0./i;ilioifhOcciv4t* 4 d ' ,that 'ha tra..414.:.:*(0311...t.f./i<br />
i4ntad,;out to him that . o lion if hp ....do ti ,<br />
p ciao° with tha<br />
• ' : ,1.<br />
• • •.‘ • • r , • t•<br />
tin thb 14-An tor 1941 that GOZRZYT6hn4 h i v4;<br />
' `pcmc di st 'silo° in : RU:a lib0. 404..<br />
then<br />
0 'rra El in oyj4000 6v. .,:tyaii-r§,;:4424h<br />
v13.1TL rofutiod Pto : ,16t tho 1. 200; 005410<br />
thrO ct that .ho J plQd tO,do41.<br />
itrtj itarr +.; :HITLZR cl.od GO.IWG on o<br />
tronsport planoevcd.e4lo ,:f<br />
• Iitto1d bim buttiddod . that tho i nuMb Or . Of.:j pianos<br />
jit thq i1ocod ' GO MI NG wh o th or...it ,<br />
▪ lpiiii .40Eftirigi, told . him that it . could .; bA...',:don<br />
borat; 9,r e wOro boing usod in tho b attl o "gaiz at<br />
US& of all availablo transport .. pianos and bomborbfioi<br />
now wing . of Ho 171 1 s, which was . 0 at 1' in ‘. tho pt.°<br />
fkr,), 13 1:1 '.<br />
<strong>for</strong> which GOING had a . particularly<br />
cLospor atolyy, . , trying to koop intact 4 urin rtho.:<br />
oulLsuoply tho ,%rmy of 200,000 with o.F.n6<br />
v, hc:),,,impcaibili.ty of tho job . duo to a numbor. ftioto,rp.?‘.:XP.,94....44.3. ,P6v,,,9t,f,C..1.„<br />
GOERII■TG;to ]d- :HITLCR that ho could not oxpoet to .hiiv`ofAl'Conetiint1.111YAng,f,-kr.(Sa..<br />
'fiit'titSomOi.daYs it would bo impo ssiblo to fly at al).<br />
..rOUPP1 i‘O's .roquirod tho following ..day uld bo • dOublod<br />
tricd t0 00mply withthe ord.aro Tho : attompto tO , r0tipply4h6, • I<br />
.<br />
-<br />
*.<br />
Ay.) •r,<br />
' '<br />
;* • '•<br />
...1.0;:,4'410<br />
• ',IV'4•■:'‘,:;t,k,11/1, • VT<br />
Er E '0 P.R .''E T.:<br />
- s<br />
* 4<br />
• , , 7 . • AW,11-i,<br />
A<br />
• 1 t I • 1 tt44•<br />
V'h':<br />
• • • #5;<br />
:
-<br />
ko down <strong>for</strong> jus-t, the roason s indi catbd by GOERING . . The, WOattiorcyail<br />
moat of tho pl °no s woro ci thor wrocked: on',Jho, ground:,<br />
's er . -. • loot ini.:1<br />
.Ocidont s • . Tho ro suit of this vent,urc Wati th,at..aftor,<br />
Pir itti Bp o r t<br />
.o....shOrt: .,:te4pgt<br />
fil an o a many bombers<br />
and the On,t'i.r.ti,., fin 177. Witil<br />
'ithat ,.,.:,ho battle of . STALINGRAD Was<br />
weroimobI bc<br />
loot any -wai::! , .,- : • ..,::':;,...t.', 7 : : :•.- .-.:: . t--41:i:<br />
-<br />
1:'0I1IING .<br />
. ' .... , ., . , .., -,,<br />
s-tato a that from that timo ti, :: ..-.<br />
on, the r di atiprid4p-.104.)*10.,..1.1y4,,,.. o,t9,..ṛ<br />
. :<br />
RITLEF: , steadily' detorior ated . if ItLEtt Wo Uld ' give and<br />
..-:. 'that :COMING co ulitoormtin4'/Peds':';' :' 1<br />
waEi 'complotoly unab 1 o to ko op' . abr oast .. of<br />
have, ' ' . 7thO ;:iiiituatipi4i',.<br />
fl, conference with him in tho afternoon '<br />
,,,,, ( .:<br />
. and .., r o<br />
t .4.<br />
- olfonir<br />
turn.,tc6 ciii'is r.tir,lar,tiOrti.;,;,.!<br />
-....,„. g to find 'a<br />
,<br />
. Tbntic nod to certain order waiting there <strong>for</strong> - him •Wh.cih!:tho-,..TiJEHit<br />
him<br />
i<br />
during tho con<strong>for</strong> Onco .: ':': Nany., of thb,:a6.4-.or derlit •tkiiiiroy'Sr'11 .44,<br />
oi .t.) 1 'o.. to carry out • . As<br />
. . an example of one of thdr:sci<br />
!prdee from 1- . c6ntrairOrtii3Ogr ..-<br />
qTLM which ordorod o thentire Luf tw e • ... .. ..,... - .1. /.. I.<br />
alto te-.0ake,-.. I-<br />
:LENINGRAD in an attompt, to Id?oek Out, the :city •<br />
ai-! ;..!6,11:. . ti,...fx,<br />
•<br />
no;t po whon ssiblly ,:tr an s<strong>for</strong><br />
sciop iN4";!....t,4:4cr,ii::1441,1.,<br />
tho ontiro airpo wor again et . ono p b Cf•i?ipP:42)<br />
. Othor ' Ob jectiVos„ especially LONDON, untoUchpd, , ilITLER:'i aCesiti3O4<br />
, ' li" - '<br />
:.".. ' --<br />
' Ooi•tard to do '.ċlaiming that it was afr Lid •<br />
tO<br />
so of :,tho ' 44f gun s in ṫoll, . him that the AA pro tection of :LONDON , Wa 6<br />
LiM.s1■611<br />
-.<br />
... ,con si,d or ab ii it'si:',Ifti:C: gP ..,,<br />
...<br />
LENINGRAD, and that tho Gorman fl i or 8 had . no t shidd aWr.k3r<br />
tIANDON •<br />
,<br />
,<br />
.<br />
. from the .:.t'itirk''''<br />
. - 4 k 01-,<br />
. • Af#1.9<br />
00E1ING s attitude with rogd s ar to tho Ru'S si an War . ...:■'.;'1::;'.!-Iiri;40,*<br />
i941,: "It ilould bo tho best thing to hold on to what Ito<br />
woe<br />
have<br />
as foPOW,C1..441*<br />
atiompt, ponotr<br />
'541:13.9. 21 ato any fur thor . Lot us build an k4sti,1..1<br />
of workor s which we havo •<br />
:13roali -t,hrOUgh; our disposal,<br />
au ao we have a ouperior<br />
no<br />
tho Lu<br />
d'dfon nos<br />
ftyra.ffo, on'cr troy<br />
without an of o'rYnøz<br />
thb ;6 'fiti<br />
foctiv o Air For g o" •<br />
on SivO' ,We.s ronowod with tho won known ro Dui t<br />
However, th9l<br />
.,.;GOg:IisIG el aimed that during the<br />
LuftwaiTO had torrifi o su ocossoo •<br />
t 'almo.st all of than . on the ground .<br />
:of. What Was hap poning in the fir at<br />
, AUPPOr,todby \TONI BR AUCHITSOH, than<br />
43.1..ove; tho phonoinonal ouc co ns at fir<br />
:<br />
.-t .<br />
Putsch<br />
On one dv they knciCkod ,out -<br />
Tho Russian s, ho c1a1mo lid n6t<br />
fow hours • of thin d<br />
wont<br />
at, and only announood tho loss 614 ,o. a-.<br />
7 60ER ING;. said that ho was supposed to have boon pr<br />
. , :131:1P d tAllid, to talc°, ,o Omit; Ett .. iii-ti.:7-tziat$<br />
1<br />
.' in .East; plaeo between HITLER and NV SSOLINI :at, thd;1740,,kg.,4<br />
: Pr us si.a, but that duo to his di sliko of<br />
.. '.. ,tho , _ : mOottng ., It was ,<br />
14U S3OLINt;"ho'<br />
, only duo to thi a fact, that hd avoidOd<br />
4g. ,ii,''<br />
*undod .<br />
..,./.;,,. „.<br />
. si.iii.t.t143boiJ<br />
14: , .'GOER J:NG ' say 0 that it was<br />
.. impo Deihl ° to o r<br />
Tpht;-: at tho. I tittio - To do away with HITLER would'll gatO.:foo.. an Of'fo.Otiii44C 6<br />
.,,..4,gr.lo*Oilt(.. with . tho. SS on that mattor,<br />
, 'al& Pr b<br />
. 1.1P,.5'<br />
'!£,O4,:..-i-1,i an the .. ga.).<br />
Mork: .,S$ asked why ho did not pro to ot paid. -n . ZIA<br />
t6.,.4;04,,<br />
1<br />
' . .: . ,Jr..,...,<br />
iip el4t<strong>for</strong> :' 49-- phi of of tho Luft<br />
fin<br />
' e waff o , wbf<br />
COM I liG:# Ati .. .'.04 ' that/Ii..:4 )..104 .<br />
ul d..1.,'oe nhoctuloirtly lo so his plaoo a e suoc 0 ciao T,*,41<br />
f)",174itLE4.2,13.notti;:Piii!till; •Ve/01,1,<br />
cJf<br />
Pl:aCb4. by BOA/LINN, <strong>for</strong> whom ho c Iaim od to have' Jti': ,: ,11, i i c fa<br />
,<br />
1,:dislikii.'7';:"'',4:?;t:f.P:',..1<br />
' Ili& hOi. al ....... - cgal.. .iisi_ .ci f y a' Gori4/az<br />
i<br />
,<br />
' :.44-1;.0.6ERr. via i 0 explan J. ation <strong>for</strong> tho r ao i al p614.0y<br />
4<br />
'iOis.iiitiOn '',.Wa's not int,ondod to take On the .aEipa:st a.<br />
in"'<br />
which<br />
many<br />
it 1.<br />
: :*ra pt . !.a6.,:f01,10146 Th po<br />
or.igin1:Ly intended to squeeze only tho8e Jews wo<br />
did later o '<br />
...<br />
04,,
Jr I,<br />
:ttiotigh0041IisTil 'openly 'admsitted that tie'',1iv'.ofti t<br />
sr- heAc I - aimed that he :never, realized: -• that.'iligYilt4 — . , e<br />
ii‘iir e,kilido,14.ght that they were place if(' ',It'les;t.: 'e,,i'ii)::ei,<br />
',...,,;,,r Wf,er , , . ... seeing . some of the picttirell'it4e p).e... 4 i _<br />
• liotkINCItiiiid ' n 1)<br />
ail ' ,thi a must have happened ithe41,15..ṣit11,,,Pi<br />
..., t-e ḻ ,;:nOt1-tnderstitrid" -4 , that ther e are ' eoree' lie41.egirilf:te<br />
,<br />
, :-',,.::::...::-..iyo<br />
=DI . 4,.,■ i<br />
8031. an itai<br />
4.1:41,74!X )41i11/4":<br />
!aas.: MU S,$OLII■TI ' s spcooh at, the con oltision of',:;:thO3,,,FrOn<br />
.1,fit,:.flaid!,(.!:ithrit';. . . . I t a eo ld i o<br />
e<br />
r . a , had accompli shod' the?'<br />
u e <strong>for</strong> i,f od po tio n en end vier et Of<br />
e Oi' :<br />
all<br />
oar tafn molantain poolc ,<br />
ha4,;;'gltsiet4,1 p<br />
. .<br />
whi hard ey<br />
1:*11
... 41,,<br />
,.,. •IPRENOH WORKS TOO<br />
'FORM REIOSSMARSOliAL<br />
f4<br />
..i.•<br />
haeeililaife tio<br />
. , . A • . . .. , . 0 of 8.;!.d4;71141561.01rit<br />
...... , .. ,.<br />
Rat<br />
• , , ...i..--1..e.....1,s.. a<br />
/„I`:::43:;..1:-<br />
0<br />
i -. Date<br />
•<br />
f<br />
.:1:4,<br />
o'..OrktiontiSe.ov<br />
Inf m<br />
.,-,..,As44!). ...<br />
nmsain31.I4'.,<br />
.<br />
Inif<br />
1,0A24<br />
..411."triotig ..:he',., has.,...boen.., depieted 1...p....111a.iv;!_:„.n.,,„.1i1%.4'.c.,<br />
thei...:-:finitilasa Jen . or :'-being a.<br />
.4<br />
highly inte<br />
mannerso-and,,A<br />
l't<br />
:<br />
11401$<br />
4<br />
certain- knowledge of art. :". 'ilfelivi " • ' ..'.gr<br />
likW'..ii.4fii:01...e*191Y.'"*Vai7itf7::(i:18171.T:1!:241411.' '<br />
^1<br />
-.:iii::,1iiiot;e;thart:.he . has • no AV .<br />
,,:.,,A C., .wkiiiii' .<br />
..ha. :110.,Ii..04.8..1.ned in <strong>for</strong>eign .bcouritrị 44M: WttA:1;<br />
eft 0.:.411,64...e.x .A, 0. ,,..1.11,,,,, i''<br />
,i.,,;, '''''tili ii7Ofr.;tiiiiaiifee ),:lzatif •,:_ • by claiming to e . a i!igra.E.4..* Ns.<br />
.:ietti7- :;;;i;.-8.1, Ḣhiez,i run .aintention ..:.;;?.),y0t1.9.. ,:ttit 4<br />
ii<br />
. to . trans<strong>for</strong>MiiPAP<br />
eay,o40 •.• ...,.<br />
8I/ti t• .<br />
"--'.t dO,ERINd!..,V1 O.<br />
l:F!NAISABOETylf.!!...:;';gAftl.<br />
,,etatee,that<br />
04441,0<br />
, .<br />
low prices of . je weirtr'andi.7<br />
\ atai p a .He claims that only about one peroe.itiafthcj<br />
IITIENOFV.12RICSOF .: ART ...IN GOER MCI'S:. OOLLEcAlOif.,<br />
• 77777.<br />
clog 1rN stat<br />
• .<br />
la that no works . of art: ,..WO<br />
weyfro<br />
,<br />
havei been very.: holPr.44Ai3O.T.iihlticy.iqkdi,a<br />
gYitrilDletee.fe.7repositoriee <strong>for</strong>.:thei*tite004,41-in'1""'<br />
111 ' stat<br />
, es that he<br />
exL statuott<br />
ekehaiie'dittkr.kfiOtilir . .<br />
o and one ..paintiiig,twhge*he.wap,.<br />
1,6*.f!!:16gcit'.ilttii:41.0;;d1C-<br />
.<br />
etates, woro leng[ pre83urieon t...his H p y<br />
land*Oiblilgb<br />
y.,,,e<br />
1)r,oppitiee Were .exhibited<br />
,-.aUP,ii. 1.7Vi'ta1oh.:' !..e.i';;IPrericina:': German .<br />
',in...ti,thii*., 4*<br />
..,,,,kinl.ti CTLER: Offi<br />
1<br />
0,01.1<br />
;iord Ors .,..t o ;.'1';,4.,tiiiit146.0 . ,,<br />
•.s;11,. ,n Royal<br />
ii'-'-'-;'i aV EL '-'-?:t, Q<br />
CaStIO;a.,.:::Cf. .-illEt1,;:a0,1-0/410<br />
G.<br />
'Ah shelters .- Of the<br />
21T; : PUEHRERBA1Jt<br />
in ! 8E231/fir.; aiid'tb..,.OBERSALZBERG..4 sTiii<br />
4T;',:in`3:i41rieb<br />
ibn 0..i tit3 E's911,th.git:LINZ:' .i.i.iiilt.J.ilieltio<br />
.;''' • AA t4iough ho .:. admitt!. '.. rtligi.48gg.<br />
,...<br />
pr,e. t.O..xide''.!to have K05%'llijiieiea.l.ning : • works'. 'no kid . .0. W 16dg.9.49.,C,..' ,.<br />
• at.1•pl tb14 C. % &tuition. ' PW<br />
of art ox.hi b it od:: at ti,i§:.i.SAL.44,,i.„ 41.<br />
'..., ..<br />
I.d.11:,-,t.i<br />
b<br />
iP.P.P it, ought some - paintinge •,-,..:441..tical 0 ..,„,<br />
..6f#k fal.;;!. T.90.. " In those doals GOERING' Was...;:a4J, es edif.:b.y1;:::* ::.i:-,<br />
and his . bids ' novor excoOded . the<br />
'ly ;icw9lry which he<br />
also<br />
' bought, was antique .• French<br />
authorized to talco .<br />
'manded! part in thee° auctiOne;<br />
: p hotographs<br />
tor.rtothad, to turn- of over all works thoir of art bought by ottio.r.'iarnat.Odra)Ii,an<br />
purchases to frITLZA'<br />
;the<br />
Museum.<br />
,..MAZIWARCRIMESDISCLOSU .REACT;<br />
2CCOL<br />
D ECLASSIFIED AID RECEASE11.<br />
MIRAL INT ELLIGENCE AGES .1.e3<br />
ta il fitEGMETHODS EXEMPT I ON3 D0044,<br />
NA/I WAR CRIMESDISCLOSUREAW—'1.<br />
iiAtt 2001 2007
••<br />
Ref . SAIC/14<br />
19 May 45<br />
Snirce states that two apecialistawere responsible <strong>for</strong>.thel:eare4 , 01.92!<br />
-of'art In'hie collection, and that alLitems W0.4:inaneXce.4entetMel<br />
aervation at the -time of their evacuation to Southern<br />
tierMihy45eelli:e*,ee0<br />
4..R3POSITORIE8 OF THE FRUCH WORKS OF ART<br />
GOERING entire<br />
RUS .i. an advance menaced CAR INHAIA. A number of ,a0B41,111:"'<br />
one s) tapeetAtierao"<br />
thoutizusaul,cmpamil"tobeleftbeland<br />
-.Eknd a certain amount, of AiiIiiture (Lotlie,101-431.1(1.,101.2.1.eAcirWilhA:61"i<br />
The Most precious collections were bent to BERQHTESGADEN<br />
' #, - by<br />
of PV'sarrest there by the SS, 25 April v-<br />
45, these-treasureatWereAot4eCtgwg00,<br />
cars which were inside the unfinished . tunnel of the . 13ERCHT E4.049EXAN,*49T4 1$<br />
on some-other cars which stood on the tracks of the RR IinefioliC130.0i-P,44C ,<br />
I KQEKGSEE. (Notes This in<strong>for</strong>mation has since been co/IfiTI*I cti ) . W40"<br />
e-;tirnè'<br />
, GOERING had time to give orders <strong>for</strong> the 'security of<br />
less'he iltkp in<strong>for</strong>med that some of the guardsattached<br />
azIPhë<br />
,<br />
to ' him q(0401' . _<br />
had Itarted to plunder the cars, as well as his .villa<br />
,<br />
at.JDBERSAIABERW4A4ero<br />
text of putting them in greater safety. Source believes,<br />
WeVer;.At**AgOt<br />
valuable works of art which he obtained from the SALLE:DES<br />
located and 'returned,<br />
JEUt. Dri*litito ,*:4; 1$?<br />
' • ,<br />
. Following the interrogation source made a<br />
4<br />
written. statement.4.1e916<br />
atior in the recovery of these art treasures<br />
lowirg.additional<br />
(See'AppendixHa:;a00gWerg<br />
where some other<br />
PAUME'might be found:<br />
works of ar t4O4Uired4f;th4 .X<br />
• '<br />
a) A certain number of GOBELINS.at the BURG.<br />
• . • , , „wit<br />
VELDENSTEIN near .<br />
NEUHAUS on:thePEO4<br />
- • '<br />
b) A certain number of GOBELINS in the air raid<br />
'Acalemy at WILDP ARK-WERDER, near POTSDAM.<br />
;<br />
c) One Painting called the "Madonna ot MEMLING" at<br />
. -171Wi<br />
.<br />
_<br />
.<br />
at 2IELL atapEE. (This painting waa returned<br />
_ a'wife0;epreeeh .<br />
dwt&i<br />
thioAinit:)<br />
by PW to (i. p, S eventh ,0, Of q.„:<br />
. .<br />
GOE RINOHcleims toAlave'had nothing to do with any Prench. .Worket04t4-<br />
'ablea other than those m entioned-in' thia'repOrt,'<br />
.,!1I<br />
• NITZs(IR lino.fro m'RUREMBERG to BAYREUTH).<br />
:<br />
19 1.(ay-1945.<br />
PAUL KUBALk,<br />
Maj, -MI,'<br />
Commanding.
-hereby declare t<br />
1) That I *a .ready to return art treaeures.,(eJchib<br />
l'4 'aoilliied ; and bought at auctions of requisit4neOrdPei4<br />
' 2 2)iThat'V'Will do my utmost to find out abOutpAa,p<br />
thatI7.‘4111 give all the pertinent in<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
) -. That ' .the greater part of 'these ae idea 'and of r total<br />
.ures .are . packed in several freight carin7BERCHUSGID‘<br />
*rticles:in air raid shelters did not oo6Ur Ib.96auW6e.<br />
the lay" after, my arrival there,<br />
0:aatI in<strong>for</strong>med the Prench liaison ofacer4in'phliig0Ti..,..P<br />
—7'1 .131aCes ẇhere there could be some less important woiks ofd<br />
Yr.<br />
• 0 •<br />
Tr!:, ' r •<br />
'<br />
. ,<br />
,<br />
TAatelii.: am convinced that a conferenoa r.Wit4 my <strong>for</strong>mer<br />
e:; 3rsence of Allied officers will lead to<br />
at cto<br />
.. .a apipdyr.::an -<br />
tib/i3Of all questions.<br />
t.
If the in<strong>for</strong>mation contained in this report is required <strong>for</strong><br />
further dist ribution, it should be so paraphrased that no mention<br />
is made of* the p risoners' names or of the methods by which the<br />
in <strong>for</strong>mation has been obtained.<br />
The ollowing. are the names and secret numbers of the prisoners<br />
mentioned in this report ;<br />
REICH8kARSCHALL<br />
45/1409<br />
- RE±CFI Minister and • . 45/1.495<br />
Chief of Chancellory<br />
O fcL4SSIFifg AN'D<br />
RELE:ASEDS*<br />
MURAL INTELLIGENCE;<br />
IOURCES METHODS EXEmPT-10N301;<br />
NAZI WAR CRIMESDISCL0111444<br />
DATE 2001 2007
'<br />
•<br />
NOTE: The following is a literal tra-islaor. of a conversation between<br />
GORING, LAMMERS, and. several : interrogating officers.<br />
I. HITLER's. Successor<br />
GORING: .1 must. tell you something. You are the head of the Chancelyou<br />
signed all documents, You became aware of a<br />
change in the situation only by accident, not through any<br />
sofficial papers. You knew about it only after DONITZ)<br />
' . radio address. Anybody could appear tomorrow and declare,<br />
"I received,. a rac/io message after DONIT,Z received his; I<br />
am the head of the state now..." I, <strong>for</strong> one, have written<br />
proof (about the nomination of a successor)...., and when<br />
DONITZ appears now, he must hrc re some sort of written orders.<br />
LAMMERSI Yes, that's clear, he will have to produce documentary<br />
proof.,<br />
G: If he has any, he has to make it known to the German<br />
peoplein the REICHSANZEIGER (Official Legal Record). Here<br />
we' have a case of a he2 ,1 of 'a state who really is not a<br />
head-of a' state, since no proof can be found. On tliTother<br />
ha.44,. I am the only one who, as legal head of the state,'<br />
could possibly be recognized by the American Government<br />
at theADresent time, and who could negotiate. This is the<br />
greatest deception ever foisted. • The Law of 13 'Sept 34,<br />
the original of which we have here, is the basis <strong>for</strong> the<br />
:case. According to this decree, HITLER can name Only one<br />
Successor—There is also a decree issued after HESS'<br />
.flight '(reads HITLER's Decree of 29 Jun 41): "In the<br />
eVentuality that I would be hindered in the execution of<br />
J4dUtiee, even if only temporarily, and should. I be unable<br />
direCtives during the time of my in-<br />
. disPobition;'I appoint as my Successor in all my offices<br />
, REICHSMARSCHAIL of the Greater German REICH, Hermann<br />
HITLER, This Decree voids the Decree of 23<br />
April:38" Concerning the FUHRER's SuCCPSSOr." • This is the<br />
44'40 o /1: why the REICHSMARSOHAIL (GORING himself) sent an<br />
inquiring telegram (in April)<br />
..It;'wasn't really necessary that T inquire (whether HITLER<br />
Iid died); it was only out of loyalty that I did it<br />
The :coup d'etat was made only because I wanted to avoid<br />
further' bloodshed, on 23 Api . 45.... You can well say that<br />
BORMANN is crazy.<br />
_ .<br />
Ihad'received the order concerning the FIIHRER's successor<br />
from the Deputy Ch'ief of Staff of the WEHRMACHTSFUHRUNGS-<br />
STABASupreme Command of the Armed Forces) in the followin6<br />
manner., Gen WINTER Wrote, "Inclosed I am sending you the<br />
contents of anorder w)-.ich was received by Grand Admiral<br />
DONITZ:::!in.the_plaoe of REICHSMARSCHAIL GORING, the<br />
FUHRER appoints you, HERR GROSSADMIRAI, as his successor.<br />
Official documents follow. As of now, you will take all<br />
,measures which are necessary according to the present situ-<br />
-ation' : - from this it can be concluded that HITLER was<br />
dead - 'signed: REICHSLEITER BORMANN".<br />
G: Is there anything more fantastic than this fraud committed<br />
'byBORMANN?...You know, the decisive point in my inquiry<br />
was (the request <strong>for</strong>) freedom of action in <strong>for</strong>eign matters.<br />
2<br />
. SECRET<br />
re•-,;;;
-JRET<br />
: Could he have =egally?<br />
L: No, in that case he would haVe had to put it on,paper.;-<br />
,<br />
G: Now I ask you, HERR LAMMERS, do you relay ,believ 1ia1<br />
after the ,FUHRER had publicly declared my appoiritmehas.,<br />
his successor, and since he further announced'myallnes;;or<br />
my withdrawal from office, he would not nave been'able.tO'.:<br />
announce ovet the radio such an important change as,i-Uat,,<br />
• " •<br />
of his successor?<br />
G: It was' ordered from elsewhere .. He (HITLER). threateneAtO.-,.<br />
shoot me or to throw me out of all jobs' eXeSpt.thy:app,o.int,<br />
merit as his successor.<br />
1.0.: NOT to relieve you as his successor?'<br />
No. That has no connection with any office:.<br />
I.O.: You admit that you did not actually resign?<br />
No. I was <strong>for</strong>ced to do so. etherwise•I Would hav,ei,<br />
ted immediately.<br />
Is: I would like to point out another thing .„-whi.W1i0O„ 700ft .-<br />
ance. After this action (GORING's<br />
appeared which stated that the resigned a '<br />
Commander of the Air Force, because of ailmet.<br />
he still retained his title as REICHSMARSCHALLahher,'<br />
decree (about HITLER's successor) wae the'refoie:still'Peffbo<br />
lye.<br />
I.O.: Now, I'd like to know, did you withdraw from all yo.r dUt4.es<br />
because of ill health, or was this step<br />
‘<br />
oidered'fro0166-<br />
where?<br />
4WY4- ,,vp<br />
G: Well,I must say, these damn coup<br />
that is outstanding.... I have alwaya.knoWnthati.C,<br />
even't' of something happening to the-PUHRERiig0(614:<br />
be ii the greatest danger <strong>for</strong> the following48hogrs*<br />
that time I would have per<strong>for</strong>med thesWearineinVandi<br />
would have been a legal fact, t any srateiwbulde46.1'<br />
dANN within 48 hours<br />
would have carr es ou wo personal- ac ions Mi. ddia,te;y::..,.:<br />
the 'arrest of BORMANN and the firing of RIBBENTROP;.:..-.Tliey::.<br />
were the two thorns in my:side ..• • • •<br />
. • `.., • . ,<br />
C . : I told some GAULEITERs who were close to me, about a year .<br />
and a half ago, when everything became clear to me l that if<br />
fate ever designated me as (HITLER's) ,successori I woftld. .<br />
place a High Court over me; I told myself that no man shoUld<br />
assume the responsibility of not having anybody over him...<br />
A dictatorship must never come again, it doesInot-work.<br />
see it now. As long as a man is good, as HITtER was in the<br />
beginning, everything is wonderful... but (then) it'came to<br />
extremes.<br />
3<br />
SECRET
SECRET<br />
II. nemical Warfare<br />
I.O.: I believed that HITLER would use gas the last minute.<br />
G: No. Once, toward the end, he considered OW, but . wOold him<br />
that gas Was out of the question.- I was:toldthat all your<br />
gas masks would have offered no protection. The-gaEr:Walfs0:-.<br />
dangerous that I wouldn't permit anotherdemonsträtionTZ<br />
knew' that the gas would have had to be transportedjtOth0<br />
rear when the Americans came, and the effect of.arir:airattilök<br />
on the train might have been ea t astrophie • tIU,st ,'iMagiiire -<br />
train of 75 loaded freight care attacked from tha ,;,airfav"biimb.<br />
frees the gas, and the fragments which fly 641i8",..Oraveli<br />
10 km spread it! • -.<br />
1.0.: But experts are of the opinion that one needs many,more gas<br />
bombs than HE or incendiaries to destroy a • city. ,<br />
G: Let mel tell you this as a specialiPP "Mobtdadgel-'aUS are<br />
the incendiaries. The Amecans have-realiy:given:ustha<br />
works with HE bombs... A small incendiary falls it'oaIh:OUSe<br />
and the whole side of the street b.urn.s..1“ndendiarteS'ate<br />
thrown against railroad yards, then, of 'cOurseitdoesti<br />
make sense at all. Some of the factories (which,<br />
attacke(:) - if you stood in front ‘ of them yeuceUldii*01"': . 7<br />
believe that they'd be rebuilt. CITROEglinPARTS7W4/i.stbince.<br />
... After six weeks they started working again Thewholerodf<br />
was down. But where there was a fire, all machines were<br />
ruined. Fire is the worst of all...<br />
We knew that we were more advanced in chemieal warfare . . , ,ari&.<br />
that we had more dangerous gases.<br />
I.O.: When one has such gases, one must expectito . use them:i'some<br />
G: Well, we thought America would start chemical warfard;-,7Itwa's<br />
pointed out that America did not have tofear<br />
And the troops who attack with gas can protect theMsélves<br />
better than the population. Vie also planned to attackE1ig42:and<br />
with gas in case the Americans resorted to chemical : warfare.<br />
The question of possible consequences of 6:beMbing.attack<br />
against a gas-manufacturing factory was raised on numerous<br />
occasions. Was the population to be evacuated? (But) the<br />
FUHRER never wanted to get the population excited about gao..<br />
That, of course, is understandable; I would have acted. the<br />
same way. During the last few years the air . Superierity was<br />
so one-sided, so pronounced. We told ourselves that everything<br />
would be spoiled by bringing up the topic of chemical<br />
warfare.<br />
I.O.: That did HITLER mean by his well-known saying: "God <strong>for</strong>give<br />
me the last three days of the war"?<br />
G: He NEVER said that.<br />
III. HITLER's Death<br />
I.O.: Do you actually believe that HITLER is dead?<br />
G: Well, he WAS sick. A cerebral liemorrhage was doubtlessly with-<br />
SECRET 4
in tho realm of possibility, in that condition. Whether this<br />
led to his end, or whether the man committed suicide...<br />
1.0.: Are you definitely_sure that he is dead?<br />
G: . I have no doubts about it.<br />
G: The FOHRER collapsed on the evening of the 22nd (April), as<br />
a result of the war situation. The whole thing was set off by<br />
my telegram in which I asked <strong>for</strong> freedom of action in matters'<br />
of fcreign policy. Since I had talked about negotiations<br />
.(With : the . Allies) <strong>for</strong> weeks and months, they knew exactly<br />
that;I:would attempt to negotiate immediately, the very same<br />
H4aySeveral generals wa:7ted to surrender.<br />
•I<br />
.IV. PoreignCurrenev Account<br />
•<br />
L. There is an account with the REICHSBANK which originates from<br />
donations mado.in:various • currencies, oven in gold coins:--We:<br />
oPened'tho accoun-L<strong>for</strong> him (HITLER) under my name, -but<br />
longs'to the' FUHRER.<br />
YOusay::th6 76,000 dollars are with the hEICHSBANK?:<br />
_<br />
L. Xes . , : ::they:are : there, The REICHSBANK holds a gift from,a.,m4n-,-;;:.<br />
frciii:H .TranOvaal who donated 69,000 dollars;. Gorman-.Americans-.<br />
' .donated .4400. dollars, anonymous gifts amount to 478-dollars<br />
I want to emphasize that it is not My account that Iam,tUrn4l.:.<br />
A:rigoVer here ". - it is proved by the documents, too. , •<br />
. AITLERAPEER.tonferenoe<br />
,e - , (HITLER) had with SPEER was iery interesting..Ten•<br />
id aYs 1;),Pf 6r 6 . .the cellapse, on the 17th (April), HITLER callecL..,<br />
SPEp : and,acCused him of sabotaging the "scorched earth" poli"-<br />
cy:;. , SPEER'replie 'el. that the people did not want this'policy,...<br />
and .'
