14-4 Sitrep

July–August 2014 Volume 74, Number 4
RCMI
The Journal of the Royal Canadian Military Institute
Founded 1890
SITREP
J.R. ‘Digger’ MacDougall places
a Canadian flag on a soldier’s
grave at the 70th Anniversary
commemoration of the D–Day
Landings, June 2014.
Inside this Issue
—J.R. MACDOUGALL
Defending our Northern Coast: Contextualizing the
Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships by Timothy Choi...............................................................3
Canadian Counter-terrorism: From Preventer to Responder by Kyle Wierks..........................6
Vocal Critic of N. Korea’s Nuclear Ambition and Belligerence: A Retired
PLA General’s View on Geopolitics in Northeast Asia by Weixin Lu............................9
Celebrating the 70th anniversary of D-Day by J. R. ‘Digger’ MacDougall..........................13
Book Review: “The Great Escape: A Canadian Story”
by Ted Barris reviewed by Maj Thomas K. Fitzgerald................................................15
www.rcmi.org

From the Editor’s Desk
It is appropriate now that the summer’s heat is upon us that
we examine Canada’s upcoming Arctic Offshore Patrol
Ships (AOPSs), the first armed vessels to be built in over
two decades in this country. Timothy Choi argues that while
the AOPSs, as currently envisioned, could use some improvements, they are far
from the “cool” commentary that critics make them out to be.
Kyle Wierks debunks the belief held by some that Canada is considered to
be a refuge for international terrorists due to supposedly lax immigration laws,
inadequate focus on security and defence and inferior counter-terrorism capabilities.
He counters that despite this criticism of Canadian counter-terrorism,
Canada’s experience with terrorism over the past ninety years has resulted in a
very strong counter-terrorism framework existing in Canada today.
Weixin Lu provides a fascinating examination of the geopolitical balance
in northeast Asia through the commentary of retired People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) Lieutenant General Wang Hongguang, a vocal critic of North Korea’s
nuclear ambition and belligerence. Seen as a strong military voice, his analysis
of regional security and China’s policies, particularly geopolitical dynamics in
Northeast Asia, not only have drawn international analysts’ attention, but also
has led to heated debates among Chinese citizens whose reactions are decidedly
mixed over international issues.
Major Thomas Fitzgerald a frequent reviewer of books for Sitrep offers a
review of Ted Barris’ latest book The Great Escape: A Canadian Story.
On the occasion of the 70 th Anniversary of the Invasion of Normandy,
RCMI member J.R. ‘Digger’ MacDougall reports with reverence on the wreath
laying ceremonies and services 7–9 June in Normandy. This series of events
marked the 49th anniversary of his first visit to the D-Day landing areas when
as a Captain he commanded a 100-man Guard of Honour in 1965 as part of the
dedication ceremonies for a Cairn which was erected to honour the fallen of the
Fort Garry Horse (10th Armored Regiment) during the invasion. He writes, “It
was truly a worthwhile life experience to be there and remember the contribution
of so many Canadians.”
Sincerely,
Col Chris Corrigan (ret’d) CD, MA
Executive Director,
Editor of Sitrep and Chair of the Security Studies Committee
Copyright © 2014 RCMI ISSN 0316-5620 SITREP may be fully reproduced in whole or in part for academic research or institutional
purposes, provided that the author’s and the institute’s copyright is acknowledged. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and
do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute or its members.
Royal Canadian Military Institute
Founded 1890
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His Excellency the Right Honourable
David Johnston, C.C., C.M.M., C.O.M., C.D.
The Governor General of Canada
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Lieutenant Governor of Ontario
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Executive Director and Editor
Col (ret’d) Chris Corrigan, CD, MA
Past President
Col James R. Breithaupt, KStJ, CD, QC
Special Consultant to the Board
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Honoraries
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KStJ, OL, Legion d’Honneur, QC
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O.Ont, KStJ, CD, QC
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2 SITREP

Defending our Northern Coast: Contextualizing the
Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships
by Timothy Choi
PARTICIPANT IN THE 16 TH
CDAI GRADUATE STUDENT SYMPOSIUM
Over the past several years, severe criticisms have come
forth regarding Canada’s upcoming Arctic Offshore
Patrol Ships (AOPSs), which will be the first armed
vessels to be built in over two decades in this country. This
article argues that while the AOPSs, as currently envisioned,
could use some improvements, they are far from the “blunder”
that critics have make them
out to be. In setting out my
arguments, I will reference the
April 2013 report published
by the Canadian Centre for
Policy Alternatives and the
Rideau Institute, authored by
Michael Byers and Stewart
Webb, entitled “Titanic Blunder:
Arctic/Offshore Patrol
Ships on Course for Disaster.”
Although criticisms have
been published in a variety
of media, most of them are
covered in the report by Byers
and Webb, making it ideal for
the purposes of this article.
Perhaps one of the most
prominent criticisms of the
AOPSs has been the extent
of its ice-breaking capability.
Infamously derided as a mere
“slushbreaker”, this critique
has followed the design since
its conception. This perception
of the AOPSs inadequate ice-breaking capability was a
result of early comparisons between them and the pre-2007
election promise of three heavy icebreakers. This comparison,
however, is unfair and irrelevant. For an armed ice-capable
Timothy Choi is a PhD student at the Centre for Military and Strategic
Studies, University of Calgary. He holds a Master of Strategic Studies degree
from the University of Calgary and a B.A. in International Studies and History
from Simon Fraser University. His research interest invariably focuses
on naval affairs and his dissertation will examine 21st century Scandinavian
naval procurement.
vessel, the important thing is not how much ice it can break in
absolute terms, but rather, how much ice it can break in comparison
to other countries’ ice-capable warships. The AOPSs is
to be built to a Polar Class 5 standard, which allows it to break
up to one metre of first-year ice. How does this compare to
other Arctic nations’ armed ice-capable vessels
Quite favourably. The Danish Thetis class patrol frigates
are also capable of up to one-metre ice, while their smaller
but newer Knud Rasmussen class can operate only up to 80
centimetres of ice—less than the AOPSs. The Norwegian Navy
does not have ice-capable vessels, though their Coast Guard
does in the form of the three old Nordkapp and newer Svalbard
ships. In both those cases, photos indicate they appear
to be capable of operations in one-metre ice, though written
sources do not indicate an official number. As for the United
States, the sorry state of their icebreaking fleet is well-known.
The production of SITREP is made possible in part by the generosity of the
Langley Bequest, which is made in honour of Major Arthur J Langley CD
and Lt (N/S) Edith F Groundwater Langley
JULY—AUGUST 14 3

