Dissertation_Dr Faisal Almubarak

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Urbanization, urban policy and city form: Urban development
in Saudi Arabia
Mubarak, Faisal Abdul-Aziz M., Ph.D.
University of Washington, 1992
Copyright ©1992 by Mubarak, Faisal Abdul-Aziz M. All rights reserved.
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Urbanization, Urban Policy and City Form:
Urban Development in Saudi Arabia
by
Faisal Abdul-Aziz Mubarak
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
University of Washington
1992
Approved by^
(Chairperspifof Supervisory committee)
2.
Program Authorized
to Offer Degree
Date
URBAN DESIGN AND PLANNING
DECEMBER 18, 1992

© Copyright 1992
Faisal A. Mubarak

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University of Washington
Abstract
Urbanization, Urban Policy And City Form:
Urban Development in Saudi Arabia
by Faisal Abdul-Aziz M. Mubarak
Chairperson of the Supervisory Committee: Professor John Hancock
Department of Urban Design and
Planning
This study is an attempt to explain contemporary urban forms and development in
Saudi Arabia by focusing on the country's sociopolitical and economic developments since
the promulgation of the new nation-state in 1932. Due to the combined effects of
centralized decision-making and active governmental financial underwriting of
modernization, the holistic traditional settlement, which evolved by accretion around a solid
core of intrinsic values, collapsed. The application of Western models of urban
development which are not tailored to the social and political environment of a non-Western
cultural systems have failed to provide effective solutions to local problems of urban design
and planning.
An underlying question was set forth: what cultural developments have driven urban
development in Saudi Arabian society and the transformation of its traditional built forms
An answer to this question involves probing into sociopolitical and economic factors that
accompanied the relatively sudden substitution of modern urban forms for the pre-industrial
forms of the traditional society. One major force that parallels the departure from the
traditional built forms has been the adoption of the nation-state and the subsequent role it
has assumed in modernizing Saudi society. Using national government documents,
interviews with government officials and planners, master plans, municipal regulations,
journalistic accounts, and recent research and studies, I examine the relationship between
the government's intervention in urban development and the resulting urban forms for the
last six decades.
-Three case studies were chosen: Riyadh, Arar and Huraimla. I focused on the scope
and character of government intervention in the process of modern urban development in
the Kingdom, in each of these cases. The findings demonstrate the overriding role of the

state in contemporary urban development. Centralized decision-making processes,
including urban planning, have supplanted control by local communities. At the same time,
the modernization of the built environment has been achieved at the cost of forgoing many
cultural needs and environmental considerations. To reestablish cultural personality and
rejuvenate economic efficiency in the contemporary built environment, I argue for
environmentally compatible, efficiency based, and community justified urban development.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Figures
List of Tables
v
vi
CHAPTER I
Urbanization, Urban Policy and City Form:
Urban Development in Saudi Arabia 1
I. Urbanization: Comparative Theories 2
n. The Saudi context: People and Terrain 5
HI. A New Nation 6
IV. The Study 7
V. Research Methodology and Structure of Study 11
CHAPTER H
The Arab-Islamic City: Historical Precedence 18
I. Islam (722-1000 AD): Philosophical and Ideological Underpinnings of
Urbanism 19
A. Islamic Expansion and Urbanization 22
B. Actual Town Building 25
II. Traditional Muslim Urban Form 29
A. Islamic Legislation: The Role of Fiqh in Shaping the City 30
B. The Role of Social Factors in Shaping the Design of
Neighborhoods and Dwellings 35
C. Physical Characteristics of the Arab-Islamic city 37
HI. The Islamic City Model: Religious and Philosophical Basis of Islamic
Urbanism 40
IV. Critique of the Model 43
V. Islam's Utopia 45
Summary 47
CHAPTER HI
Forces of Change in Saudi Arabia: Nation-state Formation, Urbanization
and National Development 55
L State and Society 55
n. Modernization, Urban Development and Urbanization: The Saudi
Model 57
A. The Saudi National Developmental Model 57
B. Early Urbanization: The Hijar Settlements and Bedouin
Sedentarization 61
HI. Political stability, growth of bureaucracy, and oil economy 64
A. The Saudi Economy: From Traditional Subsistence to Oil
Economy 64
B. Oil: A One-crop Economy 67

