history of jammu and kashmir rifles

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common feature of Ladakh is its general extreme barrenness. There are, however, many fertile tracts along the rivers and Nallas, covered with luxuriant crops. Its climate is characterized by great extremes of heat and cold and by excessive dryness. The extreme cold during the winter is between 30 to 40 degrees centigrade below zero, while during the summer the temperature shoots up to 20 degrees above zero at many places. Snowfalls are common but not as heavy as in the Dras region. The attempt at the direct conquest of Ladakh was not without great risks and Zorawar Singh could not have been unaware of these. The severe cold was certain to reduce the effectiveness of the Dogra soldiers, while the barrenness of the country restricted the deployment of a very large force. Anticipating these difficulties the Dogra General had made adequate arrangements for countering them. Strategy, tactics and administrative arrangements were so adopted as to suit the peculiar conditions. Besides he had chosen experienced soldiers and trained them appropriately for the task. The chief Dogra officers under him were Mian Rai Singh, Mehta Basti> Ram, Mirza Rasu! Beg, Rana Zalim Singh, Shinghe Mankoria, Mian Tota, Sardar Uttam Singh, Wazir Khoja Bhunja, Imam Malik, Sayeed Madin Shah, and Sardar Samad Khan. Zorawar Singh also had the advantage of the superior armament,-military tactics, and discipline of his troops vis-à-vis the Ladakhis. What is more the Dogras were invading Ladakh at a time, which could be termed as that of its deepest slumber. All preparations having been completed Raja Gulab Singh now waited for a pretext for the invasion. He was in for good luck and the opportunity did not take long to come. The Raja of Sant and Pashkyum had occupied some territory of Raja Giapo-cho of Timbus and die latter had lodged a complaint regarding this with their lord. Tsepal, the Gyalpo (King) of Ladakh. The Gyalpo had, however, taken no immediate action in the matter leaving Giapo-cho dissatisfied and frustrated. Zorawar Singh in Kishtwar had evidently not only kept himself abreast of the internal dissensions that were brewing up within the ruling families of Ladakh, but was also in close touch with some of them. So when the Raja of Timbus got no redress from the Tsepal he found it quite convenient to ask for help of the Jammu Raja through Zorawar Singh. This was a god sent opportunity and Gulab Singh issued orders to Zorawar Singh to march into Ladakh. It is believed that before doing so he not only sounded his king and master at Lahore but also the East India Company (perhaps through the Lahore Durbar) to make sure that this action was not interfered with by powers that were in a position to do so. After receiving his orders Zorawar Singh, with his troops already in a state of readiness, lost no time and immediately marched into the Ladakhi province of Purig (the estate of the Thi Sultans) from Kishtwar in April 1834 with an Army of 4000-5000 men. The Dogras entered the Ladakhi territory by the Pass at the head of the Sum Valley. Bakra-Sis who was in command of the castle at Kartse in the Sum Valley quickly collected some 200 men at Kartse and moved up towards the head of the Sum Valley to block the Dogra advance, even as he sent information of the invasion to the Gyalpo at Leh. He fought heroically for full two days against very heavy odds and in the end he was killed fighting along with his son. On receiving information of the Dogra invasion the Gyalpo declared an emergency and issued orders for the mobilization of his Army. Under the existing law, on declaration of such an emergency by the Gyalpo, every family or house in the country was obliged to furnish one armed soldier at the call of the Gyalpo's Government. For this, each house was required to maintain, at all time, at least one of these weapons - match locks, swords, bows and arrows, shields and helmets etc. There were at that time about 22,000 houses in Ladakh which meant that the Gyalpo could muster an Army of around 22,000 men. However, sickness and the necessity of guards at Leh and in the provinces, required the absence of about 2000 men from the field. Not more than 20,000 men in all could, therefore, have been mobilized for meeting the invasion. On call to arms the Makim (soldier) was told off as Infantry or Cavalry according to whether he owned a horse (Pony) or not. The soldiers had to find their own food. Each man was generally attended to by another male member of his family who carried the joint rations and provisions on his back during the daily marches. The camp at the end of the march was pitched without any regularity and consisted almost entirely of black tents made of Yak's