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From the Lab to the Police Station - Eyewitness Identification Lab ...

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dom, South Africa, Germany, and Australia, making this<br />

one of <strong>the</strong> most replicated effects in <strong>the</strong> eyewitness area.<br />

The simplicity and robustness of <strong>the</strong> sequential-superiority<br />

effect has made it one of <strong>the</strong> most important of all <strong>the</strong><br />

practical contributions of eyewitness system-variable<br />

research.<br />

John W.<br />

Turtle<br />

might not be in <strong>the</strong> lineup helps reduce <strong>the</strong> tendency <strong>to</strong><br />

simply pick <strong>the</strong> person who (relative <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r lineup<br />

members) looks most like <strong>the</strong> perpetra<strong>to</strong>r, but it does not<br />

eliminate <strong>the</strong> tendency al<strong>to</strong>ge<strong>the</strong>r.<br />

R. C. L. Lindsay and Wells (1985) used <strong>the</strong> relative<br />

judgment conceptualization <strong>to</strong> devise an alternative presentation<br />

procedure that would reduce <strong>the</strong> tendency of eyewitnesses<br />

<strong>to</strong> rely on relative judgments, namely, a sequential<br />

presentation. In <strong>the</strong> sequential procedure, <strong>the</strong> eyewitness is<br />

presented with one lineup member at a time, and <strong>the</strong><br />

eyewitness must decide for each person whe<strong>the</strong>r that person<br />

is <strong>the</strong> perpetra<strong>to</strong>r prior <strong>to</strong> being allowed <strong>to</strong> view <strong>the</strong><br />

next person. This one-at-a-time procedure discourages <strong>the</strong><br />

eyewitness from simply deciding who looks most like <strong>the</strong><br />

perpetra<strong>to</strong>r. Although <strong>the</strong> eyewitness could decide that <strong>the</strong><br />

person being viewed currently looks more like <strong>the</strong> perpetra<strong>to</strong>r<br />

than did <strong>the</strong> previous person, <strong>the</strong> eyewitness cannot<br />

be sure that <strong>the</strong> next (not yet viewed) person does not look<br />

even more like <strong>the</strong> perpetra<strong>to</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> one being viewed<br />

currently. Lindsay and Wells reasoned that this would force<br />

eyewitnesses <strong>to</strong> use a more absolute criterion (i.e., "Is this<br />

<strong>the</strong> perpetra<strong>to</strong>r or not?") ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> relative-judgment<br />

criterion (i.e., "Is this person more similar <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> perpetra<strong>to</strong>r<br />

than <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r lineup members?"). Their data showed that<br />

<strong>the</strong> simultaneous and sequential procedures produced<br />

nearly identical correct identification rates when <strong>the</strong> perpetra<strong>to</strong>r<br />

was present in <strong>the</strong> lineup. When <strong>the</strong> lineup did not<br />

contain <strong>the</strong> perpetra<strong>to</strong>r, however, <strong>the</strong> rate of mistaken identifications<br />

was 43% with <strong>the</strong> simultaneous procedure and<br />

only 17% with <strong>the</strong> sequential. O<strong>the</strong>r studies have shown<br />

that <strong>the</strong> sequential procedure is also less sensitive <strong>to</strong> lineup<br />

biases (R. C. L. Lindsay, Lea, Nosworthy, et al., 1991). The<br />

sequential-superiority effect has been replicated in experiments<br />

across <strong>the</strong> United States, Canada, <strong>the</strong> United King-<br />

Confidence Malleability<br />

Considerable research effort over <strong>the</strong> past 20 years has<br />

been devoted <strong>to</strong> assessing <strong>the</strong> relation between eyewitness<br />

identification accuracy and <strong>the</strong> confidence or certainty of<br />

<strong>the</strong> eyewitness. This is an important issue because (a)<br />

people (including jurors) assume that a confident witness is<br />

an accurate witness (e.g., Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson,<br />

1979), and (b) <strong>the</strong> judicial system has explicitly endorsed<br />

<strong>the</strong> idea that <strong>the</strong> certainty an eyewitness has in <strong>the</strong> identification<br />

is an indication of <strong>the</strong> accuracy of <strong>the</strong> identification<br />

(Neil v. Biggers, 1972).<br />

Research on eyewitness confidence has taught psychologists<br />

that <strong>the</strong> correlation between confidence and eyewitness<br />

identification accuracy is not a single value but<br />

ra<strong>the</strong>r is something that fluctuates as a function of several<br />

modera<strong>to</strong>rs. Meta-analyses indicate that <strong>the</strong> overall correlation<br />

across studies is approximately .29, but <strong>the</strong> estimated<br />

correlation rises and falls as a function of such things as<br />

viewing conditions and whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> analysis includes nonidentifying<br />

witnesses (see Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler,<br />

1995). Leippe (1980) described a process by which eyewitness<br />

accuracy is a function of memory variables,<br />

whereas confidence is a function of social variables,<br />

<strong>the</strong>reby leading <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> possibility of <strong>the</strong>ir dissociation under<br />

some conditions.<br />

In line with this idea, recent empirical evidence shows<br />

that <strong>the</strong> confidence of an eyewitness is malleable as a<br />

function of a system variable, namely, feedback, in a way<br />

that is independent of accuracy. <strong>Eyewitness</strong>es who make a<br />

mistaken identification but are <strong>the</strong>n <strong>to</strong>ld that a cowitness<br />

identified <strong>the</strong> same person or that <strong>the</strong> person identified is<br />

<strong>the</strong> actual suspect undergo confidence inflation (Luus &<br />

Wells, 1994; Wells & Bradfield, 1998, 1999). In o<strong>the</strong>r<br />

words, <strong>the</strong> justice system can induce false confidence in an<br />

eyewitness by giving feedback about <strong>the</strong> identification after<br />

<strong>the</strong> eyewitness has made a selection from <strong>the</strong> lineup. Giving<br />

feedback confirming an eyewitness's choice is a common<br />

practice in many police departments. When police<br />

investiga<strong>to</strong>rs confirm eyewitnesses' choices prior <strong>to</strong> assessing<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir confidence, <strong>the</strong> meaning of confidence becomes<br />

dis<strong>to</strong>rted. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than an indication of accuracy, high confidence<br />

could simply be an indication of feedback. Similarly,<br />

<strong>the</strong> recent work of Shaw and his colleagues indicates<br />

that repeated questioning of eyewitnesses can produce confidence<br />

inflation without increases in accuracy (Shaw,<br />

1996; Shaw, Garven, & Wood, 1997). Evidence suggests as<br />

well that directing eyewitnesses' attention <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir decision<br />

processes might actually lower <strong>the</strong> confidence-accuracy<br />

relation (Robinson & Johnson, 1998).<br />

586 June 2000 • American Psychologist

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