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THE PONDO REVOLT
Since the declaration of the State of Emergency throughout East
Pondoland, there has been an almost complete news black-out on this
troubled area.
Shortly before the Emergency the author toured Pondoland in order
to study the situation first hand. This pamphlet should therefore be a
useful and informative guide to readers interested in aquainting thernselves
with the background and facts on Pondoland.
Ben Turok, the author, is the African Representative for the Western
Cape in the Cape Provincial Council.
* An appendix explaining the powers and duties of the Bantu
Authorities ts given at tlze back of the pamphlet.

Prefqce
"The Passing of the Bantustan Act has driven the lesson home
that the Nationalist Government is planning to control the
whole range of human activities. The opposing forces are also
beginning to plan on no less a scale. They depend on the
knowledge that no Government can carry out its laws if the
majority of the people a.re not willing to co-operate, and it
seems that we have reached the point when the oppressed
people may in practice not co-operate with the Government.
When the majority of the people, in despair, set their feet on
the road of non-co-operation with those who oppress them, the
police and the army will bring little consolation to the troubled
minds of the Government supporters who find themselves
surrounded by the cold unfriendliness of the masses who, in the
words of Chief A. J. Lutuli, claim, "Freedom is the Apex" of
their struggles."
GOVAN MBEKI.
Bantustans-A Death Trap. 1959.
A FIER many months of pretence that nothing untoward was happening
f3. in Pondoland, the Government has now admitted that 4,769 people
have been arrested during the present F.mergency.
Reports filtering through the official ban on news indicate that a minor
war is in progress in East Pondoland and that hundreds of homes have been
razed to the ground, thousands of families broken up and made homeless,
and that famine threatens the rvhole area.
Furthermore, the troubles are no longer conflned to East Pondoland but
have spread throughout the whole Transkei. The whole of the Xosa people
have been inspired by the Pondo resistance and the struggle against Bantu
Authorities has been mounted throughout the area. There is now every
reason to believe that the situation will continue to deteriorate and is likelv
to spread to all the reserves of the Union.
Because of the unique charachter of the struggle in East Pondoland
and the example it has set to the other rural peoples, the Pondo Revolt
merits special study.

THE PEOPLE OF PONDOLAND
T'tHE Pondo people form part of the Xosa national group. They are
JL renown for their strong tribal ties and the firm unity that has deep
roots in their past.
Unlike most of the other African peoples of South Atrica, the Pondos
were not involved in the numerous rvars between rvhite and black -
they
were never defeated in battle. Pondoland \\tas annexed by the Cape Colony
in 1894 but has always been an African territory with European influence
limited to a fetv thousand missionaries, traders and civil servants. (1)
The pride of the Pondo people in their customs and traditions is legend.
East Pondoland, the centre of the present Pondo revolt, consists of the
districts of Bizana, Flagstaff, Lusikisiki, Tabankulu and Mt. Ayliff with a
population of over 250,000 people. It rvas intended by the Government to
be one of the nine Regional Authorities for the Transkei. But little progress
had been made in this respect.
In travelling through Pondoland one is struck by the startling difference
between East Pondoland and West Pondoland, lvhere Bantu Authorities
have been in force for some time. Here large tracts of land have been fenced
off, huts are clustered together in controlled villages, few cattle are to be
seen and very little land is now under plough. By contrast East Pondoland
presents a picture of vast stretches of lush vegetation where the cattle are
fat and much land is under cultivation. There is a general air of greater
activity and prosperity.
It was the Gover:nment's efforts to enforce its Great Design, in this East
Pondoland area of peace and tranquility, that led to the most violent and
determined resistance it has yet encountered in the Reserves of South Africa.
BANTUSTAN-A FCLICY OF DESPERATION
lfl-HE Government's attempts to interfere with the traditional tribal institu-
L tions in Pondoland was no chance event, it rvas the result of a conscious
effort on their part to find a new policy for the people of South Africa.
This arose directly from the need of tl're governing Nationalist Party for
some political solution to the critical problems facing them. With events
elsewhere in Africa highlighting the rapid awakening of the African giant,
and with the increasing political consciousness of the Non-Whites in South
Africa, the situation seemed desperate.
In this cljnrate of alarm and uncertainty the evil genius of Afrikaner
Nationalism, Dr. Verwoerd, pulled the theory of Bantustans out of the hat
to save his party from political bankruptcy. Having taken the plunge with
the new policy, the Nationalists were forced, tryhen challenged by opposition
forces. into making reckless statements that they knew to be sheer bluff.
"The Nationalist Party is prepared to divide South Africa" said Mr.
J. J. Fouche, Minister of Defence (3).
"If they want it (independence) they rvill be free to have it." Mr. De
Wet Nel said in Parliament (n).
(') Official Summary of Tomlinson Commission Report page 43.
(') Star 29/2/60.
(') Star 3/2/60.

