(EUBAM) Libya

ReShape Online Papers Series 

Paper no. 03/13 

Francesca Arcidiacono 

University of Catania 

francescarcidiacono@gmail.com 

EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Libya: Testing EU Actorness 

Abstract. This paper discusses EUBAM Libya, the European Union Integrated Border Management 

Assistance Mission in Libya, approved by the European Council on 22 May 2013, almost two years after the 

end of Col. Muammar Gaddafi’s 40 years grasp on power. The paper begins with an overview of the change 

of the roles and competences of the EU security and defense policy aimed at evaluating the EU reaction to 

the 2011 Libyan crisis. Then, the focus shifts towards EUBAM Libya. The paper explores the main aspects 

of the new civilian mission in Libya, looking to the launch of this CSDP instrument through the objectives of 

the mission itself; and to the effectiveness and the complexity of the mission. The overall aim of this paper is 

to understand whether the EUBAM mission in Libya is sufficient to safeguard Libyan and European 

interests, and is suitable to face the challenges the European Union has to deal with in order to impose itself 

as global actor in international crisis management and overcome the so-called death sentence of the CSDP 

that observers and scholars announced after EU’s poor performance in the 2011 Libyan crisis. 

Contents 

THE EU’S CRISIS MANAGEMENT ACTORNESS AND THE LIBYAN CRISIS.................................................. 2 

Will the EU become a global actor in international crisis management................................................................. 2 

Did the EU response to the 2011 Libyan crisis undermine the credibility of the CSDP ......................................... 2 

THE EU BORDER ASSISTANCE MISSION (EUBAM) IN LIBYA .......................................................................... 4 

Border control: a complex issue, a regional challenge............................................................................................. 4 

The launch of the border assistance mission ............................................................................................................. 5 

From words to deeds: critical aspects ...................................................................................................................... 6 

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................................. 7 

REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................................... 7 

The ReSHAPE Research Project on 

"EU and the multilateral policies for disaster prevention, relief and reconstruction" 

is funded by the Lifelong Learning Programme at the University of Catania 

Decision n. 2012-2839 / 001 – 001 Jean Monnet Chair Ad Personam 

© Copyright 2013, Jean Monnet Centre, Department of Political and Social Sciences, University of Catania, via Vittorio 

Emanuele 49, 95131 Catania, Italy. 

http://www.fscpo.unict.it/europa/JMAP/rpapers.htm ISSN 2281-910X

ReSHAPE Online Papers Series, no. 03/13 – June 2013 

The EU’s crisis management actorness and the Libyan crisis 

The European Union’s role and capability in international actions has been changing 

considerably in the last years. In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty created a range of mechanisms such as 

the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Policy 

(ESDP). In 1999, at Helsinki, the European Council increased its commitment in building the EU’s 

military and civilian capabilities in peace operations and post-conflict reconstruction. 

Will the EU become a global actor in international crisis management 

Since 2003, the EU has conducted civilian and military crisis management operations in the 

framework of the European Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), spanning from police and border 

assistance missions to robust military operations. In 2004, the EU created the border agency 

FRONTEX to coordinate operations between member states in securing the external borders of the 

Schengen area. 

In 2007, the Lisbon Treaty, signed also to allow the EU to become a more effective global 

actor, strengthened the role of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Its remit was 

expanded to include the processes of post-conflict stabilization, joint disarmament operations and 

the “fight against terrorism”. Also, the Lisbon Treaty made two significant changes to the 

framework established by the Amsterdam one: the advancement of the powers of the High 

Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the introduction of the 

European External Action Service (EEAS), the diplomatic service of the Union under the authority 

of the new High Representative. These changes represented an attempt to introduce new elements to 

make the European Council more effective, consistent and transparent for the management of 

foreign affairs and the CFSP. The gradual establishment of additional foreign and defense policy 

competences at the European level, like crisis management, has been accomplished through a 

progressive movement from intergovernmentalism to supranational decision-making, a disclosed 

commitment to multilateralism and an increased role for supranational actors and institutions in 

Brussels. Briefly, the European Union has “high strategic ambitions”. The question is “how to shift 

from words to deeds”. Up to now, the accomplishments of such ambitions have been very modest, 

sometimes insignificant. “Rubber stamping” and “upgrading documents” produced by diplomats 

and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, as Youri Devuyust remarks (2012). 

