The Incredible Shrinking Crisis - US-Korea Institute at SAIS

Security and Alliance Politics
receiving the leaders from both Koreas, China opted to continue its policy of
advocating for restraint on the Korean peninsula rather than blame the North for
the attack.
support has only highlighted China’s evolving role on the Korean peninsula,
from one-time antagonist to principal arbiter, as well as its increasingly
untenable position as the lone supporter of North Korea. Indeed, rather than
the two Koreas has the potential to divide the country between its short-term
strategic and long-term economic interests. This reality was underscored in
August, when Kim paid another visit to China after much of the anger over the
Cheonan sinking had subsided, presumably to seek Beijing’s approval of North
Korean succession plans that will see absolute authority kept within the Kim
clan for a third generation. This visit underscored the fact that, while it once
appeared as though China’s “reform and opening up” would necessarily compel
North Korea down a similarly incrementalist path, something that Chinese
diplomats are surely lobbying for behind the scenes, recent history, including
the Yeonpyeong Island attack, suggests that the recalcitrant North may just as
soon force China to risk harming its economic partnerships in order to save the
Hermit Kingdom.
All of the efforts by South Korea after the Cheonan sinking to seek Chinese and
international support, however, have been noticeably lacking in the aftermath
of the Yeonpyeong Island shelling. This is partly a function of North Korea’s
unquestioned perpetration of the attack, and also recognition by Seoul that
Beijing will stand by its allies in Pyongyang even in the face of undeniable
proof. Furthermore, while Chinese media reports have been slow to condemn the
attack, they have also attempted to give credence to Pyongyang’s stated position
that its actions were a defensive response to South Korean encroachment into
North Korean waters. This may explain South Korea’s growing impatience with
China’s empty calls for “restraint” on the peninsula, particularly as Beijing’s
allies in Pyongyang continue to exhibit precious little of it.
III. CHINESE RESTRAINT
In the immediate aftermath of the Cheonan sinking, the United States was
able to come quickly to the defense of South Korea, demanding an apology
from Pyongyang and conducting a series of joint military exercises with South
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