Nationalists who had been reared on the old fashioned 'baasskap" of
Mr. Strydom must have been startled by the finality of Mr. Lou$r's staternent
at the United Nations to the effect that the Government believed in
"separate Bantu communities which can eventually attain full selfgovernnlent."
And their confusion was even more confounded when this
statement received the blessing of Dr. Verloerd at a public meeting(5).
The breathtaking boldness of the Nationalist leaders misled many whites.
Here tvas the straw they could grasp in the hope that European privilege
and domination could be maintained in the developed areas of the Union
at the cost of ceding the poverty stricken reserves, which were valueless
to tlrem in any case.
Some even accepted I'Iationalist arguments that this policy fully justified
the Government's attitude of "no concessjons" to the strident demands for
political rights by the urban Africans. The poverty-stricl

The Government expected to have more success in this regard with
Bantu Authorities because democratic elections had been done away with
and they now had almost complete control of the new councils.
THE CREATION OF CLASSES
REALISING its failure to win supporters amongst the African people in
4t the towns, the Government is making concerted efforts not to suffer the
same handicap in the reserves. Their flr-st step to gain supporters was the
winning over of the chiefs and their installation as puppets within the Bantu
Authorities hierarchy. The second step was to foster the growth of a
middle-class consisting of professional men and traders. The third rvas to
encourage the emergence of a new class of comparatively well-to-do
peasants, farming on large pieces of land. These three categories were to
be privileged, but dependent on Government favour. They were to perform
a dual function, to act as the authority over the mass of the Africans,
and serve as a constant -
reminder that collaboration with the Government
pays off. In addition the Nationalists would use this upper-crust to disarm
their critics. I{ere, in the Bantu "homelands", they could say, "the Bantu
can develop to the highest levels."
SQUEEZED OFF THE LAND
f,)RASTIC interference with the traditional system of land allocation is
'r involved in the creation of a class of better-off peasant. Land in the
reserves was previously controlled communally and farmed in strips allocated
to individual peasants by the chief. It is of course true that these strips were
too small to enable families to make a living off them and the acute shortage
of land left many peasants without strips, forcing them to rely solely on
their cattle grazed on the commonage.
Government policy now is to "remove from the land all those who have
no arable allotments and place t.hem in special settlements consisting of the
landless and the dispossessed." 1s;. The intention is to drive "the landless
sections of the community to be rehoused in rural villages." (s;. Of all the
drastic and foolish steps that the Nationalist Government has taken in the
pursuance of its ideology, this is the most explosive.
This threat of dispossession of their land the African people regard as
the removal of their last shred of security. In spite of all their limitations,
the reserves have nevertheless been a hedge against the perils of unemployment
and the constant hazards of influx control.
What is more, it seems highly tikely that the removal of these people
from the land is connected with the establishment of the "border iniJustries"
(')
(')
Mbeki, page 17.
Race Relations Survey 1959/60, page 44.

