Opmaak 1 - VNG International

even when considering other factors such as differences in expenditure
levels, starting status, and demographics.
The Cambodia example addressed things like vaccination, which is
easily monitored and measured. But other services proved more difficult
to monitor. Take education; how can a student or parents monitor the
quality (and quantity) of teaching? And what else can clients or users do
to influence service delivery? Such questions bring us to the third
relationship in the accountability figure, and to a solution... a direct link
between the poor and the providers.
Solutions
My friends and colleagues, contrary to the expectation of some, the
2004 World Development Report does not promote private market
transactions as the only solution, although a direct line of accountability
will certainly promote quality of service. If you buy a sandwich, the
direct payment is an incentive for the provider. You the client may refuse
to pay if the sandwich looks lousy, or you have an exit option: you go to
another provider. But with public goods, there is the more difficult
question of holding providers to account and things get more
complicated.
The 2004 World Development Report suggests three methods for
strengthening poor people's ability to hold service providers
accountable: strengthening client power, participation and user fees.
STRENGTHENING CLIENT POWER
Client power may be strengthened by choice. For instance, a programme
in Bangladesh took a hard look at incentives and decided to give
scholarships to girls to attend secondary school. These were deposited
in an account set up in the student’s own name. The programme then
gave a stipend to the schools – be they public, private, NGO-run or
religious – based on the number of girls they enrolled. Notwithstanding
the fact that other things changed favourably as well such as economic
growth, especially in the garment industry, and the rise in the number of
private schools, the result was astonishing. Secondary school enrolment
in Bangladesh is rising twice as fast for girls as for boys, many schools
now have separate latrines for girls and boys, and they are hiring female
teachers.
Another example of client power is parents who monitor the learning
results of their children. The RECURSO programme in Peru seeks to
address the problem by specifying a simple reading standard that
schools must meet and parents can easily verify. Simple benchmarks for
instance for reading fluency: Grade 2: 60 words/min; Grade 3: 90
words/min; Grade 4: 110 words/min. Each triggers a certain response.
Remarkably, the teachers’ union showed resistance to this programme.
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