By Brian Glyn Williams - The Jamestown Foundation

preceding the Polish army's arrival. His greatest mistake was to send the Crimean Tatars, whose army
was of roughly the same size as that of the Poles, to block the Polish advance. The Khan's forces were
unwilling to take on this army in combat. Kurat claims that even if they had been so inclined they were not up
to the task of defeating the heavy Polish cavalry which had artillery support. 138 The Khan's hostile feelings
toward the Grand Vezir may have also influenced the Tatars' decision to avoid combat with Sobieski's
forces.
In the Tatars' defense, it should be noted that the Polish advance was hindered by supply problems caused by the
fact that much of the territory on the route to Vienna had been ravaged by the Tatar chambuls. Despite this
difficulty, Sobieski was able to arrive in the hills outside Vienna by the second week of September. Offensive
operations were quickly carried out in coordination with the Austrian forces under the command of the Duke
of Lorraine. Both Sobieski and the Duke agreed on making a heavy charge into the enemy’s camp, which
had not been adequately prepared for a surprise assault.
The ensuing charge won Sobieski fame throughout Europe and succeeded in completely crushing Kara
Mustafa's army. A Tatar force struck a blow at the attacking force, but this had little effect on the Christians'
progress. By the end of the day the Ottoman army was in full retreat toward the Hungarian border. The
victorious Christians were too shocked to give chase and appear to have considered the Ottoman retreat
to have been a feigned maneuver to draw them out of position. Had the Christians reacted quicker,
they might have been able to completely annihilate Kara Mustafa's army. As it was, the Ottomans were
able to retreat with comparatively few losses. 139
The inability of the crusaders to follow up on this victory cost Austria dearly. One contemporary
source claims
that the Crimean Tatars alone were able to make off with some 80,000 captives after the defeat. This excess
baggage does not, however, seem to have slowed down the Tatars who proceeded the main army in flight
by a full 24 hours. 140 The enraged Austrians actually considered striking at the distant Crimea in retaliation
for travesties committed by the Tatars in Austria but their forces were clearly not up to the task.
The victorious Christian allies were, however, capable of carrying the war into neighboring Hungary with a
vengeance. By the end of the campaign season the Emperor's forces had succeeded in pushing the
demoralized Ottomans out of Hungary. In the following year, the Porte was confronted by a
Christian alliance that now included Venice, and the Ottomans were forced to defend their borders from
Poland to the Mediterranean. The Tatars served with distinction against the Poles during these defensive
wars crushing a Polish offensive in 1687 and defeating a Polish army attempting to conquer Moldavia
on another occasion. 141
In 1688, the Tatars assisted the retreating Ottomans on several occasions. In this year Selim Giray Khan
defeated an Austrian force in the battle of Kapchak and in the following year this same Khan helped
drive the Imperials from the Belgrade vicinity. 142 In 1689, Kurat claims that the arrival of Selim Giray's troops
on the Habsburg front saved Bulgaria and Thrace from Austrian conquest. 143 Howorth mentions that six
years later the Tatars:
contributed greatly to the capture of the towns of Lugos, Nissa, and Belhn, and took an active
part in the terrible struggle for Lippa, where the Imperial general Frederick Veterani and
so many of his men were killed. 144
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