Making Ireland 'a hell for rebels to live in' - Ireland in Schools

‘Ireland in Schools’
Sutton Pilot Scheme
Dunsany Castle, Lord Dunsany’s home in County Meath, Ireland, was once sacked by the Black and Tans.
As they departed, leaving a trail of destruction in their wake, they were bid adieu by Lord Dunsany’s butler:
‘Who,’ he tartly enquired, ‘shall I say called?’
Making Ireland ‘a hell for rebels to live in’
Documents & sources
on
The Black & Tans and Auxiliaries
Contents
Map: Sinn Fein support & British reprisals
1. Revolt in Ireland
2. Who were the Black & Tans & Auxiliaries?
3. The Black & Tans & Auxiliaries in action
4. Reactions in Ireland
5. Debate in Britain 1 - House of Commons
6. Debate in Britain 2 - Beyond the Commons
7. Epilogue
Appendices
A. Interrogation & treatment of republican suspects
B. War or police action?

A Timeline of Irish History by R. Killeen, Gill & Macmillan, 0-71713-484-9, p. 87

1. Revolt in Ireland
1.1 A state of war, An t’Óglach (IRA newspaper), 31 January 1919
A state of war exists and murder and violence against the English are not crimes until the alien invaders have
left the country.
1.2 Wanted poster - the man behind the
Soloheadbeg ambush, 21 January 1919
1.3 Irish Republican Army Order, 30 March
1920, five days after the arrival of the first
English recruits to the Royal Irish
Constabulary
1. Whereas the spies and traitors
known as the Royal Irish
Constabulary are holding this
country for the enemy, and
whereas said spies and
bloodhounds are conspiring with
the enemy to bomb and bayonet
and otherwise outrage a peaceful,
law-abiding, and liberty-loving
people;
2. Wherefore do we hereby
solemnly proclaim and suppress
said spies and traitors and do
hereby solemnly warn prospective
recruits that they join the R.I.C. at
their own peril. All nations are
agreed as to the fate of traitors. It
has the sanction of God and man.
By order of the G.O.C.
Irish Republican Army
1.4 Disorder in Co. Clare, April 1920, by R.F. Hibbert, a Unionist
The condition of affairs in my neighbourhood in Co. Clare is beyond description; there is no protection
whatever for life and property.
Recently an attempt was made by some forty masked men, armed with rifles, revolvers, and axes, to raid
my house. They got in by rushing the back premises of the house. They reduced the servants to a state of terror
by threatening to shoot them, seized the Steward's gun, and tried to gag him with a rifle butt. I immediately
armed myself with a repeating rifle, and fired on the raiders from the lobby, forcing them to retire, one of their
number being wounded. I have since been warned repeatedly that my life is in danger....
IiS, Black & Tans ..., 3

The authorities ... sent down a small detachment of infantry, but recalled them after about three weeks. The
police were then withdrawn from Scarriff, and the barracks closed, leaving no police at all for a distance of
over fifteen miles.
Two nights after the closing of the barracks the Petty Sessions Court, opposite the barracks, was broken
into, and everything in it destroyed. [Later] about two hundred men pulled down the barracks with pickaxes
and crowbars.
As far as personal property goes, last week my boathouse, and other outhouses, were raided, while timber
is constantly stolen, fences and walls thrown down, etc. As there are no police and no Petty Sessions, there
is no redress.
I hear their next move is to smash up all the post offices and post office equipment, and should they wish
to do so, there is absolutely nothing to prevent them.
About a month ago one of my herders tried to join the Royal Irish Constabulary. Fifteen masked and armed
men surrounded his house one night, and searched for him, but luckily did not find him, as he was hiding
under the bed in a back room. Had they found him he would undoubtedly have been shot, as has happened
in the case of other young men who expressed their intention of joining the police.
Every night gangs of armed men assemble in different houses, and walk the countryside, terrorising the
respectable inhabitants. It is because they are so well armed, and so reckless in the use of their arms, that this
terrorism exists. They collect subscriptions in this way, as everyone is afraid to refuse to subscribe. From dark
to dawn law-abiding people scarcely dare to sleep.
Owing to the withdrawal of police all regulations are disregarded, and the public houses remain open night
and day. Consequently, as may be imagined, the state of drunkenness and robbery is appalling. Even the
farmer's crops are stolen out of the ground to buy drink....
Personally I believe that the raids on houses were field days, and preparations for something bigger, for
the Republican Army, and also the attacks on barracks.
1.5 Killing of Sergeant James O’Donoghue, 17 November 1920
The sergeant was a long-serving member of the RIC, non-political and got on well with the people in his district. He was shot
three times as, unarmed, he walked back to work, twice in the back and once in the head. This account is by his daughter
Marie. No undertaker would handle the body because of a Sinn Fein boycott.
My father came home from duty about 3.15 p.m. He was in uniform: no coat . . . It was a mild day with a
touch of frost later. I asked my father when he was returning to Tuckey Street police station, intending to
accompany him—it had been a practice of mine in dangerous times - but my father detested it and only agreed
to it because it relieved mother’s anxiety. He said he would leave at 5.50.
I went out after tea and spent some time at Timmins’ house. The ringing of the Angelus - as I believed -
made me rush out and when I reached the house I found that my father had left. ‘He is gone only a few
minutes.’ I was terribly disappointed. I had arranged to call for groceries at Union Quay police station and
Kitty Keating was to accompany me. At the gate I heard shots - there seemed to be six. I told my mother and
she came out. There were no further reports. I made my way towards Union Quay with Kitty Keating.
I collected the provisions and returned with Keating. I met Nellie O’Connell in Douglas street. She stopped
me and told me. There I learned that it was my father who was shot. ‘Your father was shot in White Street
this evening and your mother is in Tuckey Street.’ Mrs. Mary A. Hayes, the wife of Sgt. Mick Hayes, had
brought the news. She had heard the shots and rushed out as Sgt. Hayes had just left the house on Eastview
Terrace. She kept saying he (my father) was only wounded. I knew he was dead.
I went with my mother to Tuckey Street station to get further information. ‘Nothing definite’ said Head
Constable Brown, being evasive.
There were some Tans present. Someone declared that somebody would pay for the night. My mother
begged that no further violence or vengeance should follow.
We returned home sick at heart. I found my brother and we spent the night praying. My mother did not
know that my father was dead. Mrs. Timmins brought the news in the morning. My mother was overcome.
We awaited the arrival of Father Michael O’Donoghue and he and my mother went to the Military Hospital
to identify my father. We never saw our father again.
IiS, Black & Tans ..., 4

1.6 Death of an informer, ‘Din Din’ O’Riordan, November 1920
O’Riordan was a gunman and heavy drinker who informed on Charlie O’Brien, one of the gunmen who killed Sergeant
O’Donoghue. The account is by Frank Busteed an IRA officer from Blarney with relatives who lived near the O’Briens.
They bundled Din-Din into a car and again drove him out to the Viaduct. It was a cold drizzly night, and
Din-Din was shivering, but not from cold . . . When they got to the Viaduct Jim Grey stopped the car.
‘All right Din-Din, get out,’ [Dick] Murphy ordered. ‘You are a proven informer, in fact you are worse than
an informer, you are a traitor. You are on our side, and you are with them at the same time. The O'Briens were
killed by the Auxies the night before you cashed the ten pound note in Mrs. Riordan’s [a local pub]. Who gave
it to you?’
Din-Din remained silent. ‘You know why we’re here. But we will give you a chance. If you will tell us who
gave it to you we will book your passage to England and give you fifty pounds.’
Din-Din talked. He got the money from Mr. Nicholson of Woodford Bournes, the wine and spirit
merchants. He had been recruited a month before by another I.R.A. man who told him there was easy money
to be earned. He was desperate for drink at the time and took it. He gave the name of the other I.R.A. man.
They shot him and buried him at the Viaduct. Next night they shot the other I.R.A. contact.
1.7 District Inspector’s report on an ambush of a three-man RIC bicycle patrol, near Newport, Co.
Cork, 9 April 1920
The wounded survivor had been refused water at a nearby house.
We found the late Constable Finn lying on his back on the centre of the road quite dead - both eyes blown
away and the lower part of his forehead - brain matter scattered on the road and a large pool of blood. About
five yards in advance, on the left hand side of the road, we found the late Constable McCarthy in a sitting
posture against the wall of the road and a bullet wound in his neck.
1.8 County Inspector’s report on RIC opinion in West Cork, June 1920
There is a feeling among the police which is becoming prevalent in places where murders of police have been
committed that the only way to stop these murders is by way of reprisals or retaliation ... It is becoming
difficult to restrain men’s passions aroused at the sight of their murdered comrades and when they have the
means of executing vengeance it is likely that they will use them when driven to desperation.
1.9 Rineen ambush by Andrew O’Donoghue, Commander, 5th Batallion, Mid-Clare Brigade
20 or 22 September, http://www.clarelibrary.ie/eolas/coclare/history/war_of_independence/rineen_ambush.htm
In September, 1920, the 4th battalion brought off an ambush at Rineen, about two miles from Miltown-Malbay,
in which six R.I.C. men were killed and the lorry in which they travelled, together with all the arms and equipment,
was captured. Though I offered whatever assistance I could in the way of men and arms for this attack, I was led to
understand that all that was wanted was five or six rifles and some .303 ammunition. These were made available,
and there was an arrangement between myself and the 4th battalion officers that I should take about half a dozen men
with me to Ennistymon the night of the ambush where I would get back the rifles I had lent and assist in attacking
the enemy, should he attempt reprisals in the town.
Unfortunately, though I attended at the appointed place with my men, none of the 4th battalion turned up. The
enemy did carry out most frightful reprisals that night and there was no one to molest them. It was a splendid chance
lost because the British forces - R.I.C., Black and Tans and military - all went berserk in their orgy of destruction,
becoming frightfully drunk in the process and, throwing all precaution to the winds, became sitting ducks for properly
placed ambushers. Perhaps it is only just to add that, after capturing the lorry, the 4th battalion men were surprised
by enemy reinforcements and were lucky to escape with only a few wounded. The wounded included the Battalion
Commandant. In effecting their retreat, his men became widely separated, and that night they were scattered in small
groups over an area about ten miles wide. It would have been practically impossible to have them re-assembled in
time to deal with the enemy engaged in reprisals between Miltown-Malbay, Lahinch and Ennistymon.
IiS, Black & Tans ..., 5