IV. Two Decades of Turmoil (1953-1973): Development and Change
After King Abdul-Aziz 73
A. The Ten-Point Reform Program of 1963 75
B. Institution Building and Consolidation 79
C. Agricultural Development and Policy 85
D. Industrialization and Saudi Industrial Policy 89
E. The Emergence of the Middle Class 94
V. Urbanization and Urban Restructuring of the Nation 96
Summary 103
CHAPTER IV
Urban Planning: National, Regional and City Planning 110
I. The Origins of Western Urban Planning and the Role of Western
Consultants
Ill
n. Urban Planning in Developing Countries 116
n. Planning Process, Policy Making and Urban Planning In Saudi Arabia 119
m. Saudi Government Structure and Decision, and Policy-making
Process 123
IV. Urban Planning: Municipal Development, Ordinance and
Comprehensive Zoning 124
A. TTie Formative Era, 1930s and 1940s 126
V. Planned Towns and Communities 128
A. Early Planned American Oil Towns 128
B. Planned Arab Communities in the Eastern Province 131
VI. Planned Urbanization, Comprehensive Urban and Regional Planning
in the 1970s 133
A. City Master Plans 133
B. National Planning: Five-Year Development Plans 136
C. Comprehensive, Urban, Regional and Rural Planning 140
D. New Towns Built By the Government For Industrial Purposes 140
VII. Analysis & Evaluation 143
Summary 146
CHAPTER V
Major Traditional Urban Attributes and The Emerging
Urban Forms 154
I. Traditional Cultural Urban Attributes 154
A. Semi-Local Autonomy and Government and Control 155
B. The Economy 155
C. Urban Planning and Design 156
D. Land Ownership and Distribution 157
E. Home Ownership 158
F. Public Land Use and Infrastructure 158
n. Modernization Eclipses Society's Traditional Urban Forms and spurs
the Metropolis 159
ii

CHAPTER VI
Riyadh: From Walled Town to Metropolis 167
. I. Riyadh's Development: 1900-1953 167
A. The Walled Town 167
B. The Social Fabric 173
C. Early Suburbanization, Uncontrolled Development: A1 Murabbaa' 175
D. Demolishing The Wall: State Intervention and Inception of Urban
Transformation, c. 1950s 180
E. Urban Planning: Municipal Legislation, and Early Urban Growth
Controls, c. 1950s 183
F. Land Tenure 185
G. The Emergence of New Architecture and Building Methods 191
n. Building the Royal city, 1950s-1960s 199
A. King Saud (1953-1964): the 'Master Builder^ 199
1. Annasiriyah: The Royal Suburb 200
2. Al-Malaz: Planned Community for Administrative Purposes 200
3. Urban Reconstruction at the Historical Core 202
B. King Faisal's Socioeconomic Reforms: 1958-1974 205
HI. Planning the 'City of Future': the Introduction of City Master Plans and
Effective Urban Policies in the 1970s and 1980s 208
A. Urban Economy: Government Growth and Industrialization 208
B. City Master Plans 212
1. Doxiadis Plan for Riyadh, 1973 212
2. Riyadh's Second Master Plan by SECT International 218
C. Housing in the 1970s and 1980s 221
D. Urban Renewal in the Historical Core 224
IV. The Contemporary Urban Form 227
A. Architectural Hybridism 228
B. No Man's Land 230
C. Dispersed Growth 232
D. Government Land Uses 233
E. Large-scale Development 235
Summary 240
CHAPTER VII
Oil Industrialization Creates Modern-industrial Urban Forms: The case of
Arar 248
I. Location 248
EL Genesis: International Economics Spur Modem Urban Growth 249
III. Economic Growth and Employment Structure 253
IV. Urban Development And Urban Planning 256
A. The Tapline Plan, 1950s 259
B. Land Tenure 261
C. Militarization: Planning a Model Community 263
D. The Subdivision Plan of The 1960s 267
E. The Doxiadis Plan, 1970s 268
F. Piecemeal Development: Land Subdivisions in the 1970s 278
G. The Urban Domain, 1980s 279
Summary 285
iii

CHAPTER VIII
State-led Urbanization Transforms Agrarian Forms: Huraimla, From
Agrarian Settlement to Regional Administrative Center 292
I. Location And Physical Characteristics 293
n. History: Genesis 295
HI. The Development of Traditional Built Form 296
A. "Scattered" Development: 880-1045 H. (c.1460-1625 A.D.) 297
B. Compact Pattern: 1045H/1625-1233H/1818 297
C. Compact-Scattered Growth: (c. 1140sII/1740s.) 300
IV. Post-Unification Huraimla: Traditional (1900-1970) Growth and Post-
19708 "Planned" Growth 301
A. Modified Traditional Growth 302
B. Urban Planning: Intervention in the Built Environment, The
Introduction of Municipality 305
C. "Planned" Growth: Land Subdivisions in the Traditional Town 311
D. Al-Hazm: "New Huraimla" (1979-Present) 317
E. The Urban Domain (1989-Present) 321
Summary 325
CHAPTER IX
Conclusion: Envisioning The Pluralistic City 330
I. Contemporary Urban Forms 333
n. Traditional Medina vs. the Pragmatic Metropolis 334
A. Government and Political Control 335
B. Economy 337
C. Urban Design and Planning 338
D. Land Ownership and Distribution 339
E. Home Ownership 340
F. Public Infrastructure 340
ID. Envisioning the Pluralistic City 342
BIBLIOGRAPHY 349
iv

