Part Two - Indymedia

Tools of the Trade: Tlte Apparatus for Cultural Change 37
munist movement to its most celebrated and outspoken dissident, have
been the source of considerable interest and speculation. Was he a true
idealist who suddenly realized that the party had somehow gone astray,
a born fanatic genetically inclined toward rebellion, or a political opportunist
interested only in remaining in the limelight 5 Certainly up until
the split with the Soviet Union, Djilas appeared to be one of the most severe
and dogmatic leaders of the CPY, utterly devoted to Stalin, the Soviet
Union, and the ultimate cause of communism. What then could explain
his remarkable transformation into an avid proponent of
democratization My own sense is that Djilas was ruled by his belief in
the value of consistency with one's principles, over and above issues of
either humanity or practicality. Thus, when he accepted the principles associated
with Stalinism (especially the notion that the ends justify the
means), he was ruthless in their application. Later, however, when he
adopted the principles of democratization, he sought to apply them with
equal vigor and consistency, regardless of the consequences for his party
or himself. In any case, it is also true that even when spouting the Stalinist
party line in the mid-1940s, Djilas's essays displayed a level of sophistication
not found in the writings of many of his colleagues. Certainly
Djilas was no elevated Marxist theoretician, but he was able to perceive
or construct certain nuances within the party line and to express them
through manipulation of the written word. 6
Besides Djilas, a broad variety of other leading Communists and intellectuals
like Radovan Zogovic 1 , Vladimir Dedijer, Rodoljub Colakovic 1 ,
Veljko Vlartovic:, Mitra Mitrovi^, Milijan Neoredic, and Bora Drenovac directly
influenced the party's persuasive and cultural policies. The decision-making
process at these top levels took place in an extremely informal
manner, often through personal conversations, the conclusions of
which were only subsequently (if ever) formalized in written documents.
Entitled "reports" or "circular letters," these documents often lacked any
claim of authorship. In many cases, the individual author was indeed irrelevant,
as the document simply repeated the party line in the official
Communist terminology.
After all, top leaders generally agreed about the ultimate goals of the
party, its correct political and ideological line, and—with some important
exceptions—even the essential program required to attain those goals. 7
At lower levels, too, party leaders in many regions worked together very
closely. The intimacy among CPY leaders resulted in part from their common
wartime experiences; it continued after the war both out of necessity
and due to a sort of siege mentality among party members. For while
Communists bore responsibility for all political, economic, social, and
cultural activity in a region, they often made up only a tiny minority of