Such a view some scholars share about the actorness of the EU and its legitimacy, however, 

acknowledges the institutional changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon in the current years, and 

looks at whether the Union is able to meet its ambitions to become “an actor capable of intervening 

in all theatres of the world and of playing responsibility in all the major global institutions” (Attinà, 

2011: 10). In other terms, it looks at understanding if the innovations introduced in 2009 will 

improve the decision-making and leadership of the European Union, namely its effectiveness as a 

global player in international crisis management. 

Did the EU response to the 2011 Libyan crisis undermine the credibility of the CSDP 

The EU response to the crisis situation in Lybia led some analysts to underline the lack of 

unanimity and joint decisions and the Member States’ unilateralism in action. Some of them called 

the Libyan crisis as the “death sentence” of the CSDP, or at least highlighted that the EU’s reaction 

has undermined the credibility and effectiveness of the CSDP and of the newly-founded European 

External Action Service (EEAS). 

The crisis in Libya escalated at the beginning of 2011, less than 2 years after the Lisbon 

Treaty came into force. On 1 April 2011, the Council of the EU adopted the decision to dispatch a 

European Union military operation (EUFOR Libya) in “support of humanitarian assistance 

Francesca Arcidiacono, EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Libya: Testing EU Actorness - 2


operations in response to the crisis situation in Libya” 1 . In those months, apparently no one 

seriously considered an intervention under the framework of CSDP; on the contrary, on 26 February 

2011, the UN Security Council (UNSC) reacted to the outbreak of violence by adopting resolution 

1970 referring to the situation of the International Criminal Court ( ICC) and imposing arms 

embargo and strong sanctions. Additionally, France and United Kingdom acted within the NATO 

operation “Unified Protector”. Furthermore, the EUFOR mission, established in April 2011 and 

never launched on the field, was a military mission aimed more at supporting humanitarian 

assistance than at implementing an effective intervention, in fact it was decided under the request of 

the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 

The EU’s reaction towards the Libyan crisis was deeply criticized for being “too slow, too 

weak, too divided and essentially incoherent” (Kundani and Vaisse, 2011). To such strong 

comments, some scholars and experts answered that “making its activation dependent on the OCHA 

request was not only a constraint for an operation which was already planned in accordance with the 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970 and 1973, but also a debatable case of waiting for 

approval from a single UN agency, and an unprecedented restriction imposed on a CSDP 

operation/mission” (Hatzigeorgopoulos and Fara-Andrianarijaona, 2013). 

Such criticism notwithstanding, EUFOR Libya was neither an effective nor a timely crisis 

response as it never started but was just an instrument mobilized by the European Union to face the 

Libyan crisis. However, the European Commission reacted to the Libyan crisis by activating two of 

the major emergency instruments of its Directorate General (DG) for Humanitarian Aid and Civil 

Protection (ECHO), the civil protection mechanism and humanitarian assistance. 

On the whole, the EU’s immediate reaction towards the Libya descent into violence was a 

mix of diplomatic measures, humanitarian assistance and civil protection. The first action was to 

adopt diplomatic measures like declarations, official statements, high-level meetings, and sanctions 

to interrupt the Gaddafi’s regime flow of weapons and money. Activated on 23 February 2011, the 

civil protection mechanism facilitated the member state consular operations to evacuate 5.800 EU 

citizens. During the same month, the EU responded to Italy’s formal request and launched the 

Frontex Joint Operation Hermes 2011, to assist Italian authorities to deal with the migratory flows. 

Due to the volatile situation of North Africa and Libya, this mission was extended to include also 

Crete. The EU both implemented the UN Security Council sanctions against Libya, and imposed 

arms embargo and targeted sanctions on 26 persons related to the Qaddafi regime. On 1 April 2011, 

the Council adopted the already known decision on EUFOR Libya to support humanitarian 

assistance operation but UN OCHA did not request its activation. Lastly, on May 22, an office to 

support the National Transitional Council and the Lybian civil society was opened in Benghazi and 

then in Tripoli. In November 2011, the Office was changed into the EU Delegation in Lybia. 