LIST OF TABLES
Number
Page
3.1 Oil Production and Revenues, Selected Years 71
3.2 Distribution Of The Labor Force, Saudis and Non-Saudis, By Economic
Activity 90
3.3 Estimated GDP Contribution by the Private Sector and Employment by
Sector (1410/1989) 92
3.4 Foreign Employment Growth 97
3.5 Top Cities with Population of More than 30,000 (1974) and their Share of
Private Sector Establishments 101
6.1 Number of Permits (Construction, Renovation & Walling (Fencing) Issued
by Municipal Authorities in Riyadh, Arar and Huraimla Compare to the
National Total 209
6.2 Funds Allocated for the Provision of Municipal Services in Million SR
Selected Major Cities (1975-1988) And Population Estimates 211
6.3 Number of Private Establishments and Employment in Selective Saudi
Cities 212
6.4 Increase in Population, area and Number of Housing Units, Riyadh City,
1935-1986. 224
6.5 Riyadh's Land Uses and Area in Hectares 239
7.1 Employment by Economic Sector (1974) 256
7.2 Land Subdivisions, Commercial, Recreational and Industrial 279
7.3 Area of Land Uses As Listed in the Urban Domain of Arar (in hectares) 284
8.1 Number of Lots/Buildings in Old and New Huraimla (Al-Hazm) 322
8.2 Huraimla's Land Uses, Current Area and Future Needs (in hectares) 324
9.1 Matrix of Cultural Urban Attributes 336
v

LIST OF FIGURES
Number
Page
1.1 Map of Saudi Arabia 14
6.1 Riyadh still a walled town in 1950 169
6.2 Riyadh during the 1930s 170
6.3 The old suq (market). 172
6.4 Royal palaces 178
6.5 Riyadh's spike-like growth 187
6.6 Riyadh, 1976: modenization programs fueled speculation in the land market 190
6.7 Riyadh (c. 1940s): "Traditional suburbanization" 193
6.8 The villa house 194
6.9 American Ambassador's house in Jeddah 196
6.10 Riyadh: King Saud's royal suburb, Annasiriyah (c. 1950s) 201
6.11 The row of ministries in Al-Malaz ("New Riyadh") 201
6.12 Al-Malaz: large-scale development 203
6.13 The 1971 Doxiadis Master Plan 215
6.14 The 1977 SECT/Sedes Plan 219
6.15 Traditional pattern in the historical core 226
6.16 Urban renewal in the historical core 226
6.17 The Urban Domain of Riyadh 234
6.18 1970s: Increased government intervention in urban development 236
6.19 Government land uses 238
7.1 Map of Saudi Arabia showing major cities and towns, including Arar 252
7.2 Arar's layout during the 1970s 257
7.3 Arar's communities during the early 1970s 260
7.4 Ministry of Interior ISF housing ("model") project 266
7.5 King Abdul-Aziz Road 269
7.6 Evolution of urban pattern in Arar 270
7.7 Arar's growth up to the early 1970s 271
7.8 Arar land uses in the 1970s 273
7.9 Doxiadis' 1975 Master Plan 275
7.10 Arar's land subdivisions and major government land uses 280
7.11 The Urban Domain for Arar 283
8.1 Location of Huraimal 294
8.2 Huraimla's farmland , 294
8.3 Development of Huraimla's system of walls and quarters 299
8.4 Traditional Huraimla 299
8.5 Evolution of Old Huraimla's built form 304
8.6 Modern neighborhoods outside the wall 304
8.7 The modernization of Hurimla's suq 306
8.8 The laying of the main road by the municipality 306
8.9 Impact of municipal intervention 309
8.10 Emergence of modern form 312
8.11 1960s: new neighborhoods grew outside the wall 315
8.12 Al-Hazm ("New Huraimla") 316
8.13 Modernization encouraged the villa as a model housing 318
8.14 A new land subdivision in the Al-Hazm area 318
8.15 Al-Hazm's gridiron pattern 319
8.16 Huraimla contemporary developed area 319
vi