S C R :a; T<br />
they made a mess cve_it, that's quite clear tome. It was also<br />
too late. Like in •her instances, nobody ever listened<br />
to the officers.<br />
LI We want to offer our services to the Allies. We are not war<br />
criminals.<br />
^<br />
G: We Want to see to it that there is order and peace, especiallyuntil<br />
mattere, regarding the relationship to the Allied<br />
<strong>for</strong>ces:haVe been cleared up; to avoid uprisings in connection<br />
to ,Communism, etc, which would be very embarrassing to the<br />
Americans and - English. This is the only aim we can possibly<br />
hayeafter the collapse, and I am the one who can not only<br />
help, but who also knows all the episodes of the past.<br />
L: The last time I was with the'PUHREP ea 27 March. A lot of<br />
papers awaited his signature. S pill,: we-ve weeks old. He Said,<br />
,"You sign themP ! I declined; His main -opic was that Frede,:..<br />
rick.the .<br />
Great aid net:know when the war would end, either.<br />
was 'greatly excited about the REICHSMARSCHALL<br />
tempting-to start negotiations with the Allies. And then they<br />
mentioned in the last leaflet that the REICHSMARSCHALL was<br />
going to flee...'<br />
19 May 1945. SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER<br />
PAUL KUBALA, Maj,<br />
Commanding.<br />
SECRET<br />
6
00 '1 --tt 'Or iii . CI ' h 'Eion •<br />
,..;<br />
vorv -<br />
of . 42 ill OVor , e i-ncio tho birt.).C.:<br />
sotiroO . ,..',16 4rod. to BZWiiT bit'. ditir.. 1;SGiD<br />
..??stiO,s‘l:ta<br />
.7-•: - 41, 1110 d 10.<br />
Z.Ti :•w ho,r9 . BI,o ' '<br />
,,,. .,;..;,.,,........ r<br />
,. 0 cu?". ts ,i, 014 .,<br />
•-r,o.•at . ' .1. nqAt '<br />
•, , .<br />
,,,- ,' -1- .141 ' "tf<br />
'. .<br />
•<br />
; f<br />
...: r .;,„ .7'.,••• .<br />
.:13'4
. , ,:.. . . 4; •: , , h<br />
. , . mios, of IiIDZI TZEt I S a tatf ' offiCorre It Oon-enitIodPt • 0,,061111).ZipOr<br />
"ii,t,h; ekri,ọ ṭ,■iOr- •p Kr v.ii o - about s d.,. 1161,cittip.'<br />
.,.:.i,;,:. aifi_<br />
..,,ioii<br />
t ..: a k ,;441),s<br />
;taiQA,:(1hiAdF3:1,<br />
ii<br />
and , Gorriy::..!;' rar.t Th of '6 l'Ot-vo.rt.'04-01hCei?!,<br />
no i.d:Eiii4i4 Olifi . l'or . *souroo .1 ;.8Ourdtifi'i:ev46..'Ygtii:40:1<br />
or ind ii24-1:43 I tt4';-cillfilqi;tiii rà p-t . , ..,./ hi .p. !•ii'. a hot, h' ai.ḳ.?"6.bgi.lyto41140,14-1.1..<br />
' ' :.i iiilfikiiSi A:„Otziri*Ak'fi,h6r:intor rOgrttbi4 bIll(i,:t",i5k.78bp4r:Ocitill.:1:0<br />
11<br />
0t<br />
..,.<br />
44.1t;e4i'Ll'48t#.1p,ori. !' .;" ,i4i/louri.o.i.iits.,;<br />
tii; ! iifiTNrZIO;:; ,.Igit;43141i0,Pciil:t.X4liktr.<br />
istki :;1.)o.O0lis O: etiO . was a.biiooe.15i1:-4,05p1.13r jsoit.'4...,';:rthe..k:.f,il',..tiO ',. . 6.0ii.eir,:i....<br />
tOAII3"7 4 tory BA ht..noț.. ...11Aiqu0: 4<br />
•iihOIOatOUti3 .. s; ' hi:tti,,. by ' Q QUOfi rtiOn: il. ::. 9,4citi ,ii<br />
, Mi. .I. ,<br />
tfiTi''<br />
gratt,I, ..0& fkrz2:6- 7ii' i'o<br />
.tol*k:<br />
.<br />
1/3,46<br />
.."'i,ri<br />
.?,45<br />
.i., to 8'4-6 'sblóthiii,. .-<br />
tit T.11 -6 •''hlit - f164a<br />
i'di"..0<br />
.<br />
.4k4r::<br />
..;<br />
to r‘riothor; country,<br />
EliVittl.bn. Of<br />
áh0 01.9,4140 •<br />
'ii„.4.vin3<br />
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: 1048<br />
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ifT bli 11Cit<br />
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4 '. , ,•,4 e. • 1,4 zr .3 1' sho - ' has . boon comp loto ly •<br />
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• . , . • unintOrai . • , odf, On' tlid.,<br />
hp... A . ' . • ..' .' • ;?..7.••<br />
oonsidors .HIvii1,21.1 an idoalist;•,lith 4 • tra 91<br />
...<br />
f fr<br />
,-.41'-59',•(glio3t01-10v`s: t..11.e.-■:,<br />
Ovoryihing ho did ice fOr;th^' . Si •<br />
."..22-Ydk.,1945
••••<br />
Ree No SAIO/16<br />
23 MEky 45<br />
. PAEAmkt<br />
. Mvnui PETAOH:<br />
:2 E 0 R .E T<br />
';14'; Ei:0111.<br />
SEVENTH ARMY illTERROGATION OENTM' :AUthia tiq.. •<br />
anit" ,<br />
Apo 758 US ARMY<br />
a,<br />
:Date::<br />
GOVITNG DISCUSSES . }11 .* •<br />
9 1.11:k4) $0 .0 1)44.<br />
. 1 •• . "1 (."...1 :A:etfT• 40100.0.1<br />
The caupe <strong>for</strong> which GOERING atood . is )4,4. ti.,1PirPftR<br />
thinks only Of what he can do to Eselir ege. ei;m5, p,g402n<br />
or Etat ,adv ant ag Bo US positi.on fOr ,51;4114,eip„Boitt,<br />
F1.1.10 , wi.thout hesitation • Up to ow he h<br />
hi El fOr„iner henohmen, alive or dead • ,Yef., )ofeliind epiritr:<br />
• ••• L 41. `..1; •<br />
conif er satien, is a constant wetehfuln .ese <strong>for</strong> the o portuni y,tp,<br />
: 1!.:1*(1W, 44,attla Sitio txT 0<br />
Eavorable light. ,<br />
t:r: r■otrilf ,"aril :)O61:1 ptft<br />
• • *:.4' 17110 offil.<br />
Ra44ig: 9-3 Date of In<strong>for</strong>mation:' S. ea, Text),<br />
:41,140 *K1 sA.-hr-* The‘ifiZ<br />
; t..t.t r;(4 lin a t.:o.to tool) e*c.014.40t.<br />
:2 • •• THE' FUEHRER<br />
xcio oticiogitrt...t trittni,<br />
-; f•frz t In id 4....11 .111:100 ....•.aritjtOtuft<br />
) HITLER AS STRATEGIST..<br />
• nif iv d • inv. pftEli ..iO4,Einterti<br />
...-o)fin<br />
* .<br />
According to source, HITLER<br />
himeolf almo ev'exo usiv. VI :military •<br />
operations from the beginning of the war up to . he,:en4rm<br />
:0 • dee* pion<br />
down to division operations. The FUEHR .EFt pe)SLyed titiell..t`.1„EfEtto,<br />
;him<br />
be the military leader of Germany - a belief'430•04.11,Walertrien<br />
0:::IsAisioe a a<br />
of Ills operations in Franco • Here HITLER dlaatred it; Oreak t<br />
.4<br />
drive <strong>for</strong> ABBEVILLE. against the advice . Of the OXH, where i. was eithat<br />
attack was possible only from the right. flank. When OperaT<br />
jthe 044<br />
openly expressed doubt of the su.ccess.of the pron. Then, 'w<br />
acik •<br />
•<br />
off better than...expeot .ed, re.eulted,inrst..cempl.e.tesolo<br />
proud of his miiiterY•ehilik;iee-.-.-..ie<br />
111:"1:•:". •<br />
went on to describe the situation meetings .at<br />
d"<br />
was alWaya present at these meetings, which took up 6:41) , •<br />
•<br />
fol3.owing. 'KEItEL;I:GMFtl;D4130*L' ,•officers usually attended the se imootingp%:. . t• .1144.1<br />
tfJO .10<br />
. (FFla ,<br />
ifiNTER,' "GaILT, *(Maj Gen)<br />
fsj ti.60200*{A)<br />
•<br />
.<br />
BUHLE, GM d :INF (Lt<br />
c<br />
.. Gen)<br />
imtiorJ4ity Of I;lit.4"..• 4.1opxo<br />
(iANDika ' sTAF . ($i Cal)<br />
'BURGDOAF, GEN d';'INF (Lt n) Ge ) •<br />
ri; • o I 1.,1 tegiti.to Jr114:41014,1<br />
• 5 . VON, pUTTICAMMEF.1, Admire/,.,<br />
.tJze#abb aikogopzo,<br />
niolpu<br />
:•,..;VON'ilELOW,/•• OBST (Col) .<br />
• ' -:•••••,...: •<br />
kitsdis 10•44Ati. •<br />
I HONSCHE 'STUB IF' (ss t6.i)"<br />
• Obit elatsa orio<br />
rc / 4 . i(-<br />
' 'TEN,. HPTSTUF .( SS ()apt)<br />
lo 6:<br />
•<br />
•• % FEGELEIN, GRUPIMElf<br />
n.101.*: 1.0./<br />
Li all sot v*<br />
VOSS, A mirEir • • : •<br />
,op oi•ew<br />
d<br />
401j.'11*<br />
SC1ERFF, GMIMAJ• (Brig Gen) .<br />
JODL, GENOBST (Col Gen), or his<br />
14titinkreigltaft<br />
representative<br />
'<br />
•<br />
•<br />
GUDERI 'AN, 0.7210BST (Col Gen).<br />
5 ") '8A1.41$0180Plgetfil Army;<br />
" '<br />
Cie.).7.• •<br />
dpe etas! .On the elation in<br />
JUNGE, KAP z. SEE (raliy Oapi)<br />
,:i1101216%;1•1CJI' •<br />
'''Ilb.14,ktice&Pih41[TgOiif<br />
BUECHS, MIJ<br />
Roper4t:4 Atte4lir: k iituation-<br />
G)ERING . . . himself , and . GROSSADMIRAL (Crand dmir.1)<br />
• .0. .DOENITZ<br />
0.0 wore fr.e5uontly ,<br />
•• preset at "these meetings.<br />
±n (wog<br />
• - jt the ' meetings, maps were spread out • On . a'huge''tili).-10`."'hltigv.6.1.A1 .<br />
Higior'lliiii.eitcic<br />
near ho entrance <strong>for</strong> the '-eppedrance of HI TLMi,.. • 41hOzi thEi, "FUZiiik'nViktirete""<br />
itiOOk 'hands. with all present and then learthe rgrontO•L'tli(P'reoz i. .re 911 ") i pa<br />
The officer s then gave their talks .. on: . thol: VtiiiirSig.tigela"/346€104<br />
fiyrt7 'froquently interrupted end gave hi a ViciC4s<br />
in<br />
opposition to his own wore • soft-pedaled and n.Ovor<br />
scia Sion •<br />
• (1...! :•?()1.?,c)b<br />
I<br />
•<br />
•<br />
DECLASS Ifki kkAGEB BY NO WAR CRIMES DISCLOSUREACT<br />
). zak<br />
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A6E.NCY<br />
SOURCES METHOOS EXEMP11ONMI<br />
NAZI WAR cumEsalsCLOsUREAti<br />
OATI 2001 2007<br />
.t<br />
r
1 •<br />
SECRET<br />
Ref • No-stS),10/16' milsr,<br />
During . poripda whon tho.•situation was unfavorable, HITLER took it out on tho<br />
dif<strong>for</strong>ontbran'ehos oftho . armod <strong>for</strong> oos and .blamod their hoads <strong>for</strong> all mistakes.<br />
Souroo was singled out quito often, and had to tako robukos in front of all the<br />
officer° .•prosont• This load to the point whore tho officers bogan to loso thoir<br />
rosPoct <strong>for</strong> . 06,M,ING! s military ability. .<br />
t' homotingd' HITLER always presented tho latest dispatches of tho <strong>for</strong>eign<br />
prose,. whi'Oh ho thon di isoUssoct in his well mannor<br />
During tho last` fovi'montho the situation mootings woro hold in tho Winter<br />
'Garden or,i fhb . Cyqtrwollory arid thon to the vory last in HITLfft' e bunkor Luldornoath<br />
had a dimon sion of only in 54 All the officers<br />
'had 1oriid trite thi -s' dial' space and many of. thorn faintod during . thci, mootingo •<br />
The night mooting which usually started botwoon 2400 end 0100 hours Was not<br />
attended by àll tho offioors, but HITLER was always prosont After the meeting<br />
HITLER' a eamou tIcia`!1;tot11CF- tako pl asi3O Hero a ..emall circle of 'trusted friond a<br />
r'souldlnake doci sion a of prirso political importo.noo • Hero, too, BORMANN, Usod his<br />
strong influonoo to oVorrulo HITLER, who was usually tirod aftor . the previous<br />
inooting. OOERING maintains that all things not directly oonnootod with : tho<br />
conduct of tho war boom° tho rosponeibility of BORMANN.'• .-.• • •<br />
Th9 FUEHRER! toa guosts Usually included the following ,Poreons:<br />
ri .<br />
•<br />
740 05 O<br />
fici#Eile",",GRUF M a j Gon),<br />
11't tlitabORk s:' Gtir d INF (Lt Gon), .<br />
13 OP :bathe-Of the adjutants, • and<br />
QC; Or) •4.<br />
" Mr JUNGE<br />
Jaifl 1<br />
Mro 80t,snOe.iuut<br />
; • • :<br />
_,<br />
;<br />
Mk 8, CHRISTILN<br />
'.1.•1'<br />
arr .PPE-. . .<br />
b)"}rITLER' S PLANS FOR THE VIOLATION OX TH, GZIEV4<br />
„<br />
COAN'VZ.TION<br />
;TO .; ^ 11.,C1 ^ ""<br />
j ,1‘ ,,..zitla.L.pri.. 0onore of Wal•<br />
PW claims that it VMS HI nga .1 intention to doneunoo the GENE'VA<br />
Convention if tho yarl would havo 'lasted anothor threci months .......:4I: Allied 'PW<br />
oxoopt those valuable to tho Gorman war oconomy . Wore -to bo okterminatod .<br />
4.4,2,10.4f,S4rIg ti9 '.:09uroo, thiB plan booamo known to the gon oral. a . and tho<br />
Naa1„‘artr, . , le'adois;". all of whom took: a stand squarely against it, with the<br />
;oxoeption of . GOEBBELS • , .<br />
Itt ytaa ,pol.ntod..out to HITLER that Gorman :FT in Allied hands would have<br />
'to oxpOcst'thO danici fato. To this th? FUEHRai roplied'.that the-se millions of<br />
• .Goimans woro of no more u so to the war ef<strong>for</strong>t anyway ., but that aft.cir his<br />
F,Pro.pci pod no:tion thoro would be no moro do sortor .s. from tho German .z-my. The<br />
Gorman pooplo, Said ho, would thon fight to the last Men.<br />
'4 4.'4° 1 •_;- . C.•<br />
11) Chcaao9.1. Warfare<br />
Stato that',HITLER was rostrainod from the uio of OW during tho<br />
; last, poriod oA" thO .War only by<br />
•<br />
his fear of Alliod rot,aliation. Ho often<br />
.(<br />
-admitted +that ; hrid'missod tho °halloo to u se OW at the right tiino (i •o•,<br />
• JJ .n • • ' • 14o •• • •<br />
"diaring % tho !'stagos of the wok) • .4t that timo ho had boliovod German<br />
victory jclortctik;With ,,the uso of normal woapon a •<br />
44. v.i.1 xi ) . .<br />
• ' • f ;•'1-<br />
0) •HITLER<br />
*<br />
S.'<br />
, Whon the in BEalg had dotorieratod . boyond.'hopd, HITLER allowed<br />
foit'011 .76.51-4,3:1! 4,D„r .MOREL.L, to °soap() to the SOUTH of GorMany. MORELL had<br />
boon,:iadRItin ,ift,,oxink. er,„voky largo daily, :dose of hormones to tho FUEHRER • .SoUrco.<br />
boliOvOs % thatit.waajtho r suddon absonco of these tiortnonos which .oadeod HITLFA!ii<br />
genc 1 bra1cdowr cljn sub soquont doath .<br />
a.i..)' I • .i. Q • 4 I i<br />
11 _.gp)2...i.L FOliio . li:,.... nt20..., , , ..iNtivy 4 Jury' , ,<br />
!IA: tlio .FUEHRt ' 0 hoalth had boon declining. His 'right, log<br />
1 l • ‘.... , : I .<br />
&UM .f.:,'.'t41.41-acii..t9$111,agnoClia,aiy, and tho Epralost contradiction .irritatod .h1m....to, a<br />
high dogroo • .,* drilY BORMittr, WESSELS and FEGELEIN still' had any influoii60. , osti. .,.klim •<br />
•PW says , the. 'atm .° sphore of HITLM ' s sholtor was horriblo . Hi 0 aocrotary and. hi a<br />
int stroeis could stand it only by<br />
1<br />
boing drunk all day long. .<br />
'SECRET 2<br />
.
_.<br />
ZI\oli,.;rg<br />
R3f No SAI0/16<br />
25 May 45<br />
•-•<br />
_ ., . • ..:.:..., .1 , ,:-• • : ,„:1:::,3 ....,,i. 0 ..t 3 d- r c1.1 or ilo; ps944. ,..ii• Ic-x.)<br />
3. - 'ROMMEL'S DEATH<br />
: : • •: • .:2•1 ..... ,. .k . i:.; :1 : 1: ,.... .11., -.1. ovc 4 oe folt.irsOpitor.f.tt ft r<br />
PW claims that ROMMEL had plottod against FLITLEliS'i lithO4.S1 (104511<br />
'the following day the FUEHRER : sont 'a .40-'8% rOtii."911i'Aō qtat -atiftu *AN<br />
ai.thor . to aCcopt or r o et 'Ina triar : or,s'''...iiii:ra.'"'iip didiil • lii i'VlfiSititiro<br />
.<br />
ar i to r i 0 u 8 8 or v i c 6, ' to Ohoot himiolf ' ' : with .tlio.: ri ii +: ,..21_ whi __ Catn<br />
iipc4=1.<br />
m ''.. - 4 r -74 . th.1 le a ' aittsmkr<br />
al,' thei '-' en* o timo . Ho . W .68 6110 wbd . l'iv'O riiiYAAV*6 ' iiil Striiivoill t'O tifi '1<br />
4 ,-, # ..r. I<br />
RCMMEL 'cho So the second alternative) : ' .1 '<br />
.. -<br />
', GOERING ON SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY '<br />
_<br />
• ,. .,,••••<br />
,<br />
. . NJ- It<br />
.,..';::. ::{Z.;:;,:eri7,0jet,.:rto'.1.013;1‘FtLiL if 3,411/<br />
br' .r.,:!"...,3 UN -/ la dr d Oct br Li— OTIPAZ 00<br />
••v• ' !. , LII;(4a14 . flui o clop 3 atta r,. cf<br />
• . - - i...<br />
' liTOM : SMASHING _ , -I- 4".;-7,00 ...f. v!I fi r.low t asmc* eiJAM 4'1,4<br />
. . .,<br />
ftittl1MTIO<br />
_<br />
ini . el ti.ni a that Gorman scianti st a haVo , madeirem- ' andi.34`;pi;441:`,Ossr p , IiIastung tho<br />
_ atom.' ' Ho bolioves that this will be the reVO mitl'O'fiaiiiiiiaos cl. fIt'"81 ' ' " ' iiIe —<br />
--P0a10% ivi.,04.A.:!„ 1,,t1c1<br />
S LI tura .<br />
Ai Al though iiei • ho was , ,Chairman of i.i •cp-' Goiaa;,i iii oCiii0 i. fiat& girt .. 6 ,not<br />
i*<br />
hovo an appropiablo =aunt of knOi glodgoYef• ualconw<br />
Bairghis statement on rt boOkloth8 dal14tate 61* i)W<br />
claims tht- AmOri can r o Scar ch in tho ffald Of' th8 ataSi ni sIFArgg<br />
- por.41 tOPSOONCOV00- tt IR<br />
nations.<br />
. .<br />
b) NEW GORMAN U-BOAT Eganjwita (0<br />
• Sour co very proud of tho au000pwhich ho Oiarali t141414.1n IfinfittaklYarlitrici- •<br />
t.861;i1 ar in which "does net flood' tO"Barfaia'o 4jf A.,1Q0At gei-ottninf1888<br />
ubo ' wbrorortdy in spring 45; 1,n 1 aria nuMboi thoy iia vWifl otgritaik,<br />
4<br />
, 4nwago on Alliod 'ship ping: Thoir undor-atSi W<br />
.•,<br />
- s SlioadW 5 81'80, "t g li 0 1.18<br />
. high as- , tho spood of the fastost • surfaco<br />
• .<br />
Ne SeOls "; I-<br />
4<br />
1"4' "'01" 1"°<br />
■. 4 .)"Ct r1, ,; ratagpq itia ts.<br />
5 . GOING'S ECONOMIC -STATUS<br />
;;;Ii{W t eFloliZIO %arm 0%6'4<br />
-I' 00".4.00.qu:biud 0$<br />
_ _ , -<br />
* ' ' a) - RSGULAR INOOME YJr..$.1 '14) a tillo g 044Pdp1<br />
(rico. NIL- .<br />
In tho light of ono of the Party's <strong>for</strong>emost early aims - ;11Adl, 0 ono<br />
oarn moro than RN . 1,000 per month 7 GOERINg ' .13_ occnTzli4 , statp 1 e - gii td 8 '' •<br />
' In 'Fixi'is.i4or to ,questions con C Orb in g , thO . 'SO ueliC of ?ALS iiieciA67?Ple. if that<br />
ho7.1'OCOi,rOrli-vOry .decant" wag° s as Pr o eidOri' of iiio^.1Pra WirlMi Ilt Wat<br />
'1 l ago ChCC16' ' wor o - placed at ' hi s "di spo E62. n (2.uR-y-mF5 ,. !jib) S 1 1.1;. 01' flAie<br />
of tho Supervisory Council of Manufacturer 8( AUFSIOHYBM 13/ .0.P flabEN) ,<br />
alt*lugh ho -did';not rocOivo a regular ialf;xy r s fiCiaeettiii,.. jilfit :ld' not<br />
m ok6 ' Onk 'precise et at colOn t s ' as to the 'total .(:f his 'in aaarf - f ofilli4d1 It!glifloul t<br />
to o'Stabliih, hi s r o emir co s being in thO I hand ss Or a°n40; 3gOnt6k 1N4 0ERR__<br />
in eti tution s .<br />
. - : . : h., .4,.:.,,, . 10 b<br />
_.. . .<br />
o rbo<br />
_<br />
4 .4<br />
.<br />
:.o au . .,<br />
Examination of a bankbook, however, revealed the following in<strong>for</strong>mation:<br />
as Ministor of Aviation<br />
mambor of "REICHSTAG"<br />
Special oxpon so account , from REICHS Chancollory<br />
Adding to this his ostimatod salary of RN 25,000 per month as Prosidont of tho<br />
Prussian Ministry, his total monthly income from the above sourcos + was. ovor'<br />
RN 600,000 por year.<br />
•<br />
In addition, thoro woro regular chocks from the EH ER Party Publishing Ho u so<br />
amounting to RN 120,000 per year, <strong>for</strong> his writings on tho Four -,Yor -P1 an 41 . 1 0 wing<br />
<strong>for</strong> 3alaries accruing from othor public positions, a yoarly incomo of RM 1,000,000<br />
may be con sidorcd a fair ostimato.<br />
t ) ADDITIONAL INCOME<br />
approx RN 500' p or mo<br />
• 1700 ',1.!+%<br />
20000 n<br />
7ho abovo-montionod bankbook also oho we occasional chooks and : crodits from<br />
large firms - <strong>for</strong> example, somi-yoarly amounts of RN 300,000, Rivl 250,000, oto.<br />
from the REENTS:4A Firm ( Cigar otto o) , HA1BUR4 (Note: Ministor of Finahco FUNK<br />
SECRET<br />
3
okpl lain 0 those °mounts, stating that REENT(A was involvod in , a trial ,. <strong>for</strong> .. ovasioh<br />
of tsxo s amounting to sovor al million s, from which it was a.blo tO oxtri&e:to<br />
itsol,f,a4gh.G4FAIING 1 ,8.i Pidi. );:., ,i, , pi ." , : i. • .-!. . -, i. . .. .. . t<br />
was<br />
.of •<br />
''''' l'.'''.• Otit a.' f s'o t6 Fidvi4(56,i,7:Pt,:in, , , aot.troo . ableo to have any . . ono un o , mon oy<br />
TP :41;/ ', +O a 3.) f ■.- , - • - 'i c."' .-' • • it i a i, ' I ' .<br />
p t ,ht s d,i opp sal, .morO,..or loss. :Vo. ii ; Thus it may bo said that <strong>for</strong> .<br />
url. Rr<br />
- .Y. . . .. 1 .<br />
u a 'i . . . , • • .... n „ ,<br />
all ,.. pr gto 1,0 ,„ purpo 6,013, 1iporlgSr, , wo.b ..iiot ; ft:. niattor . of concorn in PI/. e life.<br />
Ciii:?Ø46p,i ', Eilo `i0- ' 6.,, i..),O oat)]. O,'. <strong>for</strong>tUnC-in <strong>for</strong>eign Countri o e, . 80 Ur C 0, . iePliod,<br />
"/ 'o 'S.ti jawilit ' elni- iiivol atftin e' a.f....y.Otir.' ‘Sion .t a' , ,Oon corning my 1. <strong>for</strong> oign fOr tin-, 0 8 ! •,' ' .<br />
with an untroubled mind.' • .. . . • V<br />
• •<br />
'<br />
(Note: It was po s sib 1 9 , ho WOV or, to l oam from REICHMINISTER . FUNIC ..tha . t<br />
GOERING had probably srauggl od 'money abroad through MEDEL ; 'a partnor in - tliô 1f1.71IG<br />
b anking, ocinOorn . MODEL, a native of Gorm any and a n atur al izpci . Dutchman i i, marriod.<br />
to a Swi se women, worked <strong>for</strong> GOZRING in come sort of i 1 1 ogi timat'o'.'deal g ' in. <strong>for</strong> oi gr<br />
or/ i ohtmoy... Alo.ou41.1,r,00k. p8j.,.(tẹAr,monitkixo . etgo :hp flow to . Spain, pro!? ab ;ly;.,4,.th ,I. l arge<br />
shki4o or4.24;1421`ING FP Pciniino.; );irii..oti , . .i v;fils . i in. . :all likelihood to be dapo . ei to-a .. .., in ,. ..;-0,—.<br />
Portugal. or dã'utR 2imoii"Ps. v.. ' " . '' ' . '<br />
..ṫ..*•.A'..T.<br />
..,iTte1, 91gict.4i1.4,0tOd o t,11/3\ G.041ING aslcod tho . intorrogating,offisor ropo,ato9.4y<br />
whothOF, "1 iyingIo?Jait'ioii a 'WO.I.- "o".. ti Ott`or:,. in ' Argontin a or : in Ohilo • • ": ' ' ' ' •<br />
D54tpis, (ii0aa.17.924 that ,'. .00ERING, :, ? e . ' di r opt o r . o f tho Pour..!-Yocx Plian;, op u1d<br />
.,.. „A i 8p4 6,000,} . ,feR4 ein,,, oyr.1*,))11# 9 4 in4 opci....i oil tly ? ; an d : that ḥo .' U Sod; ṭhorn: UntiO`eitittingly<br />
7r8i;' hie own purpose's, "sr.ioli as tho ṗtir;haSO of art trOastiros) . — ' .• - - - '<br />
• i .<br />
' , '• t<br />
%.,:.,..,...:,<br />
If f.:•. ,' .<br />
.6 ) likiir4Ti FORTUNE . • • • : .... ',..-,. (f:<br />
main ly,. in. objects of art, which ho robbed, from ;<strong>for</strong>eign<br />
,t9 11,. . 10tilioor . a ?opted as ii Njr,a).Ut4itriril .,siftsa , gom p f.of , this foiAun*O,.,corao<br />
iSiEs.tior 1 .tati 0 0 i'as v A, ?.:EIG; . which : pro sontod:hm with object s o f!:, art* ,z7. Jo wo.194<br />
- dggsiT.:444wpAilli3., bo'icis iitirought : § f go ld.,. and thp i iikO 7... at ,OyoryL.,pO seibA.9<br />
ociattdiop,. : „ i3O".fhar 1,;4:k.s Of f 'art' 9Sp29f pm tiFt i'Prciign ,...nations,. stato#119/1, ihdiks,tti-i.iii.ir st:<br />
oraft,saiOn'qmiAeouans, and from thO 'FITE 4i . Ttioy Combinoil to <strong>for</strong>m a co 1 1 octieri .<br />
Worth 6 anymill ion s, 'which, judging by his0 °motion , in di so p s si.ng: it ,...ho.c..wantodio.<br />
to build ;.up into r tho 1 ar go st treasure in tho world; "soine-thing :. liko'*the- two'<br />
fabulous ; hoards 9f Gormnn folkloro, tho NIEBELUNGDISOHATZ or tho WELFENCON4=<br />
. . ..:... -. .,. ..; .......-.. ...._...,:s , ;<br />
•<br />
Y. OUTR4`,GED<br />
PM tfl ; ^ -<br />
e'o.+6 641:e :s : t;: -vm • .,• -<br />
0.291<br />
.<br />
liairlod<br />
.<br />
o R/39F:ṭ bIB troatm§nt as a pri Boner, saying that, it 404 01 <strong>for</strong><br />
a 55s..r 13111),X ,ON'e•-1,. to , in: Oon si d in g p .poir4i.9n . as a<br />
cjq ug nT.. . . no ..twouia htiVo bo satiurloct to live in tho,.<br />
ef4Tii<br />
,t Orr ' • ask° tho Ampriö . . anS <strong>for</strong> r safo . when ho gavo ...him soli up, ..<br />
Kt( al, son or of.,vicy , Ho is worried . about his<br />
p,Mavi84,11 . °J, t . a, wasY, the :,ilios haVo boon do-ding with thorn,. hc, eve,<br />
ho fos .t hat one dry "n thOY will tako 'chi) pate off mo' i • •<br />
: o , ,<br />
••■<br />
c17: (i Or:1:•'‘..: (T•r:.• ,<br />
23 Wily<br />
Fl<br />
t 4). c<br />
ir =i, . " •<br />
111. Q ' OP kr a<br />
, .<br />
Qan I.. • ,,)<br />
• '1;.J • ;<br />
Of)ap f, i'17:Pi `.1' O.<br />
thit :1• 1 ie.,70 to - '<br />
000, .<br />
"i'r,119 ;4::;11,... 11:J •;1: • • ' •<br />
s'E'0-11.tT<br />
, -
. •<br />
SECRET<br />
soos_,:s...0 1 4'07<br />
01% .,11 - al 0 . 9. . ...... 41 It Pfilt 401■, Alf,*<br />
.S.., E C : Al, E : ''. : •<br />
Ref No SAIC/17<br />
+,,,N:4.4.1.1 „ . , i<br />
OGATION . s . 24 : May 45 CENTER: SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION tnit " ' f?.1. : .,t4-.01; • i .;ftf.V.: . th7tAr ; '<br />
-','" I<br />
APO 758 • . 'US. ARMY:Date: . 2 - Miiy, 19 5 1.<br />
!. -, ;;:: :l. n '': J lo .e.t .:111.1f4acit.. trzi.: $ - • • • •- i<br />
f?<br />
1% Mt to<br />
•\:11,0741. ta .1461<br />
Ce"r, f rd W011ozt - i<br />
• e ri'fli • eatle ti . mtItgit* .<br />
OBSERVATIONS. - ON A.11410EMPLOYIum A id Id* Rya):<br />
410<br />
,<br />
..(This., Report is in answer to . Que,s ,tionnairje..i, iffi,tp:evetat„<br />
• Office of the Armored Offiber, *dat.;14 mil 1143<br />
"see-Atio-LJe Isqp!)<br />
; f • Rat irig:: • I ritteitkAbitttlea VIDA -•<br />
• I<br />
.. 5. • Duca ...nahmitagtoo<br />
'VON GEYR, Leo GEN D PZTR (Lt Gen) Insie'cfc/it Cilt4tfir `.<br />
oud- :of !his . 'prof eseion ,' of the old-PruselatCgeb)rlily. tnre1;913131116b e gave<br />
• .71:il<strong>for</strong>matiori grudgingly; his perional zeitioulous.<br />
He ving been Military Attache in LONDON <strong>for</strong> several' yeaTx4prebilitet...claims<br />
tc have an understanding of Anglo-American affairs, • •I<br />
•<br />
Rating: 13.•2<br />
. • /Int err,p gator,:<br />
•<br />
DIETRICH, "SEPP", OBSTGRUF .Col' Gen o1:,..IWAFFENA-SA?korn.CCutf404..:Ar.my,<br />
. retsrlied by his own position and deeds, bliang ezerybosty . Ecs'ialaOk<br />
, of courage the notorious ss Generall.appear,Fd..Aq;s9r4..ti..kcizzt.1431-lied<br />
euipnient and tactics ; because he thought it was,d'expecteItnitge 'rather<br />
r, :.thitn, as . a, result of actual- experiences:;.... • He .einpha*.s04.ssilittislA45:-year -long<br />
Arny affiliations,..<br />
. ; 'torte rtmli<br />
•<br />
. . _ . • t-<br />
C-3 • ' • L • 1 irnt °Raz or,: 44" • Ottaw . .<br />
•<br />
- , ' • ns.u.r4.411.41. stop .<br />
iv)! HAUSSER Paul; OBSTGRUF (Col !: Gen .: of WAITEN t S'S •f)t",° 16x0:04.9414.?. ,Group<br />
"43". Source is a firm believer in HITLER 's theories ; manta fed to<br />
•v; justify , most- :of the FUEHRER 's * dee .he'lta1ke`etfretit41,1 /6Viralitary<br />
: 7, matters.0 7.. Formerly' a Prussian general-in the rAinly ti ti Eltivaseltinta ed • the<br />
fact that he was primarily a military leader and not afi<br />
Rat ing<br />
-<br />
,:<br />
,<br />
B-2.<br />
• .. .-.( . r, 4 Interrogator,:mR7W44;<br />
: '• -:ii-. ! t.t .m.t.ti ,:ftiaolta.<br />
.. ANSWERS TO SPE<strong>CIA</strong>L QUESTIONNAIRE . . -i...,,,,:tt.e 4 ..'./. q t.t0e1 Silk .<br />
Al ; . • . •<br />
.;f.., H .,.', .I.Y.<br />
• . 'kl. 'r. ! (.1E40 0.rt 1 4'.Stgo<br />
1. .111hz .t , 46 . yo11 think of '. the offensive fire power,..; o. ,C,,..theter4.9arititank and<br />
tank - deStroyers?. ..<br />
: - ,.-..,-:-) 4--0,:t. ra. kset<br />
-, .: . .• .... , • . -,.i. i...,:t.q.: tee irs4)61<br />
• . ,Wh4le,,Gen . GUDERIAN and Gen Von GEYR, felt that„theyorereoptufigficiently<br />
.experienced to answer the question, the <strong>for</strong>mer•,because . tle cm.,01-. ..00:Urcommand<br />
troops Opposing . American armor,,. the latter. due,:.,tq;.thep.?,imitegO.n,goyment<br />
Of . arm )r • during the part of the Normandy campaign when-he nasiiiniOommand,<br />
the t y ) SS generals praised American tanks and tank employment. "SEPP"<br />
DIETRIcH , stated that in his opinion , the SHE MAN „enginei lwas igeile gcod, but<br />
' that a larger cal gun could be mouLted on the SHER1.40444. vziple new<br />
Americi.n . heavy tank, he said, was even more satisfactory and' could be<br />
favoratly compared with the best German tank, the Royal Tiger, Gen HAUSSER<br />
called the fire-power of American tanks "immensely strong".<br />
. ), GU Dgzi AN , Heinz, GENOST .(Col Gep.)...,:1;:t1Afi,.0. erflo 1ep aieiesor?rt Et ty: <strong>for</strong>mer -<br />
.0 o S. German Ground Forces, .nspett'orfoof4;;A•regt Eiltiqrt<br />
,ApPareritly wanting to appear 4R,..RS,a3.4.clnEttiV.4413:341- guts-<br />
' t: •..dris freely, he stated emphatically :howeeF71,. , it414j,<br />
• °JAY<br />
b:icause HITLER I s death freed. him t.x...pnl, 45,, path ,pf41.<br />
—: ..ck."<br />
1<br />
SECRET<br />
;311'1MRCRIMESDISCLOSUREACT<br />
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED NA<br />
tENTRAL<br />
moa-<br />
INTELLISENCE ADENCY<br />
1011 CES MMUS EXEMPT ION3B2B<br />
NAZI WAN CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT<br />
DATE 2001 2007 -
Ref No SAIC/17<br />
24 vMELY'.45 . '.:.' •<br />
SECRE T<br />
2:Lngeneral, what is our greatest weakness in armor and armored<br />
tics<br />
'<br />
• , •<br />
- .-Gen -GUDERIAN is of the opinion that the tracks on our tanks are too<br />
narrow, causing them to . get stuck when operating . in snow or mud. Thus<br />
• the American tanks , are "Good .We.,ther. Tanka° (SCHONWETTERTANK). Gen von<br />
GEYR thinks American . arniored:factice yere: good, given American air<br />
sueriority', when difficulties were encountered, air suppbrt:was called<br />
<strong>for</strong> and the 'matter taken ..eare . of. If called to fight' in enemy with<br />
equal or stronger air power, however, American tank tactics would, have<br />
• tp J)e more daring to be successful. Attacks were not carried . ihioiith to<br />
A A,s.;„?-ast.. pf. leadership (WENDIGKEIT DER . F.Uppyil) was some-<br />
-1#m10; tfefea ,iikelillit:Wheil'Iarge ; tank 'concentrations vere emidOyed.. den<br />
.<br />
DIETRICH' points -OUterrota..in..armer employment,the fact that<br />
employed n sufficient' irtats<br />
:. .Thie*,* .he says, is<br />
tWai24a1"leriOr which' results in lack Of offensive power. in the case<br />
of ArsFeeqiiinicir :foonesntrations; the Germans 'Were . always 'aware-Of them due<br />
tMlackitofqpropersecurity. Gen HAUSSER thought that:a lower -echelon<br />
- * commanadi.:.-i/a4a—Vej better acquainted with these . problems. He stated,<br />
j•::_h0wctit43}1,4:hat,*-the idea of tank concentrations ins tead of ,individual tank<br />
0; e.tap.3.9y,meinti yfae i.correcf_lyrecognized by ; the Americans and. ,carried out in -<br />
.AttoO.M.1-0ir.b,Aftt. 1p§.5iii,N,P.:.0)r.. The t endenc y to frontal<br />
al. • attac .kii fhas proven<br />
. • .<br />
c4;r4 tftuP.SP.Ps11,,:..,<br />
,• . : 3, •. What . are your views on effectively combatting infantry . A/T measures<br />
..<br />
. ,... ,.<br />
. . •:,....'' J 1 .351. th'ili',.Us-e t'L-crif.:.!the PANZERFAUS T?<br />
•, . .<br />
-i • ••• .:, • •-..,<br />
. ,<br />
. . . ••., , , .,<br />
- ..14%-l• ;AL An COerGUDERIAINT' thinks the PANZERFAU:ST an excellent Weapon ' 'easy to<br />
4*.A4-tr."1 6.ri.aiSO'rt.:.;Y;ChWali'Jand easy to manufacture on a . mass' produc tion 'basis,<br />
. • . gwah'ill'IteKticzeci? liindle in a fokhele. Its disadvatitages, as seen: by Gen<br />
,ihtl. "101.1bEluAn' 'itii e . 'itsshoit range and the jet flame:. •. '"'" .. . * •, ,<br />
y7+1.1: -., n 1, ;.r, t,,ii3Otht.DI:ETRICH' and HAUSSER think, that although invented asa result<br />
• ' of •theA/T gun 'shortage , the PANZERFAUST has proven 'itself tO • ei• point<br />
• wher,e it- owl ; Po, longer be regare id as a pure • "emergency , weapon".. As<br />
Gen' DIE'rfRICHI5Uta - it I even if he could obtain a's many A/T *guns as he<br />
.114.",E,t,want,E.td .,he .otol.q.,d not like to omit the PANZERFAUST . in organizing: A/T<br />
-<br />
oi, br041:0P.P.P 'e•s, ..:').!.1...:. ,<br />
.<br />
,.-' . • I.; --Gen von., GEYR. regards the PANZERFAUS T as an emergency , weapon par<br />
ex,c, el,l'elic e , . ;His , answer, in full: "Faute de mieux, on: se. Couche avec<br />
,Itt.EN"-JtlIP.V.TtP■ .... ,11<br />
ii-t W iatireYOU".*foUnd .: that the bridging problems <strong>for</strong> Pz Kw V and Pz -Kw VI<br />
greatly limit their tactical mobility?<br />
. All sources answer thie question in the affirmative, but• all . point<br />
out at the same , time that, in general, the roet of the problem lies in<br />
ki, I 4710.01e)- 46 .6 1 il ä : tyPes . (cif German bridging equipment, and in supply' difficult.<br />
ies. In this connection Gen von GEYR states flatly that, With the<br />
technical quality of American equipment, no difficulties whatsoever<br />
V' T 1,44•1.:L 3h6uld' i be - 'ericOiiiitered; Gen GUDERIAN and Gen HAUSSER point to supply<br />
' fl'' 0 '', pi= 6 bl einii as . thSi'inSin :difficilIty, Gen- DITRICH 'thinks the 1C-type, bridgini<br />
. " E"" V'eciiii pinent an` siiffiCient, but ' the I-bridges very good, except in the case<br />
I 9Of:1;large riverei like the RHINE!<br />
c'i '•'' ,:ft., f1 , , :y. z.-: ..-R ,_- :.• , .<br />
`-1 -S'•)5'..A, Tii t'4hit dO •'you, attribute German tank losses. by percentages? Air, A/T,<br />
nii=ty and 'mechanic4? Which • was most feared by tank crews? • •-<br />
:.,,i LT ,,r.•-)....) .)!:..• •,.,-...-c:? .<br />
,. s<br />
. ' . •<br />
, ;•:',:;.; k;7.1 ., A:::: ., 1.••;,, : :' j..n-,..'.• •<br />
• SECRET
SE CRE<br />
.1<br />
Rel. No SAIC/17<br />
24 May 45<br />
Gen GUDERIAN:<br />
60-70. throug*,MerehartIcar tfalliiiiee)1(Ealiteliitorriorit ) 159i<br />
A/T;•5% Arty;. 5% mineST.5%)iattre(NOW0iiriee; are<br />
only a Ire* r Ough apt, r 6 cri'..irra h e 8-<br />
ta nt .about , Atte Wet ing:t hirzeqii•et tir6iP)it040. ;Pf4V.7.) U LI •<br />
-Gen von GEYR: S ource could fl . b-t giite kny.t,iapi*tidciintifâ . • '1<br />
thinks air-tank Cooperktion the most deadly cilnhination.<br />
Air attacks . 4re .; V eiy ffedtivënd lib'StICAat by **;tank<br />
crews. ful ,v0,11.0".‘ itiA;.11$1 , fi<br />
. • ):, *Ps<br />
Gen DIETRICH: 30% raechanicalt.thiluresi .: 10% .'Idev4510V40 .0ankia 'anti<br />
TDs. Losses due to arty are negligible l MOsit feared<br />
by crews! Allied tanks and TDas 4:14 ,"441 elq +.04 • •<br />
•<br />
Gen HAUSSER t During long movements to, ;thezpne eS.,449,',5„094f,1..ii..?.0-30%. of ,<br />
all tanks en raiite fall out idiA ta.mechazlics.l".feilu'res.<br />
Considering the remainder, as ar,lqa.2.0.t.s.,thrOugh<br />
Mechanical failure's.;<br />
through A/T defense; and 15% e.re knOCkeil., on., arty.<br />
Tanks and TDs are feared most , by, Gerraapvtatterews:<br />
'...What 'developments have been Made ih the , , Infra-,Rat :of• .. :.sirmilar<br />
ray devices far night operations by ..tan1cs?. 141.here can .teChnibal data<br />
be , . found . on the subject? 'Who wei4e the',Mantifacturers?'What. "inen de-<br />
velaped this device?<br />
All sources agree that these cteVelbfmente.',./isiietrigi'-'yWikaid'Ue<br />
aarly experimental .stages. Gen DIETRICH knows.bout ien:264,0,ts :Carried<br />
Dut at the TRUPPENUBUNGSPLATZ (Training . A.46410 14:DtiR.B0.11M1.,Gen,,GIDERIAN<br />
hin.lcs , the .GAF was developing ;similar deviCesrAnd . SIWZbiall..,:eata.; with<br />
..„.„ 7 .P.Kots , (paeseriger cars) • ;,;;;; ;.. .:nvz • •<br />
Gen GliDERIAN thinks the ,ENTWICKLUNGSSTEilEcDES LUFTF:giRrilINtSTERiUMS•<br />
. 1:Research Center of the Air Ministry) shonld know .detailS ..deh',POTRICTI<br />
, ifers.to_the.HEERESliAFFENAMT. (Army .:Weapone tTe.:001T BEULIgi$01Rhi4Place<br />
where details might be found; 'Gen von GEYR;'ia . ' ,Cif o'ili.013)5Iiii4Offtha4 the<br />
British': lead in the field. of Infrai-RaY research and,: specifically<br />
o ,<br />
•<br />
f ,Prof. • LINDELANN, of OXFORD; He 'does<br />
Cisr, mitn...Infra-Ray developments and also refer t'O'rstherd'AFctoirrVefirils.<br />
4 0a ed 110-1At* *4<br />
.What. ..46 : :you think of American' r ec oithai a ariti i iftedtirdliiPcg.:1**V.i<br />
• , i•d:voroin•<br />
Gen GUDERIAN thinks that American taatice at'e lent:1'411y . the ,eaMe<br />
those employed by German tinitS. Advanced (VORGESCHOBENE) , motorized<br />
ran with air support is very effective, he States' Gen von G'EYR thinks<br />
that . the • or,ganization of Amerioah ron units is ,eulierior: to .the .Geriman<br />
particularly in the number of VehiClee, where the piopoi.ttolilki$<br />
The most dangerous moment <strong>for</strong> . the-opponent is masa r6n after penetration,<br />
he points odt. Gen DLETRICH praises American air .r4 • ("excellent")<br />
but 'thinks buz rbund tactics lack ,4ggreissivenees. . Mbvements<br />
have to be 'executed • in' shorter. time, he thinksi Gen H.AOSSER particularly<br />
likes American cav groups; he thinks they are "Very effeCtive" . because<br />
they are used to close ,dangerous gaps in additiOn,:c? 4hdrrn missions.<br />
The German Army laCks a similar unit e he pOints otitl afid.. in units which<br />
ou ld per<strong>for</strong>m similarly to (Air cav groups, eguitiMeht is interior: •<br />
8, What do you think of American rdri equipment/ What '112`e its weaknesses?<br />
With the exdoptiOn of von GEYR, who claims no itlioWiedge of the subjeCti<br />
SECRET<br />
•
4<br />
Ref No SAIC/1:7<br />
24 May 45<br />
;.•<br />
•<br />
•<br />
