Mosaic Esterhazy Potash January 29, 2006 Mine Fire Investigation ...

Mosaic Esterhazy Potash 

January 29, 2006 

Mine Fire Investigation Report 

1

Acknowledgement 

Many thanks to all those people who have contributed and for the 

assistance they have given to make this report possible. 

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Section 1 

Page No. 

Section 2 

Section 3 

Section 4 

1) Investigation Team 4 

2) Introduction to Mosaic & Dynatec 5 

1) Executive Summary 6 

2) Activities of Work to Dismantle Pipe & Start of the Fire 8 

1) Notification of Mine Emergency 14 

2) Map of K1 & K2 Mine 20 

3) Refuge Stations 

a) K2 Refuge Station #5 21 

b) K2 Refuge Station #2 28 

c) K2 Refuge Station #6 30 

d) K2 Refuge Station #3 32 

e) K1 Refuge Station #2 34 

f) K1 Refuge Station #3 36 

g) K1 Refuge Station #4 38 

h) Auxiliary Refuge Station 40 

1) Emergency Training and Equipment 45 

2) Mine Rescue Activities 46 

3) Conclusion 79 

Section 5 (Appendix) 

1) Mine Rescue Team 80 

2) Fire Inspectors Report 81 

3) Calculations Interpretations of Refuge Station Gas Levels 83 

4) Mine Regulations 87 

5) Photos 97 

6) Colonsay Fire Report 104 

7) Summary of Findings 105 

8) Summary of Recommendation 112 

3

4 4 

Section 1

Introduction to the Joint Report 

Of the Fire at the 

Mosaic Esterhazy K2 Underground 

January 29, 2006 

The Mosaic Company head office is located in Minneapolis, Minnesota with 

Phosphate mining operations in the USA and Potash mining operations in Canada and 

the USA. 

Mosaic’s Esterhazy potash operations consist of two separate shafts and processing 

operations known as K1 and K2 with a workforce of 850 people. Mining is conducted 

in the Esterhazy member of the Prairie Evaporates formation at 945 meters below the 

surface. The K2 operation is located about 15 km east of the town of Esterhazy and 

within a few kilometers of the Manitoba border. Production from K2 started in 1967 

and annual production capacity is currently at 2.2 million short tons of refined KCL¹ 

production. 

The Esterhazy underground potash ore is mined using a conventional room and pillar 

method with continuous boring machines. At the Esterhazy operation there are two 

types of boring machines, fifteen that have two rotating heads and four that have four 

rotating heads. As these boring machines advance forward into the ore, the rotating 

heads cut the rock, which is then conveyed through the center of the machine onto a 

belt conveyor system. From the boring machines there is a series of belt conveyors 

that continue to move the ore to the shaft area where it is held in storage bins for 

hoisting to surface. At the bottom of the shaft, the ore goes into two separate final 

weighing bins in preparation for hoisting to surface. The ore is then transferred from 

the weighing bins into skips and hoisted to surface. When on surface the ore is 

dumped into a bin that transfers to a series of belt conveyors to the milling operation. 

At the end of 1985, the K2 operations discovered a water inflow into the mine. The 

inflow was located in an old mined out panel 2 kilometers to the south west of the K2 

shaft. As the brine² inflow enters the mine it is collected at the source and pumped to 

the K1 and K2 shafts to be transported to surface for injection disposal. Many 

kilometers of polyethylene pipe are used to transport the water underground. The 

inflow continues to be an operating challenge with a crew of 75 Mosaic employees 

and 140 Dynatec contract employees working to contain the inflow. 

Dynatec is an international mining contractor and mine development company based 

out of Richmond Hill, Ontario. Dynatec has been directing the contractor activities in 

the inflow area since December of 1997. Their role in the inflow area is to: develop 

and maintain the inflow infrastructure; to mine to locate and catch the water; and to 

place backfill and grout to provide support in the mine workings. 

¹ KCL – potash 

² Brine - Water saturated with or containing large amounts of a salt, especially sodium 

chloride. 

5

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Early Sunday morning, January 29, 2006 a fire at the Mosaic K2 underground mine 

caused 72 mine workers to retreat to refuge stations throughout the mine and prompted 

the mines rescue intervention. 

Saturday, January 28, 2006 two Mosaic employees were working in the “Main Line 

Entry 000400”, using an acetylene-cutting torch to disconnect 40 centimeter diameter 

Sclair¹ pipe. The two employees completed their work and traveled to the K2 shaft and 

arrived on surface early Sunday morning, January 29, 2006. 

Dynatec employees traveling in vehicles from the water inflow area to the K2 shaft 

early Sunday morning encountered a fire in 000400. Returning to the Dynatec dispatch 

phone office they were unable to contact the surface Mosaic dispatcher due to phone 

disruption. 

Unable to extinguish and control the fire with available equipment the Dynatec 

employees retreated to the refuge station in 000650 erecting brattice seals at several 

locations to prevent smoke and fire gases from entering the area outside the refuge 

station. 

The fire caused a total electrical power outage in the K2 mine, shutting down all 

phones and electrical equipment. The extended time of the rescue intervention was in 

part due to the fact that the location of the fire was unable to be determined early on 

because there were no phone communications underground to confirm where the fire 

was or if all workers were safe. 

Four Mosaic workers in the vicinity of the K2 shaft encountered smoke and phoned 

the K2 surface dispatcher who initiated the emergency warning system underground 

and the emergency notification procedures. 

One Mosaic worker was isolated in 000500 lunch area due to the smoke from the fire, 

and remained at this location for several hours utilizing W-65 self-rescuers for 

protection from the smoke. He eventually traveled to the 000650-refuge station. All 

underground workers took refuge in eight refuge stations throughout the mine 

complex. Eventually all workers had phone contact with the dispatcher on surface, 

except for the Dynatec workers in the 000650-refuge station and the one Mosaic 

worker who had been isolated. 

Emergency response personnel, Incident Management Team (IMT) and Mines Rescue 

Team members began arriving at the mine site within an hour and mutual assistance 

was initiated from PCS Rocanville and Mosaic Colonsay potash mines, with southern 

and central mutual assistance groups placed on alert. 

¹Sclair Pipe – Polyethylene Pipe 

6 

Section 2

Mines rescue teams were organized with the skills required and given assignments and 

directives. Fourteen teams were deployed throughout the duration of the incident into 

the mine via K2 shaft to locate the source of the smoke. The fire was located and after 

several attempts, was finally extinguished late January 29 th , with severe conditions 

encountered by a majority of the teams. 

Mines Rescue Teams evaluated the air quality throughout the underground mine 

complex prior to evacuating all 72 workers from refuge stations and escorting them to 

surface Monday morning January 30, 2006. When the mine was cleared of all 

personnel and mines rescue, the intervention was suspended for a period of five hours. 

Monday afternoon, January 30 th a Mines Rescue Team was dispatched to evaluate the 

fire area. At the fire scene the team encountered smoke and observed open flames in 

the area…the fire had reignited. This information was communicated to the IMT and 

Mines Rescue Teams were again deployed into the area and extinguished the fire. 

During response to the emergency, it was apparent that all personnel underground 

followed Mine Emergency Preparedness and Response Procedures. 

One of the fundamental purposes in conducting this investigation was to evaluate 

emergency response practice and generate discussion to build on the strengths 

identified. 

The following report detail not only the successes of the emergency response, but 

equally highlight a number of important issues for consideration and recommendations 

to specific components of the cause and response to this emergency. 

The investigation team found all personnel interviewed to be most cooperative, open 

and professional. Many thanks for their contributions. We trust that this report will 

further add to the knowledge pool of the mining industry’s emergency response 

capabilities. 

7

Work to Dismantle the Pipe 

and 

Start of the Fire 

On January 28, 2006 at the start of the night shift two employees of Mosaic Potash 

Esterhazy K-2 mine were assigned the task of disconnecting the joining flanges on an 

unused water line located in the 000400 entry in preparation for reclaiming the pipe. 

This water line was previously used to transfer water from the water inflow area to the 

shaft for pumping to surface. The line is made up of 40 centimeter diameter Sclair 

pipe with a 3.75 centimeter wall thickness. The pipe is made into approximately 60- 

meter sections with flanged ends for joining together. Sixteen 2.5 centimeter diameter 

bolts hold the two sides of the steel flanges together. 

The 000400 main line entry is the main travel way to and from the water inflow area 

to the K-2 shaft. A mine contractor, Dynatec is involved in controlling the inflow of 

water. This entry is also part of the main ventilation circuit providing fresh air for the 

rest of the mine. Fresh air enters the mine down the K-2 shaft, is pushed out through 

the water area then returns along 000400 main line entry and into the rest of the mine. 

Under normal conditions there is approximately 130,000 cfm of air in this entry. 

The two workers involved in this activity were a mine mechanic with 27 years 

experiences in this mine, the last five as a mechanic and a scoop tram operator with 

nine years experience at this mine. 

On the day shift of January 25 th or 26 th , the underground supervisor went to the work 

place with the mechanic and instructed him on the job of disconnecting the pipes. 

They were to use a scoop tram to lift the pipe joint clear of the ground then use an 

acetylene-cutting torch to cut the connecting bolts. These workers are both employed 

by Mosaic Potash and report to supervisors of Mosaic Potash, however these 

supervisors work Monday through Friday dayshift and line up the activities for the 

night shift workers ahead of time. During the night shift these Mosaic workers are 

checked for safety issues by a Dynatec supervisor who is working in the same area. 

This Dynatec supervisor reported that he saw these workers at the start of the night 

shift of January 28 th and at least two other times during the shift with the last time 

being at approximately 10:45 PM. He did not note any unusual conditions at these 

times. He did not see these workers at the end of the work shift as by this time he was 

involved in the fire activities and eventually took refuge in an underground refuge 

station. 

The workers began disconnecting the joints¹ at the north end of the sections of pipe 

near the old lube bay and worked their way south to the intersection of 00D650. One 

of the top bolts would be cut with the torch then knocked out and a shackle placed in 

the hole. A short sling was then attached and the pipe was lifted clear of the ground 

with the scoop tram. A chipper was used to clean muck from the area around the bolts. 

The remaining bolts were then cut with the torch. For the first two or three joints all 

¹ - Picture of a Joint of page 11 

8

the bolts were cut while the pipe was suspended. This allowed the joint to separate as 

soon as the last bolt was cut. This procedure allowed the pipe to spring back striking 

the worker doing the cutting. The two workers then decided to leave the last one or 

two bolts intact, set the pipe down on the ground and then cut them. At this point the 

scoop was also turned around so it was now on the down wind side of the joint being 

cut. The cutting torch and cylinders were on the service truck and moved from joint to 

joint as needed. 

The worker on the scoop tram reports that during the cutting operation he noticed 

small pools of pipe material burning as it fell to the ground. The majority of the time 

this material self extinguished before hitting the ground. While cutting a joint near the 

00D700 entry a small fire burned for three to five seconds. At no time did they notice 

any fire continue to burn for more than a few seconds nor did they have to extinguish 

any fires. During this operation eight or nine joints were disconnected using the same 

procedure. 

At about 12:30 AM January 29 th they had completed the cutting operations on the 

joints up to 00D650. They cleaned up and put the torches and tools away. No further 

cutting was done after this time. 

Because there was time remaining in the shift the workers decided to lower some 

sections of pipe that were hanging near 00D700. This was done by raising the pipe 

with the scoop tram, un-hooking the chain and lowering it. During this time the 

workers were down wind of the last joints that had been cut with the torch for about 10 

minutes. They report that they did not smell smoke at this time. 

After they had finished lowering the pipes they left the area. The operator of the scoop 

tram reports leaving the area at 12:47 AM and that he made a point of looking at each 

joint as he past. The last two joints they had cut were to the south of where he entered 

the travel way so he did not pass by these but did look in that direction for on-coming 

traffic. The mechanic drove the service truck from the area and picked the scoop 

operator up in the shop. They then went to the shaft and up to surface. While leaving 

the work area both of these workers were in open cab vehicles and were down wind of 

were the cutting took place. They report that they did not notice any indication of fire 

or other unusual condition as they left the area. These workers did report that after 

they reached surface and they were near the tag board in the wicket area they felt a 

blast of air from the utility tunnel, which runs from this area to the shaft. This was at 

about 1:30 AM January 29 th . The workers completed their shift reports and left the 

mine site. 

Dynatec employees that had been working in the water inflow area south/west of 

where the pipe was being disconnected had completed their shift. Traveling in vehicles 

towards the shaft by way of 000400 main line entry, the workers in the first truck 

encountered a fire blocking their route of travel. This was at 1:22 AM January 29 th . 

They report that there was a “big ball of flames coming from the Sclair pipe and 

licking at the power and communication cables” that were hung from the back above 

9

the pipe. They retreated to the phone office in 00D650, which is approximately 645 

meters west of the fire and told the phone man to report the fire and to stop the 

blasting operation. At this time the power went off and the phone went dead, therefore 

they were unable to report the fire to dispatch on surface or to any other part of the 

mine complex. 

They warned the other workers in the area to take refuge. Seven Dynatec employees 

loaded a wheel mounted 68 kgs dry chemical extinguisher into the truck and went 

back to attempt to extinguish the fire. A roll up door south of the fire in 000400 was 

lifted manually in an attempt to ventilate the area. There was no air movement so the 

door was closed again. Two workers crawled under the smoke as close to the fire as 

they could get and discharged extinguishers on to the fire. It appeared to have put the 

fire out but within seconds it flared up again. Poor visibility prevented them from 

backing the truck in close enough to use the larger fire extinguisher which had a 

broken wheel and could not be pushed in manually. The workers made the decision 

that the fire was beyond their control and they retreated to the area of the phone office. 

Several brattice seals were erected to try to prevent smoke from entering the area then 

all 31 workers in this area sealed themselves into refuge station # 5 which is near the 

phone office. 

The Investigation Team, with the assistance of the Fire Prevention Officer from the 

Office of the Fire Commissioner, has determined that the fire was accidental. It was 

also determined that the ignition source was the open flame of the cutting torch used to 

cut the connecting bolts. As the pipe was lifted to allow cutting the bolts the joint 

separated slightly allowing the flame and hot material to enter inside the pipe. While 

cutting the bolts on the last or second last joint at the southern end of this section of 

pipe a fire was ignited inside the pipe. When the pipe was lowered to the ground 

before cutting the last bolt the joint closed up again. This fire was not noticed as the 

joint closed up. During the remaining time the workers were in the area the fire was 

contained inside the pipe and was likely relatively small. Because the pipe was openended 

the fire was able to draw enough air to eventually burn through the wall of the 

pipe and erupt into a major fire. 

When the fire first burned through the pipe the mine ventilation system was still 

operating and the fire was fanned by 130,000 cfm of air moving north in 000400. This 

caused the fire to increase in size burning the power and communication cables. This 

caused a loss of power in the K-2 mine, shutting down K2 ventilation system and also 

a loss of communication. 

In the area of the fire, there were three Sclair pipelines side by side. The majority of 

which was laid on the ground, with some sections elevated. The heat from the fire in 

the pipe being reclaimed ignited the others and all three were consumed. 

Approximately 61 meters of the pipe being worked on and 30 meters of the other two 

pipes burned. 

10

The main ingredient in the manufacturing of this pipe is polyethylene copolymer 

(>99%), which is a petroleum-based product. When the pipes burned, a large amount 

of heavy black carbon soot was released into the mine air, which reduced visibility to 

almost zero. 

The material safety data sheets for this product indicate that the main products of 

combustion are carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, water vapor, monomer and 

hydrocarbons. There are very little if any other toxic products given off. The flash 

point is shown to be 343 degrees Celsius. 

Typical Flanged Pipe Joint With Connecting Bolts 

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Findings 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ground conditions in the area where the fire occurred are reported to have been 

stable prior to the fire. The first inspection group to enter the area after the fire 

reported that the ground was unstable and required scaling before they could 

safely enter the area. They noted that the worst loose was found where there 

were brows or other irregularities in the back. Ground conditions were 

observed to be worse on the down wind side of the fire. 

The Dynatec employees reported losing power and communications at about 

1:30 AM. This coincides with the blast of air the Mosaic workers felt on 

surface. The blast of air was the result of the mine fans underground shutting 

down and the air stopped moving into the mine and pressurized the surface 

tunnels. 

Training records for these workers do not indicate that they had been trained 

on the safe use of cutting torches or hot work procedures. Neither of these 

workers were journeymen mechanics or welders. They were familiar with the 

use of cutting torches. 

The workers were not given any instruction on fire prevention for this job nor 

were they instructed to monitor the area after they completed the job. 

The MSDS¹ for this product was available on site and shows a flash point of 

343 degrees Celsius. A cutting torch produces about 1093 degrees Celsuis. 

At Mosaic’s other Saskatchewan potash mine near Colonsay, a fire was started 

in the same type of pipe by workers using the same procedures. This fire was 

on surface and also burned undetected for some time. This occurred November 

2, 2004. 

One of the wheels on the 68 kgs extinguisher was broken and the unit could 

not be wheeled manually. 

Dry chemical extinguishers used on this fire seemed to have limited success. 

The fire was eventually extinguished using foam and water. During discussions 

the Fire Inspector indicated that foam and water would be the recommended 

method for extinguishing a fire in a polyethylene pipe. 

Recommendations 

1. Training of workers in hot work procedures. 

2. Supervision to instruct workers to monitor the area for two hours as per the 

Saskatchewan Mine Regulations. 

¹ MSDS – Material Safety Data Sheets 

12

3. Use an alternative means other than a cutting torch for cutting or removing the 

bolts. 

4. Separate the sections of pipe after removing the bolts so as to enable checking for 

hot spots inside. 