hair. As regards the command and control, the entire Army was under the Commander-in-Chief known as Makpon, who was either the son of the principal Kahlon or a member of the Royal family. Other titles and ranks were conferred on the heads of districts and villages according to the numbers of soldiers that each was able to furnish. A Kahlon (head of district) who brought a few hundred was called Stongpon (Commander of thousand). A Goba (head of village) who could furnish 50 to 100 men was known as Gyopon (commander of a hundred or captain). An inferior Goba who supplied and commanded four to five men was styled Chupon (commander of ten). Discipline was enforced through the war law known as Makkhrim. Although this ill-equipped and not too disciplined body of troops could hardly be called an Army, it was quite capable of giving the Dogra invaders a tough time. For one, the Ladakhis had the advantage of numbers, and second, they had terrain and climate on their side. Besides, while in Eastern Ladakh defence was entrusted to the unwarlike monks assisted by a few armed peasantry, the defence arrangements in Western Ladakh, through which the route of the Dogra invasion lay, were much stronger. Here the defence was entrusted to a number of petty chiefs belonging to this area, who, besides being more warlike, had their well-defended castles or forts to fight from. 7 On completion of part mobilization Tsepal rushed a 5000 strong contingent, under Dorje Namgyal (the young Minister of Stog) to Sunku. to meet the Dogra advance. So when the Dogras reached 24
Sunku on 16 August 1834 they found their passage blocked by the Ladakhis, who had taken up a defensive position on top of a hill dominating their route of advance. Soon fighting broke out which continued the whole day before the Ladakhis were routed. The Ladakhis are believed to have suffered about 30 dead before they withdrew across the Russi Pass towards Shergol, under the cover of the night. The Dogra casualties were not too heavy, six having been killed and an equal number wounded. The Dogras now advanced on Suru and occupied it. Here they halted for eight days to replenish and reorganize themselves. 6 In order to win the goodwill of the conquered people. Zorawar Singh prohibited his troops from cutting the crop which was then ripe. His clever move was duly rewarded immediately when the Zamindars came over to him in a body and not only tendered their submission but also placed themselves under his protection. With this was assured a regular supply of food to his troops, being made voluntarily by the locals. The Wazir then built a small fort, which he named as 'Kila Suru Kursi' and occupied it. He also took over the unoccupied fort of Shakhar. To establish Dogra rule over the occupied territory Zorawar Singh made a summary land settlement of the district and imposed a tax of four rupees upon each house. Small Dogra picquets were then stationed at various places to keep control over the populace. Having consolidated his occupation of Suru, Zorawar Singh left 35 men in the Suru fort and another ten to guard the bridge over the Suru River and then advanced on Lang Kartse. Lang Kartse was easily occupied and here the Dogras took up a defensive position in which they spent the next one month. Meanwhile the minister of Stog, who had suffered a defeat at the hands of the Dogras at Sunku, had reorganized his force and once again advanced to make contact with the invaders. Seeing the' Dogras in a defensive position at Lang Kartse he decided to harass them rather than go in for a major action. For launching his main offensive he had probably decided to wait for two things - the arrival of reinforcements from Leh which were already on their way and the setting in of winter which was also just round the corner. To wait for both would have indeed been a wise strategy but Dorje Namgyal became impatient when a heavy snowfall signalled the arrival of winter, and without waiting for the reinforcements he made a daring attack on the Dogra defences with whatever he had. He had obviously miscalculated the Dogras' ability to fight under wintery conditions and was Killed along with 50 to 60 of his men as the Dogras rallied to meet the attack. The rest of the Ladakhis, demoralized by the Dogra action fled across the Pashkyum River, skilfully pulling down the bridge behind them to prevent pursuit by the Dogras. Wazir Zorawar Singh who earlier was probably contemplating to spend the winter months at Lang Kartse, now decided to pursue the fleeing Ladakhis. He was, however, not going to up stick from his firm base at Lang Kartse in a hurry. So remaining in the defensive position himself along with his main force, he pushed out only 500 men under Mehta Basti Ram in pursuit of the enemy. Mehta Basti