, . .. . • .., .. .<br />
,-<br />
et! X i ti.14..4.c.1 . RJ),/0.9.1:11P4.9.6 ./ SlOscr i be :' .thei....1j.ght r cir -tank as riexellent ' l•;.,./ Geri<br />
zmit AA pk, 19,MC,thiinks 1,:the Wradicit communication system and equipment Pi<br />
the....rch car is not heavy enough, Gen<br />
G6DIRI,A1■1. enviii0,;yeeadPi,..thitt7Germati equipment is inferior.<br />
oat 11APUP14301.1 PAV.1.1.441: •rte..chnical-:. data: on 'armor been given to the',f,trapaneee?<br />
noi)-40.tcrtaclo. yoLbstob 4-aotil ea, fj::.', '..• : '‘; .'',.....•,; , :, ', .' • , . • ' . : ' .<br />
?lass . yd ,..A.Pirgptkr,M C epti Aeri::. GIJDOIAN,. had no knowledge of the sub ject. Gen<br />
, GupEIRIAN thought that according to a statement., by the FUEHRE1, .the..JaP-.<br />
. .„ allq.17 . : 1.114omatically received in<strong>for</strong>mation on all German new developments.<br />
hp:11;e4yerller0144.s..119tr.tle,:i1.0.i;s'i.•::.<br />
4-13."<br />
1<br />
.,,..- • ..:. , : ..: :. ' ...T ..1 1 s '. :.11:: 0<br />
4 e<br />
1>ifiliplit'fifiditt,' : 441S41,131,009,4 ev:y.:-1..,4 v..,:i.;1 ....,y,..,;., . ..,'..'r .<br />
. 1 94 ,- .P0 q,4.4.1 '1 ,,no W of.Any d_Mportaxt !developments • in • Japanese armor?<br />
.. . •'cl ';',:'; . ;,::: ị, :::.,': ...- e, ,!,;:4, A„ ,t, •<br />
,,. $ e., .1 . 7.1 71,.,.,.,.,0!:, v , .it t • ,,., . . -.• .: , • ,i;j.?...,f1AA'",<br />
, ii).,<br />
;"....,,"...)<br />
9 cu.aimen, no .„KnowlLedge such of developments.<br />
any<br />
0 4/6 1 i,Jc.", .,..: 5:1z ...11,-).4. !, ., .. • ,.: .,<br />
, . . . . • ,<br />
, • aPtild<br />
Gera.i' any hive operative on the<br />
•<br />
J2 •Alai.'•/4-57'""" ''':'•••'-',' • .'• • • • ''', •.<br />
L. A.;.,071,8 ,,t .t ,.-. . • , ( '.; 6 eiT.) I :,.■:.. . • .. . • : :•.: ,<br />
.'7cRoilgh 4"eatiMAte: '' 400,.500. At the time of the beginning<br />
i- - ---•'.., '... ..,(::;147:7":4 i,zi.J), . ,., .! ..., , of the in.vasion a total .. of 1 2 go ,o..9; .4*.P.,,yfeX;p japezcsatiVe ,<br />
,...., ,i.titlX:tRila e.logi4sorda'N'fiibe..e..7,4 .a4:4 09.4234., ,. +After<br />
Van' 4*; ="i h ietiii14.pOliL:tgit toh • -,in. e6ikdo ẁh 0,at39eacjal.lizre<br />
.';.:04i,s0( The<br />
.,,,;,, ',.•.'.<br />
shnita.5e was in<br />
' ••,'.'.'.-...;.-. ,, . - . • assault guns, and other gUnS.,<br />
4 .<br />
5 .<br />
. •<br />
1. ".. - : ,.'. .ii..., ..:,i.• . .. . : .<br />
t<br />
ekt.cig•gti Igo ;ti.:m Ate, : i.,200 .if360. • :: • .,,.-.:: . ,:. ,.: -. • ,..,..,, ' •:,.;•1• 44A<br />
7.1 ..,,,the ,,r. I; • ; TWi•:.;<br />
`,:•',:b ..i.1:‘. ' en., Od<br />
0° iWa8. . :49xi -mtim' , accOrding,./t,o...hiS ea,tipatuto<br />
).'3.420444 ,. ov,j,ki kpeo,n, •,...,:,0.,..,.e..11 . .. . - . , ,.. . , , ....... ... .. -...<br />
•<br />
Y - 17,,,,,,,,. c, ,. .44.<br />
ifstf.u.v1i4 4)ndg./113s ogroup i!,(P2.i..had apProx .100 tanks.':andilastaditi!guns<br />
,, , , .. : ::,--47,':,.,..i'q . • "available.' Estimate of the ..total; ‘ .1unith rhi Walleyes<br />
i41411041,:til'OT 110711.ti 4113.00X+4,faxit'OY'frect i• .1,000. • ': ..;* .. ■ .2 :'. :. lffr :.:f11,1d,Y a.ar.,<br />
:kttiYm31 " 1.t4s-vio:.b .viciipi b.t At%: :-!..,. ( .......... 1 ,:":.; ...1....;., , '. .• • :. . : , • . .. . Q ,..,a oil)<br />
i fte .elidi<br />
gtattgi Altfa-10.nimbero..of each of :t ha' .:following , tẏpai, ;:lvne.tr;. Mk VI '<br />
e<br />
IATIggil lydasmo., il,,:p„! G,.,..i ,;: ...- • ..',,i,.:<br />
4 1' *....4 .!,<br />
: .- :;ittoota40;:.'040 falila ,bnz snols 9 a e.-/ .:: v,„a',.--•t...,•:.• ':. :A • . , ! .,<br />
04 • isiiptgr la? . ,. wagt.tztrphlyt ,..one. who could :‘answer the Jci . ueStkoii.ia.'t all,<br />
,<br />
,•. ,'ailietit.41.-Aidn, #4,41 014841yi, t.o:A41 ..Ifigur,es ;except .1n, the .th cast . ', of, -JAGDT.IGEO which<br />
H<br />
he stated to be not more than 100. The monthly production of Mk V was<br />
....A13k.Ox 3001 , 'eAkivki..,'40040;; .;;Mk . .-,VI, were produced'. at t he . e.Y6raieKvia•Ce of<br />
.1,00.420 per month; JAGDPANTHER, C ,3 mm: 50-70 on the average.<br />
.<br />
tifjottis;.:•1$ i ,4/40...s ti,aos .i•Afs d o L ;; :: , A. , 1 :., :..;-.,:x.;;I. . :...: : . : . ,; ::•: •;:<br />
. (.:•..J./:!..,:..) atr:;)<br />
, , , , „ ,<br />
',...10.111.1: ioni=.., Wit.1011,12,:ii)); ,v )!.,,,;, .,...,., ,.,..., , .. • .. '.. ,,, '•-, ....•,••,..,-1,•,,..!,<br />
, : •eciakii$ ,'C'CrED. toy Ail) . .., qo :i'f.t :;; c .. • ..,.....:: J •:, ,•:,.11; isi . .. . .. . ...., . - • ..:•: (• 1 . n f;.!<br />
, "O•nitO4.,3 t: itist, : . /041equa Eitazoi:.-1,,,,;. . • . • , . ,- .....,•,, ,..., :9.0<br />
4?..1.0togon •i"d1 : 1. r'A ,,, , al ,'-‘1.: J.: rf ;SEVENTH ARMY I NTERR COATI•ta :CENTER<br />
' ... . , .‘!-''.20$1.Th .1'17 &la ai2 c i : . : -, , c1q. o . ...1 i; :t :: .•:. . • ::•• . - ;• • . :•.:.; .:::_t'lfil Slrik<br />
' •••• L 1 67C-O PI'Y;414iri.'i.tP. fl.'..a ;-.-,..:.roi.±. /.:.:. , .:, • :r.., L-,:!..".r, Ada . , ..,,,, •: ,. .. ...;<br />
. •oldvrefioiottl., ,asua.;),/ .i:e.s ....Lylv:: .....:, . r. if, :. i ..;., /....:c.‘„ • .',...d.a..,;,,,14.- .. . :,<br />
ti..1-i nftio' toicaq . Fzip,eu 1: .a..A1 . :.o.:.1:11:C 2. J. , .,..i' „;•,PAUL. KUBAL,A, •<br />
,<br />
, 0 zuzta2d.:. -u v.2 ,I,n 0'1. 1 , 'cz•:','" •, 4 ,- Y.,.. • : i ;-;:•L,..Maj , kll , • -<br />
i ta2tas.tre; c '..i ti 6 ri i• o.J. : :i.c•i .i:...,:i f::::-).i.. i,,.- •:.,q,,., commanding..<br />
rf 1 trfws -,..t.il.t,t .r.:1 .L. 1 11 ..t i ; :,-,..:. f.;,....c.,1 ....; 4 -1.:',:•.: '....<br />
. ,:•, .. %..F..,<br />
,,, It)i- .1....;tn ± a .i: :171 . ;•,. ; L . : ::: „, 4 • • " ' ' - • ' .. *..,• ,:s f...;:i.,:• .<br />
c7a6atonn-dw al •:!11. sic; i)t./ 4 4 • , 3<br />
.0ci pt4tie ..:11)140.0 0174<br />
•<br />
SECRET<br />
•
• Ref N: SAIC/18<br />
24 Ma: r 45<br />
-s- 9- 11 1 -1. :"‘"Al VICLOSURĖ "10 so.De.<br />
' • • ". I • • - i^ if<br />
SEVENTH ARMY IN,TERROGATION . CENTgatelifiti<br />
APO /58 • : .<br />
' -<br />
.7<br />
8A2IN A1311<br />
S , E C *It ,E V.77 ,1*‘-;<br />
CG<br />
a%r, ..1.431 1.010A7<br />
952<br />
.......<br />
. T3A3 ud: 41'<br />
HITLER ' S LAST SESSION IN .THE:41EICHS ..CHANCALLORY VA<br />
•• Vote: No authehtic reports,Of.-thig, session: have..; been 1:011.44ct in the<br />
." Presa, or announced over the. Radio:..IReports...Which-T fh.gyiet4been •<br />
released did not contain the trite z$it:t4,0<br />
SOURCLS, • ,' ( v.l• .<br />
, . . - • • J • 1'W.; 1,44.4<br />
. •<br />
4 .<br />
.<br />
r<br />
i) WAHL, Karl, GAULEITER of 'ii-LJGS:40G; Boiv.tlre se :men 'were-present at<br />
ii AMANN, . Max, Nazi Party giionil*rNO"). the fitiee &xi d 'below.<br />
• ,<br />
:• • .• .Date of:In<strong>for</strong>mation: 2k Feb 45 Ihtlgrroitator: • W.K.<br />
• !.. .; •... • ;•:..;; I 1 zat.Pial z)ob .<br />
The meeting was 'called on very short notice. I:t.,:..was.,..)ttalce place •<br />
,at .1300 hrs t: and the leaders were toldito come by ;tar ,and ,14.04.:roku.p. the<br />
Ratin 0-3<br />
• -eattlr,."day,. 1 , There: were some 60 . or 70. people-,....all..;t0,14),<br />
:GAO LEITERS,' S,A and ZS: leaders, but rio;•generitls...or,leaderistmlhekWAFFEN<br />
• -Sg . The ,.efembere: were lined up on, threersidee.,of ..a. ; . •large*ArtkAtfk-3.1 'un-;<br />
danaged room .6f Chancellbry i. In'' ..a? ..fssyypiinpute,e . XXXLAṚ, 4 entered,<br />
tollowea.. lby 'BORMANN. Both :Mew • shook; ..hands ,with•t .a3.1.• air there-<br />
after' :HITLER Spoke briefly to..REICHS Labor Leader ;HIEHL.;;.-it,HO„folki:Oce • in • a,<br />
--lbw volCe-,-, and only parts of the conversation could :b.e':undet*Ogi.d,•: but at<br />
the end HITLER presented' MEHL with a case containing the:;*14g14Eit i,:. German<br />
"decbratiow. •The reception was followed. by 'a.. simp1e lunchAtonbieptisisting<br />
of stew .and real coffee. HITLER left .the.' r1oom . :ati,153.94 ;And 4,4V:11,our and .<br />
ohe ..ha.I.f later the. 'leaders reassembled to hear his :-..4epee.C:h.,141,:bly-.) .<br />
:••• Mien- he returned:'to, : make his spe.ech,.• HITLER .satiat IttAillTaIaM•04ble., on<br />
j stOôped<br />
'which. were his notes ' and a•glass .-.of<br />
stooped<br />
.pos ItiOn •and •the'• fact that- his-. le fI hand :;-.:.:hot..4.the:rright-StOneolvh4h. was<br />
wouaded,on . 20 was shaking: -so . badly:I:that' .•at., rapes entipe:bady<br />
was trembling. .• It-seemed. to be. causing 'the , ILttSR great 1444p.opitort.<br />
At.: first his :voice. was,'low, but' .it •gained.strengtkfend .. Xate4514.45.ched its<br />
cus.ttomary. climax. . No change in his . voice. was.inotideab.i.e!..16io<br />
IITLER vs speech lasted. approximately:. one hour candit.O4er,..hal..fet)..urar, the<br />
first time the impression upon 'is listeners !wat . :ilot.,(0q2,1Y.Ure*net 'HITLER<br />
see)Jad to be struggling to convey,. a :feeling oinner,.:7hOteittO4-heit a8sezP,<br />
blet Party leaders,. but the sensational.news:;which.,33.11):ahtidizaked was<br />
not •<strong>for</strong>thcoming.. The substance of his,.address".follows: ••..••• • '<br />
• • .!. ..idd`.eX4,4iati)N .<br />
:,,.:11e,etated that ,the Ruesian._ onslaught! waeu .of:15kagamottntnsiP44,S,P,Arcti)<br />
the -people ., because it Was :accompanied: byi.;ser.d.614e,r.mis.40.401.4iNinst<br />
•: them; : ,:-• However, was .expected :that<br />
A large-scale counter-attack . was :planned,....bUI..:.hacL,ibaenixdeptie.d.r.b.<br />
chiefly because of great losses of heavy weapons. HITLER praised<br />
the brave deeds of certain generals, and expreseed the. wish that<br />
others were also "carved of the same wood". Many lacked the<br />
• to improvise, which •was,:a necessity. He singledioikt.<br />
pecially brave Gen HUBE, who had been killed.<br />
In the .main measage of his 'speech, however, he „called upon them not<br />
to hecome'laint,hearted but to develop supreme strength, and then<br />
the war . C6uld - still be won. The leaders would have to guide the<br />
people personally,. and bring out a "Teutonic Fury"' in-them.' He<br />
declared that this was the time to find out the true quality of the<br />
German people, Should the German people give up, 'then it would be<br />
demonstrated that they had no moral'worth, and in that case they<br />
would desei-ve destruction. That would be the rightful judgement<br />
of history and Providence.<br />
SECRET<br />
1<br />
NAM WAR CRIMES DISCLOSUREACT<br />
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY<br />
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY<br />
SOURCESRETHODS EXEMPT ION3B20<br />
NAZI WARCRIMESOISCLOSUREACT<br />
DATE 2001 2007
S E C . R E T<br />
Ref No SAIC/18,,<br />
z4 • . .<br />
• -CON-drhingj.military affairs he.: brought out four points:<br />
.'"..:77,7,;:e1"17,tGermani s.milst 1:reinain . On the defensive .in the WEST. (HITLER had<br />
,-„ • •<br />
• F r e at faith . in the IVestwall and the RHINE).<br />
14.) In the IiiST a powerful counter-:offensive would be prepared.<br />
•:t.he::!PC4P...Pr). • .<br />
t="li ILLbji he u—boAt tzi were': outstanding; they • .represented tv..revo.<br />
vt34)11itiântiti ;•the f.techniCal . tie ld DOENITZ was a phenomenally<br />
outstanding leader.•<br />
iv) The new hiESSERSCH .NITT fighter plane., 1)1E-262, was without-equal<br />
anywhere in the world. It could not be damaged in combat ,.-.'thje"-":".•-:'.<br />
4.4 ,trute 014.011j.ye, vloipsiy e, „.oplou.ryed; , as a result of accidents. in take7offacori-<br />
,,.0.44;;Pied.e. rare .i1.4iignifiCant ... Cana tion ei,,,!c if, a,• tr e -<br />
• men-dou s scale , and"the re .sults"i4Oilld . "saan be noticeable'!jiiit.fho'<br />
43.11 :ark„144Aol,.. rinTIAR th*e'h c tI, e mistakes of the • German kir::<br />
declaring that the greatest fault had been the choosing of the<br />
e*14.Ett iot/ tirdheintcdtg_st..7: • e :11 • . • .<br />
. 420ANIetattlb 'Ith "end 'Of this Eiddrerset; HITLEit . spoke of i-politi.cald ev-blats-..7 He<br />
,Enrglana.•-would: •thold :-out, the.. end ; : .she ...vaa fivnaymaIlied<br />
Halrig rotillit3-6ifiafaftiai.ciotacri not On the •other :hand,;•<br />
"•44 Wt 4.0.Vinn'any -•held . ! .firmduring• the :crisis .; a. day:-.Woulthle.bme. when<br />
, f)0.183 116 ,nferWoT1s r.ett01,.et8)Avouidl: arisw:between' Rusaie: and' the ,USr;<br />
-1,1,0113 dblḟalutilligvhisCispeech, 1.[ITLER; ,..thanked • the••assembled,,leadere,tfOr.c:thei:<br />
a,k . tirdbr.OpikiiaticifiTald 'Idyalty.•; . . ,and ;then' apoke. 'a •few words: den'eerningi his<br />
31.-.F1f * Ihlira&tfittontṪhi's ihePha.du nkiVer ... ‘done . bef•ore ,, .-so yit was: espec.ialflyr note--<br />
ilacnva-0 effect Ordiftliy1 .a.na) -hadtra.r. rdb pr UpOn e s sing .• his list enere •,:i ,He:tsaid! :that<br />
ar11$6.001:Fredeirs:r001...thre Great had .!returried:trom the mars , andi':broken,<br />
tate .14(Foin,t.e .: MCI,/ J4himself, felt the burdens of- •war e which :had...b.e.Conie:<br />
evident•Ftnifirnptoins: of. ill 'health ... , PreviOuslY owineite 4ea.•,worry<br />
e,f4taIhreatirdilfferedllfrenf a' trembling, leg :. • Now ;. .howevert,-,-.th-ei infirmity<br />
l'ocloo$5 vbiltd . inuliesiitle:ft) .cp.rnic• :. He 'hoped .not. move- to.:.hia,-head;,-...1 or a<br />
.aLw Orte)litikyealeaklizWouldLbe !..unplea-gantC: 'But even if: 'that,. Cc Ciarredl het?. :could<br />
Ittod eoftorp 6y .c tmyt:h ear ti ,wilLrrievbri qu'ake '; that-remains.- ide-,cold11.....;Q:lie<br />
41;qtrvasiVigifen 4tdo tlayrthat ;'•af ter z'.the :, attempt Of- 20: July : the ,ddatori. read/ his<br />
ann b el$ClitiOdistifnit: founcit :thatifit .thad: remained i at its customary-72 :lbeata.zi He<br />
. also mentirdned,Arbuble; with .vocal 'chords and admitted:Ahatalhe<br />
loChad,Itirridbrgond ,:an 'operation; cnot long bef ore.. • •-• . •<br />
r't1 '1H IA rdIo-ding);hdistEited uthatJ .h'e Would in the . future .be .-<strong>for</strong>ced to .7teike<br />
abide chansb4ineasure0',:i ;The:leaders .should not Misjudge- him' if.,..he:a<br />
esw sh0ld Jtakerlste14 . :ivhibhf.tdey“did 'not understand. .• • •,-•<br />
•-.4tv,,,r1::•.%. •<br />
When HITLER had spoke a . few 'Words' abbn't -loialti and<br />
rcAnirager cand)lreadinese ctoz!.foilaw; 'HITLER 'unto death. Be<strong>for</strong>e- lealiing,<br />
JetHIT.j..IERItc'exiViirsedictirieflyr f.ew• -people . Dr G'OEBBELS : , • Dr ;LEY, GAUs.<br />
HIRT4pranditHACKE.::, Then.hei • • said. he must leave', as others - were<br />
alVetair laWaiting thinaidnjanother<br />
A<br />
, ...".<br />
3i3 tle(6.1-11 • •<br />
2 1p tlfivi a:945 , SEVENTH ARhiY INTERROGATION :CENTE:R<br />
,, a frrf,:i doily f)..3.1Loo<br />
neff tri.t.Pw...c:e<br />
odl o'b.t.u8<br />
01-1 • :Id- PAUL. •KUBALA,<br />
lo y,t.t.tetrp •; me,j, ha.<br />
j bluow nr)t-iJ •• ; .• • ..• Conunanding.<br />
eaza ,t8:14<br />
1:1-tt,tasAbist .. 11)11:41i: . 1. J. • .<br />
SECRET<br />
• • • • ,<br />
. •.•<br />
0•1<br />
2
•<br />
NAZI WAR CRIMES MṀOSUREACT<br />
2001. DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY<br />
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY -<br />
SOURCESNETNOOSEXOPTION3028:..,<br />
NAZI WAR CRINESOISCLOSUREACT<br />
DATE 2001 2007<br />
4<br />
sol-01-9/c-7<br />
SECRET<br />
'1::.ii. IS IN EliCLOS17. 0 ṡ.----- E CG c ; R -- ,..- E ----<br />
Ref No SAIC/19<br />
24 May 45<br />
:: Auth 7 h TArm ' i<br />
- SEVENTH ARMY INTERROG;ITION CENTER :Init:<br />
, • .-..; : :..1;APO:.758. . ' . '' 1U.:7 A 1 . litLY. :Date: 2 , May 19 .-<br />
.,:, •<br />
.: •<br />
. ..-..,• •- .: OF PEACE<br />
.:;• •••,,a,(1441*-41".!;: /.1:4; .. . 1.i,, :::.:::•'•.:•:::: '<br />
1. SOORC. 6 .: ..n....., .1; :- . ,:i .:,..: .. ' ..:.'.,:..<br />
HOFER .; Frant o . OGRUF (Lt Gen) NSKK, GAULEITER and:REICHSSTATTHALTER of : .,<br />
1.1`yrol, - VorniNitpet,g, HOFER I s career is a typical example Of dUccess under .<br />
i:WeAa.00,4,Vellimbr.,i,. 1:11ebrose': from modest!. beginnings . to ..heights ..of :power.:.at:tain-,<br />
able4144. i.fil,I.3. VOTalitarian . state:' -Clearly seeing where .his advantages. Ivy<br />
he joitill'AttitOWAUBtriv,iabitinch:i p the Nazi . Party ' . in :.1931 , and •:. when i ,t4e: I or gan4:<br />
=-Eigiiiita.T0flii.WettiSdught :I reflike .:'iq-G Germany, where 7 he jOined- in.,plotting-,<br />
thi.411-iltiirS,A44OHL1JSS1 ::,}taving.i lieefi , 'Placed ; id charge 'Of elections .f or.,,Aus.r... 7.1<br />
tri.pfaxgetiiii.a.g . 4. :/ Gpx...n.latnY ,,.hia.,Wor'.-. may be considered :one . of the sicontributing<br />
asi9FS" TS ;t. A- Plaii .t."si.icCeSii n.in 193. . He Was rewarded with -the':<br />
. -.‘ I , •:.., t :;.*.t!'"..; ;<br />
' ft111)2114T2,1)t;i a5egi IfIPP'cl l''/° 1-* ''. .'. . .. • 7 .; . .;• .:, ::.,,,:•., ::;.„.1<br />
"ritiftl04*3 10. p bgmDateC■Of..'InfOrmation:;;See l Text- ' InterrOgator:....E:H.I<br />
;., . • . . , •<br />
?. . AvraNtSiritATI6N0.017 • .i TALI ADP TYROL .. ..:: .'; ...s.: ..... .. . ... .<br />
aa 46 to 444* .:Wr6,01(t.tividw . ii' . .:.oi,.: .,..-:,; i.I.,....,:. . . % ...., .-...i.1'..i.:. 1.';.i .-):...1,..:..4<br />
4 ,t41:19FER,AletrOlhel. otfircel 'of': REICHS,STATTRALTER. *(Governor) .: Of ; Tyrol ,,-.2.Vorarl-T<br />
1:,<strong>for</strong>er(irtt.41.44S4!0.0tite:eirice?Sep ..14.11 7:fgfterl.MITBSOLINI 's .. fall: he:i .ws.s::.thel head<br />
c‘fTe....13tactelit t 14.1141±.tiery, government and: had absolute .authority., in :ithis6ar*tes..-<br />
The,:kraf collect dtittikatae.ft: to,,i4the..) PUCE ..weret,to<br />
.taxes,. ` pay.: his : .c• tfic$.:a2:0 ,<br />
and.. dOntribute .10,000,000,000 LIRE to the : German war' ef<strong>for</strong>t monthlyt...i.t.ApproXj.mately<br />
. 40,000 .,000 LIRE of this sum was appropriated by HOFER, suPposedly • '<br />
.<br />
<strong>for</strong> the ,purpose of .road. improvement, billetting of troops, constrizOtiOn!.of_... ..<br />
air raid shelter, ..payments of bomb damages, etc. .<br />
Pi4. 1B .ouWel4belgimet:that Ve .).sVid.messed • i both' , the Nazi . and 'Fascist partiateiri , .<br />
BOZEI'll ancizARIF..NTJ under:I tha:Treteict. :..thati this, was <strong>for</strong>eign teriit..orn ge.t.o,p.:,...<br />
iiiiatralibiri4DE3:13EIRTOLIVI .,a"anl 80-.yeed-old anti-fascist .lawyer ,.• who had ;prer:'?•'.. 1<br />
v iofts9,T 1 EPFeli re th NUS S OLINI., •,:', s - .prefect :Of..TRIENT i . ; •. .. • - ....: .... ,2..i. v.!..,:0<br />
'LI' Orli h Flaw eii..t' t,,-,r3. alti :15.5...:,.:i .IF,:.": . i...- .-', • . • ' '<br />
3 ... HbFERO .S5 JEF,FORTS TOR:tEARLII.SURRENDER, i<br />
..47,04z4viaitarlo a .i.: I f ...t 4 q . ki 1 4.;! .:..t. .. ,. It -.; •.. ... .., !...i....,:f..sT<br />
4' ,1:40-FEFOrgott:..44:1itou'bht opith2iSS ..OGRUF • (SS . Lt Gen) : WOLF, Chief.. of ...,:the, ISS':....and. oil.<br />
'fOliitc•Ocii-VdtitIlYtOiwhoishad)thedi'talkii.in..early..-March with ,. •a certain;;Mr.,,,-DITT<br />
vitto'Cliiimed to be a - representative of .President Roosevelt,.. in...Switzer1and-.1-;;<br />
The purpose of these talks was to arrange <strong>for</strong> the withdrawal of •German<br />
tr-oo-ps to . a predetermined line in front of the Alps, and . ces.:Sa-tiolk,of lids-7,',<br />
tilities until the defeat of the Nazis in BERLIN'.<br />
. ó9/(at A134413..kHOFER) visited the . FUEHRERHAUPTQUARTIER: (Supreme,. Headq<br />
ifil.Vi.illill 641 iibliVerigHRER!):-.‘whr'e ,...according .-tto his claims ., ',he. advocatedf...the<br />
riAreat in Northern Italy during an interview . 'with-Genls JODL.,..-BURMANN!,:i.:<br />
excl. glitt„VARAPIP.,(4).,..a, u,,pop , his .. r.e ..irn- fron . BITLER 1, s Headquarters, HOFER icontAct<br />
ed GEIROBST(iOillontyITTINGHOF;' Commander of ..Army Group- ."C", t,', theAleirmai.<br />
aubeasadar., to Italy RAHN, and ',70LF, and toldthem Of the eurt reb .u. fi—and.'<br />
hi trifhl .gittetliV het4•04e:ived!'from HITLER. The General was noncommittal tal . -..<br />
4' 4:ri;Lettretri4he eCtintaItexWOGRUT.“(SB .j,t - 'Gen). KALTENERUNNER, ..Chief , of. the: • .SICH1.11-<br />
HI afraptIMO: teecurit',1.:Rolit a); <strong>for</strong> the •SOUTH -German area, ..a. 'direct;.rePre7-<br />
Tgri 'gra avracco't. AmEaltandii6'6iSsOr,.to . HEYDRICH, <strong>for</strong> the purpose . of.. reaching<br />
a definite line of action to avoid further bloodshed and destructiOn'in.his<br />
(HOFER's) area. No impression was made in this quarter. .<br />
On 24 '. Apr the STEIRMARK , 0 BERDONAU , KAERNTEN L and SALZBURG regions were<br />
a6ded to - HOFER's jurisdiction. On 26 Apr he had a conference with Field:<br />
Marshall<br />
..1<br />
KESSELRING and GENOBST (Col Gen) WITTINGHOF, and claimed that hci<br />
SECRET
SECRET'•<br />
_. •••• . :. ... ;.! t. '7 L. r<br />
C.1\1TAP, f).. .:<br />
Ref Jo SAIC/19 : . ..<br />
24 )).'3 r . '45. : ,',<br />
. . .. . -. . . . ..<br />
•: , . J.-, .': A . . i'll',.'.'.';:::::!<br />
imp:,ored.tnem ta . .end . a hopeless fight. KESSEIRINGdectined tdj'adcept his<br />
appewl,and . . a . tew.days : later'sent /4-11Y.Assage .,orclering him to.keep/his.noie<br />
"-... •<br />
out of military affairs. .<br />
LICA rdsult Of talks with an AmeriCeh off4:046.FIceme to discuss surrender<br />
terms, HOFER ordered the removal of the numerous AA'guns surrounding<br />
INNE;BRUCK, and that all the'bridgee.in.INNSBRUCK . .. And vie be left. . intiiet? iu„...,.... t : . •;<br />
.. . . .<br />
•<br />
4, THE FUEHRER MISINFORMED<br />
. ••• .P.:41'.,14.1.0 •.i•e7:-.!:‘,.-.<br />
1pcording to HOFER, HITLER was completely Imisin<strong>for</strong>medl,bn prosluotiAn'Agi.:<br />
uree ” HITLER received his miein<strong>for</strong>mation frorn 'oortain:HERP SAggRi'ant.07.1^!,<br />
ducti.ow:expert from Dr SPEER I s:office., .AlthOUgh2aIldfiglireswriereiplit4t; =a;<br />
ticaLly'bare-faced lies, HITLER.claimied.SAUER-s.Wbgf,his,beW6ourc.wf.0*,,,t<br />
<strong>for</strong>mation and trusted him completely.. HOVER:,cited:the.f011OwingkexaMplesi<br />
. . •<br />
HITLER was convinced that he received 2500'caremOnthl,y<br />
. , vx.<br />
factories, while actually Only 500 were pfodUced.04.0nOlof<br />
reports <strong>for</strong> a certain period ending ,1 Dec 44, he 6CateethaVaPail01*q'<br />
faó leory :in FOICCHI, Italy was producing,4,000,009/rpunds 041=00004ste1<br />
'ammunition. However, this factory had not been completed<br />
cf!Lte,' ancrdid not begin production unti1:20 .jeb45.; AnotherItinttenee.l<br />
cited by HOFER was a report issued by SAVER iI which proaiii-aa or81-mm<br />
- mortars in a factory in VIPITENO, Italy'weteclaimedltobe:48000)per•,Inonth.<br />
- Daring a conversation with HITLER, HOFER - Aas)told , that!this ilent:tprq!"r.<br />
-Idrced . at least 1000 mortars per month. The . truth, s.however l iwasIthSt the<br />
-f.aLctory . had just been completed, and production'had,not,starte&. -The ,<br />
.m,mthly . quota was set at 200 mortars.,<br />
. . .... ..., • , . • . . . . . ... ......<br />
. .<br />
5.: vci;HRWOLF : . .<br />
.:. 0',:-.:,f..1,1.:111..v,: -.J.<br />
. . . .. .! flOCi7Wi',<br />
• . • ' — .•• :- ' :tiia H<br />
'H( :I rL.Riclaims that he refused to'organize.a,VEKRWOrFin:his:1AistrAbut<br />
deep to his opposition that it,wasiorganized-throug/rOtherfchanhe<br />
ever in 'orderto s *keep "order" an&to .Nivoid'unnecessa*13rAUg410.1.[APIAX4<br />
only lead to dieaster*<strong>for</strong>•the'peOple" ,ha,appointed..a.baxttain5gPRIO:etpanx,...-<br />
ager of a factory in INNSBRUCK as liaison man between him and"the WEHRWOLF<br />
organization. Source claims he does not_kaOW: .tha...niFeT;ofAliSSaclattblif .<br />
that TOEPPER has all the needed infOrmition to . diaiiipt-thks 'organization.<br />
Heiclaithe t hOwever, thathe knows the No 2 man:(butmot!:tbp.name)1,40tOtters<br />
liS f.iervioes to assist the Allies inrounding Ap,theAgangClanAzlocatingrtheir<br />
storesofweapons„<br />
'' ".;.."71V =7,:t::7°<br />
6. ART TREASUPES .<br />
,%,.,00,..F1 ca t F.,!W.:'<br />
•.4.6:t !,.■:th:li (-,,,,b.i t i. ::: •<br />
•' ! .:, 0 r!?:<br />
. a) Czech or Hungarian State Property: Source claiMs ithaptheeekohdeete<br />
vere_stored in a railway..car.neat LANDECK„and:.weizes.iiplioaektointPY,41144,:.<br />
tilt-direction of Switzerland, .- - . ..:f', .,-„ 1.JI.J!i:Tjlr Al.: 4.4,-,-..<br />
., 0 Italian Gold Treasure: Cached in a bunker'in.iiie;,caitAVIESTEJPANLEN8-<br />
FETE, vie VIPITENO and BRESSANONE .; '' :. ' .-, —.4"/ -"4"11(1<br />
,. -: ". . ,:)....•:. v.i.,:z ,: ,i: - 0. 1 -I,)./..,..,:.;:,...:.!.•,:.<br />
- c) Property..of . Florentine At Galleriei::.Stdred-virithrthe!knoaedgelof:-.r!<br />
... tho Italian government'in . the ST LEONHARD'cotrthotese...11.0ourcefoli4moi,that<br />
'persons who may have more in<strong>for</strong>mation On the.oubjeckti..!are4t)RING4ERwho:<br />
can be reached through the LANDESMUSEUM,;INNSBRUCK;,andGRAZ(Count)HTRAPP<br />
INUSBRUCK.... . , . . -. -... :■.• :! .: .: i! U .... :I:: !: ".<br />
:<br />
S. E C R E:<br />
•<br />
'2
7. FiCTORIES<br />
BOLEN:<br />
STANICH:<br />
V1PITENO:<br />
KERCHBICHL .(vie<br />
VOERGL0-KUPSTEIN):<br />
Underground munitions factory, was to have started<br />
production 10 May with a monthly capacity of20,000,<br />
000 rounds.<br />
Underground ball-bearing factory.,<br />
Steel and Aluminum factory. .<br />
Truck factory with monthly capacity of 250 trucks<br />
per month.<br />
.Saltpeter and nitrogen plants.<br />
A completed factory <strong>for</strong> mortars; had /leiter started<br />
production, - stimated capacity, 200 per month.<br />
A 40,000 sq in light machine gun factory, , located in<br />
a lignite mine. It is also equippdd to qmild aircraft<br />
engines.<br />
8. PIRSONALITIES<br />
GIULEITER HABICHT:<br />
WEISSENBORN<br />
Dr BILGERI<br />
SE OGRUF (SS Lt<br />
Gan) GREIFELD<br />
SS OGRUF PRUETZMANN<br />
SS OGRUF GLUECKS<br />
SS OGRUF POHL<br />
First leader of Austrian Nazis in exile izi Germany; •<br />
killed on Russian front.<br />
Chief of weapons section in production office headed<br />
by SAUER. Last seen in Tyrol, supposed to be hiding<br />
in a tunnel in vie REITH.<br />
•<br />
Former president of INNSBRUCK Chamber of Commerce; '<br />
later GAUWIRTSCHAFTSBERATER (District Economic-AO-.<br />
visor). Expert on food, public utilities.. Lives<br />
in BRIXLEGG, Austria.<br />
Chief of REICHSKOMMISSARIAT (REICH Commission),.<strong>for</strong>,<br />
the security of the German people (DEUTCHES ! VOLK-<br />
STUM); in charge of repatriation :and relocation.<br />
: WEHRWOLF leader <strong>for</strong> Germany, second 'to•HIMNIER,-<br />
,<br />
Inspector General of Concentration Camps. • . .<br />
In charge of finances and busineds-eiploiiation<br />
Concentration Camps.<br />
24 May 1945
,<br />
.,.....',..<br />
*<br />
.<br />
DECLASSIFIE 0 AND RELEAS<br />
H<br />
ED GY<br />
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WY<br />
NOWNWRMABSCHSCLOMMEACT<br />
SOURCESOETHOOS EXEMPT IONGB21<br />
204-<br />
NAZI WAR ENIMESDISCLOSUREACI<br />
DATE 2004 2007.<br />
Ref No 8AX0/20<br />
24 May 45<br />
50,4441 -<br />
1000. IA<br />
E. R 1 s SEORE.T...<br />
tAuth: 00 '7th.Arm<br />
SEVENTH ARMTINTERROGATIONPENTER . anit:<br />
APO-n6 : - • . UP ARMY : Mate: 24 MaT ,19 5<br />
* •<br />
REICH MINISTRY OF FINANOE;LOOATION.OF'PERSONNEL AND DOOUMENTS'.<br />
.(This Report is being published in ..newer te-SpeCial Questionnaire<br />
--providedibvus Group 00, G+2, T-Seolil.ont 6th Army Group,:14.kai"i945)<br />
II PREAMBLE<br />
The following 'in<strong>for</strong>mation was obtained from Ppm-anent:Under Secretary REINHARDT<br />
and :Under Seoretaries_WOOTHKE.and KALLENBAOH. _They are very cooperative and state<br />
that they are willing and able ,to help in the reorganization of the Ministry and its<br />
departments. In oonneotion with the records and doouments, , if was pointed out that<br />
ml!Ili"t ha44)3014,AetToyed.in air attacks. PurthermOie 411 nonessential 'documents:<br />
were.Aistr*d iftiocaUse OfHtha.difficulty of transporting them and because cif .their<br />
conitqq:iifsel,aAre hazard during air raids. Many of the records of all departments<br />
were syaluallscIMMU41ZBUAG. and left ,there.with*tweemplOyeee as custodians.'<br />
Date of In<strong>for</strong>mations See Text Interrogator: G.PX4<br />
II,J4INISTRY0PcFINANOEL<br />
A. DEPARTMENT I<br />
Most of-the personnel and records werejast • located id BERLIN/OHARLOTTENBURG,<br />
SISMAROESTRA8SE k4852. The'tecorcfe of were in BEELITZ . near BERLI4.4bout twelve<br />
• official s,-;under'Minieterialdirigent4UUSTINE, together -with some.r000rds,.:yere<br />
lastz4mISAbiTOEtz.Someloffi-eiali i :netably Mlnisteralrats.KALLENBAOli, GERTH4-:and<br />
SOHMII#00HWARZENBERG,-wera:40 . GARMI8OHPARTENKIROilEN, but were taken-into pustody<br />
:bic1OtOyeioun4 May,4.,The::.ohief officiale still "located,in BERLIN are Dii.O.OiOre'<br />
KLUGE-and MEYER.<br />
S. DEPARTMENT 4,II<br />
-fAt qThiikdepaitMent camedirectlyunder the control-of,REINHARDT. Most . of the<br />
I. ' •<br />
records _ and pereonnel. , are in .ILMENALT; Thuringia. A rex; under Direetor'Dr SIEGERT<br />
and Miniaterialrat<br />
.., ,<br />
SORRIER,,are-otilA, in BERLIN '<br />
, ,<br />
-.<br />
•ONDEPAItMENT-• III,;:. :.rk ,.,.,,. 2; :.. 4 7 i;.,:.: .:...., . , ....;„ • .. . . ' . .<br />
This'Aiet.artent was also under the , Control. of REINHARDTi.Moet of thereektia<br />
. arid' .pereonnel„ are, in ILMENAp i,Thuringia.. ItvadditiOnto . these, thereAs.a.Regip-<br />
•' rVilEa • r.14qm.ttln ,. 8..114,0n oW0*:41fficial in.WEIWEIM)..Qberregiorungsrat':Dri4OOKI'in<br />
.... ..,<br />
-WiTIPP4#%44/44441u45404.440).0464"F401,<br />
.. . .<br />
./ . . . • 4. • I<br />
..<br />
. .<br />
(..:. D;4564it .,./r..,..,., i,!-..;-,-.,..,;.!-. 2.,,,,:.•• , . y ,. ;. t ... i •-• - '• . . . . .„ ,<br />
-NiMiniateiialgifgent.WOOTHKE : .(AGOSBURG).4as one men in:clarge-of,thiol.<br />
l iepir*IgiledtOethepersonntilAs.nd:doeuments.remained.in BERLIN, POTSDAM), .<br />
.inder ministerialdirektor WEYER. Ministerialrat'VOIGELB was 'last in OBEALAINDERN,<br />
ltear MUNIOH..In addition, there were three officiale in BADTOELZI.,MOLTER, EMMEL,<br />
an4 HP0114I :Ag o:;.i j'::1- .;:i'l.!:, ..% . . ' , . : • .<br />
': ) :i11:14PARTAtITA" LT 4j. 1 7k .:* .<br />
MOst :of the personnerian&dOouments remained in. 'BERLIN, undor,::MinisieriaA".":<br />
iirektOr Dr BERGER, although this man may now be in HAMBURG. It is believed that<br />
cne : offivial,.Dr MINOT, went to BAD-TOELZ. ' Some officials and documents were in<br />
ctIOAPURTWingtheliatWurider yMinieterialrat SAWER. Minieterialrat SOHMIDT was<br />
in GARMISOH, but was taken into custody by OIO on 4 May, 45.<br />
. "<br />
P. MARTMENTM<br />
This deyartiedt'ls , divi'dedinto four sections as follows:<br />
VI..A . Doouments anCliei'eohnel were last in BODENBAOH, in the Sudetengau, under<br />
Ministerialdirigent Di BROBTZ, who is either in BODENBAOH Or in WALDSASSEN,<br />
in the Oberpfalz' "<br />
VI-8 last located in ILMENAU,.Thuringia, under Ministerialrat ROBENBAGER. •<br />
Some personnel and records were . in . MALLERSDORF, lower Bavaria, under Ministerialdirigent<br />
VON DIETZ.'<br />
IV<br />
'<br />
R E T<br />
1<br />
/19# vi-f
Ref No ahm/20.<br />
24 May *<br />
r.04 17H/<br />
4<br />
1. •• In MEW, under Ministerialrat ENGELBRECHi.<br />
14:C-D Partly in ILMENAU, under Miniaterialrat-ENGELBREOHT, and partly in<br />
i'ALLERSDORF, under Regierungsdirektor thiNAOHELOi9 v24.0J0 liyuta<br />
r<br />
G. DEURTMENT VII.<br />
jrf.!mitlf AI :J-10q6. 401<br />
Thin departmeht-remaiheifiraii gliiisaliadiYektq:iDikRE01474Address:<br />
BERLIE/CHARLOMENBURG, BISMAROKSTRASSE 48-52•<br />
.<br />
saw<br />
DEE i.RTMItITT VIII<br />
' • Thi department was <strong>for</strong>merly the Pruss ian • Finance r eti-g.r/t arimOittit itCV<br />
BERLIN; under Ministerialdirektor Dr SOHEOHE:locie'of<br />
edriridliTEitiA tWedit'<br />
were sent to NEU-RUPIN, Brandenburg. r-- fr : hmo rifithir41.• iptid<br />
no.t.foon no n OT<br />
I. CHIEF REGIONAL FINANCE OFFICES . .<br />
4444$1014110'<br />
• •: • • 1 • r ri,ke +Igo 4:4■AZIgie<br />
Zheue,departments were directly under the control of, finder 5eore wry-nivanAnu ,<br />
rvOlo,ste,tes that there are practically no reCOrs'lhfC)moiO3 ATeeli wi<strong>for</strong>tarw<br />
destroyed in the last few years, and that it will be necesEkertY004tiVei"<br />
scratch. He . states that he would be able to reorganize .t.,Ftiteoelagi=1;16:.<br />
departments<br />
DEPORTMENT FOR TRAINING AND EXAMINING<br />
ThiE function was carried out by Under SeCratary REINHA6iN gonaaa ,7k*“<br />
there will be no difficulty in reestablishing it. •<br />
7'111A11215.<br />
,X.'INSPEOTOR GENERAL OF CUSTOMS POLICE' . !r■'Itt-A110(4 t6,r16)1.<br />
Thi s, function was transferred to the r8S . police ,under,,,HIMMW*RewiTszmv,i61.<br />
- . . .<br />
J..'MALc_OFFICEIOR GENERAL FINAmJE AND'OREDIT , QUEStiONs otlraXIobay ',04mWeird<br />
-; . Thia - office remained in BERLIN in the'REICHSBANK;'iunderR-MinfeWi41diriOnt4<br />
"BAYERWIFFER. His office was in the'OBERFINANZPRAESIDIUMYontt1WKORFIJABTENDAMOP<br />
Some o( the officials and documents Were seat to BAD-40ELZ,.tinderTkiniet.4041r,0<br />
BUSSMAK.<br />
4117i1M.<br />
M. STie!ISTIOAL OFFICE -t<br />
Records were last in ARNSTADT, Thuringia: The'headlcifi!the offieePionitterial-<br />
.-dirigent FIEDLER, was last in . GARMISCH,... •sr!Tjt t irq 94V)011<br />
N. OFF".:OE OF MAIN TRUSTEE FOR CONFISCATED PROPERTYEAST ' ."19/h14.41/4<br />
Thiu office no longer exists as such. Its functions were taken Oka-if Dtlart-<br />
Mcnt'VIII'(Par H-; above). • • • G*I.z pw<br />
"i,J3.100*I01 !NW<br />
0-.OFFIOES .IN THE*SPHERE'OF<br />
•<br />
These offices were, <strong>for</strong> the most:partf'atill.ln'BEAtIktiL'wit101e4x005tx044f<br />
the Direction of the Austrian Salt Minee.,''W'hictrwe:sqiiit9litliTENNPV,41404YeW.<br />
reme Financial Court, which was last in MUN/OH/SOGENHAUSEN, .MONTAEWAT44.40.Ahe<br />
Directorate of REICH Building was last;leoatedAn-BERLIN'00.40.044T414081193'<br />
TheAtEICH . Debt Administration,: under:Tr:FISOHBACH;wasqoompletelykOlurOgit4ItOr<br />
, FISOMMOR home s in BERLIN/DAHLEM, • • • : 7 :**<br />
o,t*y'rfh4WIe,tct.titt .<br />
.<br />
4refocw<br />
•' "<br />
-11 :7- RE/CISHAUPTKA8SE (TREASURY) • :<br />
47,<br />
The Treaaury was still located in BERLIN on 13 April 45, in the REICHSBANKirk<br />
.Building on the JAEGERSTRASSE. Plana had been made toevaouate'aVOAIINA8S64:5to<br />
Southern'Germany, but they had not<br />
Wqrfri-olq<br />
• -; le•<br />
24 May 'J..945 SEVENTH :ARMY INTERROGA T It:WPENTER<br />
.tvd jIMINA'Ar*.<br />
A, t"<br />
.P.Au4,1q144,-<br />
•410i mr,,_ .<br />
-<br />
Oommanding.,i .;;141 1'<br />
•<br />
• '<br />
W At<br />
SEORET<br />
2
Re i No SAIC/21<br />
ak May 45<br />
SOURCE<br />
10 ........--<br />
AN ENCLOSUIIE<br />
5-4S IS<br />
±-1:<br />
2 I .2 T<br />
v. '..) MAI DETaca<br />
SEVENTH • ARMY" INTERROGATION CENTER sinit<br />
- APO 758 -. . • • •et •'. Artid . ; '.' I.Dat a : a<br />
• 565,042794 4-7 •<br />
' t 1 E i.:2:314 .31 Svi . Iv. , ,.<br />
t Auth : CG . tii . Ar t •<br />
A ,<br />
• INFORMATION ON THE GERMAN'MINISRY'OF 'POSTS'<br />
, .<br />
.1<br />
. • • „. 1:;14 hTX<br />
CHNESORGE, Wilhelm, Minister of Posts i . joined the Nazi Partini419g04:,.<br />
left it in 23, rejoined it again in 33. He held no position ielle:OWtY,<br />
but was OGRUF (Lt Gen) in the NSKK since 37.. AourceH watil.. preSident,<br />
REMEPOST ZENTRALAMT (Central .Office? .frO0 29 to 33.01.ithen,*$4elss4.-f<br />
tant Postmaster General and finally, in '37,.POStlitaat -qepeOlAipigtik of<br />
Post:). 'Source is the inventor of the "four<br />
lewas<br />
very cooperative during interrogation and stated that 'he waS able liEd %tithing<br />
to help in the reconstruction of the Post . Ministry.,.<br />
• • •-•-•r i)fls •<br />
