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A Survey of Cooperative Black and Gray hole Attack in MANET - ijcsmr

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International Journal <strong>of</strong> Computer Science <strong>and</strong> Management Research Vol 1 Issue 2 September 2012<br />

ISSN 2278-733X<br />

A <strong>Survey</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Cooperative</strong> <strong>Black</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>Gray</strong> <strong>hole</strong> <strong>Attack</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>MANET</strong><br />

B.Revathi*<br />

D.Geetha**<br />

*Research scholar <strong>in</strong> Computer Science, Sree Saraswathi Thyagaraja College <strong>of</strong> Arts <strong>and</strong> Science<br />

Pollachi-642 107, Tamil Nadu, India<br />

**Assistant Pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>in</strong> Computer Science, Sree Saraswathi Thyagaraja College <strong>of</strong> Arts <strong>and</strong> Science<br />

Pollachi-642 107, Tamil Nadu, India<br />

Abstract— Mobile ad hoc networks (<strong>MANET</strong>s) are a set <strong>of</strong><br />

mobile nodes which are self-configur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> connected by<br />

wireless l<strong>in</strong>ks automatically as per the def<strong>in</strong>ed rout<strong>in</strong>g protocol.<br />

Security is an essential requirement <strong>in</strong> mobile ad hoc network<br />

(<strong>MANET</strong>s). Compared to wired networks, <strong>MANET</strong>s are more<br />

vulnerable to security attacks due to the lack <strong>of</strong> a trusted<br />

centralized authority <strong>and</strong> limited resources. <strong>Attack</strong>s on ad-hoc<br />

networks can be classified as passive <strong>and</strong> active attacks,<br />

depend<strong>in</strong>g on whether the normal operation <strong>of</strong> the network is<br />

disrupted or not. These mobile nodes communicate with each<br />

other without any <strong>in</strong>frastructure, furthermore, all <strong>of</strong> the<br />

transmission l<strong>in</strong>ks are established through wireless medium. In<br />

this paper we address the problem <strong>of</strong> packet forward<strong>in</strong>g<br />

misbehavior <strong>and</strong> propose a mechanism to detect <strong>and</strong> remove the<br />

black <strong>and</strong> gray <strong>hole</strong> attacks.<br />

Keywords— black <strong>hole</strong>, gray <strong>hole</strong>, <strong>MANET</strong>, active attack,<br />

passive attack.<br />

I. INTRODUCTION<br />

This Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (<strong>MANET</strong>s) differ from<br />

exist<strong>in</strong>g networks by the fact that they depend on no fixed<br />

<strong>in</strong>frastructure. Nodes form<strong>in</strong>g the network perform all<br />

functionality <strong>of</strong> the network with each node performs the<br />

functionality <strong>of</strong> both host <strong>and</strong> router.<br />

Fig.1.1 A typical <strong>MANET</strong><br />

A <strong>MANET</strong> is referred to as an <strong>in</strong>frastructure less network<br />

because the mobile nodes <strong>in</strong> the network dynamically set up<br />

paths among themselves to send out packets temporarily. Due<br />

to multi-hop rout<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> open work<strong>in</strong>g environment,<br />

<strong>MANET</strong>s are vulnerable to attacks by selfish or malicious<br />

nodes, such as packet dropp<strong>in</strong>g (black-<strong>hole</strong>) attacks <strong>and</strong><br />

selective forward<strong>in</strong>g (gray-<strong>hole</strong>) attacks. Another<br />

characteristic <strong>of</strong> a <strong>MANET</strong> is, limited b<strong>and</strong>width, limited<br />

battery power. This characteristic makes rout<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a <strong>MANET</strong><br />

an even more difficult task. Currently, several efficient rout<strong>in</strong>g<br />

protocols have been proposed. These protocols can be<br />

classified <strong>in</strong>to two categories: reactive rout<strong>in</strong>g protocols <strong>and</strong><br />

proactive rout<strong>in</strong>g protocols. In reactive rout<strong>in</strong>g protocols, such<br />

as the Ad hoc On Dem<strong>and</strong> Distance Vector (AODV) protocol<br />

[1], nodes f<strong>in</strong>d routes only when required. In proactive rout<strong>in</strong>g<br />

