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Valuation Analysis for<br />

December 4, 2008<br />

chad.lochrie@ttu.edu<br />

eric.hopper@ttu.edu<br />

jeff.marsicano@ttu.edu<br />

kody.roach@ttu.edu<br />

michael.barrera@ttu.edu<br />

1


Table of Contents<br />

Executive Summary 7<br />

Company Overview 13<br />

Industry Overview 15<br />

Five Forces Model 18<br />

Rivalry Among Existing Firms 20<br />

Threat of New Entrants 26<br />

Threat of Substitute Products 29<br />

Bargaining Power of Customers 31<br />

Bargaining Power of Suppliers 34<br />

Industry Analysis 35<br />

Value Creation Analysis 41<br />

Formal Accounting Analysis 46<br />

Key Accounting Policies 47<br />

Assess Accounting Flexibility 53<br />

Evaluate Accounting Strategy 56<br />

Quantitative Accounting Measures and Disclosure 64<br />

Sales Manipulation Diagnostic 68<br />

Expense Manipulation Diagnostic 76<br />

Potential Red Flags 85<br />

Undo Accounting Distortions 87<br />

Financial Analysis 90<br />

2


Liquidity Ratio Analysis 91<br />

Profitability Ratio Analysis 102<br />

Capital Structure Ratio Analysis 116<br />

Cost of Capital Estimation 123<br />

Alternative Cost of Equity 127<br />

Cost of Debt 128<br />

Weighted Average Cost of Capital 130<br />

Forecasting Financial Statements 131<br />

Income Statement Forecast 132<br />

Restated Income Statement Forecast 137<br />

Balance Sheet 140<br />

Restated Balance Sheet 144<br />

Statement of Cash Flows 147<br />

Restated Cash flows 150<br />

Valuation Ratios 153<br />

Price to Earnings Ratio 153<br />

P/E Trailing Twelve Months 154<br />

P/E Forward 155<br />

Price to EBITDA 156<br />

Price to Book 157<br />

Dividends to Price 158<br />

Price Earnings Growth 159<br />

3


Price to Free Cash Flows per share 159<br />

Enterprise Value to EBITDA 160<br />

Intrinsic Valuation Models 161<br />

Discounted Dividends Model 162<br />

Residual Income Model 163<br />

Discounted Free Cash Flows Model 167<br />

Abnormal Earnings Growth Model 169<br />

Long run residual income model 172<br />

Analyst Recommendation 175<br />

Appendices 178<br />

References 210<br />

4


Executive Summary<br />

Analyst Recommendation: Overvalued, Sell<br />

As of November 3 rd , 2008<br />

<strong>XLNX</strong> ‐ NASDAQ (11/3/2008) $17.62<br />

52 Week Range:<br />

Revenue:<br />

<strong>Mark</strong>et Capitalization:<br />

Shares Outstanding:<br />

14.28-28.21<br />

1.84 Billion<br />

4.942 Billion<br />

280.52 Million<br />

Altman Z‐scores<br />

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Initial Scores: 4.31 5.22 6.58 5.74 2.63<br />

Revised Scores: 5.13 6.40 5.61 2.57 2.59<br />

Current <strong>Mark</strong>et Share Price (11/3/08) $17.62<br />

As Stated Restated<br />

Book Value Per Share: $5.95 N/A<br />

Financial Based Valuations<br />

Return on Equity: 21.10% 36.76% As Stated Restated<br />

Return on Assets: 11.76% 20.69% Trailing P/E: 13.21 7.52<br />

Forward P/E: 15.51 10.50<br />

Dividends to Price: 0.78 0.78<br />

Cost of Capital<br />

Price to Book 1.64 1.64<br />

Estimated R‐Squared Beta Ke P.E.G. Ratio 6.61 6.07<br />

3-Month 55.21 1.087 16.29% Price to EBITDA: 0.0330 0.0202<br />

2 ‐Year 55.23 1.084 19.23% EV/ EBITDA: 8.52 5.20<br />

5 ‐ Year 55.12 1.078 16.27% Price to FCF: 12.71 12.71<br />

7‐Year 55.04 1.075 16.26%<br />

10 ‐ Year 54.96 1.072 16.24%<br />

Intrinsic Valuations<br />

Upper Lower<br />

Published Beta: 1.21<br />

Valuation Price<br />

Estimated Beta: 1.747 Discounted Dividends:<br />

$4.94<br />

Size Adj. Cost of Cap: 13.73% 17.03% 10.09% Free Cash Flows:<br />

$3.06<br />

Size Adj. Cost of Equity: 17.20% 21.16% 13.24% Residual Income:<br />

$5.81<br />

Cost of Debt: 2.94% Long Run Residual Income:<br />

$0.50<br />

WACC (BT): 13.96% Abnormal Earnings Growth:<br />

$5.34<br />

5


Source: Yahoo Finance<br />

Source: Yahoo Finance<br />

6


Executive Summary<br />

Industry Analysis<br />

Xilinx is a specialized semiconductor company with global operations in California, Asia,<br />

and Western Europe. Xilinx primarily designs and markets programmable logic devices<br />

(PLD) or chips which can go into a variety of products and industries. They currently<br />

employed 3,400 people and have over 21,000 customers worldwide.<br />

Competitive Force<br />

Rivalry Among Existing Firms<br />

Threat of New Entrants<br />

Threat of Substitute Products<br />

Bargaining Power of Customers<br />

Bargaining Power of Suppliers<br />

Degree of Competition<br />

High<br />

Low<br />

High<br />

Low<br />

Moderate<br />

Xilinx main competitors are Altera, Actel, and Lattice in the specialized semiconductor<br />

fabless industry. The specialized semiconductor industry main competitive focus being<br />

on differentiation of products due to the high demand for superior intrinsic value<br />

brought on by the volume of Research and Development. Each one of these companies<br />

is striving to make the fastest, best quality, and smallest chip out on the market. This<br />

is why the rivalry amongst existing firms is so high in this industry. One of the least<br />

concerns for this industry is the threat of new entrants because of the huge cost of<br />

physical capital as well as the human capital involved in dealing with these highly<br />

sophisticated technological devices. As mentioned above, companies in this industry<br />

need to keep up with their competitors so that the product doesn’t become obsolete<br />

because of another companies product which is faster or cheaper. With this intense<br />

competition the threat of substitute products because of faster or cheaper products<br />

from other firms is high. Another area of competition in this industry is the bargaining<br />

7


power of customers. In this industry due the fact that each company tries to find their<br />

own niche in the market creates products that are highly customized to meet the<br />

customers’ demands. With this degree of customization of products to the customer,<br />

creates in a way a degree of customer dependency. It will be harder for these<br />

companies now even to switch products because they are buying from companies that<br />

specially make products for them and to go to another company will be costly. Due to<br />

this, the bargaining power of customers in this industry is low. Companies also have to<br />

think of the suppliers as well to gain a competitive advantage. The suppliers in the<br />

semiconductor industry are moderate, due to the fact that there are numerous suppliers<br />

to choose from and for the most part offer undifferentiated semiconductor wafers.<br />

However, for Research and Development activities, companies need the newest wafer<br />

for these activities and the number of suppliers supplying these wafers is small.<br />

Accounting Analysis<br />

Accounting analysis plays a large part in valuing a firm in the sense that it must<br />

determined whether or not the key accounting policies accurately depict the company.<br />

After all, these numbers are man-made estimates, which are subject to manipulation<br />

and error, sometimes distorting the financial situation of a firm. Often, companies only<br />

report financial statements according to minimal SEC standards this gives a company an<br />

advantage because of the financial freedom the standards allow. This misleads<br />

investors to a false view of the company, making it seem like the company is<br />

performing better than it actually is.<br />

Compared to other companies in the semiconductor industry, Xilinx was effective in<br />

accurately depicting the true value of their company based on accounting policy. The<br />

key success factors for the specialized semiconductor industry were as follows: product<br />

warranties, foreign currency, research and development, and goodwill. Product<br />

warranties are important factor because if warranty liability increases in relation to sales<br />

over time it indicates poor product quality. This would adversely affect a firm’s<br />

8


evenues. Furthermore, understating warranty expense would overstate net income,<br />

leading to a less accurate financial picture of the firm. The amount of flexibility that<br />

managers have in manipulating this is high because management is only required to<br />

estimate the amount of product warranties that are probable and reasonably estimable.<br />

In Xilinx, case however we found no substantial understatement of product warranties<br />

and the materiality of this account is small relative to the other items on the balance<br />

sheet. Another key success factor in this industry was foreign currency. With some<br />

companies having over 60% of their sales internationally, being able to combat this<br />

foreign currency risk is a top priority for firms. Companies in this industry hedge, to<br />

decrease the currency risk and most, accurately display their hedging in the footnotes.<br />

Xilinx fully displayed their hedging in the footnotes and like product warranties, this<br />

account is immaterial compared to other accounts because of the low amount of<br />

expense in currency loss.<br />

Another key accounting policy that affects this industry is research and development.<br />

According to GAAP, research and development can only be accounted for as being an<br />

expense, therefore, cannot be capitalized by the firm. The problem issue with research<br />

and development is that is should be capitalized because the innovative products<br />

resulting from R&D expenditures generate revenue, which more accurate depicts the<br />

value of the firm. Since this rule is strictly enforced by GAAP, managers have no<br />

flexibility in capitalizing this expense. It is a general rule though, a more accurate<br />

picture of the what the financial statements would look like if firm were to capitalize<br />

R&D would be use a capitalization rate of approximately 25% of R&D and add this<br />

amount to assets on the balance sheet. After converting Xilinx’s R&D expense to an<br />

asset through capitalization we only found a 10% decrease in the percentage of R&D<br />

expense to total net income. The last accounting policy that was evaluated was<br />

goodwill. Goodwill is an intangible asset that generally evolves from the acquisition<br />

process. Firms are required to re-value goodwill annually. Impairment occurs when<br />

the carrying value of goodwill exceeds its fair value. When impairment is evident the<br />

firm must write down the asset to market value (mark-to-market). Companies in this<br />

9


industry resist the impairment of goodwill due to the fact that it decreases the value of<br />

the firm. If firms are not careful, they might be obligated to write off as much as 223<br />

million dollars in goodwill in one year, which was exactly what happened to Lattice in<br />

2007. Xilinx, compared to other companies in the industry, did a good job on<br />

impairment, but not enough to give a complete accurate view of the firm. As a general<br />

rule, when goodwill is greater than 10% of long term assets then impairment is needed.<br />

After performing impairment on Xilinx’s goodwill we concluded that there was no large<br />

change in the balance sheet because of this impairment. With the overall effect of the<br />

changes to the accounting policies there was no considerate amount of change to the<br />

financial statements, concluding that Xilinx has accurately displayed the true value of<br />

the firm in the financial statements.<br />

Financial Analysis, Forecasting Financials, and Cost Estimations<br />

Financial analysis involves looking at viability, profitability, and stability of firm using<br />

financial ratios. Firms use ratios in order to better measure their own financial status<br />

compared to their competitors. The three main types of ratio categories firms’ use are<br />

liquidity, profitability, and capital structure. Liquidity ratios are used to determine if the<br />

firm has enough cash to meet its current obligations. Banks will use the ratios of the<br />

firms compared to others to determine the credit risk of the company. Liquidity ratios<br />

for Xilinx were above the industry average compared to its competitors. The next<br />

category of ratios is profitability ratios. These ratios measure how efficiently the firm<br />

operates. Just as in the liquidity ratios, Xilinx consistently outperformed its competitors.<br />

The last ratio category is capital structure ratios. Capital structure ratios are different<br />

from the other two categories in that they don’t measure actual performance, but more<br />

towards how the firm finances its investments and operating activities. Firms can<br />

finance these activities in two ways, debt or equity financing. These ratios are important<br />

because they provide insight into the firms default risk. The ratios show how the firm is<br />

dealing with paying for interest payments, liabilities, and the financial leverage of the<br />

company. Xilinx has been outperforming its competitors in this category as well, but<br />

10


the trend line is showing a decrease in the future, and should been looked at further in<br />

order for this not to become a problem later on. After computing these three categories<br />

of ratios you can determine potential growth rates using the sustainable and internal<br />

growth rates. Xilinx has also out performed its competitors in this area as well. It is<br />

worth noting that even though Xilinx is out performing its competitors, they in many<br />

cases have not been performing better than their main competitor Altera. The other<br />

two companies, Actel and Lattice are was is making Xilinx be better than the industry<br />

average due to their own poor performances.<br />

The next step in this analysis is the cost of capital explanation. Before finding the<br />

weighted average cost of capital, cost of equity and cost of debt need to be calculated.<br />

From our regression analysis we found our beta to be 1.746. Our beta was stable<br />

across the time period which means that the systematic risk is not changing over time.<br />

Once you have the beta you can get the cost of equity by using the CAPM equation by<br />

filling in also the MRP, which was 7% and the risk free rate of 4%, giving us a cost of<br />

equity of 17.2% (including the size adjustment). Next you need to find the cost of debt<br />

by taking the weighted average of the liabilities times the interest rates given to the<br />

liability. With the cost of debt of 2.94% and with the cost of equity you can find the<br />

weighted average cost of capital (Wacc). The calculated size adjusted Wacc for Xilinx<br />

was 13.96% before tax and 13.73% after tax. There would have been no material<br />

change in a restated Wacc.<br />

The last and probably the most important part of the prospective analysis was the<br />

forecasting of the financial statements. This all starts with expected sales growth. From<br />

our analysis we conclude that Xilinx will have a -1% growth rate for the 2009 year, but<br />

will steadily move up to a 6% growth rate in the year 2018. After the sales have been<br />

forecasted out the rest of the income statement using either prior year’s percentages of<br />

total sales or increase the account by the growth rate. The way of connecting the<br />

income statement to the balance sheet is through the asset turnover ratio. Using this<br />

ratio you can obtain total assets and forecast the majority of the balance sheet. For the<br />

cash flow statement, using the CFFO/Sales ratio will give you the CFFO on the cash flow<br />

11


statement. To find CFFI, Xilinx was different in how they used their cash to invest in<br />

different accounts, so we used a combination of change in plant property and<br />

equipment as well as research and development cost to calculate this account. We feel<br />

confident in our income statement forecast, but remain hesitant on the balance sheet<br />

due to the retained earnings and the cash flow statement because of the payment of<br />

dividends to shareholders is difficult to forecast.<br />

Valuation Executive Summary<br />

To estimate true equity value of a firm it is necessary to use both relative financial ratio<br />

valuation and intrinsic valuation models; the latter is much more complex and requires<br />

sophistication, while the former is a simpler alternative. Our valuation analysis attempts<br />

to estimate the correct market price as of November 3, 2008.<br />

Financial ratios are used relatively, via the method of comparables, in order to indicate<br />

over- or undervaluation. For firms to be comparable they must exhibit similar cash<br />

flows and business risk; we defined Xilinx competitors as the other specializedsemiconductor<br />

firms designing similar products, they are Altera, Actel, and Lattice<br />

Semiconductor. By comparing and subsequently ranking firms an industry average can<br />

be calculated; this benchmark is the basis for under- or overvaluation detection. Of the<br />

eight comparable ratios used, four indicated that Xilinx was undervalued, two indicated<br />

they were overvalued, one indicated fair value and one was thrown out. The mixed<br />

results do not provide an adequate amount of guidance and therefore did not greatly<br />

influence our valuation recommendation.<br />

The intrinsic valuation methods were used to estimate the true equity value of Xilinx<br />

through more complex quantitative modeling. These models do not depend on Xilinx’s<br />

comparability with its industry or competitors, but rather its individual circumstance and<br />

financial position. These models are considered more substantive, and therefore render<br />

a more accurate depiction of equity value than the relative valuation of financial ratios.<br />

All of our models agree and each estimated share price value fell below $17.62 (the<br />

observed price) by more than 15%, suggesting that Xilinx is overvalued. Sensitivity<br />

12


analysis was performed to gauge how different rate assumptions would manipulate the<br />

price. We illustrated our findings in tables which prove that the overvaluation is<br />

substantial and that many different rate assumptions yield the same overall result.<br />

Company Overview<br />

History<br />

Xilinx is a participant in the specialized-semiconductor industry. They are a global<br />

operation with headquarters in San Jose, California, Singapore, and Saggart, Ireland.<br />

Xilinx is a company that designs and markets programmable logic devices (PLD) which<br />

have many functions. Xilinx employs about 3,400 people and has over 21,000<br />

customers worldwide. The company was founded in 1984, by Ross Freedman, Bernie<br />

Vonderschmitt, and Jim Barnett. Xilinx "invented the field programmable gate array<br />

(FPGA) and [was] the first semiconductor company to establish the fabless<br />

manufacturing model. This model calls for outsourcing everything [except] design,<br />

marketing and support of products. Xilinx was the first to employ 180nm, 150nm,<br />

130nm, 90nm, and 65nm process technology and currently delivers approximately 90<br />

percent of all high-end 65nm FPGAs in the world” (www.xilinx.com). In order to<br />

appropriately hedge their portfolio risk Xilinx competes in a broad scope of end<br />

markets, including: communications, consumer and automotive, industrial, and data<br />

processing.<br />

Fundamentals<br />

The company is constantly involved in research and development "primarily directed<br />

towards the design of new IC’s, the development of new software design automation<br />

tools for hardware and embedded software, the design of IP cores of logic and the<br />

adoption of advanced semiconductor manufacturing processes for ongoing cost<br />

reductions, performance and signal integrity improvements and lowering power<br />

13


consumption. As a result of [Xilinx's] R&D efforts, [they] have introduced a number of<br />

new products during the past years including the Virtex-5 and Virtex-4 series of FPGAs,<br />

and the Spartan-3 FPGA series" (Company 10-k).<br />

Source: TD Ameritrade<br />

Xilinx has had significant market share of the PLD segment for the last five years.<br />

According to the Xilinx investor relations fact sheet, the company held a 49 percent<br />

market share in 2003 and currently holds 51 percent market share in 2008. Xilinx has<br />

outpaced the specialized semiconductor industry with a five year revenue growth rate<br />

of 9.76 percent (www.Xilinx.com). The figure above shows the 24.64 percent decline in<br />

Xilinx's stock price over a five year period; it is contrasted with a 33.09 percent decline<br />

in the Dow Jones Semiconductor Industry Index. Xilinx main competitors are, Altera,<br />

Lattice Semiconductor, and Actel. These three companies compete directly with the<br />

operations of Xilinx. All are in a continual race to design smaller IC’s that use less power<br />

and operate faster using a fabless manufacture of PLD’s and FPGA’s.<br />

14


Industry overview<br />

The specialized-semiconductor industry can be described as a group of firms who<br />

design, market-develop, and market semiconductor devices. A semiconductor is a solid<br />

substance (i.e. silicon) that has electrical conductivity. This industry began in the<br />

1960’s as making transistors for simple electronic devices and has grown into a 228<br />

billion dollar industry. One wall street journal article even stated "the semiconductor<br />

industry is still widely perceived to be a proxy for the state of the U.S. economy; the<br />

reality is that it's much more closely tied to the chip inventory cycle” (WSJ.com). Prior<br />

to the 1980’s the industry was vertically integrated and participated in the<br />

manufacturing process. The average pre-1980 firm was highly leveraged in the<br />

manufacturing wafers, which are a silicon based semiconductor used in the fabrication<br />

of integrated circuits. An integrated circuit (IC) is a miniaturized or microscopic electric<br />

circuit used in semiconductors. Post 1980 the industry discovered the important<br />

implications derived from <strong>Moore</strong>'s law. The law states that "the number of transistors<br />

that can be inexpensively placed on an integrated circuit has increased exponentially,<br />

doubling approximately every two years" (Harvard Business Review). In order to meet<br />

the expectation of customers (derived from <strong>Moore</strong>'s law) the industry spends a<br />

significant percentage of total sales on research and development (R&D). As a result of<br />

these large expenditures the business model for successful firms began to transform.<br />

Relevant competitors began to outsource their input costs from manufacturing<br />

semiconductors to focusing on market development, design, and marketing. The<br />

specialized-semiconductor industry became known for its fabless business model.<br />

Fabless companies lower fixed costs by outsourcing all manufacturing to fabricationspecific<br />

companies (Barrons).<br />

Wafer fabrication is merely a process of using the silicon wafers to build the integrated<br />

circuits. The industry has grown drastically through R&D and has continued to create<br />

innovative silicon products that are smaller and stronger than ever before. After a new<br />

product has completed the scientific manufacturing process, the chips (and thus<br />

15


semiconductors) will be ready for programming. At this junction manufacturers send<br />

the chips to fabless companies that specialize in programming these mechanisms with<br />

logic memory.<br />

To be absolutely explicit, fabless semiconductor companies are primarily focused on<br />

increasing the speed and efficiency of technologies associated with integrated<br />

circuits. Four main product types have developed into the industry's focal<br />

point. First, the memory chip. Memory chips serve as temporary storehouses of data<br />

and pass information to and from computer devices. The consolidation of the memory<br />

market continues, driving memory prices lower. The second type of product is called a<br />

microprocessor. Microprocessors are "central processing units that contain the basic<br />

logic to perform tasks. Intel's domination of the microprocessor segment has forced<br />

nearly all competitors, with the exception of Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), out of the<br />

mainstream market and into smaller niches or different segments altogether”<br />

(Investopedia). The third type of product companies focus on are commodity integrated<br />

circuits. These “chips” are produced in massive batches (implying a low profit margin,<br />

high volume strategy) for basic routine processing purposes. The market for<br />

commodity IC's is dominated by Asian companies who control the market share. The<br />

fourth and final type of product that the majority of the firms in the fabless business<br />

focus on is called system on chips (SOC’s). A SOC is an IC with an entire<br />

programmable system already on the IC. “The market revolves around growing<br />

demand for consumer products that combine new features and lower prices. With the<br />

doors to the memory, microprocessor and commodity integrated circuit markets tightly<br />

shut, the SOC segment is arguably the only one left with enough opportunity to attract<br />

a wide range of companies” (Investopedia). Firms within this industry rely on these<br />

four types of products when producing and generating revenue for their company.<br />

Overlooking the industry, it has shown over time that the growth is strictly cyclical and<br />

fluctuates on a tri-annual basis. The graph below examines historical data pertaining to<br />

a more broadly defined semiconductor market. It is relevant because the specializedsemiconductor<br />

industry tends to mirror growth in the overall market.<br />

16


The drivers for this cyclicality are consumer electronics/computer demand,<br />

overcapacity, and inventory burn. The demand for consumer products can play a big<br />

part in this phenomenon as evidenced through basic supply-and-demand economics.<br />

However, the most influential driver is overcapacity. The constant demand for updated<br />

cost efficient technology generates obsolete inventory quickly, creating a surplus of<br />

soon to be out-of-date products.<br />

The semiconductor industry has grown tremendously since the 1960’s due to a strong<br />

consumer demand for new and improved electronic devices. In order to satisfy <strong>Moore</strong>'s<br />

law a significant percentage of revenue is devoted to R&D expenditures. Relevant<br />

competitors (those with business continuity) constantly develop and manage costs, new<br />

manufacturing processes, and R&D expenditures. The Wall Street Journal stated that<br />

for a company to remain relevant “each new generation of manufacturing technology<br />

produced must contain smaller circuits and chips that can run faster, use less power<br />

17


and shrink into smaller spaces” (MercuryNews.com). Innovative chips are achieved as<br />

a result of significant R&D expenditures.<br />

Additionally, it is critical for industry demand and growth to be driven by<br />

customers/industries not susceptible to being phased out of the global economy. This<br />

should not be confused with the natural evolution that takes place when cutting-edge<br />

technology improves operation efficiency, thus creating job loss. Historical industry<br />

growth is a product of the evolution of technology. Post-tech bubble data manifests a<br />

slowing growth model dependent upon R&D for sustainability. However, regardless of<br />

technical analysis the industry has a natural cycle of oscillation that we believe is<br />

sustainable into foreseeable future. This variance explains our forecast for industry<br />

growth (resulting from R&D) which is forecasted later in our analysis.<br />

Five Forces Model<br />

The five forces analysis was created by Harvard graduate Michael E. Porter. Analysis of<br />

this model allows firms to better understand the industry in which they operate and<br />

how to capitalize on varying degrees of competition that exist. The model<br />

demonstrates how industries are influenced by the following five forces: bargaining<br />

power of customers, bargaining power of suppliers, threat of new entrants, threat of<br />

substitute products, and the rivalry amongst existing competitors. When used<br />

diagnostically these forces can help prescribe how lucrative an industry could potentially<br />

be. The model is illustrated below.<br />

18


Source: Yahoo! Images<br />

Industries can compete on one of two general platforms, either price or product<br />

differentiation. Competitors in the specialized-semiconductor industry, fabless<br />

companies, can only compete on product differentiation. The industry's average R&D<br />

expenditures are so large that it would impede growth to compete on price.<br />

The five forces analysis quantifies the ability and perceived likelihood of a new company<br />

to enter into an industry. Industries that have abnormal profits are susceptible to<br />

attracting new entrants. Typically profits begin to level out as new entrants start to<br />

acquire market share. Barriers that limit access to new entrants are governmental,<br />

patents or proprietary knowledge, scale/learning economies and excess capacity.<br />

The threat of substitute products analysis estimates the economic incentive buyers have<br />

to switch products. Factors going into product substitution are the buyers switching<br />

cost and the relative price and performance between the two products.<br />

The bargaining power of customers helps define who has pricing leverage. Whoever<br />

has the bargaining power also has pricing leverage. Some of the factors that can<br />

influence this force are buyer volume, number of buyers, switching cost, and product<br />

differentiation.<br />

19


The bargaining power of suppliers mirrors the bargaining power of customers, except it<br />

focuses on the supply side. A supplier can influence price when suppliers are<br />

concentrated, have high switching cost among suppliers, and/or have low amount of<br />

substitute inputs.<br />

The chart below is a collection of our analytical findings.<br />

Competitive Force<br />

Rivalry Among Existing Firms<br />

Threat of New Entrants<br />

Threat of Substitute Products<br />

Bargaining Power of Customers<br />

Bargaining Power of Suppliers<br />

Degree of Competition<br />

High<br />

Low<br />

High<br />

Low<br />

Moderate<br />

Rivalry Among Existing Firms<br />

In the specialized-semiconductor industry average profitability is primarily influenced by<br />

the competition exhibited by rivals. The intensity of competition is affected by several<br />

factors, which we explore below. The following analysis supports our belief that the<br />

rivalry among existing firms is high.<br />

Industry Growth Rate<br />

The following chart forecasts a slowing growth rate for the specialized-semiconductor<br />

industry (www.hoovers.com). Keep in mind that these forward looking estimates are<br />

difficult to accurately predict, even if the industry leaders are in agreement with the<br />

analysis.<br />

20


Sales of semiconductor products are highly dependent upon demand from the<br />

computer industry and makers of telecommunications products. Threat of an<br />

encroaching recession will deteriorate prospective growth for such a dependent<br />

industry. However, due to the fact that this industry is cyclical it is important that we<br />

examine long-term (historical) data trends.<br />

“The Semiconductor International Association (SIA) provides information on worldwide<br />

chip sales from 1982 through 2005 on its website. Taking a look at the data shows that<br />

there has definitely been a slowdown in the growth rate. During the years 1982 through<br />

1994, chip revenues grew at a compounded rate of 17.9% per year. Since 1994,<br />

however, the growth rate has been much slower -- only 7.6% per year. These numbers<br />

are confirmed by market research firm IC Insights, which states that revenue growth<br />

over the 20-year period from 1973 to 1993 was 17%. From 1993 to 2003 the growth<br />

rate slowed down to just 8%” (www.hoovers.com). Conscious consumers know that<br />

the average selling price of chips is continually declining and chip capabilities are<br />

continually increasing (<strong>Moore</strong>’s Law).<br />

At this point it is important to determine whether the declining revenue growth rate is a<br />

result of plummeting prices or slowing growth in the number of chips sold. We believe<br />

that the answer is a combination of both issues. Profitability is exceptionally vulnerable<br />

to declines (in the short-term) because the current economic outlook is<br />

slightly softening the demand for semiconductor products. This is a direct result of<br />

consumers requiring low-cost products and declining output potential (sales demand).<br />

21


However, industry growth is not dependent upon one national economy.<br />

Semiconductor products have successfully been integrated into the global economy,<br />

and in fact are one of the technological products that made globalization possible.<br />

Strong future growth prospects for an industry decreases rivalry among incumbent<br />

firms because competitors need not gain market share in order to grow. Reciprocally,<br />

weak growth forecasts increase rivalry among incumbents. For this reason, we<br />

conclude that current forecasts for the specialized-semiconductor industry lends<br />

towards a significant rivalry.<br />

Concentration and Balance of Competitors<br />

To gain a better understand of the competitive landscape Xilinx participates in we need<br />

to develop a thorough understanding of who their direct competitors are, the size of the<br />

over-all industry, the market capitalization of each major competitor, and an accurate<br />

description of how market share is distributed amongst all competitors.<br />

The size of the industry does not distract large semiconductor firms from specializing.<br />

Xilinx specializes in the design, development, and marketing of complete programmable<br />

logic solutions. Although the semiconductor industry includes hundreds of firms,<br />

fragmentation is created through specialization. The major competitors faced by Xilinx<br />

include: Actel Corporation, Altera Corporation, and Lattice Semiconductor Corporation.<br />

Each company compete to design and market the next fastest most efficient and<br />

smallest advanced integrated circuit. These companies achieve this through the<br />

manipulation of the geometry of the circuits whereby increasing the performance of the<br />

next generation of product. Actel and Lattice Semiconductor have mid-market caps of<br />

$211.46M and $180.09M, respectively. These companies better represent the industry<br />

average-market cap of $362.2M. Xilinx and Altera have large-market caps of $4.942B<br />

and $4.519, respectively. These two companies are to be considered the most<br />

significant and relevant competitors.<br />

22


The most important component of concentration analysis is the distribution of market<br />

share. This information, in combination with industry growth expectations, is crucial in<br />

determining long-term sustainability and profitability. The following chart is available<br />

on Xilinx website and provides valuable market share information.<br />

Industry concentration influences whether direct rivals compete on price or product<br />

differentiation. The preceding chart suggests that the industry is dominated by Xilinx,<br />

thus giving them a significant cost/price advantage. However, thorough analysis of the<br />

industry dictates that competition is inherently derived from differentiation. Xilinx<br />

states clearly in their 10-K that “success depends in large part on [their] ability to<br />

develop and introduce new products that address customer requirements and compete<br />

effectively on the basis of price, density, functionality, power consumption, and<br />

performance.” High concentration creates a pricing power similar in nature to a<br />

monopoly. We believe that this industry has a high concentration, which decreases the<br />

amount of rivalry present.<br />

23


Degree of Differentiation<br />

Effective differentiation is a result of large investments in research and development.<br />

Industry standards demand fast time-to-market and volume production, and high<br />

flexibility for every product introduced. In attaining differentiation companies must<br />

contemporaneously meet industry standards while introducing innovative products that<br />

are consistently reliable. Support staffing (sales and customer service) must<br />

demonstrate the expertise and enthusiasm of the firm/products they represent.<br />

Recently, rapidly increasing processing needs have become more important to end<br />

users. The long-term future is bright for companies who can satisfy their processstarved<br />

customers.<br />

Switching Costs<br />

Switching costs are exaggerated by large R&D investments. However, differentiation is<br />

impossible without significant R&D costs. Thus, to achieve differentiation a company<br />

must accept the high switching costs that result from R&D expenditures. This<br />

contributes to the high degree of rivalry in the specialized-semiconductor industry.<br />

Learning Economies<br />

There is a steep learning curve in the specialized-semiconductor industry. This creates<br />

a significant barrier to entry as well as added incentive to aggressively seek market<br />

share.<br />

Scale Economies<br />

Small cap companies are disadvantaged when they lack the capacity to participate in<br />

scale economies. However, fabless companies (which outsource the fabrication of their<br />

devices) can more readily exploit scale economies with less capital by utilizing<br />

semiconductor foundries (semiconductor manufacturers). However, access to scale<br />

economies is limited by the capital intensiveness, due to R&D, of the industry. These<br />

factors result in an emphasis on size, creating an incentive to engage in an aggressive<br />

24


pursuit for market share. Thus, we conclude that the degree of rivalry is increased via<br />

scale/learning economies.<br />

Ratio of Fixed to Variable Costs<br />

A high fixed-to-variable cost ratio means there is incentive to reduce price and utilize<br />

installed capacity. We have reason to believe that this industry has a high ratio as a<br />

result of massive amounts of R&D expenditures. We therefore believe that the above<br />

factors increase the degree of rivalry in the industry.<br />

Excess Capacity<br />

Excess capacity creates an incentive for competitors to reduce prices and utilize<br />

installed capacity. However, in the specialized-semiconductor industry, where demand<br />

for innovation is so great, excess capacity has yet to be the source of reduced prices.<br />

The demand for new and improved products has remained consistently high, even<br />

when sales growth is slowing. Large investments in research and development are a<br />

direct result of the lack of excess capacity in this fast-paced industry.<br />

Exit Barriers<br />

Exit barriers tend to be high due to the large amount of specialized assets. These<br />

characteristics increase rivalry. These characteristics deter companies from wanting to<br />

leave the market because the sale of highly specialized assets is difficult, this increases<br />

the competitors incentive an industry to remain competitive so the firm does not risk<br />

massive losses at liquidation.<br />

Conclusion<br />

When considering the above rivalry analysis overall, we conclude that the rivalry among<br />

incumbent firms is high. Taking in the fact that this specialized industry is constantly<br />

competing for market share and trying to balance the research and development cost<br />

25


with creating new, smaller, and faster chips to generate profit to meet these cost has a<br />

turned this niche in this industry to be highly competitive.<br />

Threat of New Entrants<br />

The threat of new entrants entering a market can greatly affect an existing company’s<br />

market share and profit. The prospect of making abnormal profits attracts new<br />

entrants into an industry. The fewer barriers to entry that exist, the more likely it is<br />

that a firm can enter the market, therefore increasing the level of competition. The key<br />

factors that determine the degree to which new entrants will try to enter the industry<br />

are as follows: economies of scale, first mover advantage, channels of distribution and<br />

relationships, and legal barriers. Taking all of the factors into consideration, the threat<br />

of a new entrant into the semiconductor industry is relatively low.<br />

Economies of Scale<br />

Large economies of scale make it very difficult for new entrants to compete in an<br />

industry. The more assets a firm has, the greater the firm’s ability to take advantage of<br />

economies of scale. The following chart shows each competitor's total assets from<br />

2004 to 2008.<br />

Total Assets (in millions)<br />

2004<br />

2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx $2,937 $3,039 $3,173 $3,139 $3,137<br />

Altera $1,488 $1,763 $1,823 $2,234 $1,770<br />

Actel $320 $318 $343 $369 $364<br />

Lattice $852 $811 $715 $726 $376<br />

26


A company that has economies of scale drives down the average cost per unit through<br />

increased production, which also decreases fixed cost per unit. When fabricationspecific<br />

semiconductor companies achieve economies of scale fabless companies benefit<br />

from a lower cost per unit. The lower cost per unit can lend too many advantages (i.e.<br />

high profit margins). However, the economic barrier (billions of dollars in start-up<br />

capital) to fabrication decreases the threat of new entrants to manufacturing, which<br />

limits fabless outsourcing potential and places an artificial floor on unit cost. Increased<br />

rivalry amongst fabrication-specific firms could dramatically decrease cost for fabless<br />

companies and increase distribution channels. The two largest fabless companies in the<br />

industry, Xilinx and Altera, currently have a combined market segment share of 85<br />

percent of PLD sales. The two largest fabless companies in the industry, Xilinx and<br />

Altera, currently have a combined market segment share of 85 percent of PLD sales.<br />

Fabless companies do not inherently have great barriers to gaining economies of scale<br />

through production because outsourcing is available via fabrication-specific<br />

semiconductor firms. Thus, we conclude that the barriers to economies of scale are<br />

moderate.<br />

First Mover Advantage<br />

First mover advantage is the advantage gained by the initial occupant of a market<br />

segment. Successors are initially playing catch up because established companies have<br />

a larger resource/customer base and have been designing innovative products longer.<br />

The risk faced by first movers is compensated by the opportunity to develop brand<br />

loyalty and recognition.<br />

In a learning economy the initial firms to enter the industry will have a cost advantage<br />

after they have established relationships with suppliers and distributors. A new<br />

entrant’s ability to accumulate viable resources and a competitive edge is not easily<br />

attainable. When an industry (i.e. specialized-semiconductors) has a significant first<br />

mover advantage, the threat of new entrants is reduced. The specialized-<br />

27


semiconductor industry is a mirror image of this theory in practice. The threat of new<br />

entrants has been greatly reduced because of the first mover advantage gained by all<br />

firms in the industry.<br />

Access to Channels of Distribution and Relationships<br />

Another potential problem for new entrants is gaining access to channels of<br />

distribution. “Limited capacity in the existing distribution channels and high costs of<br />

developing new channels can act as powerful barriers to entry” (Text 2-4). The fabless<br />

business model allows for new entrants to remain competitive through outsourcing.<br />

However, as mentioned earlier, the high barriers to entering the fabrication community<br />

minimizes the overall manufacturing capacity. Thus, contracts with suppliers become<br />

extremely important for fabless companies. One example of this would be Xilinx<br />

contract with United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC). Their strategy with the<br />

company is to negotiate new contracts every two years in order to set new prices and<br />

quantity amounts for their company. This is important because minimized capacity of<br />

fabrication and contractual barriers create extremely difficult hurdles, thus decreasing<br />

the threat of new entrants.<br />

Legal Barriers<br />

In the semiconductor industry it is very important to protect intellectual property rights<br />

that prevent new entrants from obtaining proprietary information. Industry leaders<br />

hold as many as 1,800 patents relating to their products. In the specializedsemiconductor<br />

industry failure to protect intellectual property rights and trade secrets<br />

will result in a diminished bottom line. Patents and copyrights help establish companies<br />

and impede competitive growth stemming from new entrants. This industry spends an<br />

average of 20 percent of total sales on research and development, further justifying<br />

why copyrights and patents are so important to the industry. However, exceptions do<br />

exist. For example, from 2001-2006 Xilinx and Lattice sold the privilege of using certain<br />

28


intellectual property to Altera (Altera 10-k). When the top three competitors share<br />

intellectual property the competitive disadvantage aggregated to new entrants is<br />

significant, once again contributing to the decreasing threat presented by new entrants.<br />

Conclusion<br />

The semiconductor industry is very difficult for new entrants to successfully enter. The<br />

industry tends to be capital intensive, and in times of difficult fundraising this fact alone<br />

makes entering the industry near impossible. First movers to the industry have the<br />

ability to set industry standards and to develop relations with distributors; both of which<br />

has been achieved by Xilinx. Although the cost associated with developing new<br />

channels of distribution is relatively low, the risk of attaining these channels is high due<br />

to lack of capacity and contractual agreements. Thus, we conclude that the threat of<br />

new entrants into the specialized-semiconductor industry is low.<br />

Threat of Substitute Products<br />

When looking at the threat of substitute products in the specialized-semiconductor<br />

industry, one has to consider what would make a customer switch between products<br />

that essentially perform the same function. Price and performance are two of the most<br />

relevant factors when considering the threat of substitute products in this industry.<br />

Arguably the industry's most important products, PLDs, are inputs for a final product in<br />

the electronics industry. Therefore, vast amounts of products are developed by other<br />

companies that perform programmable logic, these include: field programmable gate<br />

arrays (FPGA), complex programmable logic devices (CLPD), and application specific<br />

integrated circuits (ASCI). This industry also has significant threat of product<br />

obsolescence, whereby a company could produce an alternative product that performs<br />

the same function faster and at a cheaper price, creating an attractive substitute. So<br />

for a developer of programmable logic the threat of substitute products is high.<br />