to which the Government is constantly referring. Thus, in addition to
supplying the present industrial areas and farms with labour, the reserves
are to be still further denuded of their manpower in order to staff the
White-owned factories to be established on their boundaries.
THE IMPOSITION OF BANTU AUTHORITIES
MANY of the above facets of Government policy remained hidden for a
long time. The chiefs in some areas did not recognise the trap that
lay beneath the sugary promises of the Department of Bantu "Development,"
accepting Bantu Authorities at their face value as a genuine step towards
autonomy,
But the Verwoerd tactics never deceived the vast majority of
ordinary people the very people without whom its achievement was
impossible. From -
the start, popular African leaders stated categorically that
they had no confldence in the new "Bantu Authorities," and that their
aspirations could never be realised within the narrow confines of the reserves.
South Africa must be regarded as a single whole, they stressed, and
demanded representation in the central authority, Parliament.
African representatives in Parliament launched a determined attick on
the Bantu Self-Government Bill. They objected to the political division of
South Africa and to the exclusion of any representatives of the African
people from the legislative body which made the laws governing them.
More important still, the new policy was rejected by the people in the
areas in which it was being applied. While the Bantustan Debate was
raging in the political arena, the African people in the reserves were fighting
a bitter battle aga"inst the imposition of this system.
In some areas the people would have nothing to do with the Government
sponsored 'celebrations' inaugurating the new Authorities.
"At the first oflicial ceremony to mark the establishment of a Regional
Authority in the Transvaal on the 7th August, 1959, near Zeerust, about
250 people attended of the 28,000 people covered by the Authority," states
the 1958l9 Race Relations Survey.
During 1958 large sections of the Ba Pedi tribe of Sekhukuniland had
resisted the Bantu Authorities system. The acting chief Moroamoche and
leading Councillors were banished, 338 Africans arrested, and the area was
patrolled by police for the whole of. 1959. The whole country was shocked
when many tribesmen received life sentences in the drawn out proceedings
that followed the disturbances.
Opposition to the "betterment-schemes" which are closely linked with
Bantu Authorities was a contributary cause of the widespread demonstrations
in Natal in August 1959.
In the Transkei and Ciskei opposition to Bantu Authorities was shown
in sudden eruptions of violence in many areas,

EAST PONDOLAND RESISTS
THE revolt in East Pondoland was destined to be even more widespread
4 than elsewhere. From the start, the Government made the serious error
of choosing as their arch-champion of Bantu Authorities, Chief Botha
Sigcau, a man already discredited in the eyes of his people. As far back as
1939, when the choice had to be made of a successor to the Paramount
Chieftainship of East Pondoland, the Government of the day choose Chief
Botha in preference to his half brother, Nelson who was the rightful heir.
The Pondo's did not accept this appointment, and resented Chief Botha for
having taken office. Thus, when the Nationalists used Chief Botha to introduce
Bantu Authorities into the area in 1957. thev had lost before thev
started.
Many efforts were made by the authorities to persuade the Pondos to
accept the system voluntarily, but they met with little success. In 1958,
all the Pondoland districts were invited to send representatives to a large
gathering called by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development,
Mr. De Wet Nel, and Botha Sigcau. The people were led to believe that the
gathering was some sort of celebration, but found on arrival that it was an
attempt to get Bantu Authorities under way. "Chief Botha announced thaf
he had been promoted to take over the chair of the Chief Magistrate of
[Jmtata, and that in turn some of the Chiefs would be promoted in the
various districts. The Pondo court would be enhanced in status, and great
changes would be brought about -
in short, the people were told that they
were getting self-Government." (to).
In practice, however ,it worked out that Chief Botha alone made promotions,
and it was he who selected councillors for the courts from his
own supporters. The people steadily lost confidence in the courts and
corruption set in among the councillors rvho knew that their position
depended not on the goodwill of the people, but only on their maintaining
their friendship with Chief Botha. ft was this cancer in the heart of tribal
justice that was one of the main reasons for the breakdown of the tribal
structure, and for the subsequent development of a new system during the
Pondo revolt.
The rot ate ever deeper into the once healthy organism of tribal life.
Government appointees to positions of authority were increasingly spurned
by the people, and they had to rely on the might of the lal and the strong
arm of the magistrates to impose their authority. Many chiefs and headmen
found that once they had committed themselves to supporting Bantu
Authorities, an immense chasm developed between them and the people.
Gone was the old give-and-take of tribal discussion and consultation. In
its place there was now the autocratic power bestowed on the more
ambitious chiefs who became arrogant in the knowledge that the Govern-
('o) Memorandum sent to U.N. by the Hill Committee.

