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2.3 Analysis of the security 21<br />

2.3.4 Database sanity checks<br />

Other than the different IDs the system gathers, it is difficult to say what is<br />

being sent to the back-office. It is, however, certain that rollback attacks are<br />

detectable, by looking at page 52 in [6].<br />

Sanity checks account for most of the security of Rejsekortet; if the MAC proves<br />

to be secure, then there will still be rollback attacks, and if the MAC is broken<br />

there will just be more to crosscheck. Threat assessments on a case-to-case basis<br />

will be introduced in the next chapter.<br />

2.3.5 Anonymous travel cards<br />

The introduction of completely anonymous travel cards may prove to be somewhat<br />

risky on the maintainers of the system. This means there is little to no risk<br />

in cheating with those. They will likely be disabled after next database sanity<br />

check, but then the attacker can just buy a new card and continue cheating.<br />

2.3.6 Vandalism<br />

Vandalism is largely ignored in Rejsekortet. It is possible to gain write access<br />

to cards in their touchless nature, and this makes them easy to corrupt or wipe,<br />

if the attacker knows the Mifare keys for the cards.<br />

However, with NFC cards like Mifare, the distance between card and reader has<br />

to be very short, under 10 cm. This makes it virtually impossible to “pickpocket”<br />

or in other ways read or write a card without being noticed. It will still be<br />

possible to set up “rogue terminals” on stations and such, to get people to<br />

unknowingly let their cards corrupt.<br />

Because of the proximity needed to write to the cards, the vandalism attacks described<br />

in the next chapter can be considered speculative and not really suitable<br />

for any real-world scenario. As such the system can be considered more or less<br />

resistant to vandalism; the “walking through the train and wiping everything”<br />

example is impossible, not because of a precaution taken by RKF, but because<br />

of physical constraints. Israeli researchers have tried to extend the range of Mifare<br />

reading; they successfully read/wrote a Mifare card at a 25 cm distance 2 .<br />

However, 25 centimeters is still not enough to carry out most vandalism attacks.<br />

2 http://www.eng.tau.ac.il/~yash/kw-usenix06/index.html

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