29


Relative Price and Performance<br />

In the broadly defined electronics industry there are primarily two strategies that exist.<br />

The first is cost leadership (providing the lowest cost to the consumer); and the second<br />

is product differentiation (providing a product of superior quality or variety). The<br />

PLD market incorporates to both perspectives of competitive strategy. However,<br />

recently there has been a decline in companies that provide low-cost-low-performance<br />

machines, because the price of technology has decrease substantially, allowing for a<br />

greater number of consumers to gain access to better performing products. The<br />

demand for companies to produce increasingly high-tech products increases the<br />

demand for faster, smaller, and cheaper inputs to produce these end products.<br />

Therefore, designers of PLD's have to achieve a balance between price and<br />

performance. If a buyer of these inputs perceives the price to be too high, relative to<br />

the performance, they are more willing to seek out a lower cost provider if the next<br />

best alterative will suffice. For companies who compete purely on differentiation, a<br />

superior input is the only choice when creating a product that emphasizes quality. In<br />

these situations the perceive price paid for a superior product is not as critical to end<br />

users. We conclude that relative price and performance contributes to the large threat<br />

presented by substitute products.<br />

Customers willingness to Switch<br />

In an “industry that is intensely competitive and characterized by rapid technological<br />

change, increasing levels of integration, product obsolescence and continuous price<br />

erosion,” the threat of substitute products is a reality (Xilinx company 10-k). The<br />

industry faces reverse engineering and new product development constantly, but wards<br />

off negative effects through extensive patents and licensing. Many customers seek out<br />

both the lowest price and best performance, and will switch between suppliers<br />

frequently in search of cutting-edge technology. Buyers in this industry are not inhibited<br />

30


y high switching costs. The low switching cost for end users lends to a significant<br />

threat of substitute products.<br />

Conclusion<br />

To remain competitive firms need to develop a strategy that will prevent customers’<br />

willingness to switch between suppliers. Industry competitors must strike a balance<br />

between price and performance when switching costs are low. Sustainability is attained<br />

by investing in R&D and protection of intellectual property. However, it seems<br />

impossible to mitigate the significant threat faced by substitute products.<br />

Bargaining Power of Customers<br />

When assessing the bargaining power of customers it is essential to first define the<br />

customer base. The relevant competitors in the specialized-semiconductor industry,<br />

according to their annual reports, agree that their customer base includes the following<br />

industries:<br />

· Communications<br />

· Consumer<br />

· Industrial, Scientific and Medical<br />

· Audio, Video and Broadcast<br />

· Automotive<br />

· Defense and Aerospace<br />

· Data Processing<br />

These end markets deal with primarily distributors, wholesalers, and some independent<br />

sales representatives. Each end market can be divided into separate subsections who<br />

eventually will be a beneficiary of our product and but not necessarily our customers.<br />

The customers are those four main end markets that each of the main competitors in<br />

this industry categorize in their 10-K’s. As a specialized semiconductor industry, it is<br />

crucial to develop relationships between firms and their customers.<br />

31


In this industry, the customers of these high end products realize that this field takes<br />

some expertise causing a small substitution differential. The specialized semiconductor<br />

industry is a highly competitive market with low concentration of corporations<br />

competing for similar quantities of the market share. This industry is a highly<br />

competitive market when you leave the United States and go into the global market.<br />

Globally, the industry deals with international companies that have big research<br />

development industries pertaining to integrated circuit markets such as: China, Japan,<br />

and Britain. The bargaining power of the customers/buyers can go into more detail by<br />

three elements of analyzing the company and industry: price sensitivity, relative<br />

bargaining power and customer switching costs.<br />

Price Sensitivity<br />

Typically, buyers’ are more price sensitive when the product is undifferentiated and not<br />

many switching costs. Buyers sensitivity can also depend on the products’ own cost<br />

structure. Furthermore, “the importance of the product to the buyers’ own product<br />

quality also determines whether or not price becomes the most important determinant<br />

of the buying decision.” (Palepu and Healy)<br />

Buyers of this industry are very sensitive to quality because the value added to these<br />

products are cost demanding and customizable. There is a high degree of<br />

product/service differentiation in this industry. The creation of customer value also<br />

creates (to a degree) customer dependency. Having a patent in this industry should be<br />

a requirement because it identifies the product – firm relationships for the buyers to<br />

appreciate and use as a name brand type of market. Overall, the industry contains low<br />

price sensitivity.<br />

Relative Bargaining Power<br />

Relative bargaining power is determined by whether the product is a commodity or a<br />

high end product. This is a big factor for the customers when they take into<br />

32


consideration the leverage they have on competitive advantage. This means that if<br />

there are alternative products then the customer has bargaining power with the firm<br />

and the industry. In this case, the specialized-semiconductor industry has the control<br />

of the bargaining power which gives the customers a low bargaining power against this<br />

industry. The products provided in this industry are critical for customers’ business<br />

continuity, and therefore diminishes the relative bargaining power of buyers. When<br />

comparing the relativity of the four end markets that these industries compete; each of<br />

the markets contain an importance level which puts the customers under strict<br />

negotiation room for price. Those end markets can’t bargain price very much because<br />

they need this industry to provide its products; the end markets will pay the product<br />

price. This industry can dictate the prices of their products just because they control<br />

over half of the market share.<br />

The number of suppliers in this industry is relatively high when you compare the major<br />

buyers (distributors/original equipment manufacturers) who contain most of the market<br />

share. Some of the major industry competitors are: Xilinx, Altera, Actel and Lattice.<br />

While some of the buyers are: Avnet Inc., Arrow Electronics and privately owned<br />

companies. Due to vast amount of companies that this industry deals with they have a<br />

minimum requirement of shipments for each load. They also make strong long term<br />

relationships that will hold in the future.<br />

Customer Switching Costs<br />

The ability for a customer to switch products is a common threat in most competitive<br />

markets. As for the specialized-semiconductor industry, that theme is definitely not the<br />

case; this industry is a high end market with highly specialized products used to create<br />

programmable logic devices. The switching costs are extremely large. Each product<br />

costs are high and are not a commodity but a high end necessity giving the firm all the<br />

power for customer/buyer bargaining power and limits their switching capabilities.<br />

33


Conclusion<br />

We conclude that low price sensitivity and large customer switching costs contribute to<br />

low customer bargaining power. The market sets price. As for the main incentive of<br />

this market, it would be the high research based technology programmable logic<br />

devices with the best quality out on the market. The industry does not leave much<br />

wiggle room for price adjustments since the demand for industry products is high.<br />

Bargaining Power of Suppliers<br />

The factors discussed when defining the bargaining power of customers mirror the<br />

issues analyzed on the supply side. Industries with few suppliers will have to become<br />

price takers, which can give rise to major operation costs. Suppliers achieve high<br />

bargaining power by having a differentiated product, high switching cost, and/or an<br />

indispensible service. A supplier with high bargaining power can decide cost, quantity,<br />

and even delivery terms for the industry. However, a supplier with relatively low<br />

bargaining power has little influence over price and quantity. Suppliers in this situation<br />

have many competitors. We conclude that the bargaining power of suppliers in the<br />

specialized-semiconductor industry is low.<br />

Price Sensitivity<br />

Price sensitivity of fabless firms to the fees charged by fabrication-specific firms plays a<br />

major role in defining which party has negotiating power. Price sensitivity, as discussed<br />

in the preceding section, is increased when switching costs are low. Additionally, we<br />

believe that these low switching costs are sustainable through bi-annual contract<br />

renewal. We have concluded that, due to the large number of firms participating in the<br />

fabrication process, switching costs for fabless companies is low. The ability to seek the<br />

low-cost provider increases their sensitivity to price, thus strengthening the fabless<br />

companies bargaining power and decreasing the bargaining power of suppliers.<br />

34


Relative Bargaining Power<br />

Suppliers in this industry have relatively low bargaining power. With undifferentiated<br />

products and many competitors in the fabrication-specific semiconductor industry these<br />

supply firms have little negotiation power. As a result, many fabless firms do not enter<br />

into long term contracts with suppliers. The lack of long term contractual obligation<br />

creates intrinsic value for fabless firms by keeping low-cost options open and avoiding<br />

high switching cost. Switching cost is relatively low for this industry because of the<br />

many suppliers and undifferentiated products supplied to these firms. However, some<br />

of these suppliers do offer high tech wafers for R&D activities. In the case of<br />

specialized products the suppliers bargaining power increases.<br />

Conclusion<br />

Bargaining power over suppliers is crucial in lowing input cost for fabless products. The<br />

suppliers are numerous and a majority of the products offered are undifferentiated.<br />

They do offer some highly specialized products for R&D activities which increase<br />

supplier bargaining power. For these reasons the suppliers for the semiconductor<br />

industry have moderately low bargaining power.<br />

Industry Analysis<br />

The goal of any firm in an industry is to maintain some type of sustainable competitive<br />

advantage. Firms achieve this through a hybrid mixture of two strategies. First is cost<br />

leadership, which is experienced by a company that provides similar products to their<br />

competitors but at a lower cost. To produce at a lower cost results in lower prices<br />

without necessarily decreasing profit margins. This strategy, when used effectively, can<br />

mangle a competitor’s bottom line. Companies achieve cost leadership through<br />

economies of scale, simpler product designs, lowering distribution cost, and/or efficient<br />

production. The other strategy to sustaining a competitive advantage is through<br />

35


product/service differentiation. A differentiation strategy occurs when companies supply<br />

a product to an industry that is unique. Firms can do this by having superior product<br />

quality or variety, more flexible delivery, or investing in research and development. By<br />

using these two strategies companies can achieve value in their industry and in turn try<br />

to maximize shareholder wealth. This industry’s primary focus is on differentiation but<br />

they cannot dismiss the importance of cost management.<br />

Economies of Scale<br />

Economies of scale occur when the cost per unit decrease as a result of increased<br />

output. Fabrication-specific companies achieve large scale economies by purchasing<br />

raw material in large batch quantities (Actel 10-K). Fabrication-specific firms narrow<br />

their list of suppliers, rather than purchasing raw materials from numerous suppliers, in<br />

order to receive purchasing discounts, and ultimately increasing their scale economies.<br />

The fabless companies on the other hand can achieve economies of scale in two ways.<br />

Manufacturing companies can achieve economies of scale by making chips smaller or by<br />

making the wafers bigger, thereby reducing per unit cost. United Microelectronics<br />

Corporation (UMC) stated that their “future capacity expansion plans will focus on 12-<br />

inch wafer facilities in order to maintain [their] technology leadership. 12-inch wafers<br />

offer manufacturing advantages over 8-inch wafers because of the greater number of<br />

chips on each wafer. In addition, 12-inch wafer facilities present a more cost-effective<br />

solution in achieving an economic scale of production. They intend to carefully monitor<br />

current market conditions in order to optimize the timing of their capital spending”<br />

(UMC 20-F). By switching from 8-inch wafers to 12-inch, a company can make twice as<br />

many chips, and the cost of doing this only 20% more (www.ndu.edu). Economies of<br />

scale play a substantial role in this industry, and developing new ways to low lower<br />

input cost can be a driving force to which company can sustain a competitive<br />

advantage.<br />

36


Superior Product Quality<br />

The quality of products can play a major role in how long companies can last in the<br />

specialized-semiconductor industry. Providing sub-par products to customers will<br />

eventually lead to the loss of a contract and declining credibility. Many companies now<br />

are trying to achieve International Organization for Standardization (ISO) certifications<br />

(quality standards) for their industry to show their customers that they can meet their<br />

quality needs. Under their risk analysis section of their 10-K, Xilinx emphasizes the<br />

need to maintain product integrity.<br />

“Product defects or other performance problems could result in the delay<br />

or loss of market acceptance of our products and would likely harm our<br />

business. Our customers could also seek damages from us for their<br />

losses.” -Xilinx 10-K<br />

Recently, Nvidia Corp had to pay up to $196 million dollars out of their cash reserves to<br />

cover dysfunctional products purchased by their customers (WSJ). Another example<br />

(emphasizing the importance of product quality) is from Xilinx’s 2007 annual report. In<br />

the report they state that “a product liability claim brought against [them], even if<br />

unsuccessful, would likely be time-consuming and costly to defend… Any product<br />

liability claim, whether or not determined in [their] favor, could result in significant<br />

expense, divert the efforts of [their] technical and management personnel, and harm<br />

[their] business” (Xilinx 10-k). Companies take these risks seriously and are constantly<br />

trying to meet customer specifications in hope of mitigating these threats.<br />

Superior product variety<br />

The ramifications of product diversification on long-term business continuity are<br />

significant. Transferring risk across different markets lends to profit sustainability. The<br />

graphs below show the end-use markets for the semiconductor industry from 1996-<br />

37


2008. The computer sector is by far the most dominate and companies should still<br />

strive to have a variety of their products in this sector.<br />

Source: www.wikinvest.com/industry/Semiconductor_Foundry#Fabless_Semiconductor_Companies<br />

After dissecting economic trends of the specialized-semiconductor industry, we conclude<br />

that the demand for quality and innovative products is high; however, the recently<br />

lagging economic growth has decreased the level of output of the industry. This<br />

basically means that consumers have continued to have high standards, even when<br />

they are buying lower volumes of products. Future growth of these business-tobusiness<br />

transactions is dependent on the American, European and Asian economies.<br />

Investment in Research and Development<br />

The top priority of R&D is market development. R&D teams focus on finding different<br />

applications in new markets of the same product. Xilinx, for example, has recently<br />

begun researching how they could get involved in the "green" market by studying solar<br />

panel energy transformation.<br />

Additionally, Research and Development teams in the semiconductor industry have the<br />

difficult task of keeping pace with <strong>Moore</strong>’s Law. The prevailing opinion of the<br />

specialized-semiconductor industry is explained by Lattice Semiconductor’s in their 2007<br />

annual report; they state that “the [specialized] semiconductor industry is intensely<br />

38


competitive and characterized by rapid rates of technological change, product<br />

obsolescence and price erosion."<br />

In order to keep up with the rapid technological progress in this industry firms must<br />

expend considerable amounts of capital on R&D especially to acquire the human capital<br />

necessary to keep pace with <strong>Moore</strong>’s law. Companies that fail to recognize this<br />

phenomenon will have products that become obsolete. Nevertheless companies still<br />

spend a great deal of money on R&D as evident by IBM investing 1 billion to expand a<br />

chip plant. The Wall Street Journal recently published an article that discussed how<br />

IBM is investing in nanotechnology to make smaller and faster chips. The exploration<br />

of the technology field seems boundless. The following graph compares key accounting<br />

information presented on the income statements of the relevant rivals.<br />

Net Sales Research and Development Research and<br />

Development as a<br />

percentage of net sales<br />

Xilinx $1,841,372 $358,063 19.4%<br />

Altera $1,263,548 $265,581 21%<br />

Lattice $228,709 $82,977 36.3%<br />

Actel $197,043 $63,726 32.3%<br />

* In thousands,<br />

*A further analysis of sales and research & development will be explained in detail during the forecast<br />

income statement/balance sheet.<br />

The ratio of research and development to sales shows that the smaller the sales are for<br />

a company the greater the ratio of research and development to sales required to<br />

compete. According to Investopedia, the higher the percentage of sales spent on<br />

research and development, the more opportunities available to develop new chip<br />

39


products. However, the advantage in this industry is not derived from the percentage<br />

spent on R&D but on the total amount spent.<br />

More Flexible Delivery<br />

A company in the semiconductor industry that has a flexible delivery schedule will have<br />

a competitive advantage over companies that fail to deliver to the consumer timely.<br />

Through the use of a network of distributors, a direct sales force, independent sales<br />

representatives, and electronic distributors, companies in this industry sell products<br />

worldwide. “For the fiscal year ended December 28, 2007, worldwide sales through<br />

distributors for subsequent resale to OEMs or their subcontract manufacturers<br />

accounted for 94% of total sales” (Altera 10k). Companies in this industry have main<br />

distributors that account for a large portion of their sales. For example, Arrow<br />

Electronics, the largest distributor for Altera, is responsible for 45 percent of total sales<br />

in 2007 and Avnet Inc. has accounted for at least 60 percent of total sales for Xilinx<br />

over the past three years. According to Lattice the majority of sales are made through<br />

distributors, which can provide a cost-effective way to reach a broad range of<br />

customers while providing efficient logistics service as well. Firms in the semiconductor<br />

industry have regional distributors close to customers throughout the world allowing for<br />

quicker delivery. The more flexible delivery provided by firms in the semiconductor<br />

industry, the greater the potential to gain a competitive advantage because they are<br />

able to reach more customers. Delayed delivery of products can lead to lost sales,<br />

decreased profits and weaker competitive position.<br />

Conclusion<br />

Differentiation is the main strategy that the specialized-semiconductor industry focuses<br />

on when creating a competitive advantage. Companies need to focus on superior<br />

product quality or variety, more flexible delivery, or investing in research and<br />

development in order to achieve this competitive advantage. Cost leadership can also<br />

40


e important when focusing on attaining the lowest input cost possible. Successful<br />

companies compete with a hybrid strategy, incorporating both into its competitive<br />

advantage.<br />

Value Creation Analysis<br />

Xilinx competes in a highly competitive industry with multiple end-markets. They<br />

employ a combination of competitive strategies in order to create value. Dominate firms<br />

balance their strategy by investing in certain aspects of their business<br />

effectively. Diligently improving economies of scale, product quality and variety, access<br />

to distribution and research and development all contribute to a firm’s value.<br />

Economies of Scale<br />

A scale economy is simply the measure of how large a company has to be in order to<br />

succeed in an industry. A large economy of scale translates in to lower per-unit cost and<br />

higher output. Xilinx produces "PLD’s which are standard components. This means that<br />

the same device type can be sold to many different users for many different<br />

applications. As a result, the development cost of PLDs can be spread over a large<br />

number of users” (Xilinx 10-k). This provides an advantage over application specific<br />

standard products (ASSP) because with a greater degree of customization there is<br />

generally “less flexibility, requiring longer fabrication lead times and higher up-front<br />

costs than PLDs” (Xilinx 10-k). The Xilinx business model allows for large economies of<br />

scale by mass producing a variety of undifferentiated products in order to reduce cost<br />

and increase capacity.<br />

Superior Product Quality<br />

The two functions that end markets regard as contributing the most to overall device<br />

quality are processing speed and power usage. This complies with <strong>Moore</strong>’s Law. As<br />

integrated circuits get smaller there processing speed goes up and their power<br />

consumption goes down. Therefore, in order for Xilinx to differentiate themselves from<br />

their competitors they must have a higher level of product quality. Greater product<br />

quality can create demand, gain market share and sustain value for their product. Xilinx<br />

41


has consistently pioneered and championed innovative products. For example, Xilinx<br />

was the first to introduce 90nm and 65nm technology, providing a low cost per logic<br />

cell (Xilinx 10-K).<br />

However, innovative rivals have their share of successes. For example, Altera recently<br />

outpaced Xilinx in the race to design the next smallest field programmable gate array<br />

(FPGA). This device according to Altera, is 40nm creating a 35% faster processing<br />

speed and uses 50% less power. This could greatly affect Xilinx's net revenue and<br />

market share.<br />

Superior Product Variety<br />

Programmable logic devices are inherently designed to be flexible in application. The<br />

programmability of these devices lends to greater utility by customers. PLD’s can be<br />

developed for numerous end-markets. Xilinx addresses the specific needs of their<br />

customers by developing a variety of products that cater to a large spectrum of endmarkets.<br />

This produces almost a limitless number of potential customers, which creates<br />

value for the firm. Xilinx also competes on a variety of cost structures, allowing their<br />

customers to choose the level of performance based on cost. Xilinx can therefore<br />

compete in a larger number of end market segments, including: high-end<br />

differentiation, mid-range high-growth and low-cost cost leadership.<br />

Product Overview<br />

In a technologically driven industry large research and development expenditures is<br />

expected. Participating companies seek to gain market share through process<br />

and market development. Xilinx develops software and hardware appropriately for each<br />

unit of integrated circuit that they build to help with the functioning of each product.<br />

By Xilinx creating specific software for its products it’s a way to try and control the<br />

entire market by using horizontal expansion, a mere extension of a company’s current<br />

activities to grow and gain more profit. Xilinx’ creates field programmable gate array<br />

42


products (FPGA) and complex programmable logic devices called (CPLD). CPLD'S<br />

include the Virtex, Spartan, and the CoolRunner series. Each series contributes value<br />

by providing a wide variety of applications for end markets to select from.<br />

The Virtex series is the latest generation of the FPGA and uses the most advanced logic<br />

fabric. They are considered to be top of the line products because of their<br />

performance, speed processing and memory capability. This series has been produced<br />

for specific end markets and is not advertised to all customers. This series contains the<br />

Virtex 5, Virtex 4, Virtex II Pro, and Virtex II which is definitely the best collection of<br />

Xilinx’ products that they provide for their customers.<br />

The Spartan series is another FPGA product, but is marketed towards industries<br />

currently experiencing high growth. Spartan series products cost approximately half<br />

the price of Virtex series products. This is achieved by using the lowest cost per logic<br />

cell available. One of the major networking consumers for the Spartan series is the<br />

automotive industry. The high performance is mandatory with these chips because<br />

they are specifically marketed towards industries that deal directly with safety and<br />

regulation policies. Innovative engineering has enabled Spartan products to have fewer<br />

parts without compromising quality. The Spartan product line consists of the following:<br />

Spartan 3A, Spartan 3E, Spartan IIE, Spartan II, and Spartan XL.<br />

The CoolRunner series are CPLD products that require the least memory capabilities<br />

while maintaining high performance. The products that are created under this series<br />

are the CoolRunner II and the CoolRunner XPLA3. These small products are usually<br />

marketed to electronics. This series could be the most vital product in regards to daily<br />

usage. The series is intertwined with the communication network of cell phones,<br />

competing in a very high end market.<br />

Xilinx clearly manifests its future intentions regarding research and development in its<br />

recent annual report.<br />

43


“Our Research and Development challenge is to develop new products<br />

that create cost-effective solutions for customers. In fiscal 2008,<br />

2007, and 2006, our R&D expenses were $358.1 million, $388.1 million,<br />

and $326.1 million, respectively. We believe leadership and innovation<br />

are essential to our future success and we are committed to continuing a<br />

significant level of R&D effort” (Xilinx, 10 – K Report).<br />

More Flexible Delivery<br />

Due to the global market that Xilinx is incorporated with, Xilinx sells their products to<br />

distributors to help with the wide variety of end markets that benefit from these<br />

products. The products must be spread over America, Europe, Asian Pacific, and Japan<br />

for distributors and Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM). After Xilinx sells its<br />

product in the primary market then there is a combination of secondary transactions<br />

that come into play but at this point in the process Xilinx no longer contains any<br />

liability.<br />

Xilinx uses distributors because the company feels that this is the best way to deliver<br />

their product in such an efficient way across the global market. Over 60% of all sales<br />

come from international territory which places delivery and distribution as a top priority<br />

to the business. Distributors attract customers due to the ability to manage high volume<br />

inventories and fast deliveries. “As of March 29, 2008, our backlog from OEM<br />

customers and backlog from end customers reported by our distributors scheduled for<br />

delivery within the next three months was $202 million, compared to $190 million as of<br />

2007” (Xilinx 10-K).<br />

Avnet Inc, Xilinx’s major global distributor, currently accounts for over 85% of Xilinx’s<br />

accounts receivable in 2008, making Avnet a huge asset to Xilinx (Xilinx, 10–K). Avnet<br />

has a division called electronics marketing that is solely responsible for the ongoing<br />

supply chain services. For example, “EM Supply Chain Services provides end-to-end<br />

44


solutions focused on OEMs, EMS providers and electronic component manufacturers,<br />

enabling them to optimize supply chains on a local, regional or global basis” (Avnet, 10-<br />

K). This can be relative because Xilinx specifically focuses on the relationship with<br />

Avnet by providing services for their company. “Avnet's factory-trained field<br />

applications engineers (FAEs) have developed materials for the full day SpeedWay<br />

Workshops with support from Xilinx’s applications engineers” (Avnet.com). SpeedWay<br />

workshops are the seminars that Xilinx provides for Avnet solely to understand the<br />

software and functions of their products. No other company can replicate the<br />

relationship that has developed between Xilinx and Avnet. Xilinx’s turnover ratio for<br />

distributors is high because of the ferocity displayed by Avnet in the market.<br />

Currently, “in June 2007, [Xilinx] completed construction of a building in Singapore,<br />

which serves as [their] Asia Pacific regional headquarters… The Singapore facility is<br />

primarily used for manufacturing and testing of products, services and support for our<br />

customers in Asia Pacific/Japan, coordination and management of certain third parties<br />

in [their] supply chain and research and development” (Xilinx, 10-K). This quote<br />

supports that Xilinx is moving toward a delivery structure that will sustain globally and<br />

contribute directly to their international relations. With 61% of total revenue coming<br />

from foreign markets it is crucial for Xilinx to focus on improving distribution channels.<br />

Xilinx and Altera control the market for the integrated circuits. Xilinx controls about<br />

51% of the entire market share, while Altera manages 34%, and the rest of the<br />

industry competitors control the remaining portion.<br />

Conclusion<br />

In conclusion, Xilinx has utilized a combination of both cost leadership and<br />

differentiation in creating a competitive advantage. It is important for Xilinx to maintain<br />

large economies of scale by continuing to increase production while lowering cost.<br />

However, in order to create real value in their products they concentrate on<br />

differentiation through designing a superior product with a variety of applications. Xilinx<br />

maintains this competitive advantage by investing large sums in research and<br />

45


development, spending nearly 100 million dollars more on R&D than their nearest<br />

competitor, Altera. Distribution is another key success factor in Xilinx business model;<br />

without a solid distribution to end markets Xilinx would be severely limited in growth<br />

potential.<br />

Formal Accounting Analysis<br />

Introduction<br />

There is a fundamental problem with accounting among firms; the numbers are manmade<br />

estimates, which are subject to manipulation and error, sometimes distorting the<br />

financial situation of a firm. Therefore, companies must adhere to Generally Accepted<br />

Accounting Principles (GAAP), which are established by the Financial Accounting<br />

Standards Board (FASB) to standardize and regulate the way managers calculate these<br />

estimates. These rules are enforced by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)<br />

and supplemented by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 which requires, among other<br />

things, that a public company’s financial statements are audited by a third party<br />

auditor. Independent auditors are only able to validate that a company has followed<br />

GAAP principles and ensure the accounting numbers; they are not able to always catch<br />

fraud.<br />

GAAP is flawed. The principles only mandate that firms follow “best practice”<br />

accounting, which give managers flexibility in the way certain line items can be<br />

reported. Management has several incentives to distort financial information. Examples<br />

include deflating net income to diminish tax expense or inflating net income by<br />

understating expense to give a more favorable picture to investors, creditors and<br />

potential investors. Both of these examples can be achieved legally by following GAAP<br />

and therefore mandate accounting analysis to identify key accounting principles where<br />

flexibility exist and identify any potential manipulation.<br />

46


Accounting analysis involves the implementation of six steps, ultimately leading to<br />

restating any manipulation done by managers, thus giving a more accurate view of the<br />

firm’s financial performance. The basic accounting analysis is outlined below:<br />

1. Identification of key accounting policies.<br />

2. Assessing the degree of accounting flexibility by evaluating the methods of<br />

recording expenses, calculating of estimates, choice of inventory methods, etc…<br />

3. These key accounting policies are then compared to “industry norms” and<br />

other factors to evaluate a firms accounting strategy (Palepu & Healy).<br />

4. Evaluate the quality of disclosure via qualitative and quantitative analysis.<br />

5. “Red flags” are then identified by examining unexplained or unusual<br />

changes in accounting policies or reported information.<br />

6. Finally, any distortions are undone by “[restating] reported numbers to<br />

reduce distortion” (Palepu & Healy).<br />

By employing these six steps an analyst will be able to look beyond the “accounting<br />

numbers” and accurately estimate the financial position of a firm.<br />

Key Accounting Policies<br />

Introduction<br />

Key accounting policies can directly affect the business factors that drive value. This<br />

theory can be separated out into two different types: 1 & 2. Type 1, key accounting<br />

policies, dictates the relation to business activities. As stated before, the key success<br />

factors of the specialized semiconductor industry are cost control, research and<br />

development, superior product quality and variety, and flexible delivery. Using the<br />

sales and expense manipulation ratios we will be able to determine how Xilinx has<br />

formatted their business model. As for type 2 key accounting policies, it relates to<br />

distinct items that will affect a company during the restatement of the financials. The<br />

47


accounting policies that reflect these success factors are research and development<br />

expense, product warranty, foreign currency, and goodwill. Xilinx does not have a<br />

pension plan or any operating/capital leases that pertain to its current financials. By<br />

assessing the validity of these accounting policies we will get a better perspective of<br />

Xilinx’s financial performance.<br />

Research and Development<br />

In the specialized-semiconductor industry “investment” in research and development<br />

(R&D) is an essential element for growth and crucial in gaining a sustainable<br />

competitive advantage. GAAP regulations require that R&D is expensed as incurred<br />

rather than capitalizing it as an asset. “Economic benefits from R&D are generally<br />

considered highly uncertain [because] research projects may never deliver promised<br />

new products, the products they generate may not be economically viable, or their<br />

competitors will cause their research to become obsolete” (Palepu & Healy). It is this<br />

uncertainty that supports GAAP rules to treat R&D as an expense. However there is a<br />

strong case that R&D expenditures should be capitalized because the innovative<br />

products resulting from R&D expenditures generate revenue.<br />

Newer products contribute significantly to total revenue as older products experience<br />

price erosion and declining sales. Xilinx’s sales revenue from its newest products has<br />

increased from $206.4 million in 2006 to $604.2 million in 2008 for Xilinx. Altera has<br />

also experienced an increase in sales of new products, “The increase in net sales in<br />

2006 was driven by sales of our New Products which increased 150% year-over-year<br />

predominantly due to higher sales of our Stratix II and Cyclone II families” (Altera 10<br />

k). New products are the result of R&D, further explaining how R&D creates value for a<br />

firm and why firms should capitalize at least a portion of R&D expense. The following<br />

table denotes the end markets that R&D expenditures contribute to:<br />

48


% of total net<br />

revenues<br />

2008<br />

(%)<br />

% change<br />

in dollars<br />

2007<br />

(%)<br />

% change<br />

in dollars2<br />

2006<br />

(%)<br />

Communications 43 -5 45 -1 49<br />

Industrial and Other 32 11 29 22 25<br />

Consumer and<br />

Automotive 17 4 16 18 14<br />

Data Processing 8 -14 10 -10 12<br />

Total net revenues 100 0 100 7 100<br />

The expensing of R&D has a great affect on the financial statements of all companies<br />

participating in R&D heavy industries. In general terms, expensing R&D tends to<br />

overstate expenses, thus understating net income, stockholders equity and assets. This<br />

is disadvantageous to the entire semiconductor industry. Considering Xilinx has the<br />

highest R&D expense in the industry, it could perhaps benefit more than competitors<br />

from R&D capitalization. Capitalizing R&D may in fact provide a better understanding of<br />

the company’s overall value because so much value is created via innovation and<br />

differentiation. The table below provides a representation of the affects of recording<br />

R&D as an expense rather than an asset.<br />

Assets Liabilities Equity Revenues Expenses Net Income<br />

U N U N O U<br />

*U=Understate; N=No effect; O=Overstate<br />

Product Warranty<br />

Warranty liabilities arise when a seller agrees to fix a product (or service) that fails to<br />

perform as expected within a specified period. To ensure conformity with the matching<br />

principle, the seller reports expected warranty expense in the period when revenue<br />

from the sale is reported (drtaccounting.com). The Statement of Financial Accounting<br />

Standards (SFAS) No. 5 says that companies must report “accrual of losses when they<br />

are reasonably estimable and relate to the current or a prior period” (www.fasb.org).<br />

49


The matching principle, when applied to product warranty, can help indicate poor<br />

product quality by studying a firm’s history of warranty liabilities. If the warranty<br />

liability increases in relation to sales over time it indicates poor product quality. This<br />

would adversely affect a firm’s revenues. Furthermore, understating warranty expense<br />

would overstate net income, leading to a less accurate financial picture of the firm. For<br />

companies that compete on differentiation and superior product quality, the reporting of<br />

warranty expense and liability is directly related to what drives value and is therefore a<br />

key accounting principle.<br />

It is important to consider industry standards to see if the liabilities and expenses<br />

associated with product warranties for Xilinx are generally in line. Quality analysis yields<br />

a hierarchy designating who provides the greatest quality. It is not always easy to<br />

estimate liabilities; this is why firms often use a percentage of sales number to<br />

determine the allowance for warranty liability. In the specialized-semiconductor industry<br />

the allowance is based on past utilization of warranties. Additional provisions either<br />

increase or decrease the liability based on the current periods warranty expense. The<br />

following graph shows the product warranty and indemnification over the past five<br />

years for both Xilinx and Altera.<br />

Xilinx<br />

(In Thousands)<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Beg. Balance N/A N/A 5,905 9 893 2,500<br />

Provision N/A 7,361 3,426 2,199 4,920 1,413<br />

Payments N/A (1,456) (9,340) (1,306) (3,313) (3,913)<br />

End Balance N/A 5,905 9 893 2,500 0<br />

Source: Xilinx 10-k<br />

50


Altera<br />

(In Thousands)<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />

Beg. Balance N/A N/A 2905 N/A 1453 1115<br />

Provision N/A 2350 0 N/A 1320 (874<br />

Payments N/A (255) (273) N/A (1658) (223)<br />

End Balance N/A 2095 1822 N/A 1115 18<br />

Source: Altera 10-k<br />

These graphs indicate that while the warranty liability is a small fraction of sales, the<br />

payments have no clear growth rate. This indicates that the overall quality of either<br />

company’s product has not declined. The difference between the company’s expenses<br />

can be attributed to the fact that Xilinx has had on average out sold Altera by 37.97<br />

percent. Variance in the tables also distinguishes differences in the manufacturing<br />

process and manufacturing partners. Due to the fact that these warranties are a small<br />

portion of the company’s total current liabilities (1.15%), there is little effect on revenue<br />

or the balance sheet.<br />

Foreign Currency<br />

The global economy is a conduit for foreign currency risk exposure. Industry standards<br />

manifest that a substantial portion of total revenue (averaging 69%) is derived from<br />

international sales, implicitly implying gravitas foreign currency risk exposure. Beyond<br />

sales, international fixed assets require annual adjustments in order to comply with the<br />

Securities and Exchange Commission’s GAAP requirements.<br />

Moderate movements in currency markets can translate into multi-million dollar<br />

spreads, impeding stability in a company’s bottom line. Chicago Mercantile Exchange,<br />

Inc. discusses using currency futures to hedge currency risks as a solution to overall<br />

exposure. The following excerpt is taken from their foreign currency risk research<br />

paper:<br />

51


“A key difference between investing in domestic and foreign assets is<br />

that the latter exposes the investor to a currency risk. Over the years,<br />

most investors have not been careful in characterizing this risk to<br />

returns from un-hedged portfolios. One simplistic view was to measure<br />

the return in domestic currency terms and compare it with returns in<br />

local currency terms, and characterize the difference as the ‘currency<br />

effect.’ The reasoning was that if the exchange rate remains constant<br />

from the time of purchase of the foreign asset to its sale, then the<br />

currency risk has had zero impact. On the other hand, if the domestic<br />

currency has weakened (strengthened) against the foreign currency,<br />

the exposure would result in a gain (loss).”<br />

Disclosure of foreign currency exchange risk in the footnotes of the financial<br />

statements is a key accounting policy for all specialized-semiconductor<br />

participants. The general consensus is that foreign currency exposure is<br />

immaterial; however, the industry provides full disclosure and allows analysts<br />

to evaluate management’s financial hedging performance. This lends to insight<br />

that can add significant value to the overall accounting analysis.<br />

Goodwill<br />

“Goodwill is an accounting term used to reflect the portion of the book value of a<br />

business entity not directly attributable to its assets and liabilities” (Wikipedia).<br />

Goodwill is an intangible asset that generally evolves from the acquisition process. The<br />

difference between the acquisition price and the fair value of the total assets is<br />

goodwill. Many reputable executives view goodwill as an arbitrary premium paid in<br />

order to complete the acquisition process.<br />

Firms are required to re-value goodwill annually. Impairment occurs when the carrying<br />

value of goodwill exceeds its fair value. When impairment is evident the firm must<br />

write down the asset to market value (mark-to-market). According to the Statements<br />

of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 142, “Goodwill is not amortized [annually]<br />

52


ut is subject to impairment tests on an annual basis, or more frequently if indicators of<br />

potential impairment exist” (Xilinx 10-k). This is a general accounting policy recognized<br />

throughout the specialized-semiconductor industry. However, ambiguous guidelines<br />

beget flexibility in the determination of impairment. A general rule is that when<br />

goodwill is greater than 10% of long-term assets impairment is necessary.<br />

Management incentives preclude appropriate amortization of goodwill for many<br />

companies; this ultimately leads to overstating assets.<br />

From 2002 through 2006 approximately 25% of Lattice Semiconductor Company’s total<br />

assets were goodwill. This gross overstatement was in reaction to a recent acquisition.<br />

In 2007, Lattice wrote off over $223 million of goodwill. Clearly investors would prefer<br />

for management to appropriately and rationally amortize goodwill over a specified<br />

period of time. Large write offs are detrimental to a company’s financial statements.<br />

Xilinx currently values goodwill at 8.96% of its total assets, significantly lower than the<br />

10% rule. This implies that impairment is not necessary.<br />

Conclusion<br />

The key success factors for Xilinx are research and development expenditures, product<br />

warranty liability and expense, foreign currency exchange exposure, and goodwill<br />

impairment. The succeeding analysis evaluates these four success factors in relation to<br />

the disclosure flexibility granted by FASB.<br />

Assess Accounting Flexibility<br />

Introduction<br />

The rules imposed on public companies by the SEC through the FASB regulate the way<br />

a firm reports certain accounting numbers. These limitations contravene their purpose<br />

and can preclude management from accurately describing the firm’s current economic<br />

position. Although this seems self-defeating it helps establish a standard across broad<br />

industries. However, the FASB does provide a substantial amount of flexibility in<br />

53


accounting. Identifying the areas of flexibility is the next step in understanding the<br />

firm’s key accounting principles.<br />

Research and Development<br />

There is no flexibility in accounting policies regarding research and development. GAAP<br />

mandates that research and development is expensed as incurred regardless of its<br />

relevance to future economic benefits. Forced to expense these investments,<br />

companies overstate expenses and understate net income, stockholders equity and<br />

total assets. An important point to make is that R&D heavy firms (i.e. Xilinx) are<br />

required to expense R&D at a time when they are not recognizing the benefits of R&D<br />

(revenue). This seems to contradict the matching principle. Accounting data is far less<br />

informative in economic terms for readers of financial statements when the company is<br />

forced to expense such an important investment.<br />

Product warranty<br />

FASB grants firms significant flexibility in estimating accounting numbers representing<br />

product warranty liabilities. The FASB states that the estimation of accrued liabilities<br />

must be “probable and reasonably estimable” (fasb.com). While the probability that any<br />

one product warranty will be utilized is not always certain, the allowance account<br />

representing this liability will be. Companies have the choice to estimate this liability<br />

based on a several factors such as a percent of sales or a forecast based on prior<br />

warranty expense.<br />

The flexibility of this principle can affect the bottom line and balance sheet accounts by<br />

several million dollars based on the quality of a firm’s estimation. Understating warranty<br />

expense would result in overstating net income for the period, thereby improving the<br />

perception of business profitability.<br />

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While the warranty liability for Xilinx is only a small portion of their current liabilities,<br />

they would be able to reduce their liabilities they kept the balance in the warranty<br />

indemnification account low by only adjusting for the amount of the expense for the<br />

period. If the company where to change its estimates to keep this balance high the<br />

company could recognize less expense, thus inflating the company’s net income. The<br />

amount of flexibility allowed by FASB gives firms discretion over which benefit is taken.<br />

