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20 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies Chinese excesses, and therefore has little appreciation of the reasons behind the wariness of many neighboring governments, and of the main outside power in the region, the United States. Regarding the latter, one other practice noted earlier, seen throughout the history of PRC foreign relations and supported by the strong patriotic discourse in China has been to register strident opposition to efforts by outside powers to establish and sustain positions of influence and strength around China’s periphery. Such moves by the United States and the Soviet Union in the past and Japan and India up to the present, are repeatedly seen by Chinese authorities as well as elite and public opinion in grossly exaggerated terms of threat to China, a revival of Cold War “containment.” 22 Chinese elite and popular opinion, which is strongly influenced by patriotic discourse emphasizing victimization by other powers, also involves a unique and strong sense of morality and righteousness in foreign affairs. As a result, Chinese opinion tends to see whatever problems China faces with neighbors and other concerned powers including the United States over sensitive issues of sovereignty and security in nearby areas as caused by them and certainly not by China. Accordingly, it has little patience with the complaints of other claimants and calls by some of them and other concerned powers for China to compromise on sensitive issues involving sovereignty and security. If China continues its assertive advances into disputed nearby territories, such actions are likely to be seen as a direct test of U.S. resolve as a regional security guarantor under the rubric of the Obama reengagement policy in the Asia-Pacific. The Chinese advances would make more likely confrontation between a more assertive China and a reengaging United States. Thus, the willingness and ability of China’s leaders to curb recent assertiveness and deflect public and elite pressures for tougher foreign policy approaches represents, perhaps, the most important indicator of whether or not U.S.-Chinese relations will remain on a path of pragmatic engagement with leaders on both sides carefully managing differences to avoid confrontation and conflict. Against this background, it was reassuring that Chinese leaders from Xi Jinping on down took pains to warmly welcome visiting U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew and visiting U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry during their respective visits to China in March and April 2013. The two sides underlined common ground on Korean denuclearization, broadened the purpose and scope of Sino-American official dialogues, and announced the convening of the high level Sino-American Security and Economic Development Dialogue in the United States in July 2013. In this way, they reaffirmed a commitment to managing differences while both competing and cooperating in important ways. 23 Endnotes 1. Pivot to the Pacific “The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ Toward Asia” (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service Report R42448, March 28, 2012). 2. Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust,” (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, March 2012). 3. Don Keyser “President Obama’s Re-election: Outlook for U.S. China relations in the Second term,” (China Policy Institute, Nottingham University, UK, November 7, 2012). 4. Robert Ross, “The Problem with the Pivot,” Foreign Affairs (November-December 2012); Shawn Brimley and Ely Ratner “Smart Shift,” Foreign Affairs (January-February 2013), pp. 177-181.
Sutter: The United States and China | 21 5. Ralph Cossa and Brad Glosserman, “Regional Overview,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 14, No. 3 (January 2013) www.csis.org/pacfor. 6. Bonnie Glaser, “US-China Relations,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 14, No. 3 (January 2013) www.csis.org/pacfor. 7. David Shambaugh, “The Rocky Road Ahead in U.S.-China Relations,” China-U.S. Focus, October 23, 2012. 8. Robert Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang, “China Muscles Opponents on South China Sea,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 14, No. 2 (September 2012) www.csis.org/pacfor; “China Gains and Advances in South China Sea,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 14, No. 2 (January 2013) www.csis.org/pacfor; James Przystup, “China-Japan Relations,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 14, No. 2 (January 2013) www.csis.org/pacfor. 9. James Przystup, “China-Japan Relations,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 14, No. 2 (January 2013) www.csis.org/pacfor. 10. “China-Southeast Asia Relations,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 14, No. 2 (January 2013), p. 72. 11. Daljit Singh, “US-China Dialogue Process: Prospects and Implications,” East Asia Forum (November 2, 2012) www.eastasisforum.org. 12. Richard Bush, Unchartered Strait (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), pp. 213-250. 13. Bonnie Glaser, “US-China Relations,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 14, No. 1 (May 2012) www.csis.org/pacfor. 14. Bonnie Glaser, “US-China Relations.” 15. Donilon’s speech and the officials’ media briefing were released on November 15, 2012 at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office. 16. Su Xiaohui, “Obama Will Be ‘Smarter’ in Rebalancing towards Asia and Engaging China,” China-US Focus (November 8, 2012). 17. Consultations in Washington D.C. involving groups of visiting Chinese specialists assessing U.S.- China relations after the U.S. elections and groups of concerned American specialists, November 8, 15 and 16, 2012. 18. Robert Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present (second edition). (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013). 19. Each of the domestic U.S. elements noted below are reviewed in Robert Sutter, “Domestic American Influences on U.S.-China Relations,” in David Shambaugh, ed. Tangled Titans (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012), pp. 114-24. 20. Yufan Hao, “Domestic Chinese Influences on U.S.-China Relations,” in David Shamabugh, ed., Tangled Titans, pp. 125-150. 21. Suisheng Zhao, “Hu Jintao’s Foreign Policy Legacy,” e-International Relations (December 8, 2012) http://www.e-ir.info/2012/12/08/hu-jintaos-foreign-policy-legacy/ 22. For a fuller discussion of the above broad trends in PRC foreign policy behavior, see Robert Sutter, Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013). 23. Secretary Kerry’s Press Availability in Beijing, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, April 13, 2013. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/04/ 20130413145734.html#axzz2QeH87K72.
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Page 5 and 6: Contents KEI Board of Directors ...
Page 7 and 8: | ii KEI Advisory Council Chair The
Page 9 and 10: | iv Preface For over twenty years,
Page 11 and 12: Bilateral Competition and Cooperati
Page 13 and 14: Rozman: Introduction | 3 to soft-pe
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Page 17 and 18: Sutter: The United States and China
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Page 35 and 36: Radchenko: China and Russia | 25 in
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Wan: The View from Japan | 89 Figur
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CJK Economic Trilateralism: The Pro
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Rozman: Introduction | 131 negotiat
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Prospects and Challenges for Korean
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Rozman: Introduction | 201 successf
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Park: Competing Regional Interests
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Yoo: South Korea’s Unification Po
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Kim: Understanding Peaceful Reunifi
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Contributors | 233
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Contributors | 235 Abraham Kim, Kor
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Contributors | 237 T. J. Pempel, Un
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Contributors | 239 policy since 199
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