5. Wet down combustible materials prior to and after using a cutting torch near them. 

6. Implement hot work procedures that include hot work permits. 

7. Emergency equipment such as the wheel-mounted fire extinguisher should be 

checked and maintained regularly. 

8. Communication of incidents between mine sites. 

Relevant Regulations Referenced in the Appendix 

Saskatchewan Mines Regulations, 2003 

350, 351, 352, 353, 355, 356, 363, 370, 

Occupational Health and Safety Regulations 1996 

363 

13

Notification of Mine Emergency 

All mines in Saskatchewan are required by Saskatchewan Mines Regulations 2003, to 

have an Emergency Warning System. When a fire or other emergency occurs 

underground at the Mosaic Potash Esterhazy mines, it is reported to dispatch on 

surface. Dispatch would then activate the general alarm system for the underground 

operation, and call out the appropriate emergency response personnel. 

When the underground alarm system is activated the mine conveyors stop, the 

conveyor alarms sound and the paging lights flash. Workers are then to phone dispatch 

for further instructions. In the water inflow area of the mine, the alarm systems consist 

of paging lights, an audible alarm activated through the phone system from surface. In 

addition there is a stench gas system, Femco paging phones and air compressor 

shutdown that are activated from the Dynatec dispatch phone office located in the 

inflow area. The stench gas system releases ethyl mercaptin¹ into the ventilation 

system. When workers are notified, they are to proceed to the nearest refuge station. 

From the refuge station the workers will contact the Mosaic dispatcher for further 

instructions. 

On the morning of January 29, 2006 at the time the fire occurred, there were 76 

workers underground in the K-1 and K-2 mines. These workers were performing 

routine mining activities in a variety of areas through out the mine. 

Dynatec employees that had been working in the water inflow area in the south 

portion of the K-2 mine were traveling to the shaft at the end of their work shift when 

they encountered a fire blocking the main line entry (000400). They returned to 

Dynatec dispatch phone office and attempted to contact surface mine dispatch but 

found the phone was out of service. Approximately one hour later Mosaic employees, 

who were resetting fans in the shaft area noticed smoke and phoned Mosaic surface 

dispatch to report the smoke. Dispatch activated the mine emergency warning system 

and then began contacting workers underground by phone. The dispatcher activated 

the mine rescue call out procedures. The ventilation flows down K-2 shaft and 

exhausts up K-1 shaft, therefore a fire in the K-2 mine would affect all workers 

throughout the underground complex. 

Sequence of events January 29, 2006 

12:30 AM Mosaic workers complete cutting torch work on pipe in 000400 

12:47 AM Mosaic workers leave area 

1:22 AM Dynatec workers encounter fire on pipe in 000400 

1:28 AM Electrical power disruption to K2 underground 

Dynatec workers attempt to phone surface dispatch, phone was out of 

service 

2:15 AM Mosaic workers restart fans in the shaft area 

2:30 AM Cage tender notices smoke near shaft, reports to surface dispatch. 

¹ Ethyl Mercaptin – A colorless organic liquid, that has a strong odor and is added to 

odorless fuel and fuel systems as a warning agent. 

14 

Section 3

2:35 AM Mosaic workers in shaft area inform surface dispatch of heavy smoke. 

Surface dispatch activates emergency warning system. 

2:55 AM Surface dispatch contacted K-2 Safety and Training supervisor 

3:00 AM Mine Rescue personnel begin receiving call out messages. 

3:20 AM Mine Rescue personnel begin arriving on site. 

The Dynatec workers that first encountered the fire, verbally communicated to the 

other workers in the inflow area. All 31 workers in the inflow area were accounted for 

and took refuge in Refuge Station #5 which is located in 000650 entry. The stench gas 

system could not be activated due to the power failure in the mine. Failure of the main 

mine telephone system prevented them from notifying any other persons of the fire. 

One Mosaic worker that was in the 000500 lunch area, but on the other side of the fire, 

could not be contacted due to failure of the main phone system. This worker’s first 

knowledge of the fire was when he encountered heavy smoke as he tried to leave a 

lunchroom area at approximately 1:30 AM. This worker survived by using several W- 

65 self-rescuers until eventually making his way to Refuge Station #5 several hours 

later. The details of the events of this worker are covered in a separate section of this 

report. 

There were four Mosaic workers in the area of the K-2 shaft that were attempting to 

reset power and reestablish mine ventilation. At approximately 2:30 AM, these 

workers encountered smoke. They alerted surface dispatch and then proceeded to 

surface. 

Surface dispatch activated the emergency warning system and began contacting the 

remaining workers in the K-1 and K-2 mine complex. Workers in the following areas 

were notified as follows: 

K-1 Mine 

K-1 national pumps 1 worker 

Notified by alarm system at 2:30 AM, phoned dispatch, was told to go to #3 Refuge 

Station 

Cable Bay 2 workers 

Notified by flashing light, phoned dispatch about 3:00 AM, told to go to #4 Refuge 

Station 

Shop 

1 worker 

60150 Mining Machine 2 workers 

Notified by phone call from surface dispatch at 3:30 AM, phone only worked one 

way, he could hear surface dispatch but couldn’t communicate. Went to next nearest 

15

phone and called surface dispatch for instructions, told to go to auxiliary refuge 

station. 





Conveyors stopped, phoned surface dispatch around 3:00 AM, directed to #2 Refuge 

Station 

11S101 2 workers 

Notified by crew from 01002 mining machine at 3:20 AM to go to #2 Refuge Station 


K-2 Mine 


Dispatch called at 2:30AM when power went down, they were told of smoke in the 

shaft area and to go to #3 Refuge Station. 

01004 2 workers 

Were reclaiming hard ware. When the power went out, they came out to #75 lunch 

room. When the power came back on the alarm sounded and they phoned dispatch. 

They were informed of the smoke. One worker was instructed to go to #3 Refuge 

Station the other was instructed to go to 01004 mining machine to inform fellow 

workers to accompany him to #3 Refuge Station 


When power went down, they phoned dispatch and were instructed to go to the lunch 

table. The phone at the lunch table and the alarm on 1330 belt conveyor did not work. 

A worker from #75 lunch room was sent to notify these workers of smoke in the shaft 

area and instruct them to go to #3 Refuge Station. 

#75 Lunch Room 2 worker 

There was power disruption for a short period of time. When the power was restored 

the emergency warning system was activated and workers contacted surface dispatch 

and were directed to #3 Refuge Station. 

Lube Shed 1 worker 

Around 1:30 to 2:00 AM dispatcher sent him from the #76 lunch room to the K-2 lube 

shed to check the reason for the alarm. He phoned to report from the lube shed at 

approximately 2:30 AM and was told to go to #3 Refuge Station. 

16

#76 Lunch Room 1 worker 

He phoned dispatch when power went out and was told to stay in the lunchroom. Was 

then phoned by dispatch and told of smoke in the shaft area and to go to #2 Refuge 

Station The phone in #2 Refuge Station did not work so he traveled to 97 belt 

conveyor drive and phoned dispatch to confirm that he had reached the refuge station 

and retuned to #2 Refuge Station. 


When the power went out the phone at the face did not work. They went out to main 

line belt and phoned dispatch. They were informed of the smoke in the shaft area and 

told to go to #6 Refuge Station. The alarms in this area did not work. 


When the power went out they phoned dispatch and were told to go to the lunch table 

and wait for a phone call. The phone at the lunch table was not working therefore a 

worker had to be sent from another area to inform these workers of the smoke. They 

were instructed to go to #3 Refuge Station. Alarm on 1330 belt did not work. 

1108 Belt 1 worker 

Worker was loading a skid plate, heard the emergency warning system. He phoned 

surface dispatch and was directed to #2 Refuge Station. 


Workers were at the face when the power went out. They phoned dispatch and were 

told there was smoke in the shaft area and were sent to #2 Refuge Station. The phone 

at #2 Refuge Station did not work. One of the workers went to #76 lunch room and 

phoned to reported the number of people in #2 Refuge Station and returned to it. 


The power went out at 1:30 AM, they stayed at the lunch table. At 3:00 AM they 

received a call from surface dispatch and were directed to #2 Refuge Station. They 

tried to call surface dispatch when they got to the refuge station, but phone wasn’t 

working. They went back to #76 lunch room to call in and returned back to #2 Refuge 

Station. 

Findings 

 

During this fire it was noted that some of the alarm systems did not work as 

designed. With the exception of the Dynatec workers in the inflow area and 

one Mosaic employee, all other workers did receive adequate warning and 

were able to travel to a refuge station safely. The Dynatec workers that 

encountered the fire and smoke were able to retreat in fresh air to their refuge 

station. The one Mosaic employee received no notification until he 

encountered the smoke. Only one of the workers interviewed during this 

investigation encountered difficulty in reaching a refuge station. All other 

17

workers interviewed reported that they were able to reach a refuge station 

within five to ten minutes of being instructed to do so. 

 

 

 

 

 

When the fire burned through the power and communications lines to the south 

portion of the mine, it caused a disruption to the electrical and communications 

system in the K2 portion of the mine. The emergency warning system for 

underground is reliant on the electrical and communications system to activate 

and operate. The reason some workers were notified of the fire is that they 

phoned dispatch to find out why the power was down. Because of the 

disruption, the phones in some of the work places did not work. Some of the 

workers had to travel to another area to find a phone that did work. Because of 

the location of the fire and the ventilation system failing the smoke did not 

travel to the rest of the mine complex as quickly as it could have. This allowed 

workers time to find alternate phones to use and to seek refuge. 

During the interview process it was noted that in the past some workers have 

reported problems with the alarm system that were still present at the time of 

the emergency. This affected the notification of the workers. 

The Mosaic surface dispatch operator plays a very key role during a mine 

emergency. This is the person to whom the fire is reported, activates the 

emergency warning system, contacts workers underground, advises workers on 

actions to take, refuge stations to go to and initiates the mine rescue call out. 

Workers report to him when reaching refuge stations and he maintains contact 

with workers through out the emergency. 

During the mine fire of January 29, 2006 the dispatch operator appears to have 

performed these functions admirably, however, during the early stages he was 

pushed to the limit of what one person can efficiently accomplish. There is no 

requirement for the dispatch operator to maintain a record of reports received, 

instructions given, or events occurring in the mine there fore no such records 

were kept. 

During interviews with workers it became evident that the cage tender does not 

have appropriate guidelines to follow in the event of a mine fire. After 

encountering heavy smoke in the area of the shaft at the potash level the cage 

tender and three other workers came to surface. The cage tender indicated that 

she would have gone back down the shaft if a worker had called for the cage. 

In the case of this fire, smoke accumulated at the shaft on the potash level and 

any one entering this area without breathing apparatuses would have been in 

grave danger. 

18

Recommendations: 

9. The emergency warning system to be equipped with a primary and back-up 

means of activation to warn workers in the event of a power failure. 

10. Communication lines to be located away from high risk fire areas. 

11. Routine maintenance and testing of the emergency warning system to ensure 

that it is fully operational at all times. 

12. At the first indication of an emergency situation in the mine a second person 

immediately move into the dispatch office to assist the operator in the required 

tasks. The dispatch operator maintains a written record of all reports received, 

instructions given and events occurring in the mine during an emergency. This 

should be in the form of a permanent record that can be referred to for 

information during the emergency and afterwards. 

13. Establish safe procedures for cage tenders to follow in the event of a fire and 

train the cage tenders in these procedures 

Relevant Regulations Referenced in the Appendix 

The Saskatchewan Mines Regulation, 2003 

384 

19

General Overview 

Refuge Station and Related Activity 

Underground mines in Saskatchewan are required by the Saskatchewan Mines 

Regulation 2003 to provide refuge stations at appropriate locations for workers to take 

refuge in, in the event of an emergency. 

Mosaic Potash has constructed a total of 21 refuge stations, which are located through 

out the mine. The company has stated that their intention is to provide a place of 

refuge that is within 20 to 30 minutes of walking time for all workers underground. 

Of the 21 refuge stations provided, 8 are classed as primary and 13 are classed as 

auxiliary. 

In general, the refuge stations at this mine are constructed by cutting a room into the 

potash at the production level or utilizing a previously mined out room. A brattice wall 

is installed at the end to make an air tight area in which workers can survive for at 

least 36 hours regardless of the contaminants in the mine air. 

During the January 29, 2006 underground fire in the K-2 side of the combined 

K-1, K-2 mines at Esterhazy 72 workers took refuge in eight locations. Of these 

workers, 71 were able to safely reach a refuge station within five to ten minutes of 

being informed of the fire. One worker in the area of the fire didn’t reach a refuge 

station for approximately 12 hours. 

Details of Refuge Station Activities 

Refuge Station #5 32 workers 

This refuge station is located in 00D650 near the Dynatec dispatch phone office and 

shop area. It is approximately 646 meters west from the location of the fire. 

There is one entrance to this refuge station. It has a total volume of 1203 

cubic meters and was equipped with two “H” size cylinders of breathing oxygen. 

Other supplies included a phone, first aid supplies, a fan, a portable toilet, emergency 

supply box (complete with materials to seal leaks) and enough emergency food 

concentrate and bottled water to last 39 workers for at least 36 hours. 

This refuge station was first occupied by 24 Dynatec employees from approximately 

1:38 AM January 29 th and then they were joined by 7 more employees at 3:35 AM. At 

3:40 PM, January 29 th a Mosaic water sampler arrived. All 32 remained in this refuge 

station until being released by the mine rescue team at about 3:20 AM, January 30 th . 

Out of these 32 workers, one was a mine rescue person. 

21

Prior to entering the refuge station some of this group of workers had encountered the 

fire and heavy smoke blocking their route of travel to the shaft. The details of the 

events and actions of the Dynatec group were taken from interviews and written 

statements. 

Following is one such statement that is representative of information gathered. 

Jan.29/06 

To Whom It May Concern: This is my full statement of actions taken during 

night of Sunday January 29, 2006. 

It was an 8 hour shift for all men except for 8 men on face change for 

backfilling. All Dynatec men at phone shack for blast in C-23 and 12B027 

between 1:00 and 1:15 AM, Q. Luce and G. Gurney went into blast areas. 

First truck load of men took off to shaft around 1:15 am the second truck 

leaving shortly after. I was going over white cards for shift report, talking to 

men that were staying for face change for backfilling and scoop operators as 

to what had to be done for morning. When the two trucks came back yelling 

“FIRE in 00400 by entrance to 250 drift,” I picked up phone to notify dispatch 

that there was a fire, but the phone lines were dead then the power went out. 

Fire was spotted at 1:22 a.m. T.Yawney was trying to get a hold of men 

blasting to stop the blast. I said grab the fire extinguishers. G.Hertlein and 

D.Holmberg, jumped on my truck. D.Toth W.Kaczur, C.Schaan and 

R.Hawkshaw threw the big fire extinguisher in the back of another truck. 

I told T. Yawney to take rest of the men to 650 Refuge Station. Take a 

head count and to stay there until we return, men were in Refuge Station at 

1:38 a.m. What I could see burning was power cable along the back and 16” 

Sclair pipes on floor burning about 20’ long and 10’ wide and lots of black 

heavy smoke. After the fire extinguisher was unloaded we tried to get close 

enough to flames to spray at it, the smoke was already dropping, Glenn and 

Dean H. were pulling on hose to get as close as they could to the flames. 

Spraying out extinguisher it lasted about 30 seconds. The flames went down 

but not for long, they came back up like they were mad, and more black smoke 

came with it. So getting out of the smoke, we went back to phone shack to get 

more fire extinguishers and the big extinguisher from BT 13 electrics. 

Grabbing brattice and spads from safety boxes. When returning to flames the 

smoke was too thick and black, filling entire drift. We could not even see the 

flames any more just an orange glow in the direction of where flames were 

early. I could hear snapping, crackling, and loose falling. We tried to open 

roll up door in 00D400 to see if it would push the smoke away from us so we 

could try and extinguish fire but it did not make any difference so we closed up 

door. Backing up from smoke and trying to find a place to install brattice wall 

to seal off smoke, we found a spot that was low enough to reach the back and 

22

started to brattice off drift to cut off air and keep smoke back. We spaded the 

back and sealed the floor with muck we had a lot of trouble trying to seal 

around walls due to loose crumbly ground after we thought we had it sealed 

off fairly good something happened to the ventilation and the smoke came 

threw the top brattice seal like was not even there. Regrouping I yelled we 

have to seal off 00400 roll up door. Men were sealing up door and I happened 

to look back behind us and the smoke was coming threw 500 fresh air drift into 

650, after door was sealed off we jumped on trucks and went back to phone 

shack to grab more brattice and supplies. We headed back down 650 drift to 

crib sets to install second brattice wall but we could not reach the back and 

our brattice was not long enough to reach the floor, so backing up to where we 

could reach the only place was right by the phone shack that the back was the 

lowest to reach. We started sealing off across the drift with brattice to the front 

of the phone shack. I started thinking about the smoke going into our fresh air 

down 500 drift, where is the next spot it could come in to reach us, it was right 

beside us the roll up door in 830 so we continued sealing off 650 by phone 

shack. Stripping all safety supplies that were left in safety box closing off 650 

drift, sealing off the roll up door in 830. Still thinking where could the smoke 

come at us, next possible spot was our shop and 600 fresh air fan. So once 

brattice was sealed off in 650 drift only thing left was around the top and right 

side of phone shack to seal. Talking to men we agreed that they would stay and 

finish the seal using foam off benches and plywood strips and I, Glenn and Rob 

would head to Dynatec shop to seal off wall behind screen and they would 

come straight there when they finished sealing off around phone shack. So off 

the three of us went to the shop looking at where to install brattice, Rob and 

Glenn climbed in behind the screen and wall said they had found a good spot 

they started installing brattice asking for spads and nail, wire I was giving 

them anything I could find. Once the seal was up the next seal to be installed 

was at 600 fresh air fan, not knowing what we needed to seal off around fan, 

grabbing wire, nails, spads, we went to 600 fan, once we were at the fan there 

was just a hole in the brattice for fan to suck fresh air threw from out of drift 

behind brattice wall. Grabbing some old vent tubing that was laying on floor 

and wiring the hole shut using existing brattice and old timber laying around 

we sealed it off. By the time we had finished sealing off the hole the rest of men 

came from sealing of phone shack, now back as a group of seven we headed 

into 12B023 drift to see if we could get down to 12D500 drift, knowing we had 

no gas testers and we could in counter blast smoke, we were not going to take 

any chances, we made it to D700 corner, air was okay continuing on down 

12B023 towards pump box we could smell blast smoke, that was the end of the 

line so backing up to D700 corner and turning around. Trying to find a spot to 

install another brattice wall but the back was to high for us to reach and the 

only place we could reach was just up from our shop area back in 650 west of 

shop so that was where we had to put it to seal off drift. Talking about if we 

had all the areas sealed off where smoke could reach us and what other 

supplies we could use, going back to shop we grabbed oxygen bottles off of the 

torches not knowing how long we were going to be in the Refuge Station. 