Foreign Currency<br />

The Securities and Exchange Commission requires that all derivative instruments are<br />

recorded at fair value. The SEC also encourages companies to provide adequate<br />

footnotes to supplement accounting numbers and help explain their economic<br />

situation. The industry is limited in their ability to calculate the accounting numbers<br />

required through full disclosure; however they enjoy a large amount of flexibility in the<br />

footnotes. Industry participants tend to follow these guidelines in similar formats,<br />

providing easy comparison across the competitive landscape.<br />

Goodwill<br />

GAAP provides a moderate amount of flexibility regarding impairment of goodwill.<br />

Considering the rigors of estimating the fair value of acquired assets, it is reasonable to<br />

conclude that the aegis of goodwill is somewhat unsubstantiated. Additionally, there is<br />

existing incentive for management to keep the appearance of the balance sheet strong,<br />

whether or not it is an accurate representation. Writing down goodwill increases total<br />

expenses which decreases total earnings and diminishes executive bonuses at yearend.<br />

This paradigm is commonly denoted as the agency problem between the<br />

shareholders and the managers of the firm.<br />

Xilinx’s management recently increased goodwill by $19.6 million due to an acquisition;<br />

however, this amount has already been entirely amortized. When companies allow for<br />

goodwill to maintain presence on their balance sheet it gives the impression that they<br />

are trying to inflate assets. Firms are granted investor approbation when they<br />

55


appropriately abate goodwill. Xilinx’s annual report briefly discusses their impairment<br />

strategy as follows:<br />

“Based on the impairment review performed during the fourth quarter of<br />

fiscal 2008, there was no impairment of goodwill in fiscal 2008. Unless<br />

there are indicators of impairment, the Company’s next impairment<br />

review for goodwill will be performed and completed in the fourth<br />

quarter of fiscal 2009. To date, no impairment indicators have been<br />

identified.”<br />

This statement explains the lack of impairment for years 2008, 2007 and 2006.<br />

Conclusion<br />

Accounting flexibility varies from industry to industry. Understanding the amount of<br />

flexibility the managers have in disclosing financial information is a big part in analyzing<br />

financial statements. The specialized-semiconductor industry is diverse when it comes<br />

to the amount of flexibility managers have on disclosing success factors. Research and<br />

development expensing is strictly enforced by GAAP and precludes companies from<br />

capitalizing the expenditures. For product warranties on the other hand, management<br />

has great flexibility in disclosure; requiring only that the estimation of accrued liabilities<br />

be probable and reasonably estimable. Foreign currency and goodwill have moderate<br />

accounting flexibility. With the diversity of flexibility for different items on the financial<br />

statements it is important for analyst to recognize the industry standards in order to<br />

properly evaluate companies with in that particular industry.<br />

Evaluate Accounting Strategy<br />

Introduction<br />

Accounting flexibility helps manifest accounting strategy. The accounting strategy can<br />

be thought of as the way “managers exercise their accounting flexibility… and can use it<br />

to either communicate their firm’s economic situation or to hide true performance”<br />

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(Palepu & Healy). There are two basic parameters that can assess a firm’s actual<br />

accounting strategy.<br />

The first step is determining the level of disclosure in a company’s financial statements.<br />

In a high disclosure company there are extensive explanations of accounting segments<br />

and breakdowns of asset and liability accounts. In a low disclosure company the<br />

explanation of accounting activity is minimal, reporting only enough information to<br />

satisfy GAAP.<br />

The second method to assessing a company’s accounting strategy is to evaluate<br />

whether a company uses conservative or aggressive accounting policies. Aggressive<br />

accounting leads to inflated net incomes, a policy that might be followed if manager<br />

incentives are earnings based. Conservative accounting understates earnings and would<br />

be an attractive strategy for firms who are trying to minimize tax expense. The actual<br />

accounting strategy utilized by firms will dictate whether a firm is aggressive or<br />

conservative.<br />

Research and Development<br />

Xilinx reports R&D only to the extent that minimal disclosure required by GAAP is<br />

satisfied. Xilinx cannot deviate from the accounting mandates proclaimed by GAAP<br />

regulations and they will continue to expense R&D costs as they are incurred. The<br />

expensing of R&D results in a conservative accounting.<br />

Xilinx adequately discloses the effect on R&D caused by the adoption of SFAS 123(R)<br />

which is a stock-based compensation expense classified as R&D expense. The adoption<br />

of SFAS 123(R) increased the amount of R&D expense by $62 million in 2007.<br />

Product Warranty<br />

As previously stated, the amount of warranty liability and expense recognized by a firm<br />

could be an indicator of poor quality. Firms who compete on superior product quality<br />

need to distinguish how the balance for warranty liabilities is estimated and then show<br />

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the amount of expensed. Xilinx’s accounting disclosure of warranty liabilities is mixed.<br />

There is a high-level of disclosure regarding the warranty liability account. There is a<br />

full breakdown of the beginning, ending and utilization of the warranties instead of<br />

including the warranty liability into “other accrued liabilities” paired with a footnote.<br />

The level of disclosure in terms of how the estimates are calculated is lacking.<br />

Because there is a fair amount of flexibility in the estimation of warranty liability, Xilinx<br />

uses a conservative method when recognizing warranty expense. This is probably due<br />

to the fact that the expense due to warranty utilization is such a small portion of the<br />

company’s total expenses. Therefore, Xilinx seems to change its accounting policy<br />

frequently, using an expense as incurred method to keep current liabilities at a<br />

minimum some years; and in other years, the firm keeps a higher balance in the liability<br />

account to reduce expenses.<br />

Foreign Currency<br />

The following spreadsheet excerpt quantifies total currency risk for Xilinx, a hegemonic<br />

industry participant, as a result of international sales. The data provides the net<br />

revenues by geography denominated the U.S. dollar.<br />

(In thousands)<br />

Region 2004 % of<br />

Sales<br />

2005 % of<br />

Sales<br />

%<br />

Change<br />

2006 % of<br />

Sales<br />

%<br />

Change<br />

Asia-Pacific 331.4 24 367.9 23 11 406.7 24 11<br />

Europe 270.3 19 326.1 21 21 352.8 20 8<br />

Japan 203.6 15 224.1 14 10 251.8 15 12<br />

Total Foreign Sales 805.3 918.1 1011.3<br />

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(In thousands)<br />

Region 2007 % of % 2008 Sales % of Sales % Change<br />

Sales Change<br />

Asia-Pacific 466.6 25 15 526.3 29 13<br />

Europe 426.9 23 21 407.2 22 -5<br />

Japan 217.9 12 -13 190.1 10 -13<br />

Total Foreign<br />

Sales<br />

1111.4 1123.6<br />

Source: Xilinx 10-K<br />

When composing a hedging strategy it is important to understand the reasons for<br />

annum volatility and how to minimize the pressures arising from these fluctuations. "To<br />

reduce financial risk, [Xilinx]... uses derivative financial instruments to hedge fair values<br />

of underlying assets and liabilities or future cash flows which are exposed to foreign<br />

currency, equity and interest rate fluctuations" (Xilinx 10-K). Xilinx had the following<br />

outstanding forward currency exchange contracts:<br />

(In thousands)<br />

Foreign Currency 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Euro 4,600 Unknown - 18,616<br />

Singapore Dollar - Unknown 16,902 11,938<br />

Japanese Yen - Unknown 4,309 5,364<br />

British Pound - - - 3,022<br />

Total 4,600 32,800 21,211 38,940<br />

Source: Xilinx 10-k<br />

These derivative positions help secure international sales revenues and supports longterm<br />

liquidity. The industry "does not enter into derivative financial instruments for<br />

trading or speculative purposes" (Xilinx 10-K). This data indicates that exposure to<br />

markets denominated in the euro and Singapore dollar are most critical. This seems<br />

logical because Xilinx has set up regional headquarters in Dublin, Ireland and Singapore<br />

to support European and Asia-Pacific business, respectively. <strong>Mark</strong>ets denominated in<br />

the British pound and Japanese yen are also important, but their relevance is<br />

proportional to their influence in major geographic markets.<br />

59


Foreign Currency Exchange Rates<br />

Exchange rate movements tend to be episodic and thus tenuously related. Successfully<br />

implementing a comprehensive hedging strategy can protect companies from shortterm<br />

currency exchange risks that stem from volatile currency markets. Firms<br />

exercising this financial prowess are able to lock-up profits from international sales.<br />

However, currency risk is more complicated than simple exchange rate exposure across<br />

various economic environs. Currency instability can potentially “increase credit risks for<br />

international customers and impair their ability to repay existing obligations” (Xilinx 10-<br />

K). For example, if the dollar was to move strictly and terminally strong against the<br />

euro, European demand would dramatically decline and existing un-hedged obligations<br />

would increase in value. The following charts denote currency exchange rates for<br />

denominations important to the specialized-semiconductor industry:<br />

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Source: forextrading.com<br />

Xilinx Foreign Currency Management<br />

The industry reports that foreign currency translation has historically been immaterial<br />

and future forecasts continue to make this assumption. Altera stated in the 10-K that<br />

foreign currency exchange fluctuations as large as 10% would be immaterial. Xilinx's<br />

consolidated statement of stockholders' equity lists the line item "changes in net<br />

unrealized gain (loss) on hedging transactions, net of taxes,” which helps evaluate<br />

managements hedging strategy. The information is provided in the figure 2-5:<br />

Balance<br />

at<br />

(In thousands)<br />

Cumulative Translation<br />

Adjustment<br />

Net unrealized gain on hedging transactions,<br />

net of taxes<br />

Interest and Other,<br />

net<br />

29-Mar-03 1,560 0 24,628<br />

3-Apr-04 897 0 23,409<br />

2-Apr-05 -1,692 118 31,603<br />

1-Apr-06 1,417 -105 45,958<br />

31-Mar-07 3,052 1,014 85,329<br />

29-Mar-08 N/A N/A 52,750<br />

Source: Xilinx 10-k<br />

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The quality of foreign currency exchange management is excellent. The gains (2005<br />

and 2007) and loss (2006) are independently immaterial on each of their respective<br />

statements; additionally, 2005 and 2006 simulated an annual hedge strategy against<br />

previous gains/losses. In 2007 Xilinx experienced a material change in relation to<br />

preceding gains and losses; the $1.014M gain from unrealized hedging was 10 times<br />

greater than previous years denote. This is not due to a change in management<br />

strategy, quality, or competency. The change is a direct result of substantial<br />

macroeconomic changes in the global economy. The following list briefly analyzes why<br />

such a significant change occurred over this time period (April 2006- March 2007):<br />

· The U.S. dollar weakened against the euro while European sales increased<br />

by 21%.<br />

· The U.S. dollar strengthened against the Japanese yen while Japanese<br />

sales declined by 13%<br />

· The U.S. dollar weakened against the Singapore dollar while Asian-Pacific<br />

sales increased by 15%<br />

International Fixed Assets<br />

The functional currency for Xilinx's subsidiaries in Ireland and Singapore is the U.S.<br />

dollar. However, local operating initiatives mandate that a portion of assets and<br />

liabilities are measured in local currency (i.e. overhead expenses), thus requiring<br />

translation into the U.S. dollar periodically. The gain/loss resulting from remeasurement<br />

is included in the line item "Interest and Other, net" on the consolidated<br />

income statement. Refer to figure 2-5 for annual data.<br />

Wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries use their respective local currency as the functional<br />

currency, requiring a similar re-measurement as described earlier. The inevitable<br />

exchange gains/losses "arising from translation of foreign currency denominated assets<br />

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and liabilities are included as a component of accumulated other comprehensive income<br />

in stockholders equity" (Xilinx 10-K). Refer to figure 2-5 for annual data.<br />

These figures are relevant only because they has a significant impact on total foreign<br />

currency gains/losses and assist in calculating total foreign currency exchange risk.<br />

International assets and liabilities not denominated in the company's functional<br />

currency should not be considered when analyzing managements hedging strategy<br />

because it is impossible to hedge. Additionally, this exposure to risk is the nature of<br />

doing global business and must be put in the correct perspective.<br />

Goodwill<br />

If goodwill is not managed correctly it will play an influential role in firm valuation<br />

performed by industry analysts. Compared to its competitors, Xilinx has been good in<br />

keeping goodwill stable. Below shows three tables comparing Xilinx to its competitors.<br />

(In thousands)<br />

Goodwill<br />

Company 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx 100,700 100,724 111,627 119,415 125,084 117,955 117,955<br />

Actel 32,100 32,100 32,100 32,100 30,209 30,209 30,197<br />

Lattice 223,489 223,605 223,605 223,556 223,566 0 0<br />

Goodwill as percent of Total Assets<br />

Company 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%<br />

Actel 11% 10% 10% 9% 8% 8% 8%<br />

Lattice 24% 26% 28% 31% 31% 0 0<br />

Goodwill as percent of Long Term Assets<br />

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Company 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx 8% 8% 7% 8% 8% 8% 9%<br />

Actel 43% 42% 43% 30% 27% 29% 31%<br />

Lattice 41% 50% 55% 60% 65% 0 0<br />

Source: Xilinx 10-k<br />

From the tables above Xilinx has consistently kept its goodwill below 10% of long-term<br />

total assets. While they lead among their competitors with the lowest ratio in both<br />

long-term and total assets, they still have not taken steps to write down goodwill. The<br />

consistent 8% to 9% of goodwill infers that management is trying to keep goodwill<br />

below the radar, which is considered an aggressive accounting technique. Xilinx does<br />

not show any indication of impairing goodwill in the near future.<br />

Qualitative Disclosure<br />

Introduction<br />

An important part of the accounting analysis is analyzing the quality of disclosure. In<br />

general the accounting rules only require the company to disclose a minimal amount,<br />

burdening management with the decision of what amount of disclosure is needed to<br />

adequately reflect their economic performance.<br />

Research and Development<br />

As previously mentioned, Xilinx has a relatively low level of disclosure in reporting for<br />

R&D expense. In the notes to the consolidated financial statements Xilinx did not go<br />

into great detail when explaining R&D. It is also not in the best interest for Xilinx to<br />

fully disclose the proprietary information that is closely related to R&D. Xilinx<br />

adequately discloses the effect on R&D caused by the adoption of SFAS 123(R) which is<br />

a stock-based compensation expense classified as R&D expense, which greatly<br />

increased the amount of R&D expense reported in fiscal 2007. The 10-K did not go into<br />

great detail in explaining the root cause of an increase in R&D,” [primarily the increase]<br />

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in expenses is related to investment in resources to support new product development”<br />

(Xilinx 10k). The level of transparency for R&D is low, but appropriate given the nature<br />

of the expenditure.<br />

Product Warranty<br />

As discussed earlier, product warranties are reported when the liability is reasonably<br />

estimable and probable. The firm is required to use the matching principle by reporting<br />

the expected warranty expense and adjusting the liability and revenue accounts. By<br />

adjusting the matching of the liability and expense accounts the firm can either<br />

overstate or understate net income.<br />

Xilinx makes adjustments to the liability account based on the expense incurred in that<br />

period. The quality of reporting is highlighted by the breakdown of the liability account.<br />

It is clear that Xilinx varies the way warranty indemnification is reported because there<br />

are variations from year to year on the ending balances. The historical expense is<br />

inconsequential compared to total revenues of the firm.<br />

It is difficult to say that the firm has a high quality of disclosure in the warranty<br />

indemnification account. Although there is a thorough break down of total cost, the<br />

terms, calculation and estimation of warranties are vague. Xilinx’s disclosure can be<br />

summarized by the following excerpt:<br />

“The Company offers, subject to certain terms and conditions, to<br />

indemnify certain customers and distributors for costs and damages<br />

awarded against these parties in the event the Company’s hardware<br />

products are found to infringe third-party intellectual property rights,<br />

including patents, copyrights or trademarks. To a lesser extent, the<br />

Company may from time-to-time offer limited indemnification with<br />

respect to its software products” (Xilinx 10-K).<br />

There is a moderate level of quality disclosure in Xilinx’s presentation of product<br />

warranty liabilities.<br />

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Foreign Currency<br />

Xilinx provides transparent financial statements that clearly state their foreign currency<br />

exchange risks. Xilinx embraces full disclosure enthusiastically and allows for readers to<br />

understand their basic hedging strategy. The accounting policy is adequately explained<br />

in the supplemental footnotes with an appropriate amount of disaggregation. There is<br />

thorough discussion on foreign currency forward contracts and their utility (analyzed<br />

earlier). The quality of disclosure as high.<br />

Goodwill<br />

Overall, the specialized-semiconductor industry has overvalued their total assets by<br />

failing to take steps to writing down goodwill on the financial statements. Xilinx has the<br />

lowest in percentage of goodwill in relation to its long-term assets than any of its<br />

competitors; but they have not significantly reduced goodwill. The only write off Xilinx<br />

made was in 2006 when it purchased AccelChip for $19.6 million dollars and impaired<br />

goodwill by $8.7 million, due to the acquisition of AccelChips intangible goodwill. Not<br />

recognizing the impairment of goodwill is becoming the industry norm; which results in<br />

overvaluing assets and increasing the earnings of the company, which ultimately leads<br />

to high bonuses for managers. Unless laws change that affect goodwill or change in<br />

industry standard, Xilinx's quality of disclosure will still remain fairly aggressive when it<br />

comes to keeping the goodwill under 10% of total long term assets.<br />

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Conclusion<br />

Source: Xilinx 10-k<br />

The quality of a firm’s financial statements is determined by whether they provide<br />

adequate footnotes and disclosure regarding the consequences of their business<br />

activities. Xilinx addresses these factors by going beyond GAAP requirements and<br />

providing supplementary data and breakdowns of key accounting principles. Therefore,<br />

after examining the financial statements and management’s discussion and analysis of<br />

Xilinx, we can conclude that the quality of reporting is high.<br />

Quantitative Accounting Measures and Disclosure<br />

Introduction<br />

The quantitative disclosure is a measure of accuracy in comparison to the flexibility of<br />

accounting numbers that can be reported in the balance sheet and income statement.<br />

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The allotted room for error has shrunk over the years due to the creation of GAAP,<br />

Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Before this<br />

time, the margin for inaccurate financial statements was a real problem due to flexibility<br />

when disclosing the reports. Companies and CEO’s used to manipulate the accounting<br />

numbers in order to appear more profitable and gain managerial incentives.<br />

Financial ratios are tools that companies use to analyze their numbers to prove to<br />

financial intermediaries, informational intermediaries, shareholders and stakeholders the<br />

liquidity of the company. These ratios should appear transparent within the 10-K to not<br />

cause any red flags or misleading assumptions about the company.<br />

The sales and expense manipulation are two calculations that will determine if the<br />

business activities have undergone proper procedures. The sales manipulation<br />

diagnostic involves the net sales by cash from sales, accounts receivable and inventory.<br />

This will determine whether or not the profitability of the company has been adjusted<br />

improperly. As for the expense manipulation diagnostic, the asset turnover (sales/total<br />

assets), cash flows from operations over operating income and net operating assets will<br />

aid us in configuring if these numbers were over or under expensed. By doing these<br />

ratios, this will provide a benchmark of our company against the semiconductor<br />

industry, but will also aid us in determining potential red flags for our specific company,<br />

Xilinx.<br />

Sales Manipulation Diagnostic<br />

This diagnostic shows adjustments in the net sales or appropriate cash from sales,<br />

accounts receivable and inventory to maneuver the profits to dictate what the<br />

management would like to have on the financial statements. Through this process,<br />

going back five years will provide an understanding of Xilinx and the semiconductor<br />

industry in creating patterns of manipulation or honesty within the financials. With the<br />

ratio analysis, the process is meant to find “red flags” in finding data that proves that<br />

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Xilinx, or the industry has done manipulation with the financial statements to create an<br />

agency problem.<br />

Net Sales/Cash from Sales<br />

This ratio is a determinant that refers directly to the amount of cash received in<br />

comparison to the listed sales amount. This ratio should result in being approximate or<br />

equal to 1 to be considered efficient. If the company ratio is to far above 1, the<br />

company does not have enough accounts receivable to match sales. Either a ratio<br />

calculated to be too high or below of 1, than this would draw a “red flag” for insufficient<br />

cash flows being recognized.<br />

From the chart you can see that over time from 2003 to 2004, Xilinx was the performed<br />

worst out of its competitors when comparing net sales over cash from sales ratios. The<br />

ratio was 0.85 which is drastically less than 1; causing a “red flag” in our financials. On<br />

the other hand, Xilinx showed a increasing trend during that time and reached the<br />

industry average in year 2005. As for year 2008, Xilinx is showing a decrease in this<br />

ratio and in the future will have to determine if this decrease is detrimental to their<br />

69


financial situation. In accordance to the rest of the semiconductor industry, the trend<br />

does not raise any red flags for this section of the sales manipulation diagnostic.<br />

Net Sales/Accounts Receivable<br />

This ratio determines if net sales and accounts receivables are directly correlated.<br />

Theoretically, they should positively correlate in relation. For example, if sales are<br />

moving up then account receivable should also move up. On the other hand, if the<br />

ratio is low then this portrays that the company relies on more accounts receivables on<br />

credit rather than cash from the sales. This can be explained by a type one key<br />

accounting policy includes the reasoning behind the business activity that relates this<br />

business model to this particular ideology.<br />

This chart shows that Xilinx, in comparison to the industry, is fairly average for the<br />

amount of diversity it uses for cash from sales or credit accounts. The industry<br />

generally is carrying the same pattern except with the exception of Altera. This shows<br />

that Altera was highly dependent on cash from sales during 2003 to 2006 and after<br />

which they started to rely more on accounts receivable as the ratio went down. The<br />

raw form of net sales over accounts receivable, Xilinx was in line with the industry trend<br />

during the years 2004 to 2008, but before that in 2003, the ratio was a slightly low.<br />

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The semiconductor industry in relation to this ratio should be high due to the fact that<br />

the customers will generally be buying the product from company to company during<br />

the supply chain process. The products will be usually bought in bulk and should have<br />

a high ratio putting a high focus on accounts receivable. This ratio again correlates to<br />

the understanding of the business model and key accounting policies (Type 1).<br />

The change form of net sales over accounts receivable can be simplified by<br />

understanding the differentiation of the yearly basis financials. Each year will have a<br />

change of the numerator divided by the change in the denominator. Finding the<br />

solution to this ratio equals the slope of a derivative.<br />

From understanding this chart, any type of negative drop proves that the change might<br />

have a few systematic errors. For example, the net sales could decrease which would<br />

create a negative amount and then be divided by an increasing accounts receivable<br />

which would indirectly correlate.<br />

As a general rule of thumb, Lattice will be cleared as an outlier and the rest of the<br />

industry can primarily show volatility in this ratio when taking the derivative. These<br />

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atios ideally should be trending in a positive manner; unless both net sales and<br />

accounts receivable are both declining.<br />

Net Sales/Inventory<br />

This ratio determines the amount in comparison of the net sales to the inventory levels<br />

that are kept. Businesses’ strive to achieve a high number in this ratio because it<br />

coincides with proper management of the inventory with the current sales during the<br />

periods, which in turn creates an inverse relationship. An increase of sales or a<br />

decrease of inventory will result in a high ratio. On the other hand, a backlog of<br />

product could be because they have a small inventory while managing the costs<br />

allocated. Either way, the production of a large inventory and ability to maintain it will<br />

develop into revenue. This ratio could be useful in comparing the size of a firm and<br />

future manufacturing forecasting for what percentage of inventory should be in stock.<br />

The semiconductor industry has shown a wide range of ratios but none of which was a<br />

deliberate outlier within the industry.<br />

This chart shows that Xilinx and its competitors are very spread out in response to this<br />

ratio. Net sales over inventory does not necessarily follow an industry guideline but this<br />

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does relate to the size of the company and its specific inclination on what each<br />

company believes a proper inventory level should be. Altera has the highest ratio which<br />

means that they are the most efficient in generating sales with the least amount of<br />

inventory. Xilinx is just below Altera but as the graph shows in the upcoming years<br />

Xilinx could eventually catch up to Altera. This trend might follow the reasoning that<br />

Xilinx has had increasing sales within recent years; not technically a decline in<br />

inventory.<br />

The net sales over change in inventory model display a common ratio between 0 and<br />

10 throughout 2003 to 2007. Altera on the other hand, seems to have a relatively high<br />

ratio, which would cause a “red flag” when compared to the industry. Xilinx in<br />

comparison to the industry curve is relatively on par but does have a substantial drop<br />

during 2004.<br />

The derivative in relation to this ratio is an understanding that there was an industry<br />

failure during 2004, especially for Xilinx. The differentiation should show that the trend<br />

73


will positively return back to the industry average due to the type one key accounting<br />

principles that we have explained previously.<br />

Sales Manipulation Diagnostics<br />

Xilinx 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Net Sales $1,155,977 $1,397,846 $1,573,233 $1,726,250 $1,842,739 $1,841,372<br />

Net Sales (Revenue) / Cash 0.85 0.96 1.02 1.01 1.01 0.96<br />

from Sales<br />

Net Sales/Account<br />

5.85 5.61 7.37 8.89 10.11 7.39<br />

Receivables (RAW)<br />

Net Sales/Account<br />

5.85 4.72 -4.94 -7.95 -9.78 -0.02<br />

Receivables (CHANGE)<br />

Net Sales/Inventory (RAW) 10.37 13.64 8.47 8.59 10.56 14.14<br />

Net Sales/Inventory<br />

(CHANGE) 10.37 (26.73) 2.11 10.00 (4.40) 0.03<br />

Net Sales/ Warranty<br />

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

Expenses (Liabilities)<br />

Net Sales/ Pension<br />

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

Expenses (Liabilities)<br />

• Net Account Receivables: $197,690 ‐ 2003, $248,956 – 2004, $213,459 – 2005, $194,205 –<br />

2006, $182,295 – 2007, $249,147 – 2008<br />

• Inventory: $111,504 – 2003, $102,454 ‐ 2004, $185,722 ‐ 2005, $201,029 ‐ 2006, $174,572 ‐<br />

2007, $130,250 – 2008<br />

Sales Manipulation Diagnostics<br />

Altera 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Net Sales $827,207 $1,016,364 $1,123,739 $1,285,535 $1,263,548 -<br />

Net Sales (Revenue) / Cash<br />

-<br />

from Sales 0.90 1.02 0.99 0.99 0.92<br />

Net Sales/Account<br />

-<br />

Receivables (RAW) 9.49 15.05 13.96 13.78 6.35<br />

Net Sales/Account<br />

-<br />

Receivables (CHANGE) 9.49 -9.61 8.27 12.69 -0.21<br />

Net Sales/Inventory<br />

-<br />

(RAW) 18.55 15.07 15.89 16.38 17.05<br />

Net Sales/Inventory<br />

-<br />

(CHANGE) 18.55 8.27 32.97 20.83 5.03<br />

Net Sales/ Warranty<br />

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

Expenses (Liabilities)<br />

Net Sales/ Pension<br />

Expenses (Liabilities)<br />

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

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• Net Account Receivables: $87,204 – 2003, $67,522 – 2004, $80,509 – 2005, $93,263 – 2006,<br />

$198,889 – 2007, – 2008<br />

• Inventory: $44,583 – 2003, $67,454 ‐ 2004, $70,711 ‐ 2005, $78,477 ‐ 2006, $74,110 ‐ 2007, –<br />

2008<br />

Sales Manipulation Diagnostics<br />

Actel 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Net Sales $149,910 $165,402 $178,947 $191,499 $197,043 -<br />

Net Sales (Revenue) / Cash<br />

-<br />

from Sales 0.88 1.02 0.96 1.02 1.02<br />

Net Sales/Account<br />

-<br />

Receivables (RAW) 7.30 9.35 7.08 8.70 10.88<br />

Net Sales/Account<br />

-<br />

Receivables (CHANGE) 7.30 -5.43 1.78 -3.84 -1.42<br />

Net Sales/Inventory<br />

-<br />

(RAW) 3.88 4.01 4.79 4.88 5.54<br />

Net Sales/Inventory<br />

-<br />

(CHANGE) 3.88 6.07 -3.52 6.86 -1.53<br />

Net Sales/ Warranty Expenses<br />

(Liabilities)<br />

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

Net Sales/ Pension Expenses<br />

(Liabilities)<br />

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

• Net Account Receivables: $20,537 – 2003, $17,686 – 2004, $25,287– 2005, $22,017 – 2006,<br />

$18,116 – 2007, – 2008<br />

• Inventory: $38,664 – 2003, $41,218 ‐ 2004, $37,372 ‐ 2005, $39,203 ‐ 2006, $35,587 ‐ 2007, –<br />

2008<br />

Sales Manipulation Diagnostics<br />

Lattice 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Net Sales $209,662 $225,832 $211,060 $245,459 $228,709 -<br />

Net Sales (Revenue) / Cash<br />

-<br />

from Sales 0.89 1.03 0.98 1.00 0.97<br />

Net Sales/Account<br />

-<br />

Receivables (RAW) 7.82 11.53 8.95 10.89 7.81<br />

Net Sales/Account<br />

-<br />

Receivables (CHANGE) 7.82 -2.24 -3.70 -33.33 -2.48<br />

Net Sales/Inventory<br />

-<br />

(RAW) 4.50 5.89 7.38 6.32 5.72<br />

Net Sales/Inventory<br />

-<br />

(CHANGE) 4.50 -1.96 1.51 3.36 -14.09<br />

Net Sales/ Warranty Expenses N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

(Liabilities)<br />

Net Sales/ Pension Expenses<br />

(Liabilities)<br />

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

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• Net Account Receivables: $26,796 – 2003, $19,587 – 2004, $23,577 – 2005, $22,545 – 2006,<br />

$29,293– 2007, – 2008<br />

• Inventory: $46,630 – 2003, $38,364 ‐ 2004, $28,581 ‐ 2005, $38,816 ‐ 2006, $40,005‐ 2007, –<br />

2008<br />

Conclusion<br />

Using the Sales Manipulation diagnostic tests, Xilinx, in comparison to its competitors<br />

did fairly well. The net sales over cash from sales were in direct correspondence with<br />

industry patterns was around the ratio of 1. As for the net sales over the account<br />

receivables, Xilinx followed the current industry pattern. However, Altera was the<br />

company that caused some alert for potential red flags. Lastly, net sales over<br />

inventory, Xilinx was the company that performed the best in that ratio. All the<br />

companies were spread out across the industry but Xilinx was not under or outperform<br />

the industry.<br />

Overall, Xilinx had no potential red flags using the sales manipulation diagnostic ratios.<br />

With no potential red flags, that has proven that Xilinx has been able to create a<br />

business model that works. Xilinx’ model proves it can take its daily activities and<br />

convert them to a profitable return which is shown through the key success factors and<br />

key accounting principles.<br />

Expense Manipulation Diagnostic<br />

The expense manipulation diagnostic ratios can be used to perceive the value of a firm<br />

accordingly to analyze trends throughout an industry. These ratios are asset turnover,<br />

cash flows from operations/operation income, CFFO/OI (change), CFFO/net operating<br />

assets, CFFO/NOA (change) and total accruals over sales. These ratios allow firms’<br />

cash flows from operations to take a benchmark and ability to analyze future expenses<br />

based off the income statement. The ability to take the statement of cash flows in<br />

manipulation of a firms potential abilities, this is also evident during the forecasting.<br />

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These analyses are critical ratios for a company to depend on for potential red flags and<br />

trends within the industry.<br />

Asset Turnover<br />

This ratio is computed by dividing the net sales by the total assets. The total assets<br />

should correlate directly to the amount of sales that are being generated on a periodic<br />

basis. If a company has any type of “red flags” then that must mean the assets have<br />

discrepancies and items should be written off, expensed, or capitalized. For example,<br />

some good items are goodwill and research and development and can relate to the type<br />

two key accounting policies that could affect a firms’ financials drastically.<br />

As sales rise the total assets should also increase and the ratio should remain at some<br />

constant rate. If there is a growing/shrinking industry then that is when there will be a<br />

big increase/decrease in this ratio and would then show evidence of a “red flag.”<br />

Xilinx has a constant increasing variable, which is a great example of what a company<br />

should look like over a five year period using the asset turnover ratio (using the proper<br />

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lagged form of the previous year’s total assets). When comparing Xilinx to the industry,<br />

Actel and Xilinx are generally on track with an industry pattern and are fairly similar<br />

over this time period. Altera’s ratio slightly increases in comparison to Actel and Xilinx<br />

which could result in a big increase in sales or a drop of total assets and not being<br />

constant with the previous years. On the other hand, Lattice is the “outlier” and is the<br />

industry competitor “blacksheep.” Lattice shows a large disparity from the rest of the<br />

industry and then drastically increases its ratio in one year which is evidence and<br />

considered a red flag.<br />

Overall, Xilinx was on average with the industry patterns and contains no “red flags”.<br />

The healthiness of the yearly increase with this ratio, has given analysts the ability to<br />

forecast the futures sales and other main components to provide a clear understanding<br />

of what might happen in relation to this downturn in the economy.<br />

Cash Flow from Operations/Operating Income<br />

This ratio shows the cash flow of operations over the operating income during a year to<br />

year basis period. This ratio is a tool that utilizes both the income statement and the<br />

statement of cash flows to combine both financial statements to depict important<br />

information regarding the company’s earning. Any industry would like for its ratio to<br />

equal or to be around a 1:1 ratio showing that cash flows are correlated to operating<br />

income. The relationship is explained by understanding a cash inflow is the concept<br />

behind an operating income due to the possibility of that income is concept behind all<br />

the expenses after net revenues.<br />

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According to the graph above, from 2003 to 2004, Xilinx moved from a (2:1) ratio and<br />

dropped to a (1:1) trend for the rest of the years to create a pattern. Xilinx and Altera<br />

follow the same paths during these years with a drop from the (2:1) ratio. Actel does<br />

not follow the industry pattern with the rest of the companies which causes a “red flag”<br />

for that company due to its volatility. Xilinx, in general, does not have any “red flags”<br />

and follows the industry pattern. This “red flag” for Actel could mean potential financial<br />

instability issues when relating to forecasting.<br />

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The result from analyzing the CFFO over operating income in change form results in a<br />

different range in the volatility of this ratio compared to the raw form. Xilinx dropped<br />

to a -3.5percent, the lowest point in the industry by cash flows from operations<br />

decreasing from 2004 to 2005 by about 36%. In 2006, Xilinx bounced back and had a<br />

76% increase from 2005 to 2006 back to 5.35, which halted the assumption of a<br />

“potential red flag”. Altera was the “red flag” company showing a spike in 2005 with a<br />

ratio of 13.98. Overall, Xilinx does not have any “red flags” and perceives to follow the<br />

industry pattern of ratios between -2 and 6 percent.<br />

CFFO/NOA<br />

The cash flows from operations over net operating assets can be used for business<br />

activity decisions and can relate to forecasting, key success factors, and key accounting<br />

policies. A net operating asset is plant, property, and equipment (PPE) minus<br />

accumulated depreciation. This ratio compares how the cash generated by the<br />

operations, which uses this equipment, to how much the equipment should cost. The<br />

higher this ratio is the better it is for the firm. In the semiconductor industry, PPE<br />

contains a big part of total assets and utilizing these assets to generate the most cash<br />

from sales is a key concern for management. A ratio that takes into consideration the<br />

80


plant property & equipment (PPE) will prove to be very valuable in the future. After<br />

reviewing the financials, Xilinx has been purchasing new plants on foreign soil to<br />

expand their market share in the Europe, Asia, and Japan. Since, PPE is stable<br />

throughout the years we will use that item to help our forecasting decisions for the next<br />

ten years.<br />

The raw change of the CFFO over Net Operating Assets graph has shown two out of the<br />

four companies being “red flag” companies; Altera & Lattice. This ratio is supposed to<br />

be a high ratio to depict your equipment is properly generating a profit. Altera is<br />

extremely high and above the rest of the companies, which more than likely conflicts<br />

with their business models’ key accounting policies. This could be a positive if their<br />

equipment is generating a high profit, but the company could possibly writing off too<br />

much over the years to improve their financial picture. Lattice on the other hand, is in<br />

a continuing trend of declining over the years and has been considered an outlier as a<br />

competitor within the industry. As for the industry pattern, Xilinx and Actel follow the<br />

trend of staying within a ratio of between 0.80 and 1.56.<br />

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The changed form of this ratio shows the companies begin with ratios ranging from<br />

0.65 and 2.4. From there, the ratio fluctuates anywhere from -16.70 to 26.77percent,<br />

but these altering peaks do not follow a trend which does not create “red flags” for the<br />

industry or companies. As the graph shows, Xilinx follows the industry pattern as well<br />

as all the other companies and no “red flags” are evident.<br />

Total Accruals/Sales<br />

The accrual ratio determines the efficiency of receivables versus the total sales. The<br />

calculation is cash flows from operations minus the net earnings and then divided by<br />

the total sales for that period. The ratio is usually close to 1 which proves it to be<br />

generally stable and fluid with the operating activities. If the ratio is too high, the<br />

finances are relying too much on accounts receivable. But, if the ratio is too low, then<br />

sales are received by cash or other types of transactions that are not credit accounts.<br />

Using this ratio, the industry can portray trends and outliers will be marked as red flags.<br />

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After reviewing this chart, Xilinx is on par with the rest of the industry pattern that is<br />

from 0 to 0.2. This ratio places all three companies: Xilinx, Altera and Actel in an<br />

industry norm. In this case, Lattice is again singled out and draws attention to “red<br />

flags” and should be inspected thoroughly in the financial statements for misconception<br />

and an outlier in the industry. Although, Xilinx had a drop in 2005 because of the<br />

decline in cash flows from operations by 36% and a small increase in total sales by<br />

12.5%. Xilinx is meeting the industry norm, draws no attention to its financial<br />

statements and therefore, no “red flags” have been concluded.<br />

Expense Manipulation Diagnostics<br />

Xilinx 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Asset Turnover 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.54 0.58 0.59<br />

CFFO/OI (Raw) 2.22 1.32 0.74 1.19 1.59 1.37<br />

CFFO/OI (Change) 2.22 0.51 -3.50 5.35 -0.97 0.39<br />

CFFO/NOA (Raw) 0.90 1.29 0.80 1.37 1.34 1.44<br />

CFFO/NOA (Change) 0.90 -1.83 -16.70 15.57 1.13 -3.42<br />

Total Accruals/ Sales 0.19 0.09 -0.02 0.08 0.11 0.11<br />

83


Expense Manipulation Diagnostics<br />

Altera 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Asset Turnover<br />

-<br />

0.56 0.58 0.62 0.58 0.71<br />

CFFO/OI (Raw)<br />

1.65 1.00 1.29 1.41 0.99<br />

-<br />

CFFO/OI (Change)<br />

1.65 -0.12 13.98 -0.47 5.82<br />

-<br />

CFFO/NOA (Raw)<br />

2.04 4.65 5.16 4.56 1.37<br />

-<br />

CFFO/NOA (Change) 2.04 -1.64 26.77 27.01 1.70 -<br />

Total Accruals/ Sales<br />

0.21 0.04 0.12 0.08 -0.01<br />

-<br />

Expense Manipulation Diagnostics<br />

Actel 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Asset Turnover<br />

-<br />

0.47 0.52 0.49 0.56 0.54<br />

CFFO/OI (Raw) 6.12 -8.28 3.85 -2.72 -0.89 -<br />

CFFO/OI (Change) 6.12 2.25 1.80 -0.13 4.47 -<br />

CFFO/NOA (Raw) 1.00 0.43 0.95 1.08 0.42 -<br />

CFFO/NOA (Change) 1.00 -3.49 12.03 -1.79 -5.20 -<br />

Total Accruals/ Sales 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.07 -<br />

Expense Manipulation Diagnostics<br />

Lattice 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Asset Turnover<br />

