By Brian Glyn Williams - The Jamestown Foundation

An analysis of the Tatars' effectiveness in the Caucasus should begin with an examination of their
opponents, the Persians. The Persian army consisted, for the most part, of Turkmen tribal cavalry. These
irregular warriors were drawn from the various Persian provinces and usually showed more loyalty to
their tribal emirs than to the Shah. Shah Abbas attempted to overcome this dangerous situation during his
reign by creating arquebus and artillery units loyal to himself. That the Persians could effectively use their
firearms against a steppe opponent at even earlier dates can be seen by Shah Tahmasp's use of cannons to
defeat the Uzbeks in 1528. 42
The Persian army was first and foremost a cavalry force, despite these reforms, and the Tatars were in their
element when fighting such an opponent. The Tatars fought effectively against the Persians on several
occasions regardless of the Persian’s use of cannon. In 1578, for instance, a Tatar unit overran a Persian
camp defended by both cannons and trenchworks. 43 Indeed, the Tatars frequently served as more than
just light skirmishers and in several cases fought in pitched battles against larger Persian forces.
The Crimean Tatars also served in their better known capacity as raiders, but their most valuable
contribution on the Persian front was in defending the Ottomans ’ supply lines and baggage trains from the
raids of the Persians’ swift Turkmen horsemen.
The Tatar aid in the Caucasus, as on the other fronts, also had a dark side, and relations between the Ottomans
and their wild Tatar allies were not always cordial. One of the main causes of conflict between the
Ottoman commanders and the Tatars on the Persian front was the Tatars ’ predilection to pillage the
population in territories under Ottoman control. The Tatars rarely differentiated between the peasants in
newly conquered Ottoman territory and those in enemy lands. This often led to confrontations between
Tatar leaders and the Ottoman generals who had been assigned the task of winning over the local
populations to the Ottoman cause.
The common Ottoman soldier also resented the fact that the Crimean Tatars usually received the lion's share of
the booty at the end of the campaign season as a reward for their services. The Tatars' tendency to
withdraw to the safety of the Crimea at the conclusion of every campaign season also caused
resentment among the Ottoman troops who were left to garrison the Empire's new conquests. The Ottoman
commanders no doubt realized that the Tatars had little value as garrison troops, but their departure was
nonetheless bad for the moral of the Ottoman troops who had to remain and serve through the bitter
winter months.
The Ottoman leaders on the Persian front were also confronted with the problem of pressuring the Tatar
Khans into participating in their campaigns at the beginning of every season. The Tatar Khans were often
reluctant to send their forces off to fight in the Caucasus. The reasons for this were varied but stemmed, for
the most part, from a hesitancy to leave the Crimea open to the attacks of the Cossacks and later the Russians.
It must also be noted that the Crimean beys (chieftains) were also less inclined to participate in extended
campaigns in regions that had already been impoverished as a result of previous campaigns.
Despite these drawbacks, Osman Pasha, one of the Empire's greatest generals, obviously realized the value of
the Tatar reinforcements as can be seen by his claim that "the only satisfactory means of holding the
possessions newly acquired from Persia was to gain the full support and assistance of the Crimean Khan."
Perhaps his qualified analysis should be the final judgment on the value of the Tatars ’ aid to the
Ottomans on this front.
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