part 1 of the african peace facility evaluation - European ...

THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EDF PROGRAMME
PART 1 OF THE AFRICAN PEACE
FACILITY EVALUATION:
REVIEWING THE PROCEDURES OF THE APF
AND POSSIBILITIES OF ALTERNATIVE
FUTURE SOURCES OF FUNDING
LETTER OF CONTRACT N° 2010/254164
FINAL REPORT
PREPARED BY
ROBIN POULTON
EDUARDO TRILLO
LEON KUKKUK
The project is financed by the European Union
The project is implemented by IBF International Consulting
In collaboration with BAA (Spain)

Acknowledgments
The experts would like to thank all those who contributed and provided information during the
evaluation. Staff at beneficiary organisations, Government entities, EU Member States, other donors
and individuals who have been helpful and open, and given generously of their time.
The Experts’ appreciation also goes to the EC Service Officials, the Council and the EU Delegations
staff, who assisted at all steps of the mission: providing sound advice, managing local meetings and
helping in the documentation.
The Experts hope that this evaluation report on APF, focused on procedures and alternative funding,
shall contribute to its improvement in a relevant, effective and sustainable manner.
Any mistakes or omissions remain the responsibility of the authors. The views expressed in this report
are those of the experts and can in no way be taken to represent those of the European Commission.
The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the contractor and can in no way
be taken to reflect the views of the European Union.

Contents
Executive Summary............................................................................................................................1
I. Background and scope ................................................................................................................4
I.1 Rationale.................................................................................................................................4
I.2 Scope of the Evaluation...........................................................................................................5
I.3 Evaluation phases...................................................................................................................6
I.4 Specific Methodology ..............................................................................................................8
I.5 Expected Results ....................................................................................................................8
II. General appraisal of the APF.......................................................................................................9
II.1 The success of the APF.......................................................................................................9
II.2 Funding of the APF Instrument ..........................................................................................10
II.3 APSA and the APF intervention Logic................................................................................11
II.4 APSA and APF..................................................................................................................15
II.5 SWOT Analysis of APF......................................................................................................17
III. Main Findings and Recommendations on APF Decision-Making Procedures .........................19
III.1 Overview of the APF Decision-Making Procedures ............................................................19
III.1.1 Decision-Making Procedures applying to APF programming of the Action Plan ..........19
III.1.2 Decision-making Procedures applying to APF financial decisions...............................20
III.1.3 Contribution and Grant Agreements...........................................................................24
III.1.4 Appreciation of APF decision-making and timing........................................................27
III.2 Recommendations regarding the APF Decision Making Procedures ..................................28
III.2.1 Regarding the APF programming of Action Plan:........................................................28
III.2.2 Improving APF decision-making procedures in accordance with the current legal
framework..................................................................................................................................29
III.2.3 Decision-making procedures in accordance with the current EDF legal framework .....31
III.2.4 Decision-making procedures outside the EDF legal framework...................................32
III.2.5 APF aid modalities.....................................................................................................36
III.2.6 AU/REC procedures and practice for APF requests....................................................37
III.2.7 EU-AU/RECs structural procedures ...........................................................................38
IV. Main findings and recommendations on alternative funding ...................................................39
IV.1 EU funding instruments .....................................................................................................40
IV.2 Possible AU sources of co-funding for APF-funded activities..............................................42
IV.3 Summary of the Analysis of selected EU funding mechanisms and compatibility with APF.44
IV.4 Recommendations.............................................................................................................44
IV.4.1 Funding Recommendations in a political context........................................................44
IV.4.2 Short-term options for APF Funding...........................................................................45
IV.4.3 Long-term options for funding APF.............................................................................47
IV.4.4 African P&S funding policies and implementation.......................................................49

Acronyms
ACCORD African Centre for the Constructive resolution of disputes
ACOTA African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (USA)
ACP African Caribbean Pacific states
ACPP African Conflict Prevention Pool (FCO, MOD & DFID collaboration)
AEC African Economic Community
AFRC Africa committee of PSC in Brussels composed of EU MS
ALPC Armes légères et de petit calibre (SALW)
AMIB AU Mission in Burundi
AMIS AU Mission in Sudan (Darfur)
AMISEC African Union Mission to the Comoros
AMISOM AU Mission in Somalia
APF African Peace Facility
APRM African Peer Review Mechanism
APSA African Peace and Security Architecture
APSTA African Peace Support Trainers' Association
Artemis ESDP operation in eastern Congo launched 2003
ASF African Standby Forces
AU
African Union
AUC African Union Commission
AUPG African Union Partners’ Group
AWG African Working Groups (= COAFR committee of PSC)
CAAU Constitutive Act of the African Union
CADSP Common African Defence and Security Policy
CAR Central African Republic
CD
Committee for Development
CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
CEEAC ECCAS
CEMAC Communauté économique et monétaire de l’Afrique centrale
CEWARN Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWS Continental Early warning System
CISG Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (UN)
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHPR Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights
CIDO African Citizens Directorate
CIS Consultation inter-services
CMPD Crisis Management Planning Directorate of the EU
COAFR Comité africain du COPS (see AWG)
COPS Comité politique et sécuritaire (French name for PSC of the Council)
CPCC Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (Consilium)
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
COMESA Common market for East and Southern Africa
CSSDCA Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa
DCI Development Cooperation Instrument
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DEVCO EU’s division for International Cooperation
DfID Department for International Development (UK)
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC East African Community

EASBRIG East African Standby Brigade
EC
European Commission
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States CEEAC
ECHO European Community’s Humanitarian Aid Office – now the EU’s Department of
Humanitarian Aid
ECOBRIG West African ASF Brigade (also referred to as WESBRIG)
ECOMOG ECOWAS monitoring group
ECOSOCC Economic Social and Cultural Committee
ECOWARN Early warning System of ECOWAS
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
ECPR European Consortium of Political Research
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EDF European Development Fund
EDSP European Defence and Security Policy now CSDP
EEAS European External Action Service
ENPI European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EP
European Parliament
EPA Economic Partnership Agreement
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
ESS European Security Strategy
EU
European Union
EUFOR EU force in Chad and Central African Republic
TCHAD/RCA
EUFOR DRC EU force in DRC
EUMC European Union Military Committee
EUMS European Union Military Staff
EU MS EU Member States
EUPOL EU Police mission in Kinshasa DRC
EUSEC EU SSR programme in DRC
EUSR EU Special Representative
EUTM EU Training Mission for Somalis
EWS Early Warning System
FOMAC Force Multinationale en Centrafrique / Central African Standby Force
FOSDA Foundation for Security and Development in Africa, Accra (NGO)
GAERC General Affairs and External Relations Council of the EU
GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HAC EU’s Humanitarian Aid Commissioner
IANSA International Action Network against Small Arms (INGO coalition)
IfS
Instrument for Stability
IGAD Inter Governmental Authority on development
IPSA International Political Science Association
ISC Inter-Service Consultation (CIS - internal Commission ‘comitology’)
ISS Institute for Security Studies, South Africa
JAES Joint Africa-EU Strategy
JFA Joint Financing Arrangement MoU 2010 between AU and AUPG on financing P&S
personnel
JRC Joint Research Centre
KAIPTC Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
MAES Mission d’assistance électorale et sécuritaire aux Comores de l’Union africaine /
African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros
MARAC Mécanisme d'Alerte Rapide en Afrique Centrale (ECCAS conflict early warning
system)

MDGs
MICOPAX
MONUC
MSC
NATO
NEPAD
NGO
NIP
OAU
ODA
OLAF
PAP
PAPS
PAPS
PASPA
PCRD
POW
PSC
PSC
PSO
PSD
PSOD
PSTC
RCA
REC
RECAMP
Relex
RIP
RRM
RSS
SADC
SADCBRIG
SALW
SFPI
SSR
SWOT
TFEU
TFG
UN
UNAMID
UNDP
USAID
WAANSA
WACSOF
WANEP
WANSED
WAPI
WESBRIG
WIPNET
WWN
Millennium Development Goals
Mission de consolidation de la paix en République centrafricaine (ECCAS mission)
UN mission in DRC
Military Staff Committee (AU)
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
New Economic Partnership for African Development
Non Governmental Organisation
National Indicative Programme
Organisation of African Unity
Official Development Assistance (of the EU)
Office Européen de Lutte Anti-Fraude
Pan African Parliament
Programme d'Appui en matière de Paix et Sécurité (PAPS-CEEAC) for ECCAS
Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security of ECOWAS
Partenariat Stratégique Pour la Paix en Afrique (NGO network)
Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development
Panel of the Wise (AU)
Political and Security Committee (COPS) of the Council
AU Peace and Security Council
Peace Support Operations
Peace & Security Department (AU)
Peace Support Operations Division (AU)
Peace Support Training Centre
République Centrafricaine
Regional Economic Community
Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities / Renforcement des Capacités
Africaines de Maintien de la Paix
EU DG External Relations (now SFPI)
Regional Indicative Programme
Rapid Reaction Mechanism
Réforme des secteurs de la sécurité (SSR)
Southern African Development Community
Southern African ASF Brigade
Small arms and light weapons (ALPC)
Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (ex-RELEX, ex-FPIS)
Security Sector Reform (RSS)
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats analysis
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon)
Transitional Federal Government Somalia
United Nations
UN/AU mission to Darfur
UN development programme
US Agency for international development
West African Action Network against Small Arms (CSO: cf IANSA & RASALAO)
West African Civil Society Forum (NGO coordination network)
West African Network for Peace à Accra (NGO peace network)
West African Network for Security and Democratic Governance (Nigeria)
West African Peace Institute (NGO)
a name occasionally used for ECOBRIG
Women’s international peace network (NGO peace network)
WANEP Women’s Network (NGO peace network)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EU foreign policy towards Africa has evolved in the context of successive EDFs and the Cotonou
Agreement (successor to Lomé) over more than half a century. In response to the request of the
African Union (AU) in 2003, the EU created, under the 9 th EDF, a new foreign policy financial
instrument, the Africa Peace Facility (APF), based on the philosophy of building a “developmentsecurity
nexus” as sustainable economic development can only take place in conditions of peace and
security.
Under the 10 th EDF, the APF Action Plan 2008-2010 includes as a general objective to contribute to
the African peace and security agenda through targeted support at continental and regional levels in
the areas of conflict prevention, management and resolution, and peace building. The APF addresses
peace and security following the underlying principles of the Joint Africa – EU strategy (JAES) 1 :
ownership, partnership and solidarity. The 2008-2010 APF specific objectives meet the three priorities
of the Africa-EU partnership on Peace and Security under the First Action Plan (2008-2010), namely:
‣ provide funding for African-led peace-keeping operations (PSOs)
‣ operationalise the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)
‣ promote a dialogue on challenges to peace and security in Africa.
APSA is made up of several components and structures and includes eight African regional
organisations (RECs), in particular an AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is the central AU
decision-making body; a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS); a 'Panel of the Wise', with a
mandate in conflict prevention and resolution, and an African Standby Force (ASF) to be deployed in
peace support operations. This EU commitment was renewed at the 3rd Africa EU Summit held in
Tripoli in November 2010.
The present report refers to Part I of a comprehensive evaluation of the APF: policy-oriented
review focusing on the procedures of the APF and possibilities of alternative future sources of
funding. Part II will be a substantive evaluation of the overall implementation and results.
Despite any reservations over financial procedures, the APF has transformed the way in which the AU
and the EU are perceived in Africa, making them significant players in the peace and security sector.
Each category of stakeholders (AU and AU MS, international and regional organisations, CSOs in
Europe and Africa) speaks positively about APF and its achievements. The recent events in North
Africa remind us that Europe has a direct interest in creating a strong African security infrastructure
functioning all the way down from the AU Peace and Security Council in Addis, to the distant frontiers
where conflicts occur.
Since the creation of APF in 2003, 2 the instrument has evolved considerably, both in scope (under the
JAES) and financial potential. The following table summarises the main changes in the APF between
the 9 th and 10 th EDF:
1 Adopted in December 2007.
2 For a detailed history of APF’s evolution, see annex 1.
Page 1 of 49

Main Features 1st APF (9th EDF) 2 nd APF (10th EDF)
Scope PSOs and relevant capacity Africa-EU dialogue on P&S
Conflict management incl. mediation
Conflict prevention incl. EWS,
Funding PSOs (and prevention)
Operationalisation APSA
Post-conflict stabilisation
Beneficiaries AU and sub-regional orgs AU and sub-regional organisations
Relevant institutions & national
structures related to APSA
CSOs
Allocation
Nearly €440m over 4-5 years
including AVCs 3
€300m for 3 years without AVCs
further €300m earmarked in the Intra-
ACP reserve for 2011-2013
Flexibility Decision-making process 2-3 months More flexible, with an urgent procedure
ERM can be mobilised almost
immediately
Co-financing
NIPs –% African co-financing
AVCs – first case of co-financing by EU
MS under 9th EDF
AVCs become permanent feature of APF
Open to contributions from other non-EU
countries or donors
The undoubted APF political success does not ensure its efficiency and effectiveness, and EDF
procedures are sometimes criticised for being inappropriate when dealing with PSO and early
response. The creation of ERM has increased flexibility, although its scope is very limited (6-month
mediation or planning missions), nevertheless, in practice, APF procedures generally work faster
than many EU instruments.
APF funding needs to be better targeted - possibly by using more specific earmarks for each
component - to ensure that Africa’s early warning, mediation and conflict management processes are
able to take over a progressively stronger role in promoting peace and security. Despite its impressive
record in funding PSOs, the APF might be more effective - and less controversial among EU and AU
MS and CSOs - if its procedures and funding had allowed for a more complete development of the full
range of APSA’s ambitions. This also entails APF funding beyond the AUC and REC secretariats. A
comprehensive approach to APSA must include a broadening of the implementing entities and include
civil society, specialised entities, research institutes and, in a limited number of cases, AU member
states.
After careful analysis of the procedural and funding options (many of which contain legal
obstacles caused by the EC general procedures, the military nature of PSOs or the fact that they are
African-led actions), the evaluation sees several ways in which the APF’s procedural and funding
structures could be adjusted under the 10 th EDF to ensure greater efficiency between EU funding
instruments and get the best value-for-money from APF resources and promote synergies with EU
MS:
The best for APF would be to continue to be funded under the EDF with procedural
modifications inspired by IfS and ECHO to make it more flexible and effective.
The EU should reinforce the promotion of joint management and sound administration
within the AU and RECs in order to better fulfil the objectives of JAES.
3 Additional voluntary contributions of nearly €40m came from 8 EU MS
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The principle of subsidiarity should be applied at all management levels within the EU-AU-
RECs structure regarding APF activities.
Re-defining the roles of NIP, RIP and APF to ensure maximum complementarity and no
overlapping in EU actions on peace and security in Africa.
Reintroducing the ‘slicing mechanism’ (used in 1st APF) to bring funds to the APF from
each NIP to increase both total available funding and African MS ownership.
RIPs should take responsibility for funding RECs (except for PSOs) on peace and security
activities. RIPs already include this possibility and some are currently funding complementary
APF actions. One important element is to create the necessary flexibility within RIP
implementing modalities to allow for high-impact support.
Re-establishing a balance between the parts of APSA with specifically targeted resources
for early-warning-early-intervention, Panel of the Wise and other conflict management
functions which could reduce the need to fund conflict-prevention PSOs.
Widening the potential range of beneficiaries beyond a narrow focus on AU and REC
bureaucracies including civil society, specialised entities, research institutes and possibly AU
member states dealing with relevant cross-border issues.
Expanding the range of management models, implementation modalities and possibly
operating smaller, targeted projects to complement the major support programmes.
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I. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE
I.1 RATIONALE
Conflicts in Africa continue to hamper the fight against poverty. Unless the root causes and underlining
threats to security as well as active conflicts are adequately addressed, the economic, human and
social development of Africa will be at risk. A comprehensive approach to peace and security in Africa
requires a broad regional policy framework, covering different aspects of peace and security as well as
clear and accountable role sharing between the national, sub-regional, continental and multilateral
levels.
When the African Union (AU) was established in 2002, its Member States entrusted the organisation
with a broad political mandate in the area of conflict prevention, management, resolution and peace
building. Consequently, a structural and long-term response to the African peace and security
challenges was set up, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
APSA is made up of several components and
structures, in particular an AU Peace and
Security Council (PSC), which is the central AU
decision-making body; a Continental Early
Warning System (CEWS); a 'Panel of the Wise',
with a mandate in conflict prevention and
resolution, and an African Standby Force (ASF)
to be deployed in peace support operations. At
the same time, an Africa Peace Fund, made up
of AU member state and partner contributions,
was established to promote Peace and Security
Department work. The African regional
organisations (REC/RMs) are the pillars of the
overall security architecture and regional
components are key elements of the Continental
Early Warning System and African Standby
Force.
These organisations have since committed themselves to address the challenges to peace and
security through African-owned and African-led initiatives such as the AU missions in Sudan/Darfur
(AMIS) and Somalia (AMISOM) and the ECCAS mission in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX).
The EU, mainly since 2005, has made peace and security one of the main pillars in its comprehensive
Strategy for Africa 4 and it has committed to further enhance its overall support to Africa in this area. To
this end, an “EU Concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and
resolution of conflicts” was put forward (in 2006) 5 . The main objectives of the Concept include support
to African capacities, policies and structures in the area of mediation, early warning, post-conflict
4 EU Council Conclusions of 15-16 December 2005
5 2760th General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting, Brussels, 13 November 2006
Page 4 of 49

econstruction, relevant capacities for peace operations, and the establishment of the African Stand-by
Force (ASF). Moreover, the joint Africa – EU strategy (JAES), adopted in December 2007, defined
peace and security as one of the 8 areas for a special EU – Africa partnership and dialogue including
as key objective a full APSA implementation.