-<br />

0.25 0.28 0.29 0.34 0.61<br />

CFFO/OI (Raw) -0.37 -0.09 -0.30 1.13 0.11 -<br />

CFFO/OI (Change)<br />

-0.37 -0.90 -0.20 -0.07 0.06<br />

-<br />

CFFO/NOA (Raw)<br />

0.65 0.13 -0.44 -0.31 -0.65<br />

-<br />

CFFO/NOA (Change)<br />

0.65 4.64 12.14 4.40 4.55<br />

-<br />

Total Accruals/ Sales<br />

0.60 0.26 -0.33 -0.07 0.92<br />

-<br />

Conclusion<br />

Xilinx, in comparison to its competitors did not have any “red flags” after the analysis,<br />

which concludes that there has been no manipulation in their key accounting policies.<br />

Xilinx has key success factors that follow a combination of cost leadership,<br />

differentiation, economies of scale and distribution to establish their competitive<br />

84


advantage. Using the ratios of Asset Turnover, CFFO/OI, CFFO/OI (change),<br />

CFFO/NOA, CFFO/NOA (change) and Total Accruals/Sales, they have proven Xilinx to<br />

follow the industry patterns and that their key accounting policies were consistent.<br />

After restating the financials, the asset turnover and cash flows from operations over<br />

net operating assets for forecasting but must use the type two key accounting policies.<br />

Those items that are affected are research and development expenses and the<br />

capitalization of goodwill. In general, the diagnostics have proven to be more valuable<br />

in relating an analysis to future business entities.<br />

Potential Red flags<br />

Introduction<br />

Red flags identify questionable accounting methods that demand further analytical<br />

research. Our previous discussion was centered on a couple key accounting issues<br />

(goodwill and R&D) that we have flagged as material; however, due to our extensive<br />

analysis on these subjects we believe it would be more beneficial to discuss other issues<br />

that materially affect the financial statements of Xilinx. Therefore, we will discuss two<br />

new financial topics: available-for-sale securities and operating leases.<br />

Available-for-Sale Securities<br />

Given the recent market turmoil, the slowing economic progress and the relative size of<br />

Xilinx’s available-for-sale portfolio, we believe it is appropriate to take a closer look at<br />

the quality of their investment management. The estimate fair value of their portfolio is<br />

$1.8 billion.<br />

The decreasing fair value is not surprising given the current environment. The red flag<br />

is that they do not show investments in mortgage-backed securities or asset-backed<br />

securities until March 31, 2007; this means that these investments were made at the<br />

beginning of the market melt-down resulting from mortgage defaults. Xilinx has<br />

marked down their asset-backed securities for both 2007 and 2008; however, Xilinx<br />

85


shows a net gain of $3,849,000 on mortgage-back securities for 2008. Although this<br />

amount is immaterial in the current period, Xilinx has a increased its total investment in<br />

mortgage-backed securities since 2007 and has a total amortized cost of $139,825,000<br />

relating to these securities. The complexity and lack of disclosure makes it impossible<br />

to estimate the accuracy of Xilinx’s statements, however we remain suspicious of gains<br />

in these securities. Furthermore, Xilinx has made insignificant write downs on their<br />

auction rate securities and in the year ending March 29, 2008 they showed no write<br />

down. Again, given the current market situation we find these actions suspicious.<br />

Operating Leases<br />

Significant contractual obligations exist and will have an adverse effect on liquidity. A<br />

portion of the “facilities, office buildings, and land are under non-cancelable operating<br />

leases that expire at various dates through November 2035” (Xilinx 10-K). The<br />

following table denotes the minimum lease payments obligated under non-cancelable<br />

operating leases:<br />

Year<br />

Noncancelable<br />

obligation<br />

% of Long<br />

Term<br />

Liabilities<br />

2009 10,250 1.11%<br />

2010 8,142 1.01%<br />

2011 6,077 0.88%<br />

2012 1,804 0.31%<br />

2013 1,559 0.29%<br />

Thereafter 3,431 N/A<br />

31,263 N/A<br />

Source: Xilinx 10-K<br />

Additional “commitments at March 29, 2008 totaled $74.3 million and consisted of<br />

purchases of inventory and non-cancelable purchase obligations related to<br />

subcontractors that manufacture silicon wafers and provide assembly and some test<br />

services” (Xilinx 10-K). Xilinx also had $21.5 million of non-cancelable lease obligations<br />

through 2011 due to electronic design automation software providers (Xilinx 10-K).<br />

86


We believe that the total obligations from operating leases are material and could<br />

adversely affect Xilinx liquidity in the event of slowing sales.<br />

Undo Accounting Distortions<br />

Introduction<br />

Accounting distortions are created two ways. The first is when managers choose<br />

numbers that are either too aggressive or too conservative than the industry norm. The<br />

second is when an accounting rule changes the way the manager would report certain<br />

information that gives a less favorable view of the firm. Out of the above key<br />

accounting principles, restating foreign currency exchange and product warranty<br />

liabilities would have little effect on the firm’s balance sheet. However the restatement<br />

of both goodwill and research and development expense would have a substantial<br />

effect on the economic picture of the firm. Below, both goodwill and R&D expense are<br />

restated using capitalization rates which were calculated using an industry established<br />

norms.<br />

Research and Development<br />

In order to keep up with the rapid technological progress in this industry firms must<br />

expend considerable amounts of capital on R&D to keep pace with <strong>Moore</strong>’s law.<br />

Companies that fail to recognize this phenomenon will have products that become<br />

obsolete. Xilinx had the lowest investment in R&D (as a percentage of net sales) in the<br />

specialized-semiconductor industry; but they also spent the greatest amount in total<br />

dollars (over $358 million in 2008). Comparing R&D to net income is very insightful. If<br />

R&D expense is greater than 50% of net income then a portion of it needs to be<br />

capitalized. In 2008 Xilinx reported R&D as 95.7% of its net income. This is not<br />

unusual for technologically driven firms. Below is a table showing the calculations using<br />

millions to derive the capitalized amount.<br />

87


R&D expense Cap. Rate Cap. Amount<br />

2003 222.14 20% 44.43<br />

2004 247.61 20% 93.95<br />

2005 307.45 20% 155.44<br />

2006 326.13 20% 220.67<br />

2007 388.10 20% 298.29<br />

2008 358.06 20% 369.90<br />

To find the capitalized amount we multiplied the R&D expense by the capitalization rate<br />

of 20% and added it to the succeeding year, with 2003 being the first year. By<br />

capitalizing R&D we have increased the total assets for the years indicated.<br />

Disregarding taxes, the table below shows the expected effects on the balance sheet<br />

from 2003 to 2008.<br />

Capitalized R&D 44.43 93.95 155.44 220.67 298.29 369.90<br />

Total Assets (after adjustment) 2,466.10 3,031.42 3,194.64 3,394.23 3,477.65 3,507.01<br />

Retained Earnings (after adjustment) 1,263.01 1,615.51 1,918.31 1,555.20 1,214.58 1,174.94<br />

Total Stockholders’ Equity 1,955.17 2,577.00 2,828.95 2,949.56 2,071.03 2,031.72<br />

Total Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity 2,466.11 3,031.42 3,194.64 3,394.22 3,477.65 3,507.01<br />

The table above shows the increase in total assets, retained earnings and stockholders’<br />

equity on the balance sheet if you capitalized R&D at a rate of 20%. The table below<br />

shows the effect on the income statement in millions by capitalizing R&D.<br />

Operating Expense 526.76 540.74 624.91 657.07 776.33 730.19<br />

Capitalized R&D 44.43 93.95 155.44 220.67 298.29 369.90<br />

Net Income (after adjustment) 170.135 396.94 468.16 574.82 648.96 743.95<br />

88


As the table above indicate, by capitalizing R&D the total operating expenses decrease<br />

thus increasing the operating income and leading to a higher net income in certain<br />

years. After capitalizing R&D expense the percentage of net income comprised of R&D<br />

expense decreased from 95.7% to 85% in 2008. This results in a much more accurate<br />

and realistic number for the financial statements.<br />

Goodwill<br />

If Xilinx from 2002-2008 wrote off 25% of goodwill a year the intangible assets would<br />

look very different, as indicated in the table below.<br />

(in thousands)<br />

Goodwill<br />

Company 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx 100,700 100,724 111,627 119,415 125,084 117,955 117,955<br />

Xilinx 25% a<br />

yr<br />

75,525 75,543 83,720 89,591 93,813 88,466 88,466<br />

Source: Xilinx 10-k<br />

This decrease in assets will have a major impact on how this firm values themselves<br />

amongst competitors. This is a clearer view of what the value of these assets should<br />

be. Xilinx needs to keep writing off goodwill in order for the investors to have a better<br />

understanding of the true value of this company.<br />

Conclusion<br />

By restating these accounts there is a minor difference in the balance sheet of Xilinx.<br />

After these adjustments there was an increase in total assets of 1% to 2%. The<br />

accounting policies that limit manager’s ability to report research and development cost<br />

has been undone. The overall affect was a 1% average increase from the years 2003<br />

thru 2008. With this relatively small amount of increase in net income would not<br />

obligate this company to make accounting changes in order to benefit the company.<br />

These changes have little to no affect on the financial statements.<br />

89


Financial Analysis, Forecasting Financials and Cost of<br />

Capital Estimation<br />

Forecasting expected future earnings remains one of financial analysts’ most important<br />

tasks, and it is a task that begins with current earnings. In order to accurately forecast<br />

earnings it is critical that we distinguish between contributions from ongoing operations<br />

of a firm and how much is attributable to extraordinary items (gains or losses that are<br />

unlikely to be recurring).<br />

To have a financial analysis of a company, you must be able to have a ratio analysis,<br />

forecasts, and the Weighted Average Cost of Capital. The ratio analysis will be<br />

determined by the three ratio categories: liquidity, profitability, and capital structure.<br />

The financial forecasts will be done by using the income statement, balance sheet, and<br />

statement of cash flows. The Weighted Average Cost of Capital will be concluded by<br />

using the WACC equation and previously configuring the Cost of Equity and Cost of<br />

Debt.<br />

Financial Analysis<br />

Financial statements are the source for calculating financial ratios; which are often used<br />

to compare how a firm is valued with how similar firms are priced by the market. This<br />

particular approach is called the valuation of comparables, or relative valuation, and the<br />

justifications for using this method are well founded. First, this analysis can be<br />

performed more quickly than other methods and with fewer explicit assumptions. This<br />

is an important point. The implicit assumptions are that the firms compared share<br />

similar business models, financing methodology, and customer base that relative value<br />

90


can be derived through simple comparison; these firms also share the same challenges.<br />

Second, this valuation technique is much less complex than other popular methods, like<br />

the dividend discount model, which makes it easier to explain. And finally, since the<br />

method attempts to measure firm value relatively rather than intrinsically, the resulting<br />

value is more inclined to reflect the mood of the market.<br />

Relative valuation is performed by comparing ratios that yield insight into crucial<br />

aspects of business and business management; these ratios are categorically organized<br />

under three headings: liquidity ratios, profitability ratios, and capital structure ratios. In<br />

order to perform this analysis we have collected five years of historical data for each<br />

company in the specialized-semiconductor industry.<br />

Liquidity Ratio Analysis<br />

The term “liquidity” refers to a firm’s ability to quickly convert assets to cash without<br />

having to dramatically discount those assets in the process. Liquidity ratios are used to<br />

measure a firm’s ability to pay short-term debt obligations, which arise primarily from<br />

the need to finance current operations. In addition to these short-term liquidity risks,<br />

these ratios measure default risk (the risk of a firm going bankrupt) of a company. The<br />

liquidity ratios commonly used in valuation are as follows:<br />

• Current ratio<br />

• Quick ratio<br />

• Inventory turnover ratio<br />

• Days’ supply of inventory ratio<br />

• Account receivable turnover ratio<br />

• Days’ sales outstanding ratio<br />

• Working capital turnover ratio<br />

These ratios are especially important to current and potential creditors to a firm.<br />

Creditor requirements vary widely, but all agree that larger ratios mean greater<br />

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liquidity, thus yielding a larger margin of safety for the creditor in extending credit to a<br />

firm.<br />

Current Ratio<br />

The current ratio is calculated by dividing total current liabilities into total current<br />

assets. A ratio below one indicates that there are more obligations coming due within<br />

the next period than assets a firm can expect to turn into cash; this situation indicates<br />

liquidity risk. The opposite would be true for a firm with a ratio above one, however,<br />

industry standards and a thorough understanding of the business model is required<br />

before determining an appropriate benchmark number.<br />

Additionally it is worth noting that there is a trade-off between minimizing liquidity risk<br />

and tying up cash in net working capital (net working capital= current assets- current<br />

liabilities). Generally speaking, firms should focus on reducing their current ratio to<br />

appropriate levels and managing their net working capital.<br />

The current ratio is the foundation of two additional liquidity measurements: the quick<br />

asset ratio and the cash ratio.<br />

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The chart above suggests that Xilinx has improved its liquidity over recent years. The<br />

improvement in firm liquidity is a result of substantial increases in cash and cash<br />

equivalents and building up their inventory related accounts (i.e. raw materials, work in<br />

progress, and finished goods). Also contributing to this improvement was the fact that<br />

all current liability accounts, with the exception of accrued payroll, decreased over this<br />

five year period.<br />

The current ratio of the industry has been on a continuous decline, albeit still above the<br />

text book benchmark of one. The industry may be struggling with inventory obsolesce,<br />

which results from the intensive pursuit of innovation amongst competitors. Xilinx has<br />

been outperforming the industry since 2005.<br />

Quick Asset Ratio<br />

The quick asset ratio is a variant of the current ratio; it is calculated by dividing total<br />

current liabilities into the most liquid current assets. The most liquid current assets<br />

include line items such as cash and cash equivalents, short term investments,<br />

marketable securities, and accounts receivable. This ratio yields a beneficial<br />

perspective into firm liquidity because it does not include inventory line item accounts,<br />

which have a variety of risks (i.e. obsolesce) and can easily manipulate the appearance<br />

of a firm’s financial position. Similar to the current ratio, higher ratios indicate greater<br />

liquidity; however, a ratio below one is not necessarily indicative of liquidity risk since<br />

inventory investments are not included.<br />

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Xilinx has experienced significant improvement in its quick asset ratio over the last five<br />

years, a result from its large increase in cash and cash equivalent. The large drop in<br />

2005 is a result from a declining accounts receivable account and a substantial decrease<br />

in short-term investments. The industry seems to be suffering from a sustained loss of<br />

liquidity, probably due to the same reason for the declining current ratio, which is<br />

inventory losses from obsolesce created by competitors.<br />

Inventory Turnover<br />

The inventory turnover ratio measures the efficiency of working capital management by<br />

looking at the relationship of cost of goods sold to inventory; it is calculated by dividing<br />

cost of goods sold by inventory. Inventory is carried at cost, which means that efficient<br />

management of working capital would yield a consistent ratio. All else being equal, the<br />

higher the ratio is the more effective a firm is at managing its inventory.<br />

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Xilinx seems to be unable to effectively manage inventory levels as seen by the volatility<br />

experienced by the ratio. From 2003 to 2004 the inventory account substantially<br />

increased, subsequent to 2004 Xilinx has experienced declining levels of inventory until<br />

2005 where inventory seemed to steadily climb back to peak 2004 levels. Although<br />

inventory can hinder short-term liquidity if obsolesce occurs, it is important that firm’s<br />

prepare adequately for future sales growth. However, Xilinx has not proved competent<br />

in predicting sales volume relative to inventory investments; thus instability in the<br />

inventory turnover ratio has resulted.<br />

The industry has experienced a fairly consistent level of inventory turnover ranging<br />

from 3 to 4, implying that Xilinx is slightly outperforming the industry benchmark.<br />

Mismanaging inventory investments (and ultimately working capital) can cause undue<br />

long-term financial stress. Investors must monitor this particular problem area for<br />

Xilinx.<br />

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Days’ Supply of Inventory<br />

Days’ supply of inventory (DSI) is merely an extension of the inventory turnover ratio.<br />

It measures the speed with which inventory is turned into sales revenue. A low DSI is<br />

better because it implies that inventory is being sold quickly. A large DSI will hurt the<br />

firm in the “money merry-go-round” because inventory is not being sold quickly and<br />

there is a slowing of cash inflows.<br />

Xilinx’s mismanagement of inventory is justified by the DSI, which continues from 2003-<br />

2006 to increase, implying weakening demand for their products, obsolesce, or some<br />

other cause that hinders sales. The ratio begins to decline subsequent to 2006; this is<br />

a result of decreasing inventory levels not an increase in sales. Although liquidity<br />

seems to be returning it is far from its 2003 levels. Xilinx must manage inventory and<br />

sales more efficiently. The industry is becoming more efficient in managing inventory<br />

levels and sales growth. Xilinx is once again underperforming the industry in the sense<br />

that they are getting worse while the industry is improving. Regardless that Xilinx’s DSI<br />

only recently exceeded the industry average, the momentum for the industry is<br />

downward while the momentum for Xilinx is upward. Investors must monitor this issue<br />

carefully since recent economic outlook is diming.<br />

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Accounts Receivables Turnover<br />

The accounts receivable turnover ratio, similar to the inventory turnover ratio, measures<br />

the efficiency of working capital management by looking at the relationship of sales to<br />

accounts receivable; it is calculated by dividing accounts receivable into sales. The ratio<br />

will increase (decrease) as a firm becomes more efficient (inefficient) at asset<br />

management. If a company experiences sustaining decreases it may need to modify<br />

credit policies and search for ways to increase its collection of receivables.<br />

Xilinx experienced continuous improvement in collection efficiencies from 2004 to 2007;<br />

this is due to a steadily declining accounts receivable balance and an equally steady<br />

increase in total sales during that period. Credit policies prove to be effective because<br />

the general extension period to pay short-term debt is 30 days. The dramatic downturn<br />

from 2007 to 2008 is due to a significant increase in accounts receivable. This should<br />

only be of concern if it continues beyond the fiscal year 2008 because the firms overall<br />

credit policies have not changed.<br />

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The industry as a whole has followed a similar pattern as Xilinx and increased collection<br />

efficiencies from 2004 to 2007. The only company to continue to increase collection<br />

efficiencies from 2007 to 2008 is Altera; this is a signal that the industry’s overall credit<br />

policies are changing and larger amounts of credit are being extended by all<br />

competitors. This is probably due to pressure from distributors, which are the<br />

industry’s largest customer.<br />

Days’ Sales Outstanding<br />

Days’ sales outstanding ratio describes the duration of time (measured in days) that it<br />

takes for a firm to collect credit sales and it is an extension of the accounts receivable<br />

turnover ratio. The lower the ratio is the faster the firm is at collecting credit sales, and<br />

the opposite is true for higher ratios; this has a significant impact on cash inflows to a<br />

firm and therefore is very relevant when analyzing short-term liquidity.<br />

Xilinx has mirrored the image of the industry average, but overall has underperformed<br />

over the last five years. Similar to the discussion of the preceding turnover ratio, Xilinx<br />

improved collection efficiency from 2004 to 2007 and regressed somewhat backward<br />

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from 2007 to 2008. By the end of 2008 Xilinx is practically in line with industry<br />

standards.<br />

Cash to Cash Cycle<br />

Cash to cash cycle is calculated by adding days’ sales in inventory and days’ sales<br />

outstanding. This ratio illustrates how long it takes a company to convert a cash outflow<br />

to a cash inflow. This is important for liquidity because variances in this ratio can show<br />

that a company is taking longer to receive cash inflows; the components of this ratio<br />

(DSI and DSO) allows analysts to see if a firms actual collections are appropriate in<br />

correlation with inventory and receivables policies. A lower number denotes greater<br />

efficiencies, liquidity, and consistent credit policies.<br />

Xilinx is effective in their cash to cash cycle and slightly outperforms the industry. The<br />

50 day increase in 2004 is due to the increase in days’ supply of inventory and slightly<br />

decreased collection efficiency; however overall Xilinx’s cash to cash cycle is trending<br />

downward. The industry is also experiencing a downward trending cash to cash cycle,<br />

signaling efficiencies amongst competitors.<br />

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Working Capital<br />

The working capital turnover ratio is calculated by dividing net working capital (the<br />

difference between current assets and current liabilities) into sales. This ratio yields<br />

insight into how efficiently working capital is managed (operating efficiency) in relation<br />

to total sales volume. The higher the ratio is the better the firm is at utilizing its<br />

operating capital.<br />

While Xilinx has on average outperformed the industry, their net working capital<br />

turnover ratio has been steadily declining since 2004; this implies that Xilinx is not<br />

effectively using its net working capital to generate sales. Net working capital (the<br />

denominator) over the last five years has grown on average by 13% while sales (the<br />

numerator) have grown by approximately 9.67%, thus mathematically justifying the<br />

declining ratio.<br />

The industry is experiencing an upward trend, which is a sign that operation efficiencies<br />

are enhancing the utility of working capital in generating sales. However, one caveat is<br />

that the dramatic increase experienced by Lattice skews the industry average upward.<br />

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Conclusion<br />

Xilinx demonstrates a strong ability to pay its short-term debt obligations by<br />

outperforming the industry in both the current ratio, quick ratio, and the cash to cash<br />

cycle. However, real concern arises when evaluating Xilinx’s ability to effectively<br />

manage inventory. They are underperforming the industry in both turnover ratios; and<br />

although they outperform the industry benchmark working capital turnover ratio it is a<br />

problem area for the company. The industry benchmark surpassed Xilinx at the end of<br />

2007, further justifying the need for management to take extensive measures to<br />

change inventory policy.<br />

The following table outlines the liquidity analysis.<br />

Ratio Performance Trend<br />

Current Ratio outperforming increasing<br />

Quick Ratio outperforming stable<br />

Inventory Turnover slightly outperforming unchanged<br />

Days Sales in Inventory underperforming stable<br />

Receivables Turnover slightly underperforming increasing<br />

Days Sales Outstanding slightly underperforming decreasing<br />

Working Capital T/O outperforming decreasing<br />

Cash to Cash Cycle outperforming decreasing<br />

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Profitability Ratio Analysis<br />

Profitability ratios focus on utilizing information from both the balance sheet and income<br />

statement to assess a firm’s ability to generate earnings relative to the costs incurred<br />

during the same time period. While financial statements allow for readers to estimate<br />

profitability in absolute terms, profitability ratios allow for investors to estimate<br />

profitability in comparable percentages. A thorough understanding of expenses<br />

(operating, financing, and capital) is necessary to truly gain perspective into the<br />

profitability of a firm. Operating expenses are subtracted from revenues, yielding<br />

operating earnings; financing expenses are then subtracted from operating earnings to<br />

arrive at net income; and capital expenses are depreciated or amortized over the useful<br />

life of the related asset. Profitability ratios focus on recurring expenses and disregard<br />

extraordinary items. The most commonly used profitability ratios are as follows:<br />

• Gross profit margin<br />

• Operating profit margin<br />

• Net profit margin<br />

• Asset turnover<br />

• Return on assets<br />

• Return on equity<br />

These ratios are especially important to potential investors because sustainable<br />

profitability can lead to greater market value and high dividends. For all of the ratios<br />

discussed, higher numbers mean greater profitability.<br />

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Gross Profit Margin<br />

Gross profit margin is calculated by subtracting cost of goods sold from sales and then<br />

dividing the sum by the sales in the current period. It measures profitability by<br />

revealing the residual cash available to cover additional expenses and contribute to net<br />

income. High gross profit margins are associated with efficient companies.<br />

Xilinx has slightly increased its gross profit margin over the last five years (from 59% to<br />

approximately 63%) because they have managed to dramatically reduce their per unit<br />

cost of goods sold by increasing volume. There are significant risks inherent in this<br />

strategy, but if sales forecasts are accurate this profitability will be transferred to<br />

shareholders. Demand for Xilinx’s highly technical products is stimulated by the<br />

markets need for technological innovation and efficiency; this allows for Xilinx and other<br />

industry participants to charge price premiums, which also increase gross profit.<br />

The industry’s gross profit margin has remained stable over the last five years and is<br />

believed to be sustainable due to the size and maturity of the major competitors in this<br />

market. It is key to note that Altera significantly outperforms every industry<br />

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participant; at one point Altera outperforms Xilinx by 10 percent. Xilinx is in line with<br />

the industry benchmark.<br />

Operating Profit Margin<br />

Operating profit margin is calculated by dividing operating income by revenue. This is a<br />

measure of recurring or sustainable profitability; said another way, operating profit<br />

margin is a measure of operating efficiency. Operating income is presented on the<br />

income statement before interest and tax expenses; it subtracts an additional layer of<br />

expenses from gross profit. Higher ratios mean that additional expenses beyond cost of<br />

goods sold are relatively minor and that operations are efficient.<br />

Xilinx demonstrates operating efficiency as it strongly outperforms the industry<br />

benchmark. Unlike gross profit margin, Xilinx’s operating profit margin seems to be<br />

more stable. The slight dip experienced from 2006 to 2008 is due substantial increases<br />

in research and development (R&D) and selling, general, and administrative costs<br />

(SGA); R&D expenditures returned to normal levels in 2008. The 40% difference<br />

between gross profit and operating profit suggests that R&D and SGA expenses are<br />

substantial portions of Xilinx’s cost structure. Xilinx has demonstrated an ability to<br />

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manage these costs and maintain stability over time, which are a profitable talents and<br />

definitely advantageous for the firm.<br />

The restated operating profit margin increases more smoothly after capitalizing 20% of<br />

R&D expenditures; this is much different from the original operating profit margin<br />

presented in the financial statements. This means Xilinx has actually increased its<br />

operating profits over the last five years.<br />

The industry improved operating efficiency until 2007 when all gains were lost and<br />

operating profit margin went negative. However, Lattice skews the industry average.<br />

It is important to note that Altera is doing particularly well in managing their cost<br />

structure as well and outperformed Xilinx before adjustments.<br />

Net Profit Margin<br />

This ratio communicates how much net income or profit is earned from each sales<br />

dollar. Net profit margin is computed by dividing net income by total sales. A firm that<br />

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is able to grow net profit margins over time will also experience growth in its market<br />

value (denoted by share price). Similarly, firms that demonstrate declining net profit<br />

margins will experience decreased share price and could potentially struggle to raise<br />

money in capital markets. Net profit margin is expressed as a percentage; the higher<br />

the percentage is the more profitable the firm.<br />

Xilinx has demonstrated sustainable stability of the last four years and is well above the<br />

industry benchmark. However, the table above illustrates that Altera is the most<br />

profitable firm in the specialized-semiconductor industry. This is a significant threat to<br />

Xilinx and could greatly affect its long-term ability to raise money in capital markets<br />

because investors are only interested in the most profitable firms. So although Xilinx is<br />

outperforming the industry benchmark, they must strive to reduce their total costs in<br />

order to increase firm profitability.<br />

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The restated net profit margin for Xilinx becomes much more profitable when 20% of<br />

R&D expenditures are capitalized. This is significant because it implies that<br />

management is actually increasing operating efficiency and making the business more<br />

profitable.<br />

The industry benchmark is once again skewed because of Lattice’s weak performance;<br />

if thrown out the industry would have an average profitability of approximately 10%<br />

and would demonstrate stability over time.<br />

Asset Turnover<br />

Asset turnover is calculated by dividing total assets from the previous period into sales<br />

of the current period. This ratio demonstrates what is known as the lag effect because<br />

the sales in the current period are derived from the assets of the preceding period.<br />

Asset turnover is a measure of asset productivity; said another way, asset turnover is a<br />

measure of firm’s ability to generate revenue from its assets. It is important because it<br />

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connects the income statement to the balance sheet. The higher a ratio becomes the<br />

more effective a firm is at managing its assets.<br />

Xilinx has experienced a significant improvement (10%) in asset productivity. Over the<br />

last five years its total sales revenue has increased by approximately 9.67% while total<br />

assets have increased by only 2%; implying that management can generate<br />

significantly higher sales with only a minor increase in its asset base. Additional<br />

revenue is derived from long-term contracts with outside manufacturers and<br />

distributors, which allows for Xilinx to essentially use more assets than presented on<br />

their books; this strategy helps drive asset productivity upward.<br />

Increased asset productivity has been experienced by the entire industry and once<br />

again Altera has outperformed Xilinx, even as Xilinx outperforms the industry<br />

benchmark.<br />

Return on Assets<br />

A firm’s return on assets (ROA) measures how efficiently profits are generated from its<br />

assets; said differently, ROA is indicative of firm profitability relative to assets available<br />

to generate earnings. This ratio varies widely by industry and one must be cautious<br />

when comparing firms. It is standard to compare a firm’s ROA over time to gauge<br />

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efficient use of assets for profit generation. ROA is calculated by dividing net income<br />

from the current period by the total assets in the previous period, demonstrating the<br />

lag principle. The lag is justified because the net income earned in the current period is<br />

generated by the previous period’s assets. The high the ROA is the more profitable the<br />

firm.<br />

Xilinx experienced a significant increase in its ROA in 2003 as a result of a substantial<br />

increase in net income of 97%; subsequent to 2003 net income grew by an average of<br />

3% while total assets grew by 2%. The proportionate growth in both net income and<br />

total assets is the rational for the stability demonstrated from 2004 to 2008. Stability is<br />

important because over time it appears to be sustainable, which instills investors with<br />

confidence.<br />

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The restated ROA greatly improves after 20% of R&D expenditures are transferred from<br />

the income statement to the balance sheet. This presents Xilinx in a different light;<br />

they seem to generate more return from their asset base than their competitors. Xilinx<br />

demonstrates greater asset management than the industry benchmark, and is the only<br />

firm to continuously increase their ROA.<br />

The industry, if Lattice is thrown out as an outlier, would experience the same stability<br />

as the other three competitors. Altera outperforms the entire industry before<br />

adjustments. Xilinx outperforms the industry benchmark; however, their main rival has<br />

a 5% greater return on assets before Xilinx’s restatements.<br />

Return on Equity<br />

Return on equity (ROE) represents the profitability of the equity investors in the firm.<br />

The ratio is calculated by dividing the net income from the current period by owners’<br />

equity of the previous year. Since preferred shares are considered a hybrid debt/equity<br />

type of ownership, resulting in a unique type of claim to the firm’s assets, the net<br />

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income should be calculated after preferred dividends. The lag effect is again<br />

necessary and is justified by the same theory discussed earlier. ROE can be affected by<br />

several decisions because it is based on earnings after interest payments; this means<br />

that it is affected by the financing mix. Debt financing can increase ROE if the cost of<br />

borrowing is less than total return on capital, increasing profitability to equity investors.<br />

Xilinx experiences a substantial increase in ROE from 2003 to 2008. This is due to the<br />

substantial increase in 2003 net income previously discussed in the ROA section.<br />

However, the increase from 2007 to 2008 is due to a declining book value of<br />

stockholders’ equity. In 2007 Xilinx began to repurchase $800 million dollars worth of<br />

common shares outstanding, signaling that the firm believed the market had incorrectly<br />

discounted the share price. The current economic crisis limits Xilinx’s ability to take<br />

advantage of cheap debt financing; this could strain is ability to compete with Altera in<br />

terms of profitability in the short-term.<br />

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Once again, after adjustments accounted for Xilinx overall performance greatly<br />

improves. This is important because by the end of 2008 Xilinx has the highest return to<br />

equity holders.<br />

The industry, if Lattice is considered an outlier, is slightly increasing, but remains below<br />

both Xilinx and Altera. Altera’s ROE (before adjustments) is more profitable than Xilinx<br />

by 10% and has maintained a wide spread throughout the last five years. This is<br />

significant because investors are not likely to benefit from our restatements due to<br />

GAAP regulations; this implies that Altera will be the more attractive firm to equity<br />

investors and capital markets.<br />

Internal Growth Rate<br />

The internal growth rate (IGR) measures the highest rate of growth a company can<br />

achieve without outside financing. The significance of this rate is that it quantifies<br />

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maximum growth prospects for a firm not willing to explore financing alternatives. It is<br />

calculated using the following formula:<br />

IGR= ROA (1- Dividend Payout)<br />

The following graph illustrates the IGR for the specialized-semiconductor industry.<br />

Xilinx’s internal growth rate has remained stable over the last five years and has<br />

maintained a 5% spread over the industry benchmark.<br />

If Lattice is excluded from the statistical data the industry would have a smooth internal<br />

growth rate of approximately 8%. All else being equal, this implies the industry has a<br />

strong level of self-sustaining growth.<br />

Sustainable Growth Rate<br />

The sustainable growth rate (SGR) measures the maximum growth rate a company can<br />

experience without increasing financial leverage. Financial leverage is increased by<br />

taking on debt obligations. It can be calculated using the following formula:<br />

SGR= IGR [1+ (Debt t-1 /Equity t-1 )]<br />

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The following graph illustrates the SGR for the specialized-semiconductor industry.<br />

Xilinx has maintained a significant SGR, averaging approximately about 10% over the<br />

last 5 years. The industry, with exception of Lattice, is also experiencing a stable SGR<br />

level. This is important because it means that the specialized-semiconductor industry is<br />

able to grow by about 8% annually while maintaining consistent leverage ratios. This<br />

financial stability implies that the industry is approaching maturity, meaning the<br />

competitive landscape is not likely to experience significant volatile due to leverage<br />

financing; this outlook could be altered by further consolidation.<br />

Conclusion<br />

Xilinx has experienced an increasing gross profit margin, asset turnover and return on<br />

equity over the last five years. These measures should instill investors with confidence<br />

when comparing Xilinx to the industry benchmark; however, the more appropriate<br />

standard may be to compare Xilinx directly to Altera because Lattice is often an outlier<br />

and Actel seems to consistently underperform the industry benchmark. From that<br />

perspective Xilinx is struggling even with positive results. Their operating profit margin,<br />

net profit margin, ROA, IGR, and SGR all remained stable or unchanged. Stability in<br />

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these areas instills confidence that management is able to appropriately manage<br />

profitability.<br />

Xilinx presents a much more positive outlook when restatements are taken into<br />

consideration; instead of being dominated by Altera, Xilinx actually takes the lead in the<br />

areas affected by the adjustments. However, this is not likely to because GAAP does<br />

not allow for firms to capitalize any R&D expenditures, even if capitalization lends a<br />

more accurate depiction of a firms economic activities.<br />

Xilinx has outperformed the industry average in all seven of the preceding profitability<br />

ratios. However, Altera outperforms Xilinx in every area in profitability. Xilinx has<br />

displayed an inept ability to compete with Altera in regards to profitability. Future<br />

market share could be lost to this competitive threat if they do not continue to manage<br />

their assts effectively. The following table organizes our discussion of profitability<br />

Ratio Performance Trend<br />

Gross Profit Margin average slightly increasing<br />

Operating Profit Margin outperforming stable<br />

Net Profit Margin outperforming stable<br />

Asset Turnover outperforming increasing<br />

ROA outperforming stable<br />

ROE outperforming increasing<br />

Internal Growth Rate outperforming stable<br />

Sustainable Growth Rate slightly outperforming unchanged<br />

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Capital Structure Ratio Analysis<br />

The capital structure of a firm describes the way in which it finances the acquisition of<br />

assets through a combination of debt, equity, and hybrid securities. It is critical that<br />

analysts understand the way in which a firm uses leverage because it is a key tool for<br />

growth and the source of default risk.<br />

Debt to Equity Ratio<br />

Debt ratios attempt to examine whether a firm can pay back the principle and interest<br />

on outstanding debt.<br />

The debt to equity ratio is a measure of a company's financial leverage and is calculated<br />

by dividing total liabilities by stockholders' equity. A high debt to equity ratio could<br />

potentially generate larger earnings, but the cost of debt must not be greater than the<br />

return generated through leverage; bankruptcy can occur when the cost of debt is<br />

greater than the total return, which typically leaves equity holders with nothing.<br />

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Xilinx experienced slight deleveraging from 2003 to 2006; however, they experienced a<br />

substantial increase in leverage (216%) in 2006 when it issued $1.0 billion in 30 year<br />

convertible debentures. The risk of default has naturally increased; however, Xilinx has<br />

the right to call outstanding debt and debt holders have the right to convert their<br />

debentures upon the occurrence of contingencies outlined in the indenture. The ability<br />

to convert debentures is a dilutive feature that equity holders must be made aware.<br />

The industry has experienced a steady increase in leverage; possibly a sign that higher<br />

earnings should be expected by investors. The default risks associated with Xilinx’s<br />

increasing debt is manageable as their annual obligations are 3.125% and their total<br />

return on assets is approximately 12%.<br />

Times Interest Earned<br />

The times interest earned ratio measures how many times interest payments can be<br />

covered by income from operations; this is done by dividing interest expense into<br />

operating income. Interpretation of this ratio requires a firm understanding of the<br />

firm’s capital structure and financing goals. A high ratio could signal that a firm is not<br />

incorporating enough debt into its capital structure or is paying off its debt to quickly.<br />

Having a high ratio indicates good performance, but a firm could most likely earn<br />

greater returns by investing its earnings into other projects and borrowing at a lower<br />

cost of capital.<br />

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In 2008 Xilinx has a times interest earned ratio of 8.04, which means that Xilinx could<br />

pay their interest expense 8.04 times with their income from operations. This<br />

demonstrates financial strength and contributes to the going concern assumption. The<br />

industry has experienced some volatility and has been trending downward in recent<br />

years. This indicates that either interest expense is rising or income from operations is<br />

decreasing.<br />

Debt Service Margin<br />

The Debt Service Margin measures the adequacy of cash provided by operations in<br />

cover required annual installment payments on the principal amount of long-term<br />

liabilities. Debt service margin is found by dividing installments due on long-term debt<br />

from the previous year into cash provided by operations. A higher debt service<br />

indicates better performance and ability to pay off debt with cash flows from<br />

operations.<br />

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Xilinx had a debt service margin of 1.92 in 2008 which is much higher than the industry<br />

average of .57. This is important because it indicates that Xilinx has a financing<br />

advantage over the industry, which can aid in outperforming its competitors. Investors<br />

find cash flows from operations critical in determining a company’s long-term success<br />

and business viability. The volatility over the last five years can be seen as a minor<br />

threat; however, Xilinx has experienced greater cash inflows from operations since<br />

2005.<br />

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After adjustments Xilinx’s debt service margin decreases substantially; this results<br />

because when R&D is capitalized the operating cash flow decreases, ultimately making<br />

the ratio substantially smaller.<br />

The industry benchmark before adjustments remains fairly stable. This is an important<br />

sign that the industry has appropriately managed its capital structure and financing<br />

vehicles. The dramatic change experienced by Xilinx after adjustments completely<br />

destabilizes the industry benchmark.<br />

Z-Score<br />

The Z-score is a model designed to predict the likelihood of a public firm filing<br />

bankruptcy within two years. It accomplishes this by incorporating five different<br />

financial ratios in its model. The lower the score, the greater the chances are for<br />

bankruptcy. A score of fewer than 1.8 means that the company is in danger of<br />

bankruptcy according to the model, while a score of over 3 means that the company is<br />

healthy and more financially secure. A company with a score between, or equal to, 1.8<br />

and 3 are labeled in the grey area. The formula for calculating the Z-score is as<br />

follows:<br />

Z = 1.2A + 1.4B + 3.3C + .6D + .999E<br />

Each variable represents a financial ratio; these ratios are defined below.<br />

A represents working capital divided by total assets; it is a measure of liquid assets in<br />

relation to the size of the company. B represents retained earnings divided by total<br />

assets; it is a measure of profitability that reflects a firm’s earning power. C represents<br />

earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets; it is a measure of operating<br />

efficiency apart from tax and leveraging factors. D represents market value of equity<br />

divided by total liabilities; it is designed to detect possible share price fluctuations. E<br />

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epresents asset turnover; its characteristics have already been discussed. The<br />

following graph illustrates the Z-score of the specialized-semiconductor industry.<br />