With only two unarmed polar-capable ships (USCG Cutters
Healy and Polar Star) and no new vessels in the near future,
the United States is possibly the least capable nation for making
a subtle force-based challenge to Canadian Arctic claims.
Obviously, they could use much more potent military force
that are not Arctic-specific, but it is doubtful our close ally
would resort to such overt means over maritime boundary and
Northwest Passage disputes. In essence, the United States lacks
the means for subtle shows of force in an Arctic environment
– they either have no presence, or too much. As for the final
member of the Arctic Ocean states, Russia does have a fleet
of ice-capable armed vessels, but they are six old members of
the Ivan Susanin class Coast Guard ships. The ice capability of
these ships is not published, but their size suggests roughly the
same capability as the Norwegian Coast Guard vessels. In any
case, Russia actually has fewer disputes with Canada than the
other Arctic states, as it is in Russia’s best interests to support
Canada’s view that the Northwest Passage is internal Canadian
waters, since this would strengthen Russia’s own claim to its
Northern Sea Route. In sum, then, Canada’s AOPSs will be
able to operate in just as much ice as any other Arctic state’s
armed ice-capable vessel. Should a foreign warship enter
Canada’s ice-covered waters, we, too, are certain to be able to
have a presence of our own up there.
Byers and Webb have also claimed that the AOPSs’ costsaving
traditional design makes it less suitable for operating
in ice compared to the “double-acting” hull of the Svalbard.
However, in my communiqués with a former member of the
Svalbard crew, I was informed that the unique “stern first”
function of that ship was never used on an operational basis
during that crewmember’s year of duty, which included deep
winter (December to August). The lack of a “double-acting”
hull on the Danish ships also has not appeared to negatively
affect their operations in Greenlandic waters. It would appear
that the lack of a “double-acting” hull for the AOPS will not
significantly impede its operations in Arctic waters, if the
experiences of other nations’ ships are any indication.
But being able to enter ice-covered waters is one thing—
will the AOPSs be enough to deter any of the opposing Arctic
assets Byers and Webb assert that there is no need for an
armed presence in the Arctic, while the AOPSs’ proposed
weapons fit of one 25mm cannon and two .50 calibre machine
guns would be insufficient for non-Arctic patrol duties. While
I concede the possibility of a full-out naval war between Arctic
powers over resource and boundary limitations is highly unlikely,
the scenario of a foreign warship attempting to escort
shipping or resource extraction assets through Canadian or
disputed waters is a very real challenge we must be ready to
address. In this context, how do the combat capabilities of the
other Arctic warships compare to the AOPSs In sum, it is
accurate to say that although the AOPSs will be outmatched
on a one-on-one basis, the disparity is not so much that the
AOPSs has no choice but to simply roll over and surrender.
To be more specific, although the Danish, Norwegian, and
Russian vessels are equipped with larger guns (57mm and
76mm), they are not equipped with anti-ship missiles, and are
not impervious to the AOPSs’ 25mm. The mere threat and risk
of suffering casualties as a result of an AOPS captain’s decision
to open fire is sufficient deterrent to any of the aforementioned
foreign ice-capable vessels. In essence, the AOPS armament
enables that time-honoured tradition of “a shot across the
bow”—that Canada is serious about defending its territory,
and that any violations would result in an unwanted escalation
of violence. The AOPSs do not have to be able to outright sink
its potential competitors; they merely have to establish a cost
for challenging their authority. As for the critics’ point that
a 25mm gun is insufficient for patrol duties: their proposal
of the Australian Armidale class (which has its own critics)
is hardly logical, given that it is also equipped with a 25mm
gun. More concretely, if our Atlantic or Pacific coasts are being
threatened with something that requires more firepower
than a 25mm gun, then there is the rest of our Navy that can
(and should) be put into play.
But back to the Arctic: to be present depends on the ships
having the range necessary to get to the North. Here, critics
find another point to deride - namely, that the AOPSs’ 6,800
nautical mile range is insufficient for Arctic duties, especially
when compared to the 10,000 nm ranges of large icebreakers
in the Coast Guard. On the face of it, the critics are correct—6,800
nm suffices to only get the AOPS from Halifax to
the entrance of the Northwest Passage (NWP) and back with
only a thousand nautical miles or so to spare for local patrol
purposes. While the establishment of the Nanisivik refuelling
base at the eastern entrance of the NWP will alleviate this
problem, critics point out that the decreased scale and scope
of Nanisivik reduces the amount of time an AOPS can spend
in the North. However, what the critics have failed to articulate
is just how, exactly, the reduced scale of Nanisivik will impede
AOPS operations. Just because the station will no longer be
permanently manned, that does not mean it will lack the extra
fuel capacity needed to sustain an AOPS for the duration of its
tour of duty in the area. Furthermore, the 6800 nm figure is
based upon a constant speed of 14 knots, which is fairly high
for a vessel whose maximum speed is meant to be 17 knots -
ships rarely travel at such a high relative speed on a constant
basis. Thus, an AOPS’ range can be significantly increased if
it were to transit at a lower speed. As well, the AOPS design
includes an area for three cargo containers—presumably an
ad hoc arrangement can be devised to adapt this area for
extra fuel bladders should any of the above options prove
impossible. In the past, ships operating in the High North
have had to carry all of their fuel with them because of a lack
of refuelling stations in the area—such will not be the case by
the time the AOPSs enter service, making the relatively low
organic range less problematic.
On the issue of maximum speed, the critics also claim
it is insufficient. They assert that 17 knots would not allow an
AOPS to catch up to a speedboat conducting illicit activities.
4 SITREP

Again, they claim that an alternative smaller and faster vessel,
such as the aforementioned Armidales or the Americans’
Sentinels, be purchased instead. Putting aside for the moment
that the Canadian Coast Guard already has the Sentinel class
in the form of the new Hero class patrol ships, these two
options are hardly a significant step above the AOPSs for
catching speedboats. The Armidales and Sentinels/Heros are
capable of 25 knots—faster than an AOPS, yes, but hardly
enough to catch a 30-plus-knot smuggler runabout. In fact,
the AOPS has an advantage over the two smaller ships: it will
have a helicopter on board. Needless to say, no conventional
speedboat can really outrun a helicopter. Therefore, given the
choice between a slow ship equipped with a helicopter versus
a faster ship that is still not fast enough, the decision should
be obvious.
As for helicopter operations, the AOPS is meant to fully
operate all Coast Guard helicopters, while having the ability
to land and stow the large helicopters flown (or to be flown)
by the Royal Canadian Air Force: the CH-149 Cormorant
and the CH-148 Cyclone. Critics believe that the lack of a
helicopter haul-down system (“Beartrap”) on the AOPS will
severely hinder its ability to employ helicopters in high sea
conditions. However, the AOPS design includes provisions for
it to be refitted with such a system at a future date—though
the ships will not be equipped with it when they are built.
Should operational conditions clearly indicate the necessity
of a haul-down system, it could be installed fairly cheaply. But
even in the absence of such a system, helicopters can still land
on an AOPS in high sea states in an emergency—consider,
for example, the famous video showing a Lynx helicopter
performing an unassisted landing on the deck of the Knud Rasmussen
during trials while the ship was pitching and rolling at
extreme angles. Evidently, unless one were to claim Canadian
pilots are inferior to the ones on that Lynx, it is clear that the
lack of a helicopter haul-down system does not categorically
preclude the AOPS from using helicopters in high sea states.
I have put forth a rather optimistic picture of the AOPS
design and its adequacy for operations in the coming decades.
Much of this adequacy depends on it continuing to face adversaries
that are armed roughly equal to it. This would change,
of course, if the Arctic were to become ice-free for greater
periods of time. In such a case, foreign states can deploy much
more powerful non-ice-capable warships into Canadian waters
- warships that the AOPS and its 25mm gun cannot deter.
With climate change continuing to take its toll on the Arctic
sea ice, such a scenario may come sooner rather than later.
However, one should keep in mind that if our waters are open
for other countries’ naval ships, then they would be open to
our own as well. An AOPS may not be able to deter another
Arctic state’s frigate or destroyer, but a Canadian Halifax class
frigate or future Surface Combatant can. Meanwhile, during
the winter, the AOPSs can continue to ensure sovereignty in
our waters. Thus, should the ice in fact melt earlier and more
extensively than expected, Canada’s investment in the AOPS
would not be for nought—the ice will remain in winter, and
an ice-capable vessel required for that period, while the rest
of the Royal Canadian Navy will be able to assist during summer
melts.
That said, the AOPS could have some improvements.
In particular, it lacks an underwater surveillance capability.
Given that we know foreign submarines have operated in
our waters in years past, it would seem to be a prudent step
on our part to equip the AOPSs with anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) capabilities. Although the AOPS design specifies
for it to be equipped with provisions for the deployment of
“towed bodies” (e.g. towed sonar array) from the stern container
area, such a sonar system would not work well in the
ice-infested waters of the North, as the sonar towing cable
would easily become entangled in the ice. Therefore, a robust
ASW capability for the AOPS would require a hull-mounted
sonar; while one may fear that this would impair the ship’s
ice-breaking capabilities, the fact that the Danish ice-capable
Thetis class also has a hull-mounted sonar suggests that this is
not an insurmountable problem. Furthermore, I would also
suggest the AOPS to be equipped with magazine storage for
the CH-148 Cyclone helicopter, allowing it to rearm while on
board. Current plans for the AOPSs do not indicate any storage
capacity for helicopter munitions.
Despite these drawbacks, the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship
design has great promise for increasing Canada’s ability to
monitor and defend our Arctic waters. Most criticisms of the
AOPSs fail to take a comparative perspective. These critiques
often take the ships out of the international and domestic
contexts, examining them only in arbitrary absolute terms
without regard for how they stand up to potential adversaries.
Furthermore, some critics fail to offer viable alternatives, or
propose alternatives that do not actually improve upon the
AOPS design. As mentioned, the AOPS are not heavily armed,
but that is because neither are its potential opponents. They are
not fast, but that is alleviated by its organic helicopter capability.
They do not have as much range as full icebreakers, but
that is because there will be a new forward refuelling point.
In essence, every criticism of the AOPS design can be easily
debunked via a close examination of the spatial, military, and
temporal context in which the ships are to serve. To paraphrase
a certain science fiction character: she may not look like much,
but she’s got it where it counts.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Institute
or its members.
Notes
1 Most data on AOPS design sourced from Department of National Defence,
AOPS SRD - Draft. Department of National Defence, September 15, 2010.
2 Data on AOPS helicopter capabilities sourced from Department of National
Defence, Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship Helicopter/Ship Interface Requirements Rev 4.
Department of Defence, October 13, 2010.
JULY—AUGUST 14 5