Ram met with no opposition while crossing the Pashkyum River on inflated skins, as the Chief of Pashkyum on whom the command of the Ladakhi force had devolved after the death of Dorje Namgyal, had fled with his force to the fort of Sod. Here he intended to hold out till joined by reinforcements (about 4000 men) which the King of Ladakh had already despatched, and were now racing towards Sod. The Dogras on the other hand were determined to capture Sod before it was reinforced. Advancing swiftly they reached Sod practically at the heels of the fleeing Ladakhis and laid siege to the fort. The fort was then subjected to heavy battery fire for a number of days to force its early surrender. The defenders, however, held on to the fort with grim determination and showed no signs of weakness even at the end of ten days siege and bombardment. The Dogras whose rear was threatened by the 4000 strong Ladakhi Army that was fast approaching Sod could not afford to wait any more and therefore, decided to take the fort by assault. The Ladakhis were unable to stand the determined assault of the Dogras led by Mehta Basti Ram under cover of accurate artillery fire, and after some resistance the Chief of Pashkyum surrendered along with 600 of his soldiers. The capture of the fort had cost the Dogras more than 40 killed and many wounded, but they had prevented the two Ladakhi forces from uniting against them. By the time Ladakhi reinforcements under Banka Kahlon arrived at Sod not only had the fort fallen but Wazir Zorawar Singh had also moved up to the place from Lang Kartse with his main force. Banka Kahlon, therefore, thought it prudent not to make an immediate attack but to wait for a more opportune moment. While the Ladakhis were waiting like this, an interesting development took place which stalled the Dogra advance for nearly a month. It appears that the Gyalpo of Ladakh had already completed the mobilization of his Army but was now waiting for the winter to set-in well and proper before launching his counteroffensive. He had probably learnt a lesson from the disaster that befell the minister of Stog as a result of his premature attack on the plainsmen. He therefore, planned to delay the attack and make the Dogras fight through the thick of winter. For this he needed about a month's time and in a bid to gain this time he played a ruse, by which even Zorawar Singh seems to have been taken in. At the time of the Dogra invasion Dr Henderson, who was known to be an eccentric, happened to be present at Leh. The Gyalpo made use of him not only to reassure his people but also to outwit the Dogras and induced caution into them to gain the required time. He detained Henderson under duress and made him to appear as the envoy of the East India Company, who had come with an offer of assistance to the Ladakhis against the Dogras. The information was conveniently leaked out to Zorawar Singh for whose consumption it essentially was. For once Zorawar Singh appears to have 25
Page 1 and 2: HISTORY OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR RIFLES
Page 3 and 4: Foreword It is always a pleasure an
Page 5 and 6: Colonel Puran Singh Sambyal, Lieute
Page 7 and 8: to lack of roads and tracks. Added
Page 9 and 10: The 1st Jammu and Kashmir Mountain
Page 11 and 12: miles ahead of Baramulla. His littl
Page 13 and 14: 'Bhuttas' of Gilgit but very few ca
Page 15 and 16: commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Nar
Page 17 and 18: It may also be mentioned here that
Page 19 and 20: THE EARLY HISTORY OF JAMMU CHAPTER
Page 21 and 22: the Kharoti and Beyol Jagirs awarde
Page 23: Conquest of Ladakh 6 By 1833 Raja G
Page 27 and 28: fixed at three and a half rupees pe
Page 29 and 30: for his safe stay at Suru and Leh h
Page 31 and 32: surrendered at the very sight of su
Page 33 and 34: Figure 1.1 LADAKH AND BALITISTAN Di
Page 35 and 36: target of attack. Some have called
Page 38 and 39: Zorawar Singh first heard of the Ti
Page 40 and 41: The Sino-Tibetan Invasion of Ladakh
Page 42 and 43: asked Wazir Ratnu to start negotiat
Page 44 and 45: 14.Here again there is some confusi
Page 46 and 47: uncle and the nephew into a headlon
Page 48 and 49: Rs 50 lakh in cash, out of a total
Page 50 and 51: din. 22 Little had he perhaps reali
Page 52 and 53: Note: - Commedan was the Dogri vers
Page 54 and 55: surrender and the Dogras lost Gilgi
Page 56 and 57: March Hari Chand sent detachments t
Page 58 and 59: weakened through starvation thus, t
Page 60 and 61: Jammu troops. One regiment which ha
Page 62 and 63: discretion as the better form of va
Page 64 and 65: of the course the men were reported
Page 66 and 67: The command and control in the colu
Page 68 and 69: Besides, the State Army had 66 fiel
Page 70 and 71: of Maharaja Ranbir Singh' s reign.