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The semiconductor industry as a whole has a relatively high z-score and only lattice is<br />

of concern. Xilinx had a z-score as high as 6.58 in 2006 but is currently is in a grey<br />

area with a score of 2.63, which is explained by the $957,831 decrease in retained<br />

earnings. Xilinx’s Z-score is trending downward rapidly, a result of both the decrease in<br />

retained earnings as well as the shrinking credit market in the United States. Further<br />

deterioration of credit worthiness is a substantial threat because of Xilinx resent issue of<br />

a billion dollars in convertible debentures; this issue most be monitored actively by<br />

investors and potential investors. As for the restated Z-score is immaterially different<br />

from the stated Z-score, and therefore the analysis remains the same.<br />

Conclusion<br />

The capital structure ratios provide a unique insight into how a firm finances its<br />

operations. Xilinx’s debt to equity is trending upward over the last five years and is<br />

outperforming the industry benchmark. This resulted from a significant issuance of<br />

convertible debentures in 2006. This new debt contributes to the decreasing times<br />

interest is earned (TIE ratio), even though Xilinx is still outperforming industry<br />

standards. The debt service margin experiences a great deal of volatility and offers a<br />

completely different outlook after adjustments. To this end, we should consider that<br />

the debt service margin before adjustments demonstrates Xilinx’s ability to use financial<br />

leverage to increase its total return to equity holders. And finally, the consistency in<br />

Xilinx’s Z-score suggests that they are a credit worthy company; which is further<br />

verified by the fact that they are able to issue substantial debt. However, the Z-score is<br />

trending downward, a result of the concession of the overall credit markets in the<br />

United States.<br />

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Ratio Performance Trend<br />

Debt to Equity out performing increasing<br />

Times Interest Earned slightly out performing decreasing<br />

Debt Service Margin slightly out performing varies<br />

Z-score out performing varies<br />

Cost of Capital Estimation<br />

Cost of Equity<br />

The cost of equity (K e ) is the rate of return demanded by investors in exchange for<br />

owning and bearing the risks of an asset. Greater risk is rewarded with larger return<br />

and therefore has a higher cost of equity. The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is<br />

commonly used to derive K e ; the formula and variable definitions for the CAPM are as<br />

follows:<br />

K e = R f + β (R M - R f )<br />

R f is the risk free rate; R M is the market return; and β (known as the beta coefficient)<br />

measures the correlation between an assets expected return and the markets return.<br />

The risk free rate is the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield. Treasury bonds are used to<br />

measure the riskless rate because they are backed by government fiat. The risk of<br />

default by the government is non-existent because the government can always print<br />

money to meet their debt obligations. The beta coefficient is a measure of systematic<br />

(non-diversifiable) risk; it denotes how dramatic market movements affect an individual<br />

security. In the CAPM beta is multiplied by the market risk premium (MRP). The MRP is<br />

calculated by subtracting the riskless rate from the market return; it quantifies the<br />

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compensation received for taking on additional risk. Multiplying the MRP by the beta<br />

quantifies how significant market movements are in correlation to an individual security.<br />

In order to find Xilinx’s cost of equity we had to first estimate the beta coefficient. This<br />

was accomplished through a regression analysis. The yield curve in our regression<br />

analysis was completed using returns from the 3 month T-bill, and 2-yr, 5-yr, 7-yr, and<br />

10-yr nonfinancial treasury bonds. Each collection period was analyzed using returns<br />

over 24 month, 36 month, 48 month, 60 month, and 72 month periods.<br />

3 Month T‐Bill<br />

Months 72 60 48 36 24<br />

β 1.746216 1.404632 1.277579 1.263773 1.086833<br />

R f 4.07 4.07 4.07 4.07 4.07<br />

MRP 7 7 7 7 7<br />

K e 16.29351 13.90243 13.01305 12.91641 11.67783<br />

R 2 0.341978 0.249025 0.236898 0.230476 0.273319<br />

2 Year Nonfinancial Treasury Bond<br />

Months 72 60 48 36 24<br />

β 1.746985 1.407857 1.277547 1.261572 1.084086<br />

R f 4.07 4.07 4.07 4.07 4.07<br />

MRP 7 7 7 7 7<br />

K e 19.2289 16.855 15.94283 15.831 14.5886<br />

R 2 0.342453 0.250314 0.237565 0.230933 0.273503<br />

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5 Year Nonfinancial Treasury Bond<br />

Months 72 60 48 36 24<br />

β 1.743105 1.404129 1.269849 1.25218 1.077908<br />

R f 4.07 4.07 4.07 4.07 4.07<br />

MRP 7 7 7 7 7<br />

K e 16.27174 13.8989 12.95894 12.83526 11.61536<br />

R 2 0.340276 0.249142 0.23582 0.228987 0.272048<br />

7 Year Nonfinancial Treasury Bond<br />

Months 72 60 48 36 24<br />

β 1.741396 1.402166 1.266453 1.248022 1.075228<br />

R f 4.07 4.07 4.07 4.07 4.07<br />

MRP 7 7 7 7 7<br />

K e 16.25977 13.88516 12.93517 12.80616 11.5966<br />

R 2 0.339293 0.248547 0.234959 0.228035 0.271311<br />

10 Year Nonfinancial Treasury Bond<br />

Months 72 60 48 36 24<br />

β 1.739003 1.399074 1.262211 1.242937 1.071989<br />

R f 4.07 4.07 4.07 4.07 4.07<br />

MRP 7 7 7 7 7<br />

K e 16.24302 13.86352 12.90548 12.77056 11.57392<br />

R 2 0.338374 0.24773 0.233915 0.226846 0.270381<br />

Using the data compilation we chose the highest explanatory power (adjusted R 2 ) to<br />

find the results of our Beta. The adjusted R 2 quantifies the amount (as a percentage) of<br />

the dependent variable (Xilinx’s return) which is described by the independent variable<br />

beta. The regression analysis concluded that the most accurate beta from the data<br />

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collected was 1.747 (a result from the 72 month regression using the 2-yr nonfinancial<br />

Treasury bond yield).<br />

The chart below represents the beta stability of each 3 month, 2 year, 5 year, 7 year,<br />

and 10 year Nonfinancial Treasury Bond. Overtime, the stability for Xilinx’s beta has<br />

proven to be fairly stable in comparison to the amount of months that have been<br />

related.<br />

The representation of beta stability can be shown that Xilinx has a common trend,<br />

which is the same trend for r 2 . The fact that our beta stability is stable provides an<br />

understanding that our explanatory power is related as well. For example, if the beta<br />

decreased then we would not have much explanatory power.<br />

“The market risk premium investors demand as additional return for bearing beta risk.<br />

It is the excess of the expected return on the market index over the riskless rate. Over<br />

the 1926-2005 period based off the table from the book, the returns to the s&p 500<br />

index have exceeded the rate on intermediate-term treasury bonds by 7%.” We used<br />

these estimates to calculate the cost of equity by plugging them into the CAPM formula<br />

defined earlier. We calculated the cost of equity to be 16.29% by doing the following:<br />

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.163 = .0407 + 1.746(.07)<br />

After the size adjustment of .9% our CAPM is 17.2%. The decision to include .9% to<br />

the original cost of equity for size adjustment was based off our market cap in relation<br />

to using the size premium plus the CAPM.<br />

*Cost of Equity = Riskless rate of return + (Beta risk * <strong>Mark</strong>et risk premium) + Size<br />

premium<br />

Xilinx’ market cap placed us in the size range of category 8 out of 10. This places Xilinx<br />

in the third largest bracket that a company could be in according to this model. This is<br />

important because the model states the size adjustments have a direct correlation to<br />

the volatility of risk.<br />

Below we provide the results from our regression analysis for the calculation of the<br />

upper and lower bound for cost of equity. The original ranges of 95% certainty<br />

depicted the upper bound equity of 20.26% and the lower bound equity of 12.34%.<br />

While taking into consideration the size adjustments of the cost of equity, we followed<br />

the same method for the upper and lower bounds of equity and added in the same<br />

.9%.<br />

Upper Bound of K e 21.16%<br />

Lower Bound of K e 13.24%<br />

Alternative Cost of Equity Estimation<br />

A common alternative to estimating the cost of equity is referred to as the back door<br />

method. This approach is defined by the following formula:<br />

<strong>Mark</strong>et<br />

Book<br />

= 1 + ROE - K e<br />

K e - g<br />

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The market to book ratio is on the left side of the formula. The “g” variable in our<br />

calculation is the assumed historical sales growth rate. The other variables have<br />

already been thoroughly discussed.<br />

Rudimentary algebraic manipulation used to solve for the cost of equity yields a formula<br />

that appears as follows:<br />

K e =<br />

ROE + (P/B)g - g<br />

(P/B)<br />

According to Yahoo! Finance Xilinx’s market to book ratio is equal to 3.37. We<br />

calculated Xilinx’s return on equity to be 15.53% and their assumed sales growth rate is<br />

9.67%. Using these variables to solve for the unknown variable will yield a cost of<br />

equity of 11.41%. The spread between the two different calculations of cost of equity<br />

is due to the fact that some variables were taken from internet resources. The lack of<br />

disclosure from these resources lends to a great amount of uncertainty in calculation<br />

methodology, however, the fact that the spread is small aids in the verification of our<br />

initial cost of equity calculation.<br />

Cost of Debt<br />

The Cost of Debt (K d ) is calculated by taking the weighted average of short and long<br />

term liabilities over the total liabilities multiplied by the interest rates for each specific<br />

liability. The four liabilities that Xilinx listed were as follows: current liabilities,<br />

convertible debentures, deferred tax liabilities, and other long term liabilities all coming<br />

to a total amount of $1,465,284. Each interest rate was taken from one of the four<br />

resources, St. Louis AA Non-Financial Commercial Paper, Xilinx 10-K, 10-year Treasury<br />

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Constant Maturity Rate, and the 2-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate, to find the<br />

proper interest rates.<br />

For the short term liabilities, current liabilities was the first listed on Xilinx’ 10-K and<br />

stated as $340,666. These accounts consisted of accounts payable, accrued payroll and<br />

related liabilities, income taxes payable, deferred income on shipments to distributors<br />

and other accrued liabilities. The rates used for the majority of these liabilities were<br />

1.95%, which was the St. Louis AA Non-Financial Commercial paper rate. The only<br />

current liability that was different was income taxes payable in which we used the 10-<br />

year Treasury rate.<br />

For long term liabilities, these accounts had a higher interest rate due to the fact that<br />

there is more risk involved with these accounts and the nature of time associated with<br />

them. The largest account, convertible debentures, had the amount $999,851 and had<br />

an interest rate of 3.125% from the Xilinx 10-K. This account as by far the largest with<br />

68% of total liabilities and is the main driver for the cost of debt equation. Another<br />

long term liability that was listed was deferred tax liabilities for $84,486. The interest<br />

rate on this weighted average was taken from the 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity<br />

Rate of 3.69% and equaled 0.21. The last documented liability from Xilinx was $1,159<br />

for the other long term liabilities. We used the interest rate then received from Xilinx<br />

10-k rate for convertible debentures and resulted in a ratio of 0. With all the<br />

information at hand, the weighted average of short and long term liabilities are now<br />

added together to calculate the total Cost of Debt for a percent of 2.94%.<br />

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Short and Long Term<br />

Liabilities<br />

Amount for each<br />

liability<br />

Percent of<br />

Total<br />

Liabilities<br />

Interest Rates<br />

Resources<br />

Accounts payable $59,402 4% 1.95 St. Louis AA Non‐<br />

Financial<br />

Commercial Paper<br />

Accrued payroll and<br />

related liabilities<br />

$100,730 7% 1.95 St. Louis AA Non‐<br />

Financial<br />

Commercial Paper<br />

Income taxes payable $39,258 3% 3.69 10‐year Treasury<br />

Constant Maturity<br />

Rate<br />

Deferred income on<br />

shipments to<br />

distributors<br />

Other accrued<br />

liabilities<br />

Convertible<br />

Debentures<br />

Deferred Tax<br />

Liabilities<br />

Long‐term income<br />

taxes payable<br />

$111,678 8% 1.95 St. Louis AA Non‐<br />

Financial<br />

Commercial Paper<br />

$29,598 2% 1.95 St. Louis AA Non‐<br />

Financial<br />

Commercial Paper<br />

$999,851 68% 3.125 Xilinx 10‐K<br />

$84,486 6% 3.69 10‐year Treasury<br />

Constant Maturity<br />

Rate<br />

$39,122 2% 3.69 10‐year Treasury<br />

Constant Maturity<br />

Rate<br />

$1,159 0% 3.125 Xilinx 10‐K<br />

Other Long Term<br />

Liabilities<br />

Total Liabilities $1,465,284 100% N/A Xilinx 10‐k<br />

Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)<br />

The Weighted Average Cost of Capital can be configured before and after taxes to<br />

assume the percent available for financing assets. The WACC (before tax) is the<br />

calculation of the weighted sum of cost of equity added together with the weighted sum<br />

of cost of debt before taxes. Then if you would like to find the WACC after tax add the<br />

difference of 1 minus the tax rate and multiply that by the cost of debt at the end of<br />

the equation. The Wacc is important because it shows the amount the company must<br />

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eturn on its assets in order to pay off its creditors, owners, or other providers of capital<br />

to the company.<br />

Xilinx takes the market value of equity of $4.942 billion over the market value of assets<br />

of 6.45 billion to get the ratio of 0.7731 multiplied by the cost of equity of 17.2%. The<br />

next step is to take the market value of debt of 1.47 billion over the market value of<br />

assets of 6.45 billion to get the ratio of 0.2269 multiplied by the cost of debt of 2.94%.<br />

The Weighted Average Cost of Capital (before tax) is then added together by these two<br />

methods and then calculated out to be 13.96%. The Weighted Average Cost of Capital<br />

(after tax) is then calculated by multiplying the difference of 1 minus the tax rate of<br />

35% to equal 65%. After including taxes, the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (after<br />

tax) is then 13.73%. Also included in the table is the upper and lower bound Wacc,<br />

using the cost of equity’s upper and lower 95% confidence interval. This is done in<br />

order to show the highest and lowest amount with a 95% confidence interval that a<br />

company needs to return on its assets.<br />

Weighted Average Cost of Capital<br />

WACC(before<br />

tax)<br />

WACC(after<br />

tax)<br />

WACC<br />

Upper(bt)<br />

WACC<br />

Lower(bt)<br />

MVe/MVa Cost of MVd/MVa Cost of Tax Rate WACC<br />

Equity<br />

Debt<br />

0.7731 0.172 0.2269 0.0294 0 13.96%<br />

0.7731 0.172 0.2269 0.0294 35% 13.73%<br />

0.7731 .2116 0.2269 0.0294 0 17.03%<br />

0.7731 .1324 0.2269 0.0294 0 10.9%<br />

Forecasting Financial Statements<br />

Business valuation is fruitless without forecasting future financial statements. Future<br />

business value is derived from future cash flows, earnings, and prospective growth.<br />

Contemporaneously using business/industry valuation and relative (ratio) analysis lends<br />

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to more substantive forecasting analysis. The first step in forecasting financial<br />

statements is to create greater comparability by reformatting the financial data into<br />

common size statements. Trends are then identified and used to foster forecasts for<br />

forecast-able line items. The forecasted common size statements are then used to<br />

quantify future financial statements. We have forecasted out 10 years in this analysis,<br />

but it is important to note some of the errors inherent in forecasting. The future sales<br />

growth forecast is the foundation of the forecasted statements; errors made in the sales<br />

forecast will trickle down the financials. The further out forecasts are made the greater<br />

the uncertainty, regardless of due diligence. And finally, forecasting the statement of<br />

cash flows is highly susceptible to error. The forecasts are meant to be a tool in<br />

valuation; it is incorrect to view forecasts as perfect predictions of value.<br />

Income Statement Forecast<br />

The income statement is the most important financial statement in forecasting. The<br />

income statement is the foundation for both the balance sheet and statement of cash<br />

flows that will be discussed later. The basis for the income statement forecast is sales<br />

information. To forecast sales, one must estimate future sales growth. There are many<br />

factors when considering this future growth. There are many unknowns in forecasting a<br />

company’s sales figures because of unforeseeable future growth, acquisitions, or new<br />

product technology. There are also macroeconomic factors that greatly affect sales<br />

growth, such as a recession, expansion, or inflation. After sales figures, other line items<br />

we chose as being reasonably estimable are as follows: cost of sales, gross margin,<br />

operating income, and net income.<br />

As mentioned above forecasting sales data can be difficult. To understand the direction<br />

of Xilinx sales growth we must understand the source of Xilinx’s sales. Xilinx’s sales<br />

growth is based on customer demand for consumer electronics a sector that makes up<br />

more than 60% of Xilinx sales. The second significant portion of sales comes from<br />

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industrial applications which are driven by corporate investment. Therefore, after<br />

considering the recent economic recessionary environment, which has caused a<br />

significant decrease in consumer and corporate spending, the only viable conclusion is<br />

that future sales growth for Xilinx will be negative.<br />

2007 2008 2009<br />

Date Q2 06 Q3 06 Q4 06 Q1 07 Q2 07 Q3 07 Q4 07 Q1 08 Q2 08 Q3 08 Q4 08 Q1 09<br />

%<br />

change<br />

Quarter<br />

number<br />

Total<br />

year<br />

‐3% ‐4% ‐2% 1% 0% 7% 0% 3% ‐1% ‐10% ‐5%<br />

481,362 467,180 450,725 443,472 445,912 444,894 474,806 475,760 488,246 483,537 435,183 413,424<br />

1,842,739 1,841,372 1,820,390<br />

Xilinx 10-k’s<br />

The table above shows the quarter’s sales figures from the 2007 year all the way until<br />

the beginning of 2009. All of the numbers are stated until the fourth quarter of 2008<br />

and the first quarter in 2009. After looking over this data you can see that there has<br />

never been a variation larger than a 7% increase in the quarterly data over the past 10<br />

quarters. This gave us some estimate in order to properly forecast Xilinx sales in 2009.<br />

We believe that the fourth quarter of 2008 will decrease due to the major economic<br />

events that happened during this quarter which will be a major blow to our consumer<br />

sector which contains a majority of our sales. We believe that a -10 percent drop in<br />

sales is a reasonable number for the 2008 fourth quarters due to the scale of which<br />

economist are viewing our current recession. Then we believe it will move up to -4<br />

percent in the first quarter of 2009. The primary reason for these two percentages is<br />

two-fold; the demand for consumer electronics and automotive industry as well as<br />

corporate spending on new technology has slowed due to the recession. In years past,<br />

the strong demands in both areas leads to solid sales growth. While we acknowledge<br />

demand still exist in these sectors we believe that the downward trend of consumer and<br />

corporate spending will continue to decrease for at least the next two years beginning<br />

133


to rebound in the latter half of 2009. This is supported by the International Monetary<br />

Fund which states, “the advanced economies would be in, or close to recession in the<br />

second half of 2008 and early 2009, and the anticipated recovery later in 2009 will be<br />

exceptionally gradual by past standards” (IMF.org).<br />

Using these assumptions we estimated that the negative effect of macroeconomic<br />

conditions will lead to a negative 1 percent sales growth for Xilinx in 2009. This follows<br />

the trend of the past years while compensating for recessionary data. We then<br />

concluded that after the recession, sales would rebound slowly, acknowledging a likely<br />

economic turn-around which would result in an increase in spending spurring in an<br />

initial growth of 1 percent then slowly increasing 2 percent every two years until a<br />

target of 6 percent growth is reached in 2018. The other line items highlighted in the<br />

introduction of this section are all then based off a smoothed average of their percent in<br />

relation to net sales. It is worth noting that as forecast look further into the future<br />

estimation error is likely to increase due to undeterminable events.<br />

After forecasting the sales growth, you can use these numbers to forecast the cost of<br />

goods sold, gross profit margin, research and development, operating expenses, and<br />

net income. For cost of goods sold, we took the average over the last five years can<br />

calculated an average of 38% of sales and then took this number and times it by the<br />

sales for the forecasted year. With sales and the cost of goods sold numbers you can<br />

then get the gross margin. The research and development account was consistently<br />

20% percent of our sales, so with this you can get the forecasted out research and<br />

development cost. For operating expenses and net income we took the average<br />

number from the year prior and then applied the growth rate of the sales for that year<br />

to get these numbers.<br />

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Income Statement 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 1 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019<br />

sales growth % 20.92% 12.55% 9.73% 6.75% -0.07% -1% -10% -4% -1% -2% 2% 2% 2% 4% 4% 4% 5% 6% 6%<br />

Net revenues $1,155,977 $1,397,846 $1,573,233 $1,726,250 $1,842,739 $1,841,372 $488,246 $483,500 $435,183 $416,029 $1,822,958 $1,786,499 $1,822,229 $1,858,674 $1,895,847 $1,971,681 $2,050,548 $2,132,570 $2,239,199 $2,373,551 $2,515,964<br />

Cost of revenues $473,551 $529,968 $576,284 $657,119 $718,643 $686,988 $176,506 $177,400 $165,892 $175,114 $694,912 $681,013 $694,634 $708,526 $722,697 $751,605 $781,669 $812,936 $853,583 $904,798<br />

% of Cost of Rev of Sales $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0<br />

Gross margin $682,426 $867,878 $996,949 $1,069,131 $1,124,096 $1,154,384 $311,740 $306,100 $269,291 $240,915 $1,128,047 $1,105,486 $1,127,595 $1,150,147 $1,173,150 $1,220,076 $1,268,879 $1,319,634 $1,385,616 $1,468,753<br />

Operating expenses: 0.192 0.177 0.195 0.189 0.211 0.194<br />

Research and development $222,139 $247,609 $307,448 $326,126 $388,101 $358,063 $90,734 $89,500 $87,037 $97,321 364,592 357,300 364,446 371,735 379,169 394,336 410,110 426,514 447,840 474,710<br />

Selling, general and administrative $235,347 $266,664 $303,595 $316,302 $375,510 $365,325 $93,004 $88,100<br />

Amortization of acquisition-related $14,580 $9,725 $6,668 $6,976 $8,009 $6,802 $1,425 $1,400<br />

intangibles<br />

Litigation settlements and contingencies $6,400 $3,165 $2,500<br />

Stock-based compensation related to prior $2,209<br />

years<br />

Write-off of acquired in-process research $6,969 $7,198 $4,500<br />

and development<br />

Total operating expenses $472,066 $537,367 $624,909 $657,069 $776,329 $730,190 $204,699 $181,494<br />

Operating income $155,669 $327,135 $372,040 $412,062 $347,767 $424,194 $102,420 $95,635 $87,037 $87,782 $372,873 $365,416 $372,724 $380,179 $387,782 $403,293 $419,425 $436,202 $458,012 $485,493<br />

Impairment loss on investments $(10,425) $(3,099) $(1,418) $(1,950) $(2,850) $(4,621) $(29,001)<br />

Interest and other, net $24,628 $23,409 $31,603 $45,958 $85,329 $52,750 $5,705 $8,490<br />

Income before income taxes $169,872 $350,544 $400,544 $456,602 $431,146 $474,094 $108,125 $104,125<br />

Provision for income taxes $44,167 $47,555 $87,821 $102,453 $80,474 $100,047 $24,196 $22,300<br />

Net income $125,705 $302,989 $312,723 $354,149 $350,672 $374,047 $83,929 $81,825 $82,685 $87,088 $335,527 $328,816 $335,393 $342,100 $348,942 $362,900 $377,416 $392,513 $412,138 $436,867<br />

Net income per common share:<br />

Basic $0.37 $0.89 $0.90 $1.01 $1.04 $1.27 $0.30 $0.30<br />

Diluted $0.36 $0.85 $0.87 $1.00 $1.02 $1.25 $0.30 $0.29<br />

Shares used in per share calculations:<br />

Basic 337,069 341,427 347,810 349,026 337,920 295,050 278,165 $276,169<br />

Diluted 348,622 354,551 358,230 355,065 343,636 298,636 280,881 $277,714<br />

135


Common Size Income Statement<br />

2008 2009<br />

Forecast Financial Statements<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 1 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018<br />

Net revenues 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%<br />

Cost of revenues 40.97% 37.91% 36.63% 38.07% 39.00% 37.31% 36% 37% 38% 42% 38% 38% 38% 38% 38% 38% 38% 38% 38% 38%<br />

Gross margin 59.03% 62.09% 63.37% 61.93% 61.00% 62.69% 64% 63% 62% 58% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62%<br />

Operating expenses:<br />

Research and development 19.22% 17.71% 19.54% 18.89% 21.06% 19.45% 19% 19% 20% 23% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%<br />

Selling, general and administrative 20.36% 19.08% 19.30% 18.32% 20.38% 19.84% 19%<br />

Amortization of acquisition-related intangibles 1.26% 0.70% 0.42% 0.40% 0.43% 0.37% 0%<br />

Litigation settlements and contingencies 0.46% 0.18% 0.14%<br />

Stock-based compensation related to prior years 0.12%<br />

Write-off of acquired in-process research and development 0.50% 0.46% 0.26%<br />

Total operating expenses 40.84% 38.44% 39.72% 38.06% 42.13% 39.65%<br />

Operating income 13.47% 23.40% 23.65% 23.87% 18.87% 23.04% 21% 20% 20% 21% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%<br />

Impairment loss on investments -0.90%<br />

Interest and other, net 2.13% 1.67% 2.01% 2.66% 4.63% 2.86% 1%<br />

Income before income taxes 14.70% 25.08% 25.46% 26.45% 23.40% 25.75% 22%<br />

Provision for income taxes 3.82% 3.40% 5.58% 5.94% 4.37% 5.43% 5%<br />

Net income 10.87% 21.68% 19.88% 20.52% 19.03% 20.31% 17% 17% 19% 21% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%<br />

Net income per common share:<br />

Basic<br />

Diluted<br />

Shares used in per share calculations:<br />

Basic 29.16% 24.43% 22.11% 20.22% 18.34% 16.02%<br />

Diluted 30.16% 25.36% 22.77% 20.57% 18.65% 16.22%<br />

136


Restated Income Statement Forecast<br />

The following graph shows the result of the restatement of two items which both effect<br />

accounts on the income statement. The first of which is the capitalization of research<br />

and development expenses which has the effect of increasing operating income by<br />

decreasing operating expense. The capitalization effect changed the research and<br />

development expense from an average of 20 percent of sales to 16 percent of sales.<br />

With this change, it increased operating income by 4 percent. The second is the<br />

impairment loss on investment (goodwill) which created a bigger affect on the income<br />

statement over the capitalization of research and development. The net income<br />

dropped with this impairment cost of -3.6 percent compared to stated income<br />

statement, offsetting the increase in operating income due to capitalization. With this<br />

analysis, we can see why Xilinx impairing goodwill without capitalization of R&D can<br />

have a -8 percent decreases in net income. This is why companies do their best to not<br />

impair goodwill.<br />

The second is the impairment loss on investments (goodwill) which decreases operating<br />

income slightly although not offsetting the increase caused by the significant reduction<br />

in operating expense caused by the capitalization of R&D costs. We feel this shows a<br />

more accurate financial picture of the firm highlighting the value of the earlier discussed<br />

key accounting principle. The overall effect of this restatement is a 10 percent increase<br />

in operating income and a 9 percent increase in net income in each accounts relation to<br />

net sales.<br />

137


Actual Financials 2008 2009<br />

Forecast Financial Statements<br />

Income Statement Restated 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 1 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019<br />

sales growth % 20.92% 12.55% 9.73% 6.75% -0.07% 0% -1% -10% -4% -1% -2% 2% 2% 2% 4% 4% 4% 5% 6% 6%<br />

Net revenues $1,155,977 $1,397,846 $1,573,233 $1,726,250 $1,842,739 $1,841,372 $488,246 $483,500 $435,183 $416,029 $1,822,958 $1,786,499 $1,822,229 $1,858,674 $1,895,847 $1,971,681 $2,050,548 $2,132,570 $2,239,199 $2,373,551 $2,515,964<br />

Cost of revenues $473,551 $529,968 $576,284 $657,119 $718,643 $686,988 $176,506 $177,400 $165,892 $175,114 $694,912 $681,013 $694,634 $708,526 $722,697 $751,605 $781,669 $812,936 $853,583 $904,798<br />

Gross margin $682,426 $867,878 $996,949 $1,069,131 $1,124,096 $1,154,384 $311,740 $306,100 $269,291 $240,915 $1,128,047 $1,105,486 $1,127,595 $1,150,147 $1,173,150 $1,220,076 $1,268,879 $1,319,634 $1,385,616 $1,468,753<br />

Operating expenses:<br />

Research and development $222,139 $247,609 $307,448 $326,126 $388,101 $358,063 $72,587 $71,601 $65,277 $155,126 364,592 357,300 364,446 371,735 379,169 394,336 410,110 426,514 447,840 474,710<br />

RND EXPENSE CAP $44,330 $49,522 $61,490 $65,226 $77,620 $71,612 $18,147 $17,900 $17,407 $19,464 $72,918 $71,460 $72,889 $74,347 $75,834 $78,867 $82,022 $85,303 $89,568 $94,942<br />

Research and development (net) $177,809 $198,087 $245,958 $260,900 $310,481 $286,451 $72,918 $72,918 $72,918 $72,918 $291,673 $285,840 $291,557 $297,388 $303,336 $315,469 $328,088 $341,211 $358,272 $379,768<br />

Selling, general and administrative $235,347 $266,664 $303,595 $316,302 $375,510 $365,325 $93,004 $88,100 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16%<br />

Amortization of acquisition-related intangibles $14,580 $9,725 $6,668 $6,976 $8,009 $6,802 $1,425 $1,400 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%<br />

Litigation settlements and contingencies $6,400 $3,165 $2,500<br />

Stock-based compensation related to prior years $2,209<br />

Write-off of acquired in-process research $6,969 $7,198 $4,500<br />

and development<br />

Total operating expenses $427,736 $487,845 $563,419 $591,843 $698,709 $658,578 $204,699 $181,494<br />

Operating income $199,999 $376,657 $388,625 $392,361 $404,755 $398,747 $116,937 $109,955 $100,092 $61,322 $388,307 $380,541 $388,151 $395,914 $403,833 $419,986 $436,785 $454,257 $476,970 $505,588<br />

Impairment loss on investments $(35,606) $(27,907) $(32,923) $(32,689) $(31,439) $(32,339) $(4,621) $(29,001) 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%<br />

Interest and other, net $24,628 $23,409 $31,603 $45,958 $85,329 $52,750 $5,705 $8,490<br />

Income before income taxes $189,021 $372,159 $387,305 $405,630 $458,645 $419,158 $118,021 $89,444<br />

Provision for income taxes $37,804 $74,432 $77,461 $81,126 $91,729 $83,832 $23,604 $17,889<br />

Net income $151,217 $297,727 $309,844 $324,504 $366,916 $335,326 $94,417 $71,555 $80,899 $76,724 $323,595 $317,123 $323,465 $329,935 $336,533 $349,995 $363,995 $378,554 $397,482 $421,331<br />

Net income per common share: -3.56% -3.56% -3.56% -3.56% -3.56% -3.56% -3.56% -3.56% -3.56% -3.56%<br />

Basic $0.37 $0.89 $0.90 $1.01 $1.04 $1.27<br />

Diluted $0.36 $0.85 $0.87 $1.00 $1.02 $1.25<br />

Shares used in per share calculations:<br />

Basic 337,069 341,427 347,810 349,026 337,920 295,050<br />

Diluted 348,622 354,551 358,230 355,065 343,636 298,636<br />

138


Common Size<br />

2008 Forecast Financial Statements<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018<br />

Net revenues 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%<br />

Cost of revenues 41% 38% 37% 38% 39% 37% 36% 37% 38% 42% 38% 38% 38% 38% 38% 38% 38% 38% 38% 38%<br />

Gross margin 59% 62% 63% 62% 61% 63% 64% 63% 62% 58% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 62%<br />

Operating expenses:<br />

Research and development 19% 18% 20% 19% 21% 19% 15% 15% 15% 37% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%<br />

RND EXPENSE CAP 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%<br />

Research and development (net) 15% 14% 16% 15% 17% 16% 15% 15% 17% 18% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16%<br />

Selling, general and administrative 20% 19% 19% 18% 20% 20% 19% 18%<br />

Amortization of acquisition-related intangibles 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0%<br />

Litigation settlements and contingencies 0% 0% 0%<br />

Stock-based compensation related to prior years 0%<br />

Write-off of acquired in-process research 0% 0% 0%<br />

and development<br />

Total operating expenses 37% 35% 36% 34% 38% 36% 42% 38%<br />

Operating income 17% 27% 25% 23% 22% 22% 24% 23% 23% 15% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21%<br />

Impairment loss on investments -3% -2% -2% -2% -2% -2% -1% -6%<br />

Interest and other, net 2% 2% 2% 3% 5% 3% 1% 2%<br />

Income before income taxes 16% 27% 25% 23% 25% 23% 24% 18%<br />

Provision for income taxes 3% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4%<br />

Net income 13% 21% 20% 19% 20% 18% 19% 15% 19% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%<br />

Net income per common share:<br />

139


Balance Sheet<br />

After forecasting the income statement the next financial statement to forecast is the<br />

balance sheet. Like the income statement, forecasted sales will drive the majority of<br />

the forecast on the balance sheet. The ratio that connects the income statement to the<br />

balance sheet is the asset turnover ratio. The asset turnover ratio is calculated by<br />

dividing the sales in the current year by the total assets of the preceding year. There is<br />

a lag in this formula due to the fact that the assets in the prior year are the real assets<br />

that contributed to the sales in the current year. This is why we have to do this lag in<br />

this ratio. Our calculated asset turnover ratio of .58; algebraic manipulation allows for<br />

us to find future total assets by forecasting future sales. Other line items to forecast<br />

out are the cash, accounts receivable, and inventory. To do this we took the<br />

percentage of the account to its sum in that account, (Current Assets mentioned next<br />

paragraph) then times the previous year’s percent average to the sum in that account<br />

for the year forecasted.<br />

The next part of the balance sheet that needs to be forecasted is the non-current asset<br />

section. To forecast out non-current assets the most logical way is to take the average<br />

over the past five years of the percentage on noncurrent assets against total assets.<br />

Xilinx averaged 49.3 percent of non-current assets over total assets over the last five<br />

years. To forecast, you just take the percentage times the total assets in order for you<br />

to get non-current asset for that forecasted year. Within noncurrent assets is the<br />

forecasted out PPE and goodwill. PPE was forecasted by the last five years average of<br />

itself divided by total assets. This was 14 perecent, and then times this percent by total<br />

assets to give us our forecasted numbers. Goodwill we used the same methodology but<br />

took the average from noncurrent assets, instead of total assets. The next item that is<br />

then forecasted is current assets. To do this, you simply take the total assets of that<br />

year minus the noncurrent assets of the same year. With the current assets forecasted<br />

out you can then forecast current liabilities by using the current ratio. The current ratio<br />

140


chosen was more heavily weighted on the last two year to show the most realistic ratio<br />

number due to the current financials numbers. 5.3 was our current ratio number<br />

chosen for Xilinx. To get current liabilities, take the current assets for that year divided<br />

by the current ratio.<br />

The final aspect of the forecasting process for the balance sheet is the stockholders<br />

equity section. The first step in forecasting this section is the find the forecasted<br />

Retained Earnings. To get this we use the equation (=BB re + NI for year - forecast<br />

dividends for year). With the Retained Earnings, you can now forecast Stockholders<br />

Equity. To get stockholders equity you take the previous year’s stockholder equity and<br />

add it to the change in the present year R.E. and the previous year R.E. Now you can<br />

get the total liabilities by taking the total assets minus the total stockholders’ equity.<br />

One important item to notice is that our change in sales and total assets is different<br />

with sales changing from 2009 to 2018 are different because of the lagged asset<br />

turnover ratio used to calculate total assets affecting most of the forecasted items on<br />

the balance sheet. Our change from 2009 to 2018 in total assets was around 41<br />

percent, but the change in sales over the same period of time was 30 percent. If you<br />

change the sales years from 2018 to 2019 and compute the change, the sales now<br />

increase 38 percent which goes along better with our change in total assets.<br />

141


Balance Sheet<br />

Actual Financials 2008 Forecast Financial Statements<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018<br />

ASSETS<br />

Current assets:<br />

Cash and cash equivalents $213,995 $337,343 $449,388 $783,366 $635,879 $866,995 $769,476 $701,406 $659,792 $618,179 $593,452 $605,321 $617,427 $629,776 $654,967 $681,165 $708,412 $743,833 $788,462<br />

Short-term investments $461,600 $461,617 $412,170 $201,551 $502,036 $429,440 $469,237 $599,607<br />

Accounts receivable, net of allowances $197,690 $248,956 $213,459 $194,205 $182,295 $249,147 $205,480 $234,078 $216,321 $198,563 $202,534 $206,585 $210,717 $219,145 $227,911 $237,028 $248,879 $263,812 $279,641<br />

for doubtful accounts and customer<br />

returns of $3,634 and $3,737 in 2008 and<br />

2007, respectively<br />

% inv<br />

Inventories $111,504 $102,454 $185,722 $201,029 $174,572 $130,250 $140,372 $141,704 $148,591 $155,479 $158,588 $161,760 $164,995 $171,595 $178,459 $185,597 $194,877 $206,570 $218,964<br />

Deferred tax assets $150,147 $90,386 $125,342 $110,928 $100,344 $106,842 $95,861 $85,831<br />

Prepaid expenses and other current assets $40,346 $60,796 $66,476 $119,884 $104,976 $37,522 $52,072 $60,065<br />

Total current assets $1,175,282 $1,301,552 $1,452,557 $1,648,248 $1,700,102 $1,820,196 $1,732,498 $1,822,691 $1,691,861 $1,561,031 $1,592,251 $1,624,096 $1,656,578 $1,722,841 $1,791,755 $1,863,425 $1,956,596 $2,073,992 $2,198,432<br />

Property, plant and equipment, at cost:<br />

Land $72,974 $61,445 $63,521 $63,521 $94,187 $94,184<br />

Buildings $247,452 $226,833 $235,699 $246,550 $281,334 $288,338<br />

Machinery and equipment $254,616 $254,854 $285,445 $311,516 $337,037 $357,103<br />

Furniture and fixtures $37,108 $38,603 $45,147 $44,773 $47,639 $49,821<br />

Other PPL $612,150 $581,735 $629,812 $666,360 $760,197 $789,446<br />

Accumulated depreciation and amortization ($229,167) ($246,621) ($285,296) ($308,103) ($347,161) ($385,016) ($399,376) ($410,558)<br />

Net property, plant and equipment $382,983 $335,114 $344,516 $358,257 $413,036 $404,430 $398,882 $397,350 $423,527 $449,705 $458,699 $467,873 $477,230 $496,320 $516,172 $536,819 $563,660 $597,480 $633,329<br />

Long-term investments $434,369 $767,671 $766,596 $616,296 $675,713 $564,269 $607,253 $472,268<br />

Investment in United Microelectronics $209,293 $324,026 $246,110 $239,209 $67,050<br />

Corporation<br />

Goodwill $100,724 $111,627 $119,415 $125,084 $117,955 $117,955 $117,955 $117,955 $123,207 $123,207 $125,671 $128,184 $130,748 $135,978 $141,417 $147,074 $154,427 $163,693 $173,515<br />

Acquisition-related intangibles, net $18,690 $16,813 $20,004 $22,651 $14,626 $7,825 $6,399 $4,974<br />

Other assets $100,335 $80,670 $89,998 $163,802 $190,873 $222,432 $228,068 $233,590<br />

Total non current $1,246,394 $1,635,921 $1,586,639 $1,525,299 $1,479,253 $1,316,911 $1,358,557 $1,226,137 $1,372,639 $1,519,140 $1,549,523 $1,580,514 $1,612,124 $1,676,609 $1,743,673 $1,813,420 $1,904,091 $2,018,337 $2,139,437<br />