23

Going back to Refuge Station about 3:30 a.m. I went inside and told 

everyone that we could not put the fire out but we were going to be alright the 

seven of us took every precaution possible to brattice and seal off all air 

entries so that no smoke could reach us. Once the other six guys arrived at 

Refuge Station we unloaded all safety gear and other supplies off trucks. Took 

a head count and all 31 of us were accounted for at 3:35 a.m. Refuge Station 

doors were closed up, and we tried to seal up holes along walls, installed 

caulking around door on inside. Very poor seal around walls in Refuge Station 

we sealed up with blankets and spads caulking, ear plugs and white wipes, 

cans of spray foam were hard in cans, cans were out dated. Men were playing 

cards, scaling back and walls, to be safe as where to sit or lay down to rest. 

They remained calm talking, resting, the air in Refuge Station was okay. Small 

pieces of muck were falling off of the walls, sitting waiting, listening, and 

resting was all we could do. Around 2:30 p.m. Sunday afternoon we heard a 

truck running we assumed it was at or by phone shack, but no one came, men 

were anxious to know who it was. Then it was quite again, men calmed down 

around 3:40 p.m. We heard foot steps walking towards refuge station outside. 

The door opened it was Ken Martin Mosaic water sampler, once he was inside 

I talked to him to see if he was okay and asked him what he had seen outside if 

there was any smoke in 650 Drift he said no lots in 500 fresh air. I asked him if 

he wanted oxygen he refused, continued talking to him, he told me that he had 

bratticed himself in around lunch table in 500 fresh air, and that he had used 

five self rescuers, during his stay in or under the brattice. Then I tried to give 

him to give him oxygen again this time he took it, so Glenn gave it to him for 

approximately five minutes or so he said that was good and that he was okay, 

talking about what he did for fourteen hours he also tried to put out the fire but 

could not get close enough from the smoke and heat. So he tried to come 

through 500 fresh air between D700 and 650 Drift but could not open the door 

so he made his way back to D700 and found a screwdriver and a hammer, then 

he managed to get door open and made his way down 650 to join us in the 

Refuge Station. Around 4:00 p.m. I went outside walking towards phone shack 

to check brattice seal, placed some boards back against brattice. Some of the 

other men came out to stretch and see if they could see anything. 4:10 pm 

everyone back into the Refuge Station resealed themselves back in, talked 

about what I saw, and told them everything was okay. Just happy to see Ken 

and he was just as happy to see all of us. At 7:05 pm, heard footsteps outside 

and in came the Mine Rescue team. I talked to Huey Davis, told him that we 

were all accounted for 31 Dynatec, and 1 Mosaic. He was very happy and so 

was I. Told me that the fire was not out as of yet, but they were still trying. 

The men asked if the families were notified, they said yes and they would be 

notified again that we were all safe. Mine Rescue left, men were up and 

moving around, anxious to get out. We opened up one oxygen bottle and let it 

off very slowly into the air. It lasted about 15 to 20 minutes. Air was okay 

again. 

24

Dean Duchek 

I told men to relax and stay calm, they did. They played more cards, 

some just relaxed. 

Around 9:20 pm heard footsteps again. Another Mine Rescue team 

came in and talked to us and brought Ken Martin some sugar pills and some 

orange juice. Told us they were still trying to put out the fire but should have 

it out soon. Off they went again men were again anxious to go. I told them we 

were here until the Mine Rescue team told us that it was safe to leave. So we 

sat and waited. The next Mine Rescue team showed up around 10:50 pm. 

They told us that the fire was contained and put out. They also had some pills 

for Ken Martin that his wife had sent with them. Also reassured men that their 

families were notified and that we were all safe and accounted for. They left 

telling us that it would be soon that we would be able to go home. They had to 

check all areas and establish ventilation. It was a long time before we heard 

anything or any movement outside. Men were moving around not knowing 

what was going on. We opened the second bottle of oxygen and let it off slowly 

around 11:30 pm. It took about 15 – 20 minutes to empty out. Air was good 

again. We still had two more bottles if needed. We just sat and waited. 

Around 3:20 am we heard trucks moving around, voices, people walking. 

Mine Rescue team came back in. Brent Bashtall, told us it was time to go to 

shaft drive slow and follow him to shaft. We loaded up trucks. Some trucks 

would not start, had to give them a push and away we went down 650 to 00400 

towards roll up door. There was water and black soot on floor and back. 

Black soot was everywhere. Our eyes burnt as we drove down 250 Drift and 

this was our fresh air, through underpass, down to production and in towards 

shaft. It was black everywhere. Just fresh tire tracks could be seen. When we 

got to the shaft, it didn’t look like the shaft or the parking lot area it was black 

soot everywhere. We parked trucks once everyone was there; we loaded the 

cage going to surface around 3:50 am Monday morning. We were all safe and 

accounted for. When we got to the surface Headframe we met everyone who 

was waiting to see us anxiously. Then we went upstairs for a brief talk about 

what went on then we went for a shower. Then it was time to go home. 

“In my opinion we were as safe as we could be under the circumstances. No one else 

knew that we were okay and accounted for due to the lack of no communication from 1 

am to 7:05 pm, when the first Mine Rescue arrived.” 

This was written by Dean Duchek February 4, 2006 

25

Findings: 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

There was no electricity or phone communications to this refuge station for the 

duration of the incident. 

The electric fan, provided for cooling, could not be used. Heat and humidity 

were a concern for these workers. Most found that they felt cooler when lying 

on the floor and did so. 

Toilet facilities were quickly filled to overflowing and they found it necessary 

to empty a large water bottle into their personal water container and use it to 

urinate into. 

There was a very poor seal around walls in Refuge Station. The outside door 

wouldn’t seal. 

Containers of spray foam were hard, containers were out dated. 

Scaling was required in part of the refuge station. 

The oxygen cylinder when opened lasted approximately 15 – 20 minutes. 

Some workers were concerned about the integrity of the brattice seals on the 

refuge station had the fire traveled back along the pipe down 00D650 and the 

temperatures increased. 

26

#5 REFUGE STATION 

 

REFUGE STATION INFORMATION 

SIZE: 1203.5 M³ 

# OF PEOPLE: 32 

TIME SPENT IN REFUGE: 24 HRS 

SUPPLIES 

PHONES: 1 

FEMCO PHONES: 1 

WATER: 6 - 20 LITER JUGS 

TOILETS: 2 

OXYGEN: 2 

SUPPLY BOX 

CAULKING 

FOAM 

BLANKETS 

FOOD 

FIRST AID BOX 

SPAD GUN 

SPADS 

BRATTICE 

27


This refuge station is located at BT 116 in 00D400 

There are two entrances to this refuge station, one on the fresh air side and one on the 

exhaust side. It has a total volume of 1,432 cubic meters and was equipped with two 

”H” size cylinders of breathing oxygen. Other supplies included a phone, first aide 

supplies, a fan, portable toilet and enough emergency food concentrate and bottled 

water to last 42 workers for at least 36 hours. 

Seven workers took refuge in this refuge station from approximately 2:30 AM, 

January 29 th to approximately 4:40 AM January 30 th. At which time they were released 

from refuge by the mine rescue team and escorted to the K-2 Shaft then hoisted to 

surface. One of the workers in this refuge station was a mine rescue person. 

Findings: 

 

 

 

Workers arrived at this refuge station they found the phone did not work. 

Workers left the refuge station to find a working phone from which to 

call surface dispatch for instructions and to report the names of persons in 

the refuge station 

Phone contact was established with the refuge station at about 7:30 AM 

January 29 th . This corresponds with Mine Rescue Team #1 isolating the 

phone system to Inflow area. 

28

#2 REFUGE STATION 


SIZE: 1432 M³ 


TIME SPENT IN REFUGE: 25.6 

HRS 

SUPPLIES 

PHONES: 1 

WATER: 20 - 20 LITRE JUGS 

TOILETS: 2 

OXYGEN: 2 

SUPPLY BOX 

CAULKING 

FOAM 

BLANKETS 

FOOD 

FIRST AID BOX 

SPAD GUN 

SPADS 

BRATTICE 

29


This refuge station is located at BT 194 in 00T400 


exhaust side. It has a total volume of 1,312 cubic meters. 

Other supplies included a phone, first aid supplies, a fan, a portable toilet and enough 

emergency food concentrate and bottled water to last 28 workers for at least 36 hours. 

Five workers took refuge in this refuge station, of the five one worker was a mine 

rescue person. They took refuge in this station from approximately 2:45 AM, January 

29 th to approximately 6:45 AM, January 30 th at which time they were released from 

refuge by the mine rescue team and escorted to the K-2 Shaft, and then hoisted to 

surface. 

Findings: 

 

 

Workers in this refuge station report that at no time during the incident 

did they observe smoke in the area. 

The door handle was broken on the fresh air side door to Refuge Station 

#6. The first workers to arrive here couldn’t get into the refuge station 

until another group of workers came in through the exhaust side to let 

them in. 

30


 


SIZE: 1312 M³ 


TIME SPENT IN REFUGE: 26.8 HRS 

SUPPLIES 

PHONES: 2 


TOILETS: 2 

OXYGEN: 0 

SUPPLY BOX 

CAULKING 

FOAM 

BLANKETS 

FOOD 

FIRST AID BOX 

SPAD GUN 

SPADS 

BRATTICE 

31


This refuge station is located at BT332 at 200 entry 


exhaust side. It has a total volume of 957 cubic meters and was equipped with one H 

size cylinders and one small cylinder of breathing oxygen. 

Other supplies included a phone, first aid supplies, a fan, a portable toilet and enough 

emergency food concentrate and bottled water to last 31 workers for at least 36 hours. 

Eight workers took refuge in this refuge station, of these workers one worker was a 

mine rescue person. They took refuge in this station from approximately 2:45 AM, 

January 29th to approximately 5:00 AM, January 30 th at which time they were 

released from refuge by the mine rescue team and escorted to the K-2 shaft then 

hoisted to surface. 

Findings: 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Workers reported that several hours after entering the refuge station smoke 

was observed outside on the fresh air side. None was observed on the 

exhaust side. 

Light smoke was observed inside the refuge station some time late on the 

night of January 29 th . Although, a supply of sealant was available inside 

the refuge station none was used to ensure an adequate seal of the brattice 

walls or door. 

There was no electricity to this refuge station for the duration of the 

incident. 

The electric fan provided for cooling could not be used; however, the 

workers did not feel that heat was a concern mainly due to the large size of 

the refuge station and few persons occupying it. 

Two of the oxygen cylinders were used. A regulator provided was used on 

the first cylinder, which was emptied within approximately ten minutes of 

opening it. The regulator was not used on the second cylinder, which is 

believed to have lasted longer however, no time was actually noted. 

Workers in this refuge station report that there was an adequate amount of 

most supplies. The exception to this was the toilet facilities that workers 

did not feel were sufficient in size or type. 

The door handle was broken and the door could not be made to seal 

properly. 

32


 


SIZE: 957 M³ 



SUPPLIES 

PHONES: 2 


TOILETS: 2 

OXYGEN: 1 

SUPPLY BOX 

CAULKING 

FOAM 

BLANKETS 

FOOD 

FIRST AID BOX 

SPAD GUN 

SPADS 

BRATTICE 

33

K-1 Refuge Station #2 15 workers 

This refuge station is located at 01350 

There are two entrances to this refuge station. One on the fresh air side and one on the 

exhaust side. It has a total volume of 1,511 cubic meters. Supplies in this refuge 

station include a phone, first aid supplies, a fan, portable toilets and enough 

emergency food concentrate and bottled water to last 42 men for 36 hours. 15 workers 

took refuge in this station from approximately 3:25 AM, January 29 th to 6:30 AM 

January 30 th . Four workers in this refuge station were mine rescue personnel. 

Findings: 

 

 

 

 

 

 

These workers did not encounter smoke or fire. 

This refuge station had power all the time. 

Workers in refuge station had no concerns about seals. 

Phones worked fine. Food and water served the purpose. 

No discomfort from heat or humidity. 

Toilet facilities were inadequate. 

34

K1-REFUGE STATION #2 

 


SIZE: 1511 M³ 


TIME SPENT IN REFUGE: 27 HRS 

SUPPLIES 

PHONES: 1 

WATER: 3 – 20 LITER JUGS 

TOILETS: 2 

SUPPLY BOX 

CAULKING 

FOAM 

BLNAKETS 

FOOD 

FIRST AID BOX 

SPAD GUN 

SPADS 

BRATTICE 

35

K-1 Refuge Station #3 1 worker 

This refuge station is located near 000401 

There are two entrances to this refuge station. One on fresh air side and one on the 

exhaust. It has a total volume of 810 cubic meters. Supplies in this refuge station 

include a phone, first aid supplies, a fan, portable toilets and enough emergency food 

concentrate and bottled water to last 22 men for 36 hours. 

One worker took refuge in this station from approximately 2:45 AM January 29 th to 

approximately 6:45 AM January 30 th . About 30 hours. 

Findings: 

 

 

 

 

 

 

This worker did not encounter smoke or fire. 

The worker reported Sunday afternoon he had to seal the door for he could 

smell smoke or a burnt smell. A supply of sealant was available. 

There was electricity to this refuge station for the duration of the incident. 

The worker reported all supplies were adequate. 

Worker was concerned about a lack of a second means of egress from his work 

location. 

Worker had communication to surface dispatch who communicated with him 

on a regular basis. 

36


 


SIZE: 810 M³ 


TIME SPENT IN REFUGE: 29.25 HRS 

SUPPLIES 

PHONES: 1 


TOILETS: 2 

SUPPLY BOX 

CAULKING 

FOAM 

BLANKETS 

FOOD 

FIRST AID BOX 

SPAD GUN 

SPADS 

BRATTICE 

37

K-1 Refuge Station #4 2 workers 

This refuge station is located in BT 72 in 010400 


exhaust side. It has a total volume of 723 cubic meters. This refuge station’s supplies 

included, phone, first aid supplies, fan, portable toilets and enough emergency food 

concentrate and bottled water to last 20 workers for 36 hours. The two workers took 

refuge in this station from approximately 3:00 AM January 29 th to approximately 5:00 

AM January 30 th . One worker was a mines rescue person. 

Findings: 

 

 

This refuge station had power the entire duration of the incident. 

Workers in this station had no concerns, all supplies and communications were 

adequate. 

38


 


SIZE: 723 M³ 



SUPPLIES 

PHONES: 1 


TOILETS: 2 

SUPPLY BOX 

CAULKING 

FOAM 

BLANKETS 

FOOD 

FIRST AID BOX 

SPAD GUN 

SPADS 

BRATTICE 

39

Auxiliary Refuge Station 2 workers 

This refuge station is located in 22Q300 

There is one entrance to this refuge station. It has a total volume of 1,040 cubic 

meters. Supplies in this refuge station consisted of a spad gun, spads, a five gallon 

bottle of water, a phone and a shovel. This refuge station is not equipped with 

electricity, first aid supplies, and emergency food or toilet facilities. 

Two workers took refuge in this station from approximately 3:40 AM, January 29 th to 

8:40 AM, January 30 th . One of the workers was a mine rescue person. 

These two workers were working at 60150 miner and did not encounter smoke or fire. 

Due to communications problems and elapsed time, these workers were directed to an 

auxiliary refuge station. 

Findings: 

 

 

The workers reported this auxiliary refuge station was adequate but would like 

to see electrical power for lights and fans. Extended periods in the dark were a 

concern. 

There were no seating or resting accommodations of any kind. 

40

TEMP. REFUGE STATION (150 MINER) 

 


SIZE: 1040 M³ 


TIME SPENT IN REFUGE: 29.67 HRS 

SUPPLIES 

PHONES: 1 


60 

41

General Findings: 

 

 

 

 

While workers were being transported to the K-2 Shaft after being released 

from the refuge stations, the soot that had accumulated on the roadway as a 

result of the fire was stirred up during transportation and caused severe eye 

irritation. Paper dust masks were provided for breathing purpose and seemed 

to have been effective. No respiratory difficulty during transport was reported. 

During the fire there were members of the Mines Rescue personnel that took 

refuge in refuge stations. Other workers that were in these same refuge 

stations report that having Mine Rescue personnel present helped them to 

understand the situation and the rescue procedures that were taking place. This 

had a reassuring and calming effect on all. 

