in the united states district court for the district of delaware

More documents

Recommendations

Info

marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State." I d. In contrast, writing for the other four-justice plurality, Justice Brennan concluded that due process requires only that a foreign defendant be "aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State." I d. at 11 7. b. Stream-of-Commerce Theory in Delaware Against this backdrop, Delaware courts developed their own stream -of-commerce jurisprudence based on the Delaware long-arm statute. Although this body of law is unique to Delaware, its central premise-"that a non-resident may, under certain circumstances, be found to have sufficient contacts for jurisdictional purposes with any state in which its product ends up"-is consistent with the overarching principles from Asahi that were subsequently recognized and endorsed by the Federal Circuit and Third Circuit. Power Integrations, 547 F. Supp. 2d at 371 (citing cases). As applied to the Delaware long-arm statute, stream-of-commerce theory invokes two statutory subsections (10 Del. C. §§ 3104(c)(1) and (c)(4)), 18 so this theory is more accurately characterized as one of"dualjurisdiction." Power Integrations, 547 F. Supp. 2d at 371-72. Under this dual jurisdictional approach: [T]he enumerated activities in [ 10 Del. C. § 31 04( c)( 4)] should be analyzed to determine whether there is an intent or purpose on the part of the [nonresident] to serve the Delaware market with its product. Likewise, when analyzing § 31 04( c )(1 ), it is not important that the [nonresident] itself act in Delaware. Instead, if the intent or purpose on behalf of the [nonresident] to serve the Delaware market results in the introduction of the product to this State and plaintiffi']s cause of action arises from injuries caused by that product, this section is satisfied. 18 Section (c)( 1) of the Delaware long arm-statute provides that personal jurisdiction is proper over any nonresident who, in person or through an agent, "[ t ]ransacts any business or performs any character of work or service in the State." 10 Del. C.§ 3104(c). 32
I d. at 372 (quoting Boone v. Oy Partek Ab, 724 A.2d 1150, 1158 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997) ). As such, the stream-of-commerce theory under the Delaware long-arm statute may be used to establish jurisdiction when there is a showing ofboth: "(1) an intent to serve the Delaware market; and (2) that this intent results in the introduction of the product [at issue] into the market and that plaintiffs cause of action arises from injuries caused by that product." Belden Techs., Inc. v. LS Corp., 626 F. Supp. 2d 448, 456 (D. Del. 2009) (citations omitted). Under the Delaware long-arm statute, the "touchstone" of stream-of-commerce theory relates to the first prong of this analysis, the "intent and purpose to serve the Delaware market." Power Integrations, 547 F. Supp. 2d at 372 (citing Boone, 724 A.2d at 1158). Under this precedent, a "non-resident firm's intent to serve the United States market is sufficient to establish an intent to serve the Delaware market, unless there is evidence that the firm intended to exclude from its marketing and distribution efforts some portion of the country that includes Delaware." Id. at 373. c. Application of Stream-of-Commerce Theory to Alleged Facts In this case, Plaintiff contends that IRP's agent, AlphaPet, purposefully directed its PET products into the U.S. marketplace, knowing that those PET products (or plastic beverage containers incorporating those products) would end up in Delaware. (D.I. 42 at 9-10) Plaintiff has offered evidence indicating that IRP's alleged agents have made substantial sales of products in the United States since at least 2007. In 2007, for example, more than 40% of IRP's sales were in the U.S., and while that number declined in 2008, in that year IRP still reported that 29% of its global sales occurred in the U.S. (D.I. 28, ex. C at 32) Although IRP itself appears to sell products strictly in non-U.S. markets, the same cannot be true for all ofiRP's subsidiaries. And 33
Page 1 and 2: IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Page 3 and 4: place of business in the Netherland
Page 5 and 6: jurisdictional discovery turns on t
Page 7 and 8: 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). Unless th
Page 9 and 10: elating to the agreement? Hadley v.
Page 11 and 12: clause of the TLA is valid. 7 2. IR
Page 13 and 14: only to the TLA in undertaking its
Page 15 and 16: IPR and IPW would all likewise be d
Page 17 and 18: contracting parties. There is no ev
Page 19 and 20: who expects to benefit from the suc
Page 21 and 22: power to govern its subsidiaries "s
Page 23 and 24: In Capital Group Cos. v. Armour, No
Page 25 and 26: that KSC was KSP's parent and that,
Page 27 and 28: Plaintiff has offered competent evi
Page 29 and 30: At oral argument, when asked what f
Page 31: theory may provide a basis to asser
Page 35 and 36: F. Supp. 2d at 376 (granting jurisd
Page 37 and 38: States." Oticon, Inc. v. Sebotek He
Page 39: IV. CONCLUSION The Court is mindful

in the united states district court for the district of delaware

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?