% of Non c. to TA $1 $1 $1 $0 $0 $0 $0<br />

Total Assets $2,421,676 $2,937,473 $3,039,196 $3,173,547 $3,179,355 $3,137,107 $3,091,055 $3,048,828 $3,064,499 $3,080,171 $3,141,774 $3,204,610 $3,268,702 $3,399,450 $3,535,428 $3,676,845 $3,860,687 $4,092,329 $4,337,868<br />

LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY<br />

Current liabilities:<br />

Accounts payable $41,739 $77,936 $63,172 $71,004 $78,912 $59,402 $63,867 $82,887 $70,764 $58,642 $59,815 $61,011 $62,231 $64,720 $67,309 $70,001 $73,502 $77,912 $82,586<br />

Accrued payroll and related liabilities $48,736 $54,607 $61,616 $79,260 $83,949 $100,730 $114,029 $96,990<br />

Income taxes payable $85,198 $60,430 $45,835 $30,048 $24,210 $39,258 $6,787 $9,172<br />

Deferred income on shipments to distributors $120,831 $150,979 $102,511 $126,558 $89,052 $111,678 $99,789 $94,141<br />

Other accrued liabilities $17,330 $37,178 $25,260 $38,154 $27,246 $29,598 $52,998 $35,773<br />

Total current liabilities $313,834 $381,130 $298,394 $345,024 $303,369 $340,666 $337,470 $318,963 $306,749 $294,534 $300,425 $306,433 $312,562 $325,064 $338,067 $351,590 $369,169 $391,319 $414,798<br />

Convertible debentures $999,597 $999,851 $999,552 $999,563<br />

Deferred tax liabilities $157,103 $73,281 $67,294 $92,153 $102,329 $84,486 $100,548 $95,639<br />

Long-term income taxes payable $39,122 $42,756 $73,631<br />

Other long-term liabilities $3,390 $3,470 $7,485 $1,320 $1,159 $1,138 $1,118<br />

Commitments and contingencies<br />

Total Liabilities $470,937 $454,411 $365,688 $444,662 $1,406,615 $1,465,284 $1,481,464 $1,173,586 $1,197,040 $1,220,494 $1,109,075 $1,000,881 $896,276 $861,022 $827,102 $794,721 $800,866 $847,000 $894,769<br />

Stockholders equity:<br />

Preferred stock, $.01 par value; 2,000<br />

shares authorized; none issued and outstanding<br />

Common stock, $.01 par value; 2,000,000<br />

shares authorized; 280,519 and 295,902<br />

shares issued and outstanding in 2008 and $3,502 $3,426 $2,959 $2,805 $2,761 $2,739<br />

2007, respectively<br />

Additional paid-in capital $744,166 $903,991 $906,929 $1,375,120 $849,888 $858,172 $822,891 $804,713<br />

Retained earnings $1,218,579 $1,521,568 $1,762,873 $1,334,530 $916,292 $805,042 $780,931 $764,949 $878,923 $992,896 $1,165,918 $1,336,947 $1,505,645 $1,671,647 $1,841,545 $2,015,344 $2,193,040 $2,378,548 $2,576,319<br />

Accumulated other comprehensive income ($14,855) $55,064 $204 $15,809 $3,601 $5,804 $3,008 ($12,507)<br />

Total stockholders equity $1,950,739 $2,483,062 $2,673,508 $2,728,885 $1,772,740 $1,671,823 $1,609,591 $1,875,242 $1,867,460 $1,859,677 $2,032,699 $2,203,728 $2,372,426 $2,538,428 $2,708,326 $2,882,125 $3,059,821 $3,245,329 $3,443,100<br />

Total Liabilities and Stockholders Equity $2,421,676 $2,937,473 $3,039,196 $3,173,547 $3,179,355 $3,137,107 $3,091,055 $3,048,828 $3,064,499 $3,080,171 $3,141,774 $3,204,610 $3,268,702 $3,399,450 $3,535,428 $3,676,845 $3,860,687 $4,092,329 $4,337,868<br />

142


Balance Sheet Common Size<br />

Actual Financials 2008 Forecast Financial Statements<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018<br />

ASSETS<br />

Current assets:<br />

Cash and cash equivalents 9% 11% 15% 25% 20% 28% 25% 23% 22% 20% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 18% 18% 18%<br />

Short-term investments 19% 16% 14% 6% 16% 14% 15% 20% 0%<br />

Accounts receivable, net of allowances 8% 8% 7% 6% 6% 8% 7% 8% 7% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6%<br />

for doubtful accounts and customer<br />

returns of $3,634 and $3,737 in 2008 and<br />

2007, respectively<br />

Inventories 5% 3% 6% 6% 5% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%<br />

Deferred tax assets 6% 3% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%<br />

Prepaid expenses and other current assets 2% 2% 2% 4% 3% 1% 2% 2%<br />

Total current assets 49% 44% 48% 52% 53% 58% 56% 60% 55% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51%<br />

Property, plant and equipment, at cost:<br />

Land 3% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3%<br />

Buildings 10% 8% 8% 8% 9% 9%<br />

Machinery and equipment 11% 9% 9% 10% 11% 11%<br />

Furniture and fixtures 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2%<br />

Other PPL 25% 20% 21% 21% 24% 25%<br />

Accumulated depreciation and amortization -9% -8% -9% -10% -11% -12% -13% -13%<br />

Net property, plant and equipment 16% 11% 11% 11% 13% 13% 13% 13% 14% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15%<br />

Long-term investments 18% 26% 25% 19% 21% 18% 20% 15%<br />

Investment in United Microelectronics 9% 11% 8% 8% 2%<br />

Corporation<br />

Goodwill 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%<br />

Acquisition-related intangibles, net 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0%<br />

Other assets 4% 3% 3% 5% 6% 7% 7% 8%<br />

Total non current 51% 56% 52% 48% 47% 42% 44% 40% 45% 49% 49% 49% 49% 49% 49% 49% 49% 49% 49%<br />

Total Assets 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%<br />

LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY<br />

Current liabilities:<br />

Accounts payable 2% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%<br />

Accrued payroll and related liabilities 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 4% 3%<br />

Income taxes payable 4% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0%<br />

Deferred income on shipments to distributors 5% 5% 3% 4% 3% 4% 3% 3%<br />

Other accrued liabilities 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1%<br />

Total current liabilities 13% 13% 10% 11% 10% 11% 11% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%<br />

Convertible debentures 31% 32% 32% 33%<br />

Deferred tax liabilities 6% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%<br />

Long-term income taxes payable 1% 1% 2%<br />

Other long-term liabilities 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%<br />

Commitments and contingencies<br />

Total Liabilities 19% 15% 12% 14% 44% 47% 48% 38% 39% 40% 35% 31% 27% 25% 23% 22% 21% 21% 21%<br />

Stockholders equity:<br />

Preferred stock, $.01 par value; 2,000<br />

shares authorized; none issued and outstanding<br />

Common stock, $.01 par value; 2,000,000<br />

shares authorized; 280,519 and 295,902<br />

shares issued and outstanding in 2008 and 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%<br />

2007, respectively<br />

Additional paid-in capital 31% 31% 30% 43% 27% 27% 27% 26%<br />

Retained earnings 50% 52% 58% 42% 29% 26% 25% 25% 29% 32% 37% 42% 46% 49% 52% 55% 57% 58% 59%<br />

Accumulated other comprehensive income -1% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%<br />

Total stockholders equity 81% 85% 88% 86% 56% 53% 52% 62% 61% 60% 65% 69% 73% 75% 77% 78% 79% 79% 79%<br />

Total Liabilities and Stockholders Equity 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%<br />

143


Restated Balance Sheet<br />

It is noteworthy that despite the change in goodwill because of impairment on on the<br />

restated balance sheet the asset turnover remained the same at .58, due to the small<br />

scale of the impairment. This means that the total assets are still going to be the same<br />

on the restated balance sheet. Due to this fact, the liabilities on this statement will be<br />

slightly incorrect because the assets will remain the same as on the stated balance<br />

sheet. The retained earnings, stockholders equity, and total liabilities, however, will<br />

change. The retained earnings will differ because of the new net income change due to<br />

the capitalization of R&D and impairment of goodwill. With this change, retained<br />

earnings increases in 2018 60 percent from stated to restated. This shouldn’t happen<br />

because the net income from the restated income statement sheet is lower than on the<br />

stated statement. Our group found that the method of getting retained earnings using<br />

beginning retained earnings plus net income minus dividend payments wasn’t what<br />

Xilinx doing on their balance sheet. The main problem was that the dividend payments<br />

were reported on the cash flow statement was not the number used in order to get the<br />

retained earnings. This is why the retained earnings increased so much from the stated<br />

to the restated balance sheet. The unreliable nature of forecasting dividend payments is<br />

a primary reason for this increase. If Xilinx does have this kind of retained earnings,<br />

however, the value of Xilinx, denoted by total stockholder’s equity, is significantly<br />

greater due to restatements. Common stock is indicative of market value; therefore, the<br />

prospect for future returns via the secondary market is promising. The stockholders<br />

equity increased 42 percent from the stated in 2018 dramatically increasing the value of<br />

the firm. The total liabilities began to decrease relative to the increase in stockholders’<br />

equity to make up for the amount in the total assets.<br />

144


Restated Balance Sheet<br />

Actual Financials 2008 Forecast Financial Statements<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018<br />

ASSETS<br />

Current assets:<br />

Cash and cash equivalents $213,995 $337,343 $449,388 $783,366 $635,879 $866,995 $769,476 $701,406 $659,792 $618,179 $593,452 $605,321 $617,427 $629,776 $654,967 $681,165 $708,412 $743,833 $788,462<br />

Short-term investments $461,600 $461,617 $412,170 $201,551 $502,036 $429,440 $469,237 $599,607<br />

Accounts receivable, net of allowances $197,690 $248,956 $213,459 $194,205 $182,295 $249,147 $205,480 $234,078 $216,321 $202,326 $198,279 $202,245 $206,290 $210,416 $218,832 $227,586 $236,689 $248,523 $263,435<br />

for doubtful accounts and customer<br />

returns of $3,634 and $3,737 in 2008 and<br />

2007, respectively<br />

Inventories $111,504 $102,454 $185,722 $201,029 $174,572 $130,250 $140,372 $141,704 $148,591 $158,425 $155,256 $158,362 $161,529 $164,759 $171,350 $178,204 $185,332 $194,599 $206,274<br />

Deferred tax assets $150,147 $90,386 $125,342 $110,928 $100,344 $106,842 $95,861 $85,831<br />

Prepaid expenses and other current assets $40,346 $60,796 $66,476 $119,884 $104,976 $37,522 $52,072 $60,065<br />

Total current assets $1,175,282 $1,301,552 $1,452,557 $1,648,248 $1,700,102 $1,820,196 $1,732,498 $1,822,691 $1,691,861 $1,590,612 $1,558,800 $1,589,976 $1,621,776 $1,654,211 $1,720,380 $1,789,195 $1,860,762 $1,953,801 $2,071,029<br />

Property, plant and equipment, at cost:<br />

Land $72,974 $61,445 $63,521 $63,521 $94,187 $94,184<br />

Buildings $247,452 $226,833 $235,699 $246,550 $281,334 $288,338<br />

Machinery and equipment $254,616 $254,854 $285,445 $311,516 $337,037 $357,103<br />

Furniture and fixtures $37,108 $38,603 $45,147 $44,773 $47,639 $49,821<br />

Other PPL $612,150 $581,735 $629,812 $666,360 $760,197 $789,446<br />

Accumulated depreciation and amortization $(229,167) $(246,621) $(285,296) $(308,103) $(347,161) $(385,016) ($399,376) ($410,558)<br />

Net property, plant and equipment $382,983 $335,114 $344,516 $358,257 $413,036 $404,430 $398,882 $397,350 $423,527 $458,227 $449,062 $458,044 $467,204 $476,549 $495,611 $515,435 $536,052 $562,855 $596,626<br />

Long-term investments $434,369 $767,671 $766,596 $616,296 $675,713 $564,269 $607,253 $472,268<br />

Investment in United Microelectronics $209,293 $324,026 $246,110 $239,209 $67,050<br />

Corporation<br />

Goodwill Restated $75,543 $83,720 $89,591 $93,813 $88,466 $88,466 $88,466 $88,466 $88,466 $94,291 $92,405 $94,253 $96,138 $98,061 $101,984 $106,063 $110,305 $115,821 $122,770<br />

Capitalized RND Expenditures $44,330 $49,522 $61,490 $65,226 $77,620 $71,612<br />

Acquisition-related intangibles, net $18,690 $16,813 $20,004 $22,651 $14,626 $7,825 $6,399 $4,974<br />

Other assets $100,335 $80,670 $89,998 $163,802 $190,873 $222,432 $228,068 $233,590<br />

Total non current $1,265,543 $1,657,536 $1,618,305 $1,559,254 $1,527,384 $1,359,034 $1,358,557 $1,427,453 $1,530,797 $1,547,928 $1,516,970 $1,547,309 $1,578,255 $1,609,820 $1,674,213 $1,741,182 $1,810,829 $1,901,370 $2,015,452<br />

Total Assets $2,440,825 $2,959,088 $3,070,862 $3,207,502 $3,227,486 $3,179,230 $3,091,055 $3,108,712 $3,135,196 $3,143,032 $3,080,171 $3,141,774 $3,204,610 $3,268,702 $3,399,450 $3,535,428 $3,676,845 $3,860,687 $4,092,329<br />

LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY<br />

Current liabilities:<br />

Accounts payable $41,739 $77,936 $63,172 $71,004 $78,912 $59,402 $63,867 $82,887 $71,320 $59,753 $58,558 $59,729 $60,924 $62,142 $64,628 $67,213 $69,901 $73,397 $77,800<br />

Accrued payroll and related liabilities $48,736 $54,607 $61,616 $79,260 $83,949 $100,730 $114,029 $96,990<br />

Income taxes payable $85,198 $60,430 $45,835 $30,048 $24,210 $39,258 $6,787 $9,172<br />

Deferred income on shipments to distributors $120,831 $150,979 $102,511 $126,558 $89,052 $111,678 $99,789 $94,141<br />

Other accrued liabilities $17,330 $37,178 $25,260 $38,154 $27,246 $29,598 $52,998 $35,773<br />

Total current liabilities $313,834 $381,130 $298,394 $345,024 $303,369 $340,666 $337,470 $318,963 $309,539 $300,116 $294,113 $299,995 $305,995 $312,115 $324,600 $337,584 $351,087 $368,642 $390,760<br />

Convertible debentures $999,597 $999,851 $999,552 $999,563<br />

Deferred tax liabilities $157,103 $73,281 $67,294 $92,153 $102,329 $84,486 $100,548 $95,639<br />

Long-term income taxes payable $39,122 $42,756 $73,631<br />

Other long-term liabilities $3,390 $3,470 $7,485 $1,320 $1,159 $1,138 $1,118<br />

Commitments and contingencies<br />

Total Liabilities $385,868 $606,404 $477,989 $387,315 $161,216 ($82,392) $1,481,464 $1,233,469 $469,478 ($294,513) ($518,702) ($616,201) ($709,897) ($799,398) ($825,642) ($850,042) ($872,363) ($859,372) ($809,965)<br />

Stockholders equity:<br />

Preferred stock, $.01 par value; 2,000<br />

shares authorized; none issued and outstanding<br />

Common stock, $.01 par value; 2,000,000<br />

shares authorized; 280,519 and 295,902<br />

shares issued and outstanding in 2008 and $3,502 $3,426 $2,959 $2,805 $2,761 $2,739<br />

2007, respectively<br />

Additional paid-in capital $744,166 $903,991 $906,929 $1,375,120 $849,888 $858,172 $822,891 $804,713<br />

Retained earnings $1,258,498 $1,556,225 $1,796,414 $2,023,728 $2,269,811 $2,465,163 $780,931 $764,949 $1,703,017 $2,641,086 $2,802,414 $2,961,516 $3,118,048 $3,271,641 $3,428,634 $3,589,011 $3,752,749 $3,923,600 $4,105,835<br />

Accumulated other comprehensive income ($14,855) $55,064 $204 $15,809 $3,601 $5,804 $3,008 ($12,507)<br />

Total stockholders equity $2,054,957 $2,352,684 $2,592,873 $2,820,187 $3,066,270 $3,261,622 $1,609,591 $1,875,242 $2,656,394 $3,437,545 $3,598,873 $3,757,975 $3,914,507 $4,068,100 $4,225,093 $4,385,470 $4,549,208 $4,720,059 $4,902,294<br />

Total Liabilities and Stockholders Equity $2,440,825 $2,959,088 $3,070,862 $3,207,502 $3,227,486 $3,179,230 $3,091,055 $3,048,828 $3,095,930 $3,143,032 $3,080,171 $3,141,774 $3,204,610 $3,268,702 $3,399,450 $3,535,428 $3,676,845 $3,860,687 $4,092,329<br />

145


Restated Common Size Balance Sheet<br />

Actual Financials 2008 Forecast Financial Statements<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018<br />

ASSETS<br />

Current assets:<br />

Cash and cash equivalents 9% 11% 15% 24% 20% 27% 25% 23% 21% 20% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19%<br />

Short-term investments 19% 16% 13% 6% 16% 14% 15% 19%<br />

Accounts receivable, net of allowances 8% 8% 7% 6% 6% 8% 7% 8% 7% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6%<br />

for doubtful accounts and customer<br />

returns of $3,634 and $3,737 in 2008 and<br />

2007, respectively<br />

Inventories 5% 3% 6% 6% 5% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%<br />

Deferred tax assets 6% 3% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%<br />

Prepaid expenses and other current assets 2% 2% 2% 4% 3% 1% 2% 2%<br />

Total current assets 48% 44% 47% 51% 53% 57% 56% 59% 54% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51%<br />

Property, plant and equipment, at cost:<br />

Land 3% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3%<br />

Buildings 10% 8% 8% 8% 9% 9%<br />

Machinery and equipment 10% 9% 9% 10% 10% 11%<br />

Furniture and fixtures 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2%<br />

Other PPL 25% 20% 21% 21% 24% 25%<br />

Accumulated depreciation and amortization -9% -8% -9% -10% -11% -12% -13% -13%<br />

Net property, plant and equipment 16% 11% 11% 11% 13% 13% 13% 13% 14% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15%<br />

Long-term investments 18% 26% 25% 19% 21% 18% 20% 15%<br />

Investment in United Microelectronics 9% 11% 8% 7% 2%<br />

Corporation<br />

Goodwill Restated 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%<br />

Capitalized RND Expenditures 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%<br />

Acquisition-related intangibles, net 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0%<br />

Other assets 4% 3% 3% 5% 6% 7% 7% 8%<br />

Total non current 52% 56% 53% 49% 47% 43% 44% 46% 49% 49% 49% 49% 49% 49% 49% 49% 49% 49% 49%<br />

Total Assets 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%<br />

LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY<br />

Current liabilities:<br />

Accounts payable 2% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%<br />

Accrued payroll and related liabilities 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 4% 3%<br />

Income taxes payable 3% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0%<br />

Deferred income on shipments to distributors 5% 5% 3% 4% 3% 4% 3% 3%<br />

Other accrued liabilities 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1%<br />

Total current liabilities 13% 13% 10% 11% 9% 11% 11% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%<br />

Convertible debentures 31% 31% 32% 32%<br />

Deferred tax liabilities 6% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%<br />

Long-term income taxes payable 1% 1% 2%<br />

Other long-term liabilities 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%<br />

Commitments and contingencies<br />

Total Liabilities 16% 20% 16% 12% 5% -3% 48% 40% 15% -9% -17% -20% -22% -24% -24% -24% -24% -22% -20%<br />

Stockholders equity: 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%<br />

Preferred stock, $.01 par value; 2,000<br />

shares authorized; none issued and outstanding<br />

Common stock, $.01 par value; 2,000,000<br />

shares authorized; 280,519 and 295,902<br />

shares issued and outstanding in 2008 and 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%<br />

2007, respectively<br />

Additional paid-in capital 30% 31% 30% 43% 26% 27% 27% 26%<br />

Retained earnings 52% 53% 58% 63% 70% 78% 25% 25% 54% 84% 91% 94% 97% 100% 101% 102% 102% 102% 100%<br />

Accumulated other comprehensive income -1% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%<br />

Total stockholders equity 84% 80% 84% 88% 95% 103% 52% 60% 85% 109% 117% 120% 122% 124% 124% 124% 124% 122% 120%<br />

Total Liabilities and Stockholders Equity 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 98% 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%<br />

146


Statement of Cash Flows<br />

The last statement forecasted is the statement of cash flows. This is the hardest<br />

statement to forecast due to its volatility and unreliability to forecast from year to year.<br />

Even with this statement’s lack of reliability it is still important to forecast out for<br />

investors. The three main parts that are forecasted for this statement is the Cash flows<br />

from Operations (CFFO), Cash flows from Investing (CFFI), and forecasting dividend<br />

payments to stockholders.<br />

Forecasting the Cash flows from Operations can be done several ways. They are<br />

CFFO/Sales, CFFO/Operating Income (OI), or CFFO/Net Income (NI). After finding<br />

these ratios we looked at which one had the most consistent data and for our case it<br />

was CFFO/Sales with an average over five years of 28 percent. With this average you<br />

can use the sales of that particular year times the CFFO/Sales percent which will give<br />

you the Cash flows from operations for that year.<br />

Cash flows from investing involve a different method of forecasting. Xilinx ‘s CFFI<br />

forecast needs include the fact that they actively trade in the stock market rather than<br />

focusing on investing back into the company. Additionally, we took the research and<br />

development cost then added the last year’s purchases in PPE and also added the<br />

change in PPE from the current year to the year prior.<br />

The last section to forecast and the toughest to forecast out the statement of cash<br />

flows was the Cash Flows from Financing. Due to the volatility of this section the most<br />

accurate way to forecast is to forecast the dividends paid to the stockholders. The<br />

average percentage increase paid to stockholders from 2005 to 2008 was around 5.5<br />

percent. With this growth estimate we then added this growth to the dividends ten<br />

years out.<br />

147


Cash Flow Statement<br />

Actual Financials 2008 Forecast Financial Statements<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018<br />

Cash flows from operating activities:<br />

Net income $125,705 $302,989 $312,723 $354,149 $350,672 $374,047 $83,929 $93,861 $140,791 $335,047 $328,346 $334,913 $341,612 $348,444 $362,382 $376,877 $391,952 $411,550 $436,243<br />

Adjustments to reconcile net income to net cash provided<br />

by operating activities:<br />

Depreciation $52,190 $53,666 $51,921 $53,326 $55,998 $54,199<br />

Amortization $20,260 $14,257 $11,141 $16,223 $17,926 $17,756<br />

Stock-based compensation $6,390 $3,767 $504 $90,292 $66,427<br />

Stock-based compensation related to prior years $6,969 $7,198 $2,209<br />

Net (gain) loss on sale of available-for-sale securities ($5,454) ($6,650) ($505) $4,981 ($814) $5,139<br />

Impairment loss on investments $10,425 $3,099 $1,418 $1,950 $2,850<br />

Convertible debt derivatives revaluation and amortization ($403) $254<br />

Write-off of acquired in-process research and development $4,500<br />

Noncash compensation expense $735<br />

Provision for deferred income taxes ($24,423) $49,974 $59,552 $26,032 $7,091 $669<br />

Tax benefit from exercise of stock options $17,093 $109,236 $51,854 $40,596 $35,765 $15,794<br />

Excess tax benefit from stock-based compensation ($27,413) ($22,459)<br />

Changes in assets and liabilities, net<br />

of effects from acquisition of business:<br />

Accounts receivable, net ($49,259) ($50,160) $35,490 $19,380 $11,911 ($66,853)<br />

Inventories ($14,858) $9,614 ($83,268) ($15,307) $28,617 $43,647<br />

Deferred income taxes $20,338 ($61,065) ($53,229) ($1,891) $3,532 ($891)<br />

Prepaid expenses and other current assets $45,384 ($10,035) $4,509 ($34,897) $35,652 $35,160<br />

Other assets ($4,447) $6,234 ($32,116) ($29,910) ($15,636) $4,404<br />

Accounts payable $5,008 $35,867 ($15,371) $7,811 $7,908 ($19,509)<br />

Accrued liabilities $15,084 $11,872 ($5,976) $18,917 ($10,939) $19,276<br />

Income taxes payable $20,331 ($83,709) ($23,572) ($687) ($5,244) $28,464<br />

Deferred income on shipments to distributors $51,050 $29,898 ($48,468) $24,047 ($37,506) $22,626<br />

Net cash provided by operating activities $345,000 $432,500 $275,486 $489,423 $551,568 $581,000 $158,497 $301,495 $515,991 $510,793 $500,577 $510,589 $520,800 $531,216 $552,465 $574,564 $597,546 $627,423 $665,069<br />

Cash flows from investing activities:<br />

Purchases of available-for-sale securities ($1,544,365) ($2,181,741) ($2,161,606) ($1,459,248) ($1,864,582) ($2,147,828)<br />

Proceeds from sale and maturity of available-for-sale securities $1,228,813 $1,855,933 $2,196,321 $1,812,580 $1,693,152 $2,380,055<br />

Distribution from United Microelectronics Corporation $10,693<br />

Purchases of property, plant and equipment ($46,049) ($41,040) ($61,377) ($67,040) ($110,777) ($45,593)<br />

Acquisition of business, net of cash acquired ($19,476)<br />

Other investing activities ($24,436) ($1,564) ($5,308)<br />

Net cash provided by (used in) investing activities ($355,138) ($354,798) ($45,095) $242,380 ($283,771) $192,019 $(98,619) $(20717.8) $96,134 ($410,071) ($439,070) ($446,026) ($453,121) ($450,813) ($465,195) ($480,152) ($490,339) ($504,655) ($529,458)<br />

Cash flows from financing activities: $100,722 $61,507 $64,563 $67,679 $80,403 $87,270 $94,412 $107,208 $122,768 $135,611<br />

Repurchases of common stock ($60,846) ($62,328) ($133,755) ($401,584) ($1,430,000) ($550,000)<br />

Proceeds from issuance of common stock $54,643 $107,974 $85,064 $100,949 $128,136 $125,612<br />

through various stock plans<br />

Proceeds from issuance of convertible $980,000<br />

debentures, net of issuance costs<br />

Payment of dividends to stockholders ($69,655) ($97,190) ($120,833) ($139,974) $(38928) $(86625) $(158171) $ (147,672.57) $ (155,794.56) $ (164,363.26) $ (173,403.24) $ (182,940.42) $ (193,002.14) $ (203,617.26) $ (214,816.21) $ (226,631.10) $ (239,095.81)<br />

Excess tax benefit from stock-based compensation $27,413 $22,459<br />

Net cash used in financing activities ($6,203) $45,646 ($118,346) ($397,825) ($415,284) ($541,903)<br />

Net increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents ($16,341) $123,348 $112,045 $333,978 ($147,487) $231,116<br />

Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of year $230,336 $213,995 $337,343 $449,388 $783,366 $635,879<br />

Cash and cash equivalents at end of year $213,995 $337,343 $449,388 $783,366 $635,879 $866,995<br />

Supplemental schedule of non-cash activities:<br />

Accrual of affordable housing credit investments $19,357 $0 $0<br />

Supplemental disclosure of cash flow information:<br />

Interest paid $0 $0 $32,118<br />

Income taxes paid, net of refunds ($62,984) $34,163 $52,026 $37,159 $39,330 $56,012<br />

148


Cash Flow Statement Common Size<br />

Actual Financials 2008 Forecast Financial Statements<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018<br />

Cash flows from operating activities:<br />

Net income 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%<br />

Adjustments to reconcile net income to net cash provided<br />

by operating activities:<br />

Depreciation 42% 18% 17% 15% 16% 14%<br />

Amortization 16% 5% 4% 5% 5% 5%<br />

Stock-based compensation 5% 1% 0% 26% 18%<br />

Stock-based compensation related to prior years 2% 2% 1%<br />

Net (gain) loss on sale of available-for-sale securities -4% -2% 0% 1% 0% 1%<br />

Impairment loss on investments 8% 1% 0% 1% 1%<br />

Convertible debt derivatives revaluation and amortization 0% 0%<br />

Write-off of acquired in-process research and development 1%<br />

Noncash compensation expense 0%<br />

Provision for deferred income taxes -19% 16% 19% 7% 2% 0%<br />

Tax benefit from exercise of stock options 14% 36% 17% 11% 10% 4%<br />

Excess tax benefit from stock-based compensation -8% -6%<br />

Changes in assets and liabilities, net<br />

of effects from acquisition of business:<br />

Accounts receivable, net -39% -17% 11% 5% 3% -18%<br />

Inventories -12% 3% -27% -4% 8% 12%<br />

Deferred income taxes 16% -20% -17% -1% 1% 0%<br />

Prepaid expenses and other current assets 36% -3% 1% -10% 10% 9%<br />

Other assets -4% 2% -10% -8% -4% 1%<br />

Accounts payable 4% 12% -5% 2% 2% -5%<br />

Accrued liabilities 12% 4% -2% 5% -3% 5%<br />

Income taxes payable 16% -28% -8% 0% -1% 8%<br />

Deferred income on shipments to distributors 41% 10% -15% 7% -11% 6%<br />

Net cash provided by operating activities 274% 143% 88% 138% 157% 155% 189% 321% 366% 152% 152% 152% 152% 152% 152% 152% 152% 152% 152%<br />

Cash flows from investing activities:<br />

Purchases of available-for-sale securities -1229% -720% -691% -412% -532% -574%<br />

Proceeds from sale and maturity of available-for-sale securities 978% 613% 702% 512% 483% 636%<br />

Distribution from United Microelectronics Corporation $10,693<br />

Purchases of property, plant and equipment -37% -14% -20% -19% -32% -12%<br />

Acquisition of business, net of cash acquired -5%<br />

Other investing activities -7% 0% -1%<br />

Net cash provided by (used in) investing activities -283% -117% -14% 68% -81% 51% -118% -22% 68% -122% -134% -133% -133% -129% -128% -127% -125% -123% -121%<br />

Cash flows from financing activities: 30% 19% 19% 20% 23% 24% 25% 27% 30% 31%<br />

Repurchases of common stock -48% -21% -43% -113% -408% -147%<br />

Proceeds from issuance of common stock 43% 36% 27% 29% 37% 34%<br />

through various stock plans<br />

Proceeds from issuance of convertible 279%<br />

debentures, net of issuance costs<br />

Payment of dividends to stockholders -22% -27% -34% -37% -46% -92% -112% -44% -47% -49% -51% -53% -53% -54% -55% -55% -55%<br />

Excess tax benefit from stock-based compensation $27,413 $22,459<br />

Net cash used in financing activities -5% 15% -38% -112% -118% -145%<br />

Net increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents -13% 41% 36% 94% -42% 62%<br />

Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of year 183% 71% 108% 127% 223% 170%<br />

Cash and cash equivalents at end of year 170% 111% 144% 221% 181% 232%<br />

Supplemental schedule of non-cash activities:<br />

Accrual of affordable housing credit investments 5% 0% 0%<br />

Supplemental disclosure of cash flow information:<br />

Interest paid 0% 0% 9%<br />

Income taxes paid, net of refunds -50% 11% 17% 10% 11% 15%<br />

149


Restated Cash flows<br />

Using the majority of the same methods mentioned above you can forecast the cash<br />

flow statement. The difference on the restated cash flow statement appeared when we<br />

forecasted the CFFO. Before we used the method of CFFO/Sales, the problem with this<br />

method on the restated sheet was that the changes made would not have affected the<br />

adjustments made in the restatement of cash flows which were the impairment of<br />

goodwill and the expense for Research and Development. To forecast this new cash<br />

flow, CFFO/OI gave us a more effective ratio to forecast CFFO. The restatement of<br />

both goodwill and R&D had a significant effect on the CFFO increasing it two fold. This<br />

is important because operating activities drive the value of any company. The<br />

significant increase experienced in the CFFO by Xilinx is a result of effective cost<br />

management; it also indicates strong future business value.<br />

For the cash flows from investing we used the same method as on the stated cash flow<br />

sheet but added the research and development capitalization cost which decreased the<br />

overall investing activities. This was done because we used the research and<br />

development cost in the stated cash flow statement and with the capitalization affected<br />

changed the research and development cost.<br />

The last section, cash flows from financing, did not change because the dividends paid<br />

to stockholders were not affected by the restatement.<br />

150


Restated Cash Flow Statement<br />

Actual Financials 2008 Forecast Financial Statements<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018<br />

Cash flows from operating activities:<br />

Net income $125,705 $302,989 $312,723 $354,149 $350,672 $374,047 $83,929 $93,861 $140,791 $323,132 $316,670 $323,003 $329,463 $336,053 $349,495 $363,474 $378,013 $396,914 $420,729<br />

Adjustments to reconcile net income to net cash provided<br />

by operating activities:<br />

Depreciation $52,190 $53,666 $51,921 $53,326 $55,998 $54,199<br />

Amortization $20,260 $14,257 $11,141 $16,223 $17,926 $17,756<br />

Stock-based compensation $6,390 $3,767 $504 $90,292 $66,427<br />

Stock-based compensation related to prior years $6,969 $7,198 $2,209<br />

Net (gain) loss on sale of available-for-sale securities ($5,454) ($6,650) ($505) $4,981 ($814) $5,139<br />

Impairment loss on investments $10,425 $3,099 $1,418 $1,950 $2,850<br />

Convertible debt derivatives revaluation and amortization ($403) $254<br />

Write-off of acquired in-process research and development $4,500<br />

Noncash compensation expense $735<br />

Provision for deferred income taxes ($24,423) $49,974 $59,552 $26,032 $7,091 $669<br />

Tax benefit from exercise of stock options $17,093 $109,236 $51,854 $40,596 $35,765 $15,794<br />

Excess tax benefit from stock-based compensation ($27,413) ($22,459)<br />

Changes in assets and liabilities, net<br />

of effects from acquisition of business:<br />

Accounts receivable, net ($49,259) ($50,160) $35,490 $19,380 $11,911 ($66,853)<br />

Inventories ($14,858) $9,614 ($83,268) ($15,307) $28,617 $43,647<br />

Deferred income taxes $20,338 ($61,065) ($53,229) ($1,891) $3,532 ($891)<br />

Prepaid expenses and other current assets $45,384 ($10,035) $4,509 ($34,897) $35,652 $35,160<br />

Other assets ($4,447) $6,234 ($32,116) ($29,910) ($15,636) $4,404<br />

Accounts payable $5,008 $35,867 ($15,371) $7,811 $7,908 ($19,509)<br />

Accrued liabilities $15,084 $11,872 ($5,976) $18,917 ($10,939) $19,276<br />

Income taxes payable $20,331 ($83,709) ($23,572) ($687) ($5,244) $28,464<br />

Deferred income on shipments to distributors $51,050 $29,898 ($48,468) $24,047 ($37,506) $22,626<br />

Net cash provided by operating activities $345,000 $432,500 $275,486 $489,423 $551,568 $581,000 $158,497 $301,495 $515,991 $458,202 $449,038 $458,019 $467,179 $476,523 $495,583 $515,407 $536,023 $562,824 $596,594<br />

Cash flows from investing activities:<br />

Purchases of available-for-sale securities ($1,544,365) ($2,181,741) ($2,161,606) ($1,459,248) ($1,864,582) ($2,147,828)<br />

Proceeds from sale and maturity of available-for-sale securities $1,228,813 $1,855,933 $2,196,321 $1,812,580 $1,693,152 $2,380,055<br />

Distribution from United Microelectronics Corporation $10,693<br />

Purchases of property, plant and equipment ($46,049) ($41,040) ($61,377) ($67,040) ($110,777) ($45,593)<br />

Acquisition of business, net of cash acquired ($19,476)<br />

Other investing activities ($24,436) ($1,564) ($5,308)<br />

Net cash provided by (used in) investing activities ($355,138) ($354,798) ($45,095) $242,380 ($283,771) $192,019 $(98,619) $(20717.8) $96,134 -318,798 -349,623 -354,790 -360,060 -355,891 -366,476 -377,484 -383,564 -392,542 -410,618<br />

Cash flows from financing activities: $139,404 $99,415 $103,229 $107,119 $120,632 $129,108 $137,923 $152,459 $170,283 $185,976<br />

Repurchases of common stock ($60,846) ($62,328) ($133,755) ($401,584) ($1,430,000) ($550,000)<br />

Proceeds from issuance of common stock $54,643 $107,974 $85,064 $100,949 $128,136 $125,612<br />

through various stock plans<br />

Proceeds from issuance of convertible $980,000<br />

debentures, net of issuance costs<br />

Payment of dividends to stockholders ($69,655) ($97,190) ($120,833) ($139,974) $(38928) $(86625) $(158171) $ (147,672.57) $ (155,794.56) $ (164,363.26) $ (173,403.24) $ (182,940.42) $ (193,002.14) $ (203,617.26) $ (214,816.21) $ (226,631.10) $ (239,095.81)<br />

Excess tax benefit from stock-based compensation $27,413 $22,459<br />

Net cash used in financing activities ($6,203) $45,646 ($118,346) ($397,825) ($415,284) ($541,903)<br />

Net increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents ($16,341) $123,348 $112,045 $333,978 ($147,487) $231,116<br />

Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of year $230,336 $213,995 $337,343 $449,388 $783,366 $635,879<br />

Cash and cash equivalents at end of year $213,995 $337,343 $449,388 $783,366 $635,879 $866,995<br />

Supplemental schedule of non-cash activities:<br />

Accrual of affordable housing credit investments $19,357 $0 $0<br />

Supplemental disclosure of cash flow information:<br />

Interest paid $0 $0 $32,118<br />

Income taxes paid, net of refunds ($62,984) $34,163 $52,026 $37,159 $39,330 $56,012<br />

151


Restated Cash Flows Common Size<br />

Actual Financials 2008 Forecast Financial Statements<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018<br />

Cash flows from operating activities:<br />

Net income 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%<br />

Adjustments to reconcile net income to net cash provided<br />

by operating activities:<br />

Depreciation 42% 18% 17% 15% 16% 14%<br />

Amortization 16% 5% 4% 5% 5% 5%<br />

Stock-based compensation 5% 1% 0% 26% 18%<br />

Stock-based compensation related to prior years 2% 2% 1%<br />

Net (gain) loss on sale of available-for-sale securities -4% -2% 0% 1% 0% 1%<br />

Impairment loss on investments 8% $3,099 0% 1% 1%<br />

Convertible debt derivatives revaluation and amortization 0% 0%<br />

Write-off of acquired in-process research and development 1%<br />

Noncash compensation expense 0%<br />

Provision for deferred income taxes -19% 16% 19% 7% 2% 0%<br />

Tax benefit from exercise of stock options 14% 36% 17% 11% 10% 4%<br />

Excess tax benefit from stock-based compensation -8% -6%<br />

Changes in assets and liabilities, net<br />

of effects from acquisition of business:<br />

Accounts receivable, net -39% -17% 11% 5% 3% -18%<br />

Inventories -12% 3% -27% -4% 8% 12%<br />

Deferred income taxes 16% -20% -17% -1% 1% 0%<br />

Prepaid expenses and other current assets 36% -3% 1% -10% 10% 9%<br />

Other assets -4% 2% -10% -8% -4% 1%<br />

Accounts payable 4% 12% -5% 2% 2% -5%<br />

Accrued liabilities 12% 4% -2% 5% -3% 5%<br />

Income taxes payable 16% -28% -8% 0% -1% 8%<br />

Deferred income on shipments to distributors 41% 10% -15% 7% -11% 6%<br />

Net cash provided by operating activities 274% 143% 88% 138% 157% 155% 189% 321% 366% 142% 142% 142% 142% 142% 142% 142% 142% 142% 142%<br />

Cash flows from investing activities:<br />

Purchases of available-for-sale securities -1229% -720% -691% -412% -532% -574%<br />

Proceeds from sale and maturity of available-for-sale securities 978% 613% 702% 512% 483% 636%<br />