During the time workers were to be sealed in the refuge station, however 

workers did open the doors, if the air outside appeared clear and went outside 

This was not a frequent occurrence but does seem to have taken place at least 

once at some of the refuge stations that had several people in them. 

There were no reports of workers smoking inside any refuge station at any 

time. 

Recommendations: 

14. Toilet facilities should be adequate to accommodate the number of workers 

for which the refuge station is rated for 36 hours. 

15. Refuge stations and equipment need to continue to be inspected by a 

competent person at least once a month and recorded. Any deficiencies 

identified are to be corrected immediately. 

16. Ensure that refuge station walls and seals are constructed of fire resistant 

material and maintains its integrity when exposed to very high temperatures, 

and be located no less than 100 meters from a fire hazard. They should be 

string enough to withstand all expected forces. 

17. Guidance signs or other means should be suitably located to assist workers in 

locating refuge stations in an emergency. 

18. Auxiliary refuge stations are to be used only in the event workers can not 

safely access a primary refuge station. 

19. Auxiliary refuge stations should be equipped with food, water, phone, seating, 

lights, sealant and toilet facilities. 

20. The current Mine Regulations 2003, on auxiliary refuge stations should be 

reviewed and amended to reflect the findings of this investigation. 

Relevant Regulations 

Saskatchewan Mines Regulations 2003 

398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403 

42

500 Lunch room 1 worker 

This lunch room is located in 000500 fresh air entry 

There is one entrance to this lunchroom. Although this is a fresh air entry, it is not a 

designated travel way due to ground conditions. Travel to the K-2 shaft is by way of 

000400. Under normal conditions the volume of fresh air moving through this entry is 

63,000 cfm. This area is not designated as a refuge station. The lunch room has a first 

aid kit, phone, seating capacity, fire extinguisher, brattice and six W-65 self rescuers. 

Prior to being in this lunch room, this worker was performing his normal tasks as a 

water inflow sampler. This worker was in the lunch room from approximately 1:30 

AM January 29 th , to approximately 3:40 PM January 30 th when he arrived at #5 refuge 

station in 00D650 entry. 

Prior to arriving at #5 refuge station this worker did encounter thick, black smoke and 

was unable to negotiate travel to any other location. The following is the workers 

accounting of the events that took place during his stay in the lunchroom to his arrival 

at #5 refuge station in 00D650 entry. 

The following is an accounting of the events as reported by the worker: 

When the fire broke out the worker was in the lunch room which is located 

approximately 100 meters west from the 000400 entry and north on the return side of 

the fire. The worker was in the lunchroom when he heard the routine blast at end of 

shift then the power went out. He tried to place a phone call only to find that the 

phone was out of service. Right away he noticed the lunchroom was rapidly filling 

with smoke. The worker then went to the safety station located in the lunch room and 

put on one of the W-65’s and took the remaining five. By this time the smoke was so 

dense that he had to feel his way to the lunch table. He then put two pieces of 

plywood around a table and laid down under the table. His eyes were burning so he 

wet a rag and covered his eyes. After approximately 50 minutes the self rescuer had 

become hot and difficult to breathe through, and therefore the worker decided to put 

on a second W-65. 

After about two hours after encountering the smoke, the worker could feel the air 

changing. Fresh cool air was coming towards him in 000500 entry. The worker had a 

sense of relief, he felt safe. He put on the third self rescuer and proceeded to open the 

lunchroom door. Now he could see the smoke and hear the fire crackling in the 

00D700 entry near the corner of 000400. After about 45 minutes he put the fourth self 

rescuer on and decided to try to put the fire out. He took two 9 kgs fire extinguishers 

from the electrical sled in 00D700 and proceeded towards the fire. The back was 

dripping hot water. The worker crawled on his hands and knees towards the fire. He 

discharged the two extinguishers, one high and one low to blanket the fire, but this had 

no effect. He then went back to the lunch room he took off the fourth W-65, he knew 

he had to get out. 

43

He then put on the fifth W-65 and went down 000500 closing the doors behind him 

and leaving the doors to the entrance of the lunch room open. This would keep the 

smoke and fumes being pushed towards 000400. The back in 000500 was low and 

ground conditions were poor, therefore travel through this area was slow and he had to 

crouch to get through. When he got to the roll up door in 00D650 ventilation overpass, 

the roll up door and the man door was jammed. He attempted to force the man door 

open but it would not give. The worker then went back to his truck in 00D700 and got 

a screwdriver and hammer. Smoke was not bad so he took off the fifth W-65. (He 

had two left) 

He went back to the man door and hammered the screw driver in to pry it open. He 

knew where he had to go. He could smell timber from timber sets. In 00D650 he saw 

a brattice seal by the Dynatec dispatch. He noticed that it was lifted on the left side, 

and went through the brattice and walked to the refuge station. He opened the door 

and walked in. The men in the refuge station spoke to him and gave him oxygen. He 

knew that he was safe and it was now 3:40 PM January 30 th . 

Findings: 

 

 

Due to the training this worker had in mine emergency preparedness, 

and the use of self rescuers, he was able to survive in the situation he 

found himself in. 

During this worker’s travels to the refuge station, the roll up door and 

man-door in 00D650 could not be opened. 

Recommendation: 

21. The company continues to train workers in the use of self rescuers and mine 

emergency preparedness. 

22. Regular maintenance is to be conducted on all ventilation doors and man 

doors to ensure normal operation. 


Saskatchewan Mines Regulations 2003 

404 

44

Emergency Training & Equipment 

The survival of the workers in the mine at the time of the fire and the safe response of 

the Mine Rescue teams is due in a large part to the training these workers and the 

availability of emergency equipment. Much of this training has been received at this 

and other mine sites over the past months and years. 

Self-Rescuers 

All persons working underground are trained in the use of MSA W-65 self-rescuers. 

These are a filter type breathing apparatus that allow a worker to survive in an 

atmosphere with a carbon monoxide content. These are stored in various locations 

through out the mine and are on all pieces of mobile equipment. Workers receive at 

least one refresher training session on W-65s every six months. 

Emergency Warning System 

In the event of a mine fire or other emergency, the person manning the surface 

dispatch office will activate the emergency warning system. For most of the mine 

complex this causes the conveyor belts to stop, belt alarms to sound and paging lights 

to flash. In the water inflow area there is also a local stench gas and Femco phone 

systems. When workers notice any of these warning signs they are to contact surface 

dispatch for instructions or proceed directly to the nearest refuge station. 

Fire Drills 

At least once per year a simulated mine fire drill is carried out by activating the 

Emergency Warning System. This is an unannounced drill and only a few key people 

are aware of this event. Mine management, safety personnel and O.H.&C. monitor the 

actions and response of the workers to identify areas for improvement. 

Refuge Stations 

These are areas were workers can seal themselves off from contaminants in the mine 

air and are designed to accommodate workers for at least 36 hours. Most are equipped 

with food water and other necessary supplies. Workers are trained through orientation 

and routine fire drills to be familiar with the location and the procedures of refuge 

stations. 

Fire Fighting Equipment 

All workers are trained annually in the proper use of hand held dry chemical fire 

extinguishers. These extinguishers are stored through out the mine in active work 

places, fire hazard areas and on all mobile equipment and vehicles. 

45 

Section 4

EMERGENCY RESPONSE 

MINE RESCUE AND EMERGENCY PERSONNEL 

Certified active mines rescue personnel are volunteers and come from mining, 

supervision, trades, engineering, underground and surface employees. Intensive skill 

training in rescue and associated processes such as mines rescue, first aid, fire fighting 

and emergency response techniques are required. These volunteers must be dedicated 

team workers since their conduct underground during an emergency response could, at 

any given moment, affect the safety and well being of other team members. The 

evidence obtained and the observations made, lead to the conclusions that the mines 

rescue personnel, active during the Mosaic Esterhazy underground mine fire response 

and rescue efforts measured up to this profile. 

Mosaic Esterhazy Potash Mine maintain twenty six certified mines rescue team 

members, plus six certified mines rescue instructors, Level two equipment technicians, 

and twelve new trainees. 

The Mine Emergency and Response Procedures Manual is segregated into surface and 

underground, date of the last document review was November 2005 and is presently 

under review by management. 

On the day of the emergency the dispatcher on surface notified the K2 safety and 

training supervisor James Baumgartner at 2:55 AM Sunday, January 29, 2006 to 

inform of a problem at the mine. Smoke had been reported at the K2 shaft potash level 

and mines rescue was required. 

James Baumgartner contacted his counterpart K1 safety and training supervisor Frank 

Falkevitch at 3:00 AM. The OCTEL phone system was activated contacting all mines 

rescue personnel of the emergency and to mobilize to the mine. 

Upon arrival at the mine 3:55 AM the two safety supervisors began to check how 

many mines rescue personnel had responded to the emergency call and who was not 

available. 

Crew “C” was underground at the time of the emergency. This included eight 

certified mines rescue team members who would not be available. Team members 

started arriving around 3:20 AM, by 4:20 AM eleven had arrived but without 

sufficient team members available for three teams required for initial response, the 

mutual assistance process was initiated. 

PCS Rocanville mine was contacted. Safety and training supervisor was not available, 

therefore, security at the PCS Rocanville mine was contacted and relayed the request 

for assistance. Team members and the mine manager Vance Thom from PCS 

Rocanville, seven arrived with equipment at 4:40 AM. 

46

Discussions with Dwayne Forst, Chief Mine Engineer and the appointed mine rescue 

coordinator, James Baumgartner and Frank Falkevitch safety supervisors, initially 

concluded due to the power outage and reported location of the smoke that the fire was 

electrical in origin. This conclusion required mines rescue team members on the #1 

team to have knowledge of the electrical distribution and the K2 potash level shaft 

area, only one electrician Jim Gallant was available at this time. Team members were 

assigned to the #1 team and field-tested all the required equipment. 

Bob Morgan, Inflow Superintendent contacted Al Simms, Dynatec Project 

Superintendent to inform him of the fire and that there was no communication with the 

Dynatec workers underground. Al contacted the Dynatec Emergency Team and the 

Corporate Emergency Team. Al then traveled to the K-2 Mine site to organize the 

Dynatec Emergency Response Team. 

The Incident Management Team (IMT), some members arrived at the mine site at 

approximately 3:20 AM. This group included Gary Philips, Mine Manager, Brian 

Gerhardt Production and Maintenance Superintendent-K2, Nelson Wright, Safety and 

training Manager, and Bob Morgan, Inflow Control Superintendent. The control room 

was established in Brian Gerhardt’s office, which is equipped with three separate 

outside phones and lines. Communication into the workings of the K-2 mine was not 

available. There was communication to K-2 shaft at potash level. 

Comment 

The lack of information about the fire location, source of the smoke and location of all 

underground employees due to no phone communications to some underground work 

areas created a very stressful environment. Moving from normal mining operations to 

emergency control appeared not to be structured. Individuals responsible for 

emergency duties did not reference the Emergency Response Procedure Manual, 

although mutual assistance appeared to function as pre-planned, mines rescue 

personnel from PCS Rocanville arrived and were positioned on the Mosaic Esterhazy 

initial response teams. 

47

Team #1 – January 29, 2006 

The assignment and directive for the #1 team was agreed to, with the conclusion that 

the fire source was electrical in origin and all efforts to find the source would be in this 

direction. 

The briefing was with the team captain and vice captain initially but the team decided 

it would be more efficient if all team members were included. 

Briefing of #1 Team included: 

 

 

 

Confirm phone status #5213 shaft potash level, if no phone communications 

radio hoist room to relay information. 

Explore national pumps and electrical substation. 

Report to control. 

Dale Hintz led the first team to go underground on January 29 th . 

The team under oxygen at 5:00 AM and descended K2 shaft (intake) and reported to 

the coordinator, Dwayne Forst in the control room. 

5:16 AM From the shaft potash level phone #5213, 

Report: light smoke visible, proceeding to the nationals. 

5:30 AM Phone calls from the team at shaft potash level phone 

Report: extreme conditions, heavy black smoke and limited visibility 

in 900 and 000400. Fans are off, national electric’s O.K. 

Directed to proceed to check main substations 200 entry to 250 entry to 

D300 and return to phone at shaft potash level by 7:00 AM if no phone 

communications. 

6:30 AM Phone calls from the team at shaft potash level phone 

Report: from double doors to break through (BT) 13 (01104 belt) 

heavy black smoke, could not use vehicles, very slow going. 

Directed to proceed to start the fans at the nationals and the sump 

incline. 

6:48 AM Phone call from the team at shaft potash level phone 

Report: started fan at the nationals, went through the doors into the 

parking lot, dense black smoke in parking lot. 

Directed to proceed and start fan at main substation and 61310 

conveyor drive. 

48

7:12 AM Phone calls from the team at the foreman’s office 

Report: proceeding to Op-Com room will call from there. 

7:16 AM Phone calls from the team at the Op-Com room 

Report: Jim Gallant, electrician, confirming that line “A” (50 pair) is to 

be disconnected confirmed, return to shaft potash level K2 shaft once 

line “A” is disconnected. 

7:22 AM Phone calls from Jim Gallant at the Op-Com room 

Report: phone line “A” disconnected team returning to potash level. 

7:29 AM Phone calls from the team shaft potash level phone 

Report: returning to surface. 

On returning to surface it was obvious to everyone due to the condition of the #1 team 

members clothing and equipment, covered with black soot that provisions had to be 

made for an extensive long duration response. The captain Dale Hintz was taken to 

the control room for debriefing, while the other team members proceeded to the mines 

rescue room with equipment for cleaning and servicing. 

49

Team 1 Mission Time 05:15-07:29 

Foreman Shack 

Op-Com 

Room 

Fan 

Main Sub- 

Station 

Shaft 

Nationals 

Heavy Dense 

Smoke 

National 

Electrics 

• Light smoke reported at shaft 

• Sent to explore National Pumps Electrical Substation 

• Dense smoke and 100,000 cfm at 900 & 000400 entries 

• Dense smoke on opposite side of double air doors & double 

man doors 

• Will proceed to Op-Com room to re-establish telephone 

communication with the mine 

• Telephones restored to all areas of the mine excluding Water 

Inflow area 

50

Team #2-January 29, 2006 

Discussions with the IMT, Mines Rescue Coordinator considering information made 

available from the debriefing of Dale Hintz #1 team captain, mines rescue intervention 

would proceed exploring the areas toward the water inflow section examining all 

electrical installations on route to determine source of the smoke. 

Two vehicles would be used. 

Two team members from PCS Rocanville allocated to this team. 

The briefing took place with the IMT, team captain, vice captain, briefing conducted 

in the control room. 

Briefing of #2 team included: 

 

 

 

From K2 shaft potash level, travel through steel air doors, through main 

substations continue 901, 801 to 000200 to 11L050. 

Proceed to breakthrough (BT) 9 and 000400 examine intersection. 

Return to 61320 phone and report. 

Brent Bachtold led team #2 underground on January 29 th . The team under oxygen at 

8:20 A.M. descended K2 shaft and reported to the coordinator Dwayne Forst in the 

control room via telephone. 

8:27 AM From shaft potash level phone #5213 

Report: leaving and proceeding as per plan will call back by 9:30 

AM. 

9:25 AM Phone calls from team shaft potash level phone 

Report: checked power sled at BT 9 in 000400, dense smoke in 

000400. 

9:28 AM Proceed to 000250 through underpass (U/P) 000400 to examine 

intersection. 

9:56 AM Phone calls from team shaft potash level phone 

Report: team advanced to roll up door (RUD) at BT 13. 

No power, used chain lift to open door, good air moving toward 

team. Running out of time, closed door and returned to K2 shaft. 

10:06 AM Team on Surface. 

The team Captain was taken to the control room for debriefing, other team members 

preceded to the mines rescue room with equipment for cleaning and servicing. 

51

Team 2 Mission Time 08:27 – 10:06 

Walk Through 

Air Doors 

Air Door 

Drive Through 

Air Doors 

Shaft 

Walk 

Through Air 

Door 

Heavy Dense 

Smoke 

Refuge 

Station 

#5 

500 

Lunch 

Area 

• Traveled Entry 901 – 801 to 000200 

• Traveled to 11L050 – Checked sled at BT 9 

• Advanced to roll up door in BT 13 

• Opened door manually, as power was out, good air 

on the 000300 side 

• Closed door, returned to shaft 

52

Team #3-January 29, 2006 

After debriefing of the #2 team captain and discussions of the IMT and coordinator 

the decision to continue with mines rescue intervention toward the water inflow 

section examining electrical installation on route. 


Two team members from PCS Rocanville allocated to this team. 

Briefing of Team #3 included: 

 

 

 

 

From K2 shaft potash level proceed directly to RUD at BT 13 where #2 team 

stopped through RUD travel 000300 through U/P under 10L400, East to BT 10 

through strip door (S/D). 

Inspect electrical sled at BT 15 if sled is operational restore power to RUD. 

If time permitting proceed 000250 to BT 25 RUD. 

Inspect intersection for stability; continue to phone office if possible. 

Rob Dyke led #3 team underground on January 29 th . The team under oxygen at 10:40 

AM descended K2 shaft and reported to the coordinator Dwayne Forst in the control 

room via telephone. 

10:45 AM Coordinator received a phone call from workers in Refuge Station 

#3 

Report: smoke visible in the drift, through window in refuge station. 

10:47 AM Team #3 from shaft potash level phone #5213 

Report: leaving and proceeding as per plan. 

11:48 AM Phone calls from team at 61320 conveyor drift 

Report: restored power to sled at B.T.15 RUD now working. 

B.T. 25 dense smoke and heat 

125 steps from RUD towards 000400 too hot to proceed, fire glow 

across drift returned to report. 