Canadian Counter-terrorism:
From Preventer to Responder
by Kyle Wierks
Canada has often been considered by outside nations to
be a refuge for international terrorists. Its supposedly
lax immigration laws, inadequate focus on security
and defence, and lack of counter-terrorism experience have
led to foreign nations, especially the United States of America,
label Canada as having inferior counter-terrorism capabilities.
Despite these common ideas of Canadian counter-terrorism,
Canada’s experience with terrorism over the past ninety years
has greatly informed its current counter-terrorism policies to
create a very strong counter-terrorism framework in Canada
today. From the early 1920s to present day, Canada has responded
swiftly and harshly to all terrorist threats on its soil. In
the last decade and a half, we have even seen Canada turn from
being a responder to terrorism to a preventer of terrorist acts.
Canada’s experience with terrorism really began in the
1920s located mainly in the province of British Columbia.
The Doukhobors were an ethno-religious group originating
in Russia who then went through a split in the late 1910s.
Emerging from this religious split were the Sons of Freedom,
a radical arm of the Doukhobors who despised the supposed
secularism that was prevalent in Canada at the time. The Sons
of Freedom began an arson campaign in the early 1920s, targeting
secular buildings and symbols of government power
such as railways. As the terror campaign continued through
the 1940s and ‘50s, the BC government struck back, leading
to a peak in terrorist conflict in the early 1960s. Through
the government’s harsh response, the authorities eventually
arrested the main body of Sons of Freedom terrorists in the
mid-1960s and essentially shut down their operations. Though
the Sons of Freedom were all but eradicated, they did rise
again, briefly, in the early 1980s, but have never been a major
threat to Canada since the 1960s.
The early 1960s also saw the materialization of another
terrorist group, le Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ). The
FLQ was a nationalist terror group based out of Montreal that
was dedicated to the secession of Quebec from Canada by
any means necessary. Their bombing campaign in the earlyto
mid-1960s brought a strong response from the Canadian
government, who ordered the arrests of the FLQ leadership.
By 1968, most of the FLQ’s leaders were either in prison or
in exile, and a new leadership rose up to take their place. Up
until then, the FLQ’s bombing campaigns had been targeting
buildings and purposefully avoiding casualties, but under
this new leadership, all of that changed. The FLQ became
Kyle Wierks is a first year Master’s student in political science at the University
of Alberta studying international relations and Canadian politics with a
focus on international and Canadian security. He hopes to finish his degree
in Summer 2014.
PARTICIPANT IN THE 16 TH
CDAI GRADUATE STUDENT SYMPOSIUM
increasingly more violent and lethal until things came to a
head in October, 1970.
The October Crisis of 1970 (also known as the FLQ
Crisis) started on October 5 when the FLQ kidnapped a British
official named James Cross. Two days later, the Canadian
government declared war on the FLQ and the military rolled
into Montreal. Then, on October 10, another cell of the FLQ
kidnapped Quebec Minister of Labour Pierre Laporte. The
War Measures Act (now defunct) was evoked by Prime Minister
Pierre Trudeau on October 15, suspending civil liberties
throughout Quebec, and Canadian soldiers lined the streets;
curfews were put in place and on October 16 over 500 people
were arrested in Montreal alone, though all were later released.
Then, on October 17, Minister Laporte was found dead.
The Army remained in Montreal for months. On November
6, 1970, Bernard Lortie, one of Minister Laporte’s
kidnappers, was arrested. The Canadian Army, the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and the Quebec Provincial
Police (QPP) all worked together to fight back and arrest
members of the FLQ. James Cross’s freedom was negotiated
on December 3 in exchange for passage for his kidnappers to
Cuba. The last of Minister Laporte’s kidnappers were arrested
on December 28. The Canadian Army left Montreal in February
of 1971, but the FLQ remained until 1973, when they were
finally eradicated by the QPP.
The 1960s was also an important decade in the USA, because
in 1959 the Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista, a friend of
America, was deposed and replaced by Fidel Castro. The 1960s
saw growing tensions between the USA and Cuba culminating
in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. In this time, the USA cut off
all foreign relations with Cuba, but Canada retained its relations
with both countries. American nationalists saw this as a
slight to their country and some Americans regarded Canada
as an ally of their enemy. The mid-1960s saw the beginning
of an anti-Cuba terror campaign launched against Canada
by American nationalists. Though the threat levels were low
and the attacks were mostly isolated, the anti-Cuban terrorists
conducted campaigns in the mid-1960s, the early-1970s, and
the final time in 1980. However, with cooperation between
Canadian and American law enforcement leading to multiple
arrests, combined with a decreased level of tensions between
Cuba and America, the American nationalist attacks never
occurred again after 1980.
After the final attack by anti-Cuban terrorists in 1980,
the following six years saw Canada face multiple terror threats.
Not only did the Doukhobor Sons of Freedom re-emerge for
five years (1981-1986), but there was also new threats facing
Canada. A British Columbian “hippie” terrorist group calling
6 SITREP