protocols, such as the Optimized L<strong>in</strong>k State Rout<strong>in</strong>g (OLSR)<br />

protocol [2], nodes obta<strong>in</strong> routes by periodic exchange <strong>of</strong><br />

topology <strong>in</strong>formation. <strong>Gray</strong> <strong>hole</strong> attack [3] may occur due to a<br />

malicious node which is deliberately mischievous, as well as a<br />

damaged node <strong>in</strong>terface we simulated the <strong>Gray</strong> <strong>hole</strong> attack<br />

node which is <strong>in</strong>tentionally misbehav<strong>in</strong>g, as well as a<br />

damaged node <strong>in</strong>terface we simulated the <strong>Gray</strong> <strong>hole</strong> attack.<br />

We made our simulations us<strong>in</strong>g Network Simulator version 2<br />

(NS-2) [4] simulation programs that consists <strong>of</strong> the collection<br />

<strong>of</strong> all network protocols to simulate many <strong>of</strong> the accessible<br />

network topologies.<br />

II. PROTOCOLS COMMONLY USED FOR <strong>MANET</strong>’S<br />

There are many number <strong>of</strong> rout<strong>in</strong>g protocols that are<br />

proposed <strong>in</strong> <strong>MANET</strong>. The most commonly used protocols are:<br />

A. AODV (Ad Hoc On-Dem<strong>and</strong> Distance Vector Rout<strong>in</strong>g)<br />

Ad hoc On-Dem<strong>and</strong> Distance Vector (AODV) Rout<strong>in</strong>g is a<br />

rout<strong>in</strong>g protocol for <strong>MANET</strong>s <strong>and</strong> other wireless ad-hoc<br />

networks. It is a reactive rout<strong>in</strong>g protocol, mean<strong>in</strong>g that is to<br />

establish a route to a dest<strong>in</strong>ation only on dem<strong>and</strong>. AODV is<br />

capable <strong>of</strong> both unicast <strong>and</strong> multicast rout<strong>in</strong>g. Route Requests<br />

(RREQs), Route Replies (RREPs), <strong>and</strong> Route Errors<br />

(RERRs) are the message types dist<strong>in</strong>ct by AODV. These<br />

message types are received through UDP, <strong>and</strong> normal IP<br />

header process<strong>in</strong>g applies.<br />

B. DSR (Dynamic Source Rout<strong>in</strong>g)<br />

The Dynamic Source Rout<strong>in</strong>g (DSR) [5] protocol is an on<br />

dem<strong>and</strong> rout<strong>in</strong>g protocol that is based on the concept <strong>of</strong> source<br />

rout<strong>in</strong>g. The DSR is a simple <strong>and</strong> efficient rout<strong>in</strong>g protocol<br />

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International Journal <strong>of</strong> Computer Science <strong>and</strong> Management Research Vol 1 Issue 2 September 2012<br />

ISSN 2278-733X<br />

designed specially for use <strong>in</strong> multi-hop wireless ad hoc<br />

networks <strong>of</strong> mobile nodes. DSR allows the network to be<br />

entirely self-organiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> self-configur<strong>in</strong>g, without the need<br />

for any exist<strong>in</strong>g network <strong>in</strong>frastructure or adm<strong>in</strong>istration.<br />

Dynamic source rout<strong>in</strong>g protocol (DSR) is an on-dem<strong>and</strong><br />

protocol designed to conf<strong>in</strong>e the b<strong>and</strong>width consumed by<br />

control packets <strong>in</strong> ad hoc wireless networks by elim<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

periodic table-update messages.<br />

C. DYMO (Dynamic On-Dem<strong>and</strong> <strong>MANET</strong> Rout<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Protocol)<br />

The Dynamic <strong>MANET</strong> On-dem<strong>and</strong> (DYMO) rout<strong>in</strong>g<br />

protocol enables reactive, multihop, unicast rout<strong>in</strong>g between<br />

participat<strong>in</strong>g DYMO routers. The basic operations <strong>of</strong> the<br />

DYMO protocol are route discovery <strong>and</strong> route ma<strong>in</strong>tenance.<br />

