M - Voice For The Defense Online
M - Voice For The Defense Online
M - Voice For The Defense Online
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VOICE for the defense<br />
entitled Landrigan to relief because he had indeed instructed<br />
his counsel not to present such evidence. Landrigan then<br />
filed a federal habeas petition which the district court<br />
rejected. Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, finding<br />
that Landrigan’s counsel fell below the standard required<br />
under Strickland v. Washington.<br />
own safety they are acting within constitutional limits.<br />
Cert. to 8th Circuit – Dismissed<br />
Petition dismissed as improvidently granted.<br />
Roper v. Weaver, __U.S__, 127 S. Ct. 2022 (2007); Opinion:<br />
Per curiam (6-3)<br />
:: sDR<br />
Held: <strong>The</strong> district court may refuse an evidentiary<br />
hearing as a result of a federal habeas petition made by a<br />
defendant who declined to present mitigating evidence<br />
at the sentencing hearing while claiming to “bring on the<br />
death penalty.” Supremes found the district court was within<br />
its discretion to deny Landrigan an evidentiary hearing. In<br />
deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal<br />
court must consider whether the hearing could enable an<br />
applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations, which,<br />
if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief. If<br />
the record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations, a district<br />
court is not required to grant an evidentiary hearing. <strong>The</strong><br />
Court found that even if Landrigan was granted a hearing,<br />
the fact that he had refused to submit mitigating evidence<br />
at the sentencing hearing would prevent him being entitled<br />
to habeas relief.<br />
Cert. to 9th Circuit – Reversed (civil case)<br />
No problem when cops searched naked people at gunpoint<br />
pursuant to warrant<br />
Los Angeles County, California v. Rettele, __U.S.__, 127 S.Ct.<br />
1989 (2007); Opinion: Per curiam<br />
Police got a valid warrant to search the premises of two houses<br />
in Lancaster, California in order to aid in the investigation of<br />
an identity-theft crime ring and attempt to locate four known<br />
African-American suspects. When police entered the first<br />
house, they discovered and searched two nude people of the<br />
Caucasian race. <strong>The</strong> search lasted for approximately three<br />
minutes. Respondents here claim that this search amounted to<br />
a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from<br />
unreasonable search and seizure. California federal district<br />
court granted summary judgment to all the defendants, but<br />
the 9th Circuit reversed, reasoning the officers violated the<br />
Fourth Amendment because a reasonable officer would have<br />
stopped searching the suspects upon realization that they<br />
were not the same race as their intended suspects.<br />
Held: Respondents had no constitutional claim for relief<br />
where officers entered into their residence executing<br />
a valid search warrant, even though they were clearly<br />
not the suspects the police were seeking. Court rejects<br />
respondents’ argument that the search in question was<br />
unreasonable because there were no African-Americans<br />
living on the premises and they were ordered out of bed naked<br />
and held at gunpoint. <strong>The</strong> search was not a violation of the<br />
Fourth Amendment. When the searching officers execute a<br />
valid warrant in a reasonable manner and with respect to their<br />
Weaver was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in<br />
1988. He filed a federal habeas corpus petition before the<br />
effective date of the AEDPA of 1996. <strong>The</strong> Montana district<br />
court dismissed Weaver’s habeas corpus petition without<br />
prejudice after he filed a petition for certiorari regarding<br />
denial of the state court’s post-conviction hearing because<br />
the court mistakenly believed this demonstrated that Weaver<br />
had not exhausted his other remedies. After “exhausting”<br />
those remedies, he re-filed his federal habeas petition. <strong>The</strong><br />
district court granted his writ and the Eighth Circuit affirmed,<br />
concluding that the stricter standard of AEDPA applied, but<br />
granting Weaver’s petition for habeas corpus despite that<br />
stricter standard.<br />
Held: <strong>The</strong> writ of certiorari was improvidently granted<br />
where considering the case would lead to “virtually<br />
identically situated litigants…being treated in needlessly<br />
disparate manner.” <strong>The</strong> Supreme Court initially granted the<br />
state’s petition to decide whether the 8th Circuit had properly<br />
applied the AEDPA. However, upon realizing that Weaver’s<br />
co-defendant and another similarly situated individual had<br />
been granted writs of habeas corpus, and that the only reason<br />
Weaver’s application had been applied for after the AEDPA’s<br />
effective date was due to an error of the district court, the<br />
Supremes held it had improvidently granted cert, and case<br />
is therefore dismissed.<br />
FIFTH CIRCUIT<br />
Court need give no notice to sua sponte impose nonguidelines<br />
sentence<br />
United States v. Mejia-Huerta, 480 F.3d 713 (5th Cir. 2007)<br />
After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a<br />
sentencing court is not required to provide pre-sentencing<br />
notice of its sua sponte intention to impose a non-Guideline<br />
sentence (i.e., a Booker variance from the Guidelines, as<br />
opposed to a Guidelines-based departure); Burns v. United<br />
States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991), and Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(h), which<br />
require notice before departures from the Guidelines are<br />
inapplicable to post-Booker sentences at variance with the<br />
Guidelines. (Court noted a circuit split with the 2nd, 4th,<br />
9th, and 10th Circuits.)<br />
Officers could rely on “consent” even though defendant<br />
denied consent to search<br />
United States v. Dilley, 480 F.3d 713 (5 th Cir. 2007)<br />
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