themselves Direct Action (labelled the “Squamish Five” by
the media) carried out non-lethal bombing attacks on several
industrial/commercial targets from Toronto to BC in 1982.
All of its members were arrested at a roadblock in January
1983. There were also two more very important terror groups
operating in Canada in the 1980s: Armenian terrorists and
Sikh terrorists.
Armenian terrorist activities first began in 1982 when
a group called the Justice Commandos of the Armenian
Genocide (JCAG) attacked and murdered a Turkish military
attaché working in Canada. Another Armenian group called
the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
(ASALA) attempted to kill another Turkish diplomat in
Canada, but failed. In all, between 1982 and 1985 Armenian
terrorists carried out five attacks on Turkish targets, one attack
on a Swiss target, and one attack on a Canadian target.
The last attack came in early 1985 when Armenian terrorists
assaulted the Turkish embassy in Ottawa with a van full of
explosives. They killed a security guard, took eleven people
hostage (the Turkish ambassador managed to escape), and
blockaded themselves in the embassy. The resulting standoff
between the terrorists and the police lasted for four hours
before the terrorists gave up and surrendered. Two weeks later,
as the terrorists were being held in custody, other Armenian
terrorists threatened to detonate explosives in the Montreal
and Toronto subways unless their arrested brethren were set
free. The Canadian government refused, and the threatened
attacks never came to fruition. The captured terrorists were
convicted and received sentences ranging from nine years to
life in prison. Incidentally, the attack on the Turkish embassy
was the last Armenian terrorist attack anywhere in the world.
While the Armenian terror attacks ended in the conviction
of those involved, Canada’s experience with Sikh terrorism
in the 1980s did not fare so well. Sikh extremists began
their campaign in 1984 with attacks on Indian diplomats and
Indian buildings in Canada as a response to the Indian government’s
attack on a sacred Sikh shrine. But their most important
attack, which was also the single most deadly terrorist attack
originating out of Canada, was the Air India bombing on June
23, 1985. An Air India flight left Vancouver, BC, where Sikh
extremists had placed explosives in the cargo hold. While the
plane was flying over the Atlantic Ocean on its way to Ireland,
the explosives detonated, blowing up the airplane and killing
all 329 people aboard, most of whom were Indo-Canadians.
The Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), which
had been created barely a year before this attack, was tasked
with heading up the investigation. The fledgling intelligence
service found itself wrapped up in political red tape and had
difficulty working with the RCMP to conduct its investigations.
There were no convictions this time, but when Sikh
extremists tried to reproduce their attack on an Air India
flight leaving Montreal a year later, the attempted bombing
was stopped before it could succeed.
Canada learned from both its successes and failures with
terrorism and in the late 1980s convened two special Senate
committees (followed by a third in 1999) to lay out the foundation
for counter-terrorism policy in Canada. Then September
11, 2001, changed the world’s understanding of terrorism.
Suddenly, terrorism was at the forefront of public policy and
public concern around the world. Canada responded to the
international call, spearheaded by the USA, to move its fight
against terrorism to foreign lands. So Canada went to Afghanistan,
where it stayed for over a decade, fighting to bring
peace to Afghanistan and to remove the terrorist haven there.
And the Canadians fought bravely, as tens of thousands of
Canadian soldiers have served in Afghanistan with over 155
courageous Canadians giving their lives.
While Canada’s fight against terrorism had gone international,
it still faced a very real threat of terror activity
within its own borders. Canada’s first domestic response to the
9/11 terror attacks was the passing of the Anti-Terrorism Act,
which received Royal Assent in December of the same year.
This Act criminalized the act of terrorism and provided law
enforcement with special powers when investigating charges
of terrorism. Some of the Act’s provisions were removed in
2007, but a recent Senate bill, the 2012 Combating Terrorism
Act, reinstated some of these provisions while creating new
criminal offences for assisting terror activities, both domestic
and abroad, and leaving Canada to partake in terror activities.
The first person to be arrested and convicted under the
2001 Anti-Terrorism Act was Mohammad Momin Khawaja,
who was arrested March 29, 2004, for conspiring with British
terrorists to detonate a bomb in Britain and was convicted
October 29, 2008. He was sentenced to 10.5 years in prison.
The year 2006 saw a new terror threat emerge: the Toronto
18. CSIS first caught wind of this group in 2002 when
it intercepted a communication between Fahim Ahmad, who
was trying to set up a terrorist cell in Toronto, and known
jihadists living outside of Canada. CSIS did not act right away,
but kept Ahmad under surveillance. Two years later, it came
across communications by Ahmad and Zakaria Amara to a
known jihadist website. At the same time, it received information
from a Toronto imam that the two men were spreading
jihadist sentiments in his mosque. With both men now under
surveillance, CSIS became concerned that this was no longer
an isolated action and in 2005 recruited a Canadian Muslim
named Mubin Shaikh to befriend Ahmad and Amara. In December
2005, Ahmad and Amara held a jihadist training camp.
Shaikh, who was a former member of the Canadian military,
told his new friends that he shared their jihadist sentiments
and would be willing to help train their new recruits. With
his help, CSIS and the RCMP were able to set up surveillance
to watch the training camp and gather information.
Over the next several months, CSIS and the RCMP discovered
that Ahmad and Amara were planning some sort of
bomb attack. They already had enough evidence to arrest the
pair for running a terrorist training camp, but they wanted
JULY—AUGUST 14 7

more charges. So the RCMP sent one of its own officers,
Shaher Elsohemy, to make contact with the group. Elsohemy
told the group that he was able to get them the chemicals they
needed to build their bombs. After several months of building
a relationship with Amara, Elsohemy made the final sale
of the chemicals on June 2, 2006. Immediately following the
transaction, Elsohemy’s fellow RCMP officers swept in and
arrested Amara and executed a search warrant on his house.
In the following 24 hours, 17 people were arrested for their
participation in the Toronto 18 plot and the 18 th member was
arrested two months later. These 18 people were arrested and
convicted for a large number of terrorism-related crimes,
including gathering materials to build fertilizer bombs which
they planned to detonate at the Toronto Stock Exchange, CFB
Trenton, CSIS headquarters, and possibly even the Parliament
Buildings in Ottawa.
Though the Toronto 18 is possibly the most well-known
terrorist plot in Canada since 9/11, it is not the only one. In
August 2010, three people were arrested in Ottawa and Montreal
for their plot to detonate improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) on the Montreal subway, at the Canadian Parliament,
and several other locations. One man, Hiva Alizadeh, was the
focus on the investigation, and the other two men were only
discovered after they made contact with him. For this reason,
authorities remain concerned that they might be part of a
larger terror cell, but this has never been proven.
There have been more examples of terrorist plots in Canada
in the past year, as well. Two men were arrested in April
2013 for their role in a plot to blow up a VIA Rail line as it ran
through Canada. They were arrested after a joint operation by
Canadian and American law enforcement agencies. Two more
people were arrested on July 1, 2013, in Abbotsford, BC. This
couple were operating alone in their plot to plant homemade
bombs at the British Columbia Legislature Building and then
detonate them during the Canada Day celebrations that would
take place there later that evening.
It is interesting to watch as Canada’s experience with terrorism
has changed the way in which it fights terrorism, but
not the way in which it reacts to it. Allow me to expand on that.
Prior to the 1990s, Canada was always acting in response to
terrorism. There would be a terrorist attack and then Canada
would respond by launching an investigation or declaring war
on the terrorists. Canada was often successful in its response to
terrorism (with the exception of the Air India investigation),
but it was always one step behind the terrorists. CSIS and the
Senate committees in the 1980s and ‘90s were designed to
change this, which they did. There has not been a successful
terrorist attack on Canadian soil since 1989, when a bus was
hijacked for several hours before the hijacker surrendered (and
even that might not have been an act of terrorism). Instead,
Canada is now an effective preventer of terrorism. Rather than
responding to terrorists after there is an attack, Canada’s law
enforcement and security services are able to work together
to target potential terrorists, place them under surveillance,
and stop terror activities before they begin. Much of this new
strategy is laid out in Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the
latest edition of which was released in 2013.
However, while Canada’s strategy in fighting terrorism
has changed, its reaction to terrorism, as I already stated, has
not. With only a few exceptions, every terrorist activity in
Canada, both plotted and carried out, has resulted in the arrest,
death, exile, or other punishment of the terrorists or their
organization. While it may be true that when terrorist groups
such as the FLQ or ASALA were broken up by Canadian law
enforcement not all of their members were actually arrested,
it is also true that Canada has always responded to terrorism
with a strong hand. Terrorists have been arrested and convicted
with long jail sentences. When terror groups emerge in
Canada, they have historically been eradicated quite quickly.
Canada is not the weak, terrorist haven of a nation that other
countries might think; it has a history of dealing harshly and
quickly with terrorists, both within its own borders and, more
recently, outside of its borders. 1
The views expressed are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Institute
or its members.
Notes
1 The historical information included in this article comes from a variety of
sources. However, much of information about Canada’s experience with terrorism
prior to 2001 came from a paper titled “The (un)peaceable kingdom Terrorism
and Canada before 9/11” written by David Charters. That being said, the author
used many different sources to supplement this information. The information
used to lay out the history of Canadian terrorism after 9/11 has come primarily
from news articles, government reports/websites, and various press releases.
8 SITREP