The EU has also taken key steps to strengthen financial capacity of the African institutions to foster
peace and security on the continent, with the African Peace Facility (APF), established following a
request by African leaders at the AU Summit in Maputo (2003) 6 as the biggest source of funding in this
field. First, under the 9 th EDF, APF channelled a total of almost € 440 million, and later, under the 10 th
EDF, a further 300 million were programmed for the period of 2008 – 2010. This EU commitment was
renewed at the 3rd Africa EU Summit held in Tripoli in November 2010, “Peace and security remain a
cornerstone of our cooperation. We are committed to making the African Peace and Security
Architecture fully operational in close collaboration with the regional organisations. As regards AU lead
Peace operations, it was agreed to work towards ensuring flexible, predictable and sustainable
funding."
The objectives of the APF are the following:
1. Enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security, including through systematic and
regular dialogue, consultations, coordination of positions, sharing of information and analysis,
joint assessment missions and exchange of experience
2. Operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), including working
towards the development of a fully-fledged Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of
the Wise, overall strengthening of conflict prevention mechanisms and effective post-conflict
reconstruction as well as operationalisation of the African Standby Force;
3. Predictable funding for Africa-led peace support operations, in particular through the
establishment of an EU predictable and sustainable funding scheme, as well as through
working with the international community to achieve UN mechanism to provide sustainable
and predictable financial support for these operations.
The APF action plan 2008-2010 7 , in accordance with the underlying principles of the JAES
(ownership, partnership and solidarity), the thematic scope of the APF and the priorities of the Joint
Partnership specifically allocates € 65 million for the operationalisation of APSA and Africa-EU
dialogue; € 200 million for Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and € 15 million for the Early Response
Mechanism (ERM). The timeframe of this action programme matches the first Joint Africa-EU Action
Plan.
I.2 SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION
The APF evaluation is split in two parts:
1. Part I: A policy review focusing specifically on APF sources of funding and procedures
2. Part II: A substantive evaluation of the of the overall implementation of the APF and its results
The present report refers to Part I of the APF evaluation, originally scheduled to take place before the
second Joint Africa-EU Action Plan.
6 On the basis of the Joint Council Decision 3/2003 of 11 th December 2003.
7 Pursuant to article 12 of Council Regulation (EC) No 617/2007 of 14 May 2007 on the implementation of the
10th EDF under the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement..
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In accordance with the ToR 8 , and taking into consideration political opportunities and feasibility,
institutional and legal constraints, implementing modalities and financial aspects, this report
specifically reviews and assesses:
1. The APF decision-making procedures, which have proven to be time-consuming for the EU
which can impact on the activity implementation, particularly in PSOs. This evaluation focused on
reviewing the stages of the EU decision making process, assessing their relevance and
suggesting ways to simplify/shorten the procedure.
The evaluation is also focusing on the procedures implementation and more specifically the APF
delivery approaches a well, the suitability of agreement/grant contracts for the AU/REC structures
and the possibility of establishing new management bodies for channelling APF funding. In this
sense, the internal AU/RECs procedures are considered in relation to APF requests – without
analysing the AU/RECs capacity constraints, which will be the focus of part II of the APF
evaluation, in particular in the areas of administrative and financial management, operational,
planning and long-term capacity building planning.
2. Possibilities of future alternative sources of funding, looking at the following questions:
‣ The relevance of the security and development nexus for the existence of APF 9 .
‣ The sustainability and predictability of APF funding, particularly for PSOs, as there is an
inherent unpredictability that, in the past, triggered the need for several urgent replenishments
of the APF. The possibility of third country contribution to the APF and of a bigger role for the
African Peace Fund is considered.
‣ The coming EU institutional and budgetary developments in the prospect of developing new
financial instruments for external action beyond 2013, and in close relation with the
establishment of the European External Action Service. The possible inclusion of the EDF in
the EU budget could impact the regulatory, financial and management aspects of the existing
APF.
I.3 EVALUATION PHASES
According to the ToR, this evaluation had four phases:
1) An inception phase in Brussels 2) A headquarter phase
3) A field phase 4) A synthesis phase
a. Inception Phase
The inception phase was devoted to structuring and preparing the evaluation approach and
methodology. The team studied the intervention logic of the Commission support to APF and the
development/security nexus. The inception phase included:
‣ Clarification and understanding of the objectives of the APF;
‣ Summary of the fundamental procedures concerning the identification and submission of
requests, different contracting procedures, and vetting, approval and implementation of APF
grants and/or contribution agreements;
‣ A Launch Note, presenting the team understanding of the ToR and the proposed general
approach to the work was prepared in December 2010 and presented to the CGIS on 9th
January 2011.
8 Terms of Reference, “Part 1 of the African Peace Facility Evaluation: Reviewing the Procedures of the APF and
Possibilities of Alternative Future Sources of Funding”. FWC Commission 2007 – Lot n° 4. Request for offer N°
2010/254164.
9 Article 11 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement 9 provides the necessary basis for establishing the APF.
Page 6 of 49

‣ Areas for further study and questioning were identified and presented in the Draft Inception
Note;
‣ Detailed questions were refined, stakeholder groups identified, potential interviewees identified
and contacted;
‣ A Draft Inception Note was presented and discussed on 17 January 2011, amended and
presented on 23 January 2011 and approved by the CGIS.
b. Headquarters Phase 10
The team consulted key documentation and human sources in Brussels:
‣ Examination of European Commission strategy documents and evaluations relating to
selected countries/regions and procedures covered by the APF;
‣ Examination of African Union strategy documents and evaluations relating to selected
countries/regions covered by the APF;
‣ Examination of funding agreements, income and expenditure and comparison with planning;
‣ Extraction of detailed procedures from documents concerning interventions under the APF;
‣ Detailed examination of procedures for request, selection, approval, implementation;
‣ Detailed examination of procedures for procurement, financial management, and audit;
‣ Examination of intervention-specific documents concerning APF;
‣ Analysis of the origins of procedures, and the nature of checks and balances;
‣ Analysis of oversight procedures, of how responsibility and authority function in the system;
‣ Interviews with EU Commission HQ staff in charge of the APF and related country desks;
‣ Interviews with Council staff;
‣ Interviews with officials of a few selected EU MS working on APF;
‣ Interviews with officials of a few selected African missions in Brussels;
‣ Interviews with selected CSOs and academics informed about APF functioning and
procedures;
‣ Interviews with UN officials in New York and Africa;
c. Field Phase 11
African visits in February 2011 were mandated to:
‣ 1- AU and EU offices in Addis Ababa (Mr Leon Kukkuk) and
‣ 2- ECCAS and EU offices in Libreville (Mr Eduardo Trillo).
Each field visit included:
‣ Interviews with AU/REC officials;
‣ Interviews with local EU officials in office;
‣ Interviews with local and/or regional civil society specialists;
‣ Extracting procedures from documents concerning interventions under the APF;
‣ Analysis of the origins of procedures, and the nature of checks and balances;
‣ Analysis of oversight procedures and how responsibility and authority function in the system;
‣ Detailed examination of PSO request, selection and approval procedures;
‣ Detailed examination of APF intervention, management and control procedures;
‣ Detailed examination of mediation missions request, selection, approval procedures;
‣ Examination of the way in which other EU instruments are considered and used before APF is
called in or used to create synergy with APF;
‣ Each field visit resulted in a debriefing in the African capital by the consultant.
10 For details see Annex 4
11 For details see Annex 4
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d. Synthesis Phase
The Team compiled a First Draft Report during the last week of February. This report was presented
and discussed on March 17th, then a Second Draft Final Report was delivered, and after the EC
comments, the evaluation team submitted the Final Report.
I.4 SPECIFIC METHODOLOGY
The following steps were carried out for the procedure part of the evaluation:
Analysis of the current decision-making procedures, taking EU and the AU/REC perspectives,
EU and AU Member States and other experts’ ideas into account.
Understand problems and successes during the 2008 to 2010 period, taking into account the
legal framework, administrative practices and innovations and the conditions imposed by
African security, politics and realities.
Identification of possible procedural improvements within the current legal framework.
Study possible changes to the legal framework.
Research on new and former procedures.
The following steps were carried out for the funding part of the evaluation:
Analysing income and expenditure patterns in APF from the outset.
Comparing income and expenditure with APF objectives and planning.
Obtaining information and opinion on funding history from all stakeholders.
Analysing the possible administrative changes in funding sources and application.
Investigating possible new funding sources.
The evaluation was conducted in a collaborative manner with high interaction between the consultants
and with EC staff, who provided detailed information and a reality check concerning the institutional
and political contexts. This partnership generated a learning process between the CISG and the
consultants. Key issues have been identified, which now need to be considered by the appropriate
stakeholders and decision-makers
The evaluation included the analysis of a large range of legal and procedural documents as well as a
variety of funding mechanisms. While the decisions on implementation rest with AU and EU Member
States, the evaluation team believes it has cast a searchlight on the areas where positive changes
may be achieved. The team has also presented Hypotheses that will be useful in the 2 nd Part of the
Evaluation when analysing the impact of APF in details (in annexe).
I.5 EXPECTED RESULTS
The main final result is the submission of a Final Report which includes: a thorough analysis of the
APF decision-making procedures as well as possible alternative sources of funding in the future,
including common foreign and security policy funding, and clear, complete and specific answers to the
evaluation questions. The Final Report, as requested under the ToR, is also including working
hypotheses to be further analysed during phase 2 of the evaluation. 12
12 See annex 6 on working hypothesis for APF evaluation part II.
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II.
GENERAL APPRAISAL OF THE APF
II.1 THE SUCCESS OF THE APF
The APF is considered successful by most stakeholders, particularly in funding PSOs and establishing
the AU as a serious player in peace and security issues. Its action is rooted in repeated joint
commitments by EU and AU to work together for peace in Africa, based on a legal foundation
especially Cotonou Art. 11. The APF has given the African Union political clout, with a physical and
political presence in peacekeeping that could not have been imagined ten years ago. The AU is now a
functioning organisation with major military operations, some additional experience in police and
civilian peacekeeping and mediation, and significant budgetary experience. The APF has certainly
achieved the objective of enhancing dialogue, but its achievements will be even more significant when
all the pillars of APSA are fully functioning. 13
The APF start was considered with great excitement in Europe, but even more so in Africa where AU
MS governments were delighted with the idea that they were contributing a ‘slice’ from their National
Indicative Programmes (NIP) to build the Peace and Security Architecture of AU. EU Commissioner
Poul Nielsen and AU Commissioner Said Djinnit understood the political importance of the African
‘buy-in’: African ownership felt real because 50% of the 1st APF came from African states.
Through the APF, the EU has taken political initiatives that were not even envisaged ten years ago.
This has positioned the EU as a major actor on the peace and security fields in Africa. The EU has
supplanted many of the post-colonial and bilateral processes that dominated in the 1990s, which is
both appreciated by the Africans and EU MS including some of the former colonial powers who
appreciate the European filter on peace and security issues.
The APF has also allowed the EU to experiment foreign policy initiatives and procedural mechanisms
that had never been tried before. The EEAS has the opportunity to build on this basis in Africa and
elsewhere, seeking synergies within ODA 14 funding: the APF is a seminal experiment with long-term
ramifications we cannot even begin to imagine. In a remarkably short period, the APF has changed
the face of peace and security in Africa.
APF is an instrument that provides political leverage to the AU; but some of the initial drive has
diminished as procedures sometimes took precedence over political innovation. While procedures and
internal controls are important, rules and regulations evolving in Brussels do not easily match with the
principle of African ownership and the requirements of effective delivery and value for money. AU and
REC absorptive (and management) capacities are already limited by the newness of their structures
13 ‘In order to make the APSA work, it is crucial to elaborate a forward-looking action plan on capacity-building,
including the elaboration of an innovative policy approach that looks at real African needs and provides
predictable and sustainable resources.’ Pirozzi and Miranda 2010, p3
14 The EU’s official development assistance had a total value of €49 billion in 2009, nearly €100 per citizen which
is considerably more than in the US and Japan. African countries receive €15 billion annually, the main share of
EU development assistance. European aid stands at 0.42% of gross national income (GNI), includes 3 of the 5
largest donors in the world (UK, France and Germany) and four of the five countries that exceed the UN target of
0.7% of GNI being given to development aid (Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, Luxembourg). However, the EU is
not yet on its way to meet the 2015 ODA targets.
http://www.deljpn.ec.europa.eu/modules/world/human/oda/
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and insufficient staffing. Struggling to grasp the minutiae of EU administration and procedures is a
burden that some RECs (ECCAS is one example) find almost overwhelming. The structural
deficiencies of AU/RECs on financial management have made matters worse, although the AU
appears to have made significant progress in this area during 2010.
II.2 FUNDING OF THE APF INSTRUMENT
The first APF was created with a €250 million budget. The NIP ‘slicing’ mechanism was confirmed in
DECISION No 3/2003 OF THE ACP-EC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS of 11 December 2003 on the use
of resources from the long-term development envelope of the 9th EDF for the creation of a Peace
Facility for Africa:
“Art 1 Para 1: A contribution of 1,5 % shall be taken from allocations that were notified
to African ACP States in accordance with Article 1(b) of Annex IV to the ACP-EC
Partnership Agreement. Such contribution will be taken from the uncommitted balance
of the allocation referred to in Article 3(2) (b) of Annex IV to the ACP-EC Partnership
Agreement, the so-called B-allocation.
If the uncommitted balance of the B-allocation is insufficient, the remainder will be
taken from the uncommitted balance of the allocation referred to in Article 3(2) (a) of
Annex IV, the so-called A-allocation. A total amount of EUR 126,4 million shall thus be
transferred from the respective country allocations to the intra-ACP allocation under
the envelope for regional cooperation and integration and used for the creation of a
Peace Facility for Africa.”
The slicing mechanism was not pursued in the second APF in 2007, under 10 th EDF. As a result,
without slicing mechanism, the accountability between the AU MS and the AUC may have weakened.
For many interlocutors, the NIP slicing mechanism offered several excellent aspects, among which
building political commitment to the AU was perhaps the most important. Therefore, the evaluation
sees a possible re-introduction of the NIP ‘slicing’ mechanism in the future as a valuable way not only
to increase funding for the 2nd APF, but also strengthen mutual links and commitments between the
AU as an institution and AU Member States.
Taking into account that the second APF, under the 10th EDF, budgeted €300 million (for PSOs
€200m, for APSA €65m, for ERM €15m, audit M&E etc. €7m, contingencies €13m), since the
establishment of the African Peace Facility (APF) in 2004, the EU has channelled €740 million through
this instrument. 15 In 2007, the AU and the EU decided to broaden the scope of the African Peace
Facility to cover conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation as well as to accelerate decisionmaking
and coordination processes.
In line with the priorities of the Partnership on Peace and Security of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy,
APF funds have been allocated as follows:
Item in the APF budget 16
Amount and purpose under 9 th and 10 th EDF
1) Capacity Building (CB) € 100 million have been allocated to the Operationalisation of
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and Africa-
EU dialogue. EU support aims at strengthening dialogue and
the capacity and effectiveness of the various components of
the APSA.
15 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/index_en.htm
16 Additional funds are allocated to activities such as audit, monitoring, visibility, evaluation and technical
assistance.
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Item in the APF budget 16
Amount and purpose under 9 th and 10 th EDF
2) Peace Support Operations (PSO) € 600 million have been earmarked for this purpose. The
funding of Peace Support Operations represents the core
activity of the African Peace Facility (APF). EU support aims
at providing sustainable and predictable funding to enable
effective planning.
3) Early Response Mechanism (ERM): € 15 million have been allocated to finance preparatory
stages of Peace Support Operations or urgent funding for
initial mediation processes (6 months).
4) Contingencies: € 40 million are earmarked for unforeseen needs in case any
of the above-mentioned budget lines is depleted.
APF contracted amounts under the 9 th EDF (1 st APF) 17
1st APF PSOs
AMIS Sudan
>€350m
FOMUC/MICOPAX CAR
€53.2m
AMISOM Somalia
€35.5m
AMISEC + MAES Comoros € 5m + €3m
PSO cumulated expenditure
AMIS TOTAL AMIS + others
2004 79.17 81
2005 149.17 160
2006 229.17 250
2007 306.60 350
2008 306.60 400
Capacity Building EXPENDITURE
AUC capacities €6m
ASF workshops €988 552
REC liaison, EWS & finance mgt €7.7m (South Africa budget line)
ASF planning, EWS & finance mgt €20m
II.3 APSA AND THE APF INTERVENTION LOGIC
In December 2005, the EU adopted its Africa Strategy, aiming to “support Africa’s efforts to reach the
UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and make Europe's partnership with Africa more
efficient”. 18 EU financial support to achieving the MDGs and to the APF is channelled through the
intergovernmental European Development Fund (EDF), which, as a formal EU mechanism under EU’s
first pillar, is managed by the European Commission. The APF is therefore a ‘development’ funding
directed towards creating the necessary security conditions for development in line with the spirit and
legal basis of the Cotonou Agreement.
The African Union and its African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) were born with the new
Millennium.
The following diagram displays the pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture
17 From the APF unit http://www.docstoc.com/docs/49327320/African-Peace-Facility
18 http://ec.europa.eu/development/Geographical/europe-cares/africa/eu_strategy_en.html
Page 11 of 49

From Vines & Middleton 2008
The institutional transformation of the OAU into the African Union offered new perspectives for Africa
to take control of its future. According to all interlocutors, the EU has been the primary, most reliable
and most generous funder of the APSA. The impact of the APF can be considered a huge success –
and a successful political risk for the EU - achieved in a remarkably short period.