III. CLASSIFICATION OF ATTACKS<br />

The attacks can be categorized on the basis <strong>of</strong> the source <strong>of</strong><br />

the attacks i.e. Internal or External, <strong>and</strong> on the behaviour <strong>of</strong><br />

the attack i.e. Passive or Active attack. This classification is<br />

important because the attacker can develop the network either<br />

as <strong>in</strong>ternal, external or/ as well as active or passive attack<br />

aga<strong>in</strong>st the network.<br />

A. External <strong>and</strong> Internal <strong>Attack</strong><br />

External attacks, <strong>in</strong> which the attacker aims to cause<br />

congestion, spread false rout<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation or disturb nodes<br />

from provid<strong>in</strong>g services.External attacks are attacks launched<br />

by challengers who are not <strong>in</strong>itially <strong>of</strong>ficial to participate <strong>in</strong><br />

the network operations. These attacks usually aim to cause<br />

network congestion, deny access to specific network function<br />

or to <strong>in</strong>terrupt the w<strong>hole</strong> network operations. External<br />

attackers are ma<strong>in</strong>ly outside the networks who want to get<br />

access to the network, once they get access to the network<br />

they start send<strong>in</strong>g fake packets, denial <strong>of</strong> service <strong>in</strong> order to<br />

<strong>in</strong>terrupt the performance <strong>of</strong> the w<strong>hole</strong> network. This attack is<br />

same, like the attacks that are made aga<strong>in</strong>st wired network.<br />

These attacks can be barred by implement<strong>in</strong>g security<br />

measures such as firewall, where the access <strong>of</strong> unauthorized<br />

person to the network can be mitigated.<br />

In <strong>in</strong>ternal attack the attacker wants to have usual access to<br />

the network as well as contribute <strong>in</strong> the normal activities <strong>of</strong><br />

the network. Internal attack is more strict attacks then external<br />

attacks. Internal attacks, <strong>in</strong> which the challenger wants to ga<strong>in</strong><br />

the normal access to the network <strong>and</strong> contribute the network<br />

activities, either by some malicious impersonation to get the<br />

access to the network as a new node, or by directly<br />

compromis<strong>in</strong>g a exist<strong>in</strong>g node <strong>and</strong> us<strong>in</strong>g it as a basis to<br />

conduct its malicious behaviors.Internal nodes might<br />

misbehave to save their limited resources, such as the battery<br />

powers, the process<strong>in</strong>g capabilities, <strong>and</strong> the communication<br />

b<strong>and</strong>width. <strong>Attack</strong>s that are caused by the misbehav<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>in</strong>ternal nodes are hard to detect because to dist<strong>in</strong>guish<br />

between normal network failures <strong>and</strong> misbehaviour activities<br />

<strong>in</strong> the ad hoc networks is not an easy task.<br />

.Fig. 3.1 External <strong>and</strong> Internal <strong>Attack</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>MANET</strong>s<br />

B. Active <strong>and</strong> Passive <strong>Attack</strong><br />

In active attack the attacker disrupt the performance <strong>of</strong> the<br />

network, steal important <strong>in</strong>formation <strong>and</strong> try to destroy the<br />

data dur<strong>in</strong>g the exchange <strong>in</strong> the network. Active attacks can be<br />

an <strong>in</strong>ternal or an external attack. The active attacks are meant<br />

to destroy the performance <strong>of</strong> the network <strong>in</strong> such case the<br />

active attack act as an <strong>in</strong>ternal node <strong>in</strong> the network. Be<strong>in</strong>g an<br />

active part <strong>of</strong> the network it is easy for the node to make use<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> takeover any <strong>in</strong>ternal node to use it to <strong>in</strong>troduce false<br />

packets <strong>in</strong>jection or denial <strong>of</strong> service. This attack br<strong>in</strong>gs the 18<br />

attacker <strong>in</strong> strong position where attacker can modify, make<br />

<strong>and</strong> replays the massages. <strong>Attack</strong>ers <strong>in</strong> passive attacks do not<br />

<strong>in</strong>terrupt the normal operations <strong>of</strong> the network. In Passive<br />

attack, it listens to the network <strong>in</strong> order to know <strong>and</strong><br />

underst<strong>and</strong> how they are located <strong>in</strong> the network, how the<br />

nodes are communicat<strong>in</strong>g with each other. Before the attacker<br />

start an attack aga<strong>in</strong>st the network, the attacker has enough<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation about the network that it can easily capture <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong>troduce attack <strong>in</strong> the network.<br />