MAting: B-2 Date of In<strong>for</strong>mation: See Text ,-InterrogatbrDVBZWT •<br />
GENUAL NOTE: This report is submitted in aocordanae with :-the quastionaflote<br />
sented by Sig 0, US Group CC, • T-Section, 6th Army Group,<br />
„APO 23, Many documents and records which,werei:n61.040.1utely.<br />
essential were destroyed because of transport ,difficulties,<br />
• source stated. .<br />
zo•dw vfi<br />
•• .! • 1.1rts01X<br />
1. What responsibility did the REICHSPOST (DRP) inkid i stpp3.yi4 facilitios<br />
,fcir.use"of the,Propiganda Ministry? :•• , TJft, W:114<br />
„ • ; .,;;N:)14.c.tvitrio•<br />
-.RE1CHSPOST had responsibility <strong>for</strong> all IllechanicalmattOrzauCit.M4 tranz,6•::<br />
mitters, cables, frequencies, etc,. Responsibility <strong>for</strong> niotWorksidalradiol<br />
stations was with Propaganda Ministry. Postal employees did . nOt inter . •<br />
statiDnai . • . • ' jalir Yi.riiRD.WInfttr<br />
- %.1..a07 .4f4.;;4AC:i<br />
Whit were the various units of the Central Division. (MIN-Z . or ZENTRAL.<br />
ABPEILUNO? Very briefly, what was . :the functionotleachoft4e0allitOZ<br />
• •<br />
• •<br />
• •<br />
1:44.:$Utri0.5',x1rA'N-n<br />
.i) REFERAT Party.ChancellQry-,40glitical . supervisionqtp perAonnelimatters.<br />
ii) REFERAT Postage Stamps—New issues, etc.....<br />
, . . .• . • , .<br />
iii.)REYERAT Fieldpost.<br />
(01)1V1.43<br />
REFERAT Social Benefits of Employees--Vacation .Em.yER.lottomsAmALT<br />
(W03 fare' Institutions) Latter was Of ici.01414644PariCOWi<br />
posial • employées'whith was piid to 'them in add itia'Wo6CtilWaeitY lr -<br />
v) REFERAT Instruction in Postal Matters.<br />
'vi) PEtERAT PresS.-<br />
vii) REFERAT Postal Advertisements.<br />
viii) REFERAT Statistics--Records of numbers Of letters, parcels, :etc; .<br />
3. What private companies are partly owned by the DRP?<br />
.•:.<br />
•<br />
71A ct.l.<br />
i) DEUTSCH ATLANTISCHE PEttGRAPHEN . GESELtSCliAFT.,'BIAILIN:'<br />
RADIO AUSTRIA, VIENNA'. . •<br />
• " •<br />
jjj )FERNKABEL GESELLSCHAFT,<br />
iv) POSTREKLAME GESELLSCgAFT (all shares were owned by PP but it was<br />
chartered as a private company).<br />
S EC ICE<br />
1<br />
// 1/i ../.? D E 4§LIF<br />
NAZ1WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT<br />
0$1111140ItiltE *SEW<br />
2on<br />
SONAMAItillISIXEMPIION3020<br />
NAZ)WAttgiNtSeiltLetONEACT<br />
DOE 2061 Z007
Ref No /2Z<br />
24 May . 45: -<br />
„<br />
S E . 0 R E T<br />
4 • Which vgrades . of civil workers were placed strictly on merit?<br />
From Postal Assistant up, all grades were strictly on merit. Lower<br />
services had age and merit promotions.<br />
5. Who was the Secretary of State working under you?<br />
Jakob NAGEL';'<br />
6._Do,yOU ,aridypurohiefs;6f,Telecommunications have a record of all the .<br />
, iierm'anefa-tlecOMmuniCatiOns'installations in Germany, even of part of<br />
' the facilitievuded.11)Y the military?'Who by name would have this'infOr-<br />
,,IT5i,t;?,4?.nird6<br />
,<br />
'These records should be in UNTER HACHLING, near MUNICH. MINISTERIALDIREK-<br />
TOR FLEISCHMANN , ahotild have this in<strong>for</strong>mation,<br />
71Vhat c46';,thel function of the "FACHAMT FUER BEAMTE" in the DRP?<br />
riA .1 ,<br />
'SOuicac'claimsAhere was no "FACHAMT FUER BEAMTE" in the DRP.<br />
)004:11.u4ch<br />
8. By whom and by what method has censorship of the German civilian mail<br />
recently been carried out?<br />
124•412 Saft441:109 h. c-fA,<br />
By the WEHRMACHT and GESTAPO. The WEHRMACHT censored'all,mail going .to<br />
f,,reign countries. The GESTAPO gave certain addresses to post offices and<br />
rocaived let*rs addr'essed• to themi Address lists were with the individual<br />
Potii,,offided,t<br />
13.:ft 3 3 ;toil '?j.!)<br />
9. By whom and by what method has censorship of the Geiman civil telecommunications<br />
recently been carried out?<br />
GESTAPOciedvescertain numbers to mail employees. These numbers were autometically<br />
connected with a secret room in the telephone office. Arrangements<br />
were:maditso'cthat postal employees had no chance to listen in.<br />
1C. To what extant is the BILDTELEGRAMMDIENST ("Facsimile Telephotography<br />
Service") used?<br />
.<br />
'The IS/P ' ha,(1 -11 large 'network which was not used very often during the 'war.<br />
Scurce.ittlinks'ithat:television will be much more efficient. Facaimile Telephotrai.'<br />
was not PrOfitable.<br />
11. Give the locations of the storage depots <strong>for</strong> telecommunications equipment<br />
and spare parts.<br />
RETC#SPOST , ZENTRALAMT. Storage depots of the RP LENTRALAMT were moved<br />
an MINISTERIALDIREKTOR TUNE should know where they are now.<br />
12. What is the basic system used in the Railway Post Office? For example,<br />
who or what department ow; the BBtha.l ears, 6tc?<br />
The DRP once owned approximately 3,500 Postal RR cars. Division VI<br />
(MINISMIALDIREKTOR HUBRICH) was in charge. One official of this department,<br />
who is supposed to be an expert, is in KEHLHEIM/DANUBE,<br />
t3;1:1;<br />
SECRET<br />
2
SECRET<br />
Ref No SAIC/21<br />
24 May 45<br />
L.'21<br />
•<br />
13. What general devices, such eis'Et'6ViNaril/Aing Aevice;..Were<br />
telecommunications? What type of messages- were'ient'on<br />
-<br />
The Inverter" system. It was <strong>for</strong> military and PartY . tise k, Sourbi%-<br />
invented a new system which waS'in use onithe BERLIN-OSLO line, .<br />
. '1 • 'Iv,- 41PIT<br />
14, In the DRP, how did the Various division heads'keep-in<strong>for</strong>iedX1h6avkenéral<br />
way of the work of the other divisions? ""'•<br />
,<br />
There was a monthly conference where all ,urgent questions were brought<br />
up. rhmm was also a weekly session within each section!: '"' i.1Sw<br />
15. How does the GAF teletypewriter . network fit into the teletypewriter net-<br />
' work of the DRP,?<br />
. , '21s1F, f.1STaa:IM. .<br />
05; ; riti'D:) t3J.Cf(4:') •<br />
Part of the network was rented to the Air'Foree:'•<br />
Air Force operated and procured, • . .<br />
f.trf j %ow<br />
16.'To r what,Ministries (e .g. Propaganda Ministry)aheinl:w4t .'0615bitia, are<br />
the Wireless liCense fees allotted? , '<br />
*-A7..1mpt4<br />
Propaganda Ministry got half of first 8 million participants. FOr..all.<br />
participants over 8 million, the Propaganda MinistrY!reeeiv.ed-W44khd4e:he<br />
DRP received' 1/4. Each registered radio listenerliaidit3•RM4M6Ahle.i4U:4!0`Y<br />
. S6n.wiPw n'pm<br />
17:'ApproxiMately what proportion of the'.iiicOM.o.:f.::th.VMypiriltprSni<br />
Df the income producing serviced?•<br />
Approximately .<br />
. ;:t d ;TALE<br />
as follows: .y.7 ..44104mw<br />
Letters and parcels - 62W.A<br />
Telephone 35% • •<br />
Automobile<br />
Telegrams<br />
nfsK ofiVi<br />
18. Does the DRP collect taxes? If so, what type?<br />
The DRP does not collect taxes. .<br />
- • •;Ct11:!1<br />
1•AstO ;4<br />
• • :1 ; p .<br />
19. Where are the policy-making recOrds (basie.redcirdarOCtileITEIdHOOST?<br />
Might be in KEHLHEIM/DANUBE and/or UNTER HACHING;';'riefieMUNIC.H;(40.:_r)<br />
20. How many, and which ones, are left in BERLIN? ExaCtlocation?<br />
,Old, historically . valuable records ' Were::jeft :i'iOiEkiLEII4ri . .<br />
between LEIPZIGERSTRASSE and LIElviERSTRASSE.<br />
21. When did OHNESORGE leave BERLIN?<br />
On approximately 10 Apr 45.<br />
22. G,at data, on his movements.<br />
F:Lrst he went to AiTMUEOSTER/TRAUNSEE where he staYed ai HAOIS TRAUNBLICK<br />
<strong>for</strong> 3 or 4 days, • Then to THANNKIRCHEN, near. DITRAITTLELL,-wherehe stayed 8<br />
days with the ESSER family. Thence to the BAD TOELZ Post-Office. <strong>for</strong> 4 or. 5<br />
SECRET<br />
3
Ref .No sAic/21<br />
4 may 45<br />
SECRET<br />
day .s.Thence-,to KITZBUEHL Gran•Hotel <strong>for</strong> 5 days; LOFER POSTHEIM <strong>for</strong> 3<br />
aysl , and)3ADAASTEINPost Office and Hotel . Mozart <strong>for</strong> 4 or 5 days.<br />
23, Doepythe Adt!isoryBoard (BEIRAT).exist now? If so, who are its members?<br />
•<br />
The Advisory Board still exists. Source cannot remember names because<br />
:..e;IA4v.4.13.9;7.03.cW4,hanotjunctionsd <strong>for</strong> 6 years.. The Board had up to,12<br />
nembers. .4 list of names could be obtained through source. "BEIRAT".had Only<br />
limited advisory function.<br />
24. Who makes up the NationalDefnnse,Group.(GRUPPE REICHSVERTEIDIGUNG?)<br />
_ .<br />
What were the basic functions of this group?<br />
•<br />
.mINISTERIALDIRIGENT HORNOLD was head of the Group. All, army orders an<br />
to . cable connections and networks were sent to him: In case the Arm' gave<br />
up . cer .taiind Astric:ts,thepables,were returned to the Defense Group.,<br />
, -<br />
•<br />
25. Why was the Postal Police (POSCHUTZ) taken over by the SS? - What Were<br />
t, L0 AMPAYA.41- 0.9f,I.P.4,q grpp?...How.were its members obtained? .;What,Te.r..7<br />
centage Of RP personnel Were fulljimemembers? What percentage were<br />
part—time members?<br />
Zits '101 ,0411!,(1.0.<br />
Opl4TIvaims,,lhat .r. therwas no, connection with the,SS whatever,eXcept:<br />
that unifermAuweralobtained,through SS QM offices.. Postal PolicnOffiOeraj<br />
and men were not members of the SS', but postal employees. Groups of eillp:,9yeaaryierea<br />
fti8kaclqainlyi aa,a4r,raid. protection squads. ...Later,,membersoyere,<br />
put into the vonmaima. The members of the Postal police wera_obtained,on. _ _<br />
a voluntary basis from among the employees. Only instructors were full time<br />
members. _A total of only about 80 people, in all directorates,,werer.full<br />
time members. Approximately,5% of personnel were members be<strong>for</strong>e the wki,<br />
26,.flEICHSPOSTFILIiiSTET1 in DAHLEM.<br />
a. Who was in charge?<br />
Postrat MACK<br />
b. What were the functions of this organization?<br />
To produce pictures concerning internal organization of postal<br />
:1Af.44;psuandljto,pr1/4ocure instructive pictures .<strong>for</strong> employees.<br />
c. Num,kerjjof4 employees?<br />
About 15.<br />
Yno2lnool<br />
wherer,ishe board <strong>for</strong> allotting frequencies within Germany, according<br />
Ab"the'erlibttme'ntnY bf jthe World Frequency Board? Who is the head of<br />
this Board?<br />
RP , ZENTRALAMT: National frequencies; Division VII: m International qe--<br />
quenoies. MINISTERIALDIREKTOR FLANZE is head of the board.<br />
28. Is there a long term d'e 'velopment group <strong>for</strong> cables, other technical<br />
installations, etc? Ifso, where is it in the RPM organizationAlao<br />
where is it located?<br />
.CLPILIASIT BU.AH 1)0`00 •<br />
2 RP 6ZENTSAVAMTIoca/ples and machinery, Research Institute of the RPM<br />
<strong>for</strong>te'leVi/sVor0 14:66a12red, se6ld' relay ' stationsi The RP 6ENTRALAMT was<br />
S'EORET
Ref No SAIC/21<br />
24 May 45<br />
S E • C R E<br />
ts\atika..ov,<br />
,t;eti<br />
BERLIN-TEMPELHOF. The FORSCHUNGSANSTALT (Res seVichIiiiVitilti9ANO tWOLOK: was<br />
first in BERLIN-KLEIN MACHOW, later . in BTADTYSTEINACHPThliringiki.:<br />
C 3 7<br />
TAI:A61/iJ4S<br />
29. In the last five years, has the RP operated ivith a profit or-lOss ' • o<br />
you-remember the approximate figures? \ i !,]=1:wm V1 tx,*tvld<br />
, •<br />
., The RP .operated at a profit. The gross .income was Apur,pthouSte,..nd -<br />
million marks. In 1944 this figure td"thise.§"„`Vioilthiciftneria. •<br />
6% of the gross income was given to the Ministry of t'iiiante, which ..1.4aS' in<br />
contol- of spending.- :..<br />
TV to.tahrtg<br />
.VIGr47i)D "<br />
30. lcplain . liaison and coordination yith .other IninistiAep i :Isitich %/laity<br />
and Transport, <strong>for</strong> communications with Ships .. ITIalitin peAfoigel oxfv1t . P<br />
approved personnel do the work? Who inbtalled: isiaantaineti and 'developed<br />
-;he equippent?<br />
• • , ,<br />
•j !co tml n YI • knlettal<br />
. .<br />
. . ' • • ,, ro v (Tax%) qa. .01. • ;<br />
..,,44i .son with other ministries wasAOne,bywriting aleme. AlivISTBEIALik.<br />
HORNOLD kept up coordination 'with thé 'Army. Part-of the.POstal<br />
network was taken over by the Army. Exchanges,Of.ltlidllfiWOU41115*OAtrun<br />
by Army personnel. Postal employees were used to'repair'cables.<br />
stalled and developed equipment.<br />
qfl:<br />
, nem:0.41.*m41 600Vvta<br />
' 31. Give,adetailed description of the pranches ,a4 sub-brAnChes<br />
Centrai- Office ,<br />
ZENTRALAMT)..--'<br />
_<br />
•<br />
Oiltqx#Ama-,#844:<br />
. ,<br />
irTelephOne,TranSmission Technique C4 614 vw-41<br />
trq ; .40titt.P.4<br />
-Telephone Exchange Construction, fDAmT,T. 11.4:ita3 idO*4<br />
mraWo 4Aa 4. wow<br />
-Operation ; of Long Distance Network,, icot,.4amo rkkx„nsw elm.:.4,c. -s'&14,Aril.<br />
Acoustics, Microphones, Telephones,-Calibratiorivfcgrferlmeiititg) aTiT •<br />
v) Telegraphy,, AC Telegraphy, MiiitiReX.54ei:gr723h37,"illogigeszaellii44<br />
T.A.TsTTEVIT,M . crSivi)<br />
Mechanized Operation (parcel tranepoil, 1p:1'04:patio po<br />
a3Ialtt.2,04a4i<br />
Furniture.Standardilation,<br />
_<br />
J2E:')8Y1D1.<br />
viii) Testing- of Materials. ' 17,no.ito.C7<br />
ix) Workshops..<br />
.:JL . , :to i:c1:J%$::Ufilvt4A XivIS'ne0<br />
K) Checking of costs of all DRP -InstallatiOns;:A7o T;;I::;.r;1.1.q aKOZg.<br />
32. v ;:r.Zraartm,WPAAT;8,<br />
Eiplain organization of RPF (Reich "nesearCh 'Instiz 'ute). rm.° was head<br />
of it? Where is .located? What • subjectSFYeracibeingtrebdutlY_Otair:sued?<br />
TD what organization was the research in<strong>for</strong>mation supplied and how was<br />
it 'gotten into practical use by'the Arriled''Forcea?r,v,1 c',;" t:' ,:111:$15he • ka .4":&<br />
:<br />
r.12vr<br />
rco.tzdtintstirmoci<br />
R7osident GERWICH of the RPF was in .charge..:: ibelieveclibtonbe tin<br />
AACH, i3aden. The <strong>for</strong>mer president was a Mr • GLADENBECK :who4Owithrither_ALL-<br />
GEMEINE ELEKTRIZITAETS GESELLSCHAFT.. The RPF was located..'lorr:aptAmecin<br />
STADT STEINACH, Thuringia. Subjects recently pursued were teleVisionrJand<br />
development of infra-red research. In peace time yearly publications were<br />
issued.' During the war the HEE:ESWAFFENAMT '(Army ProcureMentoOfficereceived<br />
the in<strong>for</strong>mation. • Source states that the Army madqooilittle,:cuse.Cof<br />
postal research results.<br />
; to;<br />
•<br />
33. Give evacuation addresses of all.services,- offieds'i archives, yetc•,not,..<br />
already supplied.<br />
Division I: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR HUEHN. Left BERLIN <strong>for</strong> Northern Germany<br />
SECRET<br />
5
oEC . ID, ET<br />
.3ef No SAIC/21<br />
24 May 45<br />
Division II: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR FLEISCHMANN. Believed to be in .UNTER<br />
HACHING,'together with some documents;<br />
, Division MINISTERIALDIREKTOR FLEISCHMANN.<br />
Division IV: MINIiTERIALDIREKTOR KOERNER. Believed to be in KEHLHEIM)<br />
DANUBE, with documents.<br />
Division ,V: . MINISTERIALDIREKTOR RACKOW. Believed to have been last in<br />
" BAMERG.<br />
,<br />
Division VI: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR HUBRICH. Left BERLIN <strong>for</strong> Northern<br />
Germany.<br />
DvisI!or VII MINISTERI IALDIREKTOR FLANZE. Left BERLIN <strong>for</strong> Northern •<br />
•—• y:GerMany.<br />
I '<br />
STAATS-SEKRETAER:NAGEL .left BERLIN in order to join Admiral DOENITZ;<br />
r_•1. \ VII,<br />
j<br />
RP Preilidint .. FRAHM and a Dr KLEINSTICK.were last in . BAD TOELZ. :Source<br />
states that both men have extensive knowledge of postal affairs.<br />
-!-`,-(• •- . .<br />
!rbercr dre'appioximatily . 100 postal 'employees in KEHIXEIM/DANUBE, -Amcing<br />
them are experts belonging to all divisions'. Some records might.alPo'be<br />
there. There are 20 telephone and radio officials in UNTER HApxzNp, near<br />
MUNICH. A Dr SCHNITTGER, expert on radio 'tubes, is in GEHLBERG,'aboUt 50<br />
la: from STADT STEINACH, Thuringia. ,The,last office of-the.Post•Ministry<br />
wELs in BAD . GASTEIN. Certain records should still be there, . STAAT81: : ,<br />
SEICRETAER NAGEL was supposed to open an office in BARGTE HEIDE, near HAMBURG.<br />
The CentvalrrITeIegraph , land r:Teiephons, Office was in UNTER•HACHING,,near:MUN-<br />
Situati on plans , <strong>for</strong> cables and lines might be found there .<br />
fr.d 1!..1 •• • • • ,<br />
• •<br />
Foreign Division: Dr RISCH was last in BERLIN.<br />
W •r(EASTJ,viieion:, ,General Consul KOEHN is believed , to . be , near STADT<br />
' • .' 2 - 'STEINACH, Thuringia, - possibly'with'Some:redordsic•<br />
:.• • .<br />
RP ZENTRAL44T; MiNfSTERIALDIREKTOR FLANZE.<br />
. . • • . •<br />
Postal Savings Institute VIENNA (5000 employees): MINISTERIALDIREKTOR<br />
NIRSCHEL is believed to be in a home <strong>for</strong>4Oitai<br />
ployees near the MONDSEE in Austria.<br />
Central Administration of charities: OBERPOSTRAT GIERKE.<br />
REICHS Printing Works:::DIR(TOR MOELLER, BERLIN.<br />
, ,,IATA01,DRUCKEREI;CGovtyrinting Office) VIENNA: HOFRAT<br />
..„;4; ;<br />
FISCHER VIENNA.;<br />
444.04<br />
. , a aREICIITTelevisionCorporation does not exist anymore.<br />
'.J( 1 ;.q fl'r!fj1S.: . . . .<br />
34, In addition to regularcivilian . telecommunications, what other-telecommunication<br />
services did the RP supply? Were the Other services men-,<br />
Ptionedj4erateddbyithe sameOperators-who.per<strong>for</strong>med the 'civiliaiLtelefJ.L<br />
coMMunidatiOnsciser4i0e'Wer&-the same fadilities-used <strong>for</strong><br />
Orte fote7.ofsetviceoit Soi a zeneral,description . of how.this<br />
• ^<br />
•lvdontrollec41<br />
;111,:>13ifj;14<br />
-oNetwbi-kilsOon.theArmyi Navyand.Air Force belonged to the Posts and rentalowasePaiid/<strong>for</strong>Ahemw.<br />
-The networks were operated by the Army. The Party<br />
had its own network and had to pay rent to the Posts. This network .was.;<br />
operated by the Party. Industrial firms like SIEMENS, AEG, etc, had their<br />
ownametsowhiOhlWere privately , operated. The European POSTVEREIN (Post<br />
Society) was in VIENNA.<br />
. _<br />
SECRET<br />
6
SECRET<br />
Ref No SAIC/21<br />
24 May 45<br />
rs\oTgi 674<br />
.Q41. xi;Y.<br />
35. Was the SCHULUNGSLAGER of the DRP abolished? OiAL1 Wilt al 4;1SAW<br />
Yes.<br />
:ixea Kamm ja<br />
36. When was it operated last? .<br />
115L'evt Olf* thm lArm<br />
One year ago. When the Ministry in BERLI,N,waa bombeclo.the caMp became<br />
the seat of the RP Ministry: '' '''"'6°"'.°* 9114 10.7:00Invi<br />
w!)1 1214C etiJ<br />
37. Where is OHNESORGE's wife?<br />
In ELLBACH, near BAD TOELZ.<br />
- Z.TOW.!.2.T2,)(141c1<br />
38. How long was she connected with the DRP?<br />
• ' •<br />
9'.:01,10(1891 a.ow-oif44<br />
Six years,<br />
34q btILLA<br />
39: What Was her officialposition? jS nevoilod solmoZ<br />
. ! !gr.CI TTAiiIkl.T8.0q bas<br />
3ource states that she had no official position. Since her marriage to<br />
the Minister she was only interested in'the"fP5sialvlii igoAiN"qaegeO6411<br />
homer;.<br />
rdob:file711 ez0 /0 amsfeceg,<br />
40. When you last heard of it, was the Field,:pIatr,Iptfaciugaiviin.a711g7g<br />
•<br />
ODER?<br />
. f<br />
The Field Post Office was last in ST JOHANNiiri ft iiii-82/4""14 et" .<br />
41. Vlore is MINISTLRIALDIRIGENT Dr FRITZ'SCHUSTER -oiNWifidct Pcistf*11.-k<br />
Ye went to Admiral DOENITZ together with 8TAATSSEkair1gNAGEtft43°1<br />
42, how were the Poeial Funds adminis .eeeed?'- c! - 5 gl \!:)Lr's:(1 luo Y. ti 3v, :614W .;;;<br />
Short term 'loans were given to Govt Banks 'OEICHgBANO SEEHARDBUNG/<br />
which'todk over t the administration. ' ' /P°1? "1 "" i 1"11.4n<br />
.11:(TTFUN! al<br />
43. Who was the final policy authority <strong>for</strong> paying out the 'funds?<br />
(Y“: ,1-tiev ?AIM WOH .f)P<br />
Minister OHNESORGE,<br />
I;firicurodi, xla<br />
44. I3 the POSTSCHUTZ still under a MINISTERIALRAT in the Min, Z.?<br />
ON L 60/041.11(.1..teW<br />
The POSTSCHUTZ was last in "OST" dwe a7"d14m<br />
452 'WhO ' wa5 the last known MINISTERYALDIREKTOR:Of the-tPOSTSCHliTif'11410A<br />
dulT.1145:01U<br />
•<br />
.General . Consul KOEHN.<br />
,<br />
46. nere is he now?<br />
Believed to be in LOBENSTEIN, Thuringia.<br />
47. Did HIMMLER have complete authority over the MP s ' -<br />
,<br />
Source states that HIMMLER had no authority whatever 'ovei'DAP'eraonnel.<br />
,<br />
SECRET
S E C'R : E T<br />
Ref No SAIC/21<br />
24 May 45<br />
48. Where is the main POSTSCHUTZ damp?<br />
In ZEESEN next to "SCHULUNGSLAGER".<br />
4S1. What was the total number of POSTSCHUN employees?<br />
Formerly the "TRANSPORT ' ABTEILURG" had 4,000 men with 1,600 vehicles.<br />
Ir the last few months only a few hundred men were left.<br />
5C. Did the POSTSCHUTZ personnel receive training in sabotage functions?<br />
No.<br />
— !<br />
51. Who was responsible <strong>for</strong> the <strong>for</strong>warding of Red Cross PW packages<br />
Allied PW's in Germany?<br />
. .3<br />
Source believes it was Division I. Possibly POSTDIREKTION STETTIN..(from<br />
Sweden) and POSTDIREKTIONEN KARLSRUHE and STUTTGART (both from Switzerland).<br />
52. WhYl.:MIr_0.80.many packages undelivered?<br />
. . .<br />
Because of the breakdown in communications lines.<br />
: . . .<br />
53. Who was responsibile <strong>for</strong>'this breach of faith?<br />
The •re8ident, 4c1. thar REICHSPQSTAMT STETTIN.<br />
Wherl zia t21, 1 1.auest .icache•of: Ithesa packages at this time? .<br />
Possi1070TATT;Y.,„.—<br />
55. What was your policy in disposing of undelivered packages.<br />
S91.3r,c,eqsWiee, thatjha!prdered . .them.sent„back . to thaRe“ross. lp,e- •<br />
came known thatgreat quantities of parcels:wert.giventohombed.outoper<br />
sons in STETTIN i Persons responsible <strong>for</strong> 'this were imprisoned.<br />
56. How many . vehiclts were owned and operated by'the'DRP ?'<br />
Six thousand busses, Source did not know how many'trucks or Cars.<br />
• .P ;<br />
' . •<br />
57, Does Division I deal with the administrative as well as the operational<br />
matters such as the DRP Bus,aervice?<br />
Administra4v,eTmpAterq 9nlyA: Operational matters were in the hands . . of<br />
REICHSPOSTDIREKTIONEN.<br />
. ' • .<br />
58, Does 4vision I control the operational and administrative side of the<br />
DRP Savings Bank?<br />
Yea.<br />
59 Did Division , , I,keep records of all stocks of stamps?<br />
, ,The ldAffnent v l,TIREKTIONEW! kept these records.<br />
SECRET<br />
8
SECRET<br />
Ref No SAIC/21<br />
24 May 45<br />
60. Are stocks of stamps still intact or have they been destroyed?<br />
Some stamps may have been destroyed by air attacks, etc, but . not intentionally<br />
by postal employees.<br />
61. Where are the stocks located principally at this time?<br />
There should be stocks of stamps in every Post Office.<br />
62. Describe how the R.P.O. functioned in handling the WEHRMACHT postal<br />
system.<br />
Field Post officials were members of the Army. Postal official's were in<br />
charge of transportation until mail reached a certain secret point where. the .<br />
field pest employees took over. The Army paid 20 pfennigs per man Per day<br />
in order to take care of the free mailing privilege <strong>for</strong> soldiers.<br />
63. If regular postal rates are required of all discharged MEHRMACHT personnel,<br />
will the revenues be sufficient to hire the personnel required<br />
in the DRP?<br />
Yes.<br />
64. How long would it take <strong>for</strong> the State Printing'Plant to replace"all.<br />
prirted stocks of stamps necessary <strong>for</strong> six months of operations?<br />
Replacement would be very fast as long as auxiliary printing plants<br />
could be put back in operation.<br />
65. Assuming that war damage has already destroyed all postage stamps and<br />
the time to provide temporary new issues is 30 days hence, what is your<br />
recommendation or plan to re-establish first class postal service in<br />
Germany?<br />
Find printing plants that are still operative. Auxiliary printing .<br />
plants have the necessary material. Try to find President . ROST (<strong>for</strong>merly<br />
in BRESLAU) now in the American occupation sector. Contact Presidents of<br />
REICHSPOSTDIREKTIONEN in the American sector as to personnel questions,_<br />
Contact all personnel in KEHLHEIM/DANUBE and UNTER HACHING, near MICH.<br />
Great', numbers of trucks of all kinds would be neceesary, Former Gerian<br />
Army vehicles could be used. Long stretches in rural districts could be<br />
serviced by female mail carriers. Wooden barracks could be used as post<br />
offices. Former postal employees who are now PW should be selected <strong>for</strong><br />
help in order to re-establish mail service. German signal troops and communication<br />
troops should not be dismissed, but shoUld be used <strong>for</strong> repairs.<br />
24 May 1545 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER<br />
SECRET<br />
au
SECRET<br />
VICUISPRE<br />
_?o2$-)?9/L-57<br />
...<br />
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER<br />
APO 758 US ARMY<br />
SECRET:<br />
:Auth: CG, 77th "Army<br />
:Init: 7,V1v. eit<br />
:Date: 24 May 1945<br />
- •<br />
. .<br />
•<br />
'If the in<strong>for</strong>mation contained in this report is required <strong>for</strong> further<br />
distribution, it Should be so paraphrased that no mention is made of the<br />
prisoners' names or of the .methods by which the in<strong>for</strong>mation htls been<br />
obtained.<br />
The, following are the names and secret numbers of the prisoners mentLoned<br />
in this'report:<br />
Rank, Position Secret No<br />
GOERING", .Hermann REICHSMARSCHALL 45/1409<br />
VCN BRAUCRITSCH, Bernd Walter Col, GAF; GOtRING's Adjutant 45/1410<br />
'This report should be read in conjunction with Reports Ref No SAIC/X/3,<br />
19 May 45 ' and Ref No SAIC/X/4, 21 May 45.<br />
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT<br />
200A<br />
DECLASS IF I ED AND RELEASED BY<br />
CENTRAL I NTELL IGENCE AGENCY<br />
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT I ON3B28<br />
NAZI WAR CR IMESDISCLOSURE ACT<br />
DATE 2001 2007<br />
SEC
SECRET<br />
24 May 45<br />
I. PERSONALITIES<br />
INTERROGATING OFFICER: When was the last time that you personally saw<br />
HITLFR alive?<br />
GOERING: In the evening of the 20 Apr, around half past<br />
eight. We raced away.<br />
IO: To get away that same evening? 4<br />
G: Yes, yes. Afterwards he retracted his order that I was to go South—p<br />
in his usual manner, and ordered me to be at his cave on the follow– t,'<br />
ing,day. The room was very small. He (HITLER) sat at a large table, .<br />
and we all stood around it--about twenty of us.<br />
IO: Was that in the cellar of the chancellory?<br />
G: Yes, deep down in the shelter. I can't believe that he let himself<br />
be shot. You should have seen him--his whole body shook violently.<br />
And he grew more vicious with every moment.<br />
V.<br />
V<br />
+ + +<br />
I0i By the way, this Professor HOFFLANN, the photographer, should be able<br />
to fell quite a bit about the FUEHRER,<br />
G: More than anyone else.<br />
+ + +<br />
G: You ought to know how he (HITLER) lived in the last two or three<br />
years. As long as nothing unusual was going oh, he would get up<br />
at half past eleven, after being awakened at nine o'clock. He would<br />
read the newspapers and then sleep some more. Then he'd get up and<br />
the daily routine would start. Then came the discussion of the<br />
(military) situation. Ordinarily this discussion lasted from three<br />
to four hours--during which he would get terribly excited. We had<br />
to remain throughout the conference. Then he would cat dinner and<br />
during the evening he used to talk to some officer from headquarters.<br />
After discussing the evening situation he would go to bed at nine<br />
o'clock, and at twelve o'clock he would get up again.<br />
IO: Wasn't there a discussion of the evening situation in the morning?<br />
G: Yes, the second one was at half past twelve or one o'clock i and -<br />
ldsted two s houra: . After that we had the'con<strong>for</strong>ence; It was<br />
attended by OUDERIAN, BaRMANN, FEGELEIN (HIMMLER's liaison .man to<br />
HITLER) and BURCKHARDT(?).Everything was brought up there to the<br />
least little detail. All sorts of things were rushed through at<br />
this conference.<br />
+ + +<br />
G: BORMANN was not only head of the party offices, but one day--about ri.?*<br />
a year and a half ago--we were surprised by the following interest.. r.<br />
ing letter: "The FUEHRER has repeatedly given me assignments and<br />
orders which do not come under the jurisdiction of the party, but<br />
• .<br />
S E<br />
2
•<br />
24 May 45<br />
..•<br />
are of a military nature. He did this 'in order . to.give.:methe.•<br />
authority to pass his orders along in this line as to<br />
supervise their execution. As of today*the PUEHRER has' , macle me his<br />
secretary." So now he was secretary - tothe . FUERRER! . AndAten there<br />
was another thing. The Minister of: Justice had to :subtit to' him the<br />
sentences pertaining to disloyalty trialb•in the Army. BORMANN<br />
returned them with the remark, that they were a disgrace, that such<br />
an antagonism of the court was impossible--he would see to it that<br />
the attorneys would be dismissed from office. He had the minister<br />
of justice completely under his 'thumb. sByrightt',''SEYSSINQVAgT.inj<br />
Holland should have made his reports to the State inspector,. SOWERS?<br />
. But no, he had td give his reports directly to BORMANNThe' . Only .<br />
- one who putup a struggle • was TERBOVEN in NorWay, but' 'he . wad .; taken .<br />
' care of.<br />
+ + +<br />
G: HIMMLER said that Count BERNADOTTE had come to see him. "B:etold.mei.<br />
"You know, he must have been the man-EISENHOWER sent nd a'.nesotiator.<br />
I . replied: ."I can't believe that. 'Don't' take Offense,:bUt) I : doubt<br />
whether. they will accept You as a negotiator<br />
. -Then hertto'rtedl<br />
"Sorry to contradict you, but I have undeniable prOof . that r'r am<br />
considered abroad to be the only person who can maintain peace and<br />
order." And after that, he didn't care what happened. And I thought<br />
he might have more proof than I, and restrained myself. So 1 snide:<br />
"T just can't picture that." . . •nd:he always'<br />
smething: "If anything should happen to the-FUEHRER . , • and:You art<br />
unable to take over--after r .1.1, that mighthappen-'-dt.nTectysuch<br />
and such?" That occurred at least 10 times during thOse . .2bi 3 hours<br />
I kept wondering: "Why should I be unable to take over?-- Why. should<br />
I be cut off?'.....Then it suddenly dawned upon me .....POPITZ“?)2 already<br />
had mentioned something like that...And when I mentioned that<br />
to him (HIMMLER), he said "Well, maybe POPITZ (?). May'hhv:1-Said<br />
something like that He might claim to know somethingBut'as far<br />
as I am concerned it is an unheard-of'iMpertinencented to<br />
talk with POPITZ (?) again, r.nd' .they'said :: "Of .cOurse'l l or.coUrse!"<br />
And when I asked, when our talk'could-be arrdngedthey'.'t'Old"me:'It<br />
may not be posSibld to arrange . it today, but On' the tomorrow."<br />
That day' passed without the talk. - Then I Lheard :One day<br />
that the FUEHRER had ordered POPITZ (?) 'sentenced : to death.' ''The<br />
execution was postponcd until later.. Well ', I couldn't helpthat<br />
either....<br />
+ + +<br />
G: This HIMMLER--he really startled me during this last-nonVersntion<br />
of ours. He made the ridiculous suggestion, that nominat6him<br />
as Chancellor upon becoming HITLER'sSuCceSsor. I rePlieetO him:<br />
"I cannot do that, bocausu according to our constitution'the offices<br />
of Chancellor and President are combined," Then he said: "sir, if<br />
anything should prevent you from becoming the successor, canl'have<br />
the job •hen?" There I replied: "my dear HIMMLER, we'll have to<br />
wait :rld see, That will depend upon the circumstances. I can't<br />
see what should prevent me from taking the office. What could stop<br />
me?".... And that happened in our last ConVersatiOn at least ten .<br />
.:imes. As I sat there, I'pleaded with him. All he would haireAo<br />
3
24 May 45<br />
would be to say just one word to his.SS men, and I would. be free.<br />
(G was arrested by SS end of Apr 45) But he dodged the:question,<br />
and said that un<strong>for</strong>tunately my detention had beemordered . ,by the<br />
FUEHRER, He knew <strong>for</strong> sure that'it . was a mistake.' - Eyerything would<br />
be cleared up shortly. So he just let Me sit . there.-Col FRANKE<br />
of the SS can testify to that<br />
ART TREASURES AND FUNDS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES<br />
G: I'd like to get the whole thing straightened out... I , can tell you<br />
confidentially, that certain objects were destroyedompletely. And<br />
I will confide a secret to you: there are some things. 'buried at<br />
KARIN HALL. There are large objects--four beautiful sculptures.<br />
I'll tell you what's there-- including these sculptures. Then you'l:<br />
have the whole story. Where I have traded things, I'll give you<br />
others. Those things which belong to me, can be istored: . fOr the.<br />
time being....But I am not responsible <strong>for</strong> the FUEHRER.'s stuff. All<br />
I can do <strong>for</strong> you is to tell you where my own-thingsSre.!It will<br />
do good to be able to say: 'These items are taken care of--I can<br />
<strong>for</strong>get about them."<br />
G: One day I was approached by a man who owned an insignificant house<br />
in a suburb. He had his own glass warkshop. He owned:a.tremendous<br />
collection, and sold me a few valuable pieces. From him I...bought<br />
two church windows, 8 m high.<br />
IO: You must have built some sort of a chapel.<br />
G: No, I did not. However, I bought an entire chapel fl: France, an<br />
old one. I took only its windows. I was given a:.Gothic.: . house in<br />
ABBEVILLE with all the trimmings. All I could use.were . the inside<br />
panelling, the winding stair.-case and the big gate. Then,a woman<br />
wanted to sell me a Spanish Harem. .So I looked at it . : ., ',Thete were<br />
wonderful things in it. But I couldn'tuseanything s!with the exception<br />
of a beautiful davenport, which-Lpurchased. 'Hardly six<br />
months later FRANCO asked me what had happened-. .He said he: had<br />
heard that I purchased a castle in Spain. Thank.goodnessthat<br />
wasn't so,<br />
+ + +<br />
G:.I don't have a cent abroad. A number of.the mostcrooked'deals<br />
were made in the name of the FUEHRER . or the REICHSUARSCHALL'(himself.<br />
And everything passed through the German customs sanctioned with<br />
our names.<br />
von BRAUCHITSCH: And some of the most notorious orders, of which no one<br />
knew whether they were genuine, were given in the name<br />
of the FUEHRER or REICHSMARSCHALL<br />
G: I made a present to my sister-in-law in Sweden, so that she. could<br />
buy a small house <strong>for</strong> herself. That was my . famous Swedish . castle...<br />
The last time I was in Sweden, was in 1935....