In the field of humanitarian assistance, the initial budget was € 80,5 million. To date the EU 

has provided more than € 156 million in humanitarian support, and is the biggest humanitarian 

donor. Additionally, € 79 million were dedicated to projects with long-term perspectives concerning 

public administration and democratic transition, security, civil and local governance, health, 

vocational training and education, migration, and protection of vulnerable groups. Further € 25 

million were allocated through the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) to 

strengthening EU’s activities in the fields of education, health care and security and the rule of law. 

These programmes are implemented and followed up by the EU Delegation in Tripoli. On July 

2012, the Election Assessment Teams (EU EAT) was deployed to cover the parliamentary 

elections. In January 2013, Libya asked to join the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) as an 

observer country. 

1 COUNCIL DECISION 2011/210/CFSP of 1 April 2011 on a European Union military operation in support of 

humanitarian assistance operations in response to the crisis situation in Libya (EUFOR Libya) http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.douri=OJ:L:2011:089:0017:0020:en:PDF 



The EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya 

The European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya 

(EUBAM) is a civilian mission under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) aimed at 

supporting the Libyan authorities in enhancing and developing the security of the country’s borders. 

In particular, the mission entails two kinds of objectives, in the short term the security of land, sea 

and air borders, in the long term a broader Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy. The way 

to achieve these objectives is mainly the transfer of know-how. No executive function is envisaged. 

In fact, the planned activities consist of “training and mentoring the Libyan authorities in 

strengthening the border services in accordance with international standards and best practices”; “to 

advise the Libyan authorities on the development of a Libyan national IBM strategy”; “to support 

the Libyan authorities in strengthening their institutional operational capabilities” (Task, art. 3 a, b, 

c). 2 

The mission responds to an invitation by Libya and is part of the EU’s comprehensive 

approach to support the Libyan post-conflict reconstruction, and specifically to contribute to stateconsolidation, 

economic development and the fight against organized crime and terrorism. 

Border control: a complex issue, a regional challenge 

As above mentioned, this mission is part of the EU’s comprehensive approach in the Libyan 

post-conflict reconstruction, so it is in line with the package of activities, listed in the previous 

section, the EU has implemented during the last two years in Libya. It is particularly important 

because it addresses a relevant issue in the Libyan transition and concerns a field where the EU 

would continue to work: disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. What differentiates 

EUBAM Libya from other activities is the complexity and the extension of the issue the EU has 

committed to face. That is to say that the Libyan borders’ control should be seen in a wider regional 

perspective, considering the Maghreb and the Sahel regions. This task entails coordination with the 

other CSDP mission in the wider region, namely EUCAP SAHEL Niger and EUTM Mali. 

Furthermore, the EUBAM mission should be considered as part of an international effort aimed at 

developing and supporting security sector reform in line with UN Security Council Resolution 

1973(2011) on Libya. 

It is worth underlining that Libya is a large country, bordered by the Mediterranean Sea to 

the north, Egypt to the east, Sudan to the southeast, Chad and Niger to the south, and Algeria and 

Tunisia to the west. It has a 4.348 km land border and 1.770 km maritime border which are difficult 

to control and porous to mass migration flows (south-south immigration) and to access by criminal 

organizations (arms and drugs trafficking and terrorist activities). 

The proliferation of weapons from Libya continues at an “alarming rate”. Libya arms have 

flowed to more than 12 countries and have fueled conflicts in Syria, Mali and elsewhere, boosting 

the arsenals of extremists and criminals in the entire region. As an instance, the jihadist of the 

MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), responsible for the military campaign 

of the Northern Mali and numerous atrocities, had previously served in Gaddafi’s military. 3 

The migratory phenomenon has a double movement, inward and outward. It has gained an 

increasing importance since the beginning of 2012 and has involved young people from tribes 

located near the borders, and networks of smugglers. In some territories, it has given place to the 

2 COUNCIL DECISION 2013/233/CFSP of 22 May 2013 on the European Union Integrated Border 

Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya), http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.douri=OJ:L:2013:138:0015:0018:EN:PDF 

p.1 

3 UN Security Council report, 9 March 2013, Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to 

resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C- 

8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_99.pdf 



armed occupation of the borders. 4 This statement is confirmed by data provided by the UNHCR in a 

report about Libya. At the end of August 2012 the UN agency registered approximately 10.000 

refugees and asylum seekers; in December 2013, the number increased to 12.000 refugees from 

various origins. On the contrary, in August 2012, the refugees fleeing Libya were approximately 

