Dummett's Backward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism - Tripod

Frege holds that not every sense can be defined. That is precisely why Frege says that primitive names
—including both the senses they express and the references they refer to—need explication. And
second, since references are given “only via senses” (1979c: 124), the application of this definition in
particular cases would always presuppose our grasping some sense, since the reference of “A” can only
be given to us via some sense in the first place. And that is circular.
On the face of it, Grundgesetze vol. 1, § 32 describes what senses essentially are in terms of
how they function in relationship to references, but without trying to define sense in terms of reference,
and without suggesting that senses can be derived from references. I think the circularity of the
attempted definition of sense is the underlying reason why. Thus, to apply Frege’s threefold distinction
among definition (Definition), explanation (Erklärung), and explication (Erläuterung) (see my 2003:
73), § 32 may only be understood as stating Frege’s explanation (not: definition) of what senses are.
(An explanation states what a thing is, but without technically being a definition; Frege’s only explicit
explanation is of identity as indiscernibility.) And saying that senses are the ways references are given
is the explanation underlying the explanation.
Thus the difference between what Dummett seems to think § 32 says and what § 32 actually
says is as little—and as great—as the difference between definition and explanation.
In The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy, Dummett revisits his Frege: Philosophy of
Language rejection of the “no backward road” argument. He admits there is “no backward road” in
“Frege’s unamended theory” (1981a: 95). He does not “attempt to examine the details of Russell’s
argument” (1981a: 131; see my 2003: 275–77 for the details). He is very clear on the conclusion of the
argument: whenever we try to refer to a sense, we succeed only in referring to a reference (1981a: 131).
But this is a red herring. The explicit “no backward road” thesis is not a premise of the argument or its
conclusion, but a closure clause at the end of the argument. Yet if Dummett rejects it, he is committed
to rejecting the argument as futile, since we can then backwardly single out senses after all.
30