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
In essaying this study of broad reviews of considerable public documents and
research, I often do less than justice to the subject and the officials, individual authors and
public agencies that I cite in my research and I bare the shortcomings. I put forward this
study hopefully offering some explanations and a proposal for improvement. My thanks
are due to many individuals who kindly contributed to the production of this study. In
particular, I wish to thank Professor John Hancock who, in addition to his intellectual
insight, encouragement and challenging supervision, patiently accepted the task of
guiding my research with special attention. His enlightening views, and constructive
criticism gave me a broader grasp of many relevant issues. I also thank Professors,
Arthur Grey, David Hodge, Anne Vernez Moudon, and Jere Bacharach for their valuable
contributions.
In Saudi Arabia, many individuals awarded their time and advice to me and to
whom I acknowledge appreciation. Among them are Dr. Saleh A1 Hathloul, Deputy
Minister for Town Planning and Mahir Harakati at the Ministry of Municipal and Rural
Affairs. At the Arriyadh Development Authority, I am thankful to Dr. Salah Al-Johari,
United Nations advisor, Zahir Othman and Ahmad Assubail. I am grateful to Professors
Mohammad Annowaiser and Yousef Fadan and other faculty members and staff at the
College of Architecture and Urban Planning, King Saud University which supported me
through my graduate studies. At the University of Washington, I remember the help
offered by my colleagues, Dena Assaf, Badr Al-Badr, Adnan Husnein, Tarik Khiati, and
Ross McKenzie.
I extend my sincere appreciation to my brother Saud Abdul-Aziz Al-Mubarak who
never hesitated to keep me in touch with my family and answered my requests for
materials only obtainable in Saudi Arabia. I am particularly grateful to my wife Joharah
(Jo) Springer who has patiently endured the long periods which I needed to work outside
the home. Without her moral support and editorial help, the writing of this dissertation
could have been cumbersome and less interesting. Finally, I dedicate this study to my
parents, Abdul-Aziz Mohammad and Aisha Faisal Al-Mubarak who have reared me to
appreciate knowledge. To them, after the Almighty Allah, I confess eternal indebtedness.
vii

CHAPTER I
URBANIZATION, URBAN POLICY AND CITY FORM:
URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA
Research on the role of the state in urban development and change in Third World and
developing countries is lacking. Theoretical work in such areas is both inchoate and scant.
Responding to exogenous political and economic forces, urbanization in developing
countries has been beset by numerous problems, such as population growth. Such
problems pose challenging questions for urban research. Planning paradigms imported
from Western cultures aggravated rather than assuaged the chronic problems of rapid urban
development at the cost of the abandonment of traditionally based urban systems. In these
new nation-state systems, the state has assumed a major role in shaping the new urban
scene.
The goal of this research is to probe the relationship between the role of the Saudi
Arabian government in urban development and the resulting urban form. In a mere fifty
years, Saudi Arabia's relatively traditional, rural, and agrarian society was transformed into
a modern urban society with national government help. The Saudi experience offers an
opportunity to examine the relationship between societal change and development of urban
forms. I want to examine the long-range success of this intervention in which local urban
communities have relied on state expenditures within a rigid central bureaucratic system.
In this study, I stress the employment of a political economic approach in order to
reap better understanding of urban change and development. 1 The focus is on modern
urban development in Saudi Arabia since the promulgation of the new nation-state in 1932.
In this new nation-state, propitious economic conditions coupled with a stable political
environment have forged an urban model blending evolving urban needs with Western
capitalist planning initiatives. The understanding of this urban experience constitutes an
opportunity to enrich our knowledge of non-Western, traditionally-based urban systems.
Upon this understanding, suitable urban models and solutions, which marry global
planning modes to local ones, can be fostered.
Thanks to oil wealth, the urban development programs of the Saudi government have
been influential in stimulating the national economy, shifting the socioeconomic
significance of the traditional social structure and urban network, creating a new urban

2
hierarchy, and virtually conditioning most of the new urban scene by underwriting
construction works, subsidizing private investment in the built environment and requiring
municipal land use and building controls. In return, urban planning activity and public
policy making have been the prerogative of the central government, a bureaucracy fully
presided over by the King. Due to this heavy reliance on state spending, the Saudi city has
grown economically dependent and politically immature.
Urban research in non-democratic countries, I will argue, must emphasize the role
and purpose of the state in urban transformation. In Saudi Arabia, urban planning and
development programs have been underwritten conveying a 'client-patron relationship' (in
which the government provides services for the governed in return for allegiance) rather
than rational or popular criteria. I will explore several examples of the government's role in
creating and shaping the new urban scene, ranging from the encouragement of settlement
activity, to formulating urban policy and direct building. In economically well-endowed
countries, the more autocratic the state, the greater its role in urban development and other
modernization programs, and the greater the likelihood that the intervention will be sought
for national leadership legitimacy and political stability as well as for economic progress.
I. URBANIZATION: COMPARATIVE THEORIES
Historically, modern urbanization is a result of the industrial revolution which began
in the West in the late 18th century. However, unlike the developed world, most
urbanization in Third World countries has been influenced directly by colonization and later
indirectly through capitalism. 2 Urbanization is not merely an increase in urban population
and number of cities; rather it is a process of economic and industrial development
conducive to an increase in the number of cities and to the divisioning labor specialization
in urban population.
An urban revolution at the scale of our time would not have been possible without a
powerful ideology that supplies it with strength and continuity. Modem urbanization,
unlike that of antiquity, spread all over the globe, thanks to technological breakthroughs in
manufacturing, transportation and communication. It has been accompanied by a new
ideology is that of democratic systems of control which in the developing Western societies
supplanted the older despotic forms of oligarchy and monarchy. This new form of control
has recognized the equality of the populace to participate in the making of their society. At