209.000 people. The waves of immigration from Northern Libya directly interested the European 

continent as proved by the large number of North African people trying to reach the Italian 

Lampedusa island, especially in the Spring 2011. So, this issue is important for the country and the 

entire Sahel as well as for the European countries directly affected. 5 

The European Union faced the waves of migrants from North Africa with the FRONTEX 

Joint Operation Hermes 2011, set up in February 2011 to assist the Italian authorities to manage the 

incoming flows. These waves of migration were depicted as economic and security concern on the 

European side of the Mediterranean. In September 2012, the EU and the Libyan officials, together 

with INTERPOL, established a system to control passport in order to identify wanted persons, 

suspected terrorists and transnational criminals. 

How big is the challenge EUBAM Libya is going to face was defined at a recent workshop 

run by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) for the Border Guards, police, 

customs, coastguards and other interested parties, in May 2013. In that occasion, the international 

organization identified weaknesses and strengths of the issue of border management in Libya and 

underlined the Libyan political will as well as “the shortage of modern equipment, technology, 

experienced personnel” and lack of comprehensive plan to secure borders from illegal traffics of 

arms and drugs and uncontrolled migration. 6 The Chief of Staff of the Libyan Border Guard Force, 

Brigadier-General Abdul-Khaleq Al-Senussi affirmed that there is shortage of personnel, weapons 

and technology to secure the borders and the need to rely on revolutionary brigades to do it. Other 

Libyans authorities pointed out that coordination is needed to minimize the problems tied to the 

lack of information and systematic data. They stress that the huge issues are along the remote 

southern desert border (uncontrolled and porous to criminal organizations, especially because they 

are barely populated and economically poor) and not in the coastal or aerial borders; that Libyans 

need trainings, technical expertise and more clarity in jurisdiction, and to develop the country, 

implementing small and medium size projects to absorb the youth and reduce tensions. 

The launch of the border assistance mission 

In January 2013, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Libya 

addressed a letter to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 

welcoming the Union’s CSDP proposal to support the Libyan authorities in border security 

management. After several months of reflections, discussions and observations, the Council of the 

EU approved “the crisis management concept of EUBAM Libya”. The needs assessment on 

integrated border management which the EU undertook in 2012 helped define the scope and 

activities of the mission. Then, in March 2013, the EU deployed in the country an expert mission, 

consisting of 10 experts aimed at implementing the preparatory elements of the mission and holding 

a series of constructing discussions. 7 In the same month, the leader of the EU mission, the Director 

4 Affrontements armés, réseaux tribaux et prédation aux frontières de la Libye (2012), Institut de Recherche sur 

le Maghreb Contemporaine, http://irmc.hypotheses.org/656 

5 Actually, the issue of borders was already tackled in 2011, during the Paris Conference on Libya’s future 

where the National Transitional Council of Libya, Western leaders and important international organizations met 

together. 

6 

Libyan Border Security: Feverish Determination, Sobering Reality, (23 May 2013), UNSMIL 

http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspxctl=Details&tabid=3543&mid=6187&ItemID=1480543 

7 Head of EU border support mission announced (2013), http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/03/23/head-of-euborder-support-mission-announced/ 



General of the Finnish customs service, Antti Hartikainen, was chosen and rapidly deployed in the 

theatre. 

The current 24-months mission EUBAM Libya was officially established on 22 May 2013, 

through a formal decision by the European Council, with the aim of enhancing the security of 

Libya’s borders in the short term, and a broader IBM strategy in the long term. On that occasion, 

the High Representative Catherine Ashton stressed that "EUBAM Libya is an important mission for 

Libya and the entire region, but also for the security of EU borders", concept perfectly in line with 

the problematic and complex framework above depicted. She also said that “the mission responds to 

a direct request from our Libyan partners” and that “it can now be deployed in June”. 8 

The mission should be endowed with approximately 110 staff and a budget of € 30,3 million 

for the first 12 months (the mission should last 24 months). The mission will deploy gradually 

taking due account of the political and security situation as well as the local needs. As the mission 

should entail a transfer of know-how, the 165 staff (at full operational capability) will be made by 

the head of mission, 83 seconded staff, 27 international staff and 54 locally-recruited staff. 