Vocal Critic of N. Korea’s Nuclear Ambition and Belligerence: A
Retired PLA General’s View on Geopolitics in Northeast Asia
by Weixin Lu
In China’s state-run media a group of star commentators
with military background frequently comment on
hot geopolitical topics. Among them stands out retired
People’s Liberation Army(PLA) Lieutenant General Wang
Hongguang, a vocal critic of North Korea’s nuclear ambition
and belligerence. Seen as a strong military voice, his analysis of
regional security and China’s policies, particularly geopolitical
dynamics in Northeast Asia, not only have drawn international
analysts’ attention, but also has led to heated debates among
Chinese citizens whose reactions are decidedly mixed over
international issues.
After having retired from active duty as deputy commander
of the Nanjing Military Region, Wang currently sits
on the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference(CPPCC), the country’s top political
advisory body. At 65, he is from a military family. His father,
Wang Jianqing, was an army commander in East China before
rising to the rank of major general. His father-in-law, Gao
Houliang, was political commissar of the PLA air force in
the late-1970s.
Potential Nuclear Contamination from North Korea
North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and its capricious
nature annoy its Chinese ally. In the Chinese media and
academic community there is a consensus that it is time to
get tougher with rather than be tolerant toward Pyongyang.
Wang’s commentary is simply reflective of popular sentiments.
“China would be most likely affected by nuclear contamination
from North Korea because the North’s nuclear facilities
are mainly built alongside the China-North Korea border, and
the Chinese government should make every effort to persuade
the North to drop nuclear programs, at least stop the fourth
test,” He wrote in an article titled “The Nuke Contamination
Would Be Disaster for China If N.Korean Nuke Sites under
Attack by US, S.Korea” in Global Times on 16 December 2013,
an outspoken nationalist newspaper affiliated with the Chinese
ruling party’s mouthpiece People’s Daily.
The article appeared in the wake of the execution of
North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong-un’s uncle Jang
Song Thaek, once considered the country’s No. 2 official who
helped young Kim come to power two years ago. The political
earthquake reflected the unpredictability of the Kim regime,
and underscored the urgency of the North’s nuclear issue. The
Weixin Lu, a previous contributor to Sitrep, is a freelance writer with a focus
on China issues and East Asia geopolitics. He analyzes the international issues
in the region and provides a unique commentary based on his journalistic
instinct. He has written articles on China and East Asia geopolitics for several
Canadian Institutes.
incident too highlighted a prolonged rift between China and
the North given that Jang was seen as a pro-Beijing leader
responsible for facilitating economic co-operation with China.
In the article Wang expressed China’s disgruntlement
and frustration with North Korea’s nuclear pursuit that has
created a serious threat to China’s security as well as a lingering
instability in the region. In his view, North Korea’s stability first
conforms to China’s interests, and the North’s denuclearization,
a precondition for stability on the Peninsular, is more
attuned to China’s interests.
The six-party talks that aim to dismantle the North’s
nuclear program through negotiations have stalled for five
years due to Pyongyang’s withdrawal. The North wants to have
direct dialogue with the United States, though Washington
tries to avoid it. North Korea, Wang acknowledged, has insisted
on talks as a nuclear state with the United States on an
equal footing, thus leaving China in an awkward situation as
a middleman between them. On the other hand, the United
States has allied with Japan and South Korea and mobilized
support of the international community, exerting heavy pressure
upon the North. Therefore, Wang argued, the standoff
of both sides has simply created instability on the Peninsular.
The North’s ruling party maintained “the Byungjin
Policy,” or “economic development and nuclear weapons together”
at its national conference in March 2013. The policy
highlights Pyongyang’s determination to develop nuclear
arms. Given that, Wang predicted, there will be no feasible
solution to the North’s denuclearization any time soon, and
instability is expected to continue on the Peninsular.
Wang detailed potential fallouts brought about by the
North’s nuclear pursuit. China, he cautioned, is subject to
threats from North Korea’s nuclear program due to its nuclear
sites’ proximity to China. The radioactive leak from the North’s
regular tests could drift to China’s territory. In the event of a
mishap, it would be an incalculable catastrophe to Northeast
China.
The earthquake, triggered by the North’s third nuclear
test in 12 February, 2013 resulted in distinct tremors in
China’s Yanbian region neighbouring to North Korea. If the
test upgraded, the tremors would be much stronger and possibly
bring about earthquake disasters in China. If the North’s
delivery vehicle deviated from its route and fell in Chinese
territory, it could cause more damage. “So China should take
precautions for potential mishaps,” Wang argued.
Wang too expressed concerns over the geopolitical challenge
from US military presence in the region due to North
Korea’s development of nuclear bombs and long-range missiles
to carry them. In response to the North’s nuclear program, he
JULY—AUGUST 14 9

noted, the United States has been deploying anti-missile systems
in South Korea, Japan, the high seas and America’s west
coast. “The North’s missile technology would not be able to
pose a threat to continental America, but the US pre-emptive
deployment is in essence aiming at China’s limited strategic
nuclear capability, thus offsetting China’s minimum nuclear
deterrence against the United States and threatening China’s
strategic security,” Wang concluded.
Bringing emphasis to the potential nuclear disaster from
the North, if a high-intensity earthquake occurred or North
Korean nuclear facilities were attacked by the US and South
Korea alliance when the situation spiralled out of control on
the Peninsula, the nuclear contamination from damaged sites
would be worse than Japan’s Fukushima accident. “It would
be a total disaster for China,” Wang insisted.
North Korea’s nuclear program not only has posed a
threat to China, the United States, South Korea, Japan and
Russia, but also inflicted pain upon the North itself. “For stability
on the Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, China should
make every effort to persuade the North to abandon its nuclear
program,” arguing “China should demand the United States
and South Korea not deploy nuclear weapons on the Peninsula
—VIRALREAD.COM
and not use them against the North.”
The retired general expressed a pragmatic view that
China should do more as a major player on the North’s denuclearisation.
The international community and Chinese
public are aware that China has enjoyed more than 60 years of
traditional friendship with North Korea providing the largest
aid to and exerting a special influence on the North, so China
should use the leverage to the best of its power. Meanwhile,
China should let the North know consequences if it continues
the fourth nuclear test.
China’s recent dealing with two Koreas has somehow
corroborated Wang’s analysis. President Xi Jin-ping’s two-day
visit to Seoul early July, 2014, as a return for his South Korean
counterpart Park Geun-hye’s visit to Beijing a year ago, has
highlighted China’s diplomatic priority, placing Seoul ahead
of Pyongyang. During Mr.Xi’s visit, both countries reportedly
agreed that the North’s denuclearisation must be “achieved at
all costs.” The trip could be seen as a move to hedge against
the US-led alliance.
Strengthening ties with Seoul, Beijing has snubbed
Pyongyang. After nearly three years in power, Kim Jong-un
has not received an invitation to China, nor has he invited
10 SITREP