Designed in some aspects on the EU, 19 the AU has nevertheless taken foreign policy integration much
further and much faster than the EU, at least from a theoretical perspective. The legal framework of
APSA, outlined in the AU Constitutive Act, the PSC protocol and the CADSP, 20 remains the most
ambitious regional security architecture in the world, giving mandate to the AUC and sub-regional
organisations to intervene within the borders of the member states.
Largely thanks to the APF, APSA has started to become a reality: its regional ASF brigades are
almost ready for action; interventions in CAR and Comoros were successful; mediations in Niger and
Guinea prevented war; the AMIS and AMISOM operations in Sudan and Somalia are huge and
important; collaboration with UN and EU is creating new synergies; innovative peace management
approaches like early-warning, mediation and conflict management through the Panel of the Wise are
exciting (even if they have not yet moved very far). However, the limited institutional capacity of the
19 The AU has a simpler control structure than the EU, without the different pillar competencies. The Pan-African
Parliament, however, has very limited powers, and is not directly elected. The PAP has existed since 2004. The
265 representatives who serve in it are elected from within the national legislatures of 53 African countries. Unlike
the EU, there are no economic or financial conditions for AU membership, so the divergence in ideologies is
greater. The AU agenda and origins are more political and less economic than those of the EU.
20 Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), adopted in Maputo, in July 2003
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AU, the relative limited focus on the strengthening of the AUC/RECs relation as a key driver of APSA,
and the fragility of its political consensus keep APSA weak. Nevertheless, there is no denying its
importance, or the success of its first decade.
At the same time, some of Africa’s regional organisations have also emerged as significant players in
the field of peace and security. ECOWAS can claim success in Sierra Leone and Liberia, Niger and
Guinea, and the 1998 Moratorium – now the legally binding Convention - on Small Arms is a seminal
African experience. The MICOPAX intervention in Central African Republic is considered an ECCAS
success. APSA’s success depends on the RECs and other regional structures, as well as the African
Union. The notion of RECs as pillars of APSA is complicated by overlapping memberships, and
differing roles in peace and security; and not all RECs are involved in the support to the African
Standby Force 21 .
Under the JAES, APF has evolved from a fund for PSOs, into the funding partner of APSA 22 under the
logic and legal backing of the 2005 amended Cotonou Agreement; while APSA itself has the legal
backing of the AU Constitutive Act and the AU Peace and Security Council. 23 Subsequent to the Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 25 March 2005, the JAES of 2007 sets out a new relationship
between Africa and Europe based on a set of eight partnerships. The first of these is the Peace and
Security Partnership, under which APSA falls.
APSA has ambitions that concern both conflict management and conflict prevention within and among
African countries. The evaluation sees that it would be valuable to look more closely at African
systems of ‘conflict management’, which are frequently discussed in the literature in connection with
internal conflicts: the role of States, traditional authorities and civil society in reducing tensions and
avoiding violence. Using this shorthand, APSA might be more effective and less costly, if ‘conflict
management’ systems were supported at the local level: ‘Conflict prevention’ involving outsiders such
as the REC, AU or international community would not be necessary. Such an approach, which makes
sense as a complementary measure within the APF, would require that the APF and APSA be fully
implemented in line with the human security doctrine 24 . Concretely, this would entail that APF
contracts should be signed with other parties than the AUC/RECs for such specific purposes and that
a wider range of EU aid modalities are used in implementation of APF funds.
APF has been fairly successful with low-cost interventions. In the conflict management area, the ERM
stands out: 10 mediation missions were funded during 2010 and two additional during the first quarter
of 2011, for no more than 6 months (the procedural maximum) and little cost. Using a ‘What If’
hypothesis for avoiding war, it is reasonable to surmise that several millions of Euros and the lives of
hundreds might have been saved through successful mediations in Guinea and Niger.
Among PSO experiences, the two Comoros operations stand out as APF success stories: they were
short and effective, leaving the country stabilised after elections. On the other hand, synergy has been
achieved on CB between APF and RIPs, as in the case of ECCAS, which has been very valuable to
improve impact and avoid overlapping. The evaluation sees that an APF information and outreach
strategy, disseminating Lessons Learned, could yield similar cost-effective benefits.
21 The Arab Maghreb Union cooperating with Egypt was initially designated to act as the regional organisation
which would create and support the brigade. For some time, intra-regional differences prevented any progress at
all. However, a new mounting body, the North Africa Regional Capability, has now been created to take on the
role of the REC for Northern Africa
22 For this evolution see tables in the Executive Summary sections 1.1 and 1.2 above.
23 APSA’s structure is outlined in The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council
Adopted by the 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union in Durban, 9 July 2002
24 The Barcelona Report “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe”, presented by the EU High Representative for
Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, in September 2004.
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Regarding what scholars name “the conflict cycle” 25 , APF is open to help the AU and RECs to develop
mechanisms to enable interventions at every stage of the ‘conflict cycle’ in the areas of peace and
security: from the moment when the EWS picks up signs of a small conflict or the event that could
ignite conflict, all the way through to post-conflict peace building and sustainable development – where
EDF and the development-security nexus function. PSOs intervene in the middle of the conflict cycle,
only if there is a failure of local authorities and CSOs, local police and mediation mechanisms, and AU
MS governments’ own conflict prevention mechanisms working at the basis of the continental P&S
infrastructure. It should be stressed that if national conflict management and prevention efforts prove
successful, external intervention would become unnecessary. Consequently, a more effective
coordination of all EU efforts at all levels, including RIPs and NIPs, and with other donors, is crucial for
a successful APSA. On the other hand, it is logical to consider how the demand for PSO funding could
be decreased if earlier and cheaper prevention interventions were privileged. Therefore, it could be
also concluded that a stronger APSA conflict management might reduce future APF funding needs as
a whole because costly PSOs would be less necessary.
That assumption is important as, at present, APF Funding is largely consumed by PSOs not only
because that is APF’s primary vocation, but also because the funds are available under APF to meet
the high costs of peacekeeping missions. No other EU instrument is as convenient to fund certain
military costs. In every nation, an option is to mobilise troops. Recruiting magistrates and policemen
and coastguards for a PSO is more complex, due to their lack of availability. 26 Soldiers on the other
hand, are instantly available and always keen to take on new challenges.
Human security doctrine and state sovereignty both inform the legal and political framework of APSA:
the argument developed during the 1990s in West Africa, according to which conflict is a development
cost and preventing or managing conflict should therefore be considered a legitimate use of
development funds is not the least important. The same conclusion was reached in Europe during the
May 2003 Council debate culminating in the conclusions on Countries in Conflict and in numerous
other documents. 27 The European Security Strategy (ESS), which was launched in 2003, emphasised
the link between security and development both in Europe and Africa. 28 The same reasoning underlies
the APF, the AU-EU peace and security partnership, and the JAES.
Since APF is funded under EDF, the ‘security-development nexus’ is an important part of the
intervention logic, supported by AU member States, and follows closely the doctrine of human
security. The justification for using development funds for the prevention of conflict is both politically
and legally very strong as it is fully embedded in the Cotonou Agreement that guides implementation
of the EDF including the APF. The evaluation supports the underlying development-security nexus
philosophy but some EU Member States and other European stakeholders including members of the
25 See annex 8 on conflict cycle.
26 ‘The EU’s “comprehensive approach” is supposed to ensure that the military and civilian components of
overseas interventions complement each other. But struggles inside the Council Secretariat, the bureaucratic
machinery used by the PSC, mean that, for now at least, the ideal of civilian-military co-operation remains just
that.’ Korski, D & Gowan, R 2009: Can the EU rebuild failing states A review of Europe’s civilian capacities
European Council on Foreign Relations, Cambridge, UK (Executive Summary)
27 For example : “Conflict prevention must be incorporated in cooperation programmes, since violent conflict
rarely springs out of nowhere, but is the result of a gradual deterioration. Development policy and cooperation
programmes are therefore effective instruments for dealing with the root causes of conflict. Their emphasis is on
reducing poverty.” See also Commission Communication of 11 April 2001 on Conflict Prevention and EU
Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts.
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/conflict_prevention/r12700_en.htm
28 The European Security Strategy considers that “security is a precondition of development”: A Secure Europe in
a better world – European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 2.
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European Parliament and NGOs continue to question the rationale. The use of development funds
was recently justified thus by the AUC Chief of Staff 29 :
‘… Of the many challenges facing our continent, the quest for peace and security is
undoubtedly the most pressing. Issues of peace and security have always been at the
core of the concerns of African leaders, for this is a prerequisite for the development
of our continent and its peoples.’
II.4 APF AND JAES PARTNERSHIPS
From its creation, partnership has been one of the key principles of APF. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy
(JAES) is built on eight partnerships, replacing donations as the driving force of the EU’s long-term
commitment to Africa. The first of these partnerships is Peace & Security and directly concerns APF
as the AU’s primary partner for P&S. A JAES mid-term review in Addis on 14 October 2009 concluded
that:
‘JAES needs to encourage more active participation and buy-in from individual
Members States and African Regional Economic Communities (RECs). It will also
need to stimulate greater involvement of civil society and the private sector if the full
potential of the partnership is to be realised. Likewise, attention should be paid to
diversifying and expanding the resources available to the Joint Strategy in order to
ensure that it has access to the funds needed to achieve its goals.’
APF came into the JAES P&S partnership as a flagship financial facility, but it should be assessed
whether it fully responds to the needs of the JAES and the entire range of specific objectives outlined
in the II Action Plan (2011-2013). The JAES and the Paris Declaration of 2005 reinforced concepts of
African ownership, which had already been introduced into the APF with the NIP slicing mechanism.
Nevertheless, even without NIP co-funding in the second APF, there is still some joint AU MS
ownership of APSA and all the PSOs through the AU’s elected, 15-member, Peace and Security
Council.
Resources for the Peace and Security Partnership of the Joint Africa•EU Strategy (JAES) mainly
come from the European Commission through the EDF. As said above, reluctance about development
money funding PSOs might disappear if greater political attention was paid to the non-military aspects
of PSOs and complementary actions involving conflict management and mediation actions. In part,
this may also be a communication issue: APF instrument is not good in communication outreach or
working with the relevant actors beyond the organisational secretariats in the AUC and RECs (inter
alia civil society, specialised entities, research institutions, private sector or individual AU member
states). The information contained in lengthy written reports is not easy to disseminate to
stakeholders. The result is that the APF and APSA operationalisations are insufficiently understood
outside the bureaucratic circles of a limited number of administrative services.
In that sense, the increasing importance of ERM should be highlighted as essentially reactive. Its
creation was an innovative move and it has proven a very valuable prevention tool. The weakness lies
in the fact that ERM actions are not linked to any longer-term APSA capacity building or AU
institutional building process, such as the Panel of the Wise. They are one-off missions and while the
individual mediation mission may be a success, the process is not built into APSA and does not
necessarily increase AU or REC institutional capacity for mediation.
29 Shinkaiye, Ambassador John K. 2010. Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing the New Africa-
EU Partnership, Chatham House Transcript, London, 27 October 2010.
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A similar impression emerges from funding for EWS: APSA requires the development of a fullyfledged
Continental Early Warning System (and a concomitant process for local early-intervention
when an early warning is given, which should mobilise EDF support through an ERM system at
regional or country level). While PSOs are well-managed, the comparative lack of long-term strategic
thinking for the rest of APSA within the AUC and RECs will weaken the long-term impact of APF if it
continues to be implemented with a narrow focus on intergovernmental organisations rather than a
wider range of relevant stakeholders.
The 2010 APSA Assessment emphasised the need to focus on APSA policies, which are covered in
MoU between the AU-RECs on APSA. 30 These policies may have been underestimated to the benefit
of PSOs and military build-up. AU demands presented as APSA operationalisation, tend to see APSA
pillars as objectives as such, rather than instruments to enable policy implementation. Such policies or
corresponding initiatives should be the object of more targeted and specific APF support through, for
example, the capacity building component (CB).
Beyond the capacity building component, which should be granted sufficient strategic and political
prioritisation, it appears that the police and civilian PSO components and training require more
attention compared to the military side. A lot has been written about the operationalisation of the
African Stand-by Force 31 and comparatively little about the other APSA pillars.
The AUC is one key actor responsible for building APSA, but others exist. The APF should continue
the necessary funding of the AUC and RECs but also consider whether APSA can be further
strengthened via complementary funding of initiatives and stakeholders beyond the AUC. PSO funding
may dominate AU requests to APF simply because the AUC is understaffed – notably the PSD which
is very busy running PSOs, while lacking conceptual capacity. Actually, PSD is simply not able to
devote the necessary management time for building APSA, and developing policies or doctrine.
Nevertheless, the low ‘absorptive capacity’ that limits the growth of pan-African institutions might be
overcome through deeper partnership.
The analysis of Jean-Marie Guéhenno - former UN Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping seems
particularly pertinent:
‘We have been used to balancing power with power, but we are ill-equipped to deal with
weakness: fragile states may require military deployments of peacekeepers, but strengthening
them or managing their collapse requires much more complex strategies, drawing heavily on
civilian capacities. One would expect the European Union, supposedly the civilian power par
excellence, to be at the forefront of this effort, and certainly well ahead of the US, which has
often been criticised for a Pentagon-dominated approach. Yet the Americans are fast learning
the lessons of their difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan, and energetically building their civilian
capacities. The Europeans, despite having set themselves ambitious “civilian headline goals” in
2004, are at risk of being left behind.’ 32
30 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation on Peace and Security between the AU and the
Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Addis Ababa, January 2008.
31 The Stand-by Force suffers from a similar bias: its headquarters are dominated by military officials. Planning,
training and operational exercises have demonstrated that military elements tend to be well staffed, while police
and civilian elements are lagging behind. Training curricula stress the military aspects of PSOs.
32
Jean-Marie Guéhenno’s Foreword to Korski & Gowan 2009. He goes on to criticise ‘the unwieldy divide
between the European Commission and the Council Secretariat in crisis situations’ and ‘the damaging
consequences of excessively complex institutional arrangements, and of a dogmatic conceptual distinction
between “security” and “development” issues that makes no sense in the kind of crisis situations that threaten
fragile states.’
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It is argued by the military bias supporters that other EU instruments can fund police, civilian or
mediation activities. IfS and RIP funds may be available, and NIP funds for P&S also need to be made
available at the national level, but APF was actually created as a Peace Facility intended to fund
PSOs, not as a ‘military’ fund. African critics of APF say that the current arrangement only treats the
symptoms of African conflicts, without contributing to the resolution of the causes. 33 APF will be more
effective – and its funding more firmly supported by its partners and stakeholders 34 in Europe and in
Africa - if APF is able to show that it is strengthening the institutional development of APSA as a
whole, rather than mainly funding the AUC/RECs and PSOs.
II.5 SWOT ANALYSIS OF APF
Strengths
Generously funded, APF has become an
important player in African PS politics.
This has given AU and EU significant weight in
Africa’s peace and security.
Partnership and the JAES give APF and the EU a
very strong and coherent political philosophy.
African ownership is both a strong objective, and
a partial reality (it needs strengthening).
Good APF internal managers have developed
creative ways to make inappropriate procedures
work better and keep the instrument functioning.
Innovative procedures in APF, IfS and ECHO
have opened doors for future flexibility and
efficiency.
CFSP and ATHENA offer interesting possible new
funding outside EDF or in complementarity with a
‘softer’ AP’.
APF has broadened the debate and the
commitment of EU MS towards P&S issues in
Africa.
APF has enabled AU MS to act on P&S, which
encourages creative policies and instruments for
supporting peace (some are still embryonic).
APF’s position inside EDF allows to link PSO exit
strategies with peace building and development,
and potentially creates pan-EU MS synergies.
The full range of APSA instruments will allow EU
and AU to consider alternative conflict
management entry strategies, before launching
costly and unpredictable PSOs.
Weaknesses
AUC is developing lop-sided capacities, with only
PSD showing real strength through PSOs.
APF-EDF procedures are not fully adequate for
PSO and crisis management actions.
Short-term APF funding weakens the AU edifice,
undermines AU staffing, does not build capacity,
and diminishes the influence of EU and EU MS.
The urgent funding of PSOs and APSA ’pillars’
has overtaken APSA policies: the AUC is
instrument-led.
AU staffing numbers under the Maputo
organisational plan are not adequate for the
ambitions of the AU; while the Maputo staffing
quota is not even filled.
AU management systems and procedures are
weak – including the quality of staffing &
recruitment - and APF’s CB approach has not built
institutional strength.
Short-term contracting misleads donors and AU
MS, since PSOs are mainly managed by
temporary staff that cannot build solid AU
foundations or lasting institutional capacities.
RECs have insufficient capacity, leaving APSA
with weak pillars lacking political support from AU
MS.
APF in Brussels is too far from the action,
especially from the numerous RECs: the role of
EU delegations and RIPs should therefore be
increased.
Civil Society has not been engaged in PS in Africa
(nor in Europe) yet CSOs are vital strategic
partners.
33
Similar concerns were expressed, and a number of suggestions for the future APF were jointly approved, during
the APF Joint Coordination Committee held in Addis Ababa on 4 February 2008; and again at the Annual AU-
RECs Consultation on 13 June 2001, with G8 and other partners - Para 13: ‘While noting the progress made in
the resolution of the conflicts facing the continent, the Consultation agreed on the need for continued and
sustained efforts to consolidate peace where it has been restored, as well as prevent and resolve conflicts.’