12:08 PM Phone calls from team shaft potash level phone 

Report: team coming to surface January 30, 2006. 

Team captain Rob Dyke was taken to the control room for debriefing, other team 

members proceeded to the mines rescue room with equipment for cleaning and 

servicing. 

53


Walk Through 

Air Doors 

Air Door 

Drive Through 

Air Doors 

Shaft 

Walk 

Through Air 

Door 

Heavy Dense 

Smoke 

Refuge 

Station #5 

500 

Lunch 

Area 

• Restored power to roll up door in BT 13 

• Traveled to BT 25 

• Proceeded through door at BT 25 

• Chained in 125 paces – Extremely dense 

smoke, intense heat visible fireball 

54

Team #4-January 30, 2006 

Discussions with the IMT after debriefing of the #3 team captain and the now known 

location of the fire and conditions on route, decision to continue with the mines rescue 

intervention was to concentrate on extinguishing the fire and making contact with the 

workers in the water inflow area #5 refuge station. 

Two vehicles would be used, mines rescue vehicle and the multi-tasker water and 

foam capability. 

Two rescue team members from PCS Rocanville allocated to this team. 

The briefing took place with the IMT, team captain, vice captain and coordinator in 

the control room. 

Briefing of Team #4 included: 

From K2 shaft potash level proceed directly to 000250 to BT 53. 

Return north in 000400 and RUD south of BT 32. 

Take foam unit (Multi-Tasker) attempt to extinguish fire with foam from south 

side. 

Return to shaft potash level phone, continue with time limit 2.5 hours (3:00 

PM). 

Dale Hintz led #4 team underground January 30 th . The team under oxygen at 12:32 

PM, descended K2 shaft to potash level. 

Discussions in the control room with the IMT and coordinator centered around the #4 

team not reporting and they were overdue. 

The back up team (#5 team) was briefed and mobilized underground via K2 shaft. 


 

 

From K2 shaft potash level proceed and follow the same route as #4 team, 

ribbon off the entry to the south to indicate that they are traveling in search of 

#4 team. 

To phone coordinator within one hour max from potash level. 

Hugh Davis led #5 team underground on January 30 th . 

3:29 PM Phone calls from team shaft potash level 

Report: 200ppm CO, 20.5% Oxygen. 

3:32 PM Phone calls from team shaft potash level 

Report: met with #4 team, both teams returning to surface. 

55

Debriefing of #4 team took place in the control room with the team captain, IMT and 

coordinator. 

Information made available from this debriefing: 

 

 

 

 

Attempted to extinguish the fire, unsuccessful foam unit (Multi-Tasker) and 

truck parked south of the fire area. 

Disconnected brattice seal south of fire area 000400, traveled to phone office. 

Another brattice seal across 00D650 did not proceed through seal. 

Mines rescue truck parked along 1104 drift. 

56


Walk Through 

Air Doors 

Drive Through 

Air Doors 

Shaft 

Air Door 

Walk 

Through Air 

Door 

Heavy Dense 

Smoke 

Refuge 

Station 

#5 

500 

Lunch 

Area 

• Team proceeded to fire area 

• Team found a brattice seal North of BT 32 

• Proceeded through the seal, entered dense smoke 

and heat Team #5 – January 30, 2006 

• Attempted to extinguish the fire using the Multi- 

Tasker (300 gallon foam unit) 

• Team was forced to retreat due to intense heat 

• Team was nearing the designated call-in time and 

decided to attempt to reach to Inflow #5 Refuge 

Station 

• Team encountered another brattice seal in 00D650, 

before the Dynatec phone office 

57

Team #5 – January 30, 2006 

Information available from #4 team captain, decision by the IMT and coordinator was 

to improve conditions for and about the K2 shaft area potash level. 

To achieve this, the #5 team would walk to the shop area and start fans. 

One team member from PCS Rocanville allocated to this team. 

Briefing took place in the control room, with the IMT, captain, vice captain and 

coordinator. 


 

 

From K2 shaft potash level, travel via parking lot and refuge station to the shop 

and restore ventilation. 

Bring back wheeled unit fire extinguisher. 

Murray Schlamp led #5 team underground on January 30 th. The team under oxygen at 

4:26 PM, descended K2 shaft and reported to the coordinator Dwayne Forst in the 

control room on surface. 

4:39 PM Phone calls from #5 team potash level 

Report: continuing to shop. 

5:12 PM Phone calls from #5 team at the shop refuge station. 

Report: restored compressor, started fans, bringing wheeled 

extinguisher unit to K2 shaft, steel doors are closed. Diesel bay – 

750ppm CO smoke visible. 

5:23 PM Phone calls from #5 team K2 shaft potash level 

Report: wheeled unit fire extinguisher at parking lot side of orange man 

doors, coming to surface. 

Team captain taken to control room for debriefing other team members proceed to the 

mines rescue room with equipment for cleaning and servicing. 

58


Shop 

Foreman’s 

Office 

Op-com 

Room 

Fan 

Main Sub- 

Station 

Shaft 

Nationals 

Heavy Dense 

Smoke 

National 

Electrics 

• Team went to the shop area to start ventilation 

fans to aid in clearing out the smoke in the shaft 

area 

• Team also brought a wheeled dry chemical 

extinguisher to the shaft area 

59


IMT discussions concluded that the mines rescue intervention would now be directed 

to extinguishing the fire and making contact with the Dynatec workers in the water 

inflow section. 


Three PCS Rocanville team members allocated to this team. Briefing took place in the 

control room (no record available on team assignment). 

Hugh Davis led #6 team underground January 30 th . Team under oxygen 5:45 PM, 

descended K2 shaft and reported to the coordinator Dwayne Forst in the control room 

on surface. 

5:55 PM Phone calls from #6 team at shaft potash level 

Report: smoke clearing 21.1% Oxygen 0.4ppm CO 

Time limit 2.5 hours. 


Report: Dynatec personnel and K. Martin all accounted for. 

Coming to surface – will debrief on surface. 

Team Captain Hugh Davis taken to control room for debriefing. 

All Dynatec employees (31) are fine in #5 Refuge Station. Ken Martin some smoke 

inhalation O2 administered by qualified Dynatec employee. 

All travel ways were noticeably improved (visibility), used all extinguishers, fire still 

active, pipe and cables burning. 

Foam unit (Multi-Tasker) returned to K2 shaft, moved truck that is broke down. 

60


Walk Through 

Air Doors 

Shaft 

Air Door 

Drive Through 

Air Doors 

Walk 

Through Air 

Door 

Heavy Dense 

Smoke 

Refuge 

Station 

#5 

500 

Lunch 

Area 

• Team picked up the wheeled fire extinguisher 

and proceeded to fire area 

• Proceeded through the seal, entered dense 

smoke and heat 

• Attempted Team #7- to extinguish January the 30, fire 2006 using wheeled 

dry chemical extinguisher 

• Team almost has the fire extinguished and ran 

out of dry chemical 

• Team reached the Inflow #5 Refuge Station 

• All Dynatec employees and the Mosaic 

employee who works in the area were 

accounted for 

61


IMT discussion with coordinator Dwayne Forst, team to return to fire area and 

extinguish fire, evaluate and recharge foam unit, additional chemical extinguishers, 

monitor air quality to #5 refuge station, check Dynatec and Mosaic personnel. 


Briefing took place in the control room with the IMT, team captain and coordinator. 


From K2 shaft potash level proceed to nationals. 

Reclaim dry chemical extinguishers. 

Open main doors at national electrics. 

Recharge foam unit (Multi-Tasker). 

Report when ready to proceed. 

Rob Dyke led #7 team underground January 30 th . Team under oxygen at 8:50 PM, 

descended K2 shaft and reported to the coordinator Dwayne Forst in the control room. 


Report: will gather equipment and report back. 


Report: 

BG truck low on fuel. 

Equipment loaded. 

When doors opened at the national electrics air entered, advised 

to close doors prior to leaving an assignment. 

Report back by 11:20 PM. 


Report: FIRE EXTINGUSHED. 

All personnel in #5 refuge station OK. 

Air quality readings: 

D/D at K2 shaft – 8ppm CO 

half way along 000250 – 16ppm CO 

other side of strip door – light smoke 15ppm CO 

rest of travel way good air. 

in front of #5 refuge station – 9ppm CO 

magnet – light smoke – 0ppm CO 

- light smoke – 15ppm CO 

Returning to surface. 

62

Rob Dyke #7 Team Captain taken to control room for debriefing, other team members 

proceed to the rescue room with equipment for cleaning and servicing. 

63


Walk Through 

Air Doors 

Air Door 

Drive Through 

Air Doors 

Shaft 

Walk 

Through Air 

Door 

Refuge 

Station 

#5 

500 

Lunch 

Area 

• Proceeded to fire area 

• Extinguished the fire using Multi- 

Tasker 

• Team reached the Inflow Refuge 

Station 

• Advised Inflow employees on the 

progress of the operation 

• Inflow employees remained in refuge 

station until mine could be cleared of 

gases and smoke 

64


Discussion with the IMT and coordinator Dwayne Forst, with the information 

provided by #7 team captain Rob Dyke that the fire was out, a sense of achievement 

was evident, a detailed focus on the rescue of all underground workers began with the 

#5 refuge station to be the first evacuated of 32 employees. 


Briefing took place in the control room with the IMT, team captain and coordinator. 

Briefing or #8 team included: 

 

 

 

 

 

From K2 shaft potash level call before leaving. 

Travel to fire area, take air quality readings (gas checks). 

Examine fire area, ensure fire is out (gas checks). 

Travel to #5 refuge station (gas checks), check on personnel in the refuge 

station. 

Return to K2 shaft potash level and report. 

Brent Bachtold led #8 team underground January 30 th . Team under oxygen at 12:05 

AM, descended K2 shaft and reported to the coordinator Dwayne Forst in the control 

room. 

12:18 AM Phone calls from #8 team at shaft potash level. 

Report: Foam unit still attached to vehicle, will unhook and call 

back. 


Report: Oxygen at 21%, 300ppm CO2, 0 CO. 

proceeding as planned, call back by 2:00 AM 

remind Brent to pick up dust masks. 


Report: All employees #5 refuge station are okay (31 Dynatec, 1 

Mosaic). 

Inspected travel way and fire area. 

Ken Martin is doing fine. 

Air quality readings, no concerns. 


Report: ready to proceed to #5 refuge station and evacuate to surface, 

barefaced. 

Taking a different truck. 

Call back at 3:30 AM the latest. 

65


Report: all personnel evacuated from #5 refuge station (32), no 

problems to report. 

Coming to surface, barefaced. 

On surface 31 employees from #5 refuge station were directed to the food and drink 

area for debriefing. One worker was medically checked, debriefed and proceeded 

home with his family. 

Brent Bachtold team captain was escorted to the control room for debriefing, other 

team members proceeded to mines rescue room with equipment for cleaning and 

servicing. 

66


Walk Through 

Air Doors 

Air Door 

Shaft 

Drive Through 

Air Doors 

Walk 

Through 

Air Door 

Refuge 

Station 

#5 

500 

Lunch 

Area 

• Checked gases from shaft to fire area 

• Re-checked the fire area to ensure that the fire 

was out 

• Team checked on Inflow employees in #5 

Refuge Station 

• Returned to the shaft to communicate with 

Control Group –advised to remove Inflow 

employees from the refuge station 

• Team escorted Inflow employees to the shaft 

and accompanied to surface 

67


Based on the information available to the IMT and coordinator it was decided to 

continue with the evacuation of all other refuge stations occupied by Mosaic 

employees. To achieve this evacuation in a safe and timely fashion a plan to use three 

member rescue teams was discussed, as required by the Mines Regulations 2003, Part 

XIX, section 396(2). 

“The chief mines inspector may permit a mines rescue team consisting of fewer than 

five mines rescue workers to respond to an emergency response operation requiring 

the use of self-contained breathing apparatus.” 

As a result the Chief Mines Inspector, Neil Crocker was contacted and briefed on the 

proposal, after lengthy discussion permission was given by Neil Crocker to proceed 

with the proposed plan. 

Six team members were selected for this mission; briefing took place in the control 

room with IMT team and coordinator. 

Team members from Mosaic Colonsay allocated to this team. 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bruce Fraser would lead one three member team. 

Dean Stephens would lead one three member team. 

Switch off fans in shop, travel to A400 – take air quality readings on both sides 

of the doors, return to K2 shaft and report. 

Bruce – travel to 300 entry and Dunes Hillroad, proceed to #2 refuge station 

and report. 

Dean – travel 200 to #3 refuge station and report. 

Dean and Bruce if all is clear and safe, travel with workers to K2 shaft and 

send them to surface. 

Bruce – travel T400 to #6 refuge station and report. 

Dean – travel 400 to K1 shop and report, if all safe and clear in both areas 

travel with worker to K2 shaft and to surface. 

Bruce Fraser and Dean Stephens led #9 team underground January 30 th . 

Team descended K2 shaft and reported to the coordinator Dwayne Forst in the control 

room. 

3:20 AM Phone calls from #9 team at shaft potash level 

Report: continuing to shop to switch off fans taking two 

vehicles. 

68

3:46 AM Phone calls from #9 team shop refuge station 

Report: switch off 3 shop fans. 

no phones in shop. 

30ppm CO in shop area. 

double air doors don’t work. 

under oxygen at 3:40 AM. 

4:02 AM Phone calls from #9 team shop refuge station 

Report: no phones, air doors, 10 belt or lube shed. 

32ppm CO in A400 on K2 side. 

A400 doors do not work. 

Continue to refuge stations: Bruce to #2 R.S. 

Dean to #3 R.S. 

The two three member rescue teams carried out their assignments, all travel way’s 

examined, air quality readings taken and found to be within acceptable parameters. 

Refuge stations #2, #3, #6 and K1 shop evacuated of all Mosaic personnel, escorted to 

K2 shaft potash level and to surface. 

On surface all personnel evacuated were debriefed and directed to the refreshment 

area. 

Team captains escorted to the control room for debriefing by the IMT and coordinator. 


Mines rescue intervention continued with team #10, a six member team, intention was 

to evacuate the remaining refuge stations. To achieve this team #10 would be split 

into two, three member teams, travel to the refuge stations and once safe travel ways 

were established, air quality and quantities levels are within acceptable parameters. 

Mosaic personnel are to be evacuated from the refuge stations and escorted to the shaft 

and to the surface. 

Two vehicles are to be used. 

Six team members selected for this mission briefing took place in the control room 

with IMT, team and coordinator. 


Travel bare faced to K1 Refuge Station #32. 

Lawrence Litzenberger would lead one, three member team. 

69

Dean Stephens would lead one, three member team. 

Under oxygen Litzenberger travel to #20 Auxiliary Refuge Station. 

Stephens travel to K1 shaft and nationals. 

Stephens to escort single worker. 

Litzenberger to escort four workers. 

Litzenberger and Stephens led the # 10 team underground January 30 th . 

Team descended the K2 shaft and reported to the coordinator Dwayne Forst in the 

control room. 

All travel ways were examined by the two, three member mines rescue teams as per 

the assignments, air quality and quantity readings taken and found to be within 

acceptable levels. 

Refuge Stations K1 mine complex, #2, and #3, #4 and 150 miner, 20 Mosaic 

employees evacuated and escorted to surface. 

Refuge Stations K2 mine complex, #2, #3, and #6, 20 Mosaic employees evacuated 

and escorted to surface. 

On surface all personnel evacuated were debriefed and directed to the refreshment 

area. 

Team captains debriefed by the IMT in the control room, all 72 Mosaic and Dynatec 

employees safely evacuated and on surface. 

The IMT decided at 11:00 AM to suspend operations and resume at 4:00 PM January 

30, 2006. 

70


Mines rescue intervention resumed at 4:00 PM January 30, 2006. 

The IMT included Nelson Wright and Bob Morgan. 

A three member mines rescue team was selected and briefed by the IMT on the 

assignment. 

Two vehicles to be used. 


 

 

 

 

Travel K2 shaft to potash level and report. 

Travel to water inflow area, important to evaluate the area. 

Travel to fire scene, if any concerns return to 61320 conveyor drift and report 

to coordinator, otherwise continue to explore D650 to BT 15 north to D700, 

D720, D710. 

Retreat travel 12D830, examine D400, BT 30/40 to 12D500, 0400 and check 

old motor shop. 

Coordinator Dwayne Forst arrived at mine site and assumed responsibilities with the 

IMT. 

Hugh Davis led #1 team underground. 

5:10 PM Phone calls from team potash level 

Report: upon going under oxygen Dave Robinson’s apparatus failed. 

Team directed to return to surface and replace faulty apparatus and return to potash 

level and report. 

5:45 PM #1 Team proceeding to K2 shaft. 

(Five member back up team in place.) 


Report: under oxygen proceeding as per plan, report by 7:05 PM. 


Report: Fire re-ignited inside of pipe location as previous. 

attempted to extinguish with dry-chemical 2-10lbs extinguishers. 

visible flames extinguished, smoldering inside pipe. 

coming to surface. 

Team debriefed by the IMT in control room. 

71

Team #2-January 30, 2006. 

Mines rescue intervention was discussed by the IMT and coordinator with the decision 

made to return to the fire area “main line entry 000400” and extinguish the fire. 

A five member mines rescue team was selected. 

Vehicles would be used. 

Briefing took place in the control room with the team captain, IMT and coordinator. 


 

 

 

 

Travel K2 shaft to potash level. 

Load all equipment: 

- Scoop from shaft to fire area. 

- Foam unit (Multi-Tasker) 

- Call when ready to proceed. 

