23.10.2014 Views

Beyond Pragmatism: Appraising UN-Business Partnerships

Beyond Pragmatism: Appraising UN-Business Partnerships

Beyond Pragmatism: Appraising UN-Business Partnerships

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

<strong>UN</strong>RISD PROGRAMME ON MARKETS, BUSINESS AND REGULATION<br />

PAPER NUMBER 1<br />

The Compact’s relation to the issue of corporate accountability is ambiguous in other respects.<br />

The term figures prominently in the learning process associated with the Compact and in<br />

various institutional and governance reforms (Zadek 2002; Zadek and Radovich 2006). The<br />

notion of corporate accountability à la Global Compact appears, however, somewhat truncated<br />

with attention focused primarily on one particular dimension of accountability, namely<br />

“answerability”, and less on the other crucial dimension, namely, penalties for non-compliance.<br />

Some of the limitations of the Global Compact that were identified early on by civil society<br />

campaigners and others were confirmed by the Compact’s own review process. A wake-up call<br />

was provided by an evaluation carried out by McKinsey and Company in 2004, which found<br />

that only 6 per cent of Global Compact participating companies reported that they were taking<br />

action that would not have happened without participation or that would have been difficult to<br />

implement without participation. A total of 60 per cent of companies stated that Global<br />

Compact participation had not made much difference: 33 per cent said that it had not prompted<br />

any change and 27 per cent said that changes they had taken would have happened with or<br />

without the participation in the Global Compact. The final third (34 per cent) reported that<br />

change would have happened anyway, but that association with the Compact had significantly<br />

facilitated change (McKinsey and Company 2004). These findings appeared to confirm the<br />

concerns of some civil society and other critics that centred on two major problems: first the<br />

scale of free-riding, and second, that best practice learning was either not working or remained<br />

at the level of ideas and awareness, and was not impacting corporate policy and practice in a<br />

meaningful way.<br />

Concerning partnerships more generally, the United Nations General Assembly periodically<br />

considers the topic in its annual deliberations. Initially it called attention to the need for<br />

accountability and balance in terms of the types of countries and enterprises involved (United<br />

Nations General Assembly 2002). These and other guidelines and criteria were ratcheted up in<br />

2004 with the addition of a clause which stressed that “partnerships should be consistent with<br />

national laws, national development strategies and plans, as well as the priorities of countries<br />

where their implementation takes place” (United Nations General Assembly 2004:3). In its 2006<br />

resolution, the General Assembly reiterated these points but also, as mentioned earlier, called<br />

on <strong>UN</strong> organizations and agencies “to share relevant lessons learned”, and on the Secretary-<br />

General “to promote…impact-assessment mechanisms…and facilitate effective learning from<br />

both successes and failures” (United Nations General Assembly 2006:4).<br />

Civil society and academic criticism continued to target the Global Compact. Companies and<br />

business leaders associated with the Global Compact and <strong>UN</strong>–BPs are regularly implicated in<br />

malpractice lawsuits, inquiries and “awards”. Having been, for several years, on the receiving<br />

end of the Corpwatch “greenwash” awards, a new prize for malpractice emerged in 2005 when<br />

a number of NGOs organized the Public Eye on Davos awards. In 2005 and 2006, various<br />

Global Compact companies were either short-listed or won the categories for environmental<br />

malpractice or abusive human rights and labour practices. Several were also implicated in the<br />

Iraq Oil-for-Food corruption inquiry. Some companies involved in <strong>UN</strong>–BPs feature prominently<br />

in cases associated with so-called “foreign direct liability” (Ward 2001), notably those brought<br />

under the Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA) in the United States. The Save the Children inquiry<br />

into company performance in relation to revenue transparency in the oil and gas industries<br />

revealed the poor performance of several Global Compact companies (Save the Children UK<br />

2005). A recent inquiry into the state of CSR in relation to drug promotion by the<br />

pharmaceutical industry found that many of the problems identified, such as lack of<br />

transparency and provision of verifiable information, unethical marketing, and breaches of<br />

codes and laws, applied in varying degrees to Global Compact companies (Consumers<br />

International 2006). Similar accusations are regularly levelled at Nestlé with regards to the<br />

unethical marketing of breast-milk substitutes (IBFAN 2004). And high profile corporate leaders<br />

have also found themselves in the malpractice spotlight, as in the case of Goran Lindahl, the<br />

former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Asea Brown Boveri Ltd. (ABB), who had to step down<br />

as Special Advisor to the Global Compact following accusations that he had been on the<br />

28

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!