Page 72 and 73: CHAPTER III The Imperial Service Tr
Page 74 and 75:
Killik Passes, which though not pra
Page 76 and 77:
Snider rifle, which was issued to i
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(d) Those that still remained on th
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night at Nilt. In front of it was a
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supplies of atta and meat were proc
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The Hunza-Nagar campaign was the fi
Page 86 and 87:
Reorganization, 1893-9537 As a resu
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Chitral was quite expected. In anti
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Having failed to burn out the gun t
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surmounting all difficulties, the G
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Artillery Much attention was also p
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For this work Commandant Khajoor Si
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CHAPTER IV Years of Peace Soon afte
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kind that were rarely, if ever, see
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Some Other Visits The Viceroy and L
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Gorkhas 2 Punjabi Hindus 2 TOTAL 69
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We have already noted how the three
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Along with cholera and plague there
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Transport into a troop of mules and
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Discipline Although the British had
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NOTES 1.Jammu & Kashmir Administrat
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offer and decided to carry the war
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the threat to Mombasa had been ward
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merged with Force 'B' under the com
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At about 1600 hours on 30 July 1915
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The British advance post in the beg
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On 23 June General Hoskins with two
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October 1916 to February 1917, till
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enemy action, and the State militar
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Orders for the mobilization of the
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to the plain of Dothan, and farther
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On 26 September commenced the invas
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were specially brought to the notic
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also continued as before and few to
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THE STATE BAND ABOUT WHICH SUCH A L
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CHAPTER VI Period of Modernization
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Medical Department The strength of
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(f) 2nd Kashmir Rifles (Body Guard)
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functioned as such and it continued
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when on arrival in the area of oper
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(c) 5th Kashmir Light Infantry (Sur
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Wakefield, the minister in charge p
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15 August to 21 September. On 15 Au
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25 September. A party 100 strong un
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the troops were totally tired out d
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The year 1932 saw the establishment
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Kashmir Training School moved to Sr
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Military Transport & Supply Militar
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CHAPTER VII World War II The Backgr
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it was decided to let them remain b
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egard to attachment of the SSOs wit
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Ten days bitter fighting had follow
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declaring the city open. The main I
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After staying in Damascus for some
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It appears that the intention is to
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Afghanistan were constructed and th
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(b) Escorting French personnel and
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(c) Opportunity occurring, to seize
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counterattack on 6/7 November night
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also been allotted one such defende
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eceived orders for move to the Burm
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section and a nursing orderly. The
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On arrival at Srinagar the Battalio
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Sports42 Not only did the Jammu & K
Page 202 and 203:
The next to arrive was the 4th Batt
Page 204 and 205:
CHAPTER VIII The Hour of Trial Afte
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again suspected to be the work of I
Page 208 and 209:
one company of the 1st Battalion wa
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express his regrets at having made
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the border rendered substantial ass
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Maharaja resisted such pressures ra
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Pakistan ups the Ante Pakistan, evi
Page 218 and 219:
Information regarding the incident
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The Maharaja was quite aware of the
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position occupied by him but was di
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Offensive in the Mirpur Brigade Sec
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was allotted to 'B' Company under C
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was no guarantee that the Sheikh wo
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morning the defences were reasonabl
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message for the second company to j
Page 234 and 235:
The Column reached Mandhari at abou
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on its way to Jhangar the Column ha
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71.Ibid. 72.Ibid. 73.Ibid. 74.Major
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staff a safe passage to Bunji as on
Page 242 and 243:
Garrison but the column pushed thro
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engaged continuously in the fightin
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When the attack came, a military co
Page 248 and 249:
emained where it was. The relief co
Page 250 and 251:
Situation in the Jammu Sector After
Page 252 and 253:
could have otherwise done, he had c
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night of 29/30 March, getting dange
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question was of finding troops for
Page 258 and 259:
and managed to escape. They marched
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With the establishment of the air l
Page 262 and 263:
in heavy righting on both the spurs
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Sewa Nath to continue the advance.
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The Battalion remained on the borde
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the main position at Lapri without
Page 270 and 271:
Colonel Bhagwan Singh along with hi
Page 272 and 273:
keep the enemy at an arm's length.
Page 274 and 275:
Although the Maharaja had put his s
Page 276 and 277:
Battalion was taken in hand only af
Page 278 and 279:
this. The price that the Battalion
Page 280 and 281:
Brigadier Tarlochan Singh are some
Page 282 and 283:
prevented further engagement. The I
Page 284 and 285:
Appendix B Revised agreement betwee
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25. Khumba (Bhimber) 26. Doda 27. S
Page 288 and 289:
second Aristotle on earth, the Maha
Page 290 and 291:
Appendix F Officers Commanding Unit
Page 292 and 293:
General Baj Singh 1893 General Sura
Page 294 and 295:
Lt Col Chattar Singh 1923 Lt Col Ab
Page 296 and 297:
Appendix J Subedar Majors A. CAVALR
Page 298 and 299:
L/NK Noor Alam (4 Kl) NK Chatru (4
Page 300 and 301:
L/NK Feroz Din 1920 2KMB Sep Basant
Page 302 and 303:
Appendix L List of Arms and equipme
Page 304 and 305:
Uniforms Appendix N 1. English tran
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6th Raghubir disbanded The British
Page 308 and 309:
Bibliography A. Books Allan Campbel
Page 310:
BACK COVER PAGE Beginning with the
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