IP<br />
24 11, 45<br />
III. AIR FORCE<br />
G: I have looked through . all these casualty reports,. And T found<br />
more losses than we had announced... It was . imPortant <strong>for</strong> us . , of<br />
course, to prove that we had shot down always . one or two more<br />
planes than the others. You shodld have seen what ridiculous -.<br />
statements we made--you ccoildn't help laughing when you read<br />
them. Take <strong>for</strong> example U.,: time when we wrote that we were to<br />
get a plane with a 12 cm cannon<br />
IO: Did you know anything about remote-controlled bombs?<br />
G: They had one disadvantage. They (the planes) had to reach an<br />
altitude of 6000 meters and had to fly in an absolutely,straight<br />
line toward their targets <strong>for</strong> two minutes, without being able to<br />
dodge.<br />
+ ++<br />
IO: Did you know where EISENHOWER's headquarters were in Africa?<br />
Cr: No. But we knew that there was a meeting in CASABLANCA. , _We<br />
did not like to attack headquarters anyway. We thought that<br />
might be a mutual understanding.<br />
+ + +<br />
O: The heaviest casualties were in HAMLURG, WUPPERTAL, and DRESDEN.<br />
It was terrible. The people of DRESDEN couldn't believe that<br />
you would bomb the city, because they thought DRESDEN was too well<br />
known as a cultural center. The city was Overcrowded.<br />
+ + +<br />
(G on planned air attack on Russia's power plants)<br />
G: In spite of the existing fuel shortage, enough gasoline was reserved<br />
<strong>for</strong> this attack, Everything was ready. And_ then the<br />
FUEHRER would have to order the demolition of.these:ridi'culous<br />
bridges across the ODER river, which the Russians could repair<br />
overnight anyway! Ridiculous to use this magnificent machinery<br />
just to destroy these bridges.--It was maddening. All these largescale<br />
plans had to fall through. I just couldn't stand . it anymore.<br />
I finally worked myself into a nervous condition. .<br />
IO: And what did you do <strong>for</strong> relaxation?<br />
G: I took vitamin tablets, read detective stories, and sMoked my<br />
cigars very Slowly. You know, I can read the same detective story<br />
three times without tiring of it'.<br />
IO: Did the FUEHRER read stories like that, too?<br />
G: No, that was only I. He got them <strong>for</strong> me. The FUEHRER read only<br />
very serious literature And so, little by.little, I was<br />
5
T<br />
24 May Lf 5<br />
disgraced. But what was I to do? I'd give an order, only to find<br />
out on the next day that it was all nonsense He attacked<br />
my friends, but he meant me. And then, toward the end, just<br />
because he heard the word "negotiations" he awanted to cut me off<br />
from everything--and that after 23 years<br />
IV. CONCENTRATION CAMPS<br />
+ + + + + + +,<br />
GI These pictures (of DACHAU) which you showed me yesterday must<br />
depict the activities of the last few days. It is beyond me, just<br />
what was behind all that. BIMMIER mist have suddenly gotten .a<br />
fiendish pleasure out of such things. I have heard such stories<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e, <strong>for</strong> example that a large load of Jews left <strong>for</strong> ,Poland<br />
during the winter, where some of the people froze to death in their<br />
vehicles. I heard of these things mostly from the ranks 'of my<br />
employees and from the people. When I made inquiries, I was told,<br />
that such things would not happen again--it was claimed that the<br />
trains had been sent on the wrong route. Then there was some talk<br />
about what you call "VERNICHTUNGSTRUPPEN" (Extermination troops).<br />
It was claimed that there were many diseased people in these camps<br />
and that many died of pestilence. These troops had the job of<br />
bringing the corpses to a crematorium where they Would be.burned.<br />
+++<br />
G: All cruelty was repulsive co me. I can name many people whom I<br />
have helped, even Communists and Jews. My wife was so kind-74<br />
really have to be grateful <strong>for</strong> that. I often thought, if only<br />
the FUEHRER would have had a sensible wife who would have said to<br />
him: "Here is a case where you can do some good, and here another,<br />
and this one " that would have been better <strong>for</strong> everyone<br />
It was very depressing <strong>for</strong> me. In some cases I had to write to<br />
HIMMLER, that he should release this one and that one. And he<br />
would reply, that he was very sorry, but that he could not do,.it,<br />
or perhaps that he didn't want to do it. But there wer6'quite a.<br />
few cases, whore he did it anyhow.... But now it is pretty clear<br />
to me that all my ef<strong>for</strong>ts were wasted. Whoever attacked HIMMLER,.<br />
was eliminated. On top of that, he lied to me. Not a single<br />
report was read to the FUEHRER<br />
+++<br />
G: I wanted the <strong>for</strong>eign workers-to be rounded up so that they could<br />
be turned over to the advancing enemy troops at some central point<br />
instead of being allowed to run around loose. And then I told him<br />
(HITLER) that the concentration camps should be guarded if at all<br />
possible, until the British or the Americans arrived, because we<br />
were detaining quite a number of criminals there whiCh neither we<br />
nor they would want to release. They should have been guarded, and<br />
the enemy should have taken the responsibility of segregating those<br />
whom he did not wish to release. You surely can't be interested<br />
in freeing a lot of criminals. And the same thing goes <strong>for</strong> workerL<br />
from <strong>for</strong>eign territories--that was my biggest worry. I told him<br />
that something would havu to be done about them, as well as about<br />
prisoners of war. We also mentioned Russian prisoners of war--but<br />
6
24 May 45<br />
there we knew what would •happ 'en 'if they Air iok6 .1•1(6O-s I<br />
•<br />
wer e very decent • . they were mainly exiipI6Yed c'Serffarmegficirs.<br />
V. JEW BAITING AND RELIGIOUS DIFFICULTIES'<br />
7.:.<br />
4- .4-'4-'4' avm<br />
ciriT Jilqa<br />
C asw<br />
• c: • , . glrf<br />
Fench<br />
C : ' •These NUREMBERG laws came as 'a :great pr iS6' 7f611:140". 1x149. o.ra r still<br />
wondering today, where they could have Origifiat'W 4 diriefw only<br />
too well that they would cause bad feelings 'abroad, was in<br />
charge of the Four-Year Plan. At that time SCHAQHT came to see<br />
me and said: "Sir, these incidents will cause us serious economic<br />
difficulties abroad." 'So I 'went''thereV ,indj'threY shaie reilie he<br />
laws, saying that they had • not beeriapproved zY .6 .0 t ewier.rof the<br />
clauses were being 'changed ; bUt there' iró ....e4: 'zci'ma.`di3r.' dheiges. And<br />
'from. then on the Jew-baiting really eatartedr'Vfie.inifie 'States<br />
responded with a most disc7reeiibie; li6Y6'ot t "And: n a<br />
16CtUre , that from now On it Wouletie very .diffictiif5tAigi.ntain<br />
anY kind of cOmmer cial relat ion ":Witii • A:meriCii,Bui t,Pitil befL i. s was<br />
teMporari3y <strong>for</strong>gotten in the akditemenf'sOVer'"ttiewSizdiSnqincident<br />
in Sep 38, The n the war Started in '39. For the t ime %Nang, all<br />
was well. Then, early in 1 40 they went to it again—pazing ,Rarticular<br />
attention to the Jews the.' O'C 'cliiield' i'c'Oriri-fitiiiscg:' ;1")fave<br />
to admit that things kept getting worse ,,. and that AlkeT vt,ers<br />
sanctioned by Various gicitips All aOrtedt: fiasiliblVdkcieses<br />
occurred. I didn't approve of them, biit'urifdifin,a-tt'etOT:°couldn't<br />
d6' anything against them; I didzi• 't ' go6'1 IiiiiiietrVith the<br />
par ty my 861 • The f 4. rSt time When they<br />
was in<br />
. They didn't say anything about the' • Wedding ',..;b110wittn I had<br />
'my . 'child christened n the -first year 'Of tVas attack.-<br />
. ad 'vehemently.. • It was claimed by the<br />
Of my -child would' put the FUEHRER int"O if it<br />
ever became known. They wanted ine Virtilout a<br />
' religious ceremony. That may all beweil t Vc5'ocii4eskopt that the<br />
.:FUEHRER had been put to this- :=;Part iCulariy fl?'y 'the+ ,fiff tS ter of<br />
'the:Interior , and . GOEBBELS °Then . LIITZE' ChileY sait -(tIe5 2IT:Istarted<br />
•r I '• r<br />
to • reproach me, - saying rt ha t such a step .. agairist thel-ilaz3.-party was<br />
intolerable. And from then On there -was no end of trouble--someone<br />
• would always point out this incident. Later on we had some serious<br />
arguments. It was intended to merge , the two rel.igions...1. . ,,.Next We<br />
• had 'these terrible days in ther "We'rPsgkV4i.4iiiginthen<br />
these silly Hitler youth boys started tr on6Te' sfil KF1RRL ,<br />
who is a smart man said : "I am a.' CeithdliV ealPitot want<br />
to halve .anything tio do tkith tut."' -:4AGI■TEIRCO 211o:till same<br />
attitude. The . whole thing was just plain 14"""<br />
1 0!14<br />
VI, MISCELLANY<br />
:01<br />
G; It was only since very recently--say <strong>for</strong> the last wee ks:--that<br />
he (HITLER) said: "We can 't help 'it anymore;"<br />
+ + +<br />
cv: •01"<br />
G: I had the feeling that it would take nothing -Shor t bf",a , :pir"adle . to<br />
save our cause. But I believed we might • be) 'ible tO i J:fight7 to a
•<br />
24 Tray 45<br />
y.r.,,h1 :Y4<br />
draw by ,. taking more re.d ic al measurss.,:; ,- n<strong>for</strong> tuttftte,ly Advil= ' t<br />
boss. There were a lot of . other thipgs , too,.he,4x)myyAss so'<br />
unwieldy--it should have been reorganized. The leadership of the<br />
Army was broken up through • SS inter ference--there was a serious<br />
split. The maddest scheme hadn't even been introduced 'yet, that<br />
was to come soon. There was,...to'beamerger,log.:4he:aartylleader,-,v.<br />
ship with the Army command.' 13ORMANN - wad - tii .draw74 . the necessary<br />
legal measures. He would have.-had4o7passAudgamsntsvery<br />
little general. -<br />
).fij<br />
;.= ,■ ' N,:; z);?<br />
, you' d ask me now, when Ifirss gave , :.••up .4.he . .war 10r-11.20, I ' ll<br />
have to admit that I had some.: doubts,. 4nd:Torries , tor i ciu4ste a while--<br />
but I only realized our 4neyitable„,defeat .aince,Ahe tlyeu t,last few<br />
day . .. You see, I made , every ef<strong>for</strong>t, to f,ind ,, a lway:,..!.tx,l olae_cause I<br />
believed we had • a good chance to..shold out,:much lo,nge43, ,,j as.; think I<br />
.tell you frankly that things ...would have gone diAttaAntly,, if I<br />
had been supreme commander • would: hay,e,r,used,:,iits,2pIrtzpIled<br />
:planes much . earlier—and .that „would have; be,sn . most; .<br />
13,r..i. kl,insant <strong>for</strong><br />
you,. . - i')Z; (4,91 rJs<br />
. • a:7;4<br />
Counterattack in Hungary) .4)<br />
G: . DIETRI CH then went down :there ,..with „the : „Sixth Ranz.ex j.A.rilpy.•; The<br />
. order to attack was given. The:, :Of.fensivewaS made, ,byrAto, divisions<br />
after, a In) km <strong>for</strong>ced March, and repelled,. • „ When received<br />
the _news he went, raving mad, . He said k '!I•i; we •ilose h,eNar it will<br />
(SEPP DIE rliR ' s) fault...',';.; And „h,e Ainmediate .ly issued these<br />
two orders: ' First of all, the f our .diviis4.ons,,.-!!•TITI41),TitaENDfl<br />
HITLER", "ADOLF<br />
"DAS REI CH." and .another ?,one ,..,wers..,JtA EM.19t, off their<br />
.1::raseards immediately, and were not, t.,9.,,wear.any .,del,,9,oriattops <strong>for</strong><br />
„three days. And HIMMLER _was , to . .rig1i,tvt.,4n order<br />
• tO DIETRICH, he should. to ,by rights„.,b,e death.<br />
est4c4 .4,<br />
Also that he . (HIIYELER) was to set, ein ainplA dof 44215:Ati4cayih 0 had.<br />
. 2been, a. traitor to . his country. Then, .104.`, as Rukextljto4r few days.<br />
,E314 later it , started all oVer again We were re430d 1 ons) far .<br />
. • • • :- •:!:;\ •-<br />
L" • • . „ . VOW •<br />
• f: tilIrtiznaPTTri<br />
,49. 111viANN .charged Frau SCHOLTL-KLIN( ithe f.orptnr, of Z<br />
IP.491‘Aen ..battalions • Many<br />
participated n aAvzoaircraft<br />
, :,!f1.e04 . 094h as operation . of..searchlightS0hat45 , trug ,....og4ut just<br />
,;. 41.N141, such women's battalions s:v9re , c •e,comillitWegainst the<br />
pgqqans . in . the second line; . Th e 1rri ; iT04414*s . imppa8e.4 to include<br />
*he use , of machine guns ' . • —<br />
+ + +<br />
tO t extent did Germany use liquid air'"?:,<br />
0; L4c14. 4 air, how do you mean that<br />
• •<br />
, • T. ,.7:?!<br />
B; Lipid air was an addition to explosives, since they became scarce,<br />
we heard that it had been used in Russia.The.RwqAianqAel4snded<br />
that 'it be discontinued immediately otherwise,, they, would use gas.<br />
8
. 24 May 45<br />
G: No, that is a lot of nonsense.<br />
+ + +<br />
G: THE PEOPLE NEVER CALLED ME ANYTHING ELSE BUT "HERMANN"! ONLY<br />
HERMANN! NEVER ANYTHING ELSE BUT HDRMANNI TO DE CALLED BY<br />
ONE'S FIRST NAME — THAT IS THE HEIGHT OF POPULARITY.<br />
' 24 Mcy 45<br />
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTLit<br />
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI 4i<br />
Commanding.
THIS IS AN EN(1. 1.1.SURE TS- T04.4404:2',<br />
DO HT c.<br />
Ref Wo SAI0/22<br />
25 yay, 1945.<br />
'SECRET<br />
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION °ENTER.<br />
APO 758 ' US ARMY.<br />
..1.;(":,.".14A—<br />
tAuth: mop7thArdw. 1<br />
aniti<br />
:Date: . 24:May, 1945<br />
y i •<br />
1-5:tdpi.O.,, em ... i.i .<br />
1- 0,•••4 47,.- r«..044 .41,• • ......<br />
-:----<br />
fnerfetti"i'ii- '<br />
REICH MINISTRY OF.THE.INTERIOR<br />
. kej:0110.0.1.61<br />
(This Report is being published in answer-to7SpecialYWASti9.4440<br />
provided by US Group 00, G- g , T-SectivntbrArm.Y.fGrO.upi.!lkMay45).<br />
.71-P-rtrtAnIM<br />
J'Arri.r:Isu.7<br />
I. PREAMBLE<br />
The following in<strong>for</strong>mation was obtained from. Otto EHRENSBERGERDrc.KUrWEINRIOHS,<br />
Dr LkUBT, Dr Walther OTT, and Ernst PABST, all:or whom are ., OMPia.; 814.nsOe Ministry<br />
of the Interior. Most of the records and personnel'of the . Ministry:are/lepated in<br />
the Pollowing, places:<br />
. :1:J7 1- -fesleql<br />
i) . qUERFURTH, near HALLE ,<br />
ii) SCHLOSS LEUCHTTNBURG, near JENA (DELA RR Station)l.r.aLv./rIm<br />
iii) SCHLOSS SONYENSTEIN in PIRNA, near'DRESDEN<br />
iv) BERLIN, DOROTHTTNSTRASST 46<br />
v) GARMISCH- PARTTNKIRCHEN t;)<br />
It is possible that the personnel and records which were in BERLTI■bin sNarp,h 1945<br />
were recently evacuated elsewhere or the papers were destroyed. , 7if."1-4<br />
.0f,te of In<strong>for</strong>mation: See Text 'InterrOgatori d.P.M:'"<br />
. eCr131:'.<br />
II. CRGANIZATION OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR<br />
The chart as found in the Orzanization °harts of the German_Minietriel ,W Gentral<br />
, Agencies 3.B out of Date, due to the fact that certain change8-itereIgia4inu1944<br />
when'HIMMLER'beCaMe Minister. For revised chart ShOWing . th6 7 prin.ciPtil lhags see<br />
Apperdix; . PereOnalities and their probable loCations'are'lieteeundervWEIWAZtive<br />
Departments, below:<br />
A, CENTRAL DEPARTMENT<br />
PoS#,<br />
1. Personnel<br />
:<br />
Minieterialdirektor VOELLKE - possibly in BAD SAOHSA, in the Southern.Harz.<br />
Ministerialdirigent BURKART - AuqspuRG.<br />
Ministerialrat Dr GRAU - vicinity of STUTTGART;<br />
w.f.:011C<br />
Jm'r1,1f1s,,telrin<br />
Ministerialrat Dr OTT - AUGSBURG (SAIC).<br />
Reichsrichter HAHN - Southern Germany.<br />
A number of intermediate officials are in GARSCHARTENKrRCHIM<br />
2. Records kal".<br />
The records of the Central Department are par .tially_in'qUEBFCAT-an partially<br />
ii SOHLOSS LTUCHTE7BURG, near JENA. A few are in q,14440mihOl iWerra'i in BERLIN<br />
are believed to have been totally destroyed.<br />
B. :DEPARTMENT I<br />
1. Personnel<br />
Ministerialrat Dr GLOBKT - KOCHEL, HINDENBURGSTRASSE 292.<br />
Ministerialdirigent Dr KTSSLER - AUGSBURG.<br />
Reichsrichter SCHMIDT-BRUTOKEN - AUG•BURG.<br />
Regierungsrat STITR1ALDT - AUGSBURG . .<br />
Minieterialdirektor Dr FAUST - presumably in Northern Germanyl.i,.,!,t<br />
Ministerialrat Dr VOY WOLFF - VERFURT. •<br />
Oberregierungerat Dr HOFFMA mY - in Southern Germany.<br />
2 Records<br />
The rocords are in QUTRFURT, LEUCHTENBURG, and<br />
,;;<br />
SECRET<br />
1.<br />
NAM WAR CRIMES DISCLOSUREACT<br />
2000,<br />
M114§§1 1 1f Oill AMD RELEASED AY<br />
64###44 ONifit g iENCE AMC,<br />
§MtWIE1100S ExEmPTIONJOU<br />
NAP V411 CUM DISCLAIM AC1<br />
:601 2007
• 'llef'No'SAI0/22<br />
' • . •<br />
• .23.:May<br />
SECRET<br />
Minieterialdirektor EHRENSBERGER, AUGSBURG (SAIC).<br />
Reicheriohter Or PABST,•AUGSBU1r= (SAI0).<br />
, Johannes KAIBEL„ AUGSBURG ) (SAIC).<br />
'':Oberregierungerat VOLLPRECHT,'AUGSBURG.<br />
Ministerialrat MUTTRAT, TRAUNSTEIN.<br />
Regierungerat VCF\T ROS TT IS r..TRG, TRAUNSTEIN.<br />
Oberregierungsrat Or FISCHER, GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN.<br />
: .:Rei .cherichter‘ Dr DANKELMANN, GARMISCH-PARTENKIROHEN.<br />
)0berriegerungerat-MAYER-VESTPHALEN, QUERFURT.<br />
!:ir 0b e rregierungerat .:RITTER,v0N . LEX, QUERFURT.<br />
Ministerialrat KOKO( ' EUTIN.<br />
Ministerialdirigent JACOBI, Presumably in Northern Germany'. .<br />
Ministerialrat-KLAS, . n.<br />
It 0<br />
Ministerialrat GUELDWPFENNIG.<br />
Oberverwaltungsrichter lEISE ".<br />
Oberregierungsrat Or PETZ . P •<br />
, .• • . . .<br />
' 2: jteoerde<br />
Most of the records were deetroyed in air raids, at BERLIN and KUESTRIN.<br />
Some records may be found in VERFURT, and possibly a feW-it . 6ARMISOH-PARTEN-<br />
KIROREN. -<br />
•<br />
D. DEPARTMENT III<br />
MostAof this-Department, both personnel and records,.ie-looated.at SCHLOSS<br />
ONNENSTEIN 1 in PIRNA, A smaller part remained in BERLIN, DOROTHEENSTRASSE 46.<br />
Dr JCAOHIM GARM/SCH-PARTENKIRCHEN<br />
Minietarialrat BOETTCHER PIRNA<br />
Minieterialrat BOK'? BERLIN<br />
t7-11<br />
Direktor Or HO? SISTER<br />
Ministerialrat Or TITTEL<br />
Oberregierungerat KNAUT<br />
Ministerialrat SIBSTH.<br />
BERLIN<br />
PIRNA<br />
Ministerialrat Or LAUBE AUGSBURG (SIC)<br />
Minieterialrat KAEMPER PIRNA<br />
Ministerialrat ULRICH<br />
Praeeident KNEIP<br />
Minieterialrat GOEDECKE BAD HEILBRUNN, near BAD TOELZ<br />
' Minitterialrat MOLSEN BERLIN<br />
Oberregierungerat KOBE<br />
E. DEPARTMENT IV.<br />
1. Personnel<br />
Minieterialrat Or HT/NR/CFS AUGSBURG (SAIO)<br />
Ministerialiat Or HOFFKON<br />
Ministerialdirigent Or FUCHS AUGSBURG<br />
Regierunge-KaesenratiTESOHNER LEUCHTENBURG, near JENA<br />
Gauhauptmann Di KREISSL REICHENSURG<br />
Reioherichter BERNER PIRNA<br />
Ministerialrat VON LUCAS BERLIN<br />
Ministerialdirigent Dr LOSCHELDER<br />
In addition, there are seven minor officials and seven employees in GARMISOH-<br />
PARTENKIRCHEN.
Ref No SAIC/22<br />
25 May 45<br />
SECRET<br />
2. Records<br />
Most of the records of this Department were destroyed in an air attack on<br />
BERLIN in Nov 1943. Of the new records, part are in PIRMA, part in QUERFURT,<br />
End part in LEUCHTENBU I1G, near JENA. A few records were left in BERLIN, DORO-<br />
THEENSTRASSE 49, and a few were in GARMISCH-PARTENKIROHEN, in the RATHAUS.<br />
F. PUBLIC HEALTH MATTERS<br />
Personnel<br />
Dr KAUFMANN (MD) GAMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN<br />
Ministerialrat ENGEL<br />
25 May 1945 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER<br />
/0<br />
PAUL K LA,<br />
Mai, MI,<br />
Commanding.<br />
Ap*A-ta- p<br />
3<br />
SECRET
REICH MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR<br />
HIMMIER<br />
HEAD STATE SECRETARY<br />
STUCKART<br />
1STATE SECRETARY AND<br />
tREICH HEALTH LEADER<br />
CONTI<br />
CENTRAL DEPT<br />
Budget Disbursing,Accoun.<br />
ting,Distribution<br />
of work,<br />
Internal routine,<br />
etc.<br />
DEPARTMENT I<br />
Constitution,<br />
Legislation,<br />
Administration.<br />
IO Constitution<br />
IV Legislation<br />
& Admin Law<br />
I "Sued Ost"<br />
I "BM" new order<br />
in Bohemia<br />
I "Ost"<br />
I "West"<br />
DEPARTMENT II<br />
Civil Defense<br />
of REICH<br />
I-RW Civ Defense<br />
I-RW Mil Law and<br />
Policy<br />
- RS War Damage<br />
--1-<br />
4PARTMM III<br />
A;Pol appointments<br />
Civil servants<br />
B. Higher Services<br />
C.Civ Servants Law,<br />
Policy, training,<br />
salaries ,expenses<br />
welfare ,pensions,<br />
salaried employees<br />
and workers.<br />
DEPARTMENT A<br />
Public<br />
Health<br />
L_<br />
DEPARTMENT IV<br />
Control of<br />
Local Govt<br />
DEPARTMENT B<br />
Public<br />
Welfare<br />
DEPARTMENT C<br />
Veterinary<br />
Matters
ills is<br />
. 4 I:1<br />
1# 0'01<br />
SPli't<br />
S:dDikdff/1-7<br />
SECRET<br />
Ref No SAIC/23<br />
25 May 45<br />
'S E'C 4,11E4f. avs:<br />
:Auth: CG, 7th Army<br />
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER :Init: 6,4 410.4.) 4.4,. 0 •<br />
APO 758 US ARMY - :Datis: 25 Mayi194,,,r.<br />
SOUR3ES<br />
OBSERVATIONS ON ARMOM TACTICS<br />
(Cf also Report Ref No SAIC/17, 24 May 45.),.<br />
,.•<br />
GUDERIAN, Hans, GENOBST (Col Gen), FUEBRERRESPY.,(9fficerqj00,1),<br />
rormer-Chief of Staff, German Gi und Forces, arid IhSpector'GeneParof<br />
.hrmored Units, is a 57-year old officer who apparehtly,Viantb_tp/tapPear,0<br />
Lail-Nazi. He talked freely and answered all que8tipns,Ni4iney but<br />
ctated emphatically that he did so only because HITLEPS'dth"ire ked him<br />
from his oath of allegiance. lo<br />
RtinK: B-2 Date of In<strong>for</strong>mation: See Text Interrogator: R.W.<br />
..'f1::(611r4o0 $Z<br />
VON GEYR, Leo, GEN D'PZTRUPPE (Lt Gen), Inspector , ofi Armored Units.<br />
F:70ud of his profession, of the old Prussian gener.a1-4PenCelgave<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation grudgingly; his personal pride borders upo4cIthiri:e4tilous.<br />
Having been Military Attache in LONDON <strong>for</strong> several years, source. olaims.<br />
to have an understanding of Anglo-American affairs.<br />
I fM0 nV •7,ftLT<br />
Rating: B-2 Date of In<strong>for</strong>mation: See Text' Interrogatbri s WW.-"<br />
1. PERSONAL HISTORY OF GEN GUDERIAN'<br />
17 Jun 1888 Born at CULM/VISTULA.<br />
1894-1901 School at-COLMAR.<br />
01-03 Officèrs candidate institute (KADETTEN'ANSTALT)<br />
Mi 1111,<br />
-t-,4)<br />
4,0L .)01%<br />
03-07 Main Off Candidate Institution (HAUPTKADETTENANSTALT) LICHT-<br />
• • ;:y11;;,t<br />
ERFELDE.<br />
. •<br />
.07 Assigned as 0 C (FAEHNRICH) to HANNOVERSaHES JAEdER'.130i0<br />
at BITCHE. • . . .<br />
27 Jan 08 Promoted to 2d Lt.<br />
09 Transferred to GOSLAR with Bn.<br />
12-13 On DS with TELEGRAFEN BN 3 (3 Telegraph<br />
Co.6.1<br />
13-14 War Academy (KRIEGSAKADEMIE) BERLIN. -------<br />
Aug I4-.Mov1I1rt CO of Radio Posts with various hqs.<br />
8 Nov 14 Promoted-to lst.Lt.<br />
Spring 15 Intelligence officer with various hqs.<br />
18 Dec 15 Promoted to Capt.<br />
,:•• • •<br />
Spring-fall:17 On DS on Staff of various hqs. . .<br />
(up to that time, his basic organization.was still 10<br />
JAEGER Bn)<br />
Feb-Nov 18 With a hq staff in Italy. .<br />
• .,<br />
Dec 18-Sep 19 FREIKORPS (GREDL;SCHUTZ) . (Frontier Guards) <strong>for</strong> - the EAST.<br />
Source helped to organize . these units. .<br />
•<br />
SECRET<br />
f'
S E'C R E T<br />
Ref No SAIC/23<br />
25 May 45 •<br />
summer :16-Jan 17 On DS with XXII Res Corps:,Stalf..-<br />
Jan 17-;Apr 17 Liaison Officer, First<br />
Ayr ,17-fal1 . 17 Assigned to XXII Res Corps<br />
fall 17-Apr 18 '0-2, Army group (HOG) ALBRECH T.•<br />
. • •<br />
• Apr . 184iay 18 C of B., 30 Inf<br />
May 18-Jun ,18 C of S, 26 LANDWEHR , Inf Div.<br />
G2, Army group SCHOLL.<br />
Aug 18-Sep la : On Staff of BUlgarian.ORCHRIDA<br />
'Sep 18 Ill with malaria until end of war.<br />
Mar 19 - Oc t 19 ':GROSSER GENERALSTAB (Highergeheral'StaffBEFLttO(Piilish<br />
and Russian questions). ' ' •II<br />
Jun 20-Sep 22 Instructor of tactics at OCS ERX4N an<br />
at MUNICH.<br />
. • • .<br />
: 0,<br />
Sep 22-Jan 25 Squadron Commander of 18 Cav Regt,,LUDWIGSBURG:±J.m<br />
jan.25 Promoted to Maj.<br />
Jan 25-Oct- 28 1-A (First•Staff Officer)"3'Cair'Div:' 7 ,<br />
• '; • •"• (L.<br />
28-Jan 31 1-A (First Staff Officer) VIEHRKREIS IV DRESDEN<br />
Jan 31-Apr 33 co, 14 Cav Regt LUDWIGSLUST/MEC:UENBURG.<br />
30 Promoted to Lt Col.<br />
Oct 32 Promoted to Col. •<br />
'<br />
A .,pr•33-Oct 37 Military and Air Attaché, g erianEmbaasy qZNDON:, and,in):%.<br />
the legations . at BRUSSELS and,-The HAGYE.11<br />
!<br />
Sep 35 'Promoted to Brig Gen. •<br />
Oct 37<br />
Oct 37-Feb 40<br />
Feb 40-Dec 41<br />
Apr 4o<br />
Dec 41-Jun 42<br />
Jun 42-Sep 42<br />
Oct 42- :Jan 43<br />
Feb 43-summer 43<br />
summer 43-Jul 44<br />
Promoted to Maj Gen. ,<br />
CG, 3 Armored Div, BERLIN. .<br />
CG XXIV Corps (later -changed to-XL'ArMored0OrPri)'A<br />
-<br />
Promoted to Lt Geri.<br />
CG, XL Armored Corps..<br />
Deputy CG, LXXXVI Corps.<br />
GENERAL DER PANZERTRUPPE WEST (Gen of Armored-Forces 1Vest),<br />
. ,<br />
which was nucleus <strong>for</strong> the POZERARMEE DER PANZERGRUPPE•-<br />
WEST (Panzer Arm:- of Panzer Group, W9PO4 later: renamed<br />
5 Pz Army.<br />
Aug 44-May 45 Inspector of Armored Units,<br />
In July 44, source was relieved from his command in the Y.E0<br />
because of differences in opinions regarding armored •act,ics.-<br />
-<br />
3, ilorEs ON ARMORED TACTICS - GEN GUDERIAN<br />
Gen GUDERIAN considers air superiority an essential factor in a good<br />
coordinated tank attack. Another important point is that tanks should<br />
SECRET<br />
3
SECRET<br />
Ref No SAIC/23<br />
25 May 45<br />
Oct 19-Jan 20<br />
Jan 20 .-Apr 22<br />
Apr 22-fall 24'<br />
Oct 24-Sep 27<br />
1 Feb 27<br />
Oct 27-Jan 30<br />
Feb 30-Sep 31<br />
1 ,Fe.4<br />
REICHSWEHR BRIGADE 10, HANNOVER,<br />
Company commander with 10 JAEGER Bn of 17 Inf Regt, GOSLAR,<br />
REICHSWEHRMINISTERIUM (War Ministry) INSPEKTEUR DER KRAFT-<br />
FAHRTRUPPEN (Inspector of M/T Units).<br />
On 2d Div Staff, STETTIN.<br />
Promoted to Maj,<br />
REICHSWEHRMINISTERIUM (War Ministry), TRANSPORT ABT DES<br />
TRUPPENAMTS.<br />
CO, KRAFTFAHRABT 3 (3 M/T Bn), BERLIN. LANKWITZ.<br />
PrOmoted to Lt Col,<br />
Oct 31-Jun 34 C of S, Inspector of M/T units.<br />
X"<br />
'bet<br />
r,<br />
...3 3.. .. Promoted to Col<br />
Jul 34-Oct 35 C of S, IKOt‘ILADIDO DER PANZERTRUPPEN (command o<br />
troops).<br />
. •<br />
Oct 35-Feb 38 Commanding 2 Armored Div.<br />
•1 Aug' 36 ... Promoted to'Brig Gen.<br />
1Feb'38 • promoted to . Maj Gen. .<br />
14;tr 3 -8-NO .VY38 ' . ' CG XVI Corps, BERLIN,<br />
14<br />
armored<br />
Nov 38-4g39 oxx, CHEF DER SCHNELLEN TRUPPEN (Chief of Mobile Units<br />
Nov 36 Promoted to Lt Gen (GENERi.L DER PANZERTRUPPE).'<br />
Sep 39-May 4o CG, XIX Pz Corps (Poland and France).<br />
Jun 40-Jun 41 CG PANZERGRUPPE GUDERIAN<br />
Jul 40 Promoted to GENOBST (Col Gen),<br />
Jun , 1f1-Dec 41 , CU of PANZERGRUPPE 2 (Pa Group 2, later changed to 2 Pa<br />
.Army)..<br />
Dec 41-Peb- 43' 'Placed in FUEHRERRESERVE (Officers Pool).<br />
Feb 43-Mar 45 Inspector General of Armored Troops.<br />
21 Jul 44 In addition to other duties, Chief of Staff, German Ground<br />
Forces.<br />
28 Mar 45 FUEHRERRESERVE (Officers Pool).<br />
2, PERSONAL HISTORY OF GEN VON GEYR<br />
2 Mar 1886. Born at POTSDAM.<br />
1892-1904 Gymnasium at 'STUTTGART,<br />
04-11 26 WUERTTEMBERGISCHES KOENIGSDRAGONER REGIMENT.<br />
05<br />
11-14<br />
13<br />
Aug 14-Nov 14<br />
Nov 1 14-sumnrr 16<br />
Jan 15<br />
Promoted to 2d Lt.<br />
War Academy (KRIEGSAKADEMIE) BERLIN,<br />
'Promoted to 1st Lt.<br />
Regt Adj, 7 Cav Div.<br />
With 9 Cav . Div Hq, as Russian interpreter.<br />
Promoted to Capt.<br />
SECRET<br />
2
SECRET<br />
Ref No SAIC/23<br />
25 May 45<br />
always be employed in masses. On ideal terrain and with all necessary tanks<br />
avaiable, a good attack can employ three armored divs, each with 300-400<br />
tanks. If the attacking <strong>for</strong>ce has more-than one corps available, all'divs.<br />
can be employed on a broad front without any reserves, while the other corps<br />
takes up positions to the rear as reserve unit. In the Case of tank units<br />
in reserve, the General points out, it is difficult to . bring them up to<br />
the critical points in time to be of decisive value.. As an illustration,<br />
source recalls that when he attacked the'MAGINOT Line'in 1940, he'employed<br />
three armored dive on a broad front, leaving the question of reserves to<br />
another corps. •<br />
The leader of tank, units should always be far up to the front, since<br />
quick decisions and <strong>for</strong>ceful leadership are by far,more.important in armored<br />
tactics than in engagements of any other arm. It is of paramount importance<br />
to recogniz,e , the exact moment when the unit should advance into 'battle to<br />
its best advantage. . .<br />
il&LArmoredItacticsi:source points_out, were substantially known even be<strong>for</strong>e<br />
'the war. : Source's ''ACHTUNG PANZER",,Gen:de,GAULLE's "L'ARMEE DE CHOC",'and<br />
British ;k.act,ips wera , essentially the same. However, these tactics were<br />
emplOY;d"keth e -B ritish tha'norbythe'French'<br />
'thus, despite inferiority<br />
in heavy tanks, the Germans Achieved victory in 4(i, mainly due to.superior<br />
communicaticnsequipment,,and through. correct employment . of armored tactics.<br />
As regards tank prodtICtion, it is better, in Gen GUDERIAN's<br />
have quantities of an older-type tank availablethanto•experimebtwithtoomany<br />
models and lack the necessary:.amount . of armor. .Through series production<br />
the many changes of the experimental stages (KINDERKR..NKHEITEN . - "children<br />
diseases") aA'aoided:<br />
4. NOTES ON ARMORED TACTICS - GEN VON GEYR.<br />
Source stresses the importance of speed ofsdecision'as applied-to armored<br />
tactics:6z A rAeader.oftank,units must be able to make. decisions on a min- •<br />
Ute i s notice, workconstantly under the pressure of time; he must have a<br />
" stopwatch' Mind" . (GEDANKEN DER STOPPVAR): American regtl, bn, and 'co<br />
commanders SUR require too much time <strong>for</strong> making' decisions, source believes,<br />
and are thereby losing the surprise element. Leadership of armored units of<br />
div and greater strength should be characterized by its dynamic qualities,<br />
and should "deliver punches at the right time and , at the weak spot".<br />
ArmorsA;ctaticsmust , vary• according to the oponents, source..points out.<br />
He himself developed different tactics <strong>for</strong> the Eastern and Western fronts,<br />
The.amount and execution of air-tank coordination are decisive in tank<br />
battles. In this connection, the failure of he GAF is mainly responsible<br />
<strong>for</strong> the Allied break-out in Normandy.<br />
The ability of the individual tank.gunner to aim a good shot at long<br />
ranges is also a most important factor in the outcome of tank engagements.<br />
Generally, proper organization and leadership of fire ' fights has to be<br />
stressed.<br />
5. 1-FIPIViff bEiE10111261<br />
All in<strong>for</strong>mation below has been obtained from Gen GUDERIAN)<br />
t•;)?.i<br />
Land warfare will be dominated by the use of the tank as long as no<br />
