Wireless LAN Security with 802.1x, EAP-TLS, and PEAP - Black Hat

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Disassociation attacks 802.11 associate/disassociate messages are unauthenticated <strong>and</strong> unencrypted Attacker can forge disassociation message Bothersome denials of service
Solution: keyed IC Change behavior of WEP’s IC Derive key from seed value, source <strong>and</strong> destination MACs, payload Any change to these will alter the IC Include in every WEP packet
Page 1 and 2: Wireless LAN Security with 802.1x,
Page 3 and 4: Wired equivalent privacy
Page 5 and 6: Common attacks Bit-flipping (encryp
Page 7 and 8: More IV problems Say an AP constant
Page 9 and 10: Classes of attacks Authentication f
Page 11 and 12: WEP suckage Same key reused over an
Page 13 and 14: 802.1x
Page 15 and 16: Is 802.1x enough? No It does solve:
Page 17 and 18: 802.1x over 802.11 Supplicant Authe
Page 19 and 20: Before authentication Supplicant th
Page 21 and 22: 802.11/802.1x state machine Class 1
Page 23 and 24: Extensible authentication protocol
Page 25 and 26: Authentication methods EAP allows c
Page 27 and 28: Protected EAP (PEAP) Extension to E
Page 29 and 30: Note Do not configure IAS and XP fo
Page 31 and 32: Security requirements, again Mutual
Page 33 and 34: Windows PEAP authentication First p
Page 35 and 36: Our requirements so far Mutual devi
Page 37 and 38: Windows PEAP authentication First p
Page 39 and 40: Windows PEAP authentication Second
Page 41 and 42: Why use machine accounts? Domain lo
Page 43 and 44: Remaining vulnerabilities
Page 45: Bit-flipping attacks WEP doesn’t
Page 49 and 50: System requirements Client: Windows
Page 51 and 52: Access policy Policy condition NAS-
Page 53 and 54: Interoperability PEAP standards aut
Page 55 and 56: The future—long term IEEE is work
Page 57: © 2003 Microsoft Corporation. All

Wireless LAN Security with 802.1x, EAP-TLS, and PEAP - Black Hat

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