Proceed to steel doors, to 1104, to 61342 and 000400 to BT 23 turn foam unit 

trailer and flood pipes with foam - take a bucket of muck. 

Call back by 9:37 PM. 

George Orr led #2 team underground. 

7:16 PM Leave for K2 head frame. 


Report: under oxygen gathering equipment. 


Report: proceeding as per plan, report back by 9:37 PM. 


Report: light smoke only in 000400 fire area, visible flames (small 

only) used foam on fire area and pipe. 

Pump did not prime second time 

Water tank remains ½ full. 

Pulled sections of pipe out of muck- about ten pieces – only a 

few pieces were hot. 

Dragged approximately 60 feet towards a water pool. 

Site readings – 4ppm CO – 20.7% oxygen. 

Coming to surface. 

Team captain debriefed by IMT and coordinator other team members proceed to the 


72


With the information available from #2 team the IMT in consultation with the 

coordinator decided to ensure the fire area was stable and no signs of combustion were 

evident. 

A five member mines rescue team was selected and briefed by the IMT and 

coordinator. 

Vehicles would be used. 


Travel K2 shaft to potash level and report. 

Proceed 000400, complete remedial action at fire area. Expose any pipe 

remaining, haul to water pool, use remaining foam if able to prime pump, 

ensure area is stable. 

Bring scoop and foam unit to 10L400, (scoop in 000400) (foam unit in 

000250) start fans at 10L500 / BT 17. 

Proceed south of 000250 to 00D300 to D300 RUD in BT 23 to D400 to BT 38 

proceed 12D500. 

Return to 000400, check water on travel way south of RUD. 

Return to potash level K2 shaft and report. 

Brent Bachtold led #3 team underground. 


Report: under oxygen, proceeding with plan 

report back by 12:39 AM. 

January 31, 2006 

12:42 AM Phone calls from team potash level 

Report: assignment and all tasks completed, had extra time restored 

shop ventilation. 

- 5ppm CO in shop prior to restarting ventilation. 

- 3ppm CO at fire area. 

- No gases detected in D500, 12D500 beach at Geo Tech office. 


Team captain debriefed by IMT and coordinator other team members proceeded to 


73


The IMT and coordinator decided considering information available from #3 team to 

continue the intervention by operating with three mines rescue member teams. 

Three member teams selected and organized to inspect the fire area mine travel ways 

for stability, air quality and quantity. 

Vehicles to be used. 


Stop 30hp fan at BT 17. 

Take foam unit to BT 23. 

Inspect and examine fire area. 

Continue 000400 to D650. 

Inspect 12D830 and 12D800. 

Continue to BT 15, 12D600 pump. 

Return to 61320 conveyor drive and report. 

Expect report in 1-½ hours. 

Hugh Davis led #4 team underground. 


Report: fire area, no signs of fire area cool. 

examined “Hilton” lunch area (000500), retrieved unused W-65 

Ground conditions prevented travel. 

2:40 AM #4 team departing for travel way and air quality and quantity 

evaluations. Report by 4:10 AM. 


Report: 000400 south of RUD blocked by water in travel way, unable 

to advance. 

-Air quality good 000400 to RUD. 


Team captain debriefed and assigned for continuation of clearing and evaluating 

conditions throughout the mine complex. 

Teams #4A, #5, #6 and #7 were briefed and given assignments to evaluate conditions 

underground to ensure the mine complex was clear of residual mine fire gases, travel 

ways were safe and clear and the ventilation distribution was following its normal path 

and at normal values. 

74

9:35 AM Investigation team proceeded underground to the fire area and 

returned to surface at 1:05 PM January 31, 2006 this team consisted 

of: 

Al Simms, Dynatec, Project Superintendent, OHC Management 

Chair. Darrell Woytas, Mosaic OHC Employee Chair. 

Gerry Clarke, Dynatec OHC Employee Chair 

Bob Morgan, Mosaic Water Superintendent, OHC Management 

Chair. Ernie Becker, Director Mines Safety Unit. 

Neil Crocker, Chief Inspector Mines Safety Unit. 

Kevin McEown, Fire Prevention Officer, Fire Commissioner Office. 

Greg Schmidt, Mosaic Chief Geologist. 

Brian Banga, Mosaic Supervisor. 


Saskatchewan Mine Regulations 2003 

380,381,383,384 

Findings 

 

 

 

 

During the initial response there appeared to be issues that occurred that 

require noting. There was uncertainty due to lack of information regarding the 

number of certified mines rescue personnel available and responding. 

Rooms, except the mines rescue room, were not designated or identified for 

emergency function, this created some confusion for the mines rescue and 

emergency support personnel. 

Formation of the Incident Management Team (IMT) occurred shortly after the 

arrival of the Mine Manager, the role of the IMT and individual roles and 

responsibilities of the IMT members were not clearly defined. Also an 

advisory support group was not established to assist the IMT in risk analysis 

and problem solving. At one point the control room was filled with individuals 

that did not have an IMT function disrupting the process and creating 

confusion. 

Briefing and debriefing of the mines rescue team (MRT) was carried out by the 

IMT and coordinator in the control room located on the upper floor from the 

mines rescue room. These briefings were conducted mostly with the team 

captain but on occasion the vice-captain would be in attendance. After the 

briefing the captain would return downstairs to the mines rescue room and 

brief his remaining team members, this process at times during the emergency 

created some confusion where the captain had to return to the control room for 

additional information from the IMT and coordinator. 

75

One has to question the size of the IMT and duration of activity. There is little 

question that in the early stages of the emergency that their energy levels were 

high and the thought processes were effective and efficient. However, some 

20 hours into the emergency the same IMT members and coordinator were still 

making decisions and directing the emergency response. 

It was evident that the individuals who initially formed the IMT possessed a 

thorough and accurate knowledge of the systems established and practiced in 

mines rescue and also the underground mining complex. 

Underground phone communication from the active mines rescue teams during 

the emergency to the coordinator and IMT left something to be desired. 

Transfer of timely and critical information from the active teams to the 

coordinator and the IMT was not communicated, this was due to no phone 

availability from beyond the K2 shaft potash level phone into the water inflow 

area, teams were active into this area without communications for on an 

average of two hours. 

The extreme underground environment the mines rescue teams were exposed 

to and operated in challenged the established training competencies, both 

physical and mental capabilities, throughout the emergency, on two occasions 

back up teams were mobilized, one team did lose direction due to the extreme 

conditions on the return part of the assignment. 

It was noted that one mine rescue team member while in the cage, ran out of 

oxygen when returning to surface. This team had just completed a mission in 

heavy smoke and extreme conditions. One other team member upon going 

under oxygen at potash level, experienced apparatus failure and the team 

returned to surface. 

Some of the electronic gas testing equipment provided for use by the mine 

rescue teams, failed to operate as designed due to heavy concentrations of soot. 

The designated mine rescue truck could not be used after the brakes failed due 

to traveling through an area of accumulated water. 

The trailer mounted multi-tasker was found to be extremely difficult to back up 

in conditions of poor visibility. 

Due to the dense smoke, travel by truck was extremely difficult and slow due 

to poor visibility. 

During the fire in 000400 smoke accumulated in the area of the K-2 shaft at the 

potash level even though this is a down casting shaft. This is the result of the 

ventilation system used in this mine, which allows recirculation. Mine 

ventilation drawings indicate that under normal operating conditions there is 

76

28% recirculation in the area of the shaft. When the main bulkhead fans were 

restarted with the remainder of the underground fans still off this recirculation 

increased dramatically. Doors in the shop area that are designed to open 

automatically when the power failed compounded this. During interviews with 

mine engineers, questions on ventilation recirculation were not answered to the 

satisfaction of the investigation team. 

Recommendations 

23. Review to ensure the role of the Incident Management Team (IMT) is defined, 

and also their roles and responsibilities are outlined in a format easily 

referenced (Duty card system). 

24. Review to ensure the number and balance of the IMT is correct. This is by no 

means a criticism of the Mosaic and Dynatec teams who performed admirably. 

It is more a question of fatigue and how long a team should remain constituted 

until relieved. 

25. Review to ensure the emergency control room is pre-designated at a location in 

close proximity to the mines rescue team preparation activity. 

26. Examine the requirements for emergency response rooms to accommodate the 

advisory group, briefing and debrief of mines rescue teams, quiet rest area; 

refreshments, senior mine executives, government and worker representatives, 

etc. 

27. Ensure trained personnel are available to brief and debrief mines rescue teams; 

this is by no means a criticism of the coordinators activities who performed 

very professionally. Again it is more a question of fatigue and how long a 

coordinator should remain active until relieved. 

28. Investigate the mines rescue team briefing and debriefing process, this process 

is fundamental for information flow during the emergency, all team members 

have many responsibilities, one of these being firstly, during briefing, to 

understand the directives and assignment and secondly to relay all information 

during debriefing. 

29. Ensure all key personnel can be contacted at all times. 

30. Investigate the latest technology available for communication. In the event of 

an emergency, workers will need to be notified, management and rescuers need 

to know how many workers are in danger, where they are located and how 

extensive is the emergency and associated damages. Locating personnel and 

establishing effective communications in tandem with comprehensive 

emergency preparedness planning are essential elements if an incident is to be 

managed efficiently. 

31. Continue with more and frequent mines rescue team-training exercises in 

atmospheres of impaired vision especially where the use of personnel vehicles 

is required. 

32. Continue with the investigation for application of equipment to assist mines 

rescue teams when operating in conditions of limited visibility. 

33. Investigate the availability of portable communications systems for mines 

rescue team application and implementation. 

77

34. Continue with the emergency mutual assistance process within the southern 

group also including the central group involvement. 

35. A detailed study of the ventilation system be conducted by a professional 

engineer to identify sources of recirculation and means of reducing it to an 

acceptable level. 

36. Assess the risk to workers from doors that can alter mine ventilation by 

opening automatically when the power fails. 

37. The Chief Inspector of Mines should convene a task group made up of 

representatives from all mining groups to evaluate the Mining Regulations 

2003 part XIX Emergency Response and Mines Rescue Underground at a 

Mine and recommend any amendments that may be required considering 

recent underground mine emergency responses especially the Mosaic 

Esterhazy Potash mine fire. 

38. Continue to investigate and to ensure any process or equipment used during 

mine emergency response are fit for purpose. 

78

CONCLUSION 

The lives of 72 mineworkers were put at risk because proper hot work procedures 

were not followed by the workers involved in the job that resulted in the ignition of 

the pipe. This is not the fault of the workers as they were following the accepted 

practice for this task at this site. 

The Mines Rescue persons performed admirably and brought a successful conclusion 

to the incident. All workers eventually safely exited the mine and the mine was 

restored to operation. The starting of fans and reestablishing ventilation without 

knowing the location of the fire or all the workers is not a recommended mine rescue 

response procedure. It is not clear if these decisions were based on a risk analysis 

process. With the telephone communication systems being down, the mine rescue 

teams had to travel long distances back to communicate with the coordinator, adding 

time to the rescue operations. After the fire was out, the area should have been 

constantly monitored until all personnel were evacuated from the mine. It is essential 

that a significant number of the IMT members and senior management are trained in 

the established mine rescue procedures and practices. 

The training the company has provided for worker response to mine emergencies 

proved to be invaluable in this situation and can be seen as an indication of the 

company’s commitment to worker safety. Persons responsible for the directing the 

activities in the mine need to be trained in procedures for recognizing and reducing 

risks. They must also be aware of the Regulations and accepted standards related to 

mine activities and to promptly correct any deficiencies that may affect the safety of 

workers in the mine. 

The company is already implementing many of the recommendations identified in this 

report. 

From this investigation the team has learned that: 

“In the critical minutes following an incident the safety of the underground 

mine workers is largely influenced by their own actions.” 

79

APPENDIX 

Mine Rescue Teams 

Mosaic Esterhazy 

PCS Rocanville 

Bachtold, Brent 

Brown, Doug 

Baumgartner, James Program Instructor Brown, Kevin 

Carlson, Brent 

Hanson, Rob 

Colbourne, Bruce 

Huber, Paul 

Danylko, Brad 

Mozeski, Blake 

Davis, Hugh 

Norton, Mike 

Dutka, Kelly 

Olafson, Glen 

Dyck, Rob 

Olafson, Keith 

Falkevitch, Frank Program Instructor Peddle, Paul 

Fraser, Bruce 

Petracek, Calvin Program Coordinator 

Gale, Shawn 

Reiss, Mike 

Gallant, Jim 

Stomp, Grant 

Geddes, Jody Thom, Vance Mine Manager 

Gerhardt, Dean 

Hintz, Dale Instructor Mosaic Colonsay 

Hollingshead, Clint 

Evans, Kent 

Kishalowich, Dean Huber, Kevin Program Coordinator 

Lajeunesse, Kevin 

Kingdon, Tim 

Lake, Greg 

Korte, Tim 

Larsen, Mark 

Mensch, Brent 

Lee, Sheldon 

Mensch, Greg 

Lippai, Trevor 

Sterner, Mark 

Litzenberger, Lawrence 

Tucker, Trevor 

Orr, George Instructor 

Ottenbreit, Marvin Instructor Dynatec 

Pfeifer, Marty 

Gale, Sheldon 

Prazma, Rob 

Niebergal, Neil 

Robinson, Dave 

Travis, Brock 

Schlamp, Murray 

Sherstabitoff, Bret 

Sherstabitoff, Dan 

Stephens, Dean 

Tanasichuk, Don 

80 

Appendix

Public Safety 122-3 rd Avenue N. 

Office of the Fire Commissioner Sturdy – Stone Centre 

Saskatoon, Sk S7K 2H6 

(306) 933-6670 

(306) 964-1094 Fax 

E-mail: kmceown@cps.gov.sk.ca 

February 6, 2006 

Dr. Ernest Becker 

Director, Mines and 

Radiation Safety Units 

8 th Floor, 122-3 rd Ave. N. 

Saskatoon, Saskatchewan 

S7K 2H6 

Re: Fire Occurring January 29, 2006, underground at K2 Mosaic Potash Mine 

Dear Dr. Becker 

On January 30 th , 2006 in the presence of you, Chief Mine Inspector Neil Crocker and 

members of Mosaic Company, I began the investigation of a fire at the above noted location. 

Origin of the fire was determined to be at base level of the "Main Line Entry 000400" portion 

of the mine. Cause of the fire was determined to be accidental. Use of a cutting torch caused a 

flame on the interior of a fourteen inch polyethylene pipe which is used in the mine operations. 

A cutting torch was being used by workers to remove metal bolts from a flange connecting the 

polyethylene pipes. Pipes being separated had not been used for some time and were relatively 

free of having fluid in them. Due to the duration of the pipes discontinued use, portions of the 

piping were partially covered in the ground. 

To expose the pipe joints necessitated the workers first cutting the top bolt, replacing the bolt 

with a clevis to allow lifting of the pipe using a sling attached to a loader. Cleaning operation 

using air equipment to clear away the bolts and flange was conducted. A worker first cut the 

bolts located on the back-side of the piping then crawled over the piping to finish cutting the 

remaining bolts on the front side. Cutting the bolts allowed the pipe joints to open as the metal 

pipe flanges could no longer hold the pipe joints tightly together. Subsequent torch cutting of the 

bolts around the pipe joints allowed high-temperature open flame from the torch to impinge on 

the interior corners of the polyethylene pipe joints. Since the pipe joints, flanges and bolts had 

some debris on them, increased cutting energy would have been expended in cutting through the 

bolts. These factors allowed the piping to ignite by direct flame contact. 

Reportedly it is normal to have drops of burning polyethylene as a result of the cutting operation; 

the majority of these drops self-extinguish, or when noticed are easily extinguished. 

81

Page 2 

Dr. Becker 

February 6, 2006 

Mainline entry 000400 air flow is greater than 130,000 cubic feet per minute. The worker 

operating the cutting torch reported a "banana effect" (curvature of the torch flame) while 

adjusting the torch due to the large volume of air flow. Fire inside the pipe was not detected as 

the products of combustion were pushed down the pipe by the large air flow in main entry 

000400. 

If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me. 

Sincerely, 

Kevin McEown 

Fire Prevention Officer 

Office of the Fire Commissioner 

82

OBSERVATIONS ON THE CALCULATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS 

1. Assumptions and Approximations 

The calculations are approximate, in that: 

No compensation for the volume occupied by the miners. 

Assumed normal atmosphere CO2 (0.035%) – that air was not stagnant or 

stratified. 

Calculated the average value – that assumes perfect diffusion and mixing of 

the air throughout the space. In actual conditions, diffusion will take time, so it 

is very likely that the people would experience lower Oxygen levels and 

increased Carbon Dioxide levels in their immediate vicinity – particularly if 

they gathered close together for comfort and aid – near the concentration 

limits, this effect might be significant. 

I understand that Carbon Dioxide can be evolved from the surroundings in 

potash mines (K. Leichnitz, Drager Review 35). If that condition is likely in 

the Saskatchewan mines, it should be taken into account in evaluating the 

effect of carbon dioxide on occupancy time. 

2. Interpretations 

 

 

 

Safe limits used were the generally accepted limits of O2>17% and CO2

PART XVII 

Fire Prevention and Control 

DIVISION 1 

General 

Interpretation of Part 

SASKATCHEWAN MINE REGULATIONS 2003 

350 In this Part: 

(a) “combustion products” means products produced as a result of a fire 

and includes smoke, ash and gases; 

(b) “hot work” means work that produces arcs, sparks, flames, heat or 

other sources of ignition. 

Fire prevention and control 

351 An employer or contractor must: 

(a) take all reasonably practicable steps to prevent the outbreak of fire on 

the surface and underground; 

(b) provide effective means to: 

(i) control a fire; and 

(ii) protect workers from any fire that may occur; and 

(c) develop a written fire control and emergency response plan in accordance 

with section 383. 

