May 2002 - Department of Public Advocacy
May 2002 - Department of Public Advocacy
May 2002 - Department of Public Advocacy
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Continued from page 15<br />
Another example arose when I was the conflict public defender<br />
while in private practice. A conflict was discovered<br />
right before court and I agreed to represent at arraignment a<br />
young man who was in jail and charged with unlawful transaction<br />
with a minor. Consistent with the practice in that<br />
court, I went to talk with the complaining witness to determine<br />
what resolution <strong>of</strong> the case might be possible. I’d reviewed<br />
the petition and noted that my client, who was 19,<br />
was charged with illegal sexual activity with a minor. Roaming<br />
the hallway, I found a very angry father and a rather<br />
sophisticated looking girl. The father stated that “that nigger<br />
needs to go to jail for having sex with my daughter.” The<br />
daughter, who was 17, appeared to want nothing to do with<br />
this entire matter. The complaining witness was the father,<br />
and he and his daughter were white.<br />
I got the opportunity to meet my client when they brought<br />
him over from the jail. My client was a young black man and<br />
I advised him that I did not think that there was a crime here<br />
since the girl was over the age <strong>of</strong> consent (16 years <strong>of</strong> age)<br />
and thus I did not believe this could be “illegal sexual activity.”<br />
I spoke with the County Attorney, explained my position<br />
and asked that he request that the charge be dismissed.<br />
He stated that he would have no objection to the client being<br />
released and sentenced to time served if he would plead guilty<br />
but that he would not agree to dismissal <strong>of</strong> the charge because<br />
the father was so angry and “illegal sexual activity”<br />
was not defined in the statute. My client’s major interest was<br />
getting out <strong>of</strong> jail as soon as possible. Thus, after I advised<br />
the court that I opposed that course <strong>of</strong> action, he entered a<br />
guilty plea.<br />
I explained to the court that I was objecting to entry <strong>of</strong> the<br />
guilty plea because I believed that my client had not committed<br />
a crime or been charged with a crime and that, in fact, the<br />
only reason he was charged was because he was a black man<br />
THE ADVOCATE Volume 24, No. 3 <strong>May</strong> <strong>2002</strong><br />
who had had sex with a white girl. The atmosphere in the<br />
courtroom was very tense as I talked about this, but the<br />
client was appreciative that I had spoken the truth on his<br />
behalf.<br />
The third example is a client who was acquitted in federal<br />
court <strong>of</strong> carjacking and then charged in state court with murder.<br />
The client was a black man and the victims were white. It<br />
was extraordinary for anyone to face a prosecution in state<br />
court for the same transaction for which they’d been tried in<br />
federal court. A question arose about why this particular<br />
client was being picked out. We decided to move to dismiss<br />
the prosecution as vindictive and selective and request an<br />
evidentiary hearing.<br />
The prosecutor was absolutely outraged at what he saw as<br />
an accusation <strong>of</strong> racism against him. The judge decided that<br />
there was no evidence to support our claim and refused to<br />
grant a hearing. Of course, there was no “evidence” because<br />
it is unlikely that an individual in the position to prosecute<br />
for the Commonwealth would state that they were prosecuting<br />
a person because <strong>of</strong> their race but the absence <strong>of</strong> other<br />
successive prosecutions when the possibility had existed<br />
but the defendants were white certainly set <strong>of</strong>f alarm bells for<br />
us. We didn’t even get a hearing on our motion but we hope<br />
it served as a deterrent for future successive prosecutions.<br />
In conclusion, we must litigate racial issues if they are present<br />
in our clients’ cases no matter uncomfortable they make us<br />
and others in courtroom because we owe it to our clients as<br />
their advocates.<br />
Gail Robinson<br />
Assistant <strong>Public</strong> Advocate<br />
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302<br />
Frankfort, KY 40601<br />
Tel: (502) 564-8006; Fax: (502) 564-7890<br />
E-mail: grobinson@mail.pa.state.ky.us<br />
Lexington Police Chief on Pr<strong>of</strong>iling<br />
(Lexington Herald Leader, February 22, 2001) Beatty says pr<strong>of</strong>iling banned: Lexington Police Chief Anthany<br />
Beatty said yesterday that the police department is continuing to enforce a policy that bans the targeting <strong>of</strong><br />
individuals by race. Beatty, who was speaking on a panel at the University <strong>of</strong> Kentucky, said the police<br />
department continues to track citations and arrests made by <strong>of</strong>ficers, watching to see whether blacks or other<br />
minorities are being targeted. “I, as an African-American, fully understand the problem,” he said. Beatty said<br />
that as a youth he watched Lexington <strong>of</strong>ficers discriminate against blacks. But he noted the department had<br />
responded to the accusations <strong>of</strong> racial enforcement made three years ago by adopting a policy banning<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>iling. “Whether it was real or perceived, it was an issue,” he said. After the session he said there had been<br />
no complaints <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>iling made against any <strong>of</strong>ficers since he took <strong>of</strong>fice in August.<br />
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