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i n vo l ved DoD, Joint Staff, the
S e r v i c e s, USACOM, USPAC O M ,
U S S PACECOM, USSOCOM, US-
TRANSCOM, NSA, DISA, NSC,
DIA, CIA, FBI, NRO, and the
Departments of Sta t e, Justice,
and Tra n s p o r tation.
Key observations of the exe r-
cise included—
• Poor info r m a t i o n a l / o p e rational
security practices contributed
to DoD vulnerabilities.
• Attribution of attacks (i.e.,
determining who and why) is
very difficult.
• DoD has little capability to
detect or assess cyber atta c k s.
• Detection, reporting, re -
sponse processes are unres
p o n s i ve to the speed of cyber
a t ta c k s.
ER '97 demonstrated—in a
re a l - world exe rcise—that DoD is
not properly org a n i zed for detecting,
reporting, and re s p o n d-
ing to IO attacks in a timely
m a n n e r. A case that re c e n t l y
u n d e rs c o red the findings of ER
'97 was SOLAR SUNRISE.
I An e w s l e t t e r Spring 1999 • Vol. 2 No. 4
A Real-World Example of IA
Weaknesses—SOLAR SUNRISE
SOLAR SUNRISE was a series
of DoD computer network attacks
that occurred from 1 to 26
February 1998. The attack pattern
was indicative of pre p a ration
for a follow-on attack on the
DII. At least 11 attacks on Air
Fo rc e, Navy, and Marine Corps
c o m p u t e rs worldwide fo l l o we d
the same pro f i l e. At tacks we re
w i d e s p read and appeared to be
f rom sites such as Israel, the
United Arab Emirates (UA E ) ,
Fra n c e, Ta i wan, and Germany.
Fu r t h e r m o re, the attacks occ
u r red when the United Sta t e s
was preparing for potential mili
tary action against Iraq in response
to UN weapons inspection
disputes and could have
been aimed at disrupting deployments
and opera t i o n s.
In the end, the atta c ke rs
turned out to be two teenagers
f rom California and one teenager
from Israel—not Iraq, terro r-
i s t s, fo reign intelligence serv
i c e s, nation sta t e s, or hacke rs
for hire. Although the atta c k s
did not cause any serious damage
to DoD systems, they could
h a ve seve rely affected DoD during
heightened tensions with
I raq.
SOLAR SUNRISE re c o n-
firmed the vulnerabilities of
DoD computer networks and
D o D ’s need to make some
changes in its approach to IA.
As Dr. John J. Hamre, Deputy
S e c re tary of Defense, said, "this
should serve as a serious wa ke -
up call." If high-school
t e e n a g e rs can infiltrate DoD
systems with ease, imagine the
damage that could be done to
U.S. security by skilled pro f e s-
sionals or potential adve rs a r i e s
in future asymmetric conflicts.
Making JV2010 A Viable Concept
In 1996, for the third consecu
t i ve year, the Defense Science
B o a rd (DSB) concluded that a
need exists for ex t ra o rdinary action
to deal with the present and
e m e rging challenges of defending
against possible info r m a t i o n
a t ta c k s. Ac c o rdingly, the DSB
recommended more than 50 actions
designed to better pre p a re
DoD for this new form of wa r-
fa re.
Of the 13 major DSB re c o m-
m e n d a t i o n s, the author of this
article believe five are essential
to maintaining the integrity of
DoD systems and providing an
a p p ropriate environment for executing
Joint Vision 2010 —
• Designate an accountable IO
focal point. The Secre tary of
Defense must have a single
focal point charged with providing
leadership of the comp
l ex activities and interre l a-
tionships that are invo l ved in
this new wa r fa re area.
• O rg a n i ze for IO-Defense (IO-
D). Specific IO-D capabilities
and org a n i zations must provide
or support the capabilit
i e s.
• I n c rease awa re n e s s. Seniorl
e vel government and industry
leaders must be more
a wa re of the vulnera b i l i t i e s
and implications.
• S taff for success. A cadre of
high-quality, trained pro f e s-
sionals with re c o g n i ze d
c a reer paths is essential fo r
defending present and future
i n formation systems.
• P rovide the re s o u rc e s. DSB
estimated achieving its 13
i m p e ra t i ves would cost
a p p roximately $3.1 billion
o ver fiscal years 1997 thro u g h
2 0 01.
The services—in efforts to defend
their systems and pro c e s s-
es against adve rsarial action—
a re fielding a wide variety of Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS)
u n i l a t e rally setting detection
f e a t u re s, and reporting differently.
The Army has deve l o p e d
a three-phased Ne t work Security
Impro vement Pro g ra m
(NSIP) to implement the DSB’s
re c o m m e n d a t i o n s. The Air
Fo rce and Navy are deve l o p i n g
their own plans in the absence
of a single agency consolidating
service effo r t s. Howe ve r, these
p a rochial effo r t s, conducted
along service-specific lines, are
not consistent with the JV2010
continued on page 16
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