34 For example the Carlotti Report of the European Parliament expressed reservations about continued funding of
APF by the EDF. http://www.jrseurope.org/Migration%20and%20Development/JRS-
Europe%20web%20site%20LOG%20BOOK/EU%20documents/Carlotti%20report%20on%20migration%20and%
20development.pdf
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Strengths
APF has links with RECs (through the AU) and
provides institutional support through CB
programmes.
ERM facilitates rapid response mediation by AU.
Opportunities
The EEAS offers APF a new framework for longterm
strategic thinking and planning, offsetting
some of APF’s weaknesses and providing new
synergies.
CFSP-adjusted procedures could integrate the
PSO element of the APF into EEAS and create
synergies with other instruments.
IfS/ECHO procedures offer precedents to improve
APF procedural performance and reaction times.
Stronger EU Delegations and RIPs, with better
P&S capacities and mandates, could take on APF
support functions for RECs.
APF is placed to become increasingly the major
partner for APSA, able to leverage other funds for
the AU, creating new partnerships with and for the
AU.
APF offers a fulcrum for leveraging the potential
strengths of EU MS in Africa, creating synergies
for P&S and sustainable development.
Building APSA and building peace gives EDF
more chance to help Africa to meet the MDGs
If EDF fails as a funder, ATHENA could offer EU
MS a creative possible alternative structure if
substantially revised.
CSO networks in Africa are strong and effective:
their mobilisation potential is huge if APF can
support or leverage APSA and RECs and NIPs in
using them.
Weaknesses
The Panel of the Wise and ‘palaver tree’
strategies have been neglected by AU and
consequently by APF.
Early Warning has been developed only by
ECOWAS and even there it lacks a local ‘early
intervention’ dimension.
APF has poor visibility, outreach, and
communication.
Threats
While APF makes PSOs important, the strength of
P&S could actually unbalance other JAES
partnerships and the AU. 35 The European
experience since 1945 has shown that permanent
peace must be based on solid economic
foundations, not on PSOs.
The lack of funding from AU MS undermines the
AU and unbalances the JAES partnership. 36
The procedural and funding dominance of
‘preventing conflict’ reduces APSA creativity in
‘managing conflict’ at the grassroots, borders of or
inside the member states, and avoiding violence
through other means.
The impact of APF – and its political and
innovative roles as the long-term mainstay of
APSA – will be diminished if AU/RECs do not
improve their management structures and internal
procedures.
EU MS political support needs to be maintained
and boosted, to allow APF to consolidate APSA
for long-term conflict management and peace
promotion as a lynchpin of EU Africa strategy.
AU MS political commitment to AU and RECs is
ambivalent: the whole edifice will remain weak if
AU MS support cannot be mobilised. It is in the
EU’s interest to push AU MS to participate more
strongly, since instability in Africa is a threat to
Europe.
35 EU MS representatives report that the absence of dedicated funding is repeatedly raised as a problem in
meetings concerning the other seven partnerships.
36 On 17 January 2011, AUC Chairman Jean Ping made a New Year speech in which he deplored the funding
arrears of AU MS and their tendency to give ever more tasks to the AUC without providing the means to execute
them.
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III.
MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON APF
DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES
The APF follows the standard ‘project cycle’ of the European Commission. For the purpose of this
evaluation, special consideration is given to programming, financing and the applied aid modalities
(i.e. contribution agreements, grant agreements and service contracts).
The APF (funded through the 10 th EDF) is programmed in consecutive 3-year rolling programme
documents. Art. 12 of the Council Regulation no 617/2007 outline the applicable procedures, task
division and decision-making process. In general, this process is jointly undertaken by the African
Union and the European Union. Both Commissions play a driving role but both African and, in
particular, European Member States are involved. The second phase concerns the actual financing
decisions taken by the European Commission. These financing decisions provide the legal basis for
the funding of individual APF actions. No agreement may be concluded without prior adoption of a
financing decision on the basis of an action fiche, a detailed budget and timeframe for implementation.
The administrative procedure for adopting financing decisions has a paramount influence over the
necessary time for completing the approval process. This phase also includes the selection of aid
modalities. The actual implementation and management of individual contracts are outside the scope
of this evaluation as effectiveness, results and impact are to be assessed in the second phase of the
APF evaluation.
The APF financing decision-making process is governed by the Regulations and internal rules of the
European Commission, 10 th EDF rules and procedures, and the European Commission financing
decision on the 2008-2010 APF Action Programme 2008-2010 (10 th EDF - Appendixes I and II).
III.1 OVERVIEW OF THE APF DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES
III.1.1
DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES APPLYING TO APF PROGRAMMING OF THE
ACTION PLAN
Article 12 of the Council Regulation No 617/2007 of 14 May 2007 covering implementation of the 10 th
EDF (2008-2013) lays down the decision-making procedures for the programming of the APF Action
Plan (2008-2010). It is specified that:
Upon request from the African Union, endorsed by the ACP EC Committee of Ambassadors, an action
programme shall be prepared by the Commission. This action programme shall, inter alia, specify the
objectives pursued, the scope and nature of the possible interventions, the implementation
arrangements, and an agreed format for background documents and requests and for reporting. An
annex to the action programme shall describe the specific decision making procedures for each
possible intervention according to its nature, size and urgency.
Moreover, this action programme, including the annex and any changes thereto shall be discussed by
the relevant preparatory Council working groups and the Political and Security Committee and
approved by Coreper by qualified majority as defined in Article 8(3) of the Internal Agreement before
being adopted by the Commission in accordance with the management procedure set out in Article
11(3) of the Council Regulation.
The action programme, excluding the annex referred to in point (a), shall be the basis for the financing
agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the African Union.
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III.1.2
DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES APPLYING TO APF FINANCIAL DECISIONS
a. Initiative and decision-making
1. AU/REC prepare and send the official financial request.
2. DEVCO prepares the “informative note” for the Council.
3. AWG studies the request.
4. PSC gives “political appropriateness”.
5. DEVCO launches the Commission Decision procedure.
GENERAL PROCESS:
The AU/RECs send a request. Upon reception of the request, the Commission elaborates an
‘information note’ including an assessment. The Commission evaluates whether an APF intervention
is urgent. The information note is circulated and discussed in the relevant Council working groups. Any
request above €10m must have the approval of the PSC on political appropriateness. If a blocking
minority within the Council opposes the evaluation made by the Commission on the urgency of the
intervention - as defined in article 8 of the Internal Agreement, - within 5 working days in the case of a
proposed standard procedure or 3 working days in the case of a proposed accelerate procedure after
the distribution of the information note, the Council can propose a change in procedure.
i. Standard procedure for non-urgent interventions. There is no fixed delay to obtain the
approval on political appropriateness by the PSC, except for ‘small’ operations (up to €10m)
where the PSC has minimum 10 working days for consultation process.
ii.
Accelerated procedure for urgent interventions. The Commission will request the PSC to
approve the political appropriateness as soon as possible. If the APF cannot be included in
the PSC agenda within 5 working days after circulation of the information note, the
Commission may request the PSC’s political appropriateness by written procedure with a
maximum deadline of 5 working days after the information note has been distributed.
These two decision-making procedures apply for African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and
for actions related to the operationalisation of APSA and Africa-EU dialogue.
PRACTICE
1) Preparation of the request.
Each APF request must be submitted and endorsed by the AU. Unless there is a political obstacle to
overcome, it takes around one month to prepare the request, including an extensive exchange
between the AU/REC and DEVCO-EU concerned delegation. In order to speed up the process and
improve requests, a DEVCO mission travelled twice to Africa in October 2010 to help draft the
MICOPAX 1C and AMISOM V AU/REC requests for funding respectively. According to most people
involved, DEVCO’s early and direct involvement in the preparation of a request is essential.
2) Preparation of the “information note” for the Council.
The information note (around 6 pages) is drafted by EEAS using the information provided by DEVCO
on budget and implementation. The note states why it is advisable for the EU to support the APF
action, and justifies its political appropriateness. It is sent 5 days prior to the Council meeting, so that
EU Member State representatives can report to their capitals. Good coordination and communication
between EEAS and DEVCO are important in producing the information note.
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3) “Political appropriateness” by the Council.
PSC intervention in the APF decision-making procedures is crucial and reflects its real nature:
Council political views conjoin with the Commission’s expertise in development and conflict
management/prevention. Although EC legislation makes no reference to the intervention of AWG, this
preparatory working group is also consulted so that any doubts may be discussed and resolved before
the proposal reaches the PSC, at the highest diplomatic level. The AWG meeting starts with a brief
presentation made by EEAS, but the presence of DEVCO is also important to provide an immediate
answer to any technical question from Member States. Most frequent questions relate to technicalities
such as budget lines, possible overlapping, or the future need for replenishment of APF funds. In fact,
as all the issues are resolved at AWG, the APF item in PSC agenda often becomes a procedural
matter, in particular when the Commission has been involved from the onset of the identification and
formulation of a specific programme. Within the time period under consideration, there has never been
any refusal or even problem raised at PSC level, although it occurred that PSC applied a ‘scrutiny
reserve’ delaying its decision, more for domestic/internal coordination reasons than for the substance
of the action. Upcoming PSOs such as AMISOM V and MICOPAX 1C are backed by their respective
UNSC resolutions 1964(2010) and 1923(2010). Although APF regulations establish that decisionmaking
should “be flexible enough to go ahead with funding while in the process of UN endorsement”,
in practice, this situation has never happened. The shortest time to pass through the political
appropriateness requirement is 10 days, which was the time taken for AMISOM IV.
4) Preparation of the Commission Decision ‘dossier´ for the APF financial decision.
DEVCO prepares the ‘dossier’, a very precise document (8-10 pages) containing all the necessary
documents to take an EC decision, which then goes to the Coordination Unit C3 for inter-service
consultation. The dossier contains: the ‘explanatory note’ that guides the readers through the dossier,
a draft text for the EC decision, a memo to the College of Commissioners and an annex which
contains the ‘action fiche’ presenting the detailed action, modalities, budget and calendar. DEVCO
financial/contracts Section C5 is consulted on the preparation of the dossier, especially to check the
implementation procedure because of the 4-pillar requirements for AU/RECs. The geographical desks,
now under EEAS, are also consulted to ensure that there is no overlapping with other EC actions.
DEVCO officials need around 2 weeks to prepare the dossier and make great efforts to share with
other services in order to prepare their colleagues and avoid problems during the inter-service
consultation process. The lead department needs be careful not to launch a consultation until the file
is complete and all the documents are final. Amendments after launching must be an exception.
Fortunately, an Impact Assessment is not mandatory for APF.
5) Visas (signatures) before the launch.
After the PSC has approved the political appropriateness, the dossier receives its first visas from
DEVCO: three signatures from the operational side (C6), two from the financial/contracts section 37
(C5), and then two extra signatures from the financial section 38 dealing with decisions and global
commitments. It normally (AMISOM IV) takes 10 days to obtain the 6 signatures from DEVCO
sections.
iii. Special procedure, Early Response Mechanism (ERM)
ERM will finance APF interventions that require quick reaction such as: mediation actions by
AU/RECs, preventive diplomacy, fact-finding missions for planning a PSO, and ad hoc or temporary
strengthening of those bodies in charge of planning a possible PSO.
37 ’Gestion centralisée - Coordination financière - Autorisation financière’
38 ‘Engagements primaires et dérogations’
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As ERM was included as an appendix to the current APF 2008-2010 Action Programme adopted at
the same time and is subject to the same consultations of relevant Council working groups. PSC
approval on political appropriateness is required and it would have been the case even if an ERM was
not included, as well as the inter-service consultation process: thereafter ERM funds are transferred to
the AU, the specificity being that the exact use of these funds has not yet been decided. Once a
specific action is approved, ERM funds can be released quickly because they are already in the AU
bank in Addis.
Decision process for every specific ERM intervention:
1. AU/REC send an ERM request.
2. DEVCO C6 evaluates the request and informs the Council.
3. DEVCO C6 authorises the use of ERM.
The Commission examines and evaluates each request from the AU to use ERM: political and
operational aspects including the budget. REC requests must have AU endorsement. If the
Commission considers that the request is acceptable, it informs the Council and authorises AU to use
the ERM fund. The individual initiatives are then decided at the level of the Authorising Officer (the
ACP Director in the COM). DEVCO C6 39 states that the decision-making procedure for ERM is very
peculiar because: the procedure is very fast (10 days), activities are not long (maximum 6 months)
mainly for mediations, and must respond to an evolving context with a flexible budget. It is an internal
decision by the DEVCO C6, with a request of political advice from EEAS (before Desks DEV) and
does not require the approval of DEVCO C5 40 as it was given in advance with the original ERM
funding decision.
b. Inter-service consultation (ISC) and adoption by the College of Commissioners
1. DEVCO verifies the dossier and launches the decision for ISC.
2. EEAS, Legal Service, SG, DG Budget, ECHO and OLAF are consulted.
3. Translation.
4. Adoption by the College.
INTER SERVICE CONSULTATION (ISC)
Through the inter-service consultation, the lead department, DEVCO in this case, seeks the formal
opinion of all other DG and services with a legitimate specific interest in the substance of the proposal.
A high quality inter-service consultation (ISC) guarantees the transparency 41 that is essential when
drawing up EC decisions, and reflects the collective responsibility of departments. Coordination must
take place at the earliest possible stage to ensure that inter-service consultations and subsequent
decision-making procedures run smoothly.
Before DEVCO Director sends the dossier to ISC, DEVCO C3 first verifies the format and quality of
the dossier. Until 2007, APF dossiers were often prepared in emergency and sometimes contained
mistakes that had to be addressed at a later stage. Therefore, officials informally discuss with C3
during the dossier preparation in order to avoid mistakes. This control requires two visas by the C3
heads of section and unit, three signatures in total. It takes two days. The departments identified for
APF decisions are:
39 Within DEVCO, this unit deals with AU and APF operations.
40 It deals with finance, contracts and audits for ACP countries.
41 This is the term used in the Commission. The evaluation has doubts as to whether this process actually creates
‘transparency’.
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‣ EEAS, because APF finances peace and security activities.
‣ The Legal service, whose agreement is required before initiating written procedures, except
for decisions on standard acts to which it has already agreed in advance (‘repetitive acts’).
‣ The EC Secretariat General, which may commit the EC vis-à-vis other institutions or bodies.
‣ DG budget, because APF has a direct budgetary impact.
‣ ECHO, because of the connections between APF and humanitarian actions.
‣ OLAF, which must be consulted on proposals concerning areas vulnerable to fraud.
The inter-service consultations take 10 working days if the file is less than 20 pages, which is
generally the case for APF, otherwise it may take 15 working days, or even three weeks. In case of
obvious political urgency (and not to make up for administrative delay), EC procedures allow DEVCO
either to ask the SG for permission to use the ‘fast track’ procedure (consultation ending with a
meeting) or launch a shorter consultation. In any case, DEVCO can always proactively contact the
DGs consulted and ask them to reply quicker.
The ‘fast track’ procedure for inter-service consultations lasts for three days: two to revise the
documents and one for a special meeting. DEVCO used this procedure for some APF interventions,
such as AMISOM II, MAES and MICOPAX 1A in December 2008 and in 2007 for the adoption of the
APF Action Programme 2008-2010.
After the inter-service consultation process has ended, the dossier comes back to DEVCO and is
revised according to the comments made by the departments consulted. This review normally takes
around four days. DEVCO has never had a negative opinion from the inter-service consultation during
the period analysed in this evaluation. The evaluation recommends sparing time through a 48-hour or
72-hour no-objection process to replace the formal visa system. This would modernise and speed-up
the ISC, which is mainly about information sharing. There would still be the possibility to object, and a
meeting could be called in case a decision needed further debate.
TRANSLATION
The ‘dossier’ is sent for translation into the three Commission working languages: it takes 5 to 10
working days, depending on the length of the text. The backlog of work or holiday periods may delay
translation. When the translations are finished, the dossier is encoded in the system and C3 head of
unit signs. Then, the dossier goes back to DEVCO, where the Assistant Director (one day) and the
Director (two days) sign and send it to the College of Commissioners for adoption.
ADOPTION BY THE COLLEGE OF COMMISSIONERS
During the period analysed in this evaluation, APF decisions were adopted by making use of the
‘written procedure’. The Commissioner for Development receives the dossier and gives his/her
agreement. As described above for other stages, C6 officials informally discuss with the cabinet in
advance to prevent any unforeseen problem, which takes three days. Then, the Secretariat General
has three days to check the dossier again, before launching the written procedure with the members
of the College of Commissioners: they have five working days to oppose the APF decision, otherwise
it is adopted. The President of the Commission may decide, for special urgent matters, to use an
accelerated procedure, in which case the written procedure is limited to 1 to 3 days, but this possibility
has never been used for APF decisions.
The adopted APF decision goes back to DEVCO, where the contribution agreement or grant contract
with AU may be signed.
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III.1.3
CONTRIBUTION AND GRANT AGREEMENTS
1. The College of Commissioners adopts the financing decision.
2. DEVCO prepares the contract to deliver the APF funding to AU/RECs.
3. DEVCO Director signs the contract with AU/RECs.
The success and failures of the APF very much depends on the structures and operational capacities
of AU/RECs as these organisations have been the only beneficiaries of direct APF funding.
At an overall level, the EU has attached very few conditions to the APF. As a general rule, all requests
should be agreed upon by the AU for use in operations approved by the AU PSC; and all PSOs should
have UN approval of some form. Later practice has shown that the EU may have underestimated
administrative and managerial deficiencies within AU/RECs, and their effects on APF implementation.