1.10 Operations of Third (West Cork) Brigade
For further details, go to http://www.dhoun.utvinternet.com, then click on Brigade Areas and then on Third Brigade.
July 8, 1918 First attack on Royal Irish Constabulary at Beal a Ghleanna.
Nov 17, 1919 Assault on naval sloop at Bantry Bay leads to capture of arms and ammunition.
Dec 14, 1919 RIC constable shot dead near Kilbrittain barracks.
Feb 12, 1920 Attack on Allihies RIC Barracks - one RIC man killed.
April 23, 1920 DMP member shot dead near Clonakilty.
April 25, 1920 Two RIC men shot dead in ambush at Ballinspittal.
May 10, 1920 Three RIC men shot dead in ambush near Timoleague.
June 12, 1920 Shooting dead of RIC constable Thomas King near Glengarriff.
June 21, 1920 One killed and two wounded in attack on RIC near Bantry.
June 24, 1920 Series of retaliatory attacks by RIC members in Bantry area.
July 17, 1920 Ambush of British patrol at Geata Bawn, near Ballymakeera.
July 25, 1920 Shooting of Detective Sergeant Mulhearn at Bandon.
July 25, 1920 Two marines shot dead in attack on Ballycrovane coastguard station.
July 27, 1920 RIC constable James Murray shot dead in Clonakilty's Main Street.
Aug 8, 1920 Cycle patrol of British troops ambushed near Ballyvourney.
Aug 21, 1920 Shooting dead of RIC Sergeant Daniel Maunsell.
Aug 22, 1920 IRA volunteer shot dead during ambush on RIC at Lissarda.
Aug 24, 1920 RIC constable John McNamara shot dead in ambush on patrol at Glengarriff.
Aug 25, 1920 RIC constable Matthew Haugh shot dead in ambush on patrol at Bantry.
Aug 26, 1920 Lt. Tim Fitzgerald is first member of 3rd. Brigade to die in action.
Sept 5, 1920 Vol. Liam Hegarty shot dead by British forces at Ballymakeera.
Oct 4, 1920 Capture of Schull RIC barracks.
Oct 9, 1920 Detachment of the Essex Regiment ambushed at Newcestown.
Oct 17, 1920 Civilian James Lehane shot dead by Auxiliaries at Ballymakeera.
Oct 21, 1920 Two Black and Tans shot dead in ambush near Glandore.
Oct 26, 1920 Successful ambush at Toureen.
Oct 31, 1920 Third Brigade IRA Flying Column formed - Tom Barry appointed Commander.
Nov 6, 1920 Two Auxiliaries kidnapped and shot dead near Macroom.
Nov 21, 1920 Fatal attack on party of Black and Tans at Leap.
Nov 28, 1920 Auxiliaries defeated at Kilmichael Ambush.
Dec 2, 1920 Three West Cork Brigade officers shot dead by Essex Regiment in Bandon.
Dec 2, 1920 IRA Volunteer Michael McLeane shot dead during ambush on military at Schull.
Dec 15, 1920 Shooting of Canon Magner and Tadgh Crowley near Dunmanway.
Dec 31, 1920 Kilbrittain RIC barracks attacked.
Jan 15, 1921 Second attack on Kilbrittain RIC barracks.
Jan 23, 1921 Simultaneous attacks on military and RIC barracks at Bandon.
Jan 25, 1921 Innishannon RIC barracks attacked.
Feb 1, 1921 RIC man killed and another wounded in attack on patrol at Drimoleague.
Feb 2, 1921 Firefight at Burgatia House, Rosscarbery.
Feb 15, 1921 Major loss of life in train ambush at Upton station, West Cork.
Feb 16, 1921 Four volunteers killed by British forces near Kilbrittain, West Cork.
Feb 23, 1921 Attacks on British army and RIC in Bandon by West Cork Flying Column.
Feb 25, 1921 Ambush at Coolnacahera, between Ballyvourney and Macroom.
Feb 28, 1921 Black and Tan killed when patrol is fired upon at Rosscarbery.
March 19, 1921 Major victory for IRA at the Battle of Crossbarry.
March 28, 1921 Rosscarbery RIC barracks destroyed in attack.
April 8, 1921 Black and Tan shot dead in ambush near Macroom.
May 3, 1921 Two Black and Tans killed in gun and bomb attack at Clonakilty.
May 14, 1921 Black and Tan shot dead at Innishannon.
May 15, 1921 Black and Tan shot dead near Skibbereen.
June 28, 1921 Successful raid for arms at Fastnet Rock lighthouse.
IiS, Black & Tans ..., 6

2. Who were the Black & Tans & Auxiliaries?
2.1 Black & Tans recruiting poster
2.2 The Weekly Summary, 27 August 1920
This four-page news sheet was issued by the Police
Authorities in Dublin Castle free to the police. Its purpose was
to present the Black and Tans with a more favourable view of
the events in Ireland than was provided by most of the local
papers, and to keep up their morale with staccato editorials
such as the following, which appeared in the third issue.
They did not wait for the usual uniform
They came at once.
They were wanted badly, and the R.I.C.
Welcome them.
They know what the danger is.
They have looked Death in the eyes before,
and did not flinch.
They will not flinch now
They will go on with the job - the job of making
Ireland once again safe for the law-abiding.
AND AN APPROPRIATE HELL FOR THOSE
WHOSE TRADE IS AGITATION AND
WHOSE METHOD IS MURDER.
2.3 Who joined?
2.4 Who stayed?
IiS, Black & Tans ..., 7

2.5 Reasons for joining & leaving - Douglas Duff
Remember, we were mercenary soldiers fighting for our pay, not patriots willing and anxious to die for our
country ... Our job was to earn our pay by suppressing armed rebellion, not to die in some foolish ... ‘forlorn
hope’.
2.6 Suitability of General Tudor as commander of the RIC and Dublin Metropolitan police
1. Hamar Greenwood to Lloyd George, 3 April 1921; 2. Diary of Sir Henry Wilson, 28 March 1921
1. I have told Tudor that discipline [in the police] must be maintained or he and certain subordinates must
go. He's a gallant man and it's hard to be blunt with him but he appreciates the position.
2. [King George V said he wanted] to abolish all Black & Tans and was concerned about Tudor. I replied that
in my opinion Tudor was a gallant fellow on service [i.e. during the war], but a man of no balance,
knowledge or judgement & therefore a deplorable selection for his present post.
2.7 Solidarity and comradeship among the Black & Tans and Auxiliaries
They were on their own, hurt one and you hurt them all. There was a comradeship there that you wouldn’t
get anywhere else . . . We were all ex-servicemen except three or four old R.I.C. men . . . It was the same
ribaldry and the same give and take as in the trenches . . . You had no real contact with the community at all
.. . We were all young men, you see, and I suppose in a sense it was quite natural when somebody starts
ambushing you, the rest reply.
2.8 RIC attitudes to the newcomers
We didn’t really know them. We just didn’t approve of their methods . . . they were never popular with the
regular force.
We didn’t like them, we would have no place for them, we didn’t like them coming along and mixing with
us.
The Black and Tans were all English and Scotch people see, and they were . . . very rough, f-ing and blinding
and boozing and all.
2.9 Sinn Fein and the Irish Volunteers, a pamphlet issued to all troops, October 1920.
Every soldier in Ireland must realise that the most harmless-looking civilian may be armed and hostile, that
he has cunning and desperate men to deal with who will stop at nothing, and are capable of committing any
outrage - provided the risk to themselves is not great, but who, if stood up to, generally consider that
discretion is the better part of valour.
IiS, Black & Tans ..., 8