more efAicient A/T , weapons are 'developed. Three types of tanks will continue<br />
tb"13e4SsentiaIt' A -heAvy penetration tank (SCHWERER DURCHBRUCHPANZER)<br />
<strong>for</strong> the main thiubt6I- falight reconnaissance tank (LEICHTER AUFKLAERER); •<br />
and a tank destroyer, which should be heavily armed and speedy. Source<br />
points out that during this war there has been A German tendency to replace<br />
the light tank with a heavy one, and that only on acdoUnt of his specific<br />
booz/<br />
SECRET
SECRET<br />
Ref No SAIC/23<br />
25 May 45<br />
• .f. It V;<br />
`•<br />
•<br />
requests the production of light tanks was taken p'again<br />
F pr close combat developments of the flamethrower'tank'are<br />
pectad. The German flamethrowers suffered from the bad.qualityOff . the mill)<br />
also, the inflammable liquid was pi-,ced within the tank, The American<br />
solution of placing the inflammable liquid on a trailer was : *mush\more,ef4clent<br />
and com<strong>for</strong>table <strong>for</strong> the tank crew, and American Oil-is=ekceiletits<br />
a weapon, the flame throwing tank is limited to street fighting and fightt<br />
ing against an enemy that cannot be reached bytha , straightjiiih'of the<br />
machine gun bullet. It should be used as support weapon only. Source however,<br />
expects further developments of its fire technique which, he'believes,<br />
will be carried along artillery lines. The morale effect Of:the-;*flami th'r:ow. ;-<br />
• —.4A.4V.JI;<br />
4<br />
ing .:anks upon the enemy is considerable, • '<br />
Rockets, having the obvious advantages as to weight, .etc,<br />
gage point targets and are there<strong>for</strong>e unsuitable <strong>for</strong>.'„mCiinting-:en't*Oks0.4Ce'•<br />
this disadvantage of the rocket projectors is overcome', iii)Weveiank=MICiini-<br />
' ' • ) n I, 114'15<br />
ted rocket projectors will be commonly used.. •<br />
Source does not believe that tank-mounted arty weaponSowialv,unaergo<br />
side able changes. He points out that tank crews trouble<br />
with a long barrelled 88 mm gun, especially in the Case'<br />
muzz:_e braka, when passing a . ditch, <strong>for</strong> instance. A longWbarre ..l:' ;Iplarct<br />
seriously limit: the tanks' mobility, A.limited number:OCtanklietf.:1orY<br />
• • • ill<br />
penetration only might be the exception.<br />
• Y"Ye ft., ! • •• •<br />
Howitzers<br />
mounted.on SP chassis did not prove mery . stiecis6411, V0 axbept' '<strong>for</strong><br />
speci.fically assigned special misaions. .The best.Suited:Weapopv'<strong>for</strong>-,TIOUnt<br />
ing on tanks at present are guns of calibers between 754rift.9,12411,17<br />
German technicians had quite SOMO trouble in linding-,a,6O,danktiiin<br />
dust in Russia had a destructive effect or derman enginesiTISOUrCkthink<br />
that similar difficulties might be encountered by:the Amieridarii;,When-em;<br />
ploying tanks in China. He believes Mass employment Of-tank'sagainS.t-the;•<br />
Japanese in China possible, but difficulties might be encountered trying to<br />
employ armor on a large scale on the Japanese islands; ihxejtoth'elniiMerdUs:;-.<br />
river .s in China, further developments of amphibious tanks Would'tie,.c4 value. •<br />
Scurce believes that extensive adaptations of infra-red.raystbitank,<br />
warfare are to be expected. He is of the opinion that years t'o:L.CoilMight:<br />
brine in the field developments comparable to these in the fieldliWradib''<br />
equipment between 1918 and the outbreak of the present war. -.11:'j<br />
6. COMPARISON OF EXISTING TANKS<br />
Source rates the German Royal Tiger as the best tank employed at present.<br />
Next is the Russian T-34, especially the model mounting , a 135:,mM-gua.<br />
is the American SHERMAN the main shortcoming of which : are itstool)narro<br />
tracks. The Russian T-34 has excellent tracks as well as'alight metal<br />
DIESEL engine. The quality of the.steel in Russian tanks was'.slowlYide<br />
clining, however, and the lack of easily turnable turrets aswell asfgood<br />
radio communication equipment were obvious disadvantages.<br />
Sa.zrce credits the German Army with having the best tank units<br />
7. GERMAN - JAPANESE COOPERATION<br />
Source does not believe that any attacks by the Germans and the Japanese<br />
were ,:oordinated. To his knowledge, in<strong>for</strong>mation on German tactipa Was<br />
given to the Japanese only once, in 1940. Afterwards the 'Japanese diplomatic<br />
representatives were seen by source with HITLER on rare ocCasiCns.<br />
During nine months of working close to the FUEHRER, source saw the Japanese<br />
Ambassador, Mr OSHIMA, only twice with HITLER. The 'ilapanethe' • Military<br />
Attache, Mr KOMATSU, was seen five times with HITLER during the same period.<br />
On the Japanese diplomatic staff was also a Mr NISHI (?), specialist in<br />
American questions.<br />
SECRET
SECRET<br />
Ref No SAIC/23<br />
25 May 45<br />
Source does not know whether Japanese aggressive measures which led to<br />
the declaration orwar were coordinated with German ef<strong>for</strong>ts, but he believes<br />
that they were.<br />
•<br />
8. DETAILS : CONCERNING HITLER<br />
Source eaw HITLER last 28 Mar 45, be<strong>for</strong>e being placed in FUEHRERRESERVE.<br />
At that timethejUEHRER was suffering from nervous attacks, and his left -<br />
arm and leg *ere' shaking strongly, HITLER was also still suffering from<br />
bruises On his right arm and from the injured right ear drum, results of the<br />
20 July atteMpt on his life. HITLER'tlked clearly and in a precise manner,<br />
and was wel1 in<strong>for</strong>med' about the last details of the military situation at<br />
that tiMej.„.<br />
Source ,, that after riel to power in 33, HITLER worked in the<br />
inteeSi6"and to the good of the Ge:,.man people.' The following events source'<br />
thiri passab1e,44 . notentirely Pcorrect u . This refers to the increase Cf--<br />
the:GerMahArMythe_:OCcupation of the Rhineland, the Saar plebiscite and<br />
the 'anneXat'iOn'_ef 1 A4Stria and the Sudetenland. German annexation of the<br />
remainder O 'fZ,echoSlovakia and of Poland did not find source's approval.'<br />
HITLER, sotirCe .states, was able to convince everybody that his decisions<br />
were iiklittliedUghlits personal charm throughout the war. Field . Marshal-<br />
KEITEL I.,, whom Aomrce does . not consider very clever, was particularly'suCcePt<br />
ible toHITLER i bargUments<br />
.1 •<br />
., The German General Staff raised objections as<br />
to various cOAtempl:afed operations, but HITLER had his . successes to back<br />
him , x1p,andrepeatedly accused his generalsof a lack of imagination.<br />
SCurcp: -Sia-fei0hat'the'General Staff did not like the idea of attacking<br />
Poland '1,i09 1 '.1,but that the generals finally agreed to attack knowing that<br />
theycouidno.t -r. e .S'ist':HITLER's wishes,<br />
••• •<br />
9.:-THE,EVACUATIONAT pUNURK<br />
_ . •<br />
Source' claims he 'was not allowed to enter the Port of DUNKIRK. with his<br />
tanks,TheBritish.:<strong>for</strong>ces there were to be destroyed. by the GAF. alone. .111.he<br />
Airc.Force;:thowever• . lailed in this task, and the British, evacuation at<br />
DUNKIRK was thus made:possible. Source believes that, given permission to<br />
enter DUNKIRK, he could have annihilated all troops assembled there.<br />
10, NORMANDY INVASION<br />
•<br />
While a.number of mistakes were made in the 'German preparations <strong>for</strong> an<br />
Allied invasion of France, the factor mainly responsible <strong>for</strong> Allied successes<br />
was.the;failure of the GAF! At the time of the invasion the GAF was<br />
still'atthe . `leveLofi.1940, with no new-type planes.. The lack of air-superiority<br />
led. to•%the complete breakdown of the German net of communications,<br />
Other failures were the neglect to modernize the SIEGFRIED Line, the neglect<br />
to <strong>for</strong>tify cities.like PARIS, LIEGE, ANTWERP, and the wrong distribution of<br />
armor. Source claims that the sole responsibility <strong>for</strong> all these errors lies<br />
with HITLER alone who neglected to follow advice given by the General Staff.<br />
It was HITLER who decided that the Atlantic Wall was strong enough to withstand<br />
all attacks. Commanders of tank units opposing Gen PATTON were unable<br />
-,:o'use -theirinitiative l , but had to follow HITLER's own plans. Source'<br />
%hinks -he cold have stopped Gen PATTON in France, had he been left free to<br />
employ hisOWn-strategy.<br />
2.1. NOTES: ON-THEJIUSSIAN ATTACK OF FALL 44.<br />
• After.source had'been appointed Chief of Staff, German Ground Forces,<br />
he tried to work out a plan to stop the Russian advances. He found conditions<br />
similar to those prevailing in the WEST, namely that important placea<br />
Lad 'not been <strong>for</strong>tified.<br />
SECRET<br />
6
Ref No SAIC/23<br />
25 May 45<br />
SECRET<br />
F;.V011,2<br />
ItM4APOP41M<br />
The GAF, unable to cope with Allied air superiority in the ViES;-was-rcomfaetely<br />
absent from•the Eastern front.: Source...<br />
inferior technical developments of the •Russian,Airjorge;Ae qoap4Ct,91;the<br />
Alliedithe GAF could achieve more in the<br />
butrit was;denied. .When the situation . becamemor,eal;NgkegoR,Akrmerly<br />
commanding Armyroup , Upper RHINE, ,whose<br />
firEttocatch deserters, appeared at the Eastern f2ront,centruWewgh,Jhe<br />
tasli. :of stopping the Russians. Source told HIMMLER:thatonticlg.'ihis<br />
function as leader of the German Police more importa4t,anc41;skehALR to;<br />
"stcpplayingtroop . leader". HIMMLER reported,this.o.onversat41:400tER,<br />
and.eventuailybrought about source's ousting as Chief,of',.4:t.a0:LtipOur:%<br />
alse-had . a conversation with RIBBENTROPP, in vhich:heypOinted,7,24t&aia.<br />
two-front-war-was too much to cope with,•andsasked:himtofmakekpeaCtLqther<br />
in , thetVEST or'i.n . the EAST. ThiSconversationiwas,also4;epotthtcat7tht.,<br />
FUEHRER; . and helped. .in bringing 'about GUDERIANjs,:dismissalikkAeurc,exc.14ms.<br />
that as early as 43 he had conversations with $PEERand:MEMEI,4A.ntreiard<br />
to the seriousness of the situation. Both agreed.with4sRur,9e,Z4P41,<br />
view; but were unable to influence HITLER: tostop)lieAptui,tiglay04aSe".<br />
The contemplated date and location of the .Ruspian: ,thilusimerWyet14own -<br />
to-thetop Eastern front 'leaders, source..claims;',HITLER/loyeverogd:ort<br />
belieVe that the situation was . dang7:-.7ous, believing Russia t01444attr<br />
the :"SUMMercampaign to start a new offensive. All materiel<br />
source <strong>for</strong> the Eastern front was shipped to the WEST in;14.ept64/4ig#LE,R„<br />
also erroneously overestimated . the . value , of the Tquip,4p source's Opinion.<br />
The RUHR'Was at that time already'crippledby . Aliiee&ii attacks, while.the<br />
• Upper Silesian . coal mines were still .working'fUllbiaSt 'SiiiWii"O wASAdecided<br />
to concentrate on the defense of the RUHR, SouCeiliiiiitgl-biltpthAt<br />
stronger resistance in the EAST would have helpe4German2 food pre;b1pMsf;, •<br />
sinca East Prussia was an essential factor in assuring.,theAnecepsm7copS.<br />
12. ARDENNES OFFENSIVE<br />
vg(T<br />
(b<br />
• 7:;, 997. BlnrOg<br />
Although source was not involved in this offens'in7anSOOTtiZ311(0<br />
capac.ity, he Was watching it closely,' since all • hiS'iej.hfofealent'S'q the •<br />
Easti)rn front were used up during this campaign. Source thinks . that in the<br />
beginning the front, limited to valleys, was too narrow. According to his<br />
estimate, the offensive should have been broken off on 20 s Dec, after American<br />
resistance .on 'a larger scale appeared. RUNSTEDT, however, wpA.7.-ImF1121:<br />
to hold his gains at all costs.<br />
13. PERSONALITIES<br />
Source considers VON RUNDSTEDT as the best of all German generals at<br />
the present time. He is serious and still commands the confidence of the<br />
German people. Souce suggests him as a candidate <strong>for</strong> a role similar to that<br />
of HINDENBURG in 25.<br />
HIMMLER, source believes, is responsible <strong>for</strong> the deeds of the SS.. He is<br />
a mar. with bad illusions. Source expected HIMMLER to change the ,policy of<br />
Germeny by putting HITLER in his proper place.<br />
KESSELRING, source says, is very intelligent, clever, but an opportunist.<br />
14, FERSONAL NOTE<br />
When Gen PATTON broke out of Normandy, HITLER told his generals that they<br />
would be unable to employ such daring tactics, Gen GUDERIAN objected, recalling<br />
his historic breakthrough in the ARDENNES, in 1940.<br />
SECRET<br />
7
SECRET<br />
:Ref No SAIC/23<br />
25 May 45<br />
15. MISCELLANY<br />
a) On 16 Jan 45 a German corps' had to reture toward WARSAW, The WARSAW<br />
•:garrison was weak,. but the FUEHRER ordered the city held at all costs.<br />
Source ' gave this orderto his C of S I Col VON BONIN. IA th,e. afternoon'<br />
• 'col'VON BONIN reported'that the troops as well as the WARSAW-garrison .<br />
• , Imere rWithdrawing and source, after checking this in<strong>for</strong>mation.as best he.<br />
aould,ideeignated the next stand of the withdrawing troops. At . the-: .<br />
'FUEHRER'i r conference, source was asked by HITLER whether he.had known ,, .<br />
Of the se riousfless of the•situation.. Source said he had; while they<br />
4 • •<br />
-were, conferring .i . a radiogram arrived 'stating that the WARSAW garrisonJ4'<br />
Wiai'4i111:41Oldink 611t;-: HITLER again gave orders to hold'tothelast.n.,<br />
t at orders as to a next stand had not yet-arriv,edat<br />
came, the WARSAW.commander preferred:tio-_,<br />
f011oW l.t6g e órdersthan those Of HITLER...When:the FUEHRER-received:th..<br />
l '''neWtii,='.13e'idecided'to-haId-VON BONIN responsible and put him, together wit<br />
the S - 7!AFGEFAENGNIS (Prison) BERLIN4M0ABIT,;: •<br />
deepifileaUrCe l ejrcitesta that he was the only responsible person The<br />
- 'W011iinior-YciffiCers)werefinally . released and given front assignments,,<br />
:Whi1e! .VONBONIN: FaCaSe was transferred to the RSHA (Central-Sécurity<br />
cleared VON BONIN..of all charges,but<br />
HITLERadhédj d not trust the . investigating . officers,: VONA3ONINLf..:<br />
.staiz pltison <strong>for</strong> twa ' monthsand was then'transferred.tothe.DAOHAU<br />
:OCentratiofiCamP:<br />
sic,rn:t10 c, , . .<br />
., f. i. 14.19R1 . GRAFJpN RITTBERG, an intelligent German . officer, reili4din/-<br />
_..f.,,ApriMhatthe War was lost <strong>for</strong> Germany. He said so,.andwat(shat-,far.:<br />
hig,tC ,f,q/lie" sa, remarks<br />
c)nAli g-gia WaniE0tO eliminate Poland, The American and.British policy<br />
-inregard := ta , the .: Ruesian'question is not l understandable% • -<br />
d) Source believes that Germany cannot supply her own food as long as<br />
Russia keeps her Eastern provinces.<br />
e)qTegro,trpopseither from French colonies or from the United States<br />
oused .t. as.:pC .cUpatior,k <strong>for</strong>ces, will damage all signs of good will";<br />
A<br />
25May .<br />
1945 : SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER<br />
PE-t,,,,C XI % ('--e4e‘.<br />
PAUL KUBALA,<br />
Maj, MI,<br />
Commanding.<br />
SECRET<br />
8
NOMA<br />
CRIVAESISCLOSURE ACT<br />
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED 011<br />
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CENTRAL I NTELLIGENCE AGENCY<br />
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT I mai no EAttiS<br />
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:!L he i.ii#44.444:4clent.T4te .<br />
Iferg.01:40.0.az:sev,by,c.nä tux: e, and speaks in • a • BaVar • an, r<br />
. ....I ,v :. L •.: ...to 1 Is„tv-am . 'a-<br />
VI<br />
",,:l.ect,...• ' , '<br />
•<br />
•<br />
l '..,His relationship :to the partY .stems from .. he . ;.ria .c. that .'ci r.s.' Phii'dillelet1 e<br />
'•: gt..)'. he was HITLER i s immediate superior in World War I.<br />
., , • • ,<br />
;.• .2";<br />
'PERSONAL'i RELATIONSHIP TO HITLER<br />
weiwirg ,<br />
staff of the . 16thqBay i .,<br />
- NwwWregimeht<br />
24. e_4.142.v§on- 1 .<br />
.S1 Bii4ajOr07AAMNNtdq4<br />
A cri; ,<br />
g-beea.ua'homelA Lpale soldle , whose/ 17.<br />
- • - 44.<br />
P<br />
ed • "IS}InsVNal( ET,11.0.:' paint et) ::.11 HITT& V.iV. lit 1 :6 pfcatko.-ii<br />
thi -••• 4 4<br />
iri t: he a PiltlisiOn, •ftlxitfieEirlii‘••<br />
•<br />
seglaiti.was uno'openirig.- "'• (J :13 a (l ox amt<br />
FY.1 •••<br />
' •<br />
and "thide' gotfasinovey---6<br />
to o*<br />
i'%:f<br />
'<br />
• 4.41' 0`.2 ate 12. s L , 'tine ‘01,1s4 t14.40'.7.4<br />
AMAlitf'!■!disqii, 0.8..111'21,ER as a sexually normal. mah'..::"0- HITLER, to kinlyt*blic<br />
t7ienci , cI .: •:w,itlipt4bmi•he , .' had occasional intimate relations, was EVA. BRAUN-..-<br />
f4ilit-40151444 0f :the photographer HOFFMAN, She had i<br />
:1111N.0 r 4 0 _31i 4.10:N444gie6t ohs she ..,was. constantlY<br />
fAif<br />
licil* • ;IR' 1100t1illeir!S• t( ;<br />
44d<br />
, .x.40;014.e.t) itujigg v eyy, *4..e,„ATIA,p r<br />
: • ''tiä Otigigia :1101!.=<br />
4401,14 Ao.gp.c.5),c 1-e5<br />
to visit HITLER in person. However, he alone had the right ,.;to a atsp.<br />
H3 T12,4104M12.106 4,244)r nAlg (lz:11..g.r.r9,11 1- 4-.4r . 0, N, :24<br />
,ac gpr cu.;!-t ttio0taoty0 .•.ea der,. pp, ' 44,,f.p<br />
WitiOitttaRANMIITAAmpex*teAiqh4AWIN4pet: . HITT.ER <strong>for</strong> th!._„lastilapf.enkip<br />
Fe b.:, when 41144wOjogyk &iv t hAA 0.09 44.1„th0 REIC.g.SICANZ"LEI.,......Egv.en.ttpstuti<br />
ffligq#41 P4t134;4 34ky Lin, he wae very mub under the<br />
BC<br />
qiq . a , .; r• •. . • • ;" • • ) , ;t witakoitti•<br />
it& hid■ovxj,b a.cw 11.17. 1 , • . • :: cuma:<br />
III. OTHER POLITICAL PERSONALITIES<br />
I . •<br />
•• •-•• ••;c.o.t#1,<br />
1,4:14 .1,404):10:1•<br />
-401<br />
erl tlast liEICHICXNZLEI •: •• After HESS '• I flight-',- i-i0/1 ,<br />
ieil.tildWidlilaIVieizairieV' Dior in or e cinf iidel<br />
h d e nahtine • a • •siy:' SYStitri•<br />
tV-TeirdViii .P.-u8 btranif the' list- hé ;h'id 1.1111i4deAttprolt<br />
411IP dt St tire /11C tit at , "HITLER'S" •RASPITSINA's..<br />
lutnipualitandttgoORT 8trmuNICH;'!yfie.,40.to:tiA146Vup41APtia0<br />
e.7.4441Itiutt,.t<br />
*/1 ,t1 : • • , • •••• thr.41 altahoCc4',<br />
0:0464,0r:Ttp,n ykktffiiATEGAN§R,.. tygd...47. fio.vmt„Ap. ksove<br />
"4413R4twaxcli4113.PoWEinr.:1?.el,i-eq..14.:ViSzYli43.1:4141,<br />
as a kind Of Robespierre, or as a witeh2-burnamg,.h.,,i;<br />
Considered it his duty to eliminate all enemies. of thit-4/<br />
•<br />
..,<br />
•<br />
S ' E . c .RE T
:„A<br />
26 Mkr<br />
SAIC/24<br />
1. •<br />
SECR,,E T<br />
7i--<br />
• ?7 , • • "<br />
. . " . .<br />
Nati--ideology, and he did s6<br />
.<br />
calmly and impersonitly(40:0W.thout hate and<br />
sYmpicth;ye niing the last months HIMIYILER 's importance, went to<br />
his head and. he played the great commander with a special'tr ain , : and<br />
great surroundings. In: . e.ndi.....PORP4111.4,1t1141::%emot,641 IMMER aisidev . •<br />
...........<br />
c) GOERING. GOERING was no National Socialist, but.alwaysthebie„<br />
gentleman. He never had contact with little party people<br />
He alone led HITLER into the war, by giving him wrong impressions<br />
powerf fpf,..the LUFTWATFE ., on ,whiciv, ‘HITLER:..basect ,.111:11 Repbt;.tho,p0fg<br />
was saying this GOERING, by ,coincidence ■ .Ws.s" :being led<br />
oner. • AMANfi ' jumped up excitedlypeiht lecr,.."•61A,.'.4he' l y/Pgrow at GOEIMIG ;1‘ g<br />
said, "This fat slob here, you should hot& J4rn.,. tp,o,nsAbli 4p,rot •<br />
the war• .and the death of rayson, is anc;<br />
AMANN :has no- proof of War: s eitAll:41ttrht<br />
F that "the 'people say it". " -<br />
`..4<br />
•<br />
'<br />
d) ,B$LS g0EE .; .MANN 4 Y 4.06het § 0E5liE. erfe*Y. ;44,14te<br />
iolii,4erf ere in the rtiii*,prrient of the press which IMANN.,fiSayiev.iasi/kOl■Ay<br />
he responsibility. 'AMANN belieVie BORMANN HIMKLER ant 030EBBE14:rwirt<br />
the three<br />
,<br />
bad spirts of HIT,LER.<br />
Iv. THE EHER PLWLISHING CO.<br />
•<br />
a) Establishment. TATial .11,1/ipfZia<br />
AMON •HITLER wish took over • a -41nall . • • • , vAbltiphing;..tkoutj.<br />
f • • Ta<br />
<strong>for</strong>y.thiV:party . ,in 192O.. This concern WaS ...,, oWne.d oby,„ara.tri ..„—‘"<br />
It2 , is characteristic that AMANN allowed.the<br />
ntal: . of .only ,'.50 , 1314 until her<br />
...101091PAT.--Y4an kni,9e,hh.V.10:1<br />
rt .<br />
The.,paper at . that time the .9V0ELKISqqR "C)1 Hi . 40HTE$1,1 4. WaRAynol.<br />
Eitz icwrif-ria<br />
and was kept going only through the :Sale..of li,,O(48.r.P,11,,„1-010,TireAḶ7.;11:<br />
'etivecl . a , , fee... from the.. concern -<strong>for</strong> his. articles.<br />
KAMPP" , which the EHER . firm published . , HITLaike,d..on)y,110<br />
2 14<br />
the sales price. A large sum was still ..<br />
a.<br />
owed,...tO;H:17LER .....:.. .441.figg117., 4<br />
ing yfirm,.'was.• never. claimed.<br />
b) ,Organization.<br />
,4r104.•1<br />
f!eXq1-4p0<br />
'AMAillq admits • that he could Lot have succeeded<br />
sueh a big concern . without . help of men experienCed in the .publishingT.TITII.:<br />
EsPe el:illy' helpful were Dr l'aNCKLER /Aid Dr•IRIENIIADT4'•,bo_th'-tinfP3<br />
• BERLIN.' Aft rRIENHARD T went • tO .. HIINLER ff ' nine 1161 BAUER3 swilitlitiaN4.slo.-)-ti" ir><br />
right-, hand man. mail. • . • • . ••<br />
'L<br />
•<br />
•The system *controlled about' 700- 'daily 'neWispaperti.a1;.Tha:.,9V0ELKISCHERI:'<br />
BE DBACHTER" • with its three • editions . (BERLINVMUNICW, .V1ENNA)D had 74171.5 IVO<br />
t o tal 'circulation Of 1,500 , 000 ;. AMANN admits ' that 1-the'Pame.13:4,1iiiiiibee<br />
subscriptions , was 4 result of' poor .CCiiiterits. : ' .! . The YSTUERIYIERY!9.<br />
STREICHER •organ, was independent ; • MANN did not ẁant ttr.finhilai SY:stew:1,<br />
be:ause it was too filthy. On the other hand, HIMMLER i s paper, "DA8;i0TT...:<br />
SCitiARZE KORPS" was part of the chain, but was directed only by the<br />
editor, D'ALQUEkN.<br />
For organization of the system see appendix.-- •<br />
himself was in charge of ...the main, office in, MUN.ICII Rut<br />
se'reral months ago) Individual districts of the ,,Par(t.YJ<br />
. rece'ived' uie-<br />
- . third of the income of. the district publish,ini.:, houses......Aiiia, c'CijAtJ.4„.W:tiS,<br />
appointed ,district editors . but AMANN..held.the:.i.4.4lii.$•tris.44.c.tioW.<br />
To 'implications that AMANN had ruthleetsl,y , destrey.ed:p!Oie;ptiV3rA:CS.7,•!:i .<br />
:AMON replied that he' had compensated . ,%the:.,eivnpr's.:„4:T,Iii<br />
Publishers got 12 million , HUGENBERG . got .65. milUon,i,(44:-.14,Ei4n:44;rt<br />
SCHERL Publishing Co., KNORR & Publishing 'Cc'. in MUNI0H, 'd the<br />
Stoat Exchange Paper were Paid. AMANN • admits that k.14 '..of these "made<br />
.trouble' s , but he ie .es''nO injuStice . .in his iicquisitiori of. tii`e:se<br />
'<br />
• • 1:,*;<br />
SECRET<br />
,tot 1.1•
4S"<br />
IA!<br />
SECRET<br />
Ref No SAIC/24<br />
26 May 45<br />
The suppression of the "FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG" was accomplished by<br />
HITLER himself.<br />
When asked which <strong>for</strong>eign newspapers were subsidized, AMANN replied he<br />
did not know. That in<strong>for</strong>mation is known to either the press department<br />
of the Foreign Office or to Dr WINCKLER.<br />
c) Financial Statement.<br />
•<br />
AMANN does not know the exact balances of the concern. These statements<br />
Could'be made •by his financial director BICKEL in MUNICH; Dr<br />
RICHTER, also of the EHER concern'; or Dr RIENHARDT, •<br />
At any rate, the concern was one of the greatest undertakings in<br />
Germany, and equaled IG FARBEN in sales and profits. Net yearly income<br />
averaged 100 millions. Net profits of about 500 millions have been deposited<br />
in the REICHSBANK. Asked why ho did not use profits to acquire<br />
paper factories, <strong>for</strong>ests, etc., AMANN replies, "I don't want to let myself<br />
in'<strong>for</strong> . euch things."<br />
AMANN's personal economic status is according to his own statements<br />
as follows: As head of the EHER concern he received a yearly income of<br />
120,000 1441 1 and 5 per cent of the net profit. He does-not know the<br />
exact sum of his capital; it is, however, several millions. Of real<br />
estate he possesses the following: one apartment house in MUNICH/BOGENL<br />
HAUSEN, WASSERBURGERSTRASSE 6, and one villa in ST QUIRIN on the TEGERN7<br />
SEE,: Upon HITLER's request he furnished it luxuriously <strong>for</strong> ' display •<br />
ptirposeph ,, In addition he had large hunting grounds. He did not invest<br />
any money <strong>for</strong> himself or' his concern in <strong>for</strong>eign lands..<br />
26 May '191+5 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENT4R<br />
PAUL KUMLA,<br />
Maj, MI,<br />
Commanding.<br />
SECRET<br />
3
ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN PRESS<br />
REICHSKULTURKAMNER<br />
(State Culture Commission)<br />
DR GOEBBELS<br />
REICHSVERBAND D. DEUTSCHEN PRESSE<br />
(German Press Association)<br />
CAPT WEISS<br />
REICHSPRESSECAMMER<br />
(State Press Commission)<br />
MANN<br />
El<br />
DEUTSCHES NACHTRICHTENBUERO RUNDFUNK REICHSVERBAND D -;;DEUTSCHEN ZEITUNGSVERLEGER --11:EUR PUBLISHING CO<br />
rs41<br />
(German News Bureau) (Radio) (Association of German Newspaper Publishers) AMANN<br />
01<br />
REICHSVERBAND D. DEUTSCHEN ZEITSCHRIFTENVERLEGER<br />
E4 I<br />
ot<br />
r41 (Association of German Magazine Publishers)<br />
rzl I<br />
cat DR RIENLIRDT, later WILHELL BLUER c/2 I<br />
va■<br />
N<br />
1-1<br />
•<br />
GAUVMLAGE STAMMVERLAG MUENC HEN Control of Other<br />
(District<br />
Publishers)<br />
(Main Publishing<br />
House — Munich)<br />
"Voelkischer Beobachter"<br />
Book Publishing<br />
Purchased Interests<br />
New Establishments<br />
in Occupied Territories.<br />
I-4 a<br />
trl<br />
U)
dt<br />
•<br />
: •<br />
,-.<br />
..' . 26 -MN/ 45<br />
)Af,11!:',,,::: • . , ... ,..<br />
•<br />
S E C<br />
:,,°'071:111rX!*<br />
,,,, , ..r.:if..„,;.;:„....i,..,,,,z :4-Ayr , ,r,' ".4. ,A",t<br />
r a !PI DET. AC, 11 .....;.,..,:' , ,,,,7<br />
• . _, , , . .4,,,' , •••••, . '.4•,4<br />
` ,f .4 .-.,-- , re ‘.1?-':'..,' ■ 4 rr<br />
4,'‘ I .:',- • tli'i: . "S:i1:1...i111.6(.7. ;2....„<br />
f ,,:..:._;,./„.,,,',',/,' .• 1_, !",. 7 :_,,::^' ,L...v0 97:<br />
sEvENTH.ARmX.RTTFR(WIATI10 I<br />
- APO 758 .. .,.,,,. -,.; . :. , ;1 4 3 46 oa $.. . 4 ,:p. ., ..!.. ;= 4.1:: .,,,;,...,,,, ,.,;,,c,:,..;-<br />
... .<br />
d on ;: 3/1.A.<br />
RISE OF NAZI SM IN VIENCir3,11 .,141 ,„,,,,,d2,...-„,....<br />
.-----7--.7:- ,•<br />
•<br />
'!"'!!"""fr":::J .611.!..0 PO<br />
FE Ji;<br />
„ . , .<br />
.<br />
P.). 110:All° I**,<br />
"1, SOURCE - *rfv..)1::,1c1 need . lits4".<br />
aolmalialst4q.<br />
! . •<br />
;i1 D<br />
FRAUENFELD , : Alfred Eduard, Major; 'GAF , nfOrMeriGAULEITERSOf.AX:,<br />
. je.ctr*Ets-born:18: May 1898, in.-VIENNAI'fof<br />
WifterfiniShing REALSCHULE (HighiSehool) . 1 1116e ntet44 a<br />
HOC4ACHULEft(TechniCal . College) but :veie.65bItiged,Aorailaie,0150.tat.ia<br />
dift16ultiei 4 .; -He , served in : World OlVar OI tfrb0 4916 t019191640<br />
in the Austrian Air Corps. In 1923 he became a bank olerk4 :.4"re0<br />
19 20 , ,-hebecame , interested in literaturi Sttti;ttidnt6t*iit4W:<br />
. • i; - o I no it:04006 •<br />
Rating: Date of Int ormationi. IfityT45 „interrogat<br />
.1 ono<br />
;;;Lf-% .. . • n.TaIMIUM ,TPIti T.<br />
2;%I.POLITIOAL:ACTIV ITIES IN VIENNA . VIrtutuKtio..Mit'<br />
•<br />
NAZI MR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT<br />
. •<br />
211 0 ECL ASS f?<br />
.<br />
'31""°%.400C.:.<br />
EGRET<br />
.,„,„ 111:q^.,7771. .4,7,,,,,.-:.:17,,,,,:-..7,L',1,.:;•;;S:,<br />
71i77 - Fi,...6;Lisir),•1<br />
..L,";'74.•*,'; • .;..: 4, Nr7-.N 'If -'4"` 'Aft(r•<br />
Subject ela.iMes 'he entered -the Nazi PtirtyAna929,<br />
desparatesituation of the State maderlexistence.:ffOricthe.tihd.104.<br />
Young - .people met strong.' obbteidiesatryings qb.:b4<br />
ject c:laims he tried through the Christian Social PartSinai.<br />
a1 Party.. iii;.'.Vairi)and. were : theret.Si‘..i <strong>for</strong>ceOintelohef0;<br />
particsli Subject,..4believesilthithiNationalla<br />
dire dt.f!liroduct -.1.of the Vefaailles Treaty.r..1; 0 01. af. 'rib ell 0a ;10 :Akio<br />
FRIVENFELD advanced ,:cidickly in ,th iNSDAP and,LbecatiireVAAt<br />
in the beginning of 1930 ("or rather made myself GAULEITEIV9.44.4.<br />
post vntil the party was officially banned in June 1931::<br />
over the political period lightly by saying, "The clima„.<br />
t p ights ,e.mong the . students „ at , the ..Unlyely4t' i<br />
Veaten .,up:three , ' these .four 'yeaksio.uKigfp,onirell<br />
we,,13--tif ter, ,.'thre é . af4: . ca sualtie •:t he , glittu:gglit":4W4::<br />
11.14Ailaq,<br />
FRAUENFEL became niembet • of the • LANDESRE4IOUNelt I<br />
- S,TADTIVT (City. COuniellor );* . LANDT GSASGEORDNITEPTMditial A<br />
.i.O<br />
4f t/he : .GEMEINDERAT ,( City, 'A,dMinii;;.ii;Ati:81<br />
uiafldz Ordineto' hi m 'the e . entire' pelitiar. 13nth r<br />
usual pcditicai. differences 'VIÈN in NA-and :cad' not<br />
ift<br />
trawl`<br />
105<br />
rsser.-,,<br />
FRAUE/q7ELD #as .only . GAVLEITER of vfarillte:ifieSaalWa<br />
en tra tre . :tto l.PI:oisscH , THEO . HkBICHT;, :14O`41gd<br />
1932 rie Ausirian - leaders of . the ilb14? s:star, jizqyNatli<br />
FE0' b., 'Cause': Of Jewish connections: Ar<br />
kter ditUtt<br />
ition<br />
, : . • tt., ■41asy-la-z4 0.4A<br />
• „ , . f - • • -<br />
•<br />
DVIpi efi<br />
Thi4gs gradual,ly; .became toughe r.<br />
u siniser" characieri dame to him'as c011abA0Voris.l. ,Itnarlitvns114,.<br />
HITLER'S . advent in Germany . acts of viol6lide at'arie4 ',and " .r<br />
party vias oUtlavfed. ':.FHAUENFELD'<br />
' '.....041-0,1! 4 ) A Az:<br />
9.,EvAOrhe 44+;<br />
obey th'e gilder to , flee to Germany like , all .:. 0.0...‘17..1144,..t .olkild rs . b . gri<br />
to e ' his •party • . Except ' day' d if<br />
was .,a34:o*ed ...to move 'freely VIENNA ,frOM<br />
ArreeItc4:-..o .n suspicion of ,having . auther'ed ,.;eindelease<br />
later, he was arrested again and waS''Seht t •<br />
of negotiations with Prince STARHEMBERG, He was released at<br />
34 and this time DOLLFUSS , thru his representative STEPAN, started Ale<br />
ations of his own and offered him a pesition:,:fin.hisø<br />
• Mear.while the LANDESLEITUNG of the , whose seat :was: in mime.<br />
• rrePgatediy: ordered him to flee •Austria (.anct.threatenestnhilfftWithIrSifrOt*<br />
At/A.4e.; Same PrinceST.ARHEMBERG:lhaftWiSiati. he 'found out that -<br />
. 4:911.6 srVith • DOL FUSS. L and wa n<br />
,<br />
ted .t to havéhi arrests. 0.0.1)0184cq<br />
events was . ' .:decisive <strong>for</strong> FRAUENFELD MUNICS.:10004645.<br />
At the LANDESLEITUNG in MUNICH he was rather ungraciciuSly,-;iẹ<br />
. ...4■107.:'<br />
was subsequently assigned to minor propaganda activities; .<br />
CENTRAL INTE1LISEACU.A1`<br />
ROURtESMETHOOSEKEWI*OtO*PW.<br />
NAZI WAR CRIMESOISC00.0REA01<br />
DATE 2001 2007<br />
•N? • ‘11.• 11:4;;:t4II,,<br />
. . .<br />
• •<br />
•<br />
. .<br />
00'<br />
:<br />
"<br />
'AP 4j<br />
-.••• sz.,y ..•<br />
" t`' qt., • 2•c,,.
