7 - Voice For The Defense Online

"If the subject is one of common knowledge and the facts can be intelhgibly desctihed to the jury
and they can forma reasonable opmionfor themselves, the opinion of an expert will be rejected." (31
Am. Jur.2d 494) In several cases courts have held that the jury could disregard psychiarric testmony
and accept testimony of lay witnesses on the issue of insanity (see People us. Teague, 439 N.E. 2d 1066;
People us. Jones, 440 N.E.Zd 261; and Taylor vs. State, 440 N.E.2d 1109). These cases
constitute judicial raognition that the issue of insanity or the ability to dlstinguishright from wrong
can be determined as well, or better, from lay testimony as from psychiatric tesumony. On that basis,
therefore, psychiatric testmony does not meet that test for adm~ssibilit~.
8. Psychiatric /Psychological Testimony Confuses and Misleads
Psychiatric / psychological testimony tends to confuse and mislead rather than ass~st jurors and
provide more vahd conclusions than their own. It is well known that in a large percentage of cases
jurors tend to dlsregatd psychiitric / psychological testimony, particularly in cases where there is
conflicting testimony. Further, in view of the problems and deficienctes stated above, the
introduction of psychiatric / psychological testimony will necessarily lead to extensive collateral
investigations on the validrty ofsuch testimony. The too hasty acceptance of psychiatric / psychological
testimony, considering its stage of development, has brought complicat~ons and abuses that
overbalance whatever utility it may be assumed to have. The present necessity for elaborate
exposition of the deficiencies of psychiatric / psychological theory and demonstration of its lack of
reliability, together with the problems of the psychiatric I psychological exammation and the need for
attacks on the soundness of its underlying theories, may easily result in the tr~al of the psych~atrist /
psychologist rather than the issue and the cause.
9. The Gap Between Diagnosis and Legal Issue
Even if psychiatrists / psychologists could accurately diagnose mental disorders rhere is virtually no
scientific evidence of a relat~onshtp between such conditions and any legal issue.
10. No Relationship Between Credentials and Competence or Accuracy
There is virtually no scientific evidence demonstrating a relationship between rhe psychiatrist's /
psychologist's credentials, including Board Certificat~on, and the competence with which he
conducts his examination or the accuracy of his conclusions.
11. Lack of General Scientific Acceptance: Conflicting Literature
Even where there is conflicting scientific and professional literature on any of the above points, the
very existence of such conflicts demonstrates that the issues are in doubt and such doubts, within the
scientific and professional community, render the testimony inadmissible on the grounds that it has
not reached the level of general acceptance withrn the scientific conununny and has not crossedfrom
the experimental to the demonstrable. The jury is required to decide scientific controversies concerning
psychiatric / psychological isrues which the scientlfic and professional wmmunmes have not
been able to resolve.
12. The Dubious Status of Psychiatric / Psychological Expertise
Appellate courts have rarely been asked to rule on the admissib~lity of psychiatric / psychological
evidence. Therefore, there are virtually no appellate court opintons denying admisston of psychiauic
opinion (but see below, Harper us. State). However, there are several appellate court opinions whch
at least by way of dicta describe such evidence in terns that would render it inadmmible.
In Wahington v. LJnitedSms, 390 E2d 444, (1967), the court states (p. 452). "Even after McDonald
though we allowed the experts to state whether they felt thedefendant had a mental disease or defect,
we assumed that the expert could separate the medical judgment which he was supposed to make
from the legal and moral judgments which he was not supposed to make. It has become abundantly
apparent that this theory tias not worked out."
In In Re B&y, 482 EZd, 648, (1973), the court states that psychtatric testimony exher diagnosing
mental disorder or predicting future dangerousness is "far from satisfactory" and "has never been
characterized by a lugh degree of accuracy."
In Peopk u. Bum& 14 Cal3d 306 (1979, the California Supreme Court states, "It must be
conceded that psychiatrists still experience considerable d~ficult~ in confidently and accurarely
diagnosing mental illness. Yet those difficulties are multiplied manifold when the psychiatrists
venture from diagnosis to prognosisand undertake to predict the consequences of such illness." (p. 325)
In Smith v. Sdesinger, 513 E2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the court states, "the literature concerning
impact of socialvalue judgments upon psychiatric diagnosis is immense," (p. 475) and the court states
further, "Psychiatric judgments may disguise wittingly or unwittingly, political or social biases of
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