Fig. 3.2 Active <strong>and</strong> Passive <strong>Attack</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>MANET</strong>s<br />

IV. NETWORK LAYER THREATS<br />

A. <strong>Black</strong> <strong>hole</strong> <strong>Attack</strong><br />

<strong>MANET</strong>s face various securities threats i.e. attack that are<br />

passed out aga<strong>in</strong>st them to <strong>in</strong>terrupt the normal performance<br />

<strong>of</strong> the networks. <strong>Black</strong> <strong>hole</strong> attack is one <strong>of</strong> the security threat<br />

<strong>in</strong> which the traffic is redirect to such a node that actually does<br />

not exist <strong>in</strong> the network. In these attacks, black <strong>hole</strong> attack is<br />

that k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> attack which occurs <strong>in</strong> Mobile Ad-Hoc networks<br />

(<strong>MANET</strong>). In black <strong>hole</strong> attack, a malicious node uses its<br />

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International Journal <strong>of</strong> Computer Science <strong>and</strong> Management Research Vol 1 Issue 2 September 2012<br />

ISSN 2278-733X<br />

rout<strong>in</strong>g protocol <strong>in</strong> order to endorse itself for hav<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>volves the cooperation between two attack<strong>in</strong>g nodes [14].<br />

shortest path to the dest<strong>in</strong>ation node or to the packet it wants One attacker captures rout<strong>in</strong>g traffic at one po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> the<br />

to <strong>in</strong>terrupt.<br />

network <strong>and</strong> turns it to another po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> the network that<br />

This destructive node advertises its availability <strong>of</strong> new shares a private high speed communication l<strong>in</strong>k between the<br />

routes irrespective <strong>of</strong> check<strong>in</strong>g its rout<strong>in</strong>g table. In this way attackers, <strong>and</strong> then selectively <strong>in</strong>jects tunnel traffic back <strong>in</strong>to<br />

attacker node will always have the availability <strong>in</strong> reply<strong>in</strong>g to the network. The two collud<strong>in</strong>g attacker can potentially<br />

the route request <strong>and</strong> thus <strong>in</strong>tercept the data packet <strong>and</strong> reta<strong>in</strong> deform the topology <strong>and</strong> establish routes under the control<br />

it [6]. In protocol based on flood<strong>in</strong>g, the malicious node reply over the worm<strong>hole</strong> l<strong>in</strong>k.<br />

will be received by the request<strong>in</strong>g node before the response <strong>of</strong><br />

reply from actual node; hence a malicious <strong>and</strong> forged route is<br />

created. When this route is establish, now it is up to the node 1<br />

whether to drop all the packets or promote it to the unknown<br />

2<br />

address [7].<br />

B<br />

4<br />

The black <strong>hole</strong> attack has two properties. First, the node<br />

exploits the mobile ad-hoc rout<strong>in</strong>g protocol, such as AODV,<br />

to promote itself as hav<strong>in</strong>g a valid route to a target node, even<br />

3<br />

though the route is false, with the aim <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tercept<strong>in</strong>g packets.<br />

Second, the attacker consumes the <strong>in</strong>tercepted packets without<br />

A<br />

any forward<strong>in</strong>g. However, the attacker runs the risk that<br />

neighbour<strong>in</strong>g nodes will check <strong>and</strong> represent the ongo<strong>in</strong>g<br />

attacks. There is a more delicate form <strong>of</strong> these attacks when an<br />

Fig.4.2 Warm Hole <strong>Attack</strong><br />

attacker selectively forward packets. An attacker suppress or<br />

modifies packets orig<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g from some nodes, while leav<strong>in</strong>g D. Location Disclosure <strong>Attack</strong>:<br />

the data from the other nodes unchanged, which limits the In this attack, the privacy necessities <strong>of</strong> an ad hoc network<br />

suspicion <strong>of</strong> its wrongdo<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

are compromised. Through the use <strong>of</strong> traffic analysis<br />

techniques or with simpler prob<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> monitor<strong>in</strong>g<br />

approaches an attacker is able to discover the place <strong>of</strong> a node,<br />