3. The Black & Tans & Auxiliaries in action
3.1 Lt-Colonel Smyth, Divisional Commissioner of the R.I.C. for Munster, addressing the force in
Listowel after a mutiny by the RIC in Listowel, 17 June 1920, when they refused to hand over their
barracks to the military and be posted to outlying barracks in the dangerous countryside.
(Five constables resigned at the end of this address - one of them later entered the Church, to become a Colonial bishop
before his death. A few weeks later two armed IRA entered the County Club in Cork where Smyth was, marched up to him
and said ‘your orders were to shoot at sight’. They immediately shot him and made their escape.)
Well, men, I have something of interest to tell you: something I’m sure you would not want your wives to hear
... Sinn Fein has had all the sport up to the present, and we are going to have the sport now. The police are
not in sufficient strength to do anything but hold their barracks. This is not enough, for as long as we remain
on the defensive, so long will Sinn Fein have the whip hand. We must take the offensive, and beat Sinn Fein
with its own tactics...
If a police barracks is burned or if the barracks already occupied is not suitable, then the best house in the
locality is to be commandeered, the occupants thrown into the gutter. Let them die there - the more the
merrier. Police and military will patrol the country at least five nights a week. They are not to confine
themselves to the main roads, but make across the country, lie in ambush and, when civilians are seen
approaching, shout ‘Hands up!’ Should the order be not immediately obeyed, shoot and shoot with effect.
If the persons approaching carry their hands in their pockets, or are in any way suspicious-looking, shoot them
down.
You may make mistakes occasionally and innocent persons may be shot, but that cannot be helped, and
you are bound to get the right parties some time. The more you shoot, the better I will like you, and I assure
you no policeman will get into trouble for shooting any man....’.
3.2 Sir Hamar Greenwood, Chief Secretary for Ireland, addressing the RIC in Dublin, 30 September
1920
You are a disciplined force, and I confidently count upon you to maintain that discipline, no matter what the
provocation. Accounts of reprisals in certain newspapers are always misleading, and frequently misrepresent
acts of justifiable self-defence as reprisals, but there are cases in which unjustifiable action has undoubtedly
been taken. These cases are being carefully investigated.
Meanwhile it is necessary to repeat and to emphasise that reprisals will ruin the discipline of the force, and
can not be countenanced by those in authority. The great provocation under which men suffer who see their
comrades and friends brutally murdered is fully recognised, and by no one more than myself; but the police
are urged to maintain, in spite of this, that self-control that has characterised the force in the past.
3.3 Sack of Balbriggan, 20 September 1920
The Black and Tans by R. Bennett, Spellmount, 1-86227-098-8, pp 93-4
1. On the evening of [20 September 1920], some Volunteers recognised Head Constable Burke of the R.I.C.
while he was having a drink with his brother in an hotel in Balbriggan, a village of about two thousand
inhabitants twenty miles north of Dublin. They shot Burke dead and wounded his brother.
2. The news quickly reached the Gormanstown depot three miles away. The Black and Tans piled into their
tenders and set off on a reprisals raid. They pulled up at the first public house, smashed in the door, broke
the windows, seized a quantity of liquor and set fire to the place. They surged through the village singing
‘We are the boys of the Bulldog Brigade’, shot two men whom they believed rightly or wrongly to be
Volunteer officers, burnt three more public houses, a stocking factory which was the property of an English
company, nineteen private houses and wrecked a further thirty houses. ‘We left Balbriggan and got back
to camp about three o’clock in the morning,’ a Black and Tan who took part in this raid has recorded.
IiS, Black & Tans ..., 9

‘There were many sore hearts among us, but there were plenty of bottles to cure them or make them
worse.’
3. In a speech in the House of Commons, Mr. Asquith, the Liberal leader, described the village as looking
like a Belgian town that had been wrecked by the Germans in the war, although he had not been to see it
himself. An Irish ballad of the time also suggested as much:
The town of Balbriggan they burnt to the ground
While the bullets like hailstones were whizzing around.
4. But most of the damage had been confined to one back street, and it was possible to motor through the
village a day or so later without being aware that anything untoward had happened.
5. Some of the inhabitants had profited by the chance to do some burning and looting on their own account
during the confusion. On the following Sunday, according to General Macready, ‘the parish priest told his
congregation they had only got what they deserved’.
6. Whether or not this was true, many of the older priests exercised a restraining influence on their flocks,
while some of the younger men threw themselves heart and soul into the I.R.A. struggle.
3.4 Black & Tan notice, September 1920
DROGHEDA BEWARE
If in the vicinity a policeman is shot, five of the leading Sinn Feiners will be shot.
It is not coercion - - it is an eye for an eye.
We are not drink-maddened savages as we have been described in the Dublin rags.
We are not out for loot.
We are inoffensive to women. We are as humane as other Christians, but we have
restrained ourselves too long.
Are we to lie down while our comrades are being shot down in cold blood by the corner
boys and ragamuffins of Ireland?
We say ‘Never’, and all the inquiries will not stop our desire for revenge.
Stop the shooting of the police or we will lay low every house that smells of Sinn
Fein.
Remember Balbriggan.
(By Order)
Black and Tans
IiS, Black & Tans ..., 10

3.5 Sir Henry Wilson, diary. 29 September 1920
I had 4 hours this evening with Lloyd George and Bonar Law. I told them what I thought of reprisals by the
‘Black and Tans’, and how this must lead to chaos and ruin. Lloyd George danced about and was angry, but
I never budged. I pointed out that these reprisals were carried out without anyone being responsible; men were
murdered, houses burnt, villages wrecked (such as Balbriggan, Ennistymon, Trim, etc.). I said that this was
due to want of discipline, and this must be stopped. It was the business of the Government to govern. If these
men ought to be murdered, then the Government ought to murder them. Lloyd George danced at all this, said
no Government could possibly take this responsibility. After much wrangling, I still sticking to it that either
these things ought to be done or ought not, and if they ought then it was the business of the Government to
do them, and if they ought not then they ought to be stopped, I got some sense into their heads, and Lloyd
George wired for Hamar Greenwood, Macready, Tudor and others to come over tomorrow night.
I warned Lloyd George that, although up to now the army had remained disciplined and quiet, it was quite
possible that they might break out any minute if one of their officers were murdered by Sinn Feiners, and that
the report tonight that Mallow had been sacked after the murder of one of the sergeants of the 17th Lancers
may well prove to be that the 17th Lancers had sacked the town. All this was terribly dangerous. What was
evident to me after this long talk was that neither Lloyd George nor Bonar Law had the faintest idea of what
to do.
3.6 Black & Tans to the rescue, Mallow, 30 September 1920
1. A detachment of twenty men of the Cork No. 2 Brigade under the command of Liam Lynch had made a
daring and well-planned raid on the Mallow Barracks. They waited until the main body of troops had left
for their morning’s exercise, then rushed the place, killed the sergeant in charge, rounded up the few
soldiers left behind on fatigues and locked them up in one of the stables. They captured twenty-seven rifles,
two light machine guns and a considerable quantity of ammunition. Later in the evening troops scoured
the town, yelling like savages, firing into the air and setting light to houses of Sinn Fein supporters,
Nationalists and Unionists alike. They burned the town hall, a creamery which employed three hundred
people, a small hotel and many shops.
2. The terrified townspeople rushed through the streets, many with children in their arms, some to find
sanctuary in the convent schools and some to spend the night in the safety of a cemetery. Black and Tans,
on this occasion, tried to restrain the troops. They helped to put out fires and find shelter for the homeless.
In spite of the confusion, no one was killed.
3. In England, The Times once more summed up the general feeling of the Press: ‘Day by day the tidings from
Ireland grow worse. The accounts of arson and destruction by the Military at Mallow as a revenge for the
Sinn Fein raid which caught the 17th Lancers napping, must fill English readers with a sense of shame.
...The name of England is being sullied throughout the Empire and throughout the world by this savagery
for which the Government can no longer escape, however much they may seek to disclaim responsibility.’
3.7 Reprisals for the murder of Sergeant O’Donoghue, 17 November 1920
Cork Examiner, 19 November 1920. ‘There is little doubt about the accuracy of these accounts, which were corroborated by
witnesses both at the time and at the subsequent inquest, and repeated in the unionist Cork Constitution.’
Mrs. Coleman, wife of Stephen Coleman, 2 Broad Street, said she was awakened about 11.45 p.m. by the
noise of the front door being broken open. The next thing she heard was the sound of a man running up the
stairs, and there and then a crash at the bedroom door. The door was kicked open, it being forced on its
hinges, and in rushed a man in police uniform, a policeman's cap, and goggles. He came over towards the
bedside, and she saw he had a flash lamp in one hand and a revolver in the other . . . The man merely
exclaimed ‘Hallo!'’ and flashing the lamp on the bed, he raised his revolver and fired point blank into the bed.
IiS, Black & Tans ..., 11