From words to deeds: critical aspects 

The Headquarters of the Mission will be based in Tripoli, in the North of the country; not in 

the South as originally planned since the main areas tackled like the lack of security in the borders 

due to arms and drugs trafficking and uncontrolled migrations are concentrated in southern Libya. 

However, it could not be considered a determinant factor, though it remains an influent one, 

because the main task of the experts is to provide medium and long term recommendations for 

secure border management to help Libyan authorities in strengthening border control capacity and 

defining a national integrated Border Management strategy. 

On the other hand, the location of the Headquarters points out the short-term priority of the 

EU in securing itself by prioritizing the Mediterranean coast. Actually, even if the situation in the 

Sahel region is more stable than it was in past months, this area remains an hotbed for criminal 

organizations and illegal traffics. On the long term, then, the EU’s perspective should be narrow, 

because the problems of the South could infringe the Union’s interests, especially in the long-run. 

Furthermore, the comprehensive approach the EU would implement has to take in due 

consideration the dynamics of the entire region, the interdependencies of the local countries, not 

only in term of South-South migration but also concerning illegal trafficking and criminal 

organizations. 

The challenge the EU is going to face is huge though cooperation on migration control and 

border management is an area well known to the EU due to its past activities in this field. However, 

in addition to some inconsistency and political ambivalence, another weakness is lack of linearity in 

as much as the EU seems not so much committed to decisive actions towards Disarmament, 

Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and towards the Security Sector Reform (SSR). Both 

DDR and SSR are naturally part of the EU’s response to the situation in Libya. They are managed 

by the EU Delegation in Tripoli. After several months, the new Head of the delegation, Nataliya 

Apostolova, has been appointed on 21 May 2013. She has an enormous amount of programmes and 

funds to manage but a small staff and scarce organization resources. This could represent a critical 

point for the effectiveness of the mission in a wider perspective: “financial aid administered through 

a three persons-strong EU Delegation in Tripoli is likely to quite insufficient to achieve the goal of 

building a democratic, stable and prosperous country” (Hatzigeorgopoulos and Fara- 

Andrianarijaona, 2013: 13). 

8 Green light for civilian mission to support border security in Libya (22 May 2013), Council of the European 

Union, Brussels, 9478/13, Press 189 in 

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137189.pdf 



Conclusion 

After the EU’s failure in facing the Libyan civil war, the EUBAM mission is an hazardous 

task for the EU. Its failure will have negative consequences on the credibility of the EU’s CSDP. 

Divisions among the member states, which are difficult to overcome, are the reason why EU 

interventions are always slow, badly- and micro-managed and too weakly mandated. A clear 

instance of these divisions is proved by the fact that on 2 June 2013, France offered to help Libya 

secure borders from Islamists fleeing Mali, as said by the Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian. He 

and the President Francois Hollande pushed the prime minister Ali Zeidan to attach importance to 

the issue of security and borders especially in the south. The Minister did neither talk about any 

kind of EU coordination nor mentioned the EUBAM Libya mission. On the contrary, he spoke 

about the unanimous decision by the Security Council, including China, to gradually get out of the 

military phase, the threats tied to regional insecurity, the interdependence with the situation in Mali, 

the settlement of terrorists groups and the growth of terrorism in North Africa. This is clear example 

of the fact that some EU’s member states act in a way totally detached from that of the European 

Union. 

The European Union has the potentialities to act at the global level but the lack of strategic 

consensus does not allow it. It is not a question of time and capacity, neither one tied to the famous 

metaphor on the transatlantic division of labor, according to which NATO “prepares dinner” while 

the EU “washes the dishes”. It is a matter of internal coherence/division, political will, geographical 

perspectives, briefly the inability of making divergences fit through “negotiated” internal 

convergence to the common interest of the states. The interplay of these factors causes 

compromises with negative results such as in the Libyan civil war where the EU members did not 

adopted a common position in the U.N. Security Council in regard to the establishment of the nofly 

zone over Libya. 

References 

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to participate in peace missions, in “Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies”, 3, 2, 5-17. 

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http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspxctl=Details&tabid=3543&mid=6187&ItemID=1480543

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