I
I
ment's might was behind them. On one occasion, the Chief Magistrate of
the Transkei said, "Don't forget you are the authority and power, and
whosoever is against authority and power is against you . be your own
police in your own interests use moderate violence just like a good
policeman."(t,)
By flattery, coercion, and blatant incitement the Government drove
the chiefs into open conflict with their people.
,fi
I
+
i
THE REVOLT DEVE,LOPS
"THE Pondo people are more amenable to rule by hereditary chiefs than
- other less unifled tribes, and less likely therefore to refuse to accept their
dictates 'without good reason, provided and here lies the crux of the
-
matter such chiefs or leaders are genuinely representative of tl-re
people . . . it is to be regretted that the Government has continued to insist
on upholding the appointment of chiefs and headmen arbitrarily chosen by
themselves rather than elected by the people concerned in a democratic
fashion."(11) In this outspoken manner the Institute of Race Relations put
its finger neatly on the mainspring of the trernendous revolt against tradition
and authority in East Pondoland.
The Government was well aware that the people of East Pondoland
were opposed to Bantu Authorities from the very first. In 7957, the people
voiced their objections at meetings which were held with their chiefs. But
the chiefs refused to take up their peoples' grievances with the magistrates,
either because they realised that the Government was determined to carry
its policy through and would not tolerate opposition, or because they were
Chief Botha's men.
Dissatisfled with their chiefs' attitude the people sent deputations to the
ma-gistrates directly. In 1957, in the district of Bizana for example, a
deputation was informed that their grievances would be referred to Pretoria.
Nothing was heard for some time, and a year later, another deputation interviewed
the new magistrate at Bizana who told them that he had no record
of their earlier representations. The complaints were repeated but once
again no reply was received from official quarters.
Frustration and dissatisfaction were building up, until matters boiled
over in an outburst of anger at a meeting in the Isikelo location in East
Pondoland. Two of the chief's councillors were asked to explain at an
Inkundla what benefits the people would get from Bantu Authorities which
they had been trying to popularise. When they failed to do so, the meeting
decided that they should receive corporal punishment.
Dissatisfied with their own tribal leaders and with the local magistrate,
the people sent word to the Chief magistrate of the Transkei asking him to
come to the area. Instead of his visiting the troubled area, a detachment
of police was sent in to arrest the Jeading spokesmen at the meeting.
("
("
At opening of school at Tsolo, Jan 1959, Mbeki, page 8.
Recent statement by S.A. Institute of Race Relations on Pondo situation.

Pondos in the Bizana district were incensed at the arrests and tension
mounted. Hut burnings and demonstrations against chiefs, headmen and
poiice interference took place in a growing number of locations during
1959, What was once a closely knit tribe was becoming a seething,
intriguing, unhappy people. Tremendous pressure was put on tribal leaders
by both the Pondos and the Government and they had to make their choice.
Many of them chose to ignore the people's wishes and uphold those of the
Government thus alienating themselves from their people completely.
A popular movement arose amongst the people in March 1960, and th.e
Hill Committee, composed of commoners, was established. It was this committee
which rallied the majority of the tribesmen in the Bizana district into
open struggle against the authorities and their henchmen. The committee
summoned a series of huge meetings, attended by thousands of Pondos, to
discuss their plight and make plans to carry on the struggle. Inspirecl by
these meetings neighbouring tribesmen from other districts in East Pondoland
carried back the neu's to their areas.
Repeated requests by the Hill Committee for the magistrate to come and
hear the peoples grievances were ignored, and instead they were informed
that the meetings were illegal and should cease forthwith. At this stage the
Government officials made it clear that they would have no dealings with
the leaders of the popular movement and wouJd continue to carry out
Governmcnt policies through the channel of Bantu Authorities.
The Pondos then found that news of their meetings was reaching the
magistrate's ears and that their new-found unity was being undermined from
within by Government agents. Drastic action was taken against these
informers, huts were burnt down, and many of them were forced to flee
from the area.
In retaliation, a meeting of thousands of Pondo's at Ngquza Hill was
attacked by heavily armed police. Eleven Pondos were shot dead and 15
seriously wounded (Some reports put the number at 30 dead and 60 seriously
wounded). The meeting had been summoned for mid-day but wlrile the
people were still gathering, helicopters followed by spotter-planes appeared
over the hill, flying very low. A white flag was raised by one of the leaders
as a sign that a peaceful meeting was being held, but soon afterwards vans
of armed police arrived. (13)
Tear-gas bombs were dropped, starting a veld fire, and as the gathering
scattered in confusion the police opened fire with the same callous abandon
as had been witnessed at Sharpeville and Langa.
Twenty-three Pondos were arrested after the meeting on a charge of
"fighting". Nineteen were convicted and sentenced to terms ranging from
18 months and 6 strokes, to 21 months.
Subsequently, at an inquest on the shootings, the magistrate found that
the firing of Sten gun bullets was "unjustified and excessive, even reckless."
Policing of the area increased after this incident. Saracens and radio
cars were brought in. The breakdown between the authorities and the
Pondos was complete.
r0