The bullet wounded her husband in the arm. The assailant then turned and walked out of the room, leaving
Mrs. Coleman screaming .. .
Mr. John Kenny, who was sleeping upstairs with Mr. Patrick Hanley, stated that Hanley opened the door
when he heard a man rushing up the stairs. The man, in police uniform, had just come from Mrs. Coleman's
room. Hanley, standing at his bedroom door, said ‘Don’t shoot! I am an orphan and my mother’s chief
support!’ ‘Very well!’ replied the man, and, raising his revolver, he fired at Hanley. The bullet missed him,
but the man fired a second time, and the bullet struck Hanley just above the heart, killing him instantly . . .
The rooms occupied by Mrs. Long and her mother on the same landing as Mr. Coleman were also broken
into by the same assailant, but seeing there was nobody there only two women, he went out without
discharging any shots. The man in police uniform also rushed into the bedroom of Mr. Collins, who was
sleeping with his wife and child in a room adjoining that in which Hanley was killed. ‘The man . . . carried
a revolver in one hand and a flash lamp in the other. He flashed the light on the bed and fired point blank at
us. The bullet grazed my head, and passed through the bedclothes and bed. I found it under the bed the next
morning.’ Mr. Collins said he remained perfectly still, and by doing so probably saved his life, for his
assailant rushed out of the room, leaving him for dead.
The final act of the night took place at No. 15 North Mall. Here James Coleman (no relation to Stephen) and his family were
awakened by a loud knocking and shouts of ‘Military!’ Such raids had become commonplace in Cork as the police and army
were constantly searching for arms and wanted men. Mrs Coleman’s account follows:
When my husband opened the door a tall man, wearing a policeman's cap and a heavy overcoat, stepped in,
and asked ‘Are you Coleman?’ My husband said ‘yes.’ This man then fired two shots point blank at my
husband, and he fell on the chair beside the door. The man then swung around as if to leave, but he again
turned and fired two or three shots more.
I rushed to my husband’s assistance, but he never spoke. The man who had murdered him left, and pulled
the door quickly after him. Ten minutes later a ‘Black and Tan’ whom I know by appearance came to the door
and the maid who had come down to me, opened it for him. He had a revolver in his hand, and when he came
inside the door, I said to him: ‘There is enough done.’ The maid, who knows him, said: ‘He is alright; he will
do nothing.’ I then said to him: ‘Why did ye kill him?’ He answered: ‘We didn't do it.’ I said: ‘Ye did it: I saw
it being done’ and he replied ‘Perhaps it was Sinn Feiners dressed in our uniforms.’ I repeated that I knew
who did it, and asked what would I do. He felt my husband’s pulse and said he was dead.
3.8 Lloyd George, the British prime minister, explaining in a letter that this is why the Black and
Tans acted as they did
.. a poor woman named Kitty Carroll, the sole support of her aged father and mother and invalid brother, was
dragged from her house by a party of masked men who murdered her and attached to her body this legend:
‘spies and informers, beware! Tried, convicted and executed by the IRA ...’
I think it is important for people to realise the character of Sinn Féin policy and the nature of its campaign.
... I should like to repeat that it was not till well over a hundred of their comrades had been cruelly
assassinated that the police began to strike a blow in their own defence.
3.9 Maintaining discipline - the Crozier affair, February 1921
Ireland 1905-25, Vol 1, Text & Historiography by R. Rees, Colourpoint, 1-89839-219-6, p. 265
In February 1921 a party of Auxiliaries, while searching a shop near Trim in County Meath, stole £325 worth
of food and liquor from the grocery store which they subsequently burned. When Crozier, the commander of
the Auxiliaries, arrived in Trim to investigate the incident, he quickly dismissed twenty-one of the Auxiliary
Cadets in the local company and placed a further five under arrest to await court-martial. Astonishingly,
Tudor, the RIC chief who had overall control, re-instated the men pending a full enquiry. A bitter Crozier
resigned a few days later, alleging that the men had only been reinstated when they threatened to make public
a catalogue of atrocities carried out by the police in Ireland.
IiS, Black & Tans ..., 12

3.10 Casualties, Ireland, January 1919 - 11 July 1921
The Black and Tans by R. Bennett, Spellmount, 1-86227-098-8, p. 221 - figures vary from source to source*
Category Killed Wounded
IRA 276 25.27%
Irish civilian (including spies &
informers) 288 26.37%
c. 800 40.69%
RIC 366 33.52% 600 30.52%
British army 162 14.84% 566 28.79%
Total 1,092 100.00% c. 1, 966 100.00%
3.11 ‘IRA brigade performance in Cork, 1917-1921’
The IRA & Its Enemies. Violence and Community in Cork 1916-1923 by P. Hart OUP, 0-19820-806-5, p. 106
Crown force casualties
IRA casualties
Total Per 1000 people Total Per 1000 people
Cork 1 236 12 68 3.4
Cork 1 (rural) 149 12 49 4.3
Cork 2 99 11 40 5.0
Cork 3 142 14 52 4.5
Total 626 209
* From the beginning of 1919 to the end of 1920, 177 police and 54 soldiers were killed, as against only 42 IRA and
civilian fatalities together. As the struggle continued the number of IRA and civilian casualties over the whole period
from January 1919 until the truce in July 1921, rose disproportionately, but still represented just about a third of the
security force casualties: 751 people in all were killed and some 1,200 wounded. Of the dead 405 (54%) were police
and 150 (20%) military, while 196 (26%) were civilian and IRA.
It is natural to try and draw parallels between then and now. The peak year (so far) for violence in the Northern Ireland
conflict since 1969 was 1972, during which the proportions of casualties were almost exactly the opposite: about
two-thirds civilian deaths to one-third security force. One of the reasons for this is the differing nature of the challenge
between 1919-21 and since 1969. There was, for example, almost no urban rioting during the earlier period, which
was much more in the nature of a guerrilla war with the specific targets being the security forces.
(‘British Security Policy in Ireland, 1919-21’ by K. Jeffrey in Nationalism & Unionism. Conflict in Ireland 1885-1921 edited by P. Collins, Institute
of Irish Studies (Belfast), 0-85389-495-7, p.170)
IiS, Black & Tans ..., 13

4. Reactions in Ireland
4.1 ‘The number of reprisals is few and the damage done is exaggerated’, Greenwood told a London
journalist
Sinn Fein propaganda was brilliantly organised. English and foreign journalists were taken regularly for a tour of what was
known in Dublin Castle as ‘the Republican scenic railway’.
One correspondent, on calling on an officer at the Castle before returning home, was surprised to be told the
itinerary he had followed.
‘You went to Kilteragh, the home of Sir Horace Plunkett, and you had a couple of hours with George
Russell at Plunkett House. Desmond Fitzgerald called on you at the Shelbourne Hotel, and with an
elaborate show of secrecy arranged an interview with Arthur Griffith. One or two harmless young
Catholic priests fell into conversation with you at the Shelbourne. You had invitations to tea from Mrs.
Erskine Childers, Maud Gonne MacBride and Mrs. Stopford Green, who described atrocities they claim
to have seen. Then you went to Thurles to see the Archbishop of Cashel, and from there with a letter
of introduction to the O'Rahilly in Cork, where you also had a talk with Florrie, the porter of the
Imperial Hotel. Then you went to Limerick to see Mr. Stephen O’Mara.’
Many of the books, pamphlets and articles of the period show signs of this combined influence. In particular,
the opinions of Florrie the porter, a man of moderate, but pithily expressed, nationalist views, reached a wide
reading public all over the world under various correspondents’ names.
4.2 Henry Robinson, in charge of the Local Government Board in Ireland from 1898 to 1922,
recalling in his memoirs a pub owner’s experience in County Westmeath with the Black and Tans
A staunch unionist, Robinson was accused in 1926 of having the ‘mentality of Cromwellian officialdom’.
They were a light-hearted set of men these ‘Black and Tans’, mostly ex-officers, and some of their humorous
stunts really exasperated people almost more that the reprisals. A lady travelling in Westmeath met a
prominent Nationalist she knew very well.
‘Oh, begorra, miss, things is awful with them blackguard Black and Tans driving and drinking all over the
country, threatening the lives of the people. They come into my bar and they call for what they want, and then
they start rolling their little bombs up and down the counter till they get anything they ask for. Sure, if one
of them bombs was to drop the whole village would be wiped out, so what can I do?’
4.3 Sir Hugh Gratton-Bellew, resigning as the Deputy Lieutenant for Galway and his commission
as a British magistrate, August (?) 1920.
I hope my colleagues will follow my example so that the wrecking of Irish towns and the ruin of Irish industry
may be proceeded with without any camouflage, or appearance of approval by Irishmen of the sabotage of
their country, which retention of office without function would imply.
4.4 Hugh Martin, an English journalist, who visited Tubbercurry, Co. Sligo, in November 1920, a
few days after the IRA had killed a local policeman, Inspector Brady
On Thursday [the night of Brady’s death], a lorry full of uniformed men entered Tubbercurry ... The men went
straight to Howley’s, the principal drinking bar in the town, broke the door open ... helped themselves to as
much liquor as they could swallow, smashed the windows, wrecked the interior, and set it on fire. They then
went round the village, burning or wrecking shop after shop. As the men worked, they shouted out
repeatedly: ‘Come out, Sinn Féin’ and ‘Where are the murderers?’
The surrounding fields were full of terrified women and children, crouching in the wet grass, watching the
flames. Two girls fled their homes in their nightdresses only. More women and children had fled earlier in
the evening to distant cottages, as soon as they heard of the death of Inspector Brady.
IiS, Black & Tans ..., 14