1<br />
SECRET<br />
r-<br />
4<br />
26 Nay 1.45 ,<br />
,<br />
"<br />
t<br />
• 177 _; • /. , •<br />
aaeviire plane accident and :suffered critical in-<br />
. j •drieeplut'ne?vciiiiirshock: - It took several Weeks until he recovered, and<br />
iththeidiatiarafterlisardS.had an . automobile accident. Offers this as proof<br />
that he couldn't possibly have,had any connection with the abortive upriang -<br />
in Austria and the assasinatión - of Ghandellor'DOLLFUSS.<br />
All Austrian Nazi offices in Gemny were dissolved. FRAUENFELD himself, .<br />
who claims to have been profoundly shocked by the events of those last • few<br />
months, asked <strong>for</strong> permission to return to Austria. This was refused, and he<br />
was told • that.iithe , Wantedaomething to : do, he would have to find:a'job'it<br />
Germany.bAer,00ntacted Secretaryof : the.State,, FUNK and-accepted:theapostjof<br />
3ESCHAEFTSFUEHRER',(Financial,Seoretarof the . REICHSTHEATERKAMMER.DER HEtcHS.<br />
XULCUHKAMMERo(Theatrical . Wing , of•the National Deptof Culture)...-'AccOrding<br />
toFRAUENFELDIthies Marked theend . 7.ofhis.active political.tareerJ.n_Austria::<br />
.and i; • • • . • • .<br />
He claimed thatiwithinayear he . already had differences and_troubles at::<br />
his joband that one of his close collaborators was removed from office,,<br />
.and . mdPaliW=f41-thitiAisjob 1<br />
was made impotent by the pOintment of a : Chief .<br />
.4:AMMERPRAESIDENT, FRAUENFELD sought refuge in writing and in speaking totrs.<br />
Thisgave.him opportunity to travel extensively and bemOre.indePeridentthan;<br />
it would: have been possible under normal circumstances. His speeches and<br />
- le04;AP.O.U4figrithezhrst years.were . at times , contrary....to Offiaial policy;<br />
• • 00 • • , ( •<br />
' and hi0Was <strong>for</strong>bidden:AoA.ecture on seirera2-occasions. He alSo•taught-in,the:.<br />
SchoOl. ,00the German Theater . .in:BERLIN,...at . the Theater Schoo1,1# BOCHUM,:anC<br />
atoSCHOENBRONNAn " VIENNA:<br />
111Fp4pENFELDi!eXpectedetoreturn'tO,VIENNA.after the ANSCHLUSS 4 ..but diecov.-;:<br />
eredythatlthecitYZWas-<strong>for</strong>bidden to him:by Reich Commissar - BUERCKEL.. Howeveri<br />
under the pretense of scheduled lectures at•SCHOENBRUNA and various other art<br />
instCtilti7onshiltanaged.to-visit the 'city occasionally.' 1<br />
*JAI<br />
•<br />
3 . . VIENNDIáLLTiSEONED<br />
r•,'<br />
Tn ti9ae thei .."sobering . Up process", as he calls it,:f011Owd:'"We'AUstrian ,<br />
' 1 . dreamerCwho fought Mr_the old idea of the Reich now found , . ore . us . , es v• so<br />
• • . • .<br />
21', ollt.A.B.1:00;APPenedwa,A.the ereatio0,f a: Greater "Prussia (GROSSPREUSSEi):<br />
- cViENNA on<br />
'<br />
oper'lhand; was rObbed2df ..her cultural;importanceland was<br />
ztntwiWIAt<br />
• •<br />
degradecl itolvt:subotainate provincial tOW . t. '"..:AcCording•td -himthe population<br />
• " LAW 1. Vhf!.1 11ii " ' . ' ' •<br />
of VIENN 7. tired of the machinations of cuptiuTSCHNIGG and ;BUERML, demanded'y<br />
qgnifq6eFA.4ilEk'ELD'Weriieti-hilviti campaigned in 0.4W*; •<br />
and •<br />
,the leveOstivWad_eniiely,spontaneous,.,Thit claims ṭhat<br />
OroughtaboUtthe sedond:tat.ty...:<br />
• itn,84k4grirn tOf:FR4IIENFELDThe- principal cause fdr . this'adtion wae"eh..;<br />
impre444 ircreted:.;by4reyloUs -<br />
events it VIENNA. However, the accusations:<br />
agAi4if -hith'itelUdedhairing USed,hiS'Official position to giye.aidand'coM-:'<br />
fo:7CGNISCHLINGE'ChalfAryarisYfOrilier1y active in theatrical dirdles:- The.'<br />
, caae,:,t5ri ved at,a . negativ,e_prinolusion and was dropped . . . He o asked to be<br />
. Feeikn'irom'putiliO_Offioelit:favcir of a seat on the HOird;of a.<br />
r<br />
, • •<br />
VIENNAbank;''This ,•• , .<br />
s Was flatly'refuded:'': ' • 7 ..<br />
After that<br />
Oiride_FHAUENFELD;decided it would be safer <strong>for</strong> him in the -<br />
ArinS6'%nd'in ,.1940:4i.itered:the:, GAF-as ,;i Captain. He was detailed to the .<br />
i., Fox4qt) !0?fi4 /AS ,:fiaiaon*fic'er. <strong>for</strong> various Army headquarters in occupied<br />
covntriee" .'liid dtitieifterMinated , • -with . a'iPinal injury received in:an . aUto .77.<br />
moileaccideit during the latter Part ri“940. Thereafter his job consisted<br />
of wri 'tilErWlWand-gilting , lectrires rit'the:political'and::46OnoMic'ait<br />
••• • • .<br />
atiOVV . .<br />
: 4:: ACTIVITIES .AS COMMISSAR:IN THE.UKRAINE.<br />
hall . ,431 -00 ,<br />
',Enal942helwas:,su4denlr pulled outof the Army, sent. to the OST- MINISTER •<br />
IUM (MiniAtx;Y.OorAEastern Atfairs),and.assigned as GENERALKOMMISSAR,(Genetai<br />
' PomniSsar).t<strong>for</strong>rithe .Crim ea...: He elaim4that he and GAULEITER ERICH KOCH; I541.15--<br />
was Reich'Commissar,IA'Aha UKRAINE, clashed immediately. FRAUENFELD<br />
,;•10:1<br />
SE CRET<br />
• I . _ _ %!.
sEURET<br />
26 May-45—<br />
that KOCH's administrative policies, and not his, were directly responsible<br />
<strong>for</strong> the "breeding of partisans". Source states that under hisloWnmethods<br />
he obtained the best harvest in the Crimea, and never had a caSaiOfterrorism<br />
or partisan violence. He administered the northern half tfYthe Crimea<br />
from Sep 42 to Sep 43.<br />
As a result of his differences with KOCH, two of his assistants Were<br />
arrested and removed from office. How he always managed to slip thoiigh<br />
the fingers of the Gestapo has not as yet been clearly determined. Later,<br />
disciplinary action was again started against him, but the Russian advance<br />
intarrupted proceedings. FRAUENFE'D returned to Germany and dissolved the<br />
finalcial and personnel sections of his Crimean administration and, .<br />
his own request, re-entered the Army. He was assigned to the . OKW WEST<br />
PRUS3IA and travelled to various sectors of the trOnt . dispensing political<br />
propaganda to the troops. In the course of his dutied he arrived in:VIENNA<br />
in the fall of 44. Here he was prohibited from lecturing by Baldur VON<br />
SCHIRACH.<br />
5. ANOTHER INNOCENT<br />
Subject repeatedly claimed that since 1933 he has not been politically<br />
active, and that all his friends were either artists, or businessmenwhO<br />
were lukewarm toward the regime. He also claims that during : hip:ter* as'.<br />
GAULEITER, the police and other authorities never had occasion to.eirest<br />
him <strong>for</strong> any criminal acts, and that his two arrests wereOf a pUfelr:polit<br />
ical nature. Of course FRAUENFELD did not explain what the authOrities:.:<br />
recocnized as criminal acts. He never belonged to the SA or SB, and did.<br />
not hold any rank (except GAULEITER) in any of the party organitiOna<br />
His party membership, in addition; was discontinued after his entry into<br />
the army. The latter, it must be remembered, was not voluntary; ainCe all<br />
members of the Nazi Party had to relinquish their membership upon entry .<br />
into the Seritice.<br />
26 May 1945 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER<br />
"L‘'"ae'L<br />
PAL KUBALA,<br />
Maj, MI,<br />
Commanding.<br />
SECRET<br />
3
.<br />
• :<br />
• EL): FRAUENFELD , 30, 4<br />
Alfr ed. Edu d , MAJ GAF GA4EITR f. : .,TI ENNAguzi<br />
C i ES CHAEFTS FUEHRER ( Business Manager) . `THEAVERKAMMER<br />
, I ts(Th'ese.i?e .<br />
tEICHSKULTURKAIVER (National Dept 01 Culture). (Cf Report!Illitr.<br />
• • -<br />
b) *HINKEL, Hans, REIC.HSFILMINTIThIDANT (National 'Film (Dire-Oto)<br />
T Department, 'Propaganda Ni istry'; S our o e'<br />
• 4ifot 4"A'ppe'<br />
1 P7- •<br />
. •<br />
; t • .• • "4.6;.rfr<br />
2ORIGIN S<br />
.----_—_ AND FUNCTIONS OF THE R EI C HS ICITI,TURKAMttiER<br />
. , . • .,,,:.:4k;<br />
''İ he -REICHSKULTURKAlr,MER (National Dept of 'Culture ) .14,aq kLan . tit t etiiiit .:NEVr "O.p.,*,;.<br />
bine - the entirecul6.Lral life of the nation Under :s'on lag'ig '''''' "/4:1170i6 c.4, ' 44.4''' 'Y'l<br />
existence' was : provided <strong>for</strong> in law, • and the ordei;e1.:0,f4tis'I' A • w W c4‘) ....<br />
..<br />
I- heads<br />
e l , eri<br />
4<br />
) : in turn had the pOw<br />
.. , eis,s *4 of<br />
:tithe" ,... l,aavrAt<br />
;:- . -6.; E *: . •ii er :RICK. ( R „,<br />
.:.„.. t<br />
EICHSKULTURKAIOIR); other agencies,<br />
ma.11,3 IA* its manpower . <strong>for</strong> ' their own uses, but i&;t410.-.4,i3#.4°..Q<br />
I Z 1 . ... .<br />
• qPtIl<br />
'... exietenb ë i nevertheless.;<br />
.. - , !..i.. -.4..q.ivt,r.'<br />
,<br />
,-'1,,w7j<br />
, ep. Itrt , 7. 1Z.: "'.!!;1, .„4,.<br />
T he' l'fiikOtionS' which the FMK was supposed , to .fulf,14'P! ?.I.<br />
,<br />
ow<br />
..,.' ing i ".: 6-eat iOn and supervision of art: and musicA s,choo ,ls!,,,stt,<br />
."'.1`' of .41 ,f- ,- - 'Ai„,<br />
the' ii4ereets of ' its member's , social eecurity I , 6349nYine,,t)9‘<br />
if ica.tion'''Of- . ,<br />
talent*; : pensions, relief,; . .. ' and , 3..e gal atcli c • . . ..f " . iierWo<br />
..., .,••• c, .!:;.,,,:,.....-- *titikAlmtr<br />
..:,,,...,...1,:..,..—..,!-..<br />
• .. ...tnt,k, ...- ,,,,,,, , ,<br />
'3.-,ORGANIŻATION (See .:<br />
,<br />
— Appendix) k<br />
: 4.--:43,?,,:i;<br />
:': •<br />
I ' ' - . ...<br />
•<br />
• •<br />
. .ii •<br />
• .*; '.), :1;4'i: is.sFf ,<br />
,......,.... • .,c44,-,<br />
Heading the RIX : wer e . the following' pe'rson.iiiii.vie.:1:;1t<br />
• II* •• • • • • •• :::,;*<br />
1::,..,,a,::::<br />
Pre rsident : REICHSMINISTER FUER VOLK S— ' . ,,.......<br />
'AJFKLAERUNG . ix.: . PROPAGANDA (Minister • o'f . :', 0 . ! e..,. Di,:. Pa*. V.,9;iiie<br />
r<br />
Yp abliC.' • ,Enlightenment and Propaganda)1.<br />
' 01<br />
... 3), . !r :Fu l ,<br />
. • • I ,, • .<br />
P...<br />
opaganaa Ministx:y , - i '• • ....:.....,.,.,se,e :.<br />
..<br />
. S'tiit.e ,..$eop, ...i?;.<br />
'chronb10#1:140:<br />
'<br />
.. Vice President S tate •.Secietary . of<br />
G:lscHAFTsfuzgkER • ..:. • .;...,;&:4 t ; ',. '<br />
.(BusineSs '<br />
' ...Hinii01<br />
....:, Manafler)...„ -- the actual head , i<br />
•:, - I . :A -.5 4...<br />
,.,-.<br />
1 ''' 4i• , )' •<br />
4 %<br />
.;:.<br />
.• ••• :i ';'' Li igill fExiYert-. . , .<br />
.,,..,<br />
.,:r.- :,,,..1,:,-,!tv!.,Dizscliht$ /<br />
,i - - ..:4 t Ii;Aiii1Fig\ c<br />
-11.,Source is of the opinion that greater po*er 'Vas; veit.teci.4 •<br />
i<br />
" .: •<br />
•<br />
the ,..(IESCHAEFTSFUEHRER . no . <strong>for</strong> reasons of . 4(4sSi..tY: orn..<br />
w.i:14.): .r. 1*<br />
.4 ex fi 'Oilficrymt, it A<br />
Bieli; w.,...as''; the ;result of the personal aflihi:tilOxiii':bf ittlitinifbITO-t.2<br />
tc;Ii;..o.i.)Pos,t : as . CIES C HAFTS FUEHRER adUediV,I.' . .<br />
held the . .... I '. title<br />
;:.. the<br />
9f;•49;ftilf..E114,etotrol 4. 44, .:11-ț.....:.. --<br />
I ii‘-,ganization. .<br />
' 4. ,i . ',',• .,,.. - .11, ie ::,;;ICK:., was ,:fl-u- ther di-vided into d e partments . , (K,.4,141=2<br />
l ir Co'te(H;todsopie .<br />
„.,),..,;.:eabh.bainfg.:..de%714-.*. .,.<br />
field such . as the theater, a er-music ,<br />
-'-<br />
.; iii..clio.t<br />
i,l'itiiti .. .e<br />
et,tri ṫc :t-ii.li<br />
4 t se 1 f , hWtt) ,ifii<br />
:however, had similar<br />
ga**.,-,,....<br />
depart the ritSj. .;(i iig<br />
.-/'.. .. rNiliblinl:06-<br />
i''''-..i''',).4::,,.....■-. 13. ,. e.' r e .t.e4;','-'1-<br />
... •• was 49 clear boundary . ' between :fiie iii8rii'd '..,..ct<br />
and those .„:ot,the RKK. The reslat . loss .; an nrin'tiiiVeiiii<br />
4<br />
y<br />
• functions' and, frequently, confusion and ,frict lik3n:* .fhAC<br />
it. • •<br />
fmEs DISCLOSURE ACT<br />
2000<br />
SECRET<br />
DECLASS I F IED AND REI...E.ALE.0<br />
CENTRAL INTELL IGENCE<br />
SOURCES METHODS gxEmPflON•3.0i:E:<br />
NAZI WAR CRIMES<br />
DATE 2 007- . ,2'007.<br />
. •<br />
''•<br />
•
e<br />
n't6<br />
the<br />
manager<br />
Widely.<br />
;<br />
.<br />
etc<br />
S ' E C .ill q; 'iT ''<br />
- - -- — —1 —X<br />
27ay k5<br />
,.. `:::::: ' •: ,4..: I : :.,, . '<br />
, . y.., , , ;•6 ,z,<br />
. ' , : . , .: : r'.........r';';''111'1.1` A.%) ,<br />
... . A4%, tqvi<br />
During.s.HIlsiKEL i s regime the power in;.tner .. .....„...., toty . hir. t‘t,<br />
,.1..departments , then to depar tments . in :the,„.,..., ,,‘?PrOjAigftli'a ,t),.., :<br />
lrelt,I.<br />
..,,N...1..: ,'Y , A:. 45.<br />
HINT( Et, : swoia d always manage to r egain ...his,4 lace , :ratc,.. h , .. e'd: 1<br />
• -• ''' iz/i.ti'on'; of ,, authority in the RICK wait ..,'6,6' P. .6 .....thP \I; ilLtṛ,.:.,f;,,, i,i.ṛ''.6:-.76.1%14.,i'6;,.g,.., VW '''';<br />
of the-presidents• and business thanagerS;of,IthediTferenp., 4 aeparX -<br />
up,derminingtheir-influence and impor ktance, ,,!..LlatWg4Wr4 : V. 4s, •;,.. ' '<br />
. ... . : 1.. f . 1Z e ' ; +...<br />
• ,.;;;; '$.6iii-C'e.". says that HINKEL lacked tephnicall)ackgi-0 1. .In<br />
und ,...,:rtanct<br />
41 work '', to have been of Small value,, He 6 4, iii .',14 tiiAh'ei; tlii-tiraiter<br />
,..,..„ was, :. a .. ruthless turnover .of p er s On. n., ḅ., 1, 4..?,,:v,,,, ,1- . i 't ḣ. ii1r4 i,,a4pro1411 .zpi-5.ftnoti), :1;,,1411-9m, ' '<br />
..:'. - given i'?; . ,t... !... . . . . , .„ - .: , . , . - . ' ,,,,• . 1 . ,. !1 ..."■-''' .,:''' . f.l'• kt •<br />
-„,i, ■'' i ',:- ..:,,-,' ',7:-4...,.. mcr,ATL .k *fid,e,,,i' 0<br />
. , ,' . addition titular or.,the , it a„ :ther:ewas 3.a<br />
44<br />
to the<br />
.<br />
head<br />
Senate') of 130 m embers 1 ', at ..firSt i ',diVidedq,e.cijiiiv.14.<br />
' iii:. , '' ( ICul n fur'e 1,<br />
adiai nis.tr a. tbrs”, (kULTURVERWALTU NGSFUEHRER ), ' and ', :cr e t:v; : ) :ir ''i,:.<br />
70 ' -: few :years! thev....)administriktive per sonnel:,,Were remO,V6d%fy<br />
1?ii.,', . senates C'Onifened . Once a year to heara- '. Speech by '''tfisi l<br />
, . • • .<br />
.<br />
'V' i• ' . - .',', . - .<br />
.,1, , - ,4 ... • ■ ;r: r , :;',..,<br />
-<br />
.!A?, ,,,.,f,r,,,AP.,•:,<br />
.. ' If,•, F' THE<br />
' :.<br />
DEPARTMENTS O RKK<br />
1t 3.. ,4',°''.??;94 :1Lir.,., ;' .,<br />
. '1'. f.i331; S-le-v 'T:e%... ‘..'d'./e.;74:•.'t--Men'tiṡ.:-L".<br />
” MMER<br />
..) '<br />
,.,.:i:).x.si<br />
functioned 'under ,thev,„,).4: . ii ,pflit, „yet4'<br />
li :eeratuei ,939creorati i9Vi0.7tsEa,'..c.ahnddepraadt.tio4s,..0;;;,,„.<br />
men was 'dissolved i‘asnsdbuesd<br />
, . , ,:‘,...,..t r<br />
president, business<br />
s' . , who 'as in .,:.the:Ic...a..t...;f1.,p<br />
the :..,act ' ual - . h e ad. ' ‘ ',<br />
71 ; ',.There was, ' however, a certain ' ' 4illon l '''f':'''fl.ii'o ..° 1;.<br />
t<br />
, .' "L"..4h<br />
,pOwerl,Iabiong .<br />
: these ,..: v, ar offices within , 1,t ,<br />
'. 'c' h' —diSTRAUSS<br />
. ..t.A.,.,-..„.ri<br />
. ;. as president',<br />
was, tne..,le'.athdeingde134<br />
, ist.i.Zeati.<br />
R m:-,i t,ii ..i.. a26 ;iii ':#:Oililio:readtubyx:e Pr.deo pf P ii.l t e. RAABE: i<br />
led ! ,.t . - . department, ,.4,later<br />
.:,i..4:,.......:1).:..4.. 1 arly e'...141t.<br />
, f 613:owed<br />
.',.. ,;i17::xtic..e.<br />
t",./Ps'<br />
'RI: ii "cl r'SUCHENIVIRTli was business s thanage s .. . ..<br />
arof,-the thteiatle1r3d7errbtier'<br />
" an d4 Lir- 'e.'in'ere R B, CHLOESSER until ( iith ,<br />
..4.,also t.11W...er-i!<br />
.:!... c ,,,' ...<br />
''..." ' ' - fm`ue' ' f ' the -Propaganda Mini st ry ); :.•lati, ter....±Lt.Le....... -50. , ,sLo..va t.,..br,..44r4 .<br />
Paul<br />
v<br />
Pil<br />
'''.44.&11 S''<br />
,,- lj : Ar41: .1itde,,partmentS u4:44' :a - ...- ' ' had . !1127MA11100Itte!111: from . . ees.,;.;.a.Ohi :.)517' 1<br />
43 Y31 '121<br />
015 i •gal2.-dfalY. Mini s t ty maintained branch .:office a :.:: .,.!.i.lit',11g1 irk<br />
'tiiir.'' l'efr trii seiit s ...:Of • t he RXIC maintained .", only '411eent<br />
•5` . EiCh`:`ItePiirtment .of the RICK was diVicledinto.:48e'dtille<br />
wtk,?,C.1,. were .41.1rther . divided into spécittl grbups.:,<br />
dep:ii:ctioeiit 6f* or ska'mple , was divided into the*,,..P.Oliowirle sfe.ṫtio<br />
i (BITE:iNE-Y1.•,' 14 ,4i4' entertainment ISTIK),, ('Zi'r'.-Cilt.4.:'.4itticre'vtiTer.<br />
(ART<br />
( ''<br />
.A/1) 7., .<br />
, actors (SCHAUSRIELER) , publishers. <strong>for</strong> ,the',.. Stake1(101<br />
Memh,)rithip , 'In ' sections varied ,<br />
.<br />
'' -T4 eaoosiiitifigei<br />
,,<br />
had ' abOilt 4-U 000 Members , the dance section about t- 6'.-bitio<br />
abou 1 00. . ' •<br />
, \ ,<br />
:rṭji 'e .`1: St a. ' 4e1.' , se ction of the theater de,per t me (114.i . ',' '<br />
.:,....,..,,<br />
ign) hiDe cial. groups<br />
c, . .. .<br />
•.• a ,l ..1 Produders :. State , district , city , ICRAFT‘DIJRCIi;.,FR4UP<br />
Thr °ugh' Joy ) ; private enterprises. s.<br />
••<br />
. • .., .,• • .<br />
•<br />
•<br />
-b Dir ec t Or GENINTENDANTEN (General mana,gerS ,) IDANT<br />
• •<br />
r" DYREKTOREN ( directors ) .<br />
,<br />
. . c ; . Stage Inanagers : play and opera managers .<br />
e r c ia 1 ma •iager s ; conductors, bal) et, i<br />
master<br />
d) ;tc torsi k,<br />
e) Singers.<br />
, f) Da ncersi<br />
g) Choir sinicers<br />
,<br />
'<br />
• `•-•• 1.'1<br />
L 4 r .:•L<br />
"F','<br />
sdiltiv.<br />
-°"'.4<br />
1A- y.<br />
t•- •<br />
- )<br />
4(.4<br />
• 1.<br />
'SW<br />
)1`i 4<br />
•<br />
,.. arti ■", at io; .4t 'echpi'0,a1,:,: comm-'<br />
oṛ ,j‘,L, t i y■ ,,,,...„477,-,. .1,, , .,. t a ,:. 4.... : 4. 4.,• ., ':,,'' ,<br />
iliv.,:i'.,t-o 4..;•4<br />
,<br />
'!„'''C'.'? ' ■ •,?:.'?..;,..ti11:<br />
: •<br />
,<br />
SECRET )1•••
,<br />
5. FJNCTION OF THE DEPARTMENTS<br />
•<br />
'<br />
The primary function of the departmentw was the-,represintt<br />
'members in the securing of positiona,;H.POliticai.,;:directA0it<br />
to ., emanate from the corresponding departMen t s; ', 1ritfie!Pr'olo.Agaii<br />
T'ie primary function was th e r<br />
't i0 ; Membership in the section&S';40,;.':.'.`04jeet,.'ticii'llc.:i';''<br />
the NUREMBERG 'laws. Thus, membership . Wa g poasib]Ônly<br />
Aryans Second . Class" (MISCHLINGE' 2.. I
TIMATER DEPT:<br />
Pres: Paul RARTMLNN<br />
Vice-Pres: Eugen KLOEPFER<br />
Business: Dr SCHADE<br />
Stage Dept: Theanr LOOS<br />
Directors' Dept:' SCHEFFELS<br />
Circus, Vaudeville; etc:<br />
SEIGER<br />
FILM DEPT<br />
PrOs:jPrOf Carl FROEHLICH<br />
V icePreet:Carl MELZER<br />
Businesei Carl MELZER<br />
FilMsi Prof . W. LIEBENEINER:<br />
MUSIC DEPT:<br />
Pree: Prof Peter RAABE'<br />
Vide-Pres: Prof Paul GRAENER<br />
Business: Dr NORGENROTH<br />
L&W,AFFAI<br />
BCBMIDT"...645,„<br />
•.`,;;JA<br />
PERS °MELVA<br />
VOill'DRAT;/0'<br />
:PROPAG/<br />
Nolfgeing<br />
GEM<br />
IISORERVAk<br />
ORWIVE ARTS DXPT<br />
Pres: Prof Vilhelm KBE'S<br />
Vice-Pros: BREKER, GIES8I4.<br />
Bus iness,: Htins'NEISTER.'<br />
LITERATURE'DEPTi<br />
Pros: Hans J01-123T<br />
Vice-Pros: BAUR (from tHER<br />
firm)<br />
BUt ines : GMITZ<br />
PRESS DEPT:<br />
Pros: Max IANN<br />
Vice-Press Dr DI=TRICH
•<br />
SECRET.'.5;li AVENOVSLI RE T1/5"°19-9X:(77<br />
NOT DE: b<br />
27 May 19 1+5 SECRET<br />
. - .. :AuthT: .<br />
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER . :Init: ` r• ?robk ve4 :-<br />
APO 758 US ARMY :Date: '27 May 1945<br />
...-<br />
tf*.,TerligtifY.MS.0.2.0 . ,3<br />
1. SOURCE<br />
HANS FRANK : OLAIMS<br />
''(11<br />
• C: C.Z11.- 3 a 'MI<br />
,<br />
FRANK, Hans, GOVERNOR C.IENERAL of POLAND. After reporting , <strong>for</strong> d ,uty;2 a...s a<br />
lieutenant to the 9 ml .gt upon the opening of .Ger .rṇan., hos14t.titieli.gkinst<br />
Poland, source received orders from - HITLER to take 'bitir'' '' the' aditAlletAtion<br />
of Poland. • He proceedeci. to Silesia, where the FUEHRER welcom0Mahis<br />
. special train and gave him his final order, by which Source clairr&o.,..,have<br />
guided himself throughout the period of his regime in polaildh "418:44:1)<br />
so administer the Country that We May draw frOm it the 'gretaisst poss Milile<br />
use <strong>for</strong> . the war.".SSISICKIVIUARI<br />
Source took office 7 Nov 39 in CRACOW. In 44 he returned to Gelitjy,,,<br />
with his staff and documents, having fled be<strong>for</strong>e the' Rizeisian advance. . lie<br />
...las captured at his estate at NEUHAUS/SCHLIF2SEE by American trodfik4MUA14<br />
FRANK has attempted suicid.e twice since his captured.. Weakene.dry.th.to ,ugh<br />
losc of blood, he talks only with ' ef<strong>for</strong>t .<br />
Source is clever and, .knowing the danger of his present sit .us;;;41;e.ti"n.lu the<br />
light of his past record, is dramatic and persuasive in trying .to Vindicate<br />
himself , Be now condemns the Nazi idealS:;: althOugh,SritsWirslifitnAVOUltr4<br />
Acad emy •,: 'Of .' ;Ge r man 'Law AKADEMIE • DES . DEU TS C HEWIRECHTES )1 Welt aV ars;tr;one iroic e<br />
in the <strong>for</strong>mulation .of the ' Nazi concetions : of . riglit .., f<br />
.•,- 5•.-Ifrarỵ..01/ EciEL9x<br />
.. .. ,...<br />
r.,. -'; --.—. . • 1<br />
Ratis :• C-3 Date of In<strong>for</strong>Mation:' Se•e ztext.>.i:.roaritrerr!trikatOilegi.K1<br />
uu<br />
a. ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY RECORD<br />
P.41.711.3.0 ..kcatziaa2<br />
so.„„.i, familiar, through the press,.t.witn,..the, a.cic.usat4n1 r dtts. agalinst<br />
him .E3..0i:Vernois 'General Of Poland. , He' iniiiitS:;!til e<br />
Polish
•■••<br />
SECRET<br />
i t7. MaY 4,<br />
I<br />
:;...GOVERNOR.GENERAL,S<br />
. 1<br />
•••• •<br />
,<br />
STAFF IE POLAND<br />
Source gave the following as:the personnel of his staff in Poland:<br />
SEYSS-INQUART, Dr<br />
Deputy to FRANK.<br />
BUEHLER, Dr<br />
Chief of Government; Secretary..,of<br />
State.<br />
,<br />
-.‘.•1 VON<br />
10-14.<br />
KRAVSHAAR' (Later )<br />
Dept of Interior.<br />
i• EMMERICH rb . • .<br />
Pept of EconoMicsi<br />
SPINDLER-1<br />
$TINKOVSKY,(tet,er)<br />
FRAUNDOR1/a2<br />
°I<br />
eh .eanwet..h<br />
NAUMAN1-., .1. '4:: I '<br />
t'el • • ' •r I ?Ent,'1 •<br />
GERM '<br />
I.A.UXMANNi...0 r<br />
•<br />
: President of the<br />
Dept of LabOr.<br />
Dept 9f Justice.<br />
Nutrition<br />
Railways<br />
Postal Dept<br />
Treasury,..<br />
o.t . 7<br />
KRUEPERVI.HOEHRREA: SS ,u POLIZEIFUEHRER<br />
,<br />
-) .*..(auperiora&ancifPOlice%Leader) . Liaisoh men to;HIMMLER;,, .<br />
KOPPE, HOEHERER SS u'hi"POLIZEIFUEHRER:<br />
carried out his orders in:<br />
police matters without PW!el<br />
iSti,Perkg10,qtan.LpolicevLeader).<br />
. knowledge.<br />
4, CONCENTRAT/QN. CAMPS<br />
• • ,<br />
._<br />
Source d .”'Westhat he, had nothing to do :with the establishment Of<br />
concentaiori i6P4 nor. With sending persons to them. He ciaims . he became<br />
'f gtMiliarth'tWe rtrocitiei committed in MAJDANEK Only through<br />
<strong>for</strong>eign,prefiert:he:en'try:of the Rusdians, and immediately,addrei4d<br />
. . .•••<br />
a<br />
1Witer'to'KOPPE He*nding , - Lan explanation<br />
eViOUdl$'he,h'ed'knOW'n'of the camp only as • the "Central ColleCtine:.<br />
Poi'llefOr" .iheY Se'CVPity Sirvice" CZENTRALES'SAMMELLAGER FUER DAS,SICHERHEITS-<br />
WESEN? r only other previous knowledge about concentration tamps was<br />
tt eariSr.) i'irthe ) War : the police h6d been taking prisbnera -to-th6 amp at<br />
AUSCHWITZ, Silesia.<br />
-J.fghenttheilnterrogator observed: that the German governors in LUBLIN (undex<br />
FP.ANK)BTadtitaile.known of: :the awful conditions in MAJDANEK, scurce.became<br />
frvolvedtiniself-Contradictionsiaild finally-had to - admit-that the question<br />
had been brought up be<strong>for</strong>e the chief training leader; (HAUPTSCHULUNGSLEITER)<br />
of the Party, SCHMIDT. The responsible LUBLIN governors were<br />
, •<br />
o.ZOERNER;aDt - - ; . .Former 0 BERBUERGERMEI STER , DRESDEN... •<br />
WENDLER, Dr "' ' Former BUERGERMEISTER; HOF<br />
.„. ,<br />
•• .<br />
Themin'respOneOle*fOr the.MAJDANEK:Camp was . GRUF Maj Gen),GLOBOT-<br />
SCHNIG, a natiVer'Of'KWttiNTEN, and of Slovenian . descent.: SoUrce says lie was<br />
a ratheWibtiltal banWahCAOne-time GAULEITER in VIENNA.<br />
5, ANTI-SEMITIC ATROCITIES<br />
; . - ,<br />
T:li.RagarklingaltsyAtematici.murder of the Jews in Poland, sourde,spokt%eS.':-<br />
fo)..lowsW!As;ia ;awyer.'I,am:opposed. to lawless%disregardand killing:of humaT<br />
beings ....c0I:!%belieVel: ,a,8ecret-lawexists providing, <strong>for</strong> the extermination óf:<br />
SECRIT<br />
2
SECRET<br />
27 May 45<br />
the Jews, and agreed upon only by HITLER, HIMMLER, and HEYDRICH."<br />
Source further stated that HITLER must have known of these murders and<br />
approved of them, since he himself had once notified HITLER of the unlawful<br />
activities of the SS in Poland.<br />
Source claims that besides HITLER, guilt is on the heads of HIMMLER,<br />
HEYDRICH, GLOBOTSCHNIG, and the smaller SS leaders who carried out mass<br />
murders without orders from above.<br />
27 May 1945 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER<br />
PAUL EUBALA,<br />
Maj, MI,<br />
Commanding.<br />
SECRET<br />
3
,<br />
28 May 45<br />
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER<br />
•.APO 758 • US ARMY<br />
SECRE T:<br />
CG, 7th Army<br />
LA2214114v<br />
:Date: 28 May 1947--:<br />
•<br />
Copy No 3<br />
If-the in<strong>for</strong>mation contained in this report is required <strong>for</strong> further<br />
di:itribution, it should be so paraphrased that no mention is made of the<br />
prisoners' names qr of the methods by which the in<strong>for</strong>mation has been<br />
obi:ained.<br />
The following are the names and secret numbers of the prisoners men-<br />
.<br />
ti)ned in this report:<br />
Name Rank, Position<br />
Secret No<br />
GUJERIAN, Heinz<br />
VON GEYR Leo<br />
GENOBST (Col Gen) FUEHRERRESERVt<br />
(Officers Pool). Formerly Chief<br />
of Staff German Ground Forces and<br />
Inspector General of Armored . Units.<br />
GEN D PHRUPPE '(LA Gen), InspectOr<br />
of Armored units, <strong>for</strong>merly German<br />
Mil Attache in LONDON.<br />
45/1559<br />
45/1562<br />
HAVSSER, Paul OBSTGRUF (Col Gen of WAFFEN SS),<br />
ex-CO, Army Group "G":<br />
45/1561<br />
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT<br />
2000,<br />
DECLASSIFIED AND eatASE0 VY<br />
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ANY<br />
SOURCESMETNOOSEXEMPTIONJGig<br />
NAZ I WAR CRIMESDISCLITDDfit<br />
DATE 2001 2007
28 May 45<br />
I. THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN<br />
GUDERIAN: Everything went well at the start. After the fall of SMOLENSK<br />
our high command was faced with the same choice of decisions as<br />
NAPOLEON in 1812: Should I first go to MOSCOW, or should I first conquer<br />
the UKRAINE and occupy Russia's national granary,<br />
or should I go to conquer LENINGRAD in order to get the Baltic Sea<br />
under my control. This problem had been considered earlier, because<br />
everyone knew that such a decision would have to be made sometime.<br />
Even be<strong>for</strong>e this campaign the FUEHRER had decided to take LENINGRAD<br />
first, in order to have the entire Baltic Sea under his control, and<br />
thus establish a naval base supporting the German left flank. At<br />
the time when our troops stood at the gates of LENINGRAD, and when<br />
the drive was held up at KIEV, on our right flank, he suddenly changed<br />
his mind. He abandoned the idea to take LENINGRAD first--an<br />
attempt which could have succeeded. Nor did he attempt to take<br />
MOSCOW as NAPOLEON had done--in spite of our firm conviction that<br />
MOSCOW could be taken. In fact, I had already given orders <strong>for</strong> an<br />
attack on MOSCOW <strong>for</strong> 15 Aug with my PANZER Army. Instead he decided,<br />
after weeks of thought, to conquer the UKRAINE first. Thus, on 25<br />
Aug, I had to head back in a southwesterly direction toward KIEV,<br />
instead of being allowed to ,tart my drive toward MOSCOW. Well, at<br />
least the capture of KIEV resulted in the isolation and surrender<br />
of an army group. But it set us back 4 weeks in our advance toward<br />
MOSCO W . It got us into the muddy season, where the mud made traffic<br />
on ordinary roads impossible, and retarded it very much even on hardsurfaced<br />
roads. It was winter be<strong>for</strong>e it got too cold. You mustn't<br />
underestimate MOSCON's importance. MOSCO is not only the capital<br />
of Russia, but considering the conditions of 1941, it was the hub of<br />
Russia's communication system. All the connections between North and<br />
South which were still usable, all double-track railroad line, all<br />
the main telegraph and telephone lines, all canals and navigable<br />
rivers,,..everything passed through MOSCOW. Whoever controlled<br />
NOSC01 1i also controlled the political affairs, a powerful armament<br />
industry, and a traffic and communications center of that nation, and<br />
could split Russia into two parts. I personally presented this case<br />
to the FUEHRER on the night of 23 Aug 1941. Then he was still undecided.<br />
Later the order was given to take the UKRAINE. I was called<br />
to him to present my plan <strong>for</strong> the attack on MOSCOW once again. And<br />
once again I tried to change his mind. At that time he still could<br />
control himself sufficiently to listen to me and let'me finish my<br />
story. Once more I pictured the vital importance of MOSCOW to us and<br />
explained to him, that if we could capture MOSCOW in the early fall<br />
toward the end of September, we could cut Russia in two parts. And<br />
then we could still decide whether to occupy the Southern or the<br />
Northern half first. That was the purely military angle of the<br />
affair. Now let us consider the political angle, which was equally<br />
important. It was believed that the STALIN regime would break down<br />
politically. But in order to bring this regime to a collapse it was<br />
necessary to occupy MOSCOW. ie should have pursued a policy of convincing<br />
the Russian people that they would get a better deal if they<br />
cooperated with us. We should not have said, as we did: "We shall<br />
cut Russia into small pieces. We shall divide it and make a German<br />
colony out of it. Thus the Russians, even those who were against<br />
STALIN, the White Russians, said: "No, we won't have that." This<br />
was our great political error. The decision to take the UKRAINE<br />
first, which resulted in the unsuccessful winter campaign against<br />
MOSCOW, and the misguided policy toward the Russian people--these<br />
two were the reasons why we did not find the nec c.aaa,-- support among<br />
2
a8 May 45<br />
the population, nor the military strength to finish this campagn<br />
as quickly as possible. And this Was so essential, because there<br />
still was an undefeated enemy in the West, en top of crerything,<br />
Japan and America came to grips, and we thought we might have to<br />
enter that conflict too, So we issued a new declaration of war,<br />
which added America to the Side of our enemies. I don't know the<br />
reasons <strong>for</strong> this last decision. But I was at the front, c=manding<br />
- my army, and thus couldn't familiarize myself with every detail.<br />
+ + +<br />
(Re: Why • KIEV was taken first and aat'OSCOW)<br />
GUD: I conferred with the FUEHRER twice about this question;, once on 3 Aug<br />
and once on 23 Aug.' At that time the general staff, too, was in<br />
- favor of attacking ka;SCOkV first,<br />
GEYR: When the PANZER Army GUDERIAN finally did attack, we had a temperature<br />
of 35 deg (Q) below and an icy 'wind At that time the<br />
only way to employ armored divisions . was to gather the tanks of a<br />
number of different divisions. That shows how few tanks we had<br />
left. There was no time <strong>for</strong> repairs, nor did we have the necessary<br />
equipment and spare parts. Idy own division, which I had led up to<br />
that campaign, was reduced to 12 tanks at mOSCOW.<br />
INTERROGATING OFFICER: How high do you estimate the casualties at that time?<br />
GUD: During the winter campaign of 1941 they were not too high. Our<br />
principal losses were caused through the cold. But to be honest,<br />
our casualties weren't abnormally high until we came to STALINGRAD.<br />
Those were our first catastrophic losses. Then we had these<br />
terrific envelopments. We had some 3L0,000 casualties there. From<br />
then on, with these continued envelopments of large units, we suffered<br />
our first irreplacable losses. That as.also where the German<br />
soldier's morale started its downward slide. There he lost his<br />
sense of invincibility. Our men took part in practically every<br />
attack, without complaint. But in this final .campaign we no longer<br />
could attack. None of our attacks succeeded. And be<strong>for</strong>e that, not<br />
even our most difficult attacks failed,<br />
(Re: Count VON SCHULEN3URG)<br />
GUD: He was a native of ihOSCOW, went to school there, and was said to be<br />
exceedingly well acquainted with the country. From a military point<br />
of view, he was one of the best authorities on Russian tactics, and<br />
in addition to that he had very good connections in Russian military<br />
circles. I knew that <strong>for</strong> a certainty. /Je operated just lihe a<br />
Russian. The Russians were more open 1:11 more friendly toward him<br />
than they were toward . most <strong>for</strong>eigners, Thus we always were well<br />
in<strong>for</strong>med. Nobody can say that his reports were incorrect, but no<br />
one would believe them.<br />
++ +<br />
GUD: If fewer of our outstanding strategists had been dismissed in 1943<br />
and at the end of 1941, we would have fought an entirely different<br />
war, I myself, was relieved . of . my command on the basis of a false<br />