A COMMISSION IS APPOINTED
RECOGNISING that police massacres could not break the people's
t*
resistance, the Government announced that a Commission of Inquiry,
composed of Bantu Administration officials, would be appointed to hear
their grievances. Grievances there were many, the main one being that
Bantu Authorities had never been accepted by the people, only by some
chiefs, and that the system must be abandoned. The complaint was made
that inferior education was being given to the children under Bantu Education
and that the people had lost control of the schools.
Increased taxation was a serious source of dissatisfaction.
Livestock tax had increased from 6d. per head per annum in 1944 to
llgd. Poll tax had increased by l5l- to f2.5.0 a year, and the original
health levy of 1l- a year had become a l0l- general levy.
Other complaints related to the graft in the courts, and the general
corruption that had set in among councillors and chiefs. The
findings of the Commission were announced at a public meeting near Bizana
on October l1th. It is significant that on this occasion the Government
was forced to bypass their much-vaunted Bantu Authorities machinery in
order to convey their finidings to the people, and negotiate with the Hill
Committee which had become the generally accepted tribal representative.
The Report contained a number of admissions of errors made in the
creation of Bantu Authorities but few concessions on other important complaints.
The Commissioners admitted that when Bantu Authorities were
formed, the old customs of the tribes around Bizana were not observed . . .
"and the people of Bizana had every right to complain The laws and
customs of the tribes should have been observed and they should have been
given an opportunity to say who they rvanted (in the nomination of tribal
authorities)."
The Commission also found that f20,000 damages had been caused in
the hut burnings.
The Pondos were far from satisfied with the Commissions findings. At
a meeting on the 25th October, they formally announced their rejection of
the Report, and expressed their determination to continue the struggle
against Bantu Authorities.
They decided to stop paying taxes.
This momentcus decision taken by thousands of Pondos, many of them
delegates from distant locations, was a sharp reminder that the Pondos were
in a desperate frame of mind. At the same time, five top leaders of the
Pondoland National C,ontntlttee surrendered themselves to the police as they
had lost their appeal to the Supreme Court and had been refused bail. They
had been sentenced to over a year for attending an illegal meeting!
Furthermore, as a mark of their anger at the jailing of their ieaders, and
in protest at the attitude adopted by most of the White people in Bizana,
the people decided to boycott this town. The Pondos felt that the traders
(") New Age, September 8th, 1960.

in Btzana had shown partiality towards the Government, instead of
sympathising with the people from whom they made a living, One Pondo
put it this way, "We boycott the traders because they helped the Government
in trying to break us. !\/hen we boycott them we are boycotting the
Government."
The Pondos also protested at the banning from Pondoland of Mr.
R. Arenstein, their attorney, who had fought a valiant battle in the Bizana
court for the Pondos. As a result the ban was partially lifted, allowing
Mr. Arenstein to complete the defence of the cases then pending.
T[-IE WI{ITE TR.ADERS
[T is useful to interrupt the story of the Revolt, at this stage, to take a look
r
at the small islands of Whites in the heart of this African reserve.
Recent events have caught'the lVhite traders 'and professional men in
Pondoland completely unawares. While some of them did anticipate that
the Government's interference with the tribal set up would bring trouble,
they, who pride themselves on "knowing the Native," did not anticipate
that the Pondo Revolt could take on its present dimensions. Even now,
when they have themselves seen the resistance movement unfolding before
their very eyes, they are still unable to credit the Pondos they "have grown
up with," with the ability to organise so effectively.
And so they spread the story (in whispers), "The Communists are
behind it." Or, even more bizarre, in the words of a senior magistrate of
lJmtata, "Chief Lutuli is organising it all from just over the river in
Ffarding." (One would expect an official of the BAD to know that Chief
Lutuli has been either in gaol or in confinement in Groutville, in Northern
Natal, during the past year.)
The traders are in an jnvidious position. On the one hand the Government
resents the exjstence of these pockets of preclominently English
speaking people and can withdraw their trading licences at any time,
while, on the other: hand, the traders are aware that their connivance in
the policing of Pondoland could bring even greater Pondo wrath upon them.
The fact remains that the military forces of occupation in Pondoland
are using these white settlements as bases, and therefore, in the eyes of
the Pondos these people are regarded as collaborators of the Government.
How much different is the position of the majority of white South
Africans from that of the white traders in Pondoland?
THE EMERGENCY IS DECLARE,D
tE-tHE flrst signal that the Government had decided to suppress the popular
-!- Pondo movement and was going onto the offensive, came with the
arrest and banishment of Anderson Ganyile, a Pondo leader. The movement
of troops towards Pondoland followed, as if war had been declared.
The Governnrent even went as far as taking the ridiculous precaution of
12