Fire hazard area 

352 

(1) If a risk of fire exists in any area of a mine as a result of smoking or the 

use of any open flame equipment, match or other means of producing heat 

or fire, an employer or contractor must designate the area as a fire hazard 

area. 

(2) If an area has been designated as a fire hazard area pursuant to subsection 

(1), an employer or contractor must ensure that legible fire hazard warning 

signs are posted and maintained in conspicuous locations around the perimeter 

of the area. 

Fire prohibited underground 

353 

(1) Subject to subsection (3), an employer or contractor must ensure that: 

(a) no person smokes or uses any open flame equipment, match or other 

means of producing heat or fire in any area designated as a fire hazard area 

pursuant to section 352; and 

(b) no fire is set underground. 

87

(2) Subject to subsection (3), no worker shall: 

(a) smoke or use any open flame equipment, match or other means of 

producing heat or fire in any area designated as a fire hazard area pursuant 

to section 352; or 

(b) set any fire underground. 

(3) This section does not apply to controlled open flame equipment that is 

used in accordance with section 370. 

Fire-fighting equipment 

355 

(1) An employer or contractor must ensure that there are suitable and 

adequate portable fire extinguishers and other suitable and adequate firefighting 

equipment: 

(a) in the case of an open pit mine: 

(i) on each vehicle; 

(ii) on every dredge; 

(iii) at every belt conveyor drive unit; and 

(iv) at any location where a fire may create a hazard to a worker; and 

(b) in the case of an underground mine: 

(i) at each headframe or other entrance to an underground mine; 

(ii) in each hoist room; 

(iii) at any surface location where a fire may create a hazard to a 

worker; 

(iv) on each vehicle and at each stationary diesel engine; 

(v) at every underground crusher station, electrical installation, pump 

station, shaft station, belt conveyor drive unit, service garage, fuel 

station, explosive storage area, flammable liquid storage area and hot 

work area; and 

(vi) at any other area that is designated as a fire hazard area pursuant 

to section 352. 

(2) An employer or contractor must ensure that the fire-fighting equipment 

required pursuant to subsection (1) is: 

(a) conspicuously marked; and 

(b) located so that, in the event of a fire, it will be accessible. 

Maintenance and inspection of fire-fighting equipment 

356 

(1) In this section, “equipment” means the fire-fighting equipment required 

pursuant to section 355. 

(2) An employer or contractor must ensure: 

(a) that a competent person: 

(i) maintains the equipment; 

(ii) conducts monthly inspections of the equipment; and 

88

(iii) prepares a written report containing the details of each monthly 

inspection conducted pursuant to subclause (ii); and 

(b) that the inspection report mentioned in subclause (a)(iii) is: 

(i) recorded by the competent person mentioned in clause (a) and 

countersigned by the employer or contractor; and 

(ii) located at the place of employment and made readily available to 

workers. 

Procedures for flammable substances 

363 

(1) Where a flammable substance is or is intended to be handled, used, 

stored, produced or disposed of at a place of employment, an employer, 

contractor or owner 

shall develop written procedures to ensure the health and safety of workers 

who: 

(a) handle, use, store, produce or dispose of a flammable substance that may 

spontaneously ignite or ignite when in combination with any other substance; 

or 

(b) perform hot work where there is a risk of fire. 

(2) An employer, contractor or owner shall ensure that all workers who are 

required or permitted to perform work mentioned in subsection (1) are 

trained in, 

and implement, the procedures developed pursuant to subsection (1). 

(3) Workers who perform work mentioned in subsection (1) shall implement 

the procedures developed pursuant to subsection (1). 

Hot Work 

Hot work and use of compressed gas 

370 

(1) In this section, “hot work equipment” means equipment that produces 

arcs, sparks, flames, heat or other sources of ignition, and includes welding 

equipment, cutting equipment and brazing equipment. 

(2) An employer or contractor must ensure that: 

(a) all acetylene and liquified gas containers are used and stored in an 

upright position; and 

(b) all compressed gas cylinders are stored in a safe place and are suitably 

and adequately secured. 

(3) If cylinders of compressed gas are being transported underground, an 

employer or contractor must ensure that: 

(a) the cylinder valves are protected from damage; and 

(b) all fittings, including regulators and manifolds, are disconnected from 

the cylinders, unless: 

(i) the cylinders are secured in an upright position; and 

(ii) the fittings are protected by a suitable and adequate cage or 

89

safeguard. 

(4) An employer or contractor must ensure that no device or equipment that 

produces gas, other than a cylinder of compressed gas, is used to fuel hot 

work equipment underground. 

(5) Subject to subsection 363(1) of the OHS regulations, if hot work is 

performed an employer or contractor must ensure that: 

(a) outside a designated shop or garage: 

(i) if reasonably practicable, all combustible material within a 

three-meter radius of the hot work or on which sparks or hot material 

may fall is thoroughly wetted with water before the hot work begins and 

after it is finished; and 

(ii) the area is regularly checked for two hours after the completion of 

the hot work; 

(b) adequate fire-fighting equipment is readily available at all times while 

the hot work is being done and during the fire watch mentioned in clause (a); 

(c) hot work is not conducted within eight meters of any place where 

explosives are being stored or transported; and 

(d) any area in which hot work takes place is suitably and adequately 

ventilated. 

(6) If a cylinder of compressed gas is operated from a location underground 

or in a 

conveyance that is not readily accessible to the worker who is operating the 

hot work equipment, an employer or contractor must ensure that: 

(a) another competent worker is present at all times and ready to operate 

the cylinder control devices; and 

(b) there is a suitable and adequate means of communication between the 

worker operating the hot work equipment and the worker operating the 

cylinder control device. 

(7) If a cylinder of compressed gas is used to supply hot work equipment, an 

employer or contractor must ensure that the cylinder is located, guarded and 

handled during use so that the cylinder and its fittings are protected 

from damage. 

Emergency Response and Mine Rescue re Underground at a Mine 

Interpretation of Part 

380 

In this Part: 

(a) “mine rescue certificate” means a mine rescue certificate issued 

pursuant to section 392; 

(b) “mine rescue instructor” means a person who is the holder of a mine 

rescue instructor certificate; 

(c) “mine rescue instructor certificate” means a mine rescue instructor 

certificate issued pursuant to section 392; 

(d) “mine rescue worker” means a person who is the holder of a mine 

90

escue certificate; 

(e) “self-rescue apparatus” means a small respiratory protective device 

that provides the worker with a limited amount of time to escape a hazardous 

atmosphere. 

16 May 2003 cO-1.1 Reg 2 s380. 

Application of Part – underground mines 

381 

This Part only applies to underground mines. 

16 May 2003 cO-1.1 Reg 2 s381. 

Fire control and emergency response plan 

383 

(1) In this section, “equipment” includes personal protective equipment. 

(2) An employer, contractor or owner must: 

(a) take all reasonably practicable steps to prevent the outbreak of fire 

underground and to provide effective means to protect workers from any fire 

that may occur; and 

164 

MINES O-1.1 REG 2 

(b) develop and implement a written fire control and emergency response 

plan that: 

(i) provides for the safety of all workers in the event of a fire or other 

emergency underground; and 

(ii) establishes procedures for workers to follow in the event of a fire or 

other emergency underground. 

(3) A plan developed pursuant to subsection (2) must address the following: 

(a) the types of emergencies that may reasonably occur; 

(b) the minimum number of mine rescue workers that must respond to each 

incident identified in clause (a), including: 

(i) the qualifications and responsibilities of those mine rescue workers; 

and 

(ii) the type of equipment that must be provided to those mine rescue 

workers; 

(c) the procedure to be used to summon the mine rescue team for duty; 

(d) the emergency procedures to be used in case of fire or other emergency, 

including: 

(i) a personal accountability system; 

(ii) if applicable, the use of an emergency hoist; 

(iii) a procedure to be used if the second egress is unavailable; 

(iv) evacuating endangered workers to the surface or to a refuge 

station; and 

(v) the safe recovery of the mine; 

91

(e) the use of self-rescue apparatus; 

(f) an emergency warning system; 

(g) the design and location of all refuge stations; 

(h) the training of supervisors and workers: 

(i) in the procedures developed pursuant to the plan; and 

(ii) in the use of equipment necessary to implement the procedures 

developed pursuant to the plan. 

(4) An employer or contractor must ensure that: 

(a) designated mine rescue workers are adequately trained in their duties 

under the fire control and emergency response plan; and 

(b) the fire control and emergency response plan is posted in a conspicuous 

place on the surface and underground. 

16 May 2003 cO-1.1 Reg 2 s383. 

165 


Emergency warning system 

384 

(1) An employer or contractor must ensure that an underground mine is 

equipped with an effective emergency warning system that: 

(a) warns workers of an emergency underground; and 

(b) meets the requirements of this section. 

(2) An emergency warning system used for the purposes mentioned in subsection (1) 

must: 

(a) be fully operational at all times; 

(b) be maintained by a competent person; and 

(c) be equipped with a primary and back-up means of activation. 

(3) Before installing or significantly modifying any emergency warning 

system required pursuant to subsection (1), an employer or contractor must 

submit the details of the emergency warning system, or any modification to 

it, to the chief mines inspector. 

(4) An employer or contractor must ensure that, if reasonably practicable, high 

risk areas underground are monitored with a heat sensing device that is linked 

to: 

(a) an alarm; and 

(b) if reasonably practicable, a fire suppression system. 

16 May 2003 cO-1.1 Reg 2 s384. 

Mine rescue teams 

396 

(1) Subject to subsection (2), if an emergency response operation requires the 

use of self-contained breathing apparatus, an employer or contractor 

92

must ensure that a mine rescue team of at least five mine rescue workers 

responds to the emergency incident. 

(2) The chief mines inspector may permit a mine rescue team consisting of 

fewer than five mine rescue workers to respond to an emergency response 

operation requiring the use of self-contained breathing apparatus. 

(3) For each mine rescue team mentioned in subsections (1) and (2), an 

employer or contractor must appoint one member of the mine rescue team as a 

team captain. 

(4) During an emergency response operation, a team captain mentioned in 

subsection (3): 

(a) has direct control of the activities of the mine rescue team; 

(b) is responsible for the safety of the mine rescue team; and 

(c) shall not take part in any activity at the mine that is not directly related 

to the safety of the mine rescue team. 

16 May 2003 cO-1.1 Reg 2 s396. 

Primary refuge station 

398 

(1) An employer or contractor must install, equip and maintain a primary 

refuge station underground. 

(2) An employer or contractor must ensure that each primary refuge station 

is: 

(a) excavated in solid host material or constructed of steel; 

(b) separated from adjoining workings by fire doors or stoppings that are: 

(i) designed to prevent noxious fumes from entering the refuge station; 

and 

(ii) if reasonably practicable, constructed of materials that have at least 

a one-hour fire resistance rating; 

171 


(c) located: 

(i) if reasonably practicable, in a fresh air circuit; 

(ii) at least 100 metres away from any fuel station, explosive storage 

area or other fire hazard; and 

(iii) as accurately as possible on a map of the surface; 

(d) designed to accommodate the number of workers who may reasonably be 

expected to use the refuge station; 

(e) clearly marked; 

(f) readily accessible; and 

(g) properly maintained and the area around the entrance is kept free of 

combustible material. 

(3) An employer, contractor or owner must ensure that every primary 

underground refuge station is equipped with the following: 

93

(a) at least 36 hours of breathable air for the number of workers who may 

reasonably be expected to use the refuge station in accordance with the fire 

control and emergency response plan; 

(b) potable water for the number of workers who may reasonably be 

expected to use the refuge station in accordance with the fire control and 

emergency response plan; 

(c) food; 

(d) lights; 

(e) first aid supplies; 

(f) sanitation facilities; 

(g) suitable fire-fighting equipment; 

(h) an effective means of communication with the surface; 

(i) sufficient seating. 

16 May 2003 cO-1.1 Reg 2 s398. 

Auxiliary refuge stations 

399 

(1) An employer or contractor must install, equip and maintain auxiliary 

refuge stations within a reasonable distance of all locations where workers 

are expected to take refuge in the event of an emergency incident. 

(2) An employer or contractor must ensure that each auxiliary refuge station 

is constructed appropriately and adequately. 

(3) An employer or contractor must ensure that every auxiliary refuge 

station is equipped with the following: 

(a) at least 36 hours of breathable air for the number of workers who may 

reasonably be expected to use the refuge station in accordance with the fire 

control and emergency response plan; 

172 


(b) potable water for the number of workers who may reasonably be 

expected to use the refuge station in accordance with the fire control and 

emergency response plan; 

(c) an effective means of communication with the surface; 

(d) suitable and appropriate material to maintain the seal around the door of 

the refuge station. 

16 May 2003 cO-1.1 Reg 2 s399. 

Additional refuge station 

400 

An employer or contractor must locate, install, equip and maintain refuge 

stations, in addition to the refuge stations mentioned in sections 398 and 399, 

as directed by the chief mines inspector. 

16 May 2003 cO-1.1 Reg 2 s400. 

94

Inspection of refuge stations 

401 An employer or contractor must: 

(a) ensure that every refuge station, and the equipment in the refuge 

station, is thoroughly inspected by a competent person at least once a 

month; and 

(b) ensure that the results of each inspection conducted pursuant to 

clause (a) are recorded by the competent person mentioned in clause (a) and 

countersigned by the employer or contractor. 

16 May 2003 cO-1.1 Reg 2 s401. 

Use of compressed air in refuge station 

402 

If a refuge station mentioned in section 398, 399 or 400 uses compressed air 

cylinders, the employer or contractor must ensure that the compressed air 

cylinders are equipped with regulators that provide for the optimum flow of 

air in the refuge station, taking into account the size of the refuge station 

and the number of workers who may use it. 

16 May 2003 cO-1.1 Reg 2 s402. 

Respiratory protective device for hoist operators 

403 

If the fire control and emergency response plan prepared pursuant to section 

383 requires a hoist operator to remain in the hoist room during an emergency 

and the air supply of a hoist room may become contaminated, an employer 

or contractor must ensure that: 

(a) suitable respiratory protective devices are provided for each hoist 

operator; and 

(b) the respiratory protective devices mentioned in clause (a): 

(i) provide at least four hours of breathable air; and 

(ii) are properly maintained. 

16 May 2003 cO-1.1 Reg 2 s403. 

173 


Self-rescue apparatus 

404 

(1) If the chief mines inspector requires self-rescue apparatuses to be 

provided underground, or if the self-rescue apparatuses are otherwise 

provided by an employer or contractor, the employer or contractor must 

ensure that: 

95

(a) all workers carry a self-rescue apparatus at all times while working 

underground; or 

(b) a sufficient number of self-rescue apparatuses are stored at suitable 

locations underground. 

(2) If self-rescue apparatuses are provided in accordance with subsection (1), 

an employer or contractor must ensure that a worker who may be required to 

use a self-rescue apparatus is adequately trained by a competent person in the 

proper use of the self-rescue apparatus and in its limitations. 

16 May 2003 cO-1.1 Reg 2 s404. 

96

Area where fire occurred 

Area where fire occurred 

97

End of pipe 

Wheel mounted fire extinguisher 

98

01/31/06 

Loose on floor after fire 

Lunch table area where worker survived using W-65 Self Rescuer. 

99

Lunch table area where a worker spent 14 hours 

01/31/06 

Parking lot after fire (note tire tracks in soot) 

100

Fluorescent Light that melted during the fire 

Mine Rescue Truck 

101

Multi-Tasker 

Primary Refuge Stations: Entrance 

102

Primary Refuge Stations: View of airlock at entrance 

Primary Refuge Stations: General View of Refuge Station 

103

REFERENCE: 02-NOV-14 CLASSIFICATION: REPORT ONLY DEPT: MILL 

OCCUPATION: WORKGROUP: SERVICES SUPERVISOR: T. DOUGLAS 

DESCRIPTION OF INJURY / EQUIPMENT DAMAGE: 3 – 50 FOOT LENGTHS OF SCLAIR PIPE WERE 

BURNED. 

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: SERVICE PERSONNEL WERE CUTTING SCLAIR PIPE APART AT 

SOUTH END OF TAILS PILE FOR EXTENSION OF 38 PUMP D/C. PIECE OF HOT SLAG OR CUT OFF 

BOLT FELL INTO PIPE, CAUSING PIPE TO SMOLDER AND BURN. A WORKER NOTICED SOME 

SMOKE AT THE SOUTH END ON HER WAY HOME FROM WORK AND PHONED THE SERVICES 

SUPERVISOR AT HOME AT ABOUT 1645 HOURS. HE PHONED THE MINE TO SPEAK TO THE SHIFT 

FOREMAN BUT WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT HIM AND DID NOT LEAVE A MESSAGE AS HE 

PLANNED TO PHONE BACK LATER ON. HE DID NOT PHONE BACK AND THE PIPE BURNED 

DURING THE NIGHT. THE FIRE WAS EXTINGUISHED WITH PORTABLE EXTINGUISHERS THE 

FOLLOWING MORNING. 

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: SUSPECT THAT A TORCHED OFF BOLT HEAD OR THE CUT OFF 

BOLT FELL UNDER THE PIPE AND CAUSED IT TO CATCH FIRE LATER. 

NOTHING CAUGHT FIRE IMMEDIATELY AND NO SIGN OF PROBLEMS SO HAZARD WAS NOT 

IDENTIFIED. LOADER OPERATOR WAS BACK IN THE AREA 30 MINUTES AFTER CUTTING WAS 

COMPLETED AND THERE WAS STILL NO SIGN OF A FIRE. 