That said, the general EDF regulations and internal control requirements are directly applicable to
AU/RECs in the context of the APF framework, and they are designed to provide reasonable
assurance on the achievement of the following objectives:
a) Effectiveness, efficiency and economy of operations;
b) Reliability of reporting;
c) Safeguarding of assets and information;
d) Prevention and detection of fraud and irregularities;
e) Adequate management of the risks relating to the legality and regularity of the underlying
transactions, taking into account the multiannual character of programmes as well as the
nature of the payments concerned.
These requirements apply to the various types of aid modalities used by the Commission.
According to APF regulations, APF funding is delivered through the following aid modalities:
i. Contribution Agreements require that international organisations receiving finance under joint
management should offer guarantees equivalent to internationally accepted standards relating
to accounting, audit, internal control and procurement procedures, the so-called ‘four-pillar’
requirements. A standard Contribution Agreement must be used as a model.
ii.
iii.
Grant Contracts are implemented under the centralised management of DEVCO. A standard
Grant Agreement must be used as a model.
Service Contracts are used only for the implementation of the technical assistance.
Once a financing decision has been adopted, the contract for the APF intervention in question can be
signed and part of the funds subsequently transferred. Normally there is not much delay between the
financing decision and the date of the contract: while the draft APF decision is going through the
decision-making process, DEVCO, C6 and C5 prepare the contract that will follow, clarifying
derogations, descriptions of actions, specific budgets, financial identification (each contract needs a
different bank account: the AU must have a bank account validated by the EC and the request for
payment in accordance with the contract (formal letter from AU). This process seeks to anticipate and
solve all problems. The funding provided through APF to AU/RECs finances 100% of the activities that
it covers: co-funding is not required.
It should be noted that an APF Contribution Agreement between the Commission and AU/RECs
contains general clauses applied by the Commission to every international organisation receiving
funding. In Article 7, Contribution Agreements refer to ‘other specific conditions applying to the action’
(derogations and other specific conditions), which are essential for the implementation of APF. These
clauses are already cited in the EC decision supporting the Contribution Agreement.
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The need to respond quickly to peace and security challenges has forced APF officials in DEVCO to
find solutions to make up for lengthy decision-making procedures: retroactivity and the reallocation of
funds from previous APF actions have been introduced with this objective, in line with the legal rules
(article 19) of the Cotonou Agreement.
PRACTICE
In principle, APF regulations have a relatively flexible approach, as they do not impose the use of
specific implementation modalities. The EC has to decide which aid modality is more suitable for APF
action, taking into account the situation within AU/RECS. In a sense, the most realistic process would
have been for all APF funding to be transferred to AU/RECs through Grant Agreements, until these
institutions were ready from an operational/financial/management perspective. However, it seems that
the political willingness to promote African ownership led the Commission not to insist on the need for
these organisations to prove that they could meet minimum conditions regarding sound administration
for implementing Contribution Agreements. This dynamic interpretation and the corresponding
integrated approach to capacity development are part of the Commission’s overall approach to
development, including the use of EU budget support in developing countries. This approach is
commended by the evaluation, as it would otherwise be difficult for African countries and organisations
to ever build a sustainable capacity to deal with peace and security. That said, it is very important that
the Commission fully understands and appreciates the risks involved and that appropriate risk
management strategies are used including risk aversion measures such as targeted capacity building,
oversight and political dialogue.
Audits soon started to prove problematic, and DEVCO was laudably creative in finding solutions to
keep the APF on track, without damaging expectations already created among AU and RECs
concerning their ownerships. Progress has been made by the AUC in improving its internal controls
and procedures; the 4-pillar standard may well be accorded in 2011. The same may not be true for
every REC except COMESA. Without the active intervention of EU delegations, it seems very difficult
for APF in Brussels to effectively support the RECs. So at least the monitoring of specific REC
components (not PSOs) could be better managed by EU Delegations who have the necessary
expertise.
APF regulations demand that ‘joint lessons learned exercises on APF implementation be held
systematically’ 42 , so that outcomes can be discussed in relevant fora, in particular at the APF Joint
Coordination Committee; and recommendations followed. However, since 2007 in Djibouti, such an
exercise has never taken place. According to DEVCO C5 in Brussels, this issue has been extensively
discussed in every capacity-building APF steering committee meeting. This is regrettable: these formal
exercises provide a good opportunity to discuss the problems related to APF implementation more
deeply and in a more detailed manner. Instead, DEVCO has to deal with problems on a case-by-case
basis.
BUDGETS AND THEIR AMENDMENT
Requests by AU/RECs to transfer a certain amount between budget headings may be acceptable,
provided they do not request new activities. DEVCO analyses whether these requests are coherent,
feasible and acceptable. If accepted, an addendum to the contract (grant or contribution agreement)
is established and signed by both parties. As long as the modifications requested by the AU/RECs are
non substantial, there is no intervention from the political side - the Council (AWG/PSC) - as the
change in the contract does not affect the supporting EC decision: it is just an operational issue and
shows good flexibility in EDF/APF. These “riders” were used for AMISOM on several occasions to
42 Three-year Action Programme for APF 2008-2010 (10th EDF), point 6.5 on lessons learned.
Page 25 of 49

modify, for instance, the duration contribution agreements. This element can be modified (e.g.
extended) without modifying the Commission decision, as it is not considered to be a substantial
modification affecting the objectives and contents of the action.
If the amendment requested is considered substantial, the relevant EC decision must be modified
before amending the relevant contract. Amending a contribution agreement already in force to change
i.e. its overall funding would require the same time consuming decision-making procedure as when
establishing a new contribution agreement, as modifying an EC decision takes as long as adopting a
new one.
RETRO-ACTIVITY
The clause on retroactivity included in all APF agreements is very important, because of the lengthy
EC decision-making process. AU/RECs can pre-finance their on-going activities related to PSOs or
capacity building, provided that expenditures take place after the official request date from AU/RECS
to the EU. As AU/RECs are often not able to pre-finance their APF activities with their own funds, they
are forced to reallocate the budget of the previous Contribution Agreement, or make ‘borrow-andswitch’
arrangements between accounts..
CONTINGENCIES
As regards the use of contingencies, APF regulations clearly establish that their use is not considered
as an amendment of the financing decision, as long as it does not entail a change in the nature of the
activities originally proposed. Contingencies have been used as a complement to an ongoing APFfunded
intervention, with a DEVCO decision following an AU/REC request. This provision has not
caused any problem, but it may be quite important to take into consideration the nature of PSOs.
70% ACCOUNTABILITY
One of the complaints made by AU and RECs regarding the Capacity Building Programme under the
9 th EDF APF is the EC requirement that when they have collectively spent 70% of the budget, the AUC
and all (6) RECs involved must then justify expenditures (with the relevant documentation) in order to
receive the remaining 30%. The evaluation considers the 70% accountability rule perfectly justified;
there is no reason for the accounting departments of AU and RECs not to be able to comply with it.
However, problems occurred because the rule applied to all the involved organisations, which meant
that the best performers were held back by the weakest link. This caused many additional challenges
for certain RECs and caused unnecessary frictions. In the future, the EU should apply the rule to
individual organisations or require that the AUC does not disburse all the resources to individual
RECs, but holds back a reserve that allows the good performers to move forward even if other RECs
do not deliver.
PERIODIC AUDITS
Another important clause in APF contracts refers to the need for periodic audits, as their results have
a direct impact on the ongoing funding to AU/RECs and on future contracts because of the recovery
requirements. As for any other EC programme, when an audit identifies problems in the management
of EC funds, the funded organisation must respond within two weeks. The experience with AU/RECs
as regards audits has not always been positive: they seldom respond in time, or provide auditors with
inadequate documentation. Some Commission officials report that these organisations even needed
technical assistance to deal with audits. On the other hand, it is admitted that AUC has made
considerable progress during 2010 in terms of financial and reporting procedures.
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APF MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTING
In 2005, when APF started, it was assessed that AU/RECs met the four-pillar requirement to sign
contribution agreements with the Commission. Later audits, on AMIS and MICOPAX first mission,
disclosed a serious lack of sound management in both operations. As a solution, DEVCO Director
General and AUC Deputy Chairperson reached an agreement in August 2009 on measures to
strengthen AUC financial management, including precautionary measure to ensure tighter financial
control over expenditures to keep on funding AMISOM. In the case of MICOPAX, even before ECCAS
has undergone such an institutional assessments, the French military accepted to assume financial
management of the operation through a special body in the field (CAF), and APF funding started to
come through a Grant Agreement. Currently, an institutional assessment of AU is still going on and its
official results have not yet been made public. In 2011, ECCAS will also undergo an institutional
assessment of its standards in accounting, audit, control and procurement procedures.
To the Commission, it is clear that the African organisations should comply with the minimum
conditions for implementing contribution agreements, as they are bound to the financing regulations of
the EDF and good international practices. According to DEVCO, over the past few years, the
discussion on how to address the transition - the necessary time for the AUC to pass a positive 4-pillar
review, foreseen for 2011 – was that, as a general rule, no new contribution agreement in joint
management could be signed, except for AMISOM (currently IV and V) and, possibly, the APSA
support (€40m, currently in the decision-making circuit). For AMISOM this is justified by the fact that
the AUC accepted to incorporate into the contribution agreement, precautionary measures from the
aide-memoire on measures to strengthen AUC financial management + on the basis of a financial
management risk analysis conducted by DEVCO and approved by the Director General (based on
constant financial monitoring and positive audit results). In this sense, it should be noted that AMISOM
V clearly states that: "the management system set up by the African Union Commission (AUC) for the
management of EU funds does not fully comply at the moment with all the conditions set out in Article
29 of the Financial Regulation applicable to the 10th EDF. The Commission considers however that a
contribution agreement in joint management may still be established under the strict conditions agreed
in the joint European Commission/African Union Commission Aide-Memoire to strengthen AU financial
management signed on 27 August 2009 and its revisions. These conditions were integrated in the
contribution agreement".
III.1.4
APPRECIATION OF APF DECISION-MAKING AND TIMING
APF decisions do not take longer than any other EC EDF decisions, although the current APF
decision-making procedures are quite lengthy. At best, it takes around two months to obtain an EC
decision (AMISOM IV). These procedures are not well adapted to the needs of AUC/RECs’ support
for maintaining peace and security in Africa. In peace operations, decisions often need to be fast and
effective both from the managerial and financial perspectives; lives may be in danger, many risks are
at stake. Nevertheless, APF decision-making procedures are not an exception within the EC legal
framework. Other EC financial instruments also have to go through the same general procedures,
despite their possible urgency: except for the ECHO and IfS procedures, discussed below.
IMPORTANCE OF STAFF COMMITMENT
Nevertheless, as APF actions are often urgent and because so many visas are required for a decision
to be adopted, DEVCO officials have to maintain a very active, informal, personal approach to their
relations with other units, at every stage of the procedure, in order for their funding requests to
proceed rapidly through the EC bureaucracy. This permanent, personal approach is demanding as
well as time consuming and may not be sustainable. The fact is that the success of APF depends on
the current hard working C6 and C5 staff, committed to the ideals of African peace and personally
Page 27 of 49

involved in avoiding the fatal consequences of any delay in the field. Such staff dedication cannot be
permanently guaranteed and does not constitute a sound basis in a long-term management
perspective. The situation is of course different when APF decisions refer to CB, where there is less
urgency.
Furthermore, the time spent preparing the official APF request by AU/RECs has to be added to the
two months minimum required for the EC decision-making procedures. In the case of AMISOM IV or
MICOPAX 1C, it took from three to four weeks to complete the necessary informal dialogue with all the
partners and estimate a reliable budget in accordance with APF requirements.
In the case of an APF request from a REC – e.g. the ECCAS request for APF funding for MICOPAX
1C - we should add the time from when the request is sent to AU for endorsement. Although there has
never been an AU refusal, it always takes time: in the case of MICOPAX 1C, it took eleven days. AU
endorsement is almost automatic: three days would be a more reasonable period for the AU, since the
political decision has presumably already been taken. In the case of MICOPAX, those eleven days for
the official AU endorsement were used by DEVCO C6 to prepare all the necessary documents for
AWG at the Council.
Peacekeeping missions are complex and their military component makes them quite particular in
terms of budgeting and programming. The preparation of all the APF documentation necessary for the
decision-making process, at the Council and in relation with the other Commission departments
involved, is difficult and time consuming. This particularity of APF action requires military expertise.
For the time being, C6 is fortunate to have a military officer working with them, seconded by France,
whose work and contribution at every stage is essential, both for the preparation of the AU/RECs
request and for passing through the APF decision-making procedure.
The following example does highlight the heaviness of Commission decision-making procedures and
their unforeseeable effects: two AU/REC requests for PSOs were presented in December 2010: at
end of February 2011, AMISOM V and MICOPAX 1C financing decisions were still going through
inter-service consultation (AMISOM V is going faster than MICOPAX 1C). According to DEVCO C6,
the main reason for the delay is the very long list of people that have to approve and append their
visas to the dossier. APF is not helped by the fact that it is poorly understood by Commission services.
APF is considered ‘peculiar’. As compared to 2010 requests, the current APF requests contain higher
budgets and a new line for capacity building. On the other hand, C6 officials did not receive any
request for clarification related to these requests that would explain the delays, nor have they been
informed of any problem raised by other Commission services.
III.2 RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE APF DECISION MAKING PROCEDURES
III.2.1
REGARDING THE APF PROGRAMMING OF ACTION PLAN:
The Action Programme thus established the framework for the financing agreement and individual
contracts or agreements (i.e. contribution agreements, grant agreements or services contracts).
Flexibility and adaptability to allow effective implementation, value for money and sustainable results
are important aspects. In other words, the Three Year 2008-2010 Action Programme of the African
Peace Facility sets out the overall framework the European Commission must comply when preparing,
adopting and implementing the various components of the APF (PSO, Capacity Building, ERM etc.).
As has been pointed out above:
First, as suggested above, if the APF is to be a financing facility that can finance all three
objectives of the JAES PS Action Plan (2011-2013) i.e. political dialogue on peace and
security, APSA and PSOs, then it will be necessary to have a standing reserve which can be
activated to deliver quick-wins and flagship initiatives of the EU and AU/RECs.
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Second, the main APF programmes (on PSOs, capacity building and ERM) should be
complemented by specific interventions reflecting the evolving peace and security partnership
as well as allow for direct financing of stakeholders outside the AUC and REC secretariats.
Third, the EU should adopt 6-year Action Plans that correspond to the entire period of the
corresponding financial perspective as of 2013 when the 10 th EDF runs out. Peace and
security in Africa is a long-term process where windows of opportunities provide specific
possibilities for supporting leaps forward. The recent experience in North Africa is just one
illustrative example. The APF thus needs a long-term support programme within which
structural support and capacity building as well as targeted and specific initiatives is provided
to PSOs that can move APSA and the wider Africa EU partnership on peace and security
forward.
III.2.2
IMPROVING APF DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The question now is whether it would be possible to introduce improvements that might accelerate the
current process while using the current EC legal framework applicable to APF decisions. As a general
comment, it appears that, within the current legal framework, changing the requirement for a separate
individual decision for every APF intervention is not possible, even though a global financial decision
exists for the APF programme 2008-2010.
It seems unfortunate that to continue an activity a full new approval process is required, when the sole
change is a time- and a budget extension. This is certainly one area in which procedures could be
made easier and swifter, in line with the practices of many other donor organisations.
As regards the preparation of the APF request by AU/REC, this first stage comes under AU/RECs that
use their own procedures. Here, EC involvement is unofficial, but decisive in practice in order to obtain
an adequate request document prepared with minimum delay. For AMISOM V and MICOPAX 1C,
DEVCO C6 officials and the military advisor travelled to Africa, directly participated in the drafting of
the requests and provided crucial assistance. This suggests that EC involvement is necessary at the
formulation level and should be formalised as one part of the APF procedure. Another question is
whether this EC involvement is needed because of the complexity of EU procedures, or because of
managerial deficiencies within AU/RECs. If EU support is required at this stage, should it be provided
by DEVCO from Brussels or by EU Delegation staff who work closely with these organisations in their
headquarters In any case, for both proposals, the presence of peacekeeping expertise seems a very
significant advantage.
The ‘political appropriateness’ requirement is a logical consequence of the peace and security related
nature of the APF - maintaining peace and security in Africa is part of the European Foreign and
Security Policy, in line with the legal basis of the Lisbon Treaty. PSOs are politically sensitive, and EU
MS will not relinquish their right to control the political use of military force. This step in the approval
process is unavoidable when it comes to PSOs. However, there appears to be scope for providing the
EAAS and the Commission with the possibility to take decisions regarding the other components of
the APF such as Capacity Building and ERM. Such programmes should not necessarily require prior
PSC approval.
Nevertheless, within the Council, two bodies are usually involved, Africa Working Group (AWG) and
Political and Security Committee (PSC). According to the current APF regulation, the PSC has the
formal authority to approve the “political appropriateness” of APF decisions. The justification for
consultation with AWG is to discuss any technical doubt at a lower diplomatic level and recommend to
the PSC the agreement on political appropriateness without any difficulty. If the PSC were to delegate
political approval to the AWG, only one EU MS body would be involved in examining the APF
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’information note’ and approving political appropriateness. However, according to EC legal services,
this delegation of powers from PSC to AWG would not be legally possible even through a Council
decision.