report which a senior general had made'about me. In Jan 1942, after<br />
returnin from Russia, I demanded -an investigatiOn by a military<br />
court. It was my intention to have the facts straightened out. My<br />
3
28 May 45<br />
request was not granted. In the case of another general, an investiP;ation<br />
was.also refused. One general filed a suit, which, however,<br />
was not carried through. In the following spring a law was<br />
passed which suspended the regular courts. Thus the dictatorship<br />
was firmly entrenched in the army. ' From then on it was impossible<br />
to file a suit, or to demand a trial. Later, when the law was<br />
intensified, it even became impossible to resign My predecessor as<br />
Chief of the General S t aff handed in his resignation five times, but<br />
it was never accepted. When I was assigned to the General Staff<br />
without being consulted about the assignment, I was received with<br />
these words: "I do not want you to start out by tendering your resignation.<br />
It wouldn't be granted anyway. It is up to me (HITLER)<br />
whether you stay in your office or not--your wishes are of no consequence.<br />
I alone am responsible <strong>for</strong> what happens--not you!"<br />
II, THE INVASION<br />
'10: There is a sharp difference between the tank battles on the Eastern<br />
front, and those of the '3estern front. Those in the EAST were always<br />
on a larger scale.<br />
CEYR: That is just what we wanted. 1e wanted to spare our tanks, in<br />
order to be able to engage t.le Americans and the English in a real<br />
fight where we could put our experiences of the Eastern front to<br />
good use. I was of a different opinion than ROMEL. I expected your<br />
landing to be successful. The Anglo-Saxon world had prepared itself<br />
<strong>for</strong> a landing--and we could not stop the guns of the Anglo-American<br />
fleet and its aircover with merely a few mines. The troops would<br />
simply walk ashore. There wks our one chance to engage the Allies in<br />
a real tank battle, while PATTON was still assembling his units.<br />
It would have been a boon to my old days . , if I had another chance<br />
to fight with the divisions I had trained myself. But fate wouldn't<br />
have it so ROMMEL's armered divisions were largely dispersed, and<br />
under constant AT fire.<br />
10: But it was almost 2 months after the invasion be<strong>for</strong>e PATTON broke<br />
through at AVRaNCHES.<br />
GEYR: That made our mistake a worse one yet..<br />
ID: He <strong>for</strong>ced you into a very small pocket.<br />
GElfl: That is the reason why I was relieved. After CHERBOURG Was taken,<br />
everyone realized, including MARSCHALL RUNDSTEDT that the CAEN bridge<br />
head would have to be vacated. I proposed that in order to save the<br />
armored divisions, so that I could let them get some rest and then<br />
commit them on the left flank. Every would-be officer realized that<br />
the Americans would come down from CHERBGURG to break through our<br />
7th Army positions. I had the divisions (to stop them) but was not<br />
permitted to employ them in this manner.<br />
IO: It was too late, even then. We already had CHERBOURG.<br />
GEYP: There was slim chance of success. But our chances would have been<br />
much better at AVRANCHES. At that time you could have been defeated.<br />
IC: I still remember that there were araored divisions opposing us. And<br />
we always wondered when they. would be committed.<br />
4
900<br />
GEYR: I can tell you exactly, which divisions I had in store <strong>for</strong> you. The<br />
17 SS Division and the division "DAS 'REICH," a first rate outfit,<br />
were reserved <strong>for</strong> the Americans. Then we had saved <strong>for</strong> you the<br />
"LEIBSTANDARTE" and "HITLERJUGEND" divisions and large components<br />
of the 21 Armored and the 5 Armored. ,That was Quite a far cry from<br />
the overstrained 17 Division. They were a brave new unit, more or<br />
less the only ones in the 7 Army sector who fought brilliantly.<br />
Besides that there were a few medium-sized armored units which did<br />
not- belong to the 7 Army sector.<br />
28 May 45<br />
HAUSSER .: There was also the LEHR division.- It was further back, on the<br />
right flank.<br />
GMR: According to the original plan, the (PANZER) LEHR division was not<br />
to be committed. But I could not withdraw it from the vicinity of<br />
BAYEUX except by vacating the CAEN bridgehead. That bridgehead was<br />
no longer of any use to us z- yway. The time <strong>for</strong> throwing the British<br />
from the bridgehead back into the sea had long passed. It was<br />
only a matter of holding a few plain fields.... Un<strong>for</strong>tunately I<br />
was not to have the pleasure of crossing swords . with General PATTON.<br />
I really would have enjoyed that. It was beyond me, why we could<br />
not have committed a PANZER army in this decisive battle against<br />
your <strong>for</strong>ces. Then at least we would have fought on an even basis.<br />
+++<br />
GEYR: The situation at CAEN was as follows: On the morning after the<br />
attack there were but 300 men left with the surviving commander of<br />
the division which had been hit on the coast! That is what I found<br />
when I took over two days later, having missed the beginning. The<br />
remainder of the division had been destroyed by the allied warships<br />
of which you know more than I do. But I know how effective they are!<br />
And then no one wanted to believe us when we told them how far inland<br />
the guns of these warships could fire. They just wouldn't believe<br />
our reports. There I had but one reply: "Gentlemen, just<br />
stand there <strong>for</strong> a while and you'll find out how far they can fire."<br />
GUD: In our reports to headquarters these and many other descriptions were<br />
simply not believed. That was our hard luck. Our mis<strong>for</strong>tune in<br />
this war, one of many, was that the majority of 01117 leading personalities<br />
never had any front line commands during the war. When it<br />
was reported, <strong>for</strong> example, that the British fleet was outside CAEN,<br />
that they could fire as far as 30 km inland, and that there<strong>for</strong>e it<br />
would be senseless to leave our armored divisons within the range of<br />
their artillery--someone would simply maintain that they couldn't<br />
fire that far. And they wot..,d . claim next, that just these last 3<br />
or 5 km would make all the difference. The people who made these<br />
statements never took an active part in the war themselves. They got<br />
all their experience at sessions around .conference tables.<br />
10: We could not understand why the invasion in the South of France<br />
succeeded so easily. You must have been prepared. After all, you<br />
had daily reconnaissance missions over Corsica, North Africa, and<br />
Italy You must have suspected something. And you must have seen<br />
our boats which were on reconnaissance patrol along the coast.<br />
5
28 May 45<br />
sv.00<br />
CUD: The reason <strong>for</strong> this lies in our peculiar evaluation of defensive<br />
strengith, which is indicative of our strategy during the last year<br />
of this war. It was purely a strategy of lines (LINEAR-STRATEGIE).<br />
Our system of <strong>for</strong>tifications was arranged along a number of lines.<br />
First the WESTWALL, which was only one line <strong>for</strong> all practicall purposes.<br />
The line behind it had not been completed. Then the ATLANTIK-<br />
WALL was built, again nothing but one line. And this was the line in<br />
which all available divisions were committed. When it was suggested<br />
to assemble our armored divisions behind it, as a mobile reserve<br />
which could be used to oppose an attack, regardless of where it may<br />
come from,we were told: 'No, they would be too late, everything will<br />
have to be thrown into the front line." ROMMEL was the main proponent<br />
of this strategy.<br />
IO: How is it, that POMMEL favored such a theory? He should have learned<br />
his lesson in North Africa.<br />
CUD: ROMMEL was the principal proponent of this theory in France. Later<br />
on KLUGE followed suit. And it was im p ossible <strong>for</strong> me to do anything<br />
against it. A <strong>for</strong>tress such as ANTWERP, <strong>for</strong> example, was not utilized.<br />
It had neither ammunition or armament worth mentioning. That<br />
was the worst blunder we could possibly have made. And we did not<br />
<strong>for</strong>tify PARIS! Nor did we repair the <strong>for</strong>tresses VERDUN, EPINAL,<br />
BELFORT, METZ, or STRASSBURG so that they could be used. Vie simply<br />
had two lines: the ATLANTIKWALL--which was expected to fail like any<br />
other installation of its kind wherever the enemy would attack; and<br />
then the WESTV;ALL-eanother line which was expected to succumb wherever<br />
the enemy would concentrate all his ef<strong>for</strong>ts.<br />
H: ROMMEL and I were at odds about this <strong>for</strong> many months. Then General<br />
GUDERIAN himself came to France in order to back me up. But un<strong>for</strong>tunately<br />
it was impossible to achieve anything.<br />
GUD: I was sent to ROI.LEL <strong>for</strong> that particular purpose, But HITLER told<br />
me: "I can't tell the Fieldmarshal ,in command how to run his business."<br />
H: We knew exactly, even be<strong>for</strong>e the invasion started, that the ratio<br />
of allied arLored recn cars (PANLERSPAEHWAGEN) to Ours was 15 to 1;<br />
tanks, 10 to and planes, 30 or 50 to 1. And in view of this situation<br />
our only hope <strong>for</strong> victory lay with mobile warfare.<br />
GEYR: RCEidEL was a fairly good tactician, but he didn't have the faintest<br />
idea about strategy.<br />
GUI): ROMMEL was excellent as high up as a corps commander. He was a first<br />
rate divisional commander, because . he was courageous, went to the<br />
front, and participated in everything. But later, when he commanded<br />
an army, using the same technique, he lacked the vision which is<br />
essential <strong>for</strong> such a task. You know, it takes time to learn to lead<br />
large and fast armored units. And ROi.MEL was not a tank expert.<br />
After all, you can't suddenly replace years of schooling by intuition.<br />
ROLMEL lost some of his nerve in Africa.<br />
IO: What do you think of our General PATTON?<br />
GUD: General PATTON did what we would have liked to have done and what we<br />
used to do. He was very fast, which could already be seen in NOR-<br />
MANDY. I was with the FUEHRER when PATTON's drive started. He said:<br />
411<br />
4,<br />
6
i'Mzty. 45!<br />
thing but the ehathk-6,pox<br />
. could have .6rie';tkigtV,<br />
'<br />
Ilei/Th<br />
-through French MaginOt4insf)<br />
'proceeded in the . same 4' Manner.:,:oktpt<br />
our i ZIE " of theiRtithsiariT,ibtfeit'T,40414.,<br />
1 ci pje,t. tank commander<br />
'suCCeethfUl l Fate gives''hiM:''jniiiNeite,Orla'a<br />
/1',whiCh 4 t 6 do his stuff<br />
(qt • D;;T. The dOOrdiziat iozi of yelir aii lif4y u<br />
Lorraine - campaign was 'so bli tS x. ti:gLy:,.:it41,;(t. 7,1;<br />
., these' American tactics intoth the ' Cir!<br />
!Ischbar<br />
ri.0 'iViffi.i''<br />
at ' BERGEN. '<br />
),A,!'4‹."-q,'.A'!..<br />
01<br />
• GM/ V .;)Eveni earlier . than that ; "in'4101RIVI<br />
.. '<br />
. Coq<br />
'.--,4-•2tii6<br />
.<br />
ilithei.i can:spearheads '.. by • the<br />
,,. q.,..L i .,ua ly<br />
,<br />
:<br />
.<br />
in<br />
.<br />
,order .. ,, I. -<br />
'tilaile.s.A.054,6<br />
,. to clear, the :, via<br />
..y,, ,... t4-erialtyr. , ,.; ha. , , 0<br />
,e ....,,,34#Oi101ei',"/Plpid':y81,i,,knoi0hitt it,i0' .,Trkt4M6fia.<br />
- •`,.4.i.l'eilas ' t 6 (- the length of time:441{114C,A84ril,<br />
would not be liable: to attacki -..,"I:Tia.<br />
:.-deriSOr 'missed it, and I also 'W/thePiX,''<br />
:<br />
, 1C.rieW r.thei.TILS-:'veiy ,<br />
shOwe&i'lit:.;;':,f60 , , :td.<br />
we ll, and ,..th érigOi*I'geskir 'IV<br />
' Y oiS1:1": 'ItriOw ,the7:British : well, ' 'Sr oix-9.1,;`kii:eiktatt<br />
the first or second ,:paiie . of<br />
.,tbegin ,„ .<br />
!S<br />
with ' t h e '<br />
f<br />
lliii dd le :' ' • • 'Siri<br />
reading<br />
sa e :,-' 1 ':, Eiiii .3i .e`iHqiiiisalil l,2 ', z '<br />
:niat t e r ,s,:,,.',.;',..,',,. I t.:diSC a iieli.'k<br />
.:-...1;4O'i6'6'!ot..,-Oii4Oi'li.,'markee-i'lie4i5AiliOrdi<br />
.ċfSn'tOie. AlttRtit'<br />
''a ilieetiig<br />
_.i. b'tvie enr6pi^esent4iiii6s1-i3V4i0i.e.c.<br />
N.-ttriCCi‘,.ali.d.',:,iàiLdhordei.O.i. d<br />
" 'ar ;::0' -' eas'<strong>for</strong>' -c1.60414,-<br />
American ‘'armor<br />
kei".0<br />
ed<br />
4:54,:, ,,,..<br />
-tih'e<br />
d iVi Si Ciiii;;:lcbpeehVO<br />
qiindowrir:à-1.6hat :tkiey;vidtfild-t,,,libSf,*3.4*qi .,<br />
':)../Ah .d .e"J"taiiliahet iVers'ei-46:b4.4ii.ii'441e0I4<br />
4,<br />
v4'WLiffia;p14 irit ea in '.-.the .• TXIIIES ; . as.:Welp;as.!:!:, 0-1004<br />
iiiiive ..: befOre .:'15<br />
We',,'Co'il -<br />
tê.li 't.;-1:f*Ie'ilfetit6,<br />
ld' i:de'cluce from that, ,:*'' 1 a Vi ' 0<br />
'iOneAl'failia%<br />
theiouldn'tmake<br />
';fi'lüe of the Navy and't<br />
4.1rEISCELLANY ,.<br />
*GE.k :. tvie:s ' ",: deeply' 'grieved vitA fit n:,.rr‘,/:1,*ariii ..a.<br />
i .ALACN 4reskj,<br />
.t.1.4. .,., d. Oificio<br />
,- -.<br />
n'thch. --:ALSACE fs'<br />
4 , op ing .:th<br />
Ge'rriiKn*-4.1:42LOilitkl .gi.q& l<br />
,Alt 'there was the pose?..<br />
. . ' 'tSr 1.. , i:li . si c if ,,, 'ea'itroiii ,: , ohii<br />
`.1:4:i.iiiintermediary , and<br />
.. ..,,<br />
that '<br />
4iiiieY being. .-A<br />
the deci siOn-: mighttl'teloci<br />
4Cii . 1, fter all , no trile':'G4iinin'.Ctiii'141i.4110r:.e.<br />
Gerniay. 130:4nagain -.eat treated 'ea ,the<br />
V this . .<br />
time . ' ' Th'd '.11thati.a.ris'''aw'kwieeialT.:ttlilet it<br />
ii:!'ALS ACa . .<br />
into Germany, ' It would<br />
. la.ciint':a.t.:Iiiresetit ..,<br />
.s.f%OtV v4,' if -sti<br />
.<br />
Atiiiens ';'.: would have a neural' ad<br />
.;te, a' P.:be tt.:_e: , ipr:: „, i<br />
h,,,,, . L.,<br />
zi l e w<br />
niniStratOn .1.4e<br />
:years,. and vi<br />
pretil ' te'..... . There<strong>for</strong>e it was<br />
i...670.i6n-:giv.ght.4'qr myi.;;It<br />
' .-;;';.."k•<br />
considered 'IpOiWneWs!,,,4<br />
SE
28 May 45<br />
(Re: DACHAU)<br />
SAAR territory was to be under American jurisdiction. No European<br />
can be unbiased about these questions, not even the British. The<br />
idea of a "Balance of Power" is of prime importance to the Englishman.<br />
There was a bitter struggle between EDEN's and SAV;UEL HOADE's<br />
schools of thought concerning this point. England under her present<br />
leadership is not in the position to be as impartial toward European<br />
problems as the United States would be. One must look at this<br />
realistically. A farreaching and fair solution of Europes economic<br />
problems is possible only under the leadership of the United States.<br />
+ + +<br />
GUI): Ne can't understand that. Even our own circle was affected. The<br />
chief of my operational deprl-tment was in DACHAU. I never got any<br />
news from him. My wife coula't utter a word, or she, too, would<br />
have been sent to DACHAU. Ue knew of a few of these dirty affairs<br />
in the concentration camps.<br />
IC': Couldn't you go there youself?<br />
GUD: No, that was impossible HIalLER was responsible <strong>for</strong> all the<br />
atrocities.<br />
+ + +<br />
GEYR: I was with RIBBENTROP <strong>for</strong> one year as a military attache. I only<br />
stayed with him out of a sense of duty. He was no professional<br />
diplomat who knew his business. He had lived in Canada <strong>for</strong> a while,<br />
and thought that the British were just like the Canadians. But<br />
they are quite different--you can't compare the two nations. And<br />
guided by his ignorance he believed that he understood the English<br />
people.<br />
+ + +<br />
GUD In the Summer of 1 43 and the Fall of '44 our generals explained to<br />
our Foreign Minister that a two-front war would be impossible. The<br />
front in the East could be held only if the West could be pacified.<br />
We would have to be free on one side. I presented these ideas not<br />
only to the Foreign Minister, but also to the FUEHRER. It was impossible<br />
to get them to consider these questions seriously.<br />
+ •: +<br />
GUD: During the Polish campaign, the FUEHRER was with me, only 50 meters<br />
behind the front line--he was still with me in France--but never in<br />
Russia.<br />
IO: He would stay around as long as everything went well, but no longer.<br />
GUD: That was not the reason--he left because he had to fly South. Only<br />
a few weeks ago he was still with some divisional headquarters near<br />
the ODER.: He was not to be blamed himself; the FUEHRER was no coward<br />
But the fault lay with his friends, who kept him more and more in the<br />
dark, without themselves knowing anything about warfare. Too bad<br />
he didn't follow my advice to join his.men. However, his health<br />
wasn't up to standard any111fe - There actually were some men in his<br />
8
• CENTRAL INTEL LIGENCE AREW<br />
. DEC LASSIFIED AND O ELEASEA It<br />
1,v,„...,.:•...S.00.R.C.ES NE TIDO S EXEMP.t (.11,41431,1v1)4): ' .44.A.:14(<br />
NAZI WAR CRINEG<br />
OIGCLODUNt Agi<br />
DATE 2001 2007<br />
•
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- Germany to supervise Music at , the frad4.618.tatitiiiiall''':.4',<br />
of fic::.als , of the Propaganda ,Ministry 7.0Thiti 'Esoi446.elfal," i<br />
him' 'a' Chance to leave ; BERtiIiiroadundc,ia.'VNiltilii:::i:: e ::<br />
,.. since: she Wail . dismissed , frotr, the . cCficentiatiOriti Ce.M '<br />
' sitied the /Bavaria Film' GOmp,a14,1,in--, 'Mi.i t n: ti-hc,hi.<br />
, • rderd o , , of tionil,aga ns , f,,<br />
. GIESS ° ':"...' P From there ,he went .to KTTE, , , , .. ,o,, Beni 6<br />
Music department of the REICHSRUNDFUNKt::*ere‘ as, ,<br />
his equipment to American authoritiee, , when2theY1' r.1<br />
Was :arrested , there by US' soldiers ,: '..f';:..,:''. / ,',: t"?.r:'I14.<br />
1 \ ■ 1 :,' .r ,i. i ,,,t<br />
' SSubjectclaims that the ,singer Anita .: SP,OA704204,, : r '., • -<br />
wife', ,, wnP i thrown 'iri: p, the RAVENSBRUECK..0Ond'erittiiti3rikd .-. ,.<br />
— <strong>for</strong> ."4e,featism . and pacifism". His subseciu,enti*arriq e,;44<br />
, , .<br />
-v<br />
Pq<br />
unfavorably by Dr GOEBBELS 1 whom source descrilieE0:e:ie his
'49-year-did..Huite: g$1<br />
ot. Dec 43 to Nov 44: 14*.i Ahq-Cfe;<br />
14‘d ;'St.i45 41:iiii,. he was able to niak5<br />
' other; , diean,:le.ria language we. ll and who therfo<br />
1:.' ' — • °<br />
e-r' 'ilaci: :t"ifii<br />
!. • ' • - '-. A : — ''',, ),•1 '`'t<br />
' ‘.7<br />
5 our A oe .?-traiied freely and appears to be<br />
R ii iiiiri.' ,, 13, ' .: : I ' .:D ate ' -is t In<strong>for</strong>matidn: Hee text . 'II..<br />
--- ,<br />
,<br />
• v`.:PERSONAL HISTORY OF ; dm ONODERA<br />
i<br />
.Gei .. O.NODFltA, who /is 43 years old, coitieri . froM a;<br />
f:lis -Wife :13,elongs, to a. Japanese family of the higheet:nOtiil<br />
•. -..-reili.ier ,,... . . to , the Emieror; . . a fact Of which the Geri<br />
. _ . 18..4aiisi;•:,.."<br />
. • theildilat," ..•<br />
..• • A ', ' • • . . •. 1•41-io is 15 years old', is at .6..;;Cailet1;ii011683f.'"<br />
- P. arentlyz'zliVo • a• modest, flarmcrnioua . family , .. , Ci<br />
•-li,fe: : . . t.<br />
..-gb ". . . -.,..40t1-6*ari3I•<br />
g uests. .:;.. Geri ....-<br />
14<br />
I ONOIV14..• is a moderate • mail', . or.-.148:. veiT<br />
•sr<br />
: ;•:...na •,.,• ..7: .... suffers<br />
. • ,. .from. Iow blood pressure .% Once<br />
i.1.4:.Vg:p.`Atiridic.dbe te<br />
-,p.a<br />
.<br />
•',Or....itric e<br />
,r1-0- ;...twith'•• his . r... . .<br />
',i'MO:iii'llt4,:to<br />
.,',. : 'vO.40.<br />
•<br />
"'''<br />
•aons and . relatives . ,,•: ,•:7......,..g cpc4,.... 1.y. -47;.<br />
di:tilt:4. sSikt;"4. 0,,<br />
in ... Japan ;,... 1...,.vi...2.1.4/1., • , . . : ,• `: 'hie : 'GO n . is a, diligont and tireless :Worker: ..'ite,. 4Ap , ;..c.,., ,.- ...'`.elptp.. , .<br />
.c.'i,<br />
..-.J., ai3.3ake ., ....t.o...,<br />
.:, and...' writes Cornian poorly, and<br />
.-., anc:...<br />
..;Undoretand ei:::::0111 .. ,■:iittii ... 'i•.-'<br />
ki::i J Ii<br />
tii-;4;',,Y.6.)2):6' :liercire k/.1,41:.<br />
. .• making a statement... .He ; has :. frequent]: - ''..tol-4:!;stiltroiii. i , .. . ,<br />
."..eilii. . -.131340r.<br />
., .1,i '113.*ff , an won as the EmporOr.,'WaS ...higii). "'U.. Q; t',77,:4 jfif. .,...:•.‘,<br />
'11'<br />
. ...;.k‘...,S.!.ppicl.ip:.r.4.,•7, and ...,on, a -5i4.aa:tisi.i;!:;4•Tri:J:t<br />
QVoral . o 00E1.8 ions ??7..A<strong>CIA</strong>3V-;4'.<br />
.c:,. ..-: ,...,•.• is<br />
y..40•,)-#34k.:.gt.,Y.0)..4 ,....;;NI'ttir.e...•-zOalidlAs.1-t.,0 . <strong>for</strong> the poet of.:..0hief,At.AỊ.104.4;0:1?i,i,410%<br />
.E,1,9.4i NtiOti;,..'F.-A.M.1° ,71t.. ,, g.. '4! t<br />
.•<br />
Iii51.4a:111'.:.<br />
:"I'S-.;.-yi) ."<br />
Eer ..01 1YOk. .en'..tO. souroo in detail .aboUt.-hiiiljaar.i.§,r1. ,Vr,ii.ki• "u,/<br />
..:,;•,..,bii-Ct.'dgi4titthr.140<br />
''. i. ";ciiiii iit.400nvorsatiOns b OtwOen Fob and NoV:7....1.14ii.o0.66'....AS.;;,.e.lile•itOlii'''<br />
'4*<br />
..•••,„ "-i-Tt1.',04,:ationi!,..about.: the GenOral.,!s , historyt.,-..hz-jr...- . :;i:..4;,..:. ,..;:i....ii:v..„1... .0<br />
'4:ii, i.*:,t;• ' ' ..',.;:-.:;.: ;;*:r:'• .•......':' ''. ' . . .<br />
. 1 :.. 23 .<br />
:1',..:;:aJ....-6.<br />
araduat<br />
•••••'+'41..lilitr, ;.4<br />
60..fronii War • College, .. whOrgiir,he:!..).* .d.t..:eit) ..0.<br />
24-27 Various . aseignmonts. with higffei',...-commands, ...l.Vii,;:.,<br />
2 8.4•30 ,,..sėi7ved as Oapt:. (Intelli . gai-mles,100tiier ), ''.0r).:".::i1-4(4,sfifit<br />
,,.. p.o.sr.ng.....tho... Russians in Me:nChtir.14V .; Their.o...:•444.07<br />
.,.,:::::.i,.....,-.. .,tn-„,Rufti.iiiii.1.1a..p.glio.go, ' arid , : is<br />
30-36<br />
:Said.....tO', ha Ne,ci<br />
• ; 40,-a<br />
.,:iii4ii:Crt, co ,<br />
i.griod . to various higher : commEitid a :*:,,.:41..sipiiii.4"'" '<br />
. ...••,,,tica‘'i:ai::We.r iciolloge. ,.. .., : .. .. ..:1,, -. ..i'.1::.::::Stfit!)<br />
..1'. 37..017ganiZed • tho. ::1:;ro -Japane a o' ...".1■Tat iOnat;i0hinalick. .4<br />
.,i•.•:..„..oOrding. ... . , .. to his sown. statc:monts',-. 7ho...<br />
.: .. :,..<br />
did,..a..01itat ,liot,<br />
icrodit:;:<strong>for</strong> this work.<br />
:I.V06:0*ended an •..inf •div fighting -... .r.li.N.r.:,<br />
in•Chine,i,;:f16.4r2 an ;,,en<br />
•• ,...1).yly."0.8 , t was. in40., .. • . ,.:., , .<br />
n., 7 '.'1.<br />
.., .• • .: •,,;!...ii,•;.i...4..A,<br />
•49t4.12• 11014 . :114)44<br />
to War College. as<br />
.„‘,..•. :'<br />
linstructOr.,...'.,-..,,..,i,;,,.4..tiv •<br />
..'?".Assigned to STOCKHOLM as Military.:AtiaOhei...„/X<br />
:. :.• -'" • : ; : 1. . • • - ,-. ..„: .: ,.. ' . ' .. . •:,..•z 'i, i.:!.!'......' .' • ,' , !..::<br />
OFFICE . OF IMPERIAL '.JAPANEB l' MILITARY A.TilitOlii ;'-,:efOOK<br />
.(''::: i: ,,,, -.1$;,•.:$;•i,-.., . ', ,<br />
. -. I.;;d at fon<br />
ixig<br />
of this off ico is to furnish military intolligonOo tar-66 1. 1m-<br />
'<br />
Govornmont. Its importance was eonsidei ;od- so groat .: that:it'took<br />
tho Japanoso Logation at S TOCKHOLM. Gori : -011'ObTRA reptirts',.<br />
A rteL4S..1 . F.I<br />
• .; 1: •<br />
EL, (A SO.:Ef.<br />
E14.Y<br />
tx .:Elf#':t-pi 1821<br />
N R tilitt ke.T<br />
DOE 2001 2Q07'
,...41On -IC24LGREEN4,Dirootor of tho Swodiph.Attapho':*.ouvw t E4<br />
_ . .<br />
Ma177ERSON;:Dirootor of tho . Swodiah Com&uhioationT0040,
ONOD<br />
....:,,, : ; ,...,., , ;,.'.,. ..01■TODERIt.': boasted of having an agent. `1.n .the:.Br1:t:<br />
..t<br />
..,P„.i?..,elm,..<br />
:Cia,$=-J4tts4caAkt T ' STOOKHOLi4• .He claime d ' that.', hiielgills:'il . eee.'&4;c<br />
the ,. B e'er etary Of . the British liegs.tion, a. ciptsiarq';:::.,,:fylo-;:vso,F.F ., ..<br />
hi' e of ; Vie British Intelligence Oorlis.'0,";„This:".;.itakkiltgliOil,rs.3,00'r.<br />
.'''''.....tiiii.i'ent ' to ' ' ONODERA,1 - whieh 1. hIill • s ' ustrated .- '/4'1i .!,,ii4W ihAirV I'll!1%<br />
One 'day ''a .Swedish jjournalist,Ofiiit' . ..'GO'esta?.111.11) 24<br />
, ..iiili. , ' OE ,. •<br />
t:3?1.4fieheon at the ,RIOHE Restaurant :..;'..fi.....lhe'.:',IOU.*.l.ikk ;SO<br />
.:1-•;::::,:-?-,i'OtilaCE1...1''clize6"t'iOnb; 'among --.others 'hei-ati.ke3;khitii*e..0/.04..<br />
,. . !..H.iiiiiiiiii-k !,A.i-triy to an Allied landing A-N• '<br />
'in.''.'thd'':.'";Be-1.gkị:113”,'[..;.'<br />
41"g iry. would_ be --very .pleased :about it,,.blit-;'ets.f,ed".;.tthatlegc<br />
. . ' rtilre at ; leas 'c, 20 d l ye , as . the GernfifiT'yore.v.ory ,,..;..et .1,.. ,*41.11!<br />
4<br />
'` .1, le ,'' following day source visited the<br />
.<br />
..'ciriiii-iiiI.J a !':'• Officii , ea ri<br />
''.. :tiat ! ONODSItA . vas stir:Tie ious of him. .2•q..tiiet„......_ 13. " ei'?.. .... ,,...'ei. 8'414.1ciet-ii:<br />
.. %."iifit ;11., :',.,171:5 _, '4, :i fili9:crirj elti.."4<br />
... , '. 1.•''i ,t,; ' . 4 ",•1<br />
asiiii;c1,him' ho ii ho happened n to know a<br />
'<br />
06.13 7t ,j'7,<br />
d: / you<br />
11 ,.., .1:4<br />
).<br />
'...kiilow ..that oii i iiii :.....it t;igr• '<br />
. •<br />
., I, .laiow him? . •Dici....':.y9..:.p9.!:,14?...,151,..„4.,.. /35) ,with 4 '<br />
ONODZRA a t rop. . • ' ti .,::,.,<br />
od- . that he had road" tlị0 ,/;.r,e,..pptAihioh.,.pH-S). .,.-141P%.:.i.„,. ..eox<br />
fi<br />
?LIN .' ; Souro :o then told the Gon .what ,..hd;:hadi,tdld. t.id.044 .4. ; .T.I 1t14 ., ,„ `! •<br />
10 : ::,, 4..0:-<br />
Pṫ1!„ -';....."1,"1,iei,;',....,.1‘. °P. a, .r t .1ff ' hi ch OHM<br />
. .,13,•.I.R.E....6 1.A6 .,...ṭ-ii ..$„.t ,17-it,54,i.r.r4t6<br />
.,ly , , I. 14,:.7<br />
44. 7 ...:qi:1 3 1: had wp r.kod.,.it over.". .. . ,:-. : :1<br />
.;\•#.6pktr:4.:Lb:!414 r° '<br />
'a o'n: ,-ri...: .<br />
. ONO PEA,. 6,-1 14,f-=--.14..,.<br />
gi: iv/ EV i '11,1iiit°4 <strong>for</strong>i''''<br />
• . :. • ,. .,
...',...;-,AtAliii- tilid . of Aug 44, ONODERA ' d eoliii.liaNvia.t.:141,0,Ear<br />
thO t. 'clanaer‘s ,' of ' Bolshevism -e. ft eff .Al1'iisdViiiVirft440ete.<br />
., gaining&control of the Continent:t r4ri`'.8 9.a041 , :V.1. : . . *IA. ..<br />
• ] • '. i,:r, , , .. 1 antIO P . and''. from there and fr om ' the Haft,i'O.I(S:004lio. ii. ,, ,<br />
•i:.:,;;,:,-. .. :••• . •:e ..'i. i'd :ṭ..-thricrell 'aetrenver e.L3.i. .: D.sehnmar oe .. thicr. tAfont. Oil .1, c1 ..O?n,,_.. hletririgo.,:.1: 3:::..he;77p,... :.r.„4.07 ....e8 :..:.<br />
tC, .Wci i. .<br />
. ' t the l'English', Ohi3.nriel:skf‘i Riltbilittia`f dirdY,<br />
and''.fr -om thero .<br />
- 2:::..i:cl . lie f East.i<br />
i,-,.6.156,4inda.%illo.hiFtcrin will . 46<br />
•.<br />
..ev,7ri..iyt4<br />
FriiiIcea41 it<br />
?eniisula<br />
'e. .<br />
‘,IiiitYP.qi.rid;11„..%,-, 4P<br />
.<br />
'thwe t • Soviet 8.,0 ti 1/1 itio0 .Afiibii:J:4674*W.i?.i?44-<br />
kEricS•uq• ims.tely • .4 ,ng JAL .itlik4<br />
--.<br />
co'<br />
veno time.<br />
; to attend to J.DuroK 0<br />
0 n0<br />
ntroṇ. , • •-i• .„ „<br />
0 she • , , 4_tt d<br />
•<br />
1<br />
JePan will confront - lho dB. wi:t .i.i..„(i,..n7:1aii.a7;.,<br />
uE <strong>for</strong>ces. t3 complete y<br />
.<br />
the other , ,<br />
1fie.'Rlial 6 re<br />
11:ITGo/'mane in th.1010)<br />
NATI,<br />
v ied:ar013...-A.4.0t4114.40ri0042J<br />
,.7.1i2er.iel*Pralliiir<br />
Ps Tia"Ehaglat s nliad Um' o to roorganizo:hor .disrup,<br />
tcriOs 'Into full operation again, sho .bo ti46<br />
,<br />
• / no ,c aunt° r powor in Europo.<br />
Russo-Japanoso Rolations<br />
■:" 7-77<br />
. . ..,__<br />
, -1.:.;:.n1::.':i:' , „<br />
•, , ‘,<br />
: ./;it<br />
.' . '.':• .. ONOD MIA .spOko froquontly of' JapanO s e .%hati,•.64. ::'20fAhel-Ri.i0 44.1,.1,-,r , • li 41<br />
out that ...,Tap an 1 s •primary onomy was 'thci:'USA .,*,......±...riY4.4.qhdr.W.04f ...*rfta.i 474,i,r4fs, ,: ..1„,<br />
...., . . Rusils,',.WoUld . _ . . . , not attack. Japan.' • Ho - -backie his, reS.ii0r.l*COX134:5.e.k: . .7.:: ḳ.4 :::i . .411..1:<br />
. ' .,‘! • ha b i1. itato hor industrial and agric ultarb..it.iitiliiVol?,-41:01'4,rar . . •<br />
KOLHOS and so<br />
..-. ,,.,,<br />
. - - .',.<br />
iC - iiitni z 6 : hcir . • l,llikitifir!)t441.:4:<br />
.mos . (dei ....., ,...,,,14„8._,.,‘..a.,!.0;iiiitlirlca4i 7%03<br />
'.i.,<br />
''1. .. • It: to<br />
re, '7 and '.' gonora 1 ly .2. rova mp hor agricu.vtufa, . ; ,. o y . p. ., . ,. . r , 1.4. •'....11,: :0-, • '-': :<br />
during<br />
' ''''<br />
.-"ihC v.rar r.. , ...The "Russi an ffirmor ' ;. ' "would —. ., .,, hair , . 6 .., ., t6 ..,..,?,,......,0.,.., t ,tiiitCeitT), . , . 0 . ., e ,• .tA,,<br />
•::' \ 7)'-'", 44. -.;11;.P.O'liitikfliat ration .'..if tho ,US .• had not s hippo d e Vatit,• ,,cp..ta,rr4g .. . t... ;48 j<br />
...1 ,iii. 43..'e.'4taj OrAl i:Euts tor: in tho food ''iiitukticin 1■1.4:)<br />
! ...Ste•<br />
.i.40<br />
4".:,■,;',:;.:Fi'..., ;7,..„,` , ' '<br />
1.4V.<br />
1,4:-01 '<br />
•., , 4 '' )<br />
:, - , ' .': ',:, 1 ,t..<br />
,.. ! .:•... • . .<br />
, , ,,•,': 'ti .!:' 41) A \ ',..' •,; ‘ gTe gwo..;:.!,. - .? .1••,,:,.. -, ,IF,,i:.'40.tWA'<br />
oty.1..,,,,,r,,,....40w ,,,4- .3 '<br />
.. a'.) Th o .' Mk '<br />
7,-- •-•<br />
--<br />
'.. ,.. -7.., tc -i ' ,. • . ' ' ;. ' ' ' ' . - • ' •' ' !.' • '''''',,!''''.;•:!, , i''''' , kr,..1,-,.'''Z'. - . ': zii,,,, .,. ,<br />
:,, .<br />
ONObl<br />
. i<br />
-31..RA .4-41: :tod - ; • .- / 'r ,-, ." 17,kt. i, , 6 .'<br />
in Oct 44 that ho i. : '<br />
oxP0ot od-4he E<br />
HO '<br />
1.4.3',C,T 0.041.i,<br />
^.46Ciai si'iidthat: the US' had alroady:rwOn.the'Nineritgi*Or!!qiy<br />
‘..; .,., I:5 s o ..,...... .f :.CEtruida.; ..— ' ' C oa ntk •"1Ani or ' i ca, . . ' 'iii ċi-)96iith , .'<br />
. AMorleat.' ' '....._ . .. '. '4t t 'ill' - .1"-<br />
.<br />
60.<br />
r....„ ,. ,Ji . ..1...,,,,,,, •, Ptho..a<br />
..t.,,,...,,. ''''<br />
rous. air and , naval bas os ,. tho<br />
... - '''''. '-'<br />
. US had ; gaine&'-.Ctliquolitionabk . ; ..<br />
'iii4)(gveii ghod Britain. How ovo r ', ' 5 ovi et P i•OPdiandaiS'ai.teh . Oti<br />
, ..., . incrOas o .; : .and . as iii 0 . froM tho problems ' ciiiia.t o<br />
i_ .
, -<br />
. , .. : .: ,,. ..: i !t:it. ..;k''''''''<br />
: Oeamiarid had been equally stupid. No confereficeir,werf0 1.41e .<br />
•nated *conduct of the 'war. The last thing t.hat.. theO<br />
German attack upon 'Rusaia. The Japanese' High' . i5Oiiiiiiiiiiii:zlisia:31.:Squi<br />
they 'Wanted, dari-miirii 'to * drive through ' the Billtiriti t,lit;Yrfoifi Lir<br />
' the . , Persian . ,_ .., ...,. 'Gulf, „ and ;finally to link up •with 'IC'. d '414f: 1 - '.',. .lici".<br />
in- thdla. OistODERA said that it was high. tinge, I in tii*Og',., .—<br />
xt .i. k together. , He had 'received . word from , TOKYO • .. , that” .eb.n.f )3<br />
two high • 6<br />
otrunand . , s would shortly -take pltiee'at.'the'FUEHROO :k•:i:,<br />
'afterwards I . the German hews papers annotizioid' that. ':./ixtreniel:'<br />
Azurtum<br />
' ercei were pending eencernini the :Coinicion' ,conduCt':'ef,<br />
. v ->••1'.'<br />
t)ilkiii ., .„, ti ..0, p ,t440.1,.. io ..<br />
Ten' days later .the sub j ect was dropped coMpliirtelk; -:`, and<br />
•<br />
" " . 4 - NI il•^A • ' '''",t ;4+ :.- ..,,y ` "•^' ,io-f4 ..;■<br />
pt;blishe'd or spoken regarding the conferences:: When aource<br />
or the 'matter, the latter answered dv"ively, merely<br />
..j-qtiektio„, i11441.444 , P 4, .6.?:' k<br />
. ,<br />
stiting'''tfià‘-''etla15-iwite<br />
f.,.. ..,....1. -<br />
continue the war to the end, regardless<br />
. .<br />
of<br />
..<br />
the ' outcoMcd.in7EiliO.P"‘Atit.Siitif<br />
li eyẹ ' is ' that the Japanese offer.- of comiori action in the':' 6 ozidtietri, fr. -. f t ,i4Velit14Inte.:/:',.1'<br />
' irterided to Misipa.d the Gorm an High' Command cf and to i..n. f. i 'ue`ni'e'?'!i..'u.<br />
ii ..';01'.. .4'i0A0'6Adititr.'d-oH,<br />
a "special a.greemont" wit,h Japan, a' diff 6i-cant'. i'OrM'...of:‘;g1;:e4.4tift,;*6,41.f'';' g111‘.,<br />
Year Non .-Aggression Pact". Gen 0N0D<br />
this Pact.<br />
,Y-54:0:.<br />
,. A 4.,ppee,e4';'<br />
,7re‘5'i'...' .P'.3'...;.<br />
tr‘i;71,1/44 310 ,4„..zt ,d);4., le,,<br />
(47.1V' ''el ':1-14'il'e'<br />
,.j.,'<br />
ll.:6441itfil ‘,,<br />
i:44.111;?1,14.,<br />
,i./.• ro.f. ... n. .<br />
•<br />
, From that . time onward, .0NODERA mentioned e.gailf t ,<br />
stay in STOOKHOLM <strong>for</strong> a long time Prior to Nall 4k he :;had.'2,bekeiCi4,a03.v.-<br />
sums of money from various sourcea, including 156,000 Svii`a*jfra:rio<br />
oae Attache in Finland. Source believes that, owing to the'ii`tgir<br />
a.tiOn and to the disruption* of Communications, there 't.ciai''bekt'Op,lia<br />
Nee*<br />
\ organization; but ho declares that a. man, of ONODZRA I. s petecoje<br />
would be able , to repair them without great loss of timQ.<br />
0NODE1A has built , an espionage and intelligence service<br />
bo UT) 'center of such Japanese activity in turepo.
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASEIliiY<br />
CENIRAL I IIIELLIIENCE Angel'<br />
SOURCEMINOMUOPII01,1121<br />
NAZIWAPCIIIMOIMO§MktAttl<br />
2001<br />
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NAZI VAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT<br />
2001<br />
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED DY<br />
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY<br />
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT 101131121<br />
NAZI WAR CRINEGOINCLOGIINEACT<br />
DATE 2001 2007
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