20130424-013764

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20 130424-013 764 4 • Terrain necessitated the use of a scout element to relay his conummice1tions to the TOC. The scout element conumulicated the seriousness of the situation, but the TOC did not understand the sense of urgency. o A platoon from a company in TF Chosin arrived, but the platoon leader informed him the platoon's orders were to stand down and remain at the Objective Rally Point (ORP). The TOC assured him the platoon would move forward, but wheJl he went ahead to recover fallen Marines, the platoon did not move. The failure to move could only be the result of an order fmm tbe TOC not to move or cowardice. • No one from the Forward Operating Base (FOB) came forward during the battle to improve command, control, and co111lllU1ucations or gain better situational awareness. More generally, CPT Swenson ste1ted: • The Battle of Ganj gal was not the first time the TF Chosin TOC failed to provide timely fire support. He had received more timely fire support from Afghan National Security Forces (ANSP). • After the battle, TF Chasin "started using fires more liberally," resulting in fewer rocket attacks on the FOB. • The ANSF were ready and willing to fight bt1t TF Chosin did not know how to properly interface with the ANSF. • Air assets often failed to ani ve (when platmed for or requested) and could be L!IU'eliable. • The TOC should support the grO\Ind force commander. When a ground force commander makes a fiJe support request, the TOC should fu·e the mission wit110ut question. • Fires approval authority rests "at an echelon above reality." Following the investigation, Major General (MG) Curtis M. Scaparrotti, U.S. Army, former Commander, CJTF-82, directed a joint U.S. Army and U.S. Marine · ~ ....... 6 ... ~v ... iltto lead · actions in the and execution of the ,.,.~,...,.n JvfoH Recommendations for CPT S111enson and CPL 1\deyer digitally signed and submitted a Department of the Army (DA) Form 638, "Reconunendationfor Award," 7 MG Scnparrotti is now GEN Scapnrrorti and Commander, United Nations Command/United States Forces- Korea. Iu this report we liSe the ranks military members held at the time the events in qtiestion occuned. F8R 8Jif18h'l!ls ~131@ 81 flSY
<strong>20130424</strong>-<strong>013764</strong> 5 recommending CPT Swenson for the MoH. the recommendation package to HQ, CJTF-82. (b)l3), (b)i6) recommended approvnl and submitted HQ, U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC) was aware of CPT Swenson's involvement in the Ganjgal battle. In autumn 2010, while working on a MoH for Cpl Meyer, HQMC personnel contacted Army HRC to determine ifHRC was processing any actions to recognize CPT Swenson. HRC emails to HQMC ·between September and December 2010 indicated they were not. On Jam1aty 5, 2011, the Assistant Chief, Awards and Decorations Branch, HRC, signed a memoranchnn informing HQMC that CPT Swenson received a Bronze Star Medal (BSM) for meritorious service between November l3, 2008 and November 12,2009, and would receive a Purple Heart. The memorandmn also stated CPT Swenson did not receive an award "specifically for actions on September 8, 2009., Questions about CPT Swenson's MoB recommendation snrfaced and no one could accolmt fot• the status of the package. Emails from July 2011 indicated the Assistant Chief of Staff (A CoS), ISAF, was aware of Cpl Meyer's pending MoHand that searches for CPT Swenson's recommendation were unsuccessful. In an email dated July 6, 2011, the CJ-1 ) CJTF- 1, informed the ACoS, "We found the packet on the portal. We're checking to see what all is in it/if we need anything else. Will tweak with the new intermediate authorities, package. for processing ASAP.» On July 14,2011, an official in the J-1, USFOR-A coorclinated with HQMC to use Cpl Meyer's package as an example because the unit was attempting to recreate CPT Swenson's package. On July 15, 2011, the Assistant Director, Policy, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense fm.· Military Personnel Policy and Officer and Enlisted Persmmel Management, invited DA officials to review Cpl Meyet's MoB package "so that the Army can use it as a template for the Swenson nomination. 11 On July 28, 2011, USFOR-A initiated an investigation to determine the facts and 9 circumstances surrounding CPT Swenson's origiJlal recommendation for the MoH. The investigation, completed in August 2011, confirmed that CPT Swenson was reconuneuded for the MoHJ but could not determine any processing of the MoB fol' CPT Swenson beyond the CJTF-82 Command Gtoup. Further, a discrepancy between the actual status of the award and CJTF briefing slides which indicated processing at CENTCOM and HRC "could not be resolved." The 10 noted the 1st Cnvalry Division (CJTF-1) WOllld submit a ''recreated" MoH recommendation for CPT Sweuso11. On Setembet 8, 2011, the Ptes.ident awarcted Cpl Meyer the MoH for his bravery during the battle at OanjgaL 9 When n recommendation is lost, AR 600-8-22 !!llows the !!pproval of equivalent re.commendations if there is conclusive evidence of the original submission into military channels and subsequent loss or inadvertent failure to act 011 the reconuneudation. F9Ia Q:litJMCJ ¢ k I!"' Q} fLY
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Page 12 and 13: 20130424-013764 10 (b)(3), (b)(6) )
Page 14 and 15: 20130424~013764 12 Pirst Endorsemen
Page 16 and 17: 20130424-013764 14 SPC Carter CENTC
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Page 24 and 25: 20130424-013764 22 Search o[CENTCOJ
Page 26 and 27: 20130424-013764 24 CENTCOM. The dat

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