ROOT CAUSE: HOT BOLT WAS NOT NOTICED UNDERNEATH THE PIPE. 

OTHER COMMENTS: 

IMC POTASH COLONSAY 

INCIDENT REPORT 

FOLLOW UP FOR PREVENTION: 

ACTION ITEM BY WHOM BY WHEN 

1. ACCOUNT FOR ALL HOT PIECES THAT ARE TRADESMEN 

ONGOING 

TORCHED OFF WHEN WORKING AROUND 

SCLAIR PIPING AND DOUBLE CHECK FOR 

PROBLEMS AT THE END OF THE JOB. 

2. ENSURE PROMPT FOLLOW UP TO REPORTS 

OF A FIRE. 

EVERYBODY 

ONGOING 

104

TOTAL LIST OF FINDINGS 

Refuge Station Findings 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The electric fan, provided for cooling, could not be used. Heat and humidity 

were a concern for these workers. Most found that they felt cooler when lying 

on the floor and did so. 

Toilet facilities were quickly filled to overflowing and they found it necessary 

to empty a large water bottle into their personal water container and use it to 

urinate into. 

There was a very poor seal around walls in Refuge Station. The outside door 

wouldn’t seal. 

Containers of spray foam were hard, containers were outdated. 

Scaling was required in part of the refuge station. 

The oxygen cylinder when opened lasted approximately 15 – 20 minutes to 

empty. 

Some workers were concerned about the integrity of the brattice seals on the 

refuge station had the fire traveled back along the pipe down 00D650 and the 

temperatures increased. 

Workers arrived at this refuge station they found the phone did not work. 

Workers left the refuge station to find a working phone from which to call 

surface dispatch for instructions and to report the names of persons in the 

refuge station 

Phone contact was established with the refuge station at about 7:30 AM 

January 29 th. . This corresponds with Mine Rescue Team #1 isolating the phone 

system to the inflow area. 

Workers in this refuge station report that at no time during the incident did 

they: observe smoke in the area. 

The door handle was broken on the fresh air side door to Refuge Station #6. 

The first workers to arrive here couldn’t get into the refuge station until 

another group of workers came in through the exhaust side to let them in. 

 

Workers reported that several hours after entering the refuge station smoke was 

observed outside on the fresh air side. None was observed on the exhaust side. 

105

Light smoke was observed inside the refuge station some time late on the night 

of January 29 th . Although, a supply of sealant was available inside the refuge 

station none was used to ensure an adequate seal of the brattice walls or door. 

There was no electricity to this refuge station for the duration of the incident. 

The electric fan provided for cooling could not be used however, the workers 

did not feel that heat was a concern mainly due to the large size of the refuge 

station and few persons occupying it. 

Two of the oxygen cylinders were used. A regulator provided was used on the 

first cylinder, which was emptied within approximately ten minutes of opening 

it. The regulator was not used on the second cylinder, which is believed to 

have lasted longer however, no time was actually noted. 

Workers in this refuge station report that there was an adequate amount of 

most supplies. The exception to this was the toilet facilities that workers did 

not feel were sufficient in size or type. 

The door handle was broken and the door could not be made to seal properly. 

These workers did not encounter smoke or fire. 

This refuge station had power all the time. 

Workers in refuge station had no concerns about seals. 

Phones worked fine. Food and water served the purpose. 

No discomfort from heat or humidity. 

Toilet facilities were inadequate. 

This worker did not encounter smoke or fire. 

The worker reported Sunday afternoon he had to seal the door for he could 

smell smoke or a burnt smell. A supply of sealant was available. 

There was electricity to this refuge station for the duration of the incident. 

The worker reported all supplies were adequate. 

Worker was concerned about lack of a second means of egress from his work 

location. 

106

Worker had communication to surface dispatch who communicated with him 

on a regular basis. 

This refuge station had power the entire duration of the incident. 

Workers in this station had no concerns, all supplies and communications were 

adequate. 

The workers reported this auxiliary refuge station was adequate but would like 

to see electrical power for lights and fans. Extended periods in the dark were a 

concern. 

There were no seating or resting accommodations of any kind. 

During the fire there were members of the Mines Rescue personnel that took 

refuge in refuge stations. Other workers that were in these same refuge 

stations report that having Mine Rescue personnel present helped them to 

understand the situation and the rescue procedures that were taking place. This 

had a reassuring and calming effect on all. 

During this time, workers were to be sealed in the refuge station, however 

workers did open the doors if the air outside appeared clear and went outside 

This was not a frequent occurrence but does seem to have taken place at least 

once at some of the refuge stations that had several people in them. 

There was no reports of workers smoking inside any refuge station at anytime. 

During this worker’s travels to the refuge station, the roll up door and mandoor 

in 00D650 could not be opened. 

Power and Communication Findings 

 

 

The Dynatec employees reported losing power and communications at about 

1:30 AM. This coincides with the blast of air the Mosaic workers felt on 

surface. The blast of air was the result of the mine fans underground shutting 

down and the air stopped moving into the mine and pressurized the surface 

tunnels. 

During this fire it was noted that some of the alarm systems did not work as 

designed. With the exception of the Dynatec workers in the inflow area and 

one Mosaic employee, all other workers did receive adequate warning and 

were able to travel to a refuge station safely. The Dynatec workers that 

encountered the fire and smoke were able to retreat in fresh air to their refuge 

station. The one Mosaic employee received no notification until he 

encountered the smoke. Only one of the workers interviewed during this 

investigation encountered difficulty in reaching a refuge station. All other 

107

workers interviewed reported that they were able to reach a refuge station 

within five to ten minutes of being instructed to do so. 

 

 

 

When the fire burned through the power and communications lines to the south 

portion of the mine, it caused a mine wide disruption to the electrical and 

communications system. The emergency warning system for underground is 

reliant on the electrical and communications system to activate and operate. 

The reason some workers were notified of the fire is that they phoned dispatch 

to find out why the power was down. Because of the disruption, the phones in 

some of the work places did not work. Some of the workers had to travel to 

another area to find a phone that did work. Because of the location of the fire 

and the ventilation system failing the smoke did not travel to the rest of the 

mine complex as quickly as it could have. This allowed workers time to find 

alternate phones to use and to seek refuge. 

During the interview process it was noted that in the past some workers have 

reported problems with the alarm system that were still present at the time of 

the emergency. This affected the notification of the workers. 

There was no electricity or phone communications to this refuge station for the 

duration of the incident. 

IMT/Mine Rescue Findings 

 

 

 

 

Rooms, except the mines rescue room and IMT control room, were not 

designated or identified for emergency function, this created some confusion 

for the mines rescue and emergency support personnel. 

Formation of the Incident Management Team (IMT) occurred shortly after 

the arrival of the Mine Manager. The role of the IMT and individual roles and 

responsibilities of the IMT members were not clearly defined. Also an 

advisory support group was not established to assist the IMT in risk analysis 

and problem solving. At one point the control room was filled with individuals 

that did not have IMT function disrupting the process and creating confusion. 

Briefing and debriefing of the mines rescue team (MRT) was carried in the 

control room by the IMT and coordinator, the control room located on the 

upper floor from the mines rescue room. These briefings were conducted 

mostly with the team captain but on occasion the vice-captain would be in 

attendance. After the briefing the captain would return downstairs to the 

mines rescue room and brief his remaining team members, this process at times 

during the emergency created some confusion where the captain had to return 

to the control room for additional information from the IMT and coordinator. 

One has to question the size of the IMT and duration of activity. There is 

little question that in the early stages of the emergency that their energy 

108

levels were high and the thought processes were effective and efficient. 

However, some 20 hours into the emergency the same IMT members and 

coordinator were still making decisions and directing the emergency 

response. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

It was evident that the individuals who initially formed the IMT possessed a 

thorough and accurate knowledge of the systems established and practiced 

in mines rescue and also the underground mining complex. 

Underground phone communication from the active mines rescue teams 

during the emergency to the coordinator and IMT left something to be 

desired. Transfer of timely and critical information from the active teams to 

the coordinator and the IMT was not communicated, this was due to no 

phone availability from beyond the K2 shaft potash level phone into the 

water inflow area, teams were active into this area without communications 

for on an average of two hours. 

The extreme underground environment the mines rescue teams were exposed 

to and operated in, challenged the established training competencies, both 

physical and mental capabilities, throughout the emergency, on two 

occasions back up teams were mobilized, one team did lose direction due to 

the extreme conditions on the return part of the assignment. 

It was noted that as one mine rescue team member while in the cage, ran out of 

oxygen when returning to surface. This team had just completed a mission in 

heavy smoke and extreme conditions. One other team member upon going 

under oxygen at potash level, experienced an apparatus failure and the team 

returned to surface. 

Some of the electronic gas testing equipment provided for use by the mine 

rescue teams, failed to operate as designed due to heavy concentrations of soot. 

The designated mine rescue truck could not be used after the brakes failed due 

to traveling through an area of accumulated water. 

The trailer mounted multi-tasker was found to be extremely difficult to back up 

in conditions of poor visibility. 

Due to the dense smoke, travel by truck was extremely difficult and slow due 

to poor visibility. 

109

General Findings 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ground conditions in the area where the fire occurred are reported to have been 

stable prior to the fire. The first inspection group to enter the area after the fire 

reported that the ground was unstable and required scaling before they could 

safely enter the area. They noted that the worst loose was found where there 

were brows or other irregularities in the back. Ground conditions were 

observed to be worse on the down wind side of the fire. 

Training records for these workers do not indicate that they had been trained 

on the safe use of cutting torches or hot work procedures. Neither of these 

workers were journeymen mechanics or welders. They were familiar with the 

use of cutting torches. 

The workers were not given any instruction on fire prevention for this job nor 

were they instructed to monitor the area after they completed the job. 

The MSDS for this product was available on site and shows a flash point of 

343 degrees Celsius. A cutting torch produces about 1093 degrees Celsius. 

At Mosaic’s other Saskatchewan potash mine near Colonsay, a fire was started 

in the same type of pipe by workers using the same procedures. This fire was 

on surface and also burned undetected for some time. This occurred November 

2, 2004. 

One of the wheels on the 68 kgs extinguisher was broken and the unit could 

not be wheeled manually. 

Dry chemical extinguishers used on this fire seemed to have limited success. 

The fire was eventually extinguished using foam and water. During discussions 

the Fire Inspector indicated that foam and water would be the recommended 

method for extinguishing a fire in a polyethylene pipe. 

The Mosaic surface dispatch operator plays a very key roll during a mine 

emergency. This is the person to whom the fire is reported, activates the 

emergency warning system, contacts workers underground, advises workers on 

actions to take, refuge stations to go to and initiates the mine rescue call out. 

Workers report to him when reaching refuge stations and he maintains contact 

with workers through out the emergency. 

During the mine fire of January 29, 2006 the dispatch operator appears to have 

performed these functions admirably however during the early stages he was 

pushed to the limit of what one person can efficiently accomplish. There is no 

requirement for the dispatch operator to maintain a record of reports received, 

instructions given, or events occurring in the mine therefore no such records 

were kept. 

110

During interviews with workers it became evident that the cage tender does not 

have appropriate guidelines to follow in the event of a mine fire. After 

encountering heavy smoke in the area of the shaft at the potash level the cage 

tender and three other workers came to surface. The cage tender indicated that 

she would have gone back down the shaft if a worker had called for the cage. 

In the case of this fire, smoke accumulated at the shaft on the potash level and 

any one entering this area without breathing apparatuses would have been in 

grave danger. 

While workers were being transported to the K-2 Shaft after being released 

from the refuge stations, the soot that had accumulated on the roadway as a 

result of the fire was stirred up during transportation and caused severe eye 

irritation. Paper dust masks were provided for breathing purpose and seemed 

to have been effective. No respiratory difficulty during transport was reported. 

Due to the training, this worker had in mine emergency preparedness, and the 

use of self rescuers, he was able to survive in the situation he found himself in. 

During the initial response there appeared to be issues that occurred that 

require noting. There was uncertainty due to lack of information regarding 

the number of certified mines rescue personnel available and responding. 

During the fire in 000400 smoke accumulated in the area of the K-2 shaft at 

the potash level even though this is a down casting shaft. This is the result of 

the ventilation system used in this mine, which allows recirculation. Mine 

ventilation drawings indicate that under normal operating conditions there is 

28% recirculation in the area of the shaft. When the main bulkhead fans were 

restarted with the remainder of the underground fans still off this recirculation 

increased dramatically. Doors in the shop area that are designed to open 

automatically when the power failed compounded this. During interviews with 

mine engineers, questions on ventilation recirculation were not answered to the 

satisfaction of the investigation team. 

111

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS 

1. Training of workers in hot work procedures. 

2. Supervision to instruct workers to monitor the area for two hours as per the 

Saskatchewan Mine Regulations. 

3. Use an alternative means other than a cutting torch for cutting or removing 

the bolts. 

4. Separate the sections of pipe after removing the bolts so as to enable 

checking for hot spots inside. 

5. Wet down combustible materials prior to and after using a cutting torch near 

them. 

6. Implement hot work procedures that include hot work permits. 

7. Emergency equipment such as the wheel-mounted fire extinguisher should 

be checked and maintained regularly. 

8. Communication of incidents between mine sites. 

9. The emergency warning system to be equipped with a primary and back-up 

means of activation to warn workers in the event of a power failure. 

10. Communication lines to be located away from high risk fire areas. 

11. Routine maintenance and testing of the emergency warning system to 

ensure that it is fully operational at all times. 

12. At the first indication of an emergency situation in the mine a second person 

immediately move into the dispatch office to assist the operator in the 

required tasks. The dispatch operator maintains a written record of all 

reports received, instructions given and events occurring in the mine during 

an emergency. This should be in the form of a permanent record that can be 

referred to for information during the emergency and afterwards. 

13. Establish safe procedures for cage tenders to follow in the event of a fire and 

train the cage tenders in these procedures 

14. Toilet facilities should be adequate to accommodate the number of workers 

for which the refuge station is rated for 36 hours. 

15. Refuge stations and equipment need to continue to be inspected by a 

competent person at least once a month and recorded. Any deficiencies 

identified are to be corrected immediately. 

16. Ensure that refuge station walls and seals are constructed of fire resistant 

material and maintains its integrity when exposed to very high 

temperatures and be located no less than 100 meters from a fire hazard. They 

should be strong enough to withstand all expected forces. 

17. Guidance signs or other means should be suitably located to assist workers 

in locating refuge stations in an emergency. 

18. Auxiliary refuge stations are to be used in the event workers can not access 

a primary refuge station. 

19. Auxiliary refuge stations should be equipped with food, water, phone, 

seating, lights, sealant and toilet facilities. 

20. The current Mine Regulations 2003, on auxiliary refuge stations should be 

reviewed and amended to reflect the findings of this investigation. 

112

21. The company continues to train workers in the use of self rescuers and mine 

emergency preparedness. 

22. Regular maintenance is to be conducted on all ventilation doors and man 

doors to ensure normal operation. 

23. Review to ensure the role of the Incident Management Team (IMT) is 

defined, and also their roles and responsibilities are outlined in a format 

easily referenced (Duty card system). 

24. Review to ensure the number and balance of the IMT is correct. This is by 

no means a criticism of the Mosaic and Dynatec teams who performed 

admirably. It is more a question of fatigue and how long a team should 

remain constituted until relieved. 

25. Review to ensure the emergency control room is pre-designated at a 

location in close proximity to the mines rescue team preparation activity. 

26. Examine the requirements for emergency response rooms to accommodate 

the advisory group, briefing and debrief of mines rescue teams, quiet rest 

area; refreshments, senior mine executives, government and worker 

representatives, etc. 

27. Ensure trained personnel are available to brief and debrief mines rescue 

teams; this is by no means a criticism of the coordinators activities who 

performed very professionally. Again it is more a question of fatigue and how 

long a coordinator should remain active until relieved. 

28. Investigate the mines rescue team briefing and debriefing process, this 

process is fundamental for information flow during the emergency, all team 

members have many responsibilities, one of these being firstly, during 

briefing, to understand the directives and assignment and secondly to relay 

all information during debriefing. 

29. Ensure all key personnel can be contacted at all times. 

30. Investigate the latest technology available for communication. In the event 

of an emergency, workers will need to be notified, management and 

rescuers need to know how many workers are in danger, where they are 

located and how extensive is the emergency and associated damages. 

Locating personnel and establishing effective communications in tandem with 

comprehensive emergency preparedness planning are essential elements if an 

incident is to be managed efficiently. 

31. Continue with more and frequent mines rescue team-training exercises in 

atmospheres of impaired vision especially where the use of personnel 

vehicles is required. 

32. Continue with the investigation for application of equipment to assist mines 

rescue teams when operating in conditions of limited visibility. 

33. Investigate the availability of portable communications systems for mines 

rescue team application and implementation. 

34. Continue with the emergency mutual assistance process within the southern 

group also including the central group involvement. 

35. A detailed study of the ventilation system be conducted by a professional 

engineer to identify sources of recirculation and means of reducing it to an 

acceptable level. 

113

36. Assess the risk to workers from doors that can alter mine ventilation by 

opening automatically when the power fails 

37. The Chief Inspector of Mines should convene a task group made up of 

representatives from all mining groups to evaluate the Mining Regulations 

2003 part XIX Emergency Response and Mines Rescue Underground at a 

Mine and recommend any amendments that may be required considering 

recent underground mine emergency responses especially the Mosaic 

Esterhazy Potash mine fire. 

38. Continue to investigate and to ensure any process or equipment to assist during 

mine emergency response are fit for purpose. 

114

115

Mosaic Esterhazy Potash January 29, 2006 Mine Fire Investigation ...

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