The latest APF decisions (AMISOM V and MICOPAX 1C) involve no special political sensitivity in
comparison to AMISOM IV and MICOPAX 1B, nor any aspect which would justify double-checking at
a higher diplomatic level; although AMISOM V entailed a mission reinforcement from 8,000 to 12,000
peacekeepers and the approval to use UN allowances for peace keepers, which, according to DEVCO
C6, can be considered politically sensitive. While the evaluation encourages delegation of
implementation powers (such as the norm under the EU´s deconcentration policy) to Addis and/or
regional EU delegations, it seems that EU MS are unlikely to agree to delegate political
appropriateness decisions (i.e. financing decisions) outside Brussels. In other words, centralised
decision-making related to the political appropriateness and overall financing decisions should be kept
in Brussels. However, the implementing powers for the individual contracts and contribution
agreements, in particular for the APF components dealing with ERM, capacity building and service
contracts should be deconcentrated to the respective EU delegations.
The preparation of the ‘information note’ and the ‘dossier’ for each APF decision is currently done by
DEVCO C6, which works together with DEVCO C5 on the financial aspects. They actually work very
efficiently, taking advantage of the assistance provided by the military expert. Involving EU delegations
at AU/REC level at this stage would be realistic only if their PSO experts staff would be available.
Their closeness to AU/RECs would indeed help to collect better information for the documents and
develop a better partnership EU-AU/RECs as regards APF.
Concerning the required signatures for APF decision on a PSO, the evaluators consider that the two
extra signatures from the financial section 43 dealing with decisions and global commitments do not add
value and might be replaced by a Commission Secretary General decision. The ‘four eyes’ principle is
a good one, but when three or four visas are required from the same unit, the evaluation doubts
whether they add any value.
The process before the inter-service consultation to adopt an APF decision is blamed for being too
long. Five departments are targeted: Legal service, SG, ECHO, DG budget and OLAF. It seems
reasonable to consult with all of them in order to provide transparency and collective responsibility.
Nevertheless, a good solution would be that the inter-service consultation ‘fast track’ procedure be
normally used with a special meeting involving all departments. However, this particular procedure is
only allowed when the concerned department asks a special permission to the SG in case of a
manifest political urgency. In this regard it should be noted that, for the two APF decisions currently
going through inter-service consultation - AMISOM V and MICOPAX 1C, DEVCO did not request this
procedure despite the relative urgency of these funds for the field. It is true that it is very difficult to
justify urgency for every APF decision.
An example of the lack of flexibility in the EC legal framework is the only current exception to the
generalised procedure: the aid provided by the Commission through a special fund for the Haitian
government after the January 2010 earthquake. All financial decisions 44 related to this fund had a
special five-day inter-service consultation, following a decision taken by SG last year. The SG decision
explicitly states that, ‘It is essential that these decisions are treated in the best delays, not only to face
our political commitments but also to make our support start as soon as possible. Consequently,
43 "Engagements primaires et dérogations".
44 Faced to this disaster, the European Commission set up a fund that aimed at helping the recovery of Haiti. One
amount of €100m was approved for short-term support. For the medium and long term, a €200m fund was
approved to respond to the requests by the Haiti state.
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aiming at allowing a fast and effective response to this matter, I ask your approval for a systematic
reduction to 5 working days of delay for the inter-service consultation, for all the decisions regarding
the help to the Haitian state’.
Regarding the communication system within ISC, all documents for the ISC are loaded in an on-line
system called CIS-NET and an e-mail directly linked to the ISC is automatically sent to relevant
services. EC officers comment and directly send the revised versions of the documents on-line. All the
documents are available 24/7 in the system, including supporting information and details of everyone
involved in the exercise. Meetings are held only for fast-track ISC, when there is no time to exchange
comments in writing and wait for the answers.
Regarding adoption by the College of Commissioners, apart from the written procedure used for APF
decisions, EC legislation also provides for:
‣ The empowerment procedure: one of the Commissioners is empowered by the College to
adopt an individual decision (but the ACP envelope within EDF is not covered by this
procedure);
‣ The sub-delegation procedure: the Commissioner delegates authority to the Director General
concerned.
A change from the general written procedure to the empowerment or sub-delegation procedures (the
latter may only be used for decisions under €10m) would require an internal decision of the College of
Commissioners. For APF, special competence would concern the Commissioner for Development or
DEVCO Director General.
In any case, on November 21 st 2010, the College took the decision to apply the empowerment
procedure as a general rule, unless decided otherwise. This also means that no translation is needed
and the procedure should save 5 working days: it should be applied to APF from now on. The
evaluation commends this decision.
ERM
Every single APF contract (no matter how short) requires an EC financing decision, which normally
requires a full clearance and approval process with 30 signatures. The evaluation considers this
complexity might be reduced, and the ERM shows that this is possible, but it would require
amendment to the current legal framework. The ERM can obtain clearance in 2 weeks, a remarkable
improvement (but limited to small mediation-type missions not exceeding 6 months).
According to most interlocutors, ERM has been innovative, and provides hope for further flexibility in
EDF procedures. The evaluation considers that the accelerated ERM procedures work well for the
purpose, as they are quite fast and flexible.
III.2.3
DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CURRENT EDF
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
EC-AU JOINT FORMULATION
APF experience has shown that EC involvement with AU and RECs, including PSO expertise in
military, policy and civilian interventions is needed at the request formulation level and should be
formalised as part of the APF procedure.
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DIFFERENTIATION OF POLITICAL APPROPRIATENESS WITHIN THE APF
Political appropriateness from the Council (PSC) is understandably required for APF financing of
PSOs. However, such prior approval of funding within the two other APF components, namely ERM
and Capacity Building, is not needed. Information and explanation of Commission/EAAS decisions
within the relevant preparatory working group (AWG) after formal approval should be sufficient. Such a
change would allow the Commission/EAAS to respond more timely, more effectively and in a more
result-oriented fashion to the needs, throughout Africa.
ACCELERATE INTER-SERVICE CONSULTATION PROCEDURE AND TRANSLATION
The inter-service consultation ‘fast track’ procedure should be adopted to create the necessary speed
and flexibility within the EC. This particular procedure normally requires individual exception and
special permission from the SG, in case of a manifest political urgency. If legally possible, by SG
decision, the ‘fast track’ procedure should be used for every urgent decision on PSOs when the
Director of DEVCO so requests. At very least, PSO decisions should enjoy the same treatment
allowed by SG to ECHO to help the Haitian state, a systematic reduction to 5 working days of delay for
inter-service consultation, which also includes an informal accelerated procedure for the translation of
these decisions.
ADOPTION BY THE COLLEGE OF COMMISSIONERS THROUGH SUB-DELEGATION PROCEDURE
The new general empowerment procedure 45 should be adopted, empowering the Commissioner for
Development to adopt APF decisions, although the sub-delegation procedure may normally only be
used for decisions regarding less than 10 million Euros. This change would require an internal
decision of the College of Commissioners and would imply a special competence to DEVCO Director
General.
AUC COULD TAKE DECISIONS ON ERM MEDIATION AND FACT-FINDING MISSIONS
Since the ERM funding has already been pre-approved by the EU PSC, the evaluation recommends
that ownership of ERM mediation decisions - and political appropriateness for mediation/fact-finding
and the subsequent release of funds – should go to the AUC, subject to an exchange of information
(emails) with the EU delegation in Addis and the establishment of an AU ERM technical assistance
unit to improve management. We consider that the EU Delegation in Addis may be better placed than
DEVCO in Brussels to identify ERM needs. The EU Delegation would officially inform APF and PSC in
Brussels of the AU decision. This way, AU would be fully responsible for ERM decisions and their
implementation and the African ownership of APF actions would be improved.
III.2.4
DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES OUTSIDE THE EDF LEGAL FRAMEWORK
a. New procedures for APF would open new opportunities
When analysing other EC financial instruments and decision-making procedures, we should bear in
mind that APF was not created at random. The EU wanted to help AU/RECs to develop their own
continental system for peace and security and it was decided that long-term capacity building for
APSA including support to African led PSO was in line with the security-development nexus in the
Cotonou Agreement and thus funding from the EDFs. This coherent decision relates to the importance
of linking peace and sustainable development. EDF is linked to the 2000 Cotonou agreement, which is
financed by EU Member States outside the regular budget of the EU. As an intergovernmental
45 On November 21 st 2010 the College already decided to have the empowerment procedure as a general rule
unless decided otherwise.
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mechanism, EDF has its own decision-making procedures, which exclude intervention of the
European Parliament and ensures that EU member states have more direct influence over the use of
resources than with the regular EU budget.
The current APF legal framework will be in force until 2013 when the 10 th EDF ends - although
Cotonou continues until 2020. The EDF might be integrated into the EU budget. APF might be left out
of this framework and a decision will be taken on whether the APF can be managed through the
Commission and/or through the European External Action Service. The changed legal framework of
the Lisbon Treaty means that new procedures and internal EU task division is required if the EDF is
budgeted. Therefore, it is important to observe what procedural characteristics from other EU financial
instruments might be incorporated into the APF legal framework. New procedures should naturally
improve and shorten the current APF decision-making procedures. Moreover, if more relevant
procedures are available within other EU instruments, the latter could also be applied to the future
APF even if the EDF is not budgeted.
INSTRUMENT FOR STABILITY
IfS can provide inter alia technical and financial assistance to support efforts by international and
regional organisations to promote confidence building, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation in
response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis. In stable conditions for cooperation, IfS can also
provide technical and financial assistance, pre- and post-conflict long-term capacity building support
for international and regional organisations, to help promoting early warning and mediation. These
latter measures may include know-how transfer, exchange of information, risk/threat assessment,
research and analysis, early warning systems and training. In this sense, we could say that IfS might
fund certain activities now being funded by APF under ERM. However, IfS cannot finance military
operations, even if they have a peacekeeping purpose, as this would contradict EU Treaties on the
competence of the Commission.
IfS intervenes with ‘exceptional assistance measures’ and ‘interim response programmes’ adopted
following the general EC decision-making procedures (inter-service consultation, College of
Commissioners). However, contrary to what is required for APF, the Commission does not ‘request’
the approval of the PSC, it simply informs the PSC of the measures they are planning to take, and
have 48 hours to object. Nevertheless, the Commission meets with the PSC once a month to discuss
the measures they are planning. Two days before the meeting they send PSC a note (‘IfS monthly
note’) outlining the content of these measures (a very broad outline, roughly 3 or 4 paragraphs per
measure). This note is discussed during the PSC meeting. If the measure costs more than €20m, a
special Council committee must be consulted, made up of EU MS representatives. 46 A negative
opinion obliges the Commission to delay adoption for up to three months. IfS managers say they have
reduced the burden of ‘comitology’ from 12 months to two months in the best conditions, although they
can send mediation missions in a matter of days using a pre-approved Standing Facility (the Georgia
Observer Mission was on the ground within 3 weeks). An average of 2 months is necessary, more or
less the same as for the quickest APF decisions.
IfS only intervene when other instruments are not available. The EC officers in charge have to
constantly assess the international situation and carry out programme identification in cooperation with
EU delegations.
In theory, even if Member states disagreed with IfS measures, the Commission could still go ahead
with them. In practice, if a proposal raises concerns amongst MS, the Commission takes a second
look. This only happened once, out of a total of some 140 measures proposed to date, because a lot
of political coordination takes place upstream, both with PSC Delegations and with MS embassies in
the country concerned. IfS is normally pretty sure when proposing a particular measure, that it will not
raise difficulties in the PSC.
46 EU Member States representatives have 48 hours to oppose.
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Despite all the possibilities of IfS, the Council has proved unwilling to enlarge the scope of IfS activities
to include military actions.
While both APF and IfS decision-making procedures are centralised in Brussels, IfS management is
sub-delegated to EU Delegations, also involved in programme identification. This facilitates the
coordination of all EU activities (including RIPs and NIPs), and coordination with other donors,
reducing the risk of overlapping. For APF, centralised in Brussels, coordination is more difficult to
achieve because delegations are not normally involved in APF activities - although the EU Delegation
in Addis is involved in the monitoring of APF through one full time contract agent working with APF
and in daily contact with Brussels.
ECHO FINANCING DECISIONS
Jointly with APF, ECHO activities often take place in conflict or post-conflict situations and eligibility is
quite strict. DG ECHO´s mandate is implemented through financing decisions that follow EC
administrative procedures, but with some particularities.
In emergency situations, ECHO may request ‘primary’ and ‘not primary’ financing decisions. In the first
case, the Director-General of ECHO (sub-delegation procedure) may adopt decisions under €3m
without inter-service consultation or consultation with the European Parliament or the Humanitarian
Aid Commissioner. In the second ‘not primary’ case, the Director General ECHO may adopt decisions
without inter-service consultation or consultation with EO and HAC when the cost is below €5m.
Between €5 and €10m, the decision is adopted under the same conditions by the Commissioner
(empowerment procedure). In all these cases, the financing decision may be adopted within ten
working days, two weeks. These are the fastest decisions within the EC framework. The evaluation
recommends that ECHO ‘primary procedures’ should be adapted and adopted for AU execution of
mediation and emergency responses (related to ERM, early warning and early intervention, and
activation of the Panel of the Wise).
This differentiation, depending on the emergency and the amount, might be useful as a reference for
possible amendments in the APF decision-making procedures. However, the military character of
most APF activities clearly hampers the analogy, taking into account the special eligibility (not
humanitarian aid as for ECHO) and the actors involved (not NGOs) in APF interventions.
ATHENA DECISION
Athena is an EU MS instrument outside the competence of the Commission. Following similar
principles of individual state contributions as for EDF or EIB, under Article 41.2 of the Treaty of the
European Union, MS 47 contributions to ATHENA are based on the Gross National Income scale. This
instrument is presented in Annex 3.5.
As compared with APF, there are many other differences:
ATHENA is managed by an administrator, the commander of each operation and an
accounting officer, under the authority of a Special Committee composed of representatives of
the MS contributing to the financing of each operation;
The expenditure section for an operation in any draft budget, is drawn up on the basis of a
proposal made by its operation commander;
All 26 EU MS agree to pay their assessed share when they approve an operation, and there
are heavy interest charges for late-payers, which ensures good cash-flow;
47 Only 26 MS contribute since Denmark does not participate in EU decisions with defence implications, it does
not contribute to ATHENA
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The costs covered by ATHENA include the maintenance of the operational headquarters,
investments in the infrastructure made to support the operation, medical services, as well as
‘Nation Borne Costs’ which include lodging, fuel, and similar expenses linked to the
mobilisation of national contingents. All the other costs related to deployed personnel
(allowances, salaries...) are borne individually by the State contributing to the operation in
question. ATHENA does not intervene in the way each contributing State manages its
operational costs. Nevertheless, the Special Committee may decide that the administrative
management of certain expenditures, while remaining the responsibility of the Member State
concerned, should be entrusted to ATHENA;
ATHENA has shown flexibility, in that the mechanism has evolved over time: originally medical
costs, transport etc. were not covered;
ATHENA has been designed to become a very flexible, effective and efficient instrument for
military operations in the field. It has the necessary legal identity to hold a bank account or
property, to sign contracts and to be a party to legal proceedings. It is not profit making. Any
payment from ATHENA´s account only requires the joint signatures of the administrator and
the accounting officer;
Any joint action by which the Council decides that the EU will conduct a military operation, and
any joint action or decision by which the Council decides to extend a EU operation, shall
contain a reference amount for the common costs of this operation. The administrator shall
evaluate this amount for the planned period – meaning that budgets are determined annually,
which is not a definition of long-term ‘predictable funding’ as compared to the current
objectives of the APF;
ATHENA allows the EU MS to conclude ad hoc administrative arrangements with third States
indicated by the Council as potential contributors to a specific EU operation, or as contributors
to EU operations in general.
This financial mechanism was established for military operations, inspired by NATO procedures, for
European-led PSOs. Because of these features, ATHENA might be an inspiration to make APF a
more effective and faster instrument to support PSOs. APF financial decisions might be taken more
quickly. However, for Athena to serve as an operational model in Africa, substantial modifications
would be needed to the original Decision. It should be also recalled that the APF has a limited budget
for PSOs and that an “Athena-Africa” mechanism might be needed to replace APF PSO support, when
or if, funding runs out. That said, it is questionable whether the EU member states have the political
and financial interest to create such an additional mechanism.
An oversight committee could be created for Athena-Africa (or Athena-APF), made up of AU/RECs
together with the EU and which would respect principles of African ownership and Africa-EU
partnership. However, these changes would not solve one of the main problems for APF: the fact that
most African armies lack sound administrative management systems. When efficient management
systems must interact with other inefficient management systems, the interaction becomes inefficient.
b. Differentiate between the various APF Components:
The EU should separate the three APF components: PSOs, capacity building and ERM, to set up the
best decision-making procedures for each of them.
IFS INFORMATION PROCEDURE
In case the Commission retains its competence on APF, the evaluation recommends introducing the
IfS information procedure using written information notes from DEVCO to inform the PSC in Brussels
and just give MS 48 hours to object, but without requiring written approval or any formal meeting of
Council committees or groups. This procedure is particularly relevant for the non-PSO funding of the
APF.
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ENCOURAGING TRANSPARENCY AND RESPONSIBILITY
New procedures for APF should address the problem of the lengthy administrative procedures inside
the Commission. The evaluation finds that too many signatures are required for each APF financing
decision, leading to confusion and lengthiness. While the ‘four eyes’ principle is relevant, six or eight
eyes constitute a waste of resources. Departmental Directors should not have to sign a document that
has already been signed by a deputy. Through committees, transparency becomes opacity through
dilution of responsibility. It is said that multiple signatures and multiple committees have become
protection mechanisms, to avoid that any individual or department be ever held responsible for
anything that goes wrong. This is perfectly plausible, but the system should be challenged. The
evaluation recommends that Directors and departments - and EU Ambassadors and Delegations -
should be held responsible for errors or failures, just as they should get credit for success.