3
the same time, industrialization's political ideology also includes nationalism, and its
economic doctrine is a variation of the laissez-faire market system.
Industrialization is not merely the shift from animated to unanimated sources of
energy and the substitution of agricultural production with market and factory production; it
also implies abundance of production which caters both to the existing populace's demands
and to the creation of new markets. An industrial society presupposes the primacy of
progressiveness of tradition. In a traditional society, religion defined and enforced social
discipline. The imperatives of the industrial city, however, relegate religion to a secondary
status, if considered at all, of moral temperance. Modern city life results in
cosmopolitanism in which economic activities provide citizens with alternatives to religious
attendance. The environment of the city is fluid and open: rationalism triumphs over
traditionalism and movement up and down the social ladder is governed by aptitude, not
social status. 3
David Clark defines urban development as "the process of emergence of a world
dominated by cities and by urban values." According to Clark, urban development
involves two different processes, urban growth and urbanization. Urban growth is a
spatial and demographic process which refers to the "increased importance of towns and
cities as concentration of population within a particular economy or society." Urban
growth results when a society moves from being largely hamlet and village based to one
dominated by cities and towns. More importantly, urbanization also "is an aspatial and
social process which refers to the change of behavior and social relationships which occur
in society as a result of people living in towns and cities. Essentially, it refers to the
complex changes of life style which follow from the impact of cities on society." 4
Urbanization is an economic and social process that occurs in the society as a whole,
not just urban settlements. 5 To Reissman, urbanization is one component of a broader
phenomena which includes the parallel emergence of three other features: nationalism,
industrialism, and the consolidation of a middle class. As defined by the concentration of
population in cities and the increasing number of urban agglomerations, urbanization can be
said to be overwhelmingly spreading in most of today's countries. But in terms of its
components, different societies have shown different paths of modernization. 6

4
Adherents of the 'orthodox paradigm' of economic development argue that
development passes through stages, hence stressing the notion that Third World Countries
are closer to traditional societies than to modern ones. Third World development is
compared to that of developed nations at their early industrial growth. In this
developmental stage, the state should apply minimal action to stimulate development;
development will occur under an environment of laissez-faire. 1 Such an approach focuses
on economics as the key to development. In contrast to the orthodox view, the politicaleconomic
paradigm is more concerned with historical processes. Within this paradigm,
there are two major schools of thought, the Marxist and the dependency theorists. Radical
political economic theory, which derives its major inspiration from Karl Marx's writings,
views the process of urbanization as a natural response to capitalist activity. The city in a
capitalist society is viewed as the locus of production and reproduction of capital
accumulation. 8
However, according to dependency theory, Third World (the periphery) development
has lagged behind the developed nations (the core or center) due to the will of the latter to
keep the former as a source of cheap labor and raw materials. At the same time the center
needs the periphery as markets for its products and as a manufacturing stage for cheap
consumer goods to be marketed at cheaper prices in the center's markets. 9 Accordingly,
the urbanization process in Third World counties has been inhibited by this "intentional"
interference by center countries. 10
Not all societies have managed to reap urbanization's positive by-products (i.e., an
open, fluid, democratic society, with a pluralistic government and one in which individuals
are free to express their own view as well as free to participate in shaping their own
environments). Modernization theory emphasizes the need for a "positive socioeconomic
development and political participation." 11 Cam contends that social mobilization must go
in tandem with urbanization, here considered a first stage of modernization, both must
flourish under nationalism. Modernization is said to stimulate literacy, education and usage
of mass media to spread social awareness and enhance political participation. 12
While the classical approach to urbanization views urbanization as that of population
increase in urban centers and the number of cities, Reissman stresses that urbanization
should be viewed as an integral part of a whole set of complex institutional processes, as
part of social change, an interpretation which places urbanization in the mainstream of