Distribution from United Microelectronics Corporation 3%<br />

Purchases of property, plant and equipment -37% -14% -20% -19% -32% -12%<br />

Acquisition of business, net of cash acquired -5%<br />

Other investing activities -7% 0% -1%<br />

Net cash provided by (used in) investing activities -283% -117% -14% 68% -81% 51% -118% -22% 68% -99% -110% -110% -109% -106% -105% -104% -101% -99% -98%<br />

Cash flows from financing activities: 43% 31% 32% 33% 36% 37% 38% 40% 43% 44%<br />

Repurchases of common stock -48% -21% -43% -113% -408% -147%<br />

Proceeds from issuance of common stock 43% 36% 27% 29% 37% 34%<br />

through various stock plans<br />

Proceeds from issuance of convertible 279%<br />

debentures, net of issuance costs<br />

Payment of dividends to stockholders -22% -27% -34% -37% -46% -92% -112% -46% -49% -51% -53% -54% -55% -56% -57% -57% -57%<br />

Excess tax benefit from stock-based compensation 8% 6%<br />

Net cash used in financing activities -5% 15% -38% -112% -118% -145%<br />

Net increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents -13% 41% 36% 94% -42% 62%<br />

Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of year 183% 71% 108% 127% 223% 170%<br />

Cash and cash equivalents at end of year 170% 111% 144% 221% 181% 232%<br />

Supplemental schedule of non-cash activities:<br />

Accrual of affordable housing credit investments 5% 0% 0%<br />

Supplemental disclosure of cash flow information:<br />

Interest paid 0% 0% 9%<br />

Income taxes paid, net of refunds -50% 11% 17% 10% 11% 15%<br />

152


VALUATION RATIO’S<br />

Introduction<br />

Earnings valuation multiples are commonly used to measure relative value. Each ratio<br />

provides its own specific insights into the financial position of a firm and/or industry.<br />

But misuse of valuation ratios is common, so we must discuss four basic steps<br />

necessary to properly use these ratios. First, the multiples must be clearly and<br />

consistently be defined; this ensures that comparable firms are measured uniformly.<br />

The second step is to be aware of differences across firms that may impede a ratio’s<br />

relevance to the analysis. Third, one must understand the multiple and its<br />

fundamentals in order to correctly analyze the results. And finally, it is extremely<br />

important that firms are actually comparable. This means that the firms experience<br />

similar cash flows and business risk.<br />

All of our ratios are valued as of November 3, 2008. Competitors’ information was<br />

taken from yahoo finance.<br />

Price to Earnings Ratio<br />

The price to earnings ratio is consistently defined as the market price of equity divided<br />

by earnings per share. However, this ratio has variations on the earnings per share<br />

used in its computation; these derivations depend on whether you are calculating<br />

forward earnings or using the trailing earnings. These variations can create very<br />

different results due to the potential volatility in earnings per share; this can cause<br />

forward PE to be very different from trailing PE. However different these results may<br />

be, the interpretation remains the same; higher PE ratios are often accompanied by<br />

higher growth, lower risk and higher payout.<br />

153


P/E Trailing Twelve Months<br />

The trailing price to earnings multiple (PE) is defined as the market price of equity<br />

divided by the last four quarters of earnings per share. We compiled the necessary<br />

data and have displayed the results in the following table.<br />

P/E (ttm)<br />

Comparables<br />

Company PPS EPS P/E (ttm) Industry Avg. <strong>XLNX</strong> PPS<br />

Xilinx 17.62 1.3342 13.21 13.56 18.07<br />

Xilinx (Restated) 17.62 2.3431 7.52 13.56 31.77<br />

Altera 16.71 1.0823 15.44<br />

Actel N/A N/A N/A<br />

Lattice Semiconductor 1.73 0.148243 11.67<br />

It can be argued that this ratio is more accurate than the forward price-to-earnings<br />

ratio because it uses actual earnings. The industry’s competitors’ information was<br />

provided by www.finance.yahoo.com and was the only data used in the industry<br />

average calculation. Actel Corporations data was unavailable and thus not incorporated<br />

into our calculations.<br />

To estimate company value we multiplied the average industry trailing P/E by Xilinx’s<br />

trailing EPS for the last 12 months. This calculation estimates Xilinx price-per-share to<br />

be $18.07, which is within 15% of the closing price on November 3, 2008 and therefore<br />

suggests that Xilinx is fairly priced. However, this ratio is derived using historical<br />

information and is not a measure used in predicting future value.<br />

154


P/E Forward<br />

The forward price to earnings multiple (PE) is defined as the market price of equity<br />

divided by the earnings per share in the next financial year. We compiled the necessary<br />

data and have displayed the results in the following table.<br />

P/E (forecast)<br />

Comparables<br />

Company PPS EPS P/E (forecast) Industry Avg. <strong>XLNX</strong> PPS<br />

Xilinx 17.62 1.136 15.51 20.99 23.84<br />

Xilinx (Restated) 17.62 1.6781 10.5 20.99 35.22<br />

Altera 16.71 1.2109 13.8<br />

Actel 12.3 0.4366 28.17<br />

Lattice Semiconductor N/A N/A N/A<br />

We discussed our earnings forecast earlier in our analysis; this number, when divided<br />

by the number of shares outstanding, will yield the estimate needed in calculating the<br />

forward P/E.<br />

The forward P/E will be lower than the trailing P/E if earnings growth is expected.<br />

Xilinx’s PE TTM is lower than its forward PE by 2.3, which implies growth; in our<br />

forecasted financials we have presented slight contraction. We recognize that this<br />

contradicts our short-term predictions; however, the growth implied by the difference<br />

between the PE ratios is in agreement with our long-term forecast. The forward P/E<br />

suggests that Xilinx is undervalued because it estimates true value is approximately<br />

35% higher than the markets current value at $23.84.<br />

The estimated P/E is inherently erroneous because it limits the forecast to one year in<br />

the future and ignores potential earnings growth beyond 12 months. Without additional<br />

data neither the forward nor the trailing price-to-earnings ratio will render accurate<br />

valuation estimates.<br />

155


Price to EBITDA<br />

This ratio is calculated by dividing the market cap by the earnings before interest, tax,<br />

depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA). Essentially, the lower the ratio is the more<br />

profitable business operations are because EBITDA represents an operating cash flow.<br />

Additionally, low ratios indicate a strong correlation between the value generated by the<br />

firm and the markets valuation of firm assets. Put another way, this ratios measures<br />

how operating cash flows justified the markets value of equity.<br />

However, one weakness is that this ratio ignores a company’s ability to manage debt<br />

and taxes; if management lacks adeptness in these two areas profitability can be<br />

destroyed.<br />

Company<br />

Price/EBITDA<br />

EBITDA<br />

<strong>Mark</strong>et Cap ($Millions) ($Millions)<br />

P/EBITDA<br />

Industry<br />

Avg.<br />

Comparables<br />

<strong>XLNX</strong> PPS<br />

Xilinx 4,942.00 533.646 0.033 0.06 32.53<br />

Xilinx (Restated) 4,942.00 874.057 0.0202 0.06 52.44<br />

Altera 4,519.00 274.953 0.061<br />

Actel 211.46 N/A N/A<br />

Lattice<br />

Semiconductor 180.09 N/A N/A<br />

The data above only includes one of Xilinx’s competitors and comparability is difficult to<br />

interpret without an industry benchmark. However, Xilinx does have a really low<br />

price/EBITDA ratio, which suggests that it is significantly undervalued. The accuracy of<br />

this ratio valuation is highly questionable and should be viewed with caution.<br />

156


Price to Book<br />

The price to book ratio is useful in investment analysis for several reasons. First, is that<br />

a firm’s book value is a fairly stable measure of firm value that can easily be compared<br />

to market value. This offers investors a much simpler benchmark. Second, because<br />

the specialized-semiconductor industry has reasonable consistency in accounting<br />

standards, the price to book ratio can be used to signal over- or undervaluations.<br />

Finally, price to book is not affected by firms that experiences negative earnings; which<br />

is one of the limitations to the price to earnings ratio. However, price to book is not<br />

without its own limits. The book value of a firm is an accounting number and thus<br />

inherently susceptible to manipulations in policy (i.e. depreciation, amortization, and<br />

leasing). If accounting policies vary amongst industry competitors the price to book<br />

values will not be useful in comparison. Additionally, firms that generate most of their<br />

value from intangible assets will not find comparing price to book ratios very insightful.<br />

The ratio is calculated by dividing the current period’s price per share by the current<br />

book value of equity per share. The book value per share is calculated by dividing the<br />

book value of equity by the number of shares of common stock outstanding. After<br />

determining the P/B ratios for each firm, we took the industry average, excluding Xilinx,<br />

and multiplied that average by Xilinx’s book value of equity per share. According to the<br />

price to book ratio, Xilinx is undervalued in the market because their current share price<br />

of $17.62 is much less than the price we calculated for the industry average which is<br />

$28.55.<br />

157


Price/Book<br />

Comparables<br />

Company PPS BPS P/B Industry Avg. P/B Xilinx PPS<br />

Xilinx 17.62 10.73 1.64 2.66 28.55<br />

Xilinx (Restated) 17.62 10.73 1.64 2.66 N/A<br />

Altera 16.76 2.77 6.05 N/A N/A<br />

Actel 12.3 10.88 1.13 N/A N/A<br />

Lattice 1.73 2.16 .8 N/A N/A<br />

Dividends to Price<br />

This ratio consisted of the dividends per share divided by the price per share. Out of<br />

the three Xilinx competitors only one paid dividends, this was Altera. With only one<br />

competitor to take the industry average from to get the price made this valuation not as<br />

reliable as the others. To get the price, we took Xilinx’s dividends per share and divided<br />

it by the industry average dividends over price to get the price of Xilinx, which came out<br />

to 3.9. From this calculation led us to say that Xilinx under this method was<br />

overvalued.<br />

Dividends/Price<br />

Comparables<br />

Company D/P Industry Avg. D/P Xilinx Price<br />

Xilinx .78 .2 3.9<br />

Xilinx (Restated) .78 .2 N/A<br />

Altera .2 N/A N/A<br />

Actel N/A N/A N/A<br />

Lattice N/A N/A N/A<br />

158


Price Earnings Growth<br />

The PEG ratio compares the PE of a firm to its expected growth rate with the intention<br />

of identifying undervalued and overvalued stocks. The growth rate used must be the<br />

growth in earnings per share; this follows the rule of consistency that we mentioned in<br />

the introduction. Firms that have a growth rate that exceeds their PE ratio are viewed<br />

as undervalued; said differently, a lower PEG ratio indicates that a firm is undervalued.<br />

The PEG ratio is calculated by dividing expected growth into the PE ratio. One caveat is<br />

that the forward PE ratio should never be used in the calculation of PEG because it<br />

would result in double counting growth. The following chart provides the data we have<br />

collected and calculated for the specialized-semiconductor industry.<br />

Price Earnings Growth<br />

Comparables<br />

Company P.E.G Industry Avg. Xilinx PPS<br />

Xilinx 6.6071 .92 2.45<br />

Xilinx (Restated) 6.6071 .92 N/A<br />

Altera .95 N/A N/A<br />

Actel N/A N/A N/A<br />

Lattice 1.85 N/A N/A<br />

For the purpose of comparison, lower-growth firms have higher PEG ratios and are<br />

overvalued. The specialized-semiconductor industry has an average PEG ratio of .92,<br />

while Xilinx has a PEG ratio of 6.6; this suggests that Xilinx is a low growth firm and is<br />

significantly overvalued.<br />

Price to Free Cash Flows per share<br />

The price to free cash flows per share ratio offers insight into the value of operating<br />

cash flows relative to the market price. The larger the ratio, the more expensive the<br />

firm is from the investors perspective. The ratio is calculated by dividing free cash<br />

flows per share into the market share price. This ratio can’t be used in analyzing the<br />

159


specialized-semiconductor industry because all of Xilinx’s competitors have a negative<br />

ratio, therefore the negative industry average made this valuation irrelevant.<br />

Enterprise Value to EBITDA<br />

The enterprise value to EBITDA ratio is calculated by dividing EBITDA into enterprise<br />

value. The analysis of this ratio avoids two major ratio limitations. First, fewer firms<br />

have a negative EBITDA than the number of firms with negative earnings; this means<br />

that more firms can be valued. Second, accounting differences in line items like<br />

depreciation have no effect on EBITDA.<br />

Company<br />

Enterprise Value/EBITDA<br />

Enterprise EBITDA<br />

Value ($Millions)<br />

EV/EBITDA<br />

Industry<br />

Avg.<br />

Comparables<br />

<strong>XLNX</strong> PPS<br />

Xilinx 4,547.00 533.646 8.52 0.77 28.04<br />

Xilinx (Restated) 4,547.00 874.057 5.20 0.77 45.03<br />

Altera 3,850.00 274.953 14.00239<br />

Actel 134.67 ‐12.099 ‐11.1307<br />

Lattice<br />

Semiconductor 134.46 ‐241.838 ‐0.55599<br />

Generally, the higher the multiple, the more overvalued a firm appears. The industry<br />

average is skew due to the negative ratios for two primary competitors; therefore an<br />

accurate industry benchmark is not known. The table indicates that Xilinx is<br />

undervalued.<br />

Conclusion<br />

The valuation ratios’ present a wide range of speculative value and overall present<br />

conflicting results. The PE forward, price/EBITDA, price/book, and EV/EBITDA all<br />

indicate that Xilinx is undervalued relative to the industry; the dividends/price and PEG<br />

ratio indicate that Xilinx is overvalued; and PE ttm indicates that they are fairly priced.<br />

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The overall valuation is more skew towards Xilinx being undervalued; however a<br />

substantive conclusion is impossible using these ratios alone.<br />

Valuation Ratios<br />

PE ttm<br />

PE Forward<br />

Price/EBITDA<br />

Price/Book<br />

Dividends/Price<br />

PEG<br />

Price/FCF<br />

Enterprise Value/EBITDA<br />

Valuation Results<br />

fairly priced<br />

undervalued<br />

undervalued<br />

undervalued<br />

overvalued<br />

overvalued<br />

N/A<br />

undervalued<br />

Intrinsic Valuation Models<br />

The intrinsic valuation models are used to estimate a company’s market value price per<br />

share. Each valuation model generates a sensitivity analysis using weighted average<br />

cost of capital, size-adjusted cost of equity, and growth rates (positive/negative) to<br />

illustrate the affects of various scenarios. The intrinsic valuation models will include<br />

Discounted Dividends Model, Residual Income Model, Free Cash Flow Model, Abnormal<br />

Earnings Growth (AEG) and Long Run Residual Income Model. Each specific model<br />

provides another perspective to value the firm but all are benchmarked against our<br />

forecasting for 2009 until 2018. The forecasting line items used included are from the<br />

income statement, balance sheet, and statement of cash flows. The forecast has<br />

several red flags due to inherent errors in CFFI, retained earnings and dividend<br />

payouts; these issues are why some of the models below look different from a normal<br />

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analysis. We are confident however, that the models and theory behind them are<br />

correct.<br />

Discounted Dividends Model<br />

The foundation for the discounted dividend model is built on the idea that the only cash<br />

flow investors receive from a firm are its dividends. This is the simplest model for<br />

valuing equity; the value of the stock is the present value of all expected dividends.<br />

The two basic inputs of this model are the expected dividends and the cost of equity.<br />

The expected dividends are derived from assumptions made about future earnings<br />

growth rates and payout ratios.<br />

This model is viewed as the most unreliable in estimating equity value and has several<br />

limitations, albeit it is supported by some of the most important financial theories. The<br />

most significant limitation is the models sensitivity to growth rate inputs. Incorrectly<br />

estimating growth rates will have a significant impact on the results of the model; this is<br />

because the model goes on into infinity. Additionally, analysts could miss value firms<br />

that do not return to their stockholders what they can afford.<br />

After finding the present value of the total year by year dividends, the dividend discount<br />

model requires that you find the value of the perpetuity. We estimated the value of<br />

Xilinx’s dividends per share in perpetuity to be $.899 in year 2018; we then found the<br />

terminal value of the perpetuity by discounting it back to year zero using the cost of<br />

equity. These two numbers are then summed in order to calculate the implied model<br />

price as of 3/31/08 (Xilinx’s year end). However, since we are valuing the firm as of<br />

11/3/08 it is necessary to calculate the time consistent price; this is performed by<br />

exponentially multiplying the implied model price by the fraction of the year that has<br />

come to pass, which is (7/12) in this specific case. The time consistent price is then<br />

compared to the actual closing price as of 11/3/08 in order to determine whether the<br />

firm is over- or undervalued.<br />

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Discount Dividends Model Sensitivity Analysis<br />

Growth Rate<br />

Ke 0 0.015 0.03 0.055 0.08 0.11 0.14<br />

0.13 4.76 4.97 5.23 5.9 7.25 13.3 N/A<br />

0.15 4.56 4.71 4.89 5.34 6.09 8.26 23.39<br />

0.16 4.47 4.6 4.76 5.13 5.73 7.25 13.3<br />

0.17 4.4 4.51 4.65 4.97 5.45 6.57 9.94<br />

0.18 4.33 4.43 4.56 4.83 5.23 6.09 8.26<br />

0.19 4.27 4.36 4.47 4.71 5.05 5.73 7.25<br />

0.21 4.17 4.25 4.33 4.51 4.76 5.23 6.09<br />

Green Orange = Fairly Valued Red<br />

Undervalued $14.62 < $17.62 < $20.62 Overvalued<br />

Above is our sensitivity evaluation of the discounted dividend model. Our calculated<br />

cost of equity was 17.2% and a growth rate of 5.5% yielded a valuation price of $4.94;<br />

which would imply that Xilinx is overvalued when compared to the observed market<br />

price of $17.62. The lack of comparability to the observed price can be attributed to<br />

the volatility of the changing cost of equity and growth rates in the model. Even with<br />

the lack of variability in this model, it still shows the company as being overvalued.<br />

Residual Income Model<br />

The residual income model has the highest explanatory power, making this model the<br />

most reliable and least sensitive to the growth rates. The summation of the book value<br />

of equity, the total present value of the year by year residual income and the terminal<br />

value of the perpetuity is what comprises this valuation model. The calculation of this<br />

method will result in the amount of value that has been either destroyed or added by<br />

the company.<br />

To begin, the annual normal income is calculated by multiplying the previous year’s<br />

book value of equity by the cost of equity; it denotes the growth/retraction in net<br />

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income. Next, the annual residual income is calculated; it is defined as the difference<br />

between the net income and the annual normal income from the same year. And<br />

finally, the present value of the year by year residual income is calculated by multiplying<br />

the annual residual income by its present value factor. These are then summed in the<br />

same way that it has been in the other models. Then the terminal value of the<br />

perpetuity is calculated in the same manner as the other valuation models and summed<br />

with the book value of equity, which is denoted on the firm’s balance sheet. The<br />

summation of these three items denotes the residual income models market value of<br />

equity as of the year end 3/31/08. The time consistent price is once again calculated<br />

(in the same manner) and used to compare with the closing price as of 11/3/08. The<br />

results of this process will allow for judgment as to whether Xilinx is over- or<br />

undervalued.<br />

If the annual residual income is a negative then the firm destroyed value over the<br />

period. On the other hand, if the annual residual income is positive then the firm has<br />

added value for shareholders.<br />

To break down this valuation model we had to use the first year out of our forecasting<br />

for 2009 with a net income of $335,526.84 with the rest of the years following up until<br />

2018. The next step was taking the total dividends $147,672.57 for 2009 and the rest<br />

to 2018. Then, we simply took the previous year’s book value of equity and multiplied<br />

that number by our size adjusted cost of equity of 17.2%. After taking the Benchmark<br />

amount subtracted by the current year’s net income it worked out to find the annual<br />

residual income for all ten forecasted years.<br />

To find the total present value of residual income, the calculation was then added on a<br />

yearly basis to equal the terminal value of perpetuity, which is extremely low when<br />

comparing the sensitivity to discount dividends and free cash flow models. The<br />

perpetuity that we used for this model was our size-adjusted cost of equity of 17.2%<br />

and our growth rate of -.10% and discounts back to time-zero dollars to create the<br />

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terminal value perpetuity of a loss for $96,700.36. The percentage of value in<br />

comparison to the market value of equity equaled a -6.77%. The result of having a<br />

negative percentage for the terminal value perpetuity has caused a “red flag” due to<br />

Xilinx business model not correctly matching this outcome. For example, Xilinx is a high<br />

research and development company and should be a positively high percentage.<br />

The following data will be summed by adding the book value of equity, $1,671,823,<br />

total present value of year by year residual income, loss of $146,424, and the terminal<br />

value perpetuity, loss of $96,700.36, to reach the market value of equity at 3/31/2008<br />

for $1,428,699.11. This amount will then have to be divided by the amount of shares<br />

outstanding for 280,519,000 to come up with the price per share. The time consistent<br />

price will be found by multiplying the amount we just calculated by one plus the sizeadjusted<br />

cost of equity and raised to seven over twelve (to adjust for our fiscal year<br />

end). The initial price per share that we will use as a benchmark was found through<br />

yahoo finance closed on November 3 rd , 2008 at $17.62.<br />

Residual Income Model Sensitivity Analysis<br />

Growth Rate<br />

Ke ‐0.1 ‐0.2 ‐0.3 ‐0.4 ‐0.5<br />

0.11 9.18 9.01 8.92 8.87 8.83<br />

0.12 8.4 8.31 8.26 8.23 8.22<br />

0.13 7.71 7.68 7.67 7.66 7.66<br />

0.15 6.56 6.62 6.65 6.67 6.69<br />

0.16 6.09 6.17 6.22 6.25 6.27<br />

0.17 5.67 5.76 5.82 5.86 5.88<br />

0.18 5.29 5.4 5.46 5.51 5.54<br />

0.19 4.95 5.07 5.14 5.18 5.22<br />

0.21 4.38 4.5 4.57 4.62 4.65<br />

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Restated Residual Income Model Sensitivity Analysis<br />

Growth Rate<br />

Ke ‐0.1 ‐0.2 ‐0.3 ‐0.4 ‐0.5<br />

0.08 7.42 7.35 7.32 7.3 7.29<br />

0.10 5.64 5.71 5.75 5.77 5.78<br />

0.13 3.1 3.31 3.42 3.49 3.54<br />

0.15 1.47 1.74 1.89 1.99 2.06<br />

0.16 0.67 0.97 1.13 1.24 1.32<br />

0.17 N/A 0.2 0.38 0.5 0.58<br />

0.18 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

0.19 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

0.21 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

The two charts show the sensitivity analysis of the residual income growth and the<br />

restated residual income growth model. After reviewing the results, our graphs have<br />

been consistently overvalued. The residual income model based off our size-adjusted<br />

cost of equity was a price of $5.59. This price was found with a -10% growth rate but<br />

can range to a price of $5.81 when using a -50% growth rate. The greater the growth<br />

rate becomes, the slower the return to equilibrium; the smaller the growth rate<br />

becomes, the faster the return to equilibrium. We believe the return to equilibrium will<br />

be moderate, so our analysis focuses on the middle growth rate. Additionally, it is<br />

important to note that if the terminal value of the perpetuity starts as a negative<br />

number then a decreasing growth rate will increase the market value. If the terminal<br />

value of the perpetuity starts as a positive number then a decreasing growth rate will<br />

decrease the market value. This theory demonstrates that the terminal value of the<br />

perpetuity will always approach equilibrium.<br />

In relation to the residual income cost of equity lower bounds, we have extended our<br />

ranges further to 11% and 12% in order to reach a positive percentage of value in the<br />

total present value of yearly residual income and terminal value perpetuity. The time<br />

consistent prices were still overvalued ranging from $8.22 to $9.18 using this cost of<br />

equities. The industry that Xilinx is a part of must have this positive percentage of<br />

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value because of its business model. If this was a commodities company then the<br />

percentage of value would primarily be in the book value of equity.<br />

As for the restated residual income, the upper and lower bounds did have the sizeadjustments<br />

added in with the same growth rates but did not have the extension to the<br />

lower bounds. When pertaining to the higher cost of equities closer to the upper<br />

bound, the reason for the N/A is due to a negative number.<br />

Discounted Free Cash Flows Model<br />

The discounted free cash flows model is a valuation model that attempts to determine<br />

the intrinsic value of a company by summing the present value of a firm’s year by year<br />

free cash flow and the present value of the free cash flow perpetuity.<br />

Before beginning this model it is necessary to understand its fundamental foundation.<br />

The cash flows from operating (CFFO) and cash flows from investing (CFFI) are the two<br />

numbers from which the model depends. Both line items are found on the statement of<br />

cash flows; however, for Xilinx we have made an adjustment to its CFFI. The CFFI<br />

includes the capitalized amount of R&D expenditures because it can be viewed as an<br />

investment in product development.<br />

The process is relatively simple, but has many steps. To begin, the year by year cash<br />

flow is calculated by subtracting the cash flows from investing (CFFI) from the cash<br />

flows from operating (CFFO). This is performed for each forecasted year in the model;<br />

and the sum of these two cash flows are then multiplied by their present value factors<br />

to determine the present value for each year. The present value of the year by year<br />

free cash flows is then summed. The total present value of the year by year free cash<br />

flows is then added to the present value of the free cash flow perpetuity; this<br />

calculation yields the total market value of assets, which we found to be $936,298. The<br />

167


market value of assets is then divided by the total shares outstanding (280,519) to find<br />

the price per share as of 3/31/08 (Xilinx’s year end). Similar to the discounted<br />

dividends model, a time consistent price is needed for comparability; this number is<br />

calculated the same way it was found in the DDM and then used to compare the<br />

forecasted results with the actual market price as of 11/3/08. The table below<br />

illustrates our sensitivity analysis.<br />

The sensitivity analysis for this model focuses on the relationship between the growth<br />

rate and the weighted average cost of capital. By manipulating the rates in the formula<br />

the analysis yields an outcome that can be compared to the time consistent price, which<br />

can then be used to determine whether the firm is over- or undervalued. The table that<br />

is used is based off of the upper and lower bounds of Xilinx’s weighted average cost of<br />

capitals. In order for the model to work, the growth rate needs to be greater than one<br />

and less than the cost of capital. Another problem with this model is that it assumes<br />

that the perpetuity growth rate is constant to infinity. In reality a company cannot<br />

sustain a high growth rate for a long time and eventually will reach a sustainable<br />

growth rate.<br />

Discount Free Cash Flow Sensitivity Analysis<br />

Growth Rate<br />

Wacc(bt) 0.02 0.032 0.044 0.056 0.068 0.08 0.09<br />

0.11 3.47 3.74 4.10 4.62 5.45 6.94 9.54<br />

0.12 3.30 3.51 3.79 4.17 4.74 5.64 6.94<br />

0.13 3.15 3.33 3.55 3.84 4.25 4.86 5.64<br />

0.14 3.04 3.18 3.36 3.59 3.90 4.34 4.86<br />

0.15 2.94 3.06 3.21 3.40 3.64 3.96 4.34<br />

0.16 2.85 2.95 3.08 3.24 3.43 3.69 3.96<br />

0.17 2.78 2.87 2.97 3.10 3.27 3.47 3.69<br />

Green Orange = Fairly Valued Red<br />

Undervalued $14.62 < $17.62 < $20.62 Overvalued<br />

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We forecasted Xilinx’s CFFO to gradually climb out of the recession to a growth rate of<br />

6% by 2018. The CFFI was estimated using the growth in plant, property and<br />

equipment. The forecasted growth in CFFI is justified because Xilinx has the change in<br />

plant, property, and equipment as well as the research and development expense. This<br />

trend will continue to have a cash outflow for the company. The market observed price<br />

as of 11/3/08 for Xilinx is $17.62. In comparison to their initial weighted average cost<br />

of capital of 13.96% and growth rate of 5.55% the price was calculated to be $3.6,<br />

which implies Xilinx is overvalued.<br />

Restated Discount Free Cash Flow Sensitivity Analysis<br />

Growth rate<br />

Wacc(bt) 0.02 0.032 0.044 0.056 0.068 0.08 0.09<br />

0.11 4.910 5.270 5.760 6.470 7.590 9.600 13.120<br />

0.12 4.670 4.960 5.340 5.860 6.620 7.840 9.600<br />

0.13 4.480 4.710 5.020 5.410 5.970 6.780 7.840<br />

0.14 4.320 4.520 4.760 5.070 5.490 6.080 6.780<br />

0.15 4.180 4.350 4.550 4.810 5.140 5.580 6.080<br />

0.16 4.070 4.210 4.380 4.590 4.860 5.200 5.580<br />

0.17 3.970 4.090 4.240 4.410 4.630 4.910 5.200<br />

Abnormal Earnings Growth Model (AEG)<br />

The abnormal earnings growth model (AEG) is based on a forward price to earnings per<br />

share ratio that is calculated through accounting assumptions. This valuation model is<br />

based off the forecasted net income and total dividends starting in year 2010 until<br />

2018. We will have to use the forecasted net income and total dividends for 2009 to<br />

create the actual drip method. The drip method is a calculation of cumulative dividends<br />

169


y taking the size-adjusted cost of equity 17.2% multiplied by a negative one to the<br />

previous year’s total dividends amount.<br />

The “drip” method is a concept that is an understanding of what certain dividends are<br />

distributed throughout a company. If a company doesn’t provide any dividends then it<br />

was completely a direct wealth dividend policy. On the other hand, if there are<br />

dividends then this dividend policy would be an indirect and direct wealth transfer<br />

within the company policy.<br />

After finding the dividends that must be reinvested at the appropriate cost of equity<br />

rate, then we calculated the sum of the current year’s net income and dividend amount<br />

that had to be reinvested at 17.2% to equal the cumulative dividends throughout the<br />

entire forecasted ten years.<br />

The normal earnings calculation is the next step to lead into the AEG results. This<br />

equation used will be this below:<br />

Now that we have determined the cumulative dividends and the normal earnings for the<br />

forecasted abnormal earnings growth model; the subtraction of the two will then<br />

conclude the abnormal earnings (AEG). The actual amount for AEG will then<br />

demonstrate the amount of actual value that has been destroyed on a yearly basis by<br />

the firm. The table below is proof that our AEG model follows the Residual Income<br />

check figure by taking the yearly change; for example the annual residual income of<br />

2010 subtracted by 2009.<br />

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Abnormal Earnings Growth Model<br />

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018<br />

Net Income 335527 328816.3 335392.6 342100.5 348942.5 362900.2 377416.2 392512.8 412138.5 436866.8<br />

Total Div ‐147673 ‐155795 ‐164363 ‐173403 ‐182940 ‐193002 ‐203617 ‐214816 ‐226631 ‐239096<br />

Div Reinvest at 17%<br />

Drip 25399.68 26796.66 28270.48 29825.36 31465.75 33196.37 35022.17 36948.39 38980.55<br />

Cum‐Div 354216 362189.3 370371 378767.8 394365.9 410612.6 427535 449086.9 475847.3<br />

Normal Earnings 393237.5 385372.7 393080.2 400941.8 408960.6 425319 442331.8 460025.1 483026.3<br />

Abnormal Earnings<br />

(AEG) ‐39021.5 ‐23183.4 ‐22709.2 ‐22173.9 ‐14594.7 ‐14706.5 ‐14796.8 ‐10938.2 ‐7178.96<br />

PV Factor 0.853242 0.728022 0.62118 0.530017 0.452233 0.385864 0.329236 0.280918 0.239691<br />

PV of AEG ‐33294.8 ‐16878 ‐14106.5 ‐11752.5 ‐6600.18 ‐5674.69 ‐4871.62 ‐3072.73 ‐1720.73<br />

Residual Inc Check<br />

Figure ‐39021.5 ‐23183.4 ‐22709.2 ‐22173.9 ‐14594.7 ‐14706.5 ‐14796.8 ‐10938.2 ‐7178.96<br />

RI PROOF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0<br />

Abnormal Earnings Growth Sensitivity Analysis<br />

Growth Rate<br />

Ke ‐0.1 ‐0.2 ‐0.3 ‐0.4 ‐0.5<br />

0.11 9.81 9.75 9.72 9.7 9.68<br />

0.12 8.69 8.66 8.65 8.64 8.63<br />

0.13 7.78 7.77 7.77 7.77 7.76<br />

0.15 6.38 6.4 6.41 6.42 7.04<br />

0.16 5.85 5.87 5.88 5.89 5.9<br />

0.17 5.38 5.41 5.43 5.44 5.44<br />

0.18 4.99 5.02 5.03 5.04 5.05<br />

0.19 4.64 4.67 4.69 4.7 4.71<br />

0.21 4.07 4.1 4.11 4.13 4.13<br />

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Restated Abnormal Earnings Growth Sensitivity Analysis<br />

Growth Rate<br />

Ke ‐0.1 ‐0.2 ‐0.3 ‐0.4 ‐0.5<br />

0.11 9.63 9.56 9.52 9.5 9.48<br />

0.12 8.54 8.51 8.49 8.47 8.47<br />

0.13 7.65 7.64 7.63 7.63 7.62<br />

0.15 6.3 6.31 6.31 6.32 6.32<br />

0.16 5.77 5.79 5.8 5.8 5.81<br />

0.17 5.32 5.34 5.35 5.36 5.37<br />

0.18 4.93 4.95 4.97 4.98 4.98<br />

0.19 4.59 4.62 4.63 4.64 4.65<br />

0.21 4.04 4.06 4.07 4.08 4.09<br />

The two charts above represent the sensitivity analysis for the abnormal earnings<br />

growth and the restated abnormal earnings growth model. There are similarities with<br />

the residual income model because this model is also less sensitive to the negative<br />

growth rates in an assumption that we will not be able to beat the cost of equity of<br />

17.2%. As take into consideration the sensitivity analysis for this model, the chart<br />

demonstrates that our firm is consistently overvalued. The firm itself has a November<br />

3 rd , 2008 initial price of $17.62. The closest to that price that we get is during a growth<br />

rate of -10% and with a cost of equity of 11% coming out with $9.63. Using our actual<br />

size-adjusted cost of equity of 17.2% with an average of -30% was a price per share of<br />

$5.34. As for the restated abnormal earnings growth model, it resulted in the same<br />

conclusion as the previous chart proving that the results were consistently overvalued.<br />

To demonstrate an understanding of how much of a change the size-adjusted cost of<br />

equity we derived through multiple costs of equities to find where we would come<br />

across a fairly valued price. To receive a fairly valued shared price, it would have to<br />

have a 7.2% size-adjusted cost of equity to have a $17.65 price per share.<br />

LONG RUN RESIDUAL INCOME MODEL<br />

The long run residual income model applies most of the same methods from the<br />

residual income model but there are some differences between the models. This model<br />

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is focused on the long run and in the residual income model used dividends as one of<br />

the bases of calculating market value of equity (MVe). Dividends, however, are hard to<br />

forecast in the long run, therefore the results are. The long run residual income uses a<br />

different calculation to get market value of equity that takes a more long term approach<br />

for this model. The new equation for MVe is listed below.<br />

Mve = Be(t0) * [1+(Roe-Ke)/(Ke-g)]<br />

This new equation for Mve takes into account ROE and growth as new factors for this<br />

equation. To get ROE, we took the average on the ROE forecasted out and took out<br />

the outliers giving us a ROE of 18.06%. For our growth, we determined it to be around<br />

6%. With these numbers we found a time consistent price of $.5. This number is<br />

clearly nowhere close to the comparable price of $17.62. The main justification for this<br />

is because our growth rate is nowhere near the cost of equity. Since the growth rate is<br />

based off of the net income, which is calculated using a low sales growth, the growth<br />

for this model is also low.<br />

Actual<br />

Growth<br />

Ke 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09<br />

0.13 3.31 3.68 4.14 4.73 5.51 6.62 8.27<br />

0.15 1.67 1.82 2 2.22 2.5 2.86 3.33<br />

0.16 1.04 1.12 1.22 1.35 1.5 1.68 1.92<br />

0.17 0.5 0.53 0.58 0.63 0.69 0.77 0.87<br />

0.18 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04<br />

0.19 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

0.21 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

Constant ROE 18.06<br />

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Roe<br />

Ke 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.1806 0.19 0.2 0.21<br />

0.13 1.87 2.8 3.74 4.67 5.6 6.54 7.47<br />

0.15 N/A 0.73 1.45 2.18 2.91 3.63 4.36<br />

0.16 N/A N/A 0.65 1.31 1.96 2.62 3.27<br />

0.17 N/A N/A N/A 0.59 1.19 1.78 2.38<br />

0.18 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.54 1.09 1.63<br />

0.19 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.5 1.01<br />

0.21 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

Constant Growth 6%<br />

Roe<br />

Growth 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.1806 0.19 0.2 0.21<br />

0.03 N/A N/A N/A 0.37 0.83 1.29 1.75<br />

0.04 N/A N/A N/A 0.4 0.89 1.39 1.88<br />

0.05 N/A N/A N/A 0.43 0.96 1.5 2.04<br />

0.06 N/A N/A N/A 0.47 1.05 1.63 2.22<br />

0.07 N/A N/A N/A 0.51 1.15 1.79 2.44<br />

0.08 N/A N/A N/A 0.57 1.28 1.99 2.7<br />

0.09 N/A N/A N/A 0.64 1.44 2.23 3.03<br />

Constant Ke 17.2%<br />

Growth Rate RESTATED<br />

Ke 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09<br />

0.13 1.96 2.18 2.45 2.8 3.27 3.92 4.9<br />

0.15 0.54 0.59 0.65 0.73 0.82 0.93 1.09<br />

0.16 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

0.17 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

0.18 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

0.19 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

0.21 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

Constant ROE of 16%<br />

Considering that this model incorporates book value of equity, and Roe, this model<br />

needs a restated portion. There was a new book value of equity used for this<br />

174


estatement as well as a new Roe percentage from the restated net income and equity.<br />

The constant Roe dropped, which also dropped the prices around 50%.<br />

Analyst Recommendation<br />

After a significant amount of due diligence and analytical research, it is our opinion the<br />

Xilinx is overvalued. This opinion is comprised of thorough discussion and analysis of<br />

Xilinx’s competitors, accounting policies, and financial position. In order to arrive at this<br />

conclusion, we had to restate and accurately forecast Xilinx’s financial statements. Our<br />

forecasts enabled us to implement several valuation models aimed at capturing the<br />

intrinsic value of the firm. All of our valuation models suggest that Xilinx is dramatically<br />

overvalued, and therefore it is our opinion that current shareholders should sell their<br />

holdings.<br />

To expose the true economic value, we must understand all of the economic influences<br />

that add and subtract value to Xilinx. We begin by discussing the business environment<br />

in which they operate. The specialized-semiconductor industry is one of tremendous<br />

competition. Success relies on technological innovation, product differentiation, and<br />

large economies of scope. Xilinx and its fiercest competitor Altera hold a strong<br />

majority of market share in the designing and marketing of programmable logic devices<br />

(PLD), which are used in everything from cell phones to automobile manufacturing.<br />

The industry has been experiencing a slowing growth, suggesting maturity; however,<br />

there will always be a need for PLD’s because of the strong consumer demand for new<br />

and innovative electronic devices. The industry has a high concentration of<br />

competitors, significant threats of substitute products, moderate influence of suppliers,<br />

and low bargaining power over customers, which all lead to a fiercely competitive<br />

nature and are crucial for success. These key success factors helped narrow our focus<br />

as we began the accounting, financial, and prospective analysis.<br />

The focus of the next stage of analysis is the key accounting policies employed by Xilinx<br />

and the quality of disclosure articulated. Key accounting policies can be categorically<br />

175


segmented between business activities relating to success factors and those policies<br />

that materially distort the financial statements. The key accounting policies dealing with<br />

business activities involve foreign currency and product liability warranties. Foreign<br />

currency policy has a significant impact on business success because over 60% of<br />