Mr.Xi to Pyongyang, a significant thermometer to measure
the temperature of bilateral relations. Kim’s father Kim Jong-yi
and grandfather Kim Il-sung paid numerous visits to China
during their lifelong reign. In spite of this, China is expected
to maintain a lukewarm sometimes strained ties with the
North, providing economic aid and political support the
isolated regime badly needs. The North’s geopolitical value
has decreased, but China still sees it as a buffer zone at least
psychologically.
Query Assessment of North Korea’s Military
North Korea’s military strength including conventional
forces and nuclear capability has frequently been discussed
in international media and academic communities. After the
publication of US and South Korean reports on the North’s
military each year, experts would analyse them and debate
about the validity of the North’s military estimation.
In an article titled “N. Korean Military Largely Overestimated”
in Global Times on 31 May 2013, Wang questioned
the validity of the recent US and South Korea’s assessment of
North Korean military power, particularly a conspicuous imbalance
of the ratio of equipment to personnel. According to
the South’s annual report, the North has 3,500 towed artillery
guns, 4,400 self-propelled artillery guns, 4,800 multi-barrel
launchers (or 5,100 estimated by Americans), 7,500 mortars
and 11,000 anti-aircraft guns. In addition, the North has 4,100
tanks and 2,100 armoured vehicles.
Based on calculation, Wang said, those artillery pieces
could equip sixty-five towed artillery regiments, eighty-one
self-propelled artillery regiments, eighty-nine multi-barrel
launch regiments (or ninety-three regiments according to
American data), thirty-seven large-calibre mortar regiments
and three hundred and five anti-aircraft gun regiments.
Given the context, North Korea would have half a
million artillery troops totally comprising more than one
hundred artillery divisions. And the North’s tanks and armoured
vehicles could equip about a dozen tank divisions.
Then there are the North’s 200,000 special forces, and after
that only 100,000 troops are left for logistic support mission.
“So, where are the North’s infantry units now” asked Wang,
pointing out an outstanding imbalance in the North’s military
establishment that was respectively revealed in the US and
South Korea’s reports.
According to the article titled “DoD Issues New Threat
Report North Korea” in Military Times, 9 March, 2014, North
Korea has the fourth largest military in the world in terms of
manpower, with as many as 1.2 million people serving on active
duty, including the ground forces, air force, navy, strategic
rocket forces and a special operation force.
Routine maintenance is a huge cost estimated at roughly
three billion US dollars. “Actually North Korea could not afford
it,” Wang asserted. “Given that, much of its equipment is
believed to be sealed up. When out of service for a long time,
the equipment would literally be nearly scrapped.” With satellite
technology, the United States and South Korea should
have a pretty good idea of what is going on with the North’s
military equipment.
Wang too rebutted an account that “North Korea has the
ability to saturate Seoul with up to half a million shells within
an hour.” In reality, the retired PLA commander explained,
each time an artillery gun can continuously deliver only one or
two units of fire, maximum one hundred or so shells. Given the
circumstance, five thousand guns would be needed to fire half
a million shells. However, when five thousand artillery guns
were closely deployed, roughly one gun for every ten metres,
along the terrain in front of the areas neighbouring Seoul,
they would easily be targeted by the US and South Korean
forces. The North Korean army would have great difficulty
concealing pre-positioning moves.
In fact, Wang noted, except for 170mm propelled guns
and 240mm multi-barrel launchers, most of the North’s
artillery guns fall short of Seoul, which is 40-50 kilometres
away from the 38th parallel dividing line. And there is a demilitarized
zone along the line, a buffer area four kilometres
wide. Given that, the version of “the North’s artillery delivery
of a heavy bombardment on Seoul” is not tenable, Wang
concluded.
A more realistic threat to the US-South Korea alliance,
is from the North’s one hundred surface to surface missiles
mounted on trucks, which have a range of 200 kilometres
covering the whole northern areas of South Korea. South
Korean media quoted the South’s intelligence saying that
North Korea could possibly test the advanced 300mm rocket
launchers whose range is at 180 kilometres. Wang queried the
information. “The Russian ‘Smerch’ 300mm multiple rocket
launcher has a 70 kilometres-range. Since the North has no
capability to manufacture the third generation main battle
tank, how could it make a much highly sophisticated artillery
piece” Wang doubted.
Wang’s analysis partially coincides with the remarks
by Anthony Cordesman, Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Artillery
is not that lethal,” Cordesman asserted. “It takes a long time
for it to produce the densities of fires to go beyond terrorism
and harassment.” Even in a worst scenario, where both U.S.
and South Korean forces are somehow paralyzed or otherwise
engaged, and North Korea fires its 170mm artillery batteries
and 240mm rocket launchers with total impunity, the grim
reality would not live up to the hype. Flattening, levelling or
otherwise destroying a city is an obsolete tactic. The firestorms
of the past century have been replaced with surgical, precisionguided
strikes, Cordesman noted.
In conclusion Wang noted that the exaggeration of
the North’s strength was a psychological warfare waged by
the United States and two Koreas. With a “powerful” North
Korean army stationed at the border, South Korean military
would be able to seek more funding from the national assembly.
Meanwhile, talks of the North’s threats would help to
JULY—AUGUST 14 11

promote “patriotic education” among South Koreans. In the
event of a war, the South could easily switch to the wartime
system, Wang thought.
When confronted with “highly militarized” North Korea,
the United States would have sufficient justification to
strengthen its military presence in South Korea, advancing its
Asia strategy and “legitimately” deploying anti-missile systems
in the region. On the other hand, Wang said, North Korea’s
silence on the US and South Korean assessment is intended to
impress the world with its inflated military, thus threatening
the neighbours and gaining from “the brink of war policy.”
Considering Wang’s military background, his analysis
of the North’s artillery is very likely a reflection of the real
strength. Given that the artillery troops are major part of
North Korean army, the assessment he provided reflects to a
certain extent the general level of the North’s military forces.
The North’s Missile nearly Hits a Chinese Flight
North Korea’s provocations frequently grab media
headlines. On 4 March 2014 North Korea fired several shortrange
missiles toward the Sea of Japan passing through the
commercial air route from Tokyo to Shenyang, a northeastern
Chinese city, just six minutes before a Chinese airliner flew
through the trajectory of one of these missiles, according to
South Korean military.
“The Chinese authorities should strongly criticize North
Korea’s irresponsible act and make the North ensure that no
similar incident will happen,” Wang Hongguang noted in an
article titled “N.Korean Rocket Passing through China’s Air
Route Is Dangerous “ in Global Times on 11 March 2014,
adding that the North’s act had seriously threatened the safety
of a flight on this passage if the news proved to be true. The
article came three days after the mysterious disappearance of
a Malaysia Air flight on its way from Kuala Lampur to Beijing,
thus sparking extra concerns over North Korea’s apparently
reckless acts that would endanger aviation safety in the region.
Wang disagreed with some online comments that said
Seoul was “making a fuss about it” and “provoking dissension
between Beijing and Pyongyang.” From a military perspective
he assessed the North’s provocation as high risk. In the military
drill, he noted, co-ordination of the air force and ground artillery
unit is an important part of training programs. Without
co-ordination, a friendly fire could otherwise inflict casualties
upon its own forces in actual combat.
Wang cited the specifications of North Korea’s 300mm
rocket launcher that was mentioned in the incident. When
the launcher’s range is set at 50-60 kilometers, the maximum
trajectory height is about 14,000 meters. And when the range
is at 150-kilometers, the maximum trajectory height reaches
as high as 30,000 meters. Given that the maximum altitude of
a large commercial jet is at between 10,000 to 12,000 meters,
the Chinese airliner in this incident was just under the trajectory
height of the North’s rocket.
In actual combat, Wang explained, co-ordination of artillery
strikes and air force attacks in the same area is prepared
beforehand, and the interval between the two attacks is usually
set at two or three minutes. During an exercise, the interval
will be prolonged up to ten minutes to ensure safety. In this
incident, six minutes of interval between a North Korean missile
and a Chinese flight is an extremely short time differential.
Furthermore, civil aviation had received no notice of military
drill from North Korea in advance.
North Korea’s act, Wang argued, was totally against the
international norm and ordinary military practice, since a
country that holds a military exercise should be responsible
for ensuring no civil aircraft fly into the relevant airspace during
the time. “In order to prevent accidental harm to civilian
flights, military exercise command centers should inform air
traffic control authorities of the upcoming drills in advance.
Usually the military yields to airlines, and sometimes airlines
adjust their routes and flying time,” Wang said. “The schedules
of the flights could be postponed up to half a day, thus ensuring
the absolute safety of civil aviation.”
In this case, Wang noted, North Korea fired missiles
toward the Sea of Japan. Given that the region was far from
China’s territory, it would be difficult for China to track the
trajectory of the North’s missiles. North Korea was fully aware
that its rockets would run across the Chinese flight’s route
and could see from its radar system that the Chinese airliner
was scheduled to fly into this danger zone. But North Korean
military ignored it giving an order to fire rockets.
In the article he expressed China’s military’s strong indignation
against the North’s reckless act. North Korea “manifested
a rather unfriendly attitude toward China,” Wang noted,
adding that relevant Chinese authorities should not downplay
the incident with diplomatic rhetoric like “the Chinese flight
flew over North Korean airspace normally on that day with
nothing special” or “China will verify the relevant situation
with the relevant party and express necessary concerns over
that.” The relevant authorities here are believed to refer to
China’s foreign ministry.
Neither the Pyongyang regime nor its embassy in Beijing
has as of now clarified media reports on the rocket launch
incident. Usually North Korean diplomats would react to
such international media report they deem slanderous or
malicious. For instance, a Chinese professor noted in a commentary
in Global Times, 20 December 2013 that most of
cemeteries for Chinese army martyrs in North Korea lie in
waste. The accounts raised Chinese readers’ eyebrows. One
month later, a North Korean diplomat in Beijing furiously
denied the accounts in the same newspaper questioning the
author’s political motive.
Reflection on the Korean War from New Perspective
With North Korea relentlessly pursuing nuclear weapons,
China has shown displeasure with its long-time ally,
Continued on page 16
12 SITREP