5
macro-social change. He states that "urbanization is not a process that requires a society to
go through the full cycle of change." To Reissman, industrialization is not a linear
direction toward a fully urbanized society; alternatives abound. 13
For example, Hamdan contends that today's civilization has reached the stage of
"post-industrialization." Citing G. Hamdan, Subhi states that "urbanization is no longer a
function of the degree of industrial growth; therefore, it is possible, and even natural, to
have big cities without big industries." 14 Similarly, Mullins questions the evolutionary
approach which stresses that urbanization implies a three-phased economic process, that is
mercantile, industrial and corporate capitalism. He examines urbanization in Australia in
which cities have passed from mercantile to corporate capitalism without passing through
the industrial stage. 15
The above theories have been based chiefly on Western urbanization, particularly that
of North America. The trend of applying Western models to non-Western societies
undergoing rapid urbanization has proven largely ineffective and problematic. Despite the
outward parallels and similarities in many nations' recent urban developments, urbanization
experience in each country poses new challenges to policy makers and urban planners. In
this study, I examine an urban transformation in which a powerful state, in a mere few
decades, has engaged its traditional society in a modernization program to attain living
standards unmatched in many developing countries. Thanks to oil affluence and cultural
coherence, the Saudi monarchy has played a leading role in this process. The synergistic
application of imported technical expertise, education and oil resources has expedited the
demise of traditional built forms and the emergence of modernized urban forms.
II. THE SAUDI CONTEXT: PEOPLE AND TERRAIN
Saudi Arabia is a vast, desolate expanse of desert and semi-desert land that
encompasses an approximate area of 860,000 square miles- approximately the size of the
United States east of the Mississippi River. Except in the southwest, rainfall is scarce and
the country has no rivers and no significant perennial streams. Prior to the discovery of oil
in large-scale production in March 1938, the country's spatial structure comprised three
complementary ways of life: nomadism, settled agriculture and towns. 16

6
The majority of the Country's land is a great area of desert forming a formidable
natural barrier separating the diverse sections of its land into islands of isolated settlements.
Hitherto, these circumstances conditioned the life of its inhabitants for millennia.
Especially in the past, inhospitable geography sorted the population into thinly inhabited
enclaves distributed along three belts. The first, the southwestern Hijaz-Asir plateau forms
the south half of the Red Sea escarpment (Tihamat Asir). The Asir mountains extend north
and are littered with numerous tiny hamlets occupying the high mountains. Asir is the most
populated region of the country and has thrived for centuries performing agriculture on
man-made terraced mountain slopes. North of Asir lies the northern half (Tihamat Ash
Sham) due to its proximity to the Sham countries of Jordan, Palestine and Syria. Hijaz
forms a lower series of mountains which at their low western coastal lands contain the two
holy cities of Makkah and Madinah, with their religious importance to Muslims worldwide.
The Hijaz-Asir belt houses half of the country's estimated 14.1 million population. 17
The second belt pertains to the central Najd, the power base of the House of Saud. It
consists of an archipelago of oases that allowed for the rise of agricultural settlements
including Riyadh, the capital. Najd's towns were settled by the literati, petty traders,
craftsmen and agriculturalists. Some of these towns were seats of princely powers. The
third belt occupies the eastern part of the country which encompassed a relatively large
population dispersed in small settlements in A1 Ahsa and A1 Qatif oases. Currently, the
Eastern Province, which contains most of the country's oil reserves, houses scores of
towns and cities who owe their growth and prosperity to the oil industry.
The country's harsh ecology and desolate vastness fostered a multitude of sparsely
populated subregions living at the verge of poverty and separated by formidable expanses
of sand desert, most of which are inhabited by recalcitrant herdsmen. Since ancient times,
travelers trekked along the desolate caravan routes, from one oasis to another. This
environmental rigidness had defied the creation of national political power capable of
changing the intrinsically centrifugal tendencies of the society.
III. A NEW NATION
Prior to the unification of Saudi Arabia in 1932, the majority of the Arabian
Peninsula's population inhabited rural settlements abutting scattered oasises on the slopes
of the mountains of Asir in the south west, and in the towns of the western coastal region.

7
In addition to this form of living, the tribes of the predominantly dessert areas of the
Peninsula forged a nomadic form of living which accounted for approximately half of the
Peninsula's population at the turn of this century. 18 Still the coastal lands of the Red Sea
on the west and the Persian Gulf on the east contained a population utilizing, in addition to
small scale agriculture, maritime commerce, fishing and pearl diving as their major sources
of living. The towns of Makkah, Madinah and Jeddah in the western region constituted an
exception to the prevailing agrarian and nomadic (pastoral) habitats. The advent of Islam in
the seventh century A.D. strengthened their urban status and provided them with
continuous religious activities that helped support their economies.
The promulgation of Saudi Arabia in 1932 as a new country has assured a new era of
urban experience. With the formation of the new state, the urban network began to
experience profound changes through relatively sudden integration with the increasingly
internationalized world economy, thanks to the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in
the late 1930s. The utilization of such a vital source of energy has launched the Country
into unprecedented economic importance in the world market.
The peculiarities of the Country's socio-political structure, coupled with its reliance
on a massive oil reserve, has conditioned the development of the new urban network. No
longer do agriculture, maritime trade and religious activities constitute the backbone of local
economies. The new political economic changes, represented by nationalism and oil
wealth, also resulted in abandonment of the traditional built environment to accommodate
new and growing urban functions forged by the new changes.
IV. THE STUDY
This study is aimed at deciphering the major forces that have caused the discontinuity
and the demise of the traditional forms and created the modem (industrial) forms. The
relatively short span of time that accompanied this transformation constitutes an opportunity
to understand factors underlying the new forms and some of their shortcomings.
Specifically, I am concerned with the role of the state in shaping both the production of
contemporary urban space and its form. Focused on the relationship between space
formation and state-led intervention in development- characterized by massive public
financing and centralized urban planing- the underlying assumption in this study is that in
Saudi Arabia urban development has been more susceptible to political characteristics of the