4.5 Making gunmen?
Statement of Timothy O’Connell, Ahakeera, Dunmanway, West Cork, arrested by the Black and Tans on 2 January 1921 and
released on 11 May - see Appendix A for the full statement.
I was arrested on the morning of 2 January 1921 about a mile from the scene of the Kilmichael ambush.
I happened to be in bed in a friend’s house when someone down-stairs shouted ‘Tans!’ I hopped out of bed
and had a look through an upstairs window. I could see two lorries stopped on the road about a few hundred
yards away. The occupants of both lorries were out on the road studying the countryside through binoculars.
I slipped on my trousers and coat, the latter being the coat Pat Deasy had worn when he was mortally
wounded in the ambush at Kilmichael about five weeks earlier. The bullet hole was plain to be seen, and God
help me if the Auxies could only guess the truth.
I ran from the house a short distance, and tried to put the house between me and the enemy. I then made
across the fields for a short cut to some cover and away from the road, when suddenly fire was opened on me
from all directions. I then discovered that the whole place was surrounded and any hope of escape gone. I still
kept going, dodging in and out through bushes and any cover I could find, but to no avail. I knew I hadn’t a
hope of escape, so I lay down by a low stone fence to escape their fire which was still kept up. They were
shouting at me to come out. I knew that if I showed myself then I’d get riddled with bullets. They moved up
to where I lay, and hauled me to my feet. The first question they asked me was, ‘Where were you hit?’ I said
that I wasn’t hit. At that they seemed disappointed to have missed me at such short range, crack shots and all
as they were supposed to be.....
A few days after I was beaten up, I was taken before the big shots, Latimer, De Havilland, and Sparrow,
and questioned. All my answers to their questions were to the effect that I didn’t know anyone they
mentioned, or what they were talking about - even though I knew plenty which they would have given
anything to know. Before I was taken away I was told I had until six o’clock next morning to make up my
mind to give them the information I had. On the way back to my cell, I was brought into another small room,
the walls of which were smeared with blood as well as marks which looked like bullet holes. I was told how
a few Shinners who refused to give information were shot against those walls, and that my turn wasn’t far
away....
There was one prisoner in that hut whom I didn’t know then, one of the Clonmult survivors named Paddy
Higgins. He had been wounded in the fight and taken prisoner. After a week or so both he and I were called
out, and marched across the square to the courtmartial quarters. He was led in while I was kept outside the
door. He was in for less than fifteen minutes when he came out, and was put on a lorry bound for Cork jail:
he had been sentenced to death. I was marched back to the hut without being asked a question. This happened
about three times in all, and on each occasion the prisoner was sentenced, but I was never taken inside the
door of the murder room. A couple of weeks went by before my next move, which was back to Bandon. I
spent another couple of weeks there, and was moved finally back to Dunmanway workhouse where the
Auxies were lodged.
On 11 May I was released conditionally, and ordered to report back every Saturday morning at eleven
o’clock. Once I was outside that building, I prayed that the next time I would come face to face with that gang
of murderers I would have a gun in my hands.
IiS, Black & Tans ..., 15

5. Debate in Britain 1 - House of Commons
5.1 House of Commons, Prime Minister’s (David Lloyd George’s) statement, 9 October 1920
A small body of assassins, a real murder gang, dominate the country and terrorise it.... it is essential in the
interests of Ireland [that] that gang should be broken up .... we have murder by the throat.
5.2 House of Commons debate, 20 October 1920
1. Labour leader, Arthur Henderson, moved the following Resolution:
That this house regrets the present state of lawlessness in Ireland and the lack of discipline in the armed
forces of the Crown, resulting in the death or injury of innocent citizens and the destruction of property:
and is of the opinion that an independent investigation should at once be instituted into the cause, nature
and extent of reprisals on the part of those whose duty is the maintenance of law and order.
2. Sir Hamar Greenwood replied for the Government, assuring the House:
I have laid down a code of still more severe discipline for the Royal Irish Constabulary, and I shall be
glad to know that it will meet with approval. I myself had a parade of a large number of the Royal Irish
Constabulary. I addressed them. I saw that what I said was published in nearly every paper in Ireland.
. . . I put the matter in as strong words as I could command that their business, and mine, was to prevent
crime and to detect criminals, and when there was great provocation they must not give way.
But I cannot in my heart of hearts - and, Mr. Speaker, I say this - it may be right or it may be wrong -
I cannot condemn in the same way those policemen who lost their heads as I condemn the assassins who
provoked this outrage....The best and the surest way to stop reprisals is to stop the murder of policemen,
soldiers and loyal citizens.
I regret these reprisals beyond words. It is a reflection on the discipline of a famous force. It is a
reflection on my administration as political head of that force. But if I could bring to the minds and
hearts of every member of this House - I do not care on what Benches they sit - the two years of agony,
of the intolerable provocation that these policemen, and some cases soldiers, have gone through, the
situation would be better understood, and reprisals, whilst condemned, and properly condemned, would
also be understood.
3. The House of Commons the Labour resolution by 346 votes to 74. They saw Sinn Fein as another form
of ‘Bolshevism’ - a problem with which they were much obsessed at home and abroad. A coal strike had
started two days earlier, and twenty thousand unemployed rioting in Whitehall on the same day suggested
that revolution might be round the corner.
4. The Morning Post probably summed up the feeling of the majority in its leader the following morning:
Whatever we may think of these reprisals in theory, in practice they are found to be the most effective
way of causing these murders to cease.
5. It was possible to defend the policy of reprisals, or to deny that it existed. Lloyd George had followed the
first course at Caernarvon* and Sir Hamar Greenwood the second in the House of Commons, causing Lord
Hugh Cecil to observe: ‘It seems to be agreed that there are no such things as reprisals, but they are having
a good effect.’
* The police naturally feel that the time has come to defend themselves and that is what is called reprisals in Ireland. ...
There is no doubt that at last their patience has given way and there has been some severe hitting back. Let us be fair
to these gallant men who are doing their duty in Ireland (10 October 1920).
IiS, Black & Tans ..., 16

5.3 House of Commons questions, 22 November 1920, following ‘Bloody Sunday’
Sir WILLIAM DAVISON asked the Prime Minister whether he is aware that the House of Commons would
be prepared at a single sitting to give him whatever powers may be necessary to stamp out the atrocious
murder campaign in Ireland under which fourteen British officers and civilians were yesterday foully done
to death in Dublin, and will he take immediate steps to introduce any necessary legislation to enable persons
found in possession of arms or ammunition without a permit in any disturbed area in Ireland to be shot?
THE PRIME MINISTER: I appreciate the view and desire of my Hon. Friend, and share with him the horror
we all feel about the cold-blooded murder of unarmed British officers by assassins in Dublin yesterday. The
Government are resolved to suppress the murder conspiracy in Ireland. We always realised that to stamp out
such a carefully organised and highly-subsidised plot would take time, but we are convinced, in spite of recent
outbreaks, that the Irish authorities are gradually succeeding in their gallant efforts to break up the gang of
assassins who have been terrorising Ireland. Should, however, experience show that the powers with which
the Irish Government are equipped prove insufficient for the purpose, they will have no hesitation in asking
Parliament for such further authority as may be necessary to achieve that end.
MR DEVLIN: May I ask the Prime Minister why it is, when a question is put to him and the Chief Secretary
to recite all the horrible occurrences that have taken place last Sunday in Dublin, we have heard nothing about
the appearance of the military forces at a football match at which ten people were killed [HON. MEMBERS:
‘Sit down!']. I will not sit down, I want to know why the House of Commons has not been made acquainted,
in the recital of these other things that have occurred, with the onrush of the military into a football field, with
fifteen thousand people, indiscriminate shooting, and ten people killed ...
Grave disorder having arisen, MR SPEAKER suspended the Sitting ...
5.4 House of Commons, Prime Minister’s (David Lloyd George’s) statement, 10 December 1920
The PRIME MINISTER: ... During the last few weeks the Government have been in touch with intermediaries
who have been anxious to bring about a better understanding. The majority of the people of Ireland are
anxious for peace and a fair and lasting settlement ... On the other hand the Government are also very
regretfully convinced that the party, or rather the section, which controls the organisation of murder and
outrage is not yet ready for a real peace, that is to say, for a peace that will accept the only basis on which
peace can be concluded - a basis which would be consistent with the unbroken unity of the United Kingdom.
In these circumstances the Government determined on the double policy which I propose now to declare. On
the one hand they feel they have no option but to continue and indeed intensify their campaign against that
small but highly organised and desperate minority who are using murder and outrage ... but on the other hand
they are anxious to open every channel ... for an honourable settlement ...
We have decided to proclaim in that quarter of Ireland [the south west] martial law, and to mete out exactly
the same treatment to these people as would be done if they were open rebels ... We are only meting out the
ordinary rules of civilised warfare ... There will be a proclamation of martial law ... The effect will be that
after a certain date unauthorised persons found in possession of arms in the specified areas to which martial
law is applied will be treated as rebels, and will be liable on conviction by a military court to the penalty of
death. The same penalty will be applied to the unauthorised wearing of the uniforms of any of His Majesty's
forces and to the aiding and abetting and harbouring of rebels ...
IiS, Black & Tans ..., 17

