Morphogenesis versus Structuration: On Combining ... - Moodle

Morphogenesis versus structuration 481
Sociology', in M. S. Archer, Social
Origins of Educational Systems,
London and Beverly Hills, Sage, 1979,
pp.5-42.
15. Giddens, Central Problems in
Social Theory, op. cit., p. 5.
16. Ibid., p. 69.
17. I am indebted to Dr John
Heritage for this insight.
18. Ibid,p.56.
19. Ibid, p. 210.
20. Ibid., p. 71.
21. Ibid.,pp.77-8.
22. Ibid., pp. 69 -70.
23. Ibid., pp. 50 -2.
24. Ibid.,p. 104.
25. Activation need not involve
power relations unless Giddens's premise
that all action is logically tied to
power is accepted. See ibid., p. 88.
26. Ibid., p. 80.
27. As Gellner succinctly puts it,
group variables 'can indeed only exist
if their parts exist-that is indeed the
predicament of all wholes-but their
fates qua fates of complexes can
nevertheless be the initial condition or
indeed the final condition of a causal
sequence', 'Holism Versus Individualism',
in May Brodbeck, Readings in
the Philosophy of the Social Sciences,
op. cit., p. 263.
28. For example I have tried to show
at length how a centralized system of
education conditions subsequent patterns
of educational interaction and
profoundly influences the processes by
which change can be introduced in
ways quite different from those
characteristic of decentralized systems.
See my Social Origins of Educational
Systems, op. cit., especially ch. 5,
pp. 265-8.
29. Giddens, Central Problems in
Social Theory, op. cit., p. 78.
30. Ibid., p. 76.
31. Ibid,p. 144.
32. M. Maruyama, 'The Second
Cybernetics: Deviation-Amplifying
Mutual Causal Processes'; op. cit.,
p. 164.
33. Giddens, Central Problems in
Social Theory, op. cit., p. 215.
34. Ibid., p. 7.
35. Ibid, p. 229.
3 6. Amitai Etzioni provides the
boldest illustrations of this point in his
discussions of 'under' and 'over
managed societies and their typical
and very different kinds of crises, The
Active Society, op. cit.
37. Giddens, Central Problems in
So cial Theory, op. cit., p. 93 *
38. See R. J. W. Selleck, English
Primary Education and the Progressives,
1914-3 9, London, Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 19 7 2.
39. It should be clear from the foregoing
that I endorse Lukess approach
to the concept of power rather than
that of Giddens. Once again this is a
cluestion of dualism versus duality.
Lukes maintains analytical dualism by
seeking to draw a line between structural
determination and the exercise of
power. Hence he talks of 'where
structural determination ends and
power begins' (S. Lukes, Essays in
Social Theory, London, Macmillan, p.
18) and is predictably chastized by
Giddens for tending to 'repeat the
dualism of agency and structure'
(Central Problems in Social Theory,
op. cit., p. 91). Giddens wants to overcome
this divide by defining power as
'transformative capacity', hence maintaining
duality by viewing structure
as implicated in power relations and
power relations as implicated in
structure. Now Lukes does not deny
these interconnections but he avoids
Giddens's compacting of the two
elements which blurs the distinction
between responsible action and determined
action, severing the tie between
power and responsibility which is
essential to Lukes. On the contrary he
tries to discover, explain and assess the
weight of structural limitations on
action which delimit the zone in which
it is proper (and profitable) to speak
of power relations. Thus to Lukes, in
general, 'although the agents operate
within structurally defined limits, they
none the less have a certain relative
autonomy and could have acted differently'
(Lukes, ibid., p. 6-7). What is
then required in this dualistic approach
'is a sustained discussion of the nature
of, and conditions for, autonomy (and