ATHENA-AFRICA TO SUBSTITUTE APF PSO FUNDING DEPENDING ON SCALE AND SCOPE OF CRISIS
The APF only has limited resources for PSOs. Moreover, major PSOs require specialised military
capabilities and expertise. The PSOs risk diverting prioritisation and commitments to the other
important objectives of the EU Africa Partnership, namely political dialogue and APSA. The EU should
therefore consider whether creating an Athena-Africa mechanism that, if need be, could take over APF
PSO support is politically and financially acceptable.
III.2.5
APF AID MODALITIES
PROMOTION OF JOINT MANAGEMENT AND SOUND ADMINISTRATION
Joint management is the best way for APF mechanism to provide ownership by the African
organisations. Training of AU/REC staff on sound management procedures, in accordance with EC
procedures, is essential for these organisations to pass the four-pillar requirements and qualify to run
APF contribution agreements. This can best be done in-house, as part of a process to bring the APF
and AU closer together, through adequate technical assistance to develop their own procedures, and
through staff exchanges and joint staff training so that these organisations also become able to train
themselves.
AMENDING CONTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS
Current EC regulations follow the principle that every financing decision must have a legal basis: as a
consequence, amendments require a new EC financing decision. But, if new APF procedures are
adopted outside EDF regulations, the evaluation recommends that an accelerated amendment
procedure be created, taking into consideration the specific needs of APF and the AU/RECs, 48
provided that only the amount of money and the duration are changed, while other political and
procedural conditions remain the same as in the original approval.
DO NOT LIMIT THE POSSIBILITY OF AID MODALITIES
It appears unnecessary to limit the range of possible aid modalities. Obviously, the Contribution
Agreements are the most appropriate, comprehensive aid modalities for APF support to the AUC and
RECs. However, other aid modalities are needed as alternative implementation arrangements for
48 ‘The Commission recognises that international organisations complying with international standards are
different than other entities (e.g. NGOs) and hence, in view of such differences, a different type of agreement
recognising their specificities may be used (cf. agreements concluded between the Commission and international
organisations, treatment of international organisations in the Financial Regulations -EC Budget and EDF-, etc).
However, the application of this possibility must be made public (in the relevant Guidelines).’
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/procedures/implementation/practical_guide/documents/2010_prag_en.pdf
p113 of 127
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RECs that might not qualify or for other actors that can add value to APSA or even other objectives
within the Africa-EU partnership on Peace and Security.
BE RESULT-ORIENTED RATHER THAN ACTOR-ORIENTED
The result is what matters so APF strategic focus must be on the three objectives of the Africa-EU
Partnership, namely political dialogue, operationalisation of APSA and PSOs. The AU and RECs are
important actors in this context and the majority of funding should target these intergovernmental
organisations. However, the AU and RECs are not the only stakeholders or drivers behind politics,
APSA and PSOs. Many other actors, such as individual African member states, but also civil society
groups, research and training centres, specialised entities, private sector and other international
organisations should be eligible for funding.
A MANUAL OF APF PROCEDURES IS NEEDED
The evaluation recommends the elaboration of a specific, multilingual manual for all those involved in
APF, containing the objectives, actors, rights, duties and controls related to APF activities. It should
be easy to read for everyone and explain in detail how APF works with regard to AU/RECs. This
manual should be a useful tool to facilitate initiatives, implementation and auditing and improve
efficiencies and mutual understandings between EU and AU/RECs. Nevertheless, the mutual
absorbing of institutional cultures is equally important to build partnerships as well as an
understanding of why procedures exist and how they work.
III.2.6
AU/REC PROCEDURES AND PRACTICE FOR APF REQUESTS
According to the evaluation ToR, AU/REC capacity constraints at all levels will be a focus of APF
evaluation Part 2, in particular in the areas of administrative and financial management, operational,
planning and long-term capacity building planning. Nevertheless, it is necessary at this stage to make
an assessment of the current AU/REC procedures and practices pertaining to APF requests.
The political legitimacy of APF-funded activities in Africa comes from the AU, and for PSOs it also
comes from the UN. The AU has the very important Peace and Security Council, composed of fifteen
elected MS, and their decisions bear both legal and political weight. Supporting the PSC and
increasing its profile will benefit the institutional capacity of AU both from a management point of view
(to make the PSC function efficiently) and politically because AU MS political will and support for
APSA is not guaranteed, although necessary for APSA success.
Political approval of APF requests comes from the PSC. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, in less
politically sensitive matters, such as CB or ERM, approval could be delivered by the AUC, including
political approval for REC requests. The evaluation considers this AU endorsement to be a valuable
step, since it reinforces both the institutional architecture of APSA and the necessary hierarchy to pancontinental
institutions. In practice there is little or no delay caused by political approval, since the
practical administrative work takes place in parallel inside APF.
The P&S policy should be under the overall guidance of AU, from where doctrine should emerge. The
principle of subsidiarity would reduce the risk of centralised AUC decision-making hampering APF
implementation. This would require that the management of P&S be the responsibility of RECs,
following doctrine established by the AU. Certain RECs will always be stronger than others (or even
than the AU in some fields), but a common doctrine will bring them together politically and
philosophically.
Decisions of the PSC are executed by the AUC, and in particular the PSD. The PSOD coordinates
and manages PSOs. The PSD should also be providing the overall leadership and doctrine to RECs
Page 37 of 49

concerning P&S strategy. In the latter area, PSD has not been able to dedicate much time or energy,
since PSOs take up most of the Director’s attention.
Devolution of APF management to EU delegations might allow faster decisions in accordance with the
situation at field level: for instance, when extra funding is needed in a crisis situation. Currently, all EC-
AU communications are made through the EU delegation in Addis, but there is no real involvement
from the Delegations in the daily management of APF contracts. According to ECCAS officers
involved in APF, this means RECs wait longer without appropriate backstopping, and in most APF
actions they consider that, for operational/financial management issues, it would be better to have a
more efficient connection with the EC.
Because of the support that can be provided by EU delegations on the ground, the evaluation
concludes that generally speaking, RECs would be best funded from RIPs, except for PSOs. EU
delegations helping and funding RECs, would need some form of P&S military or security expertise.
This can often be found inside the embassies of EU MS who have military and/or police attachés and
some formal or informal arrangements might be found for EU delegations to benefit from their advice.
III.2.7
EU-AU/RECS STRUCTURAL PROCEDURES
PROMOTION OF SUBSIDIARITY 49 WITHIN AU/RECS
The EU should promote the principle of subsidiarity in the implementation of APF activities. In the case
of CB and ERM under APF, RECs should have the administrative management of these activities at
regional level in order to improve the African efficiency and effectiveness, in accordance with the
general directives and common strategy decided at AU level.
EU DELEGATIONS WORKING WITH APF
In practice, EU delegations participate pretty well when they have adequate RIP funds to create
synergy with APF, but more can and should be done to adjust procedures in favour of subsidiarity.
The evaluators, in line with the APSA Road Map (Dec 2010), recommend the following in order to offer
APF new opportunities for flexibility and enhanced value for money:
Implementation of EU support to the REC APSA mechanisms and/or APSA related policies
should be deconcentrated to the EU Delegations rather than centrally managed.
That will require P&S expertise within the EU delegation in Addis for AU (and others for the
RECs) and also a substantial change in the communication and outreach strategies of APF.
Financial checks and monitoring should be managed by the EU Delegation close to AU/RECs.
RECs (ECCAS and others) feel insufficiently supported by AU. For most APF operational and
financial management issues, a direct connection with EU through the EU Delegation would
improve performance.
49 The subsidiarity principle is one of the central principles in the EU context, laying down that political decisions in
the EU must always be taken at the lowest possible administrative and political levels, and as close to the citizens
as possible. Beyond the areas where the EU has exclusive competence, this means that the EU can only act if it
is better to implement the legislation at stake at EU rather than national, regional or local level.
Page 38 of 49

IV. MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON
ALTERNATIVE FUNDING
Stakeholders almost everywhere in the world describe the APF as an appropriate and effective
instrument. Although concerns about limitations, constraints and shortcomings are raised, APF is
almost invariably qualified as the best existing instrument for continental and regional peace building
in Africa. The APF should therefore be seen as the best available instrument, but also as a tool that
can be further improved.
A closer alignment of the funding instrument with political will and policy priorities may make it a more
nimble funder, more often reflecting the reality behind the three objectives of the African EU
Partnership on Peace and Security (i.e. the II Action Plan, 2011-2013) and encouraging a more
reasonable division of labour between AU/EU, their respective MS and other relevant stakeholders. It
is important not to see the APF as an isolated instrument, but to keep it at the heart of the full Africa-
EU relationship. Likewise, it seems necessary to engage a broader range of relevant stakeholders and
better link political decision making with quick delivery of specific initiatives.
In a sense, EU member states may be reluctant to re-open the debate on APF funding at this stage.
However, the world changes and the EU has a different legal and institutional set-up, which requires
some adaptation. More flexibility, more predictability, more differentiation among APF components,
implementation modalities and direct beneficiaries as well as more fluid procedures, adapted to
military-type operational funding (including the possibility to fund a wider range of military costs) would
increase effectiveness, results and value for money.
To make meaningful recommendations on how improvements can be achieved, the nature and scope
of funding sources must be critically evaluated. Links need to be made between what should be
funded and the availability/suitability of future funding sources, by examining whether the right
activities are properly funded.
Although the scope of this evaluation does not include a detailed analysis, AMISOM does provide an
example of a funding instrument intended for initiatives whose political dynamics is largely determined
by other actors than the funding countries. A lack of constructive strategic discussion and political
decision-making (for example, between UNSC, IGAD and countries with a stake in the future of the
region) leaves the EU and AU with a blurred political situation. This makes sensible funding decisions
and planning for the best use of available funds very difficult. This example also reminds political
decision-makers and technical staff of the risks involved in peace and security interventions as well as
the requirement to use integrated risk management strategies, including mitigating measures.
The recommendations below are largely based on financial information and compliance with expected
outputs as well as interviews achieved during the evaluation. The phase II of the evaluation will
provide an adequate and comprehensive picture of the APF, performance of the respective
organisations, or ability to create and sustain value.
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IV.1 EU FUNDING INSTRUMENTS
Funding Instruments in the EU are numerous and varied. An analysis of the advantages and
disadvantages to fund APF from other sources are considered below. Each instrument is summarised
in Annex 2. A detailed summary of available EU funding instruments highlighting advantages and
disadvantages for the APF is given in Annex 3.
Several possibilities for the APF were considered:
THE STATUS QUO:
The status quo: 100% funding by EDF under the Cotonou Agreement Art. 11 and taking full advantage
of the development-security nexus is analysed in Annex 3.2. The evaluation team considers this the
best option until the end of 2013 when the 10th EDF comes to an end, and probably also beyond that
date. A higher degree of creativity may be possible after this date, to make EU funding better fitted to
the needs of African-led PSOs.
THE NEW EEAS AND THE CFSP/ESDP BUDGET
The new EEAS and the CFSP/ESDP budget might not replace or offer substantial funding to APF in
the short run due to legal and other obstacles (such as African ownership, financial capacity, political
willingness,). Apart from the APF, only CFSP provides an opportunity of EU funding to certain military
costs. This highlights the originality of APF. Annex 3.3. provides detailed analysis.
It is too early to know how EU foreign policy will evolve, but APF should certainly become a part of
EEAS policy-making in Africa as soon as the new service shows clear added value. The EEAS may
slowly move the ideas of MS in the direction of a CFSP modification that removes (substantial) PSO
funding from the APF. In exchange for a less direct influence over the use of short-term funds, Council
could approve longer-term funding in order to generate higher impact and better results in support to
clear strategic objectives; and this could be part of a process for bringing Council and Commission
planning systems into harmony.
Funding African PSOs under the CFSP budget is possible, but it would require substantial
modifications. One operational advantage emerges from this option: in theory at least, it may be easier
to create synergies if all the EU instruments and budgets are brought into a single policy-making
structure. However, officials admit that systemic synergies are unlikely to emerge even within the
EEAS: cooperation and synergy inside the EU system are achieved through individual efforts and
initiatives as well as goodwill of colleagues working with other instruments. Many of the opportunities
for synergy are created at the regional or country levels (sometimes when officials from Brussels are
visiting EU Delegations in Africa or vice versa); others emerge in Brussels, but most often when the
same Division manages different instruments. The EEAS should bring greater coherence to the overall
structure of foreign and CFSP policies.
OTHER PARTS OF EU BUDGET:
Other parts of EU budget, including DCI and IfS (and even ENPI in North Africa), could contribute
small amounts of funding in specific cases, but none of these instruments is designed for a continental
or regional programme in Africa, nor for African ownership and Africa-led military operations. They are
discussed in Annex 3.6.
Both the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and the CFSP are fairly modest in size compared to the EDF.
Even though the CFSP has more than doubled in size in the past five years, its current levels of
funding would not enable to handle an instrument such as APF in terms of size. Even the larger IfS is
only one tenth of EDF size and suffers from a number of legal constraints. The Cotonou Agreement
and intergovernmental structure of the European Development Fund appear to involve a series of
advantages.
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At first sight, the Instrument for Stability seems to be a potential partner for APF. Yet, the analysis
reveals too many legal and procedural discrepancies to make this feasible. IfS has grown to be more
valuable, moving from the small, six-month Rapid Reaction Mechanism to a substantial instrument
with crisis response capacity and 18-month (extendable) interventions. But the restrictions on time, its
global mandate and the impossibility to fund anything but ‘military’ actions give the IfS a profile that is
very different from the long-term, sustainable, pan-Africanist APSA and PSO-oriented APF. However,
procedural innovations are developed by IfS, which, if applied to APF, would make it a more flexible
and efficient instrument. These are explained in more detail in Annex 3.4.
THE ATHENA DECISION,
The ATHENA Decision presented in Annex 3.5, offers EU MS an innovative military funding
mechanism outside the EU budget. It could possibly be adapted to create an Athena mechanism for
Africa. However, significant changes to the existing model would be necessary to ensure ‘predictable
funding’ (Athena is funded annually on a needs-basis) and allow for African leadership. The Athena
Decision is the odd-one-out in the list, used by EU MS to create a mechanism outside the EU budget,
for European-led military operation funding on an annual budget basis. Its potential magnitude,
flexibility and military components make it an attractive option to fund or replace APF funding of PSOs,
but it may be difficult to adapt it to African use because AU administrative management and control
procedures are still weak. However, the Athena Decision demonstrates EU MS creativity in
responding to security needs.
VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS FROM EU MS
Under annex II of the APF regulations, when one PSO requests additional APF funds, the EC can ask
Member States for additional voluntary contributions. This has been done in the past, as an innovation
under the 9 th EDF (when eight MS contributed to AMIS). By their very nature, however, AVCs cannot
be considered as ‘predictable and sustainable funding’.
The fact that several EU MS have established their own P&S funds (Italy, Spain, Denmark) points to
the political nature of support to African Peace and Security efforts as well as a certain reluctance
among certain EU member states to put all of their eggs in one basket. Coherence and synergy
should start within the EU. The existence of small, rival, bilateral APFs seems inconsistent, now that
the EEAS has been set in motion to bring coherence to EU foreign policy in Africa. This is discussed in
Annex 3.7.
MIXED OPTIONS:
It would be possible to cobble together a combination of EDF financing of ‘soft elements’ (i.e. nonmilitary
expenses) if EU MS decided to abandon the development-security nexus and refuse EDF
funds for PSOs. In this case, some ad hoc CFSP funding (for military hardware and/or big PSOs)
might be possible. However, no EU funding instrument, apart from APF, would include African
ownership and African leadership in military peace operations.
THE DCI BUDGET
The DCI Budget of €16.9 billion for the period 2007-2013, is more substantial than other CFSP or IfS
budgets. The APF could be included if the rules allowed DCI to fund APF activities and APSA. Yet, the
PSO part cannot be covered under DCI rules. Actions such as capacity building (non-military),
mediation, Early Response Mechanism, early warning, conflict management and the Panel of the
Wise could possibly be funded under DCI, which can offer assistance in post-crisis situations and to
fragile States and fund international organisations. It is unlikely that such a change would add any
significant added value, however Annex 3.6. provides a detailed summary of the possibilities for DCI
and Mixed Options.
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CREATING A NEW APF, EU MS OR MULTI-NATION PARTNERSHIP INSTRUMENT
This is another option for post-2013 funding if EU MS decided to take APF out of the 11 th EDF Annex
3.7. considers the advantages and disadvantages of creating a new EU instrument.
IV.2 POSSIBLE AU SOURCES OF CO-FUNDING FOR APF-FUNDED ACTIVITIES
Locating the APF within the African Union and possible funding sources from AU pillars (EDF
and non-EDF possibilities)
AU
Peace and
security
APF
Capacity
Building
Institutional strengthening
Capacity development
Economic
Development
Common Defense and Security
Policy
Governance
Gender
Shared values
Figure 1
ADDITIONAL AU FUNDING
Theoretically, the EU (whether through APF or not) might co-finance APSA and PSOs where the main
funding would originate in a Peace Facility of the AU. The latter might be made up of the African
Peace Fund, AU PS budget, special contributions from AU MS, or a supplementary ‘basket’ of AU
funds by third-country funders such as Japan, China, India, Brazil and Turkey or certain Arab States.
The AU currently hasn’t such funds at its disposal, and the evaluation sees no realistic likelihood of
their significant emergence in the foreseeable future. 50 However, there may be a benefit in placing the
issue on the agenda of the JCC, in the context of the continuing EU-AU Political Dialogue, to study
what measures the EU or APF might be able to take to facilitate the creation of a viable peace facility
– or strengthen the Peace Fund - within the AU.