Celebrating the 70th anniversary of D-Day
by J. R. ‘Digger’ MacDougall
RCMI member J.R. ‘Digger’ MacDougall missed the
Cavalry Luncheon this year to participate in the
celebrations of the 70th anniversary of D-Day. He
planned to attend the events on Canadian and American
landing areas, but traffic congestion, tight security and long
lineups limited access to all sites.
This was also the 49th anniversary of Digger’s first visit
to the D-Day landing areas when as a Captain he commanded
a 100 man Guard of Honour in 1965 as part of the dedication
ceremonies for a Cairn which was erected to honour the fallen
of the Fort Garry Horse (10th Armored Regiment) during
the invasion. On D-Day 1944 The FGH landed with the first
waves of The Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada, the North Shore
Regiment and le Regiment de la Chaudiere.
Coincidental with the visit of Digger and his wife Nancy
to Normandy was a visit by members of the Fort Garry Horse
Association who were tracing the path of the Garries from
their Forming Up Place (FUP) in England, through the landing
and battle sites into Caen and the Falaise Gap. The Mac-
Dougall’s joined the FGH Association group and participated
in wreath laying ceremonies and services 7-9 June.
A great deal of authenticity was provided by local organizations
from around Europe and even collectors from
North America who wore period allied uniforms and drove
around the beach areas in armoured vehicles, jeeps, trucks,
and an assortment of pre-war and wartime civilian vehicles.
There were even tented camp areas set up for visitors to view.
Security was extremely tight throughout the entire
province of Normandy on 6 June due to the visits of heads of
state from around the world, including Queen Elizabeth and
members of our royal family. Even cow paths were guarded
with armed security agents and local residents as well as
tourists and official visitors required security stickers on their
vehicles. Hundreds if not thousands of vehicles were turned
back daily from security points.
Some of Canadian Wounded Warriors of Afghanistan at the Memorial Service at the War Cemetery.
—J.R. MACDOUGALL
JULY—AUGUST 14 13

Highlights of the return to Normandy
for the MacDougalls
• Participation with the Afghanistan Wounded Warriors
of Canada in official services at the Canadian War Cemetery
at Beny-sur-mer.
• Official wreath laying ceremonies and services at FGH
Markers on the advance to Caen 1944.
• Accepting an invitation to read the names of Canadian
D-Day War Dead.
• Visit to the Juno Beach Centre and the monument to
Canadians.
• Visit to the newly named Canada House on Juno Beach,
which is a living memorial to the Queen’s Own Rifles of
Canada and The Fort Garry Horse and other regiments
which accompanied them during the invasion.
• Visits to the FGH Cairn erected in 1965 and to the FGH
Memorial erected by the Association In 2002.
• Visits to several memorials erected by regiments and
associations in the landing area.
• There will continue to be annual celebrations and services
to mark the anniversary of the D-Day landings to
honour the allies, their regiments, their fallen and the
survivors; however, this 70th anniversary will probably
be the last big celebration with survivors present.
Digger told Sitrep: “Throughout the entire visits to
Normandy, Nancy and I recalled every day the words from
RL Binyon’s The Fallen:”
They went with songs to the battle, they were young,
Straight of limb, true of eye, steady and aglow.
They were staunch to the end against odds uncounted;
They fell with their faces to the foe.
They shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old:
Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn.
At the going down of the sun and in the morning
We will remember them.
“We are proud of the achievements of those who, like my
father, served during World War II. We are proud to have been
in the position to honour those who participated in the D-Day
landing and memorialize those who fell, never to rise again.
Being on Sword, Juno and Gold Beaches and experiencing the
vastness of the ground that our troops had to cross in order
to survive the landing made the whole event so much more
meaningful for all who were there. It was truly a worthwhile
life experience to be there and remember the contribution of
so many Canadians.”
—J.R. MACDOUGALL
Left: Canadian Ambassador to France (later Governor General) Jules Leger with Capt MacDougall at
commemoration ceremonies in 1965. Right: Capt MacDougall at Fort Garry Horse Cairn,
where he commanded the FGH Guard of Honour in 1965
14 SITREP