5.5 House of Commons, June 1921
Debates on Ireland in the House became increasingly bitter and frequently lapsed into farce. On the same day,
Sir Hamar Greenwood rose to answer a question about the Black and Tans and had begun: ‘I am going to
stand up again for these men today....’ when Mr. Jack Jones, a Labour member, who was a cockney by birth
and an Irishman by blood, interposed: ‘Three cheers for the chief assassins.’
Considerable uproar followed and there were loud cries of ‘Withdraw’. The Speaker said that he had
occasion before to warn the Honourable Member that he was not entitled to make these interjections, and Mr.
Jones replied that he was not willing to withdraw and was willing to go out.
As he left the Chamber he turned, and roared at the assembled members: ‘Goodnight all you assassins.’
A Coalition member shouted back angrily: ‘You’re a dirty dog’, and Mr. Jones, unabashed, replied: ‘You're
nothing but a damned gang of assassins, the whole lot of you.’
An Arab deputation which had come to a visit to the House to study the workings of British democracy
was impressed by the liveliness of the proceedings.
5.6 Lloyd George’s private opinion on the conduct of the Black & Tans, etc., 25 Feburary 1921
In a letter to Hamar Greenwood, the Irish chief Secretary, the Prime Minister’s hard line in private contrasted with his public
assurances and also linked indiscipline in Ireland with public opinion.
I am not at all satisfied of the state of discipline in the Royal Irish Constabulary and its auxiliary force.
Accounts reach me from too many and too authoritative quarters to leave any doubt in my mind that the
charges of drunkenness, looting and other acts of indiscipline are in too many cases substantially true ... [This
is] causing grave uneasiness in the public mind ... It is vital that the violence and indiscipline which
undoubtedly characterises certain units in the Royal Irish Constabulary should be terminated in the most
prompt and drastic manner. It is weakening seriously the hands of the executive.... Public opinion, which is
already unhappy, will swing round and withdraw its support from the policy which is now being pursued by
the Government in Ireland. There is no doubt that indiscipline, looting and drunkenness in the Royal Irish
Constabulary is alienating great numbers of well disposed people in Ireland and throwing them into the arms
of Sinn Fein.
IiS, Black & Tans ..., 18

6. Debate in Britain 2 - Beyond the Commons
6.1 Religious leaders declare ‘Government attended by such consequences cannot be right’, 6 April
1921
During the early months of 1921 revulsion at the reprisals policy – which the Government appeared to be defending, if not
initiating - spread widely in Britain. It began among political opponents such as Asquithian Liberals and Trade Unionists, was
articulated through groups such as the Peace with Ireland Council (the Secretary of which body was, improbably, the young
Sir Oswald Mosley, later founder of the British Union of Fascists), and was afterwards taken up by the main Protestant
churches. The following declaration was issued by seven Church of England bishops and thirteen leaders of other Protestant
churches in England and Scotland.
In opening the latest discussion on the Irish situation in the House of Lords, the Archbishop of Canterbury
took occasion once more to protest strongly against the deplorable practice of indiscriminate and unauthorised
reprisals by the irregular forces of the crown. He did so on the highest of all grounds — namely, the absolute
unlawfulness of the attempt to overcome wrong, however flagrant and provocative, by means of further and
equally indefensible wrong. With that protest we, the undersigned, desire earnestly to associate ourselves.
And we go further. While not entitled to commit our respective Churches, we feel constrained to say
that we cannot regard the cruel and detestable outrages which have given rise to the whole reprisals
policy, authorised and unauthorised alike, as a mere outbreak of criminality in the ordinary sense.
Notoriously there lies behind them a long-cherished and deep-seated sense of political grievance which
has been aggravated and inflamed by many untoward events, and which the concessions of the new
[1920] Irish Government Act have altogether failed to appease ...
In these circumstances we join our voices with those who are appealing from many sides for the
adoption of a different line of policy. We plead with the Government to arrange, if possible, a genuine
truce, with a view to a deliberate effort after an agreed solution to the Irish difficulty. It may be that
attempt will fail; but until it has been seriously and patiently tried we cannot acquiesce in any alternative
course of action. The present policy is causing grave unrest throughout the Empire, and exposing us to
misunderstanding and the hostile criticism even of the most friendly of other nations of the world ... It
affords no prospect of the speedy restoration of law and order. Nor can we believe that it leads to the
end all must desire — a peaceful and contented Ireland. On the contrary, its heaviest condemnation
perhaps lies in the deepening alienation it is steadily affecting between this country and all classes of
the Irish people. A method of government attended by such consequences cannot be politically or
ethically right, and ought, we submit, to give place without delay to a policy of conciliation. What form
this should take we do not presume to say. Various possibilities seem to be open. What the situation
in our judgement requires is that the Government should take the initiative, and with resolute
magnanimity pursue such a course, by the blessing of Heaven, to the end.
6.2 The Manchester Guardian, 14 June 1921
Do not let us imagine that the policy which is favoured by some of the Government advisers of making great
military drives, setting up blockhouses and concentration camps would bring us to anything but disaster and
disgrace.
IiS, Black & Tans ..., 19

7. Epilogue
7.1 On the run
The Black and Tans by R. Bennett, Spellmount, 1-86227-098-8, pp 208-9.
By the summer of 1921, the I.R.A. campaign was becoming desperate and intense. Six soldiers were killed
and twenty-one wounded by a mine at Youghal in Cork on the last day of May, and two District Inspectors
and thirteen members of the R.I.C. were killed and twenty-one wounded during the first three days of June.
Sporadic ambushes continued throughout the month, but the upsurge of Volunteer activities during May and
June looked more serious than it was from Dublin Castle and Westminster.
The areas in which the I.R.A. could operate were becoming strictly limited. In many parts of the country units
dropped out of the fight and agreed to local truces. Dry summer weather had hardened the ground and made
it possible for military and police transport to drive round the road blocks and trenches, and even to travel on
the mountain roads which had hitherto been impassable. The long summer evenings gave the Flying Columns
only a few hours of respite from harrying attacks. Arms and ammunition were scarce everywhere and Liam
Lynch, and other Southern Commanders, came to Dublin to report to G.H.Q. that enemy pressure and
shortage of ammunition were making it impossible to continue the fight.
Morale began to crack as the number of prisoners mounted. A field service notebook of a Volunteer
Commander in mid-Limerick indicates some of the problems that he had to face at that time. General
lawlessness and looting by Volunteers were on the increase.
There was, for example: ‘Martin Nolan living on his wits, cut a goat in two with a bill hook, broke windows,
generally drunk, plenty of money to spend, has family and supports them. He asked J. Wayle to get a few to
go with him and they would earn plenty of money. People generally afraid of him. Does looting in Mid-Tipp
area.’ He reports that no recruiting can be done and that there were many desertions. A unit has refused to
burn a large house when ordered and roads are not being properly cut. The men do not understand the use of
the grenade, and fifty per cent of one company do not know how to handle a rifle. The locals are talking too
much, and a Major comes from Cork every week to pay informers.
The leaders doubted whether the I.R.A. could survive another summer campaign even if the threatened
reinforcements were not sent from England. But all was not lost. The movement against the Government’s
policy was growing in England, where Ireland was in the news every day, in one form or another...
7.2 The achievement of the ‘Black & Tans’
The Black and Tans by R. Bennett, Spellmount, 1-86227-098-8, p. 222.
The major credit for [the Treaty] settlement ... was accorded to Lloyd George, but some at least should attach
to the Black and Tans. They had played a decisive part in the long, sad history of Anglo-Irish relations. They
had, indeed, made Ireland ‘a hell for rebels to live in’, and had carried out the Government’s policy so
successfully that the Prime Minister was forced to abandon it and come to the conference table. The I.R.A.
never beat the ‘Tans’, an old Volunteer commander has said. ‘It was the British people who did it.’
IiS, Black & Tans ..., 20