The subject of sustainable funding beyond APF has been extensively discussed between AU and
donor partners (see for example the Annual Consultation of June 2008 – text box below). The UNmandated
Prodi Panel considered a number of funding options, without reaching a definitive
conclusion. A number of potential funders are looking at ‘complementary peace facilities.’
50 In January 2011, China announced that it would give $30m to the AU, for AMISOM. This fairly modest sum
should be seen in the 2011 context of the EU allocating an additional €300m to the APF.
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In the short term, this evaluation recommends the creation of a ‘common funding basket’ led by the
AU and supported by the EU. The procedures for such an institution could initially follow the model of
a UN Trust Fund, since the AU has not yet proved that is has the capacity to manage such a ‘funding
basket’. These various initiatives are considered something of ‘a moving target’ based on a shopping
list of possibilities; they are discussed in more detail in Annex 3.8.
Agreement for a working group about a new Peace Facility
16. Partners agreed that the ongoing dialogue between the AU and partners on all aspects of
achieving sustainable funding for AU peacekeeping operations should be intensified, including
effective follow-up to the conclusions reached during the May 2007 Consultation on the
establishment of an AU-G8++ Working Group to look into the possibility of the establishment of a
Peace Facility Complementary to APF.
Annual Consultation between the AU - Regional Economic Communities, Regional Mechanisms for
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, the G8 Member Countries, and other Partners,
Addis Ababa, 13 June 2008.
SUPPLEMENTARY UN FUNDING
UN funding for APSA remains a long-term option in terms of UN DPKO funds. The APF has emerged
as the specific long-term partner of APSA, which is a very different ambition from merely ‘running
peace keeping operations’. The JAES and the choice of APF to support and build APSA follows a
long-term strategic vision that was shared by Commissioners Poul Nielson and Said Djinnit for the AU
Peace and Security Architecture. This vision has suffered to some extent from the rising cost and
management demands of PSOs. It could perhaps be argued that APF procedures have created a
demand for PSOs at the expense of the long-term vision of APF to build lasting, pan-African
institutions. In this perspective, UN funding is not an alternative to EU’s commitment to African
development expressed in the JAES. UN ideas for funding were discussed by the Prodi Panel - see
Annex 3.9.
An African CSO perspective on the APF
Current PSOs deal more with the symptoms of African conflict than with their causes.
There is a feeling in Africa, expressed most forcefully by representatives of CSOs interviewed, that the
international community and the UN are sidestepping their responsibilities with regard to P&S by asking the
AU to handle the continent’s most difficult conflicts.
Many cases of peacekeeping in Africa would more appropriately be dealt with by the UN. Instead, ‘African
Ownership’ is raised as a reason for leaving them to the AU which does not yet have the necessary
capacities. Peace and security in Africa are important for European security as well as for Africa, while
human security doctrine places an obligation on the international community to intervene. PSOs should
therefore be seen as an international public good.
APF was originally created on the precept that the UN would run PSOs, with the AU gradually taking over
once the “heavy lifting had been done” and conditions had stabilised. Darfur showed that AU troops can be
deployed quickly and more cheaply, and the philosophy inverted.
There are a number of possible patterns where EU budgets could intervene – or where it could
possibly intervene if the regulations currently in force were modified. EU MS have the power to
change any or all of these instruments and budgets – or to create new ones - if they so decide. The
following table presents a brief assessment of the current position.
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IV.3 SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS OF SELECTED EU FUNDING MECHANISMS AND
COMPATIBILITY WITH APF
APF support to PSOs
could come from here
APF support to APSA
could come from here
Complementary
funding for
AU/APSA
EDF (inside which is APF) Yes Yes
Peace-building
support /synergy
Eur. Neighbourhood &
Partnership Instr. (ENPI)
No
(possibly in North Africa)
Yes
(only North Africa)
Development Cooperation
Instrument DCI (formerly
DCEC)
No Yes Yes
Instrument for Stability
No
Yes – SSR, support to
AU peace building and
mediation [ERM could be
shifted here]
Yes
Common foreign and security
policy budget
No Yes Yes
Athena mechanism of CFSP Possibly Possibly No
CSDP of CFSP Possibly Possibly Possibly
Other (humanitarian aid,
macro-financial assistance
No Possibly Possibly
AU Co-Funding Yes Yes Yes – from AU MS
New special instrument for
voluntary EU MS
contributions
Yes Yes Possibly
UN funding for AU PSOs No No Yes
IV.4 RECOMMENDATIONS
On balance – and it is only after careful consideration of the pros and cons of EU instruments, politics
and laws, the evaluation sees greater advantage for APF to work towards improving the status quo
inside EDF rather than undertaking major changes. It seems that APF can yield greater benefit from
inside the EDF, provided that the procedures can be streamlined to strengthen APSA as a whole. EDF
offers wider opportunities for African leadership and synergistic development of peace and security –
and other JAES partnerships – than the alternative scenarios.
IV.4.1
FUNDING RECOMMENDATIONS IN A POLITICAL CONTEXT
The evaluation is sympathetic to arguments supporting the ‘development-security nexus’ and
recommends that the APF continue to be funded under the EDF.
The evaluation recommends that APF redefine its role and procedures, to define itself as the principal
funding partner of APSA in all its components. Significant pillars of APSA may not have received
adequate attention.
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The evaluation recommends earmarks for each APSA pillar, as a more even procedural and financial
balance is needed to develop AU policy and protect the component parts of APSA: allocating greater
resources to the AU’s early-warning-early-intervention, mediation and conflict management tools.
Entry strategies should be rethought and redesigned, to ease and lower the price of exit strategy
negotiations.
Locating the APF within the 10 th EDF (to 2013) with possible funding sources
EU (EDF)
AU
EU MS
Voluntary
Contributions
Military
Equipment
Support to
PSOs
Public
Information
Streamlined
Procedures
AU MS
Voluntary
Contributions
Military Equipment
Support to PSOs
Liaison Offices
APF
Support from AU
Pillars: CB, CDSP,
Governance, Gender,
Institutional
Strengthening,
Capacity
Development, Panel
of the Wise, CEWS,
Mediation Unit
NIPs/RIPs
ASF Mediation
Liaison Offices
Centre of Excellence
UN MS Voluntary
Contributions
Military Equipment
Support to PSOs
UN
Figure 2
IV.4.2
SHORT-TERM OPTIONS FOR APF FUNDING
The evaluation perceives three ways in which – under the current funding regime - the APF’s funding
structures could be adjusted to ensure that the Overall and Specific Objectives of APF are better
achieved, drawing greater efficiency of the EU’s funding instruments, getting the best value-for-money
from APF resources and promoting synergy with EU MS:
Redefining the roles of NIP, RIP and APF to ensure minimal overlap and maximum
complementarity. More than one of the interviewed EU MS representatives raised
concerns about the overall delivery and results of the APF that might be impeded because
most of the programme design and fund disbursement in Brussels. Most of the APF
programmes are also centrally managed; implementation responsibilities should be
decentralised to EU Delegations for all non-PSO components of the APF. A number of
P&S issues, such as piracy, terrorism, transnational organised crime and drug trafficking
where dynamics are very specific to certain regions are perhaps best dealt with by the
RECs. Not all RECs have strong P&S pillars and SADC for example only accepts EU
funding for its peace and security actions, through the African Union. Nevertheless, better
co-ordination between RECs and the AU is desirable, with the EU funding requests from
these institutions to the RIPs or NIPs. Annual Steering Committee Meetings attended by
AU/RECs/EU should be used to define respective responsibilities and determine funding
needs. Additionally, there may be merit in having bi-annual meetings, to better follow the
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disbursement of funds and identify inefficiencies, overlaps and gaps that can be
streamlined. This will allow APF to position itself more clearly as the primary partner of
APSA. The box below illustrates this point with a case study where both RECs and the AU
could have benefitted from closer co-ordination.
Re-establishing a balance between the parts of APSA, making better use of resources
allocated to the early-warning-early-intervention, mediation and conflict management
functions. In the longer term, this may reduce the demands of funding of expensive
conflict prevention and PSO interventions. APSA long-term policies and institution building
have not received adequate prioritisation at the political level, perhaps hampered by the
urgency of the need to fund PSOs. Key elements of APSA are not functioning as
envisaged. Promoting cost-effective conflict management processes will strengthen AU
and RECs as institutions contributing effectively to peace and security.
NIP and APF. The evaluation recommends that the ‘slicing’ precedent of 1st APF should
be re-introduced. By receiving an allocation from each AU MS representing a ‘slice’ of
their NIP, the APF will bring greater African ownership to the Facility as the political will be
generated from both AU and EU MS. This will involve negotiations and require
commitment from all EU Delegations and AU MS. It will also strengthen AU member
states’ ‘buy-in’ and link the AU officials in PSOD more closely to the political decisionmaking
of the elected 15-nation PSC. AU MS commitment to APSA and to the AU can
only be enhanced. A co-funding arrangement will free financial resources for the APF and
ensure that regular and sustainable funds are available. That said, an issue needs to be
considered if this option is pursued: What aid modalities and implementing procedures
should the NIPs use to effectively support the regional aspects of APSA and specific
peace and security-initiatives
RIP and REC. APF coordination has been fairly effective with RIPs. Consultations with
officials in the ECCAS, ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD and EAC regions lead the evaluation to
the conclusion that APF should focus on the AU and APSA, leaving the RECs to be
funded by RIP. RECs currently appear well funded. The absorptive capacity of RECs may
impose limitations to absorb all the financial resources at their disposal (including bilateral
arrangements), whereas APF resources are over-stretched by the demands of PSOs.
Moreover, APSA support should entail direct support to other actors than just the AU as
mentioned elsewhere in the evaluation.
Lack of Synergy between RECs and the APF
Under the 10 th EDF a Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) was signed between the EU and the Eastern and
Southern African Region - COMESA/IGAD/EAC/Indian Ocean Community(IOC). This is a grouping of
RECs with many overlapping memberships. The RSP had two main focal areas: P&S and Trade, with a
smaller component for Co-ordination and functional co-operation, making a total of €645m.
€80m was allocated to P&S. IGAD took the lead in P&S. Responsibility is allocated to a REC based on
regional capacity. Initially €5m of the P&S funding was allocated in the first phase, towards a ‘Regional
Human Security Governance Programme’ led by EAC.
None of the remaining funds have been used for to date, although IGAD has been preparing a programme
on Maritime Security.
Under the 9 th EDF COMESA had a component to deal with war economies. Pressured by outside actors,
including the EU during the 10 th EDF, COMESA decided to do something on piracy. No research was done
on this. The initiatives came from the EU.
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Lack of Synergy between RECs and the APF
Meanwhile IGAD already had a maritime strategy in place, and at the same time the IOC was under
pressure to deal with piracy in the waters of Mauritius. Since the IOC had no capacity to do this they asked
COMESA to take over. Individual member states were supposed to come up with additional ideas of what
to fund in P&S.
This demonstrates a situation where the APF has activities but struggles with funding, whilst the RECs
have funds but struggle to find activities. The EU has funding instruments like APF and EDF, as well as IfS
and CFSP, but struggles to define a coherent long-term policy into which they can all be integrated.
Since the AU sits on the Inter-Regional Co-ordinating Committee (IRCC), it should know what the linkages
are. Clearly a better mechanism is required for improved co-ordination, identification of activities, fewer
overlaps and gaps. Instrument-led policy leads to poorly allocated funds imposing responsibilities on
institutions that are ill-prepared to utilise the funds effectively.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/acp/dv/eastafrica_/eastafrica_en.pdf
Institutions/
Instruments that
could be created
ATHENA - Africa
Institutions/
Instruments that
need legal
framework or
procedural
modifications
IfS
Locating the APF after the 10 th EDF (2014- ) with possible funding sources
UN
UN MS Voluntary and Assessed Contributions, Military Equipment support to PSOs, Reimbursements to TCCs
African Peace
Fund
Capacity Development
Panel of the Wise
Mediation Unit
CB, ERM, ASF
CEWS
EWS
AU
RIPs
NIPs
AP
EDF
CB, Governance, Gender,
Institutional Strengthening
Centres of
Excellence
Liaison Offices,
Mediation
Streamlined
Procedures
Capacity
Development
Strengthening JAES
Third Party Countries
Centres of Excellence,
Military Equipment support to
PSOs, PSOs, CB, CDSP,
CEWS, Governance, Gender
Institutional Strengthening,
Capacity Development,
African Peace Fund, Peace-
Building, DDR, SSR, Panel of
the Wise, Mediation Unit
EU MS Bilateral Fund
Centres of Excellence, Peace
Building, DDR, SSR,
Governance, Gender
CFSP AU MS and EU MS
DCI
ENPI
Voluntary contributions,
Military Equipment support to
PSOs, Public Information,
Liaison Offices
Figure 3
IV.4.3
LONG-TERM OPTIONS FOR FUNDING APF
If the EDF were incorporated into the EU budget (as some – but not all – EU MS suggest) then the
funding of ‘military support operations’ would no longer be possible under existing EU rules, and Art.11
of the Cotonou Agreement would no longer apply (at least according to some legal interpretations of
this hypothetical situation).
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In that case, one possible alternative funding solution for the APF would be the CFSP - the only
budget with ‘military support’ possibilities - with additional complementary funding from DCI for the
non-PSO and non-ASF parts of APSA. Nevertheless, under the CFSP as currently constituted, Africaled
operations appear problematic and current CFSP procedures seem unlikely to support the EU’s
African policy based on JAES partnerships and increasing African ownership.
If the EDF were to be absorbed under the EU budget, the APF could only fit into the CFSP, but this
would be tricky, even with complementary funding from DCI. For the APF to successfully fit into the
CFSP, while maintaining the JAES partnership strategy and respecting the Paris Declaration of 2005
and the Accra Agenda, would require the Council to adjust the mandate and tools the CFSP.
The European Council is a core institution for the CFSP, given that it defines its «principles and
general guidelines». Under the Amsterdam, Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties, the Council plays the
guiding role. The European Council adopts strategy documents such as the European security
strategy. The Council uses different planning processes than the Commission, which makes
coordination difficult. The Council would have to carefully consider in what way CFSP regulations
should be changed in order to accommodate the needs of APF and APSA, in line with the objectives
of EU foreign policy and the JAES.
Moreover there are financial constraints on the current EU budget, which may not increase by more
than 4% per year. This limit may hamper the inclusion of such a large fund as the APF into the budget,
at least all at once. This might very well lead the Commission, the Council and EU MS to reach a very
different conclusion on the destiny of APF.
For this and other reasons, EU MS could decide that APF should be made a separate Instrument, to
be implemented by the EC. A new financial instrument with its own procedures, following the
precedent created by the Athena Decision, could take into account the requirements on African
ownership and African led PSOs as established in APSA. The DCI, EDF, CFSP budget, and APF
would then be separate. That would require a Council Decision, but is definitely an option to be
considered for implementing the EU’s Africa foreign policy and the JAES that is currently built around
the construction of long-term pan-African institutions (AU, RECs).
Whatever the main EU instrumental and budgetary decisions, the opportunity for AU co-funding of
APSA appears to bear no disadvantages. The African Peace Fund may grow and may even be
incorporated into an African owned APF or – in the long term – APF might merge into the Peace Fund.
The EU should study ways to advance these long-term perspectives. The ongoing EU-AU political
dialogue is the forum for these ideas to be explored by the JCC.
At this stage, the option of UN funding - following the ideas of the Prodi Panel – appears to offer much
less sustainable funding than the APF, but entails no apparent political disadvantages. A new
discussion paper is expected from the Secretary General in the course of 2011, focusing on
‘comparative advantage and collective security’ in making and maintaining peace in Africa. Following
the publication of this paper, EU and AU MS will have a chance to discuss the mechanisms both for
implementing and funding African PSOs and the various elements of APSA.
Ensuring reliable funding for the African Peace Fund or – if that is the political decision – merging
different existing and potential funds, create alternative possibilities for the EU to support the AU. The
African Peace Fund and APF could be combined. It may ensure that African countries make a sincere
effort in a critical area to development, and tentative political discussions in this sense should be
engaged.
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IV.4.4
AFRICAN P&S FUNDING POLICIES AND IMPLEMENTATION
Funding can distort priorities. In certain areas, EU Africa policy needs to be clarified for the EU policy
in Africa has sometimes been funding-led and instrument-led. AU also needs to be clearer in terms of
purpose, and AU MS should more clearly express their political will. The demand-driven aspects of AU
need to be corrected, so that strong negotiation can take place with funders when partners identify
their general areas of interest.
The evaluation team endorse the following proposals from the APSA Road Map (Dec 2010), which will
offer APF new opportunities for flexibility and enhanced fund allocation to develop regional actions: the
EU should allow APSA related funding to be implemented through the existing procedures for
interventions in crisis situations.
The governance of EU support needs to be upgraded to ensure that it manages the strategic and
political aspects and decide on specific priorities funded through the APF and other EU financial
instruments (EDF, RIP and IfS). This requires two changes:
‣ First, a more politically oriented EU-AUC/REC (APF) Steering Committee and
‣ Second, a financial facility containing funds for short-term initiatives that help operationalise
APSA.
The EU could create a financial facility to finance specific, high profile and incentive-based initiatives
jointly agreed by the EU, AUC and RECs. Such initiatives should ideally be based on specific requests
from African member states and implemented by the AUC or REC/RMs as services, goods, works and
supplies. Such specific initiatives need to add value to APSA, be of cross-border nature and ideally
encourage active involvement of African countries in regional or continental peace building.
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