Xilinx’s total sales occur overseas; additionally, they have a significant amount invested<br />

in fixed assets abroad Product warranties are important because of the fact that if the<br />

warranty liability increases in relation to sales over time it indicates poor product<br />

quality; ultimately having adverse affects on the bottom line. The accounting policies<br />

dealing with items that can materially distort their financial position involve research<br />

and development and goodwill. GAAP regulation requires all R&D be expensed in the<br />

period incurred, which negatively impacts Xilinx’s financials because a great deal of<br />

their products is a result of significant investments in research and development. These<br />

expenses would better represent their financial position if they were capitalized. The<br />

SEC does not demand that firms amortize goodwill at a certain pace, and leaves it up to<br />

the individual firm’s to decide the most appropriate rate. Xilinx has not amortized<br />

goodwill in recent years; we address this issue thoroughly in our restatements. The<br />

accounting restatements that our findings require affect both the financial and<br />

prospective analysis.<br />

The financial analysis begins to quantitatively access how well Xilinx operates<br />

independently and relative to its competitors. We used commonly accepted ratios to<br />

depict Xilinx’s liquidity, profitability, and capital structure. We found Xilinx has adequate<br />

liquidity and outperforms the industry. Additionally, they demonstrate above average<br />

profitability, however they are not more profitable than Altera. Xilinx has historically<br />

outperformed the industry in capital structure ratios, however, the firm is trending<br />

downward and we believe the outlook is not positive.<br />

The most critical part of our analysis is the portion that performs the actual valuation.<br />

We employed several different models that are all supported by fundamental financial<br />

theory. The ratios used in the method of comparables portion of the analysis yielded<br />

conflicting results; half of the ratios indicated Xilinx was undervalued, two ratios<br />

176


indicated they were overvalued, one ratio indicated fair value and one ratio was thrown<br />

out because of unreliable information. This level of dissension is not unusual when<br />

performing relative valuation; these ratios are poor methods of accurately depicting a<br />

firm’s economic circumstance. However, a clear and uniform perspective manifested<br />

when we employed intrinsic valuation models. All of the models agreed that Xilinx was<br />

overvalued. The residual income model, which is the most reliable model, estimated<br />

Xilinx’s market price to be $5.75. This outcome is substantially lower than the markets<br />

actual price of $17.62. For all of these reasons, we feel that Xilinx is worth substantially<br />

less than the current market price.<br />

177


Appendices<br />

Sales Manipulation diagnostics<br />

Sales Manipulation Diagnostics<br />

Xilinx 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Net Sales $1,155,977 $1,397,846 $1,573,233 $1,726,250 $1,842,739 $1,841,372<br />

Net Sales (Revenue) /<br />

Cash from Sales<br />

Net Sales/Account<br />

Receivables (RAW)<br />

Net Sales/Account<br />

Receivables (CHANGE)<br />

Net Sales/Inventory<br />

(RAW)<br />

Net Sales/Inventory<br />

(CHANGE)<br />

Net Sales/ Warranty<br />

Expenses (Liabilities)<br />

Net Sales/ Pension<br />

Expenses (Liabilities)<br />

0.85 0.96 1.02 1.01 1.01 0.96<br />

5.85 5.61 7.37 8.89 10.11 7.39<br />

5.85 4.72 -4.94 -7.95 -9.78 -0.02<br />

10.37 13.64 8.47 8.59 10.56 14.14<br />

10.37 (26.73) 2.11 10.00 (4.40) 0.03<br />

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

Sales Manipulation Diagnostics<br />

Altera 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Net Sales $827,207 $1,016,364 $1,123,739 $1,285,535 $1,263,548 -<br />

Net Sales (Revenue) /<br />

Cash from Sales<br />

Net Sales/Account<br />

Receivables (RAW)<br />

Net Sales/Account<br />

Receivables (CHANGE)<br />

Net Sales/Inventory<br />

(RAW)<br />

Net Sales/Inventory<br />

(CHANGE)<br />

Net Sales/ Warranty<br />

Expenses (Liabilities)<br />

Net Sales/ Pension<br />

Expenses (Liabilities)<br />

0.90 1.02 0.99 0.99 0.92 -<br />

9.49 15.05 13.96 13.78 6.35 -<br />

9.49 -9.61 8.27 12.69 -0.21 -<br />

18.55 15.07 15.89 16.38 17.05 -<br />

18.55 8.27 32.97 20.83 5.03 -<br />

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

178


Sales Manipulation Diagnostics<br />

Actel 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Net Sales $149,910 $165,402 $178,947 $191,499 $197,043 -<br />

Net Sales (Revenue) / Cash<br />

from Sales<br />

Net Sales/Account<br />

Receivables (RAW)<br />

Net Sales/Account<br />

Receivables (CHANGE)<br />

Net Sales/Inventory<br />

(RAW)<br />

Net Sales/Inventory<br />

(CHANGE)<br />

Net Sales/ Warranty<br />

Expenses (Liabilities)<br />

Net Sales/ Pension Expenses<br />

(Liabilities)<br />

0.88 1.02 0.96 1.02 1.02 -<br />

7.30 9.35 7.08 8.70 10.88 -<br />

7.30 -5.43 1.78 -3.84 -1.42 -<br />

3.88 4.01 4.79 4.88 5.54 -<br />

3.88 6.07 -3.52 6.86 -1.53 -<br />

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

Sales Manipulation Diagnostics<br />

Lattice 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Net Sales $209,662 $225,832 $211,060 $245,459 $228,709 -<br />

Net Sales (Revenue) / 0.89 1.03 0.98 1.00 0.97 -<br />

Cash from Sales<br />

Net Sales/Account<br />

-<br />

Receivables (RAW) 7.82 11.53 8.95 10.89 7.81<br />

Net Sales/Account 7.82 -2.24 -3.70 -33.33 -2.48 -<br />

Receivables (CHANGE)<br />

Net Sales/Inventory 4.50 5.89 7.38 6.32 5.72 -<br />

(RAW)<br />

Net Sales/Inventory 4.50 -1.96 1.51 3.36 -14.09 -<br />

(CHANGE)<br />

Net Sales/ Warranty N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

Expenses (Liabilities)<br />

Net Sales/ Pension<br />

Expenses (Liabilities)<br />

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

179


Expense Manipulation Diagnostics<br />

Expense Manipulation Diagnostics<br />

Xilinx 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Asset Turnover 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.54 0.58 0.59<br />

CFFO/OI (Raw) 2.22 1.32 0.74 1.19 1.59 1.37<br />

CFFO/OI (Change) 2.22 0.51 -3.50 5.35 -0.97 0.39<br />

CFFO/NOA (Raw) 0.90 1.29 0.80 1.37 1.34 1.44<br />

CFFO/NOA (Change) 0.90 -1.83 -16.70 15.57 1.13 -3.42<br />

Total Accruals/ Sales 0.19 0.09 -0.02 0.08 0.11 0.11<br />

Expense Manipulation Diagnostics<br />

Altera 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Asset Turnover 0.56 0.58 0.62 0.58 0.71 -<br />

CFFO/OI (Raw) 1.65 1.00 1.29 1.41 0.99 -<br />

CFFO/OI (Change) 1.65 -0.12 13.98 -0.47 5.82 -<br />

CFFO/NOA (Raw) 2.04 4.65 5.16 4.56 1.37 -<br />

CFFO/NOA (Change) 2.04 -1.64 26.77 27.01 1.70 -<br />

Total Accruals/ Sales 0.21 0.04 0.12 0.08 -0.01 -<br />

Expense Manipulation Diagnostics<br />

Actel 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Asset Turnover 0.47 0.52 0.49 0.56 0.54 -<br />

CFFO/OI (Raw) 6.12 -8.28 3.85 -2.72 -0.89 -<br />

CFFO/OI (Change) 6.12 2.25 1.80 -0.13 4.47 -<br />

CFFO/NOA (Raw) 1.00 0.43 0.95 1.08 0.42 -<br />

CFFO/NOA (Change) 1.00 -3.49 12.03 -1.79 -5.20 -<br />

Total Accruals/ Sales 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.07 -<br />

180


Expense Manipulation Diagnostics<br />

Lattice 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Asset Turnover 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.34 0.61 -<br />

CFFO/OI (Raw) -0.37 -0.09 -0.30 1.13 0.11 -<br />

CFFO/OI (Change) -0.37 -0.90 -0.20 -0.07 0.06 -<br />

CFFO/NOA (Raw) 0.65 0.13 -0.44 -0.31 -0.65 -<br />

CFFO/NOA (Change) 0.65 4.64 12.14 4.40 4.55 -<br />

Total Accruals/ Sales 0.60 0.26 -0.33 -0.07 0.92 -<br />

Liquidity Ratios<br />

Current Ratio<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx 3.74 3.41 4.87 4.78 5.6 5.34<br />

Altera 4.78 3.3 3.2 2.7 2.87 3.13<br />

Actel 10.64 4.48 4.03 3.83 3.83 4.58<br />

Lattice 8.63 10.3 5.53 5.34 3.01 2.36<br />

Industry<br />

Average<br />

6.95 5.37 4.4 4.16 3.83 3.85<br />

Quick Asset Ratio<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx 2.78 2.75 3.6 3.42 4.35 4.54<br />

Altera 4.16 2.91 2.62 2.25 2.38 2.49<br />

Actel 7.94 3 2.89 2.66 2.66 3.46<br />

Lattice 6.63 7.79 4.35 4.5 2.33 1.41<br />

Industry<br />

Average<br />

5.38 4.11 3.37 3.2 2.93 2.98<br />

181


Inventory Turnover<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx 8.97 10.45 6.47 3.27 4.12 5.27<br />

Altera 6.73 5.96 4.6 5.18 4.66 5.77<br />

Actel 1.37 1.45 1.88 1.87 1.93 4.5<br />

Lattice 1.63 1.91 2.51 3.36 4.5 2.58<br />

Industry Average 4.68 4.94 3.87 3.42 3.8 3.98<br />

Days’ Supply Inventory<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx 40.69 34.93 56.43 111.66 88.67 69.2<br />

Altera 54.24 61.21 79.38 70.53 78.27 63.2<br />

Actel 266.6 251.3 193.75 195.26 189.23 157.71<br />

Lattice 224.24 190.67 145.59 108.75 81.1 141.55<br />

Industry Average 146.44 134.53 118.79 121.55 109.32 107.92<br />

Accounts Receivable Turnover<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx 5.85 5.61 7.37 8.89 10.11 7.39<br />

Altera 12.46 9.49 15.05 13.96 12.05 6.46<br />

Actel 6.54 8.48 6.4 8.13 8.7 10.88<br />

Lattice 8.69 7.82 11.53 8.95 10.89 7.81<br />

Industry Average 8.39 7.85 10.09 9.98 10.44 8.14<br />

182


Days’ Sales Outstanding<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx 62.42 65.01 49.52 41.06 36.11 49.39<br />

Altera 29.29 38.48 24.25 26.15 30.29 56.47<br />

Actel 55.79 43.06 57 44.91 41.96 33.56<br />

Lattice 42.01 46.65 31.66 40.77 33.52 46.75<br />

Industry Average 47.38 48.3 40.61 38.22 35.47 46.54<br />

Cash to Cash Cycle<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx 103.11 99.94 105.95 152.72 124.78 118.59<br />

Altera 83.53 99.96 103.63 96.68 108.56 119.67<br />

Actel 322.39 294.36 250.75 240.17 231.19 191.27<br />

Lattice 266.25 237.32 177.25 149.52 114.62 188.3<br />

Industry Average 193.82 182.83 159.4 159.77 144.79 154.46<br />

Working Capital Turnover<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx 1.34 1.52 1.36 1.32 1.32 1.24<br />

Altera .78 .93 .95 1.19 .99 1.23<br />

Actel .62 .93 .94 .94 1 .95<br />

Lattice .66 .58 .69 .76 1.11 2.07<br />

Industry Average .85 .99 .99 1.05 1.1 1.37<br />

183


Profitability Ratios<br />

Gross Profit Margin<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx 59.3% 62.09% 63.37% 61.93% 61.00% 62.69%<br />

Altera 63.04% 67.86% 69.48% 67.43% 67.43% 66.71%<br />

Actel 60.60% 60.06% 57.43% 59.05% 60.51% 58.20%<br />

Lattice 60.05% 57.42% 57.11% 54.55% 56.52% 54.90%<br />

Industry Average 61% 62% 62% 61% 61% 61%<br />

Operating Profit Margin<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx 13.47% 23.40% 23.65% 23.87% 18.87% 23.04%<br />

Xilinx (Restated) 17.30% 30.12% 33.53% 36.65% 35.06% 43.13%<br />

Altera 23.96% 30.99% 28.67% 28.67% 23.42% 21.76%<br />

Actel -2.73% -0.51% -0.80% 3.28% -4.71% -6.14%<br />

Lattice -43.45% -45.12% -27.91% -31.25% -5.22% -110.1%<br />

Industry Average -5% 0.43% 7% 6% 9% -17%<br />

Net Profit Margin<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx 10.87% 21.68% 19.88% 20.52% 19.03% 20.31%<br />

Xilinx (Restated) 13.08% 23.84% 26.76% 29.94% 30.39% 35.39%<br />

Altera 18.75% 27.07% 24.81% 24.81% 25.14% 22.95%<br />

Actel 0.06% 2.37% 1.68% 3.93% -1.13% -1.47%<br />

Lattice -76.48% -43.79% -23.02% -23.27% 1.26% -104.8%<br />

Industry Average -13% -.24% 7% 6% 11% -15%<br />

184


Asset Turnover<br />

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx .58 .54 .57 .58 .58<br />

Altera .68 .64 .62 .58 .71<br />

Actel .47 .52 .53 .52 .53<br />

Lattice .22 .28 .26 .34 .32<br />

Industry Average .47 .51 .50 .51 .50<br />

Return on Assets<br />

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx 12.51% 10.65% 11.65% 11.05% 11.76%<br />

Xilinx (Restated) 13.91% 14.47% 17.17% 17.82% 20.69%<br />

Altera 18.49% 15.81% 15.30% 14.47% 16.39%<br />

Actel 1.12% 0.88% 2.07% -0.58% -0.79%<br />

Lattice -9.75% -6.37% -6.06% 0.43% -33.04%<br />

Industry Average 4% 6% 6% 7% -2%<br />

185


Return on Equity<br />

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx 15.53% 12.59% 13.25% 12.85% 21.10%<br />

Xilinx (Restated) 17.08% 16.95% 19.33% 20.52% 36.76%<br />

Altera 24.96% 21.81% 22.06% 20.10% 33.67%<br />

Actel .1.34% 1.05% 2.58% -0.74% -1.00%<br />

Lattice -13.89% -8.58% -9.05% 0.62% -46.86%<br />

Industry Average 4% 8% 7% 9% -2%<br />

Internal Growth Rate<br />

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx 13% 13.44% 14.8% 14.86% 16.23%<br />

Altera 18.67% 15.08% 14.99% 14.47% 16.39%<br />

Actel 1.12% 0.88% 2.07% -0.17% -0.38%<br />

Lattice -9.75 -6.37% -5.96% .43% -33.04%<br />

Industry Average 5.59% 5.83% 6.54% 7.25% -0.32%<br />

Sustainable Growth Rate<br />

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx 16.04% 10.01% 10.21% 7.98% 12.86%<br />

Altera 25.02% 21.86% 22.08% 20.01% 33.98%<br />

Actel 1.02% .97% 2.96% -1.17% 0.04%<br />

Lattice -14.27% -9.11% -9.07% 1.16% -47.72%<br />

Industry Average 6.95% 5.79% 6.55% 7% -.21%<br />

186


Capital Structure Ratios<br />

Debt to Equity Ratio<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx .24 .18 .14 .16 .79 .88<br />

Altera .21 .35 .38 .44 .39 1.05<br />

Actel .20 .19 .24 .27 .27 .25<br />

Lattice .42 .41 .49 .44 .42 .31<br />

Industry<br />

Average<br />

.27 .28 .32 .33 .47 .62<br />

Debt Service Margin<br />

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx 1.38 0.72 1.64 1.60 1.92<br />

Xilinx (Restated) 0.95 0.75 1.10 0.39 0.40<br />

Altera 0.81 0.86 0.77 0.45 N/A<br />

Actel 0.44 0.49 0.42 0.16 N/A<br />

Lattice 0.76 0.15 -0.28 -0.23 -0.26<br />

Industry Average .98 .53 .66 .57 N/A<br />

Z-Score<br />

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx 4.31 5.22 6.58 5.74 2.63<br />

Xilinx (Restated) 5.13 6.40 5.61 2.57 2.59<br />

Altera 5.13 4.12 4.18 3.88 3.83<br />

Actel 4.59 4.57 3.87 3.63 3.53<br />

Lattice 1.90 1.90 1.64 1.64 1.90<br />

Industry Average 3.98 3.78 4.07 3.72 2.97<br />

187


Times Interest Earned<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

Xilinx 6.32 14.58 11.77 9.24 5.04 8.04<br />

Altera 13.89 19.86 9.24 9.25 5.14 4.39<br />

Actel -0.14 -0.24 -0.39 1.5 1.42 1.41<br />

Lattice -16.07 30.87 -6.04 -5.54 -0.76 -20.07<br />

Industry<br />

Average<br />

1.02 14.61 3.87 3.38 2.71 -2.07<br />

188


Cost of Debt<br />

Short and Long Term Amount Weight Rate Resources<br />

Liabilities<br />

Accounts payable $59,402 4% 1.95 St. Louis AA Non-Financial Commercial<br />

Paper<br />

Accrued payroll and<br />

related liabilities<br />

$100,730 7% 1.95 St. Louis AA Non-Financial Commercial<br />

Paper<br />

Income taxes payable $39,258 3% 3.69 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate<br />

Deferred income on<br />

shipments to<br />

distributors<br />

$111,678 8% 1.95 St. Louis AA Non-Financial Commercial<br />

Paper<br />

Other accrued liabilities $29,598 2% 1.95 St. Louis AA Non-Financial Commercial<br />

Paper<br />

Convertible Debentures $999,851 68% 3.125 Xilinx 10-K<br />

Deferred Tax Liabilities $84,486 6% 3.69 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate<br />

Long-term income taxes $39,122 2% 3.69 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate<br />

payable<br />

Other Long Term<br />

$1,159 0% 3.125 Xilinx 10-K<br />

Liabilities<br />

Total Liabilities $1,465,284 100% N/A Xilinx 10-k<br />

Weighted Average Cost of Capital<br />

Value of Debt* 1.47<br />

Value of Equity* 4.94<br />

Total* 6.41<br />

Cost of Debt 2.94%<br />

Cost of Equity 17.20%<br />

Upper Bound 21.16%<br />

Lower Bound 13.24%<br />

Alternative Cost of Equity 11.41%<br />

Upper Bound WACC 21.16%<br />

Lower Bound WACC 13.24%<br />

WACC 13.96%<br />

*In Billions<br />

189


Table in thousands<br />

Regressions<br />

3 Month<br />

SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 24<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.592659916<br />

R Square 0.351245777<br />

Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.341977859<br />

Standard Error 0.078601747<br />

Observations 72<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F<br />

Significance<br />

F<br />

Regression 1 0.23414956 0.23414956 37.89910488 4.14306E-08<br />

Residual 70 0.43247642 0.006178235<br />

Total 71 0.66662598<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.005299268 0.009307529 0.569352773 0.570939297<br />

-<br />

0.013264014 0.02386255<br />

-<br />

0.013264014 0.02386255<br />

X Variable 1 1.746216031 0.283650462 6.156224889 4.14306E-08 1.180493031 2.311939031 1.180493031 2.311939031<br />

SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 36<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.511618332<br />

R Square 0.261753318<br />

Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.249024926<br />

Standard Error 0.070946215<br />

Observations 60<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F<br />

Significance<br />

F<br />

Regression 1 0.103508768 0.103508768 20.56452508 2.94277E-05<br />

190


Residual 58 0.291935192 0.005033365<br />

Total 59 0.39544396<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.000464787 0.009160328 0.050739116 0.959707745<br />

-<br />

0.017871602 0.018801175<br />

-<br />

0.017871602 0.018801175<br />

X Variable 1 1.404632287 0.309744287 4.534812574 2.94277E-05 0.784611737 2.024652836 0.784611737 2.024652836<br />

SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 48<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.50312401<br />

R Square 0.253133769<br />

Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.236897547<br />

Standard Error 0.067978363<br />

Observations 48<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F<br />

Significance<br />

F<br />

Regression 1 0.07204544 0.07204544 15.59068132 0.000267624<br />

Residual 46 0.212568661 0.004621058<br />

Total 47 0.284614102<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.003337554 0.009825405 0.339686159 0.735639016<br />

-<br />

0.016439959 0.023115067<br />

-<br />

0.016439959 0.023115067<br />

X Variable 1 1.277578825 0.323560247 3.948503681 0.000267624 0.626285839 1.928871812 0.626285839 1.928871812<br />

SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 60<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.502455971<br />

R Square 0.252462003<br />

Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.230475591<br />

Standard Error 0.071844808<br />

Observations 36<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F Significance<br />

191


F<br />

Regression 1 0.059269662 0.059269662 11.48263784 0.001791173<br />

Residual 34 0.175497001 0.005161677<br />

Total 35 0.234766663<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.005219725 0.012074664 0.432287356 0.668262054<br />

-<br />

0.019318946 0.029758395<br />

-<br />

0.019318946 0.029758395<br />

X Variable 1 1.263772633 0.372947854 3.388604114 0.001791173 0.505851408 2.021693858 0.505851408 2.021693858<br />

SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 72<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.55219006<br />

R Square 0.304913862<br />

Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.273319038<br />

Standard Error 0.062780932<br />

Observations 24<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F<br />

Significance<br />

F<br />

Regression 1 0.038037918 0.038037918 9.650753501 0.005145503<br />

Residual 22 0.086711798 0.003941445<br />

Total 23 0.124749716<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.015605662 0.013111493 1.190227689 0.246642593 -0.01158591 0.042797233 -0.01158591 0.042797233<br />

X Variable 1 1.086832595 0.349850133 3.106566191 0.005145503 0.36128783 1.812377359 0.36128783 1.812377359<br />

2 Year<br />

SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 24<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.593054624<br />

R Square 0.351713787<br />

192


Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.342452556<br />

Standard Error 0.07857339<br />

Observations 72<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F<br />

Significance<br />

F<br />

Regression 1 0.234461548 0.234461548 37.97699938 4.03722E-08<br />

Residual 70 0.432164432 0.006173778<br />

Total 71 0.66662598<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.005931709 0.009294688 0.638182693 0.52543712<br />

-<br />

0.012605962 0.02446938<br />

-<br />

0.012605962 0.02446938<br />

X Variable 1 1.746985477 0.283484273 6.162548124 4.03722E-08 1.181593929 2.312377025 1.181593929 2.312377025<br />

SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 36<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.512854932<br />

R Square 0.263020182<br />

Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.250313633<br />

Standard Error 0.070885315<br />

Observations 60<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F<br />

Significance<br />

F<br />

Regression 1 0.104009742 0.104009742 20.69957704 2.79374E-05<br />

Residual 58 0.291434218 0.005024728<br />

Total 59 0.39544396<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.000954226 0.009151346 0.104271699 0.917313477<br />

-<br />

0.017364183 0.019272636<br />

-<br />

0.017364183 0.019272636<br />

X Variable 1 1.407856873 0.309440938 4.549678784 2.79374E-05 0.788443541 2.027270205 0.788443541 2.027270205<br />

SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 48<br />

193


Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.503772655<br />

R Square 0.253786887<br />

Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.237564863<br />

Standard Error 0.067948634<br />

Observations 48<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F<br />

Significance<br />

F<br />

Regression 1 0.072231327 0.072231327 15.64458815 0.000261999<br />

Residual 46 0.212382775 0.004617017<br />

Total 47 0.284614102<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.003621847 0.009825107 0.368631787 0.714093403<br />

-<br />

0.016155067 0.02339876<br />

-<br />

0.016155067 0.02339876<br />

X Variable 1 1.277547311 0.322994349 3.955324026 0.000261999 0.627393416 1.927701205 0.627393416 1.927701205<br />

SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 60<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.502897513<br />

R Square 0.252905909<br />

Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.230932553<br />

Standard Error 0.071823474<br />

Observations 36<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F<br />

Significance<br />

F<br />

Regression 1 0.059373876 0.059373876 11.50966256 0.001771874<br />

Residual 34 0.175392787 0.005158611<br />

Total 35 0.234766663<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.005333494 0.012075263 0.441687588 0.661511829<br />

-<br />

0.019206394 0.029873382<br />

-<br />

0.019206394 0.029873382<br />

X Variable 1 1.261571792 0.371861035 3.392589359 0.001771874 0.505859249 2.017284335 0.505859249 2.017284335<br />

194


SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 72<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.552349738<br />

R Square 0.305090233<br />

Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.273503425<br />

Standard Error 0.062772966<br />

Observations 24<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F<br />

Significance<br />

F<br />

Regression 1 0.03805992 0.03805992 9.658786575 0.005129969<br />

Residual 22 0.086689796 0.003940445<br />

Total 23 0.124749716<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.015673112 0.013114264 1.195119462 0.244765188<br />

-<br />

0.011524207 0.042870431<br />

-<br />

0.011524207 0.042870431<br />

X Variable 1 1.084086295 0.348820957 3.107858841 0.005129969 0.36067591 1.807496681 0.36067591 1.807496681<br />

5 Year<br />

SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 24<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.591242745<br />

R Square 0.349567983<br />

Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.340276097<br />

Standard Error 0.07870332<br />

Observations 72<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F<br />

195<br />

Significance<br />

F<br />

Regression 1 0.233031099 0.233031099 37.62077847 4.54514E-08<br />

Residual 70 0.433594881 0.006194213


Total 71 0.66662598<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.006763207 0.009299509 0.727264938 0.469489083<br />

-<br />

0.011784079 0.025310492<br />

-<br />

0.011784079 0.025310492<br />

X Variable 1 1.74310513 0.284190589 6.13357795 4.54514E-08 1.17630488 2.30990538 1.17630488 2.30990538<br />

SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 36<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.511730606<br />

R Square 0.261868213<br />

Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.249141803<br />

Standard Error 0.070940694<br />

Observations 60<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F<br />

Significance<br />

F<br />

Regression 1 0.103554203 0.103554203 20.57675425 2.92894E-05<br />

Residual 58 0.291889757 0.005032582<br />

Total 59 0.39544396<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.00145572 0.009158668 0.158944494 0.874264776<br />

-<br />

0.016877346 0.019788786<br />

-<br />

0.016877346 0.019788786<br />

X Variable 1 1.404128584 0.309541188 4.536160739 2.92894E-05 0.784514581 2.023742587 0.784514581 2.023742587<br />

SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 48<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.502075083<br />

R Square 0.252079389<br />

Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.235820245<br />

Standard Error 0.06802633<br />

Observations 48<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F Significance<br />

196


F<br />

Regression 1 0.071745349 0.071745349 15.5038539 0.000276953<br />

Residual 46 0.212868753 0.004627582<br />

Total 47 0.284614102<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.003849914 0.009840104 0.391247278 0.697420907<br />

-<br />

0.015957188 0.023657015<br />

-<br />

0.015957188 0.023657015<br />

X Variable 1 1.269848534 0.322501759 3.937493352 0.000276953 0.620686172 1.919010895 0.620686172 1.919010895<br />

SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 60<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.501014775<br />

R Square 0.251015805<br />

Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.228986858<br />

Standard Error 0.071914271<br />

Observations 36<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F<br />

Significance<br />

F<br />

Regression 1 0.058930143 0.058930143 11.39481635 0.001855454<br />

Residual 34 0.17583652 0.005171662<br />

Total 35 0.234766663<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.005487048 0.012097397 0.453572598 0.653018342<br />

-<br />

0.019097821 0.030071917<br />

-<br />

0.019097821 0.030071917<br />

X Variable 1 1.252180168 0.370948105 3.375620883 0.001855454 0.498322924 2.006037413 0.498322924 2.006037413<br />

SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 72<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.551088489<br />

R Square 0.303698523<br />

Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.272048456<br />

197


Standard Error 0.062835793<br />

Observations 24<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F<br />

Significance<br />

F<br />

Regression 1 0.037886304 0.037886304 9.595509588 0.005253751<br />

Residual 22 0.086863411 0.003948337<br />

Total 23 0.124749716<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.015886768 0.013143646 1.208703302 0.239608141<br />

-<br />

0.011371485 0.043145021<br />

-<br />

0.011371485 0.043145021<br />

X Variable 1 1.077908499 0.347974865 3.097661955 0.005253751 0.356252803 1.799564196 0.356252803 1.799564196<br />

7 Year<br />

SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 24<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.590422543<br />

R Square 0.348598779<br />

Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.339293047<br />

Standard Error 0.078761936<br />

Observations 72<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F<br />

Significance<br />

F<br />

Regression 1 0.232385003 0.232385003 37.46065208 4.79446E-08<br />

Residual 70 0.434240978 0.006203443<br />

Total 71 0.66662598<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.00715301 0.009302118 0.768965702 0.444500505<br />

-<br />

0.011399479 0.025705499<br />

-<br />

0.011399479 0.025705499<br />

X Variable 1 1.741395825 0.284518056 6.12051077 4.79446E-08 1.173942463 2.308849188 1.173942463 2.308849188<br />

SUMMARY 36<br />

198


OUTPUT<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.511158708<br />

R Square 0.261283225<br />

Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.248546729<br />

Standard Error 0.070968799<br />

Observations 60<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F<br />

Significance<br />

F<br />

Regression 1 0.103322873 0.103322873 20.51452943 3.00001E-05<br />

Residual 58 0.292121087 0.00503657<br />

Total 59 0.39544396<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.00169501 0.009162851 0.184987226 0.853884406<br />

-<br />

0.016646429 0.02003645<br />

-<br />

0.016646429 0.02003645<br />

X Variable 1 1.402166198 0.309577019 4.529296792 3.00001E-05 0.782480472 2.021851924 0.782480472 2.021851924<br />

SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 48<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.501234521<br />

R Square 0.251236045<br />

Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.234958567<br />

Standard Error 0.068064672<br />

Observations 48<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F<br />

Significance<br />

F<br />

Regression 1 0.071505321 0.071505321 15.43458119 0.00028464<br />

Residual 46 0.213108781 0.0046328<br />

Total 47 0.284614102<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.003986449 0.009848075 0.404794732 0.687504674<br />

-<br />

0.015836697 0.023809595<br />

-<br />

0.015836697 0.023809595<br />

X Variable 1 1.26645316 0.322360416 3.928686954 0.00028464 0.617575308 1.915331012 0.617575308 1.915331012<br />

199


SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 60<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.500090945<br />

R Square 0.250090954<br />

Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.228034805<br />

Standard Error 0.071958657<br />

Observations 36<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F<br />

Significance<br />

F<br />

Regression 1 0.058713019 0.058713019 11.33883164 0.001897714<br />

Residual 34 0.176053644 0.005178048<br />

Total 35 0.234766663<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.005592022 0.012109549 0.461786187 0.647175836<br />

-<br />

0.019017542 0.030201586<br />

-<br />

0.019017542 0.030201586<br />

X Variable 1 1.248022185 0.370627937 3.367318168 0.001897714 0.4948156 2.00122877 0.4948156 2.00122877<br />

SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 72<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.550447839<br />

R Square 0.302992824<br />

Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.271310679<br />

Standard Error 0.062867627<br />

Observations 24<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F<br />

Significance<br />

F<br />

Regression 1 0.037798269 0.037798269 9.563520068 0.005317579<br />

Residual 22 0.086951447 0.003952339<br />

Total 23 0.124749716<br />

200


Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.016016232 0.013160252 1.217015559 0.236493071<br />

-<br />

0.011276461 0.043308925<br />

-<br />

0.011276461 0.043308925<br />

X Variable 1 1.075228082 0.347689609 3.09249415 0.005317579 0.354163969 1.796292196 0.354163969 1.796292196<br />

10 Year<br />

SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 24<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.589655125<br />

R Square 0.347693166<br />

Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.338374497<br />

Standard Error 0.078816666<br />

Observations 72<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F<br />

Significance<br />

F<br />

Regression 1 0.231781298 0.231781298 37.31146202 5.03944E-08<br />

Residual 70 0.434844682 0.006212067<br />

Total 71 0.66662598<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.007554437 0.009304559 0.81190703 0.419597393<br />

-<br />

0.011002921 0.026111795<br />

-<br />

0.011002921 0.026111795<br />

X Variable 1 1.739002551 0.284694506 6.108310898 5.03944E-08 1.171197271 2.306807831 1.171197271 2.306807831<br />

SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 36<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.510372876<br />

R Square 0.260480473<br />

Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.247730136<br />

Standard Error 0.071007349<br />

201


Observations 60<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F<br />

Significance<br />

F<br />

Regression 1 0.10300543 0.10300543 20.42930155 3.10027E-05<br />

Residual 58 0.29243853 0.005042044<br />

Total 59 0.39544396<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.001967384 0.009168836 0.214572911 0.830852961<br />

-<br />

0.016386035 0.020320803<br />

-<br />

0.016386035 0.020320803<br />

X Variable 1 1.399074154 0.309538001 4.519878489 3.10027E-05 0.779466529 2.018681778 0.779466529 2.018681778<br />

SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 48<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.500214585<br />

R Square 0.250214631<br />

Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.233914949<br />

Standard Error 0.068111081<br />

Observations 48<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F<br />

Significance<br />

F<br />

Regression 1 0.071214612 0.071214612 15.35089038 0.000294226<br />

Residual 46 0.213399489 0.004639119<br />

Total 47 0.284614102<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.004167218 0.009858205 0.422715689 0.67447227<br />

-<br />

0.015676319 0.024010755<br />

-<br />

0.015676319 0.024010755<br />

X Variable 1 1.262211493 0.322155348 3.918021233 0.000294226 0.613746422 1.910676565 0.613746422 1.910676565<br />

SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 60<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.498934869<br />

R Square 0.248936003<br />

Adjusted R 0.226845886<br />

202


Square<br />

Standard Error 0.072014049<br />

Observations 36<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F<br />

Significance<br />

F<br />

Regression 1 0.058441875 0.058441875 11.26911176 0.001951786<br />

Residual 34 0.176324788 0.005186023<br />

Total 35 0.234766663<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.005748571 0.012125962 0.474071322 0.638479477<br />

-<br />

0.018894349 0.030391491<br />

-<br />

0.018894349 0.030391491<br />

X Variable 1 1.242936709 0.370257762 3.35694977 0.001951786 0.490482409 1.995391009 0.490482409 1.995391009<br />

SUMMARY<br />

OUTPUT 72<br />

Regression Statistics<br />

Multiple R 0.54963919<br />

R Square 0.30210324<br />

Adjusted R<br />

Square 0.27038066<br />

Standard Error 0.062907733<br />

Observations 24<br />

ANOVA<br />

df SS MS F<br />

Significance<br />

F<br />

Regression 1 0.037687293 0.037687293 9.52328718 0.005399073<br />

Residual 22 0.087062423 0.003957383<br />

Total 23 0.124749716<br />

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%<br />

Upper<br />

95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.016200471 0.013182983 1.228892634 0.23209533<br />

-<br />

0.011139362 0.043540303<br />

-<br />

0.011139362 0.043540303<br />

X Variable 1 1.071988694 0.347373564 3.085982369 0.005399073 0.351580018 1.79239737 0.351580018 1.79239737<br />

203


Method of Comparables<br />

Price/Earnings (trailing twelve months)<br />

Company PPS EPS P/E (ttm) Industry Avg. <strong>XLNX</strong> PPS<br />

Xilinx 17.62 1.3342 13.21 13.56 18.07<br />

Xilinx-Restated 17.62 2.3431 7.52 13.56 31.77<br />

Altera 16.71 1.0823 15.44<br />

Actel N/A N/A N/A<br />

Lattice Semiconductor 1.73 0.148243 11.67<br />

P/E (forecast)<br />

Company PPS EPS P/E (forecast) Industry Avg. <strong>XLNX</strong> PPS<br />

Xilinx 17.62 1.136 15.51 20.99 23.84<br />

Xilinx-Restated 17.62 1.6781 10.5 20.99 35.22<br />

Altera 16.71 1.2109 13.8<br />

Actel 12.3 0.4366 28.17<br />

Lattice Semiconductor N/A N/A N/A<br />

Price/EBITDA<br />

Company <strong>Mark</strong>et Cap ($Millions) EBITDA ($Millions) P/EBITDA<br />

Industry<br />

Avg. <strong>XLNX</strong> PPS<br />

Xilinx 4,942.00 533.646 0.033 0.06 32.53<br />

Xilinx-Restated 4,942.00 874.057 0.0202 0.06 52.44<br />

Altera 4,519.00 274.953 0.061<br />

Actel 211.46 N/A N/A<br />

Lattice Semiconductor 180.09 N/A N/A<br />

Price/Book<br />

Company PPS BPS P/B Industry Avg. P/B Xilinx PPS<br />

Xilinx 17.62 10.73 1.64 2.66 28.55<br />

Xilinx restated 17.62 10.73 1.64 2.66 N/A<br />

Altera 16.76 2.77 6.05 N/A N/A<br />

Actel 12.3 10.88 1.13 N/A N/A<br />

Lattice 1.73 2.16 .8 N/A N/A<br />

204


Dividends/Price<br />

Company PPS BPS D/P Industry Avg. D/P Xilinx Price<br />

Xilinx 17.62 10.73 .78 .2 3.9<br />

Xilinx restated 17.62 10.73 .78 .2 N/A<br />

Altera 16.76 2.77 .2 N/A N/A<br />

Actel 12.3 10.88 N/A N/A N/A<br />

Lattice 1.73 2.16 N/A N/A N/A<br />

Price Earnings Growth<br />

Company PPS P.E.G Industry Avg. Xilinx PPS<br />

Xilinx 17.62 6.6071 .92 2.45<br />

Xilinx restated 17.62 6.6071 .92 N/A<br />

Altera 16.76 .95 N/A N/A<br />

Actel 12.3 N/A N/A N/A<br />

Lattice 1.73 1.85 N/A N/A<br />

EV/EBITDA<br />

Company PPS # of Shares EV EBITDA EV/EBITDA Industry Average Xilinx PPS<br />

Xilinx 17.62 280.52 4547.32 874.057 8.52 14.00 28.04<br />

Xilinx restated 17.62 280.52 4547.32 874.057 5.20 14.00 45.03<br />

Altera 16.76 301.34 3850 274.953 10.578<br />

Actel 12.3 25.73 134.67 -12.099 N/A<br />

Lattice 1.73 115.37 134.46 -241.838 21.093<br />

Price/Free Cash Flows<br />

Company PPS # of Shares FCF P/FCF Industry Average Xilinx PPS<br />

Xilinx 17.62 280.52 646 12.71 -.04 -8.30<br />

Xilinx restated 17.62 280.52 646 12.71 -.04 -4.99<br />

Altera 16.76 301.34 -788.49 -11.30<br />

Actel 12.3 25.73 -9.67 -282.57<br />

205


Lattice 1.73 115.37 -3.04 -1.67<br />

Discounted Dividends Model<br />

Intrinsic Valuations Model<br />

Residual Income Model<br />

206


Restated Residual Income Model<br />

Discounted Free Cash Flows Model<br />

207


Restated Discounted Free Cash Flows Model<br />

Abnormal Earnings Growth Model<br />

Restated Abnormal Earnings Growth Model<br />

208


Long Run Residual Income Model<br />

Restated Long Run Residual Income Model<br />

209


References<br />

1. Xilinx 10-k<br />

2. Xilinx 8-Q<br />

3. Xilinx Investors Factsheet<br />

4. Altera 10-k<br />

5. Altera 8-Q<br />

6. Actel 10-k<br />

7. Actel 8-Q<br />

8. Lattice Semiconductor 10-k<br />

9. Lattice Semiconductor 8-Q<br />

10. Yahoo Finance<br />

11. Wikipedia.com<br />

12. Investopedia.com<br />

13. The Wall Street Journal<br />

210

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