Appendix A
Interrogation and treatment of republican suspects
by the British Auxiliary Forces, ‘Black and Tans’, January 1921. Statement of Timothy O’Connell, Ahakeera, Dunmanway,
West Cork
I was arrested on the morning of 2 January 1921 about a mile
from the scene of the Kilmichael ambush.
I happened to be in bed in a friend’s house when someone
down-stairs shouted ‘Tans!’ I hopped out of bed and had a look
through an upstairs window. I could see two lorries stopped on
the road about a few hundred yards away. The occupants of
both lorries were out on the road studying the countryside
through binoculars. I slipped on my trousers and coat, the latter
being the coat Pat Deasy had worn when he was mortally
wounded in the ambush at Kilmichael about five weeks earlier.
The bullet hole was plain to be seen, and God help me if the
Auxies could only guess the truth.
I ran from the house a short distance, and tried to put the
house between me and the enemy. I then made across the fields
for a short cut to some cover and away from the road, when
suddenly fire was opened on me from all directions. I then
discovered that the whole place was surrounded and any hope
of escape gone. I still kept going, dodging in and out through
bushes and any cover I could find, but to no avail. I knew I
hadn’t a hope of escape, so I lay down by a low stone fence to
escape their fire which was still kept up. They were shouting at
me to come out. I knew that if I showed myself then I’d get
riddled with bullets. They moved up to where I lay, and hauled
me to my feet. The first question they asked me was, ‘Where
were you hit?’ I said that I wasn’t hit. At that they seemed
disappointed to have missed me at such short range, crack shots
and all as they were supposed to be.
The next move was out to the road and on to the lorry. But
before I was hoisted on to same I was given a few hefty wallops
for good measure. The morning was awfully cold with showers
of sleet, and to make matters worse I was only poorly clad,
trousers, coat and shirt: I did not have time to put on boots.
However, I didn’t mind the cold much as I was getting an odd
wallop which helped to keep the blood in circulation!
The lorries moved from Shanacashel where I was captured to
Coppeen. They hadn’t gone far when, meeting a cyclist, a man
who knew me quite well, they stopped and asked him if he knew
the prisoner. ‘No’, he said, ‘I never saw him before.’ That
happened on three occasions before we reached Coppeen, and
all these three people knew me. Their reason for denying me
was that they thought I had given a wrong name, and they didn’t
want to get me into more trouble.
Before reaching Coppeen village, the lorries came to a halt.
I was ordered down, and told to stand up by the fence. Five or
six of them stood on the road with rifles at the ready, and
naturally I expected the volley any second. I closed my eyes and
waited, but it didn’t come. We continued on to the village where
they again stood me against the wall of Mr P. Murphy’s shop.
I could see them in conversation with him, and looking my way
at the same time. Eventually one of them came over to me and
said that I could thank this man (Mr Murphy) for saving my life
as they would have left my brains on the wall, if he hadn’t given
them my name—which, of course, was the same as I had
given—my right name.
They moved from Coppeen southwards towards Castletown
for about a mile, turned off at the next crossroads, to the right
for another mile or so where they arrested an old man whom
they terrified by placing grenades in his pockets with lengths of
string attached to pull the pin and blow him up: they specialised
in and enjoyed this kind of stuff. They moved again back to
Shanacashel to the house I had run from, and searched the place
thoroughly, but found nothing. From there they moved to the
townland of Lisheenleigh, where some of our boys, including
the Company Captain, Jim Crowley, had been sleeping in an
empty cottage. This house lay about a quarter of a mile off the
road. They stopped the lorries at the nearest point to the above
and moved across the fields to their objective, but came back
empty-handed and sorely disappointed. I heard them say that the
men they were after had just gone as the blankets were still
warm.
The next and final move was from there to the headquarters
in Dunmanway workhouse. I was led to the guardroom where I
had to take off all my clothes and was thoroughly searched.
They found nothing except a scapular which they pulled off my
neck and threw on the fire. I was ordered to dress and was taken
to the back of the building where a hand-pump was shown to
me. I was ordered to get to work turning this to supply the house
with water. This job lasted non-stop for over an hour, and by
then my palms were raw and bleeding. I was almost too weak to
stand. It was now almost twenty-four hours since I had any food,
or even a cup of tea.
Although there were other prisoners there at the time, I was
brought back to the guardroom where I lay on the floor until
about midnight when three Auxies came in and ordered me to
get on my feet. I was marched out of there, one leading and two
others following just behind. We climbed a stairs leading to the
top storey at the back of the building. I was led into the room,
and when about halfway through the room, the leader, a great
big savage, suddenly turned round, and before I could realise
what was going to happen he lifted me off the floor with a
punch. He didn’t drop me. I kept on my feet and took at least a
few more before I went down. I made no attempt to get up until
one of the other two came at me with a bayonet, and after that
I stood up with my hands high to guard my face. Once again the
savage moved in with a few more haymakers, and put me down
for the second time. The blood was almost choking me by then:
Once more I was forced to stand up to face the puncher and take
more punishment. Finally, I went down to stay. I asked them to
shoot me. The big fellow said, ‘No, we wouldn’t have your
blood on our hands’, even though by then they had most of what
I had on their hands and clothes as well as pools on the floor.
In the end one of the Auxies dragged me to the top of the
stairs where I made an attempt to get to my feet. At this the big
one caught me with a kick, and set me tumbling down almost
half way. I then got up, and managed to walk to my cell, an unlit
poke of a room where I lay on the floor until morning in agony.
My face had swollen to a lump of jelly, both my eyes were
almost closed, and my nose was broken. I was brought some
breakfast, but I couldn’t eat it as my teeth had gone right
through my lips, and I couldn’t open my mouth, save a small
space in one corner. Through this small opening they fed me
with soup, and it was almost a month before I could chew or
swallow any solid food.
A few days after I was beaten up, I was taken before the big
shots, Latimer, De Havilland, and Sparrow, and questioned. All
my answers to their questions were to the effect that I didn’t
know anyone they mentioned, or what they were talking
about—even though I knew plenty which they would have given
anything to know. Before I was taken away I was told I had until
six o’clock next morning to make up my mind to give them the
information I had. On the way back to my cell, I was brought
into another small room, the walls of which were smeared with
blood as well as marks which looked like bullet holes. I was told
IiS, Black & Tans ..., 21

how a few Shinners who refused to give information were shot
against those walls, and that my turn wasn’t far away.
Next morning at the stroke of six I was brought before the
big shots. Each of them had a gun in his hand. One of them
stood behind me with a gun to my neck. They started with the
usual question whether I had made up my mind to give the
information they wanted. I said I didn’t have any to give. The
kept at me for half an hour or so, but I refused to answer. One
of them wanted to shoot me there and then, but was stopped by
the others, and I was then taken back to my cell, and asked no
further questions.
I was again moved to the guardroom, still under close arrest,
and one day—I can’t understand how it could happen—my
mother and a neighbouring girl happened to get into the
guardroom. How they got past the guard is still a mystery to me.
I sat on a chair in the centre of the room, and both of them sat
on a stool just inside the door, and there was no more than six
feet between us. Neither of them recognised me for about ten
minutes, when suddenly the girl spotted something that gave her
a clue. At that she turned to my mother and said, ‘That’s Tim!’
Then my mother rushed towards me shouting, but she was
manhandled immediately and thrown through the door.
A week or so after that, three of us were taken to Cork as
hostages, and arrived back in Dunmanway late last night. I had
joined the other prisoners by this time, and they waited up until
we arrived back, and had a grand fire to greet us—the weather
was shocking cold. Naturally we got as close to the fire as
possible, and in about ten minutes my false face fell off in the
form of a great scab about an inch thick. So I looked almost
normal again.
One Monday morning shortly afterwards, I was called out
along with two other prisoners, the Barrett brothers of Coppeen.
Three lorries were lined up, each full of Auxies. We were
ordered on board, one of us on each lorry, and were told that if
one shot was fired at the lorries all three of us would be shot
immediately. The first stop was the military barracks at Bandon
which had been attacked the previous night. We were ordered
off the lorries, and kicked through the gate. Then the Auxies
told the military that they had arrested us on the road, and gave
it to be understood that we had taken part in the attack on the
previous night. Naturally the military decided to get their own
back on us. So we were marched to the far end of the barracks
where the baths were, ordered to strip off all our clothes, and
stand underneath the showers. Then the cold water taps were
turned on. It was a bitterly cold morning and the water was
almost freezing. We had to stand under the jets of cold water
until we were almost lifeless, and the military didn’t pull any
punches during the proceedings so that we emerged from the
showers with more black eyes.
We were brought back again to the barrack square where we
were shown an empty coffin which, we were told, was meant for
one of us. We were to be shot at intervals of one hour beginning
at three o’clock. After a short while four military came from the
back of the barracks with a stretcher on which lay a body. They
asked us whether we recognised the corpse. We replied that we
did not. We were then ordered to place the body in the coffin.
One arm was bent and stiff, and I went to push it down by the
side. As I did so one of them hit me and knocked me down,
while another of them pushed the arm down with his boot, and
not too gently either. We put the lid on the coffin which we
were then told to pick up and bring to a lorry waiting outside the
gate of the barracks. Later we learned that the body was that of
Volunteer Daniel O’Reilly who had been killed in the attack on
the previous night.
We were held in Bandon military barracks for a week or so.
Every day new prisoners were being brought in, and soon the
number mounted to thirty. Then on the Saturday night about
midnight fourteen of us were handcuffed in pairs and moved to
Kinsale in an open lorry under heavy rain. The late Brigade
Quartermaster, Dick Barrett, was one of us. On arriving at
Kinsale we were ordered down off the lorry, and marched
across the fields to Charles Fort. On our arrival there it was
discovered that the keys of the handcuffs were left behind in
Bandon. So we had to sleep on the cold floor in pairs without as
much as one blanket until some time next day when the keys
arrived and the handcuffs were removed.
On the following Sunday we were put on the train for Cork
military barracks. There we were housed in a sheet-iron hut with
plenty of air holes. We did not even have a smoke, as our
pockets had been turned out before we were locked up. After a
week or so there we were transferred to Cork jail which
happened to be about the best and safest place so far, for we
were rid of Auxies, Tans, and military. I spent another three
weeks or so there, and was then moved down the river to Spike
Island. New prisoners arrived every day until there were a
couple of hundred, all of whom were handed Internment Forms
stating that they were to be held for the duration of the war—all,
that is, except myself.
Naturally, I had doubts as to what they intended to do with
me next. However, I didn’t have too long to wait. After a couple
of months or so a wire reached the camp with orders for my
removal back to Cork military barracks. This didn’t sound too
cheerful. Our O/C in Spike, Henry O’Mahony, sent for me on
hearing the news. He asked me to give him an account of my
activities up to the time I was arrested. I told him everything,
and he came to the conclusion that I was to be court-martialled.
He gave me instructions to follow if his hunch proved to be
correct, i.e. to re-apply for legal aid, witnesses, etc. He feared
that I would be accused of taking part in the Kilmichael ambush.
As well as advice he gave me some of his own clothes and cash
to help me on my way. I have never forgotten that kind act of
Henry.
At midnight an armed guard arrived and marched me down
to the harbour, I was put aboard the boat that was sailing up to
Cork. A car and two officers were waiting for me when we
landed, and they brought me in the car to the barracks. They had
erected two extra huts there by then, all full of prisoners, and the
only one I knew was Dick Barrett (I forgot to mention that he
was released from Kinsale, and had been re-arrested). He was
asleep when I entered the hut. It was about 5.00 a.m., and he
could not imagine where I had come from at that hour. I sat
down beside him and told him the story. He thought it sounded
bad.
There was one prisoner in that hut whom I didn’t know then,
one of the Clonmult survivors named Paddy Higgins. He had
been wounded in the fight and taken prisoner. After a week or
so both he and I were called out, and marched across the square
to the courtmartial quarters. He was led in while I was kept
outside the door. He was in for less than fifteen minutes when
he came out, and was put on a lorry bound for Cork jail: he had
been sentenced to death. I was marched back to the hut without
being asked a question. This happened about three times in all,
and on each occasion the prisoner was sentenced, but I was
never taken inside the door of the murder room. A couple of
weeks went by before my next move, which was back to
Bandon. I spent another couple of weeks there, and was moved
finally back to Dunmanway workhouse where the Auxies were
lodged. On 11 May I was released conditionally, and ordered to
report back every Saturday morning at eleven o’clock. Once I
was outside that building, I prayed that the next time I would
come face to face with that gang of murderers I would have a
gun in my hands.
(Signed) Tim O’Connell
(Signed) James Crowley, Company O/C (Witness)
IiS, Black & Tans ..., 22