<strong>and</strong> the configuration <strong>of</strong> the network.<br />

Fig.4.1<strong>Black</strong> <strong>hole</strong> <strong>Attack</strong><br />

B. Impersonation <strong>Attack</strong>:<br />

The attacker nodes impersonates a right node <strong>and</strong> jo<strong>in</strong>s the<br />

network untraceable, sends false rout<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation, masked<br />

as some other trusted node.<br />

C. Worm<strong>hole</strong> <strong>Attack</strong>:<br />

In the worm<strong>hole</strong> attacks, a compromised node <strong>in</strong> the ad hoc<br />

networks colludes with external attacker to create a shortcut <strong>in</strong><br />

the network. By creat<strong>in</strong>g this shortcut, they could trap the<br />

source node to w<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> the route discovery process <strong>and</strong> later<br />

starts the <strong>in</strong>terception attacks. Packets from these two<br />

collud<strong>in</strong>g attackers are usually transmitted us<strong>in</strong>g wired<br />

connection to create the best route from source to the<br />

dest<strong>in</strong>ation node. In addition, if the worm<strong>hole</strong> nodes<br />

constantly ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> the false routes, they could permanently<br />

reject other routes from be<strong>in</strong>g established. As a result, the<br />

<strong>in</strong>termediate nodes reside along that denied routes are unable<br />

to contribute <strong>in</strong> the network operations. The worm<strong>hole</strong> attack<br />

E. <strong>Gray</strong> <strong>hole</strong> <strong>Attack</strong><br />

In this k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> attack the attacker misleads the network by<br />

approv<strong>in</strong>g to forward the packets <strong>in</strong> the network. As soon as it<br />

receive the packets from the neighbour<strong>in</strong>g node, the attacker<br />

falls the packets. This is a type <strong>of</strong> active attack. In the<br />

beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g the attacker nodes behaves usually <strong>and</strong> reply true<br />

RREP messages to the nodes that started RREQ messages.<br />

When it receives the packets it starts fall<strong>in</strong>g the packets <strong>and</strong><br />

launch Denial <strong>of</strong> Service (DoS) attack. The malicious<br />

activities <strong>of</strong> gray <strong>hole</strong> attack is different <strong>in</strong> different ways. It<br />

drops packets while forward<strong>in</strong>g them <strong>in</strong> the network. In some<br />

other gray <strong>hole</strong> attacks the attacker node behaves maliciously<br />

for the time until the packets are dropped <strong>and</strong> then switch to<br />

their normal behavior [8]. Due this behavior it’s very tricky<br />

for the network to figure out such k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> attack. <strong>Gray</strong> <strong>hole</strong><br />

attack is also termed as node misbehav<strong>in</strong>g attack [9].<br />

V. PROPERTIES OF BLACKHOLE, GREYHOLE AND<br />

WORMHOLE ATTACKS<br />

First, the <strong>Black</strong> <strong>hole</strong> node exploits the ad hoc rout<strong>in</strong>g protocol,<br />

such as AODV, to promote itself as hav<strong>in</strong>g a valid route to a<br />

dest<strong>in</strong>ation node, even though the route is fake, with the<br />

<strong>in</strong>tention <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tercept<strong>in</strong>g packets. Second, the packets are<br />

consumed by the <strong>Black</strong> <strong>hole</strong> node. Third, the <strong>Black</strong> <strong>hole</strong> nodes<br />

can conduct synchronized attacks. Grey <strong>hole</strong> is a node that can<br />

switch from behav<strong>in</strong>g acceptably to behav<strong>in</strong>g like a black <strong>hole</strong>.<br />

Worm<strong>hole</strong> attacks depend on a node misrepresent<strong>in</strong>g its<br />

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International Journal <strong>of</strong> Computer Science <strong>and</strong> Management Research Vol 1 Issue 2 September 2012<br />