putting the navy on to guarding the coast of Pondoland against "Russian
submarines!"
A State of Emergency was declared, and the previous curtain of silence
that had been drawn around Pondoland was drawn still tighter. Recent
reports filtering through to the press indicate that hundreds of Pondos have
been arrested, screened and treated with extreme brutality.
A New Age eye-witness writes, "A large contingent of armed police and
soldiers seal ofi an area, usually soon aftel midnight, Each hut is raided
by two armed men who take arvay everything that remotely resembles a
weapon. In some areas, even hoes are confiscated."
More recent reports indicate that the declaration of the State of
Emergency has added fuel to the long smouldering fires of revolt in Pondoland
and the Translcei as a ivhole. Violence and hut burnings are taking
place over the rvhole area.
Above all, the declaration of the Emergency constitutes an outright
admission of failure to suppress the resistance of the people, and the
Government has yet to explain why it was necessary to introduce the army
to siop the rvork of "outside agitators." It would be more correct to say
that the Nationalist army of occupation is now ti-ying to achieve what their
forefathers could not manage -
the complete subjugation of the Pondo
people.
The story of Pondoland is a repetition of those of. Zeerust, Sekhukuni-
Iand and Zululand. ln each of these areas, widespread disturbances took
placc because of the imposition of Bantu Authorjties. In each area the
pattern of events leading up to the distur:bances was similar. Only, in
Pondoland, where the tribe was more unified than in other areas, the
resistance has been more determined and more sustained.
THE LE,SSONS OF THE PONDO STRUGGLE,
Q[n 7tt
s/:?1 1.t'l
EVERY 'struggle develops a momentum of its own; and as the struggle
progresses new concepts arise, new demands are made, and the participants
are Iocked in battle on a higher level. The Pondo Revolt is no
exception, as can be seen from the changes that have taken place in the
demands and approach of the Pondos during the course of the struggle.
In the first protests against Government dictatorship, the Pondos limited
their demands to the issues that were of inrmediate concern. Even though
the Government likes to pretend that the Pondos were stirred up by "outside
agitators," the truth is that the Government pressed the people so hard
that they had to fight back. Furthermore, initially, their methods of struggle
were the traditional ones the holding of meetjngs, deputations to the
magistrate, and, as the crisis - deepened, the burning of huts and expulsion
of undesirables from their midst.
But their experience of the Government taught the people that these
methods did not suffice. Peaceful meetings were broken up by aircraft,
t3