8
country than to those of both the capitalist market forces in democratic societies and Islamic
Shari'ah, a major organizer of space in traditional settlements. 19
For example, all Five-year Development Plans of the national government are explicit
about the King's commitment toward the promotion of the population's well being and
living standards. A major vehicle to reach this goal has been massive allocation of funds
in infrastructure improvements and social services. Through the provision of tax-free
infrastructure networks and public and social services; interest-free industrial and
agricultural loans; real estate investment opportunities and free and subsidized housing; the
new urban form has come to reflect the state as the major, if not sole, decision-maker. In
return, urban planning activity and public policy making have been the prerogative of the
government bureaucratic system, an activity fully controlled by the King.
The sudden departure of colonial powers left most newly born Third World nations
with callow leadership. In Saudi Arabia, as in these countries, the role of the state in
national urban development has been significant. In Saudi Arabia, the urban development
programs of the government have been influential in restructuring national urban
economies, shifting the political-economic significance of the traditional urban network,
creating a new urban hierarchy as well as virtually conditioning most of the new urban
scene through land allocation for development and private speculation and by underwriting
construction works. The historically important Holy towns of Makkah and Madinah in the
western region presently rank third and fourth respectively in terms of population size and
government spending, after Riyadh, the Capitol (1.5 million residents) and the port city of
Jeddah (one million residents). Similarly, the previous fishing settlements of Dammam and
Alkhobar on the east coast have assumed national and regional importance with the
discovery of oil. Concomitant with this restructuring of the urban economies is an
urbanization process fueled by an influx of rural migration and foreign labor.
The problem this study deals with is the production of modern urban structures and
forms that do not represent their own culture and environment. Instead, the new urban
forms have come to reflect political leadership's vision and adaptation to world market
needs. This problematic urbanization, marked by heavy reliance on alien urban growth
models, must be seen through an investigation of the national decision-making process. To
alleviate the pressures of urbanization, the government has sought technical forms of urban
planning, that is physical planning, to curb surmounting negative aspects of development.

9
In most cases, even physical planning has been an ex post facto activity, coming after the
growing of an urban problems. Such apolitical approaches to control urban problems have
been done without public participation and with minimum governmental -appreciation for
societal values and long-range advantages. The resulting urban forms are rigid
representations of hasty, culturally and environmentally irrelevant development.
This study is a political economic approach to urban development. In this approach,
the focus is, first, on the dependent nature of a country's economy and its degree of
development in relationship with the world economy. The focus is, secondly, on the
significance of historical changes which have occurred in the structure of cities as a result
of the switch from traditional (precapitalist) to capitalist modes of production. The focus
is, thirdly, on the class structure of the cities, especially the role played by government
created economic opportunities. Finally, the political economic approach emphasizes the
role of the state and its relationship to the elite in shaping the urbanization process. In
short, to understand the modern built environment, I am taking an approach that places
urban growth within sociopolitical, economic processes and recognizes cultural and
historical differences among societies experiencing massive transition, that is the Third
World Countries.
Several attempts have been made to understand the contemporary physical
environment of the Muslim-Arab city. 20 These studies, whether explicitly or implicitly,
distinguish between the processes shaping the traditional physical environments and the
modern built environments created by the new nation-states following their emancipation
from colonialism. While some authors have questioned the validity of the distinction •
"Islamic city," others have shunned the whole concept of the Islamic city model. Still, to
some researchers, the Islamic city concept has been used in a substantial portion of urban
research on the Middle East and North African cities. 21 Nevertheless, research on the
Middle Eastern city is lacking. For example, in his 1976 review of the current state of
urban research in the Middle East, Bonine concluded that "The traditional Middle Eastern
city is still being explained in cliches and stereotypes...The modern city and processes of
urbanization have barely been touched upon." 22
A comprehensive and realistic approach to understanding the urban transformation is
employed. The urban transformation is seen as an integral part of societal change in which
settlements have had to respond to the new exigencies brought by national and international