Appendix B
War or police action?
Adapted from The Oxford Companion of Irish History, edited by S.J. Connolly, OUP, 0-19866-240-8, pp 15-16, 32, 47-9
Republican campaign
The Irish Volunteers, now increasingly known as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), mounted an armed
campaign, now called the Anglo-Irish war, against government forces in Ireland to defend the Irish Republic
established in 1916. The campaign is conventionally dated from 21 January 1919, when nine Volunteers,
including Dan Breen and Sean Treacy, killed two policemen in an ambush at Soloheadbeg, Co. Tipperary.
It continued until a truce on 11 July 1921 opened the way for the negotiation of the Anglo-Irish treaty,
concluded on 6 December 1921.
Guerrilla warfare
The development of a highly effective form of guerrilla warfare, wholly different from the tactics of the rising
of 1916 or earlier insurrections, represented a gradual adaptation to practical necessity, dependent more on
local initiative than on central planning. IRA activity during 1919 consisted mainly of arms seizures and
attacks on individual policemen. A successful attack on the police barracks at Carrigtwohill, Co. Cork, on 2
January 1920, marked the commencement of more ambitious raids and ambushes. By June the IRA had killed
55 police. Sixteen occupied barracks had been destroyed in attacks, and hundreds of others abandoned as
indefensible. In Dublin members of a squad directed by Michael Collins had begun systematically killing off
detectives from the political division of the Dublin Metropolitan Police.
British response
In response to this challenge the government deployed regular troops and created two new forces, the Black
and Tans 1 and Auxiliaries, 2 to reinforce the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC). The Restoration of Order in
Ireland Act continued and extended the emergency powers created by the wartime Defence of the Realm Acts.
But the draconian security policy alienated the civilian population without suppressing IRA activity. The
events of late 1920, notably ‘Bloody Sunday’ (21 Nov) 3 and the killing of fifteen Auxiliaries in an ambush
at Kilmichael, Co. Cork (28 Nov), marked a sharp escalation in violence. The same period saw the appearance
of ‘flying columns’, bodies of IRA men permanently under arms of the kind led by Tom Barry in Co. Cork
and responsible for the Kilmichael ambush. Continued violence in the first half of 1921 brought the total
death toll for the period to 405 police, 150 military, and an estimated 750 IRA and civilians.
IRA’s war
The term ‘Anglo-Irish War’, like the older ‘War of Independence’, raises complex issues. IRA activists and
leadership determinedly employed the vocabulary of conventional warfare to assert their status as combatants
in a national conflict. In doing so they glossed over the sporadic, hit-and-run character of most operations,
the limited scale of the violence prior to late 1920, and the predominance among the early victims of the IRA
of the locally recruited, and predominantly Catholic, RIC.
British government’s police action
The government was equally determined to deny the ‘murder gang’ the legitimacy of belligerent status. It
condoned reprisals, including the widespread destruction of property in such incidents as the Black and Tan
raid on Balbriggan, Co. Dublin, on 20 September 1920, and the ‘sack’ of Cork city by Auxiliaries and Black
and Tans on 11-12 December 1920. It also ignored the assassination, clearly by security force members, of
several republican activists. But Lloyd George’s insistence that ‘you do not declare war on rebels’ meant that
the military never got a really free hand, and that authority remained confusingly divided between police and
army.
Status of IRA
Assessment of the IRA’s claim to represent the popular will is also difficult. Modern historians, reacting
against an earlier tradition of uncritical glorification, have emphasized the extent to which violence was
IiS, Black & Tans ..., 23

deliberately employed by a militant minority to block any possibility of a compromise settlement, and the
ruthless action, shading into a more general intimidation, against ‘informers’ and ‘collaborators’. IRA activity
was geographically uneven, high levels of activity in the western counties of Munster and part of the midlands
contrasting sharply with relative tranquillity elsewhere. Although the Dail had declared as early as January
1919 that a state of war existed between Britain and Ireland, a section of Sinn Fein was known to be unhappy
with the bloodshed. IRA activists for their part demonstrated a reluctance to submit to the authority either of
Volunteer GHQ or of the ‘politicians’ of Dail Eireann. These divisions were later to contribute to the Civil
War of 1922-3. But for the moment what was remarkable was the success with which differences were
concealed in the face of a common enemy.
_________________
1 Black and Tans
The failure of the Royal Irish Constabulary to combat IRA raids in 1919 convinced the government that the police
needed to be reinforced. From January 1920 British ex-soldiers and sailors were recruited and, by November 1921,
some 9,500 such men had joined the RIC. A shortage of RIC uniforms meant that recruits were issued with khaki
military trousers and dark green police tunics. Although full RIC uniforms were soon substituted, this mixed dress gave
rise to the new policemen’s distinctive sobriquet, the Black and Tans.
Hurriedly and inadequately trained, recruits were posted to RIC barracks, mainly in Munster, west Connacht, and
Dublin. Thus strengthened, the RIC from mid-1920 was encouraged to pursue the IRA more vigorously. The
government, at first tacitly and then openly, condoned reprisals by the police. The leading role of the Black and Tans
in some of these incidents may have been exaggerated, as British-born and Irish-born policemen were difficult, when
in full uniform, to tell apart. Nevertheless, the Black and Tans gained a fearsome reputation for brutality, which only
helped alienate the population from the RIC as a whole. Of policemen recruited in 1920–1 over one-third died, were
dismissed or discharged, or resigned: a very high wastage rate in-deed, attesting both to the difficulties of service and
to the inadequacies of recruits. But 63 per cent went on to secure government pensions when the RIC was disbanded
in 1922.
2 Auxiliaries
The Auxiliary Division of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) was raised from among de-mobilized officers of the
British army in response to the escalation of the Anglo-Irish War. Recruitment began in July 1920 and by November
1921 some 1,900 men had joined. While nominally under RIC command, outside Dublin the Auxiliaries in fact
operated independently. Divided into companies of about 100 men, they were heavily armed and highly mobile. By
mid-1921 fifteen companies were scattered through what were considered the ten most disturbed counties, mainly in
the south and west. Recruited hurriedly and with insufficient planning as to their role, the Auxiliaries soon gained a
well-deserved reputation for drunkenness and brutality. Unable to discipline them, their commander, Brig. Gen. Frank
Crozier, a former Ulster Volunteer Force officer, resigned in February 1921.
The sobriquet Black and Tans was often applied to the Auxiliaries, as well as to British-born RIC constables, although
the two groups were distinctly different. Disbanded in 1922, many Auxiliaries subsequently joined the Palestine police
force.
3 ‘Bloody Sunday’
The original ‘Bloody Sunday’ was a massacre of Russian protesters on 9 January 1905. Its first Irish namesake was
21 November 1920, when IRA men in Dublin killed thirteen men and injured six others, most, though not all, of whom
were British intelligence agents. Later two arrested IRA leaders, Peadar Clancy and Richard McKee, were killed, along
with another prisoner, supposedly trying to escape. The same afternoon Auxiliaries dispatched to search for wanted
men at a crowded Gaelic football match in Croke Park opened fire, possibly after coming under attack, killing twelve
people. More recently the name has been applied to 30 January 1972, when paratroopers sent to make arrests following
a banned civil rights march in Derry shot dead fourteen civilians. The rapid escalation of violence that followed helped
precipitate direct rule in Northern Ireland.
For further information, please see http://journals.aol.co.uk/kha200/Ireland in Schools
or contact:
Professor Patrick Buckland, Chairman, ‘Ireland in Schools’
19 Woodlands Road, Liverpool, L17 0AJ. Tel: 0151 727 6817; email: iis02@aol.com