Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations A Critical Guide

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we share in how our rulers and tape-measures should in practice be used. Consequently, if we wish to resolve a dispute about the actual length of an item as determined by a particular tool in cases where some doubt or inconsisency has arisen, then we will employ appropriate criteria within these particular contexts - checking with other rulers etc. - to determine where the fault arises. The proper practical ‘standard’ of what a metre is, is in this way carried by all the tape-measures and rulers that there are, insofar as they are all used in the agreed practice of (metric) measurement. Jacquette’s idea that ‘the standard metre bar can be used as intended to check the accuracy of metre sticks designed for industrial and household use’ (Ibid., 53), whilst not obviously inaccurate, only serves to mislocate any genuine role that can have been originally granted to the metre bar by the French National Assembly. In the course of his exposition, Jacquette raises a fourth question, one relating to the Tractatus, about the significance of Wittgenstein’s statement about the standard metre bar for the meaning of the claim that one can attribute neither being nor non-being to elements, ‘a point that has not usually been emphasized by commentators on PI 50’ (Ibid., 52); and here his final answer, not unreasonably, is that ‘He seems to want only to understand what it would mean for someone - his earlier self - to deny that fundamental elements could be the meaningful subjects of existence or non-existence predications’ (Ibid., 59). Prior to his section about Saul Kripke on the standard metre, Jacquette provides a thought experiment which strangely neglects the usual surrounding circumstances in which measurements take place. If, on his example, we make a replica from the standard metre bar in Paris, and the replica is at some point used to ‘measure’ the standard bar, then if there is a discernible difference in the expected result of measurement, there will be no way of telling which bar had altered in length, or even if both bars have actually changed. This is the basis for his suggestion that certain alternative possibilities ‘cannot be criteriologically distinguished in practice’ (Ibid., 57). But it is perfectly clear that this little scenario could never be realised in practice, precisely because it is proposed in the absence of any normal surroundings which would provide available criteria enabling us to determine what changes in the bars, if any, had in fact occurred. This has a bearing on his criticism of Kripke. 14
The final part of Jacquette’s paper criticises Saul Kripke on the standard metre, where the fundamental point does not lie with the criteriological problem that he sees as an insurmountable barrier for Kripke’s argument. Whereas Kripke’s distinction between the epistemological status of the statement that stick S is one metre long at time to as a priori, and its metaphysical status as contingent, is arrived at by looking at this statement in complete isolation from any practical circumstances in which someone might wish to use a ruler to measure the length of an item, Wittgenstein’s distinction between a means of representation and something represented relates directly to the role of any tool in the practical business of taking measurements. Whilst this standard metre can be thought of as a practical means of comparison, this is not its primary role, since in practice it need not exist at all. Kripke inhabits a different (philosophical) world from Wittgenstein, who would recognise no employment in this case for any distinction between the epistemic and the metaphysical within the language-game, for it has no bearing on the role played by the standard metre in the practice of measuring. If Jacquette’s actual criticism of Kripke misfires, this is rather because Kripke does not make the false assumption that there is an independent standard for inches ‘in terms of which the length in inches of the metre stick can be evaluated’, an invalid assumption because ‘this papers-over the criteriological problem to which Wittgenstein in the target passages calls attention’ (Ibid., 61 et seq.). Yet there is no criteriological problem. Jacquette is thinking of a situation apart from any normal context. As he puts it: To posit an equivalence between metres and inches can never amount to anything more than approximation, if the two units are truly independent and their equivalence not merely stipulative. We must then ask whether we can ever get exact equivalences where entirely different units are concerned.....because even in principle we can only physically compare them, and physical comparisons and judgements of coextension are inherently approximate (Ibid., 61) If this sounds astonishing, it is because we do in practice ‘stipulate’ or come to an agreement over just how ‘long’ one metre is in imperial terms. We can, for example, alter or extend our 39.37 inches 15
Page 1 and 2: CRITICAL NOTICE Wittgenstein’s Ph
Page 3 and 4: ecomes the activating structure of
Page 5 and 6: Many readers will find an inevitabl
Page 7 and 8: the interpreter provide an explanat
Page 9 and 10: constantly to give their pupils the
Page 11 and 12: consequence of this kind of attempt
Page 13: provided to the first. But the more
Page 17 and 18: eveals, complications arise from a
Page 19 and 20: equire strict necessary and suffici
Page 21 and 22: elements in the sentence’ (Ibid.)
Page 23 and 24: question whether Wittgenstein is ev
Page 25 and 26: gravitate towards either wholly ‘
Page 27 and 28: there could be any genuine applicat
Page 29 and 30: who have some prior knowledge of St
Page 31 and 32: y being taught the meaning of the w
Page 33: ENDNOTES (1) Meredith Williams: Bli

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