ISSN 2278-733X<br />

location. Hence, location based rout<strong>in</strong>g protocols have the<br />

potential to prevent worm<strong>hole</strong> attacks.<br />

VI. COUNTERMEASURES<br />

A. Worm<strong>hole</strong> <strong>Attack</strong> Countermeasure<br />

Worm<strong>hole</strong> attacks depend on a node misrepresent<strong>in</strong>g its<br />

position. Hence, location based rout<strong>in</strong>g protocols have the<br />

ability to prevent worm<strong>hole</strong> attacks. Localization may be done<br />

us<strong>in</strong>g globally easy to get to beacons that broadcast known<br />

locations [10]. A solution to worm<strong>hole</strong> attacks was planned <strong>in</strong><br />

which all nodes are equipped with directional antennas. Nodes<br />

use specific ‘sectors’ <strong>of</strong> their antennas to communicate with<br />

each other. Each couple <strong>of</strong> nodes exam<strong>in</strong>e the track <strong>of</strong><br />

received signals from its neighbour. If the directions <strong>of</strong> both<br />

pairs match the neighbour relation is set [10]. This method<br />

may only be used <strong>in</strong> networks us<strong>in</strong>g Directional antennas<br />

[11].Another solution was proposed <strong>in</strong> which nodes estimate<br />

the expanse <strong>of</strong> its neighbours us<strong>in</strong>g the Received Signal<br />

Strength. The value is sent to a central controller which<br />

calculates the physical topology based on <strong>in</strong>dividual sensor<br />

distance measurement. Worm<strong>hole</strong> can be trapped as without<br />

worm<strong>hole</strong> attack the topology is usually flat [12] [11].<br />

B. <strong>Black</strong> <strong>hole</strong> <strong>and</strong> Grey <strong>hole</strong> <strong>Attack</strong> Countermeasure<br />

To detect black <strong>and</strong> gray <strong>hole</strong> nodes, one proposal is<br />

hav<strong>in</strong>g the sender occasionally check through all available<br />

routes to establish if the dest<strong>in</strong>ation received all <strong>of</strong> its<br />

messages <strong>in</strong>tact. This must be done after some data has been<br />

sent. In order to avoid any black <strong>hole</strong> nodes that might<br />

<strong>in</strong>terfere with message traffic, the sender broadcasts a "check"<br />

request message (Fig. 3), <strong>and</strong> the dest<strong>in</strong>ation's response would<br />

follow the same route as the request (Fig. 4). To pact with the<br />

possibility <strong>of</strong> a node alter<strong>in</strong>g or fak<strong>in</strong>g the client’s response,<br />

the sender compares each response with the data that it sent to<br />

the dest<strong>in</strong>ation. If the responses differ from what the sender<br />

sent, it may <strong>in</strong>dicate a bad l<strong>in</strong>k or a malicious node. If any two<br />

client responses vary, that is almost a sure sign <strong>of</strong> a malicious<br />

node [13].<br />

S<br />

Fig.6.1 black <strong>hole</strong> <strong>in</strong>terference <strong>in</strong> sender broadcast<br />

S<br />

N1<br />

BH<br />

N1<br />

BH<br />

Fig.6.2 Dest<strong>in</strong>ation Response<br />

N2<br />

D<br />

N2<br />

D<br />

CONCLUSION<br />

In this paper, a study on the work that attempt to detect<br />

black or gray <strong>hole</strong> or cooperative black <strong>and</strong> gray <strong>hole</strong> attack<br />

has been done. Each node can locally ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> its own table<br />

<strong>of</strong> black listed nodes whenever it tries to send data to any<br />

dest<strong>in</strong>ation node <strong>and</strong> it can also aware the network about the<br />

black listed nodes which are <strong>of</strong> great importance <strong>in</strong><br />

network<strong>in</strong>g. The survey revised about various type <strong>of</strong><br />

protocols commonly used for <strong>MANET</strong>’s.(eg. AODV, DSR,<br />

DYMO) <strong>and</strong> briefly summarized about the classification <strong>of</strong><br />

attacks, Network layer threats <strong>and</strong> its properties <strong>of</strong> black <strong>hole</strong>,<br />

gray <strong>hole</strong> attack, worm <strong>hole</strong> attacks. F<strong>in</strong>ally the paper<br />

expla<strong>in</strong>ed the countermeasures <strong>of</strong> Warm <strong>hole</strong> attacks, gray<br />

<strong>hole</strong> attack <strong>and</strong> black <strong>hole</strong> attack.<br />

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