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VOICE for the defense<br />

entitled Landrigan to relief because he had indeed instructed<br />

his counsel not to present such evidence. Landrigan then<br />

filed a federal habeas petition which the district court<br />

rejected. Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, finding<br />

that Landrigan’s counsel fell below the standard required<br />

under Strickland v. Washington.<br />

own safety they are acting within constitutional limits.<br />

Cert. to 8th Circuit – Dismissed<br />

Petition dismissed as improvidently granted.<br />

Roper v. Weaver, __U.S__, 127 S. Ct. 2022 (2007); Opinion:<br />

Per curiam (6-3)<br />

:: sDR<br />

Held: <strong>The</strong> district court may refuse an evidentiary<br />

hearing as a result of a federal habeas petition made by a<br />

defendant who declined to present mitigating evidence<br />

at the sentencing hearing while claiming to “bring on the<br />

death penalty.” Supremes found the district court was within<br />

its discretion to deny Landrigan an evidentiary hearing. In<br />

deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal<br />

court must consider whether the hearing could enable an<br />

applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations, which,<br />

if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief. If<br />

the record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations, a district<br />

court is not required to grant an evidentiary hearing. <strong>The</strong><br />

Court found that even if Landrigan was granted a hearing,<br />

the fact that he had refused to submit mitigating evidence<br />

at the sentencing hearing would prevent him being entitled<br />

to habeas relief.<br />

Cert. to 9th Circuit – Reversed (civil case)<br />

No problem when cops searched naked people at gunpoint<br />

pursuant to warrant<br />

Los Angeles County, California v. Rettele, __U.S.__, 127 S.Ct.<br />

1989 (2007); Opinion: Per curiam<br />

Police got a valid warrant to search the premises of two houses<br />

in Lancaster, California in order to aid in the investigation of<br />

an identity-theft crime ring and attempt to locate four known<br />

African-American suspects. When police entered the first<br />

house, they discovered and searched two nude people of the<br />

Caucasian race. <strong>The</strong> search lasted for approximately three<br />

minutes. Respondents here claim that this search amounted to<br />

a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from<br />

unreasonable search and seizure. California federal district<br />

court granted summary judgment to all the defendants, but<br />

the 9th Circuit reversed, reasoning the officers violated the<br />

Fourth Amendment because a reasonable officer would have<br />

stopped searching the suspects upon realization that they<br />

were not the same race as their intended suspects.<br />

Held: Respondents had no constitutional claim for relief<br />

where officers entered into their residence executing<br />

a valid search warrant, even though they were clearly<br />

not the suspects the police were seeking. Court rejects<br />

respondents’ argument that the search in question was<br />

unreasonable because there were no African-Americans<br />

living on the premises and they were ordered out of bed naked<br />

and held at gunpoint. <strong>The</strong> search was not a violation of the<br />

Fourth Amendment. When the searching officers execute a<br />

valid warrant in a reasonable manner and with respect to their<br />

Weaver was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in<br />

1988. He filed a federal habeas corpus petition before the<br />

effective date of the AEDPA of 1996. <strong>The</strong> Montana district<br />

court dismissed Weaver’s habeas corpus petition without<br />

prejudice after he filed a petition for certiorari regarding<br />

denial of the state court’s post-conviction hearing because<br />

the court mistakenly believed this demonstrated that Weaver<br />

had not exhausted his other remedies. After “exhausting”<br />

those remedies, he re-filed his federal habeas petition. <strong>The</strong><br />

district court granted his writ and the Eighth Circuit affirmed,<br />

concluding that the stricter standard of AEDPA applied, but<br />

granting Weaver’s petition for habeas corpus despite that<br />

stricter standard.<br />

Held: <strong>The</strong> writ of certiorari was improvidently granted<br />

where considering the case would lead to “virtually<br />

identically situated litigants…being treated in needlessly<br />

disparate manner.” <strong>The</strong> Supreme Court initially granted the<br />

state’s petition to decide whether the 8th Circuit had properly<br />

applied the AEDPA. However, upon realizing that Weaver’s<br />

co-defendant and another similarly situated individual had<br />

been granted writs of habeas corpus, and that the only reason<br />

Weaver’s application had been applied for after the AEDPA’s<br />

effective date was due to an error of the district court, the<br />

Supremes held it had improvidently granted cert, and case<br />

is therefore dismissed.<br />

FIFTH CIRCUIT<br />

Court need give no notice to sua sponte impose nonguidelines<br />

sentence<br />

United States v. Mejia-Huerta, 480 F.3d 713 (5th Cir. 2007)<br />

After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a<br />

sentencing court is not required to provide pre-sentencing<br />

notice of its sua sponte intention to impose a non-Guideline<br />

sentence (i.e., a Booker variance from the Guidelines, as<br />

opposed to a Guidelines-based departure); Burns v. United<br />

States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991), and Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(h), which<br />

require notice before departures from the Guidelines are<br />

inapplicable to post-Booker sentences at variance with the<br />

Guidelines. (Court noted a circuit split with the 2nd, 4th,<br />

9th, and 10th Circuits.)<br />

Officers could rely on “consent” even though defendant<br />

denied consent to search<br />

United States v. Dilley, 480 F.3d 713 (5 th Cir. 2007)<br />

33 |

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