a_
spokesmen at deputations were arrested by armed police, and representations
about simple things like dipping were written down to "Communist
agitation." The people realised that a Government which based its policies
on pure force, and completely ignored peaceful representations, had to be
opposed, and that the fraudulent Bantu Authorities had to be rejected in
toto.
Thus the Pondos turned their attention to the bigger political issues
responsible for their plight, and declared the demand for direct representation
in Parliament. "Pondoland will be satisfied with nothing short of
sending representatives to Parliament."(r+;
The tactics of the Pondos also underwent a change. The boycott of
the traders -
a new weapon in the reserves -
was completely effective.
It highlighted the unity of the people, and gained much publicity for their
struggle. More drastic still \{/as the decision not to pay taxes, and the
adoption of the slogan "no co-operation with the authorities." This step
was supported by the decision to call for a withdrawal of labour from the
mines and sugar estates rvhich would thus force their employers to intervene.
These methods adopted by the Pondos show a maturity that is extraordinary
for a people who were not particularly active in political movements
in the past, It shows that the Africans in the reserves are perfectly
capable of using their initiative in forging new weapons of struggle when
the issues are sharp enough.
New conditions, have also created new forms of organisation. The recent
developments have brought great changes in the tribal structure. The system
of chieftainship is gone, probably never to return in the old form. The
people of East Pondoland have elected the Hill Committee democratically,
and it would seem likely that this system will remain whatever the outcome
of the present struggle may be. One thing is certain, indirect rule through
Chiefs accepted by the people, will never work again. The Government
will either have to recognise the newly constituted authority of the Pondos
- the Hill Committee or it will have to rule by outright force alone.
-
THE BANTUSTAN BLUFF EXPOSED
t[tHE revolt against authority and tradition in East Pondoland has great
+ slgnificance for South Africa. National issues which were still subject
to debate and dispute before these events, have now been tested in practice,
and shorvn to be complely unworkable.
Whereas it was previously the opposition parties and organisations which
criticised and condemned the theory of Bantustans, it has now been rent
asunder by the Africans themselves. "Autonomy," "Self-Government" and
1r4) Anderson Ganyile, New Age, 17/11/1960.
14

"Develop on your own lines" -'4ll
the deception of a politically bankrupt
Government stand exposed as a hollow fraud, by the heroic resistance of
the Pondo people.
Dr. Verwoerd's wondrous vision, elaborated at great length in Parliament,
of a dynamic new policy that would solve the critical problems of
South Africa, is a vision no more. fnstead, there stands the stark reality
of the South African police state -
shed of all pretence of ruling by
consent
-
ruling by force alone.
This is all the Nationalists have left to offer South Africa. As long as
they remain in office there will be more and more Pondolands, rvith ever
increasing strife, bloodshed and misery. This appalling prospect presents a
challenge to us all.
Apperadix
The powers and duties of the various Banftr duthorities.
The most important features of the Bantu Authorities are:
1. Any person appointed to any Authority may be removed at any
time.
2. There is no elective principle as it is generally understood.
3. Every law, or rule made by an Authority is subject to the approval
of the Governor General.
4. The Minister can frame a law for an Authoritv and it is deemed to
be the law.
5. A commissioned police officer may attend a Bantu Authority meeting
whenever he wishes to.
6.
The Minister's consent is required for the expenditure of all funds.
TRIBAL AUTHORITIES.
Tribal authorities are established by the Government after consultation
with the tribe concerned. The head is the local chief, but he may
be deposed at any time. This has occurred in a great number of cases
where the chiefs have refused to carrv out Government orders. In the
15

Transkei about half of the Councillors are elected by African taxpayers
in the area acting in consultation with the Chief, but these councillors
rnay be dismissed by the Minister,
Tribal Authorities assist the Chief to maintain law and order, disperse
unlawful assemblies, collect taxes, etc.
DISTRICT AUTHORITIES.
All the chiefs are ex-officio members and there are four members
representing the tribal authorities in the area. Two are appointed by
the Bantu Commissioner.
The District Authorities supervise the Tribal Authorities and have
other additional duties.
REGIONAL AUTHORITIES.
These are created in a similar way to the above, except that members
hold office for 5 years. The Minister may appoint a civil servant to
participate in the meetings. The public may not attend,
These councils are responsible for schools, hospitals, irrigation, etc.
They may levy rates and frame enactments which can be vetoed or
changed by the Minister. The Regional Authorities are fully supervised
by the B.A.D., and minutes of the rneetings must be sent to specified
officials.
TERRITORIAL AUTHORITY.
There are to be eight Territorial Authorities, one for each National
unit.
They may make representations to the Government in regard to
problems in their area, they may appoint chiefs, impose taxes and make
enactments which are subject to Government approval and amendment.
The Chief Bantu Commissioner is empowered to suspend any action
contemolated.
(For the above information the author is indebted to the Surveys
of the S.A. Institute of Race Relations and to the speech by Mr.
W. Stanford, M.P., in Parliament on 19th May, 1959.)

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