The Incredible Shrinking Crisis - US-Korea Institute at SAIS

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Security and Alliance Politics The Incredible Shrinking Crisis: The Sinking of the Cheonan and Sino-Korean Relations By Jeremy Chan I. INTRODUCTION While the sinking of the South Korean naval corvette Cheonan in March 2010 ratcheted up tensions on the Korean peninsula to their highest level in years, China found itself thrust into the unfamiliar position of playing regional power broker, torn between supporting its rapidly expanding economic ties with South Korea (ROK) on the one hand and its strategic interest in regime survival in North Korea (DPRK) on the other. In the end, China (PRC) predictably hedged toward the latter, shielding the North against international condemnation at the UN Security Council, but managing to do so in a manner that did not earn the lasting ire of South Korea. That China was able to successfully pull off this delicate balancing act and defuse tensions on the peninsula in the process, suggests that the Cheonan pan. A similar balancing act has been considerably harder for China to strike, however, in the aftermath of the latest North Korean attack in November 2010 on Yeonpyeong Island, a sparsely inhabited South Korean island situated in highly contentious waters in the Yellow Sea near North Korea. While the Cheonan sinking proved to be more important not for what was lost, notably 46 South Korean lives, but for what was salvaged; the Yeonpyeong Island shelling has seen a downturn in PRC-ROK relations which was noticeably lacking after the Cheonan incident in March. China’s inability to placate angry South Koreans this time around speaks to differences in the nature of the two attacks, but also to a growing consensus that the two Koreas will never break out of their crisis-recovery cycle until China decides that it is in its own interest as well. After both the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents, the preexisting U.S.-ROK and PRC-DPRK alliances were strengthened, with China shielding North Korea from censure by the UN Security Council after the Cheonan sinking and U.S.- ROK forces holding large-scale military exercises after both attacks. More surprisingly, the PRC-ROK partnership, which has built up economic linkages 19
SAIS U.S.-Korea Yearbook 2010 the Cheonan sinking largely unscathed. The same, however, has not held true in the aftermath of the Yeonpyeong Island attack, with both Seoul and Washington spurning Beijing’s calls for an emergency return to the negotiating table. Subsequent large-scale military exercises by U.S.-ROK forces in the Yellow Sea were also explicitly directed at Pyongyang, and implicitly at Beijing. What’s more, just when inter-Korean relations appeared to be on the verge of taking a surprising turn for the better, with Lee Myung-bak moving away from his policy of strategic “neglect” of the North Korea question, the Yeonpyeong Island attack renewed the two countries’ diplomatic freeze. Much speculation has surrounded the possible motivations for North Korea’s most recent attack, the majority of which relates to the coming power succession from Kim Jong Il to his third son, Kim Jong Un, but Pyongyang has clearly indicated that it was not particularly interested in reconciling with Seoul, nor was it deterred by South Korea’s futile response to the Cheonan sinking. If anything, South Korea’s willingness to excuse North Korea’s misbehavior in the South vulnerable to another attack. That even a show of force by the United States in the form of joint military exercises could not deter more brazen North Korean attacks demonstrates that China, rather than the United States, is the linchpin for continued “stability” on the Korean peninsula, and that Beijing will play an increasingly central role in deciding the fate of the two Koreas. China’s entire approach to resolving the latest downturn in inter-Korean relations, which has consisted of measured public statements calling for restraint and stability, stands in marked contrast to U.S. efforts at deterrence. This is partly explained by China’s emerging view of itself as a leader and a “neutral” peacemaker in defusing crises on the peninsula, exhibited in Beijing’s recent suggestion that all relevant parties should return to the Six-Party Talks, which have remained dormant since North Korea’s last nuclear test in 2009. Meanwhile, the United States has felt compelled to reassure and stand by one of its staunchest allies in Asia, conducting large-scale joint military exercises with South Korean forces after the Cheonan sinking and again after the Yeonpyeong Island attack. The latter exercises, which featured a U.S. aircraft carrier battle provocations, but their location in the Yellow Sea near waters that China claims as its own territory was also a shot across the bow at Beijing, which had loudly objected to earlier plans to hold exercises in the same waters in July. In a recent 20
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The Incredible Shrinking Crisis - US-Korea Institute at SAIS

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