Book Review: “The Great Escape: A Canadian Story” by Ted Barris
reviewed by Maj Thomas K. Fitzgerald
Winston Churchill was once asked how history would
judge him and his leadership in the Second World
War. Churchill responded that history would be kind
to him because he would write it. An ancillary to the notion that
the victors write history is the national conceit that only one
ally won the war to the almost absolute
exclusion of the efforts of the others.
Popular history has adopted the idea
that Canadians played an inconsequential
part in the winning of the war. Even
in descriptions of less than significant
war time events, the role of Canadians
is downplayed or ignored altogether. So
it is that when Hollywood portrayed the
mass escape of seventy-six airmen from
Stalag Luft III, a PW camp for Royal Air
Force and Royal Canadian Air Force members, on 24 March 1944,
nary a Canadian is portrayed as participating in the planning or
execution of the escape even though nine who participated in the
escape- three were captured and returned and six of “The Fifty”
were murdered- were Canadians. 1 If, for no other reason than
“setting the record straight” noted and award winning author Ted
Barris’ book The Great Escape is a valuable and necessary read.
The facts of the “Great Escape” are familiar to most but what
is unknown to many is the role Canadians played in the planning
of the escape. Wally Floody of Chatham, the “tunnel king,” who,
with his partner John Weir of Toronto, planned and dug “Tom,
Dick and Harry.” Tom Pengelly of Weston forged many of the
documents used by the escapers. George Sweanor of Port Hope
was instrumental in the security section of the “X” organization,
monitoring the guards (the “goons”) as they entered and left the
camp and Richard Bartlett of Vancouver who, for five years, kept
a clandestine radio away from the Germans so that the prisoners
could listen to the BBC were but a small few of the Canadians
involved in planning the escape.
Drawing on a wealth of archival, secondary materials
and, most importantly, interviews with the dwindling number of
survivors, their families and POW associations, Barris weaves a
fascinating story of the backgrounds, war time service and daily
lives of the kreigies (Kreigsgefangenen) or prisoners. One is left
astounded and with an immense sense of national pride at the
ingenuity and tenacity of these airmen who, under the very noses
of their captors, dug a series of lengthy tunnels under the wire,
produced the necessary clothing and official documents for the
escape and, eventually, escaped, all the while trying to prevent
the Germans from discovering their efforts. Their escapes commenced
almost from the day they were captured usually in a most
impromptu and often hilarious manner until the very day of their
liberation. Whether motivated by their duty as officers, a desire
to get back at the “goons” or out of simple boredom, Canadians
participated in every type of escape and contributed their skills
in their various preparations.
The sense of amusement which the reader might have from
reading The Great Escape does not take away from the serious
nature of escapes by PWs during the latter part of the war. By
1944, Aktion Kugel (Operation Bullet) and more precisely Stufe
III (Grade III) decreed that all recaptured fliers were to be turned
over to the Gestapo for interrogation and eventual execution.
Kugel was the basis for the murder of Hank Birkland (Spearhill),
Gordon Kidder (St. Catharines), Patrick Langford (Edmonton),
Edward McGill (Toronto), James Wernham (Winnipeg) and
George Wiley (Windsor) following their recapture. 2
The liberation of the Canadians did not, for many, end their
captivity. As Barris eloquently writes, many suffered from what
today would be called post-traumatic stress disorder and spent
countless years battling depression, sleepless nights, anger, guilt
and a sense of disillusionment with the whole idea of the escape.
For many, their return to Canada allowed them to return to the
anonymity of civilian life with little public acknowledgement of
their efforts until the release of the movie.
Barris’ The Great Escape is a thoroughly enjoyable book.
It combines a tremendous story with larger than life characters.
It is highly recommended for those who prefer their history
with little contextual analysis and great drama. It sets the record
straight that the Canadian airman was a resourceful and intrepid
individual who played a very real role in the final victory.
“The Great Escape: A Canadian Story” by Ted Barris Toronto
Thomas Allan Publishers 2013 ISBN 978-1-77102-272-9,
288 pages $33.99.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Institute
or its members.
Other Recommended Reading:
Dancocks, Daniel, G., In Enemy Hands: Canadian Prisoners of
War 1939-1945, Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1983.
Greenfield, Nathan, “The Forgotten: Canadian POWs, Escapers
and Evaders in Europe, 1939-1945,” Toronto: Harper-
Collins, 2013.
Morton, Desmond, Silent Battle: Canadian Prisoners of War in
Germany 1914-1919, Toronto: Lester Publishers Ltd., 1992.
Notes
1 The Great Escape. Directed: John Sturges. United Artists, 1963. James Garner
plays Lt. Robert Hendley, the “Scrounger” who is portrayed as an American
who enlists in the RCAF.
2 Following the end of the war, a number of field Gestapo officers were tried
for the murder of the fifty escapees. Fourteen were hanged for their roles in the
murders on 27 February 1948 at Hameln Jail. With the exception of Polizeiassistant
Erich Zacharias who was hanged for the murder of Gordon Kidder, no
other person was brought to justice for the murder of the other five Canadians:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/moslive/article-2285629/Nazi-killers-How-Great-
Escape-murders-led-post-war-Europes-biggest-manhunts.html
JULY—AUGUST 14 15

North Korea—continued from page 12
switching the bilateral relations to a normal state-to-state level
from so-called “blood-nurtured friendly relations,” a bond
forged in the 1950-53 Korean War. Remarkably, China’s official
media have on many occasions neutrally termed hostilities
of more than 60 years ago “the Korean War” rather than “the
War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea” that has been
used since the time when the Chinese army entered the war.
China’s conventional thinking has long seen the participation
of the Korean War as part of its military’s legendary legacy
that is reflected in the formation of the existing eighteen elite
PLA combined corps, most of which entered the war.
Against the backdrop, Wang brought up a pragmatic
perspective to look at the Korean War and its consequences
ensuing. “With regard to the country’s unification and development,
China has now been encumbered with consequences
from the Korean War that ended more than 60 years ago,”
Wang noted in an essay titled “China Encumbered with
Consequences from Korean Issues in History” in National
Human History of the late September issue 2013, a subsidiary
magazine of People’s Daily. Wang went into detail about
Korea’s traditional ties with imperial China during ancient
time. Historically the Peninsular witnessed numerous seesaws
between strategic offence and defence, threatening the
central government of imperial China, sometimes even with
destructive consequences.
While reviewing the modern Chinese history, Wang
thought that due to the Korean War, China’s military strategy
was diverted to the Peninsula from Taiwan, thus leading to the
separation of the island from Mainland China. Although the
United States re-bolstered up the Chiang Kai-shek government
in June 1950 out of multiple considerations, the outbreak of
the Korean War definitely was one of the major reasons. When
the war occurred, “China’s leaders too had significant differences
over the decision to enter it or not,” Wang recalled. “But
eventually they decided to send the troops.” Here Wang obviously
skipped the real reasons behind the outbreak of the War.
China is fearful that its modernization would be held
up once again as Pyongyang has been persisting in nuclear
weapons amid the growing tensions in the region. “With the
country faced with the North’s nuclear arms issue and instability
on the Peninsula, China’s strategic opportunity would be
affected by the tension there as did in history,” Wang noted,
adding that “we should not underestimate North Korea’s commitment
to nuclear programs, and should put it directly to
the North that no matter whether it goes ahead with nuclear
tests or not, make sure no immediate contamination to China’s
territory.” In the essay Wang unequivocally delivered Beijing’s
disgruntlement over the North’s nuclear program and grave
concerns over the regional tension. Wang reiterated a position
that the country would not see a historic recurrence any more.
With China boosting its ties with Seoul as a hedge
against the US and Japan influences, Japan eventually adopting
a controversial collective self-defence policy, Pyongyang
continuing provocative rocket launches while showing reconciliatory
posture over the issue of abducted Japanese nationals
for Tokyo’s easing certain sanctions, and Seoul sharing with
Beijing a mistrust of Japan’s new assertive military role and
of its obscurity of cruel invasion history, regional forces are
interactively in flux. In spite of these, as the US-dominated
regional defence measures are in full swing, and each East
Asia government is entangled in domestic issues, a geopolitical
equilibrium is likely to maintain in the region.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Institute
or its members.
Abstracts of proposed presentations from Masters
and Doctoral students in the realm of security and defence
are being accepted in two rounds, with deadlines
for submission of 12 May (first round) and 15 September
(second round). Between 16 and 20 presenters (circa 5
to 7 panels) will be accepted. Applicants will be notified
of the result of their submission within 10 days of the
deadline they submit against. The final draft of presentation
papers (maximum 4,000 words) must be submitted
by no later than 29 September.
Cash prizes of $1,000, $500 and $250 will be
16 SITREP
Call for Papers
17th Annual CDAI Graduate Student Symposium
“Canada’s Security and Defence Interests”
October 16–17, 2014, Currie Hall, RMC Kingston
http://www.cdainstitute.ca/en/symposium
presented to the top three presenters, who will also be
offered an honorarium of $2,000 each to develop their
presentations for publication in a CDA Institute publication.
An additional prize of $750, the Colonel Peter
Hunter Award will be presented by the Royal Canadian
Military Institute (RCMI). The recipient of the Colonel
Peter Hunter Award will also be offered the opportunity
to develop the paper into an RCMI publication.
Please send all presentation abstracts with your
institutional affiliation and contact information (no more
than one page) by email to policy@cdainstitute.ca.