10
developments. The discontinuity between traditional, authentic architecture and urbanism
and that of the contemporary built environments is not merely due to changing ideological
attitudes favoring imported Western paradigms. The urge for development has led to largescale
development and new building technology causing the demise of authentic
architectural and urban principals as well. Nor can the problem of chaotic modern urban
forms be solely attributed to shifting the roles of responsibility in shaping neighborhood
from local residents to the state's municipal control of urban growth. 23
Rather, stated more comprehensively, the apparent lack of relevance of contemporary
built environments in Saudi Arabia is mainly due to these societal systems' sudden,
lopsided development from traditionally based social systems to capitalist/industrialized
ones. Explanations that oversee the relationship between sociopolitical developments and
urban transformation, while contributing to the understanding of some problems, do not
provide comprehensive answers. They provide partial analysis of specific aspects of the
problem such as the lack of importation of unsuitable technology and/or urban planning.
Little, if anything, however, is said about the political economic aspects of urban
development and the resulting urban form.
The discovery of oil reserves in commercial quantities has strengthened Saudi
Arabia's economy and catapulted its population's living standards to ranks surpassing
those in many developed countries. These oil revenues are at the disposal of a centralized,
national bureaucracy which makes urban and regional decisions; the only discretion left to
local communities includes limited technical decisions such as platting and detailed
blueprints for infrastructure and public services at the municipal level.
The justification for this centralized planning can be attributed to the government's
touted financial commitment for implementing and running virtually all the nation's needed
infrastructure and social services. Similarly, the justification for this form of governance
can be extended to explain the centralized, top-down political character of the Country. As
long as there is a strong source of income from the central government, there is no
pressing need for some form of local governance by local communities who have grown
fully dependent on state funding. The new urban network has been organized by and
around the national bureaucracy. However, it is true to say that despite this somewhat
unwieldy centralized bureaucracy, urban planning in Saudi Arabia, though technical, has
assuaged many problems characteristic of urban transformation. 24

11
V. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE OF STUDY
Through investigation of Saudi Arabia's urbanization experience, in general, and
through individual cases of some representative urban areas, I will show the relation
between state intervention and the resulting urban forms. In addition to tackling the
problems of urbanization, I will also look at how centralized policy-making has enhanced
leadership legitimacy and control. My purpose is to analyze the government's direct and
indirect involvement as the major architect and planner of urban development. Ultimately, I
believe, such massive intervention has shaped both the structure and form of the various
settlements. By exploring the government's mechanisms of land and financial resource
allocation, a model of urban development can be deduced and generalization to other nondemocratic
political systems in the Middle Eastern oil-based economies can be outlined.
The methodology of the research is centered around the investigation and
manipulation of data from three Saudi Arabian settlements. The role of government in
creating and shaping both the urban structure and the urban forms of Saudi settlements will
be assessed by focusing on urban policy in these three towns in particular, as well on
other settlements in general. The three settlements are selected to provide a variety in terms
of their population size, urban economies, and origins--whether evolved from agrarian
settlements or industrial camps to modern communities.
The first and largest of these towns is Riyadh, the capital, which represents a large,
administrative city. With a population of approximately 1.5 million, it is the political heart
of Saudi Arabia and the home of the Royal authority. The second town to be studied is
Arar, representing a small city of 65,000 residents located in the northern region of the
country. Arar was originated anew from a small industrial camp in the early 1940s. The
third settlement is Huraimla, a small town with a population of 5,500, located fifty miles
north of Riyadh. Huraimla was originally a village with an agricultural economy. While
Arar is only forty years old, Riyadh and Huraimila have been on the map for centuries.
The rationale behind selecting these settlements is mainly that of the researcher's
familiarity, personal contacts and accessibility to information.
The first chapter of the dissertation contains a definition of the problem, the rationale,
and a discussion of the study's contribution toward understanding the Saudi urban
transformation. Such an urban experience is valuable in the sense that it provides an

12
alternative approach to understanding urban transmutation in non-democratic and
traditionally based cultural systems in developing countries.
In this chapter, I present an original urban development model that contributes to the
understanding of urban processes in societies under transition. The analysis is drawn upon
political economic studies in which the role of the state in urban transformation is
highlighted. 25 It explores a unique experience in which whole urban economies have been
changed from individually controlled pastoral and agrarian settlements to integral national
urban networks heavily dependent on government financial support. Through the
provision of jobs and services and investment opportunities in the built environment, the
national government has assumed full control of the decision-making process. The Saudi
city cannot be seen as an engine for economic development; rather it is better understood as
a means for collective consumption, a means for equitable redistribution of oil wealth to
individuals, and a source for political stability and legitimacy. Due to this heavy reliance on
state spending, the Saudi city has grown economically dependent and politically immature.
The second chapter is an exploration of the urban processes which created and shaped
the traditional Muslim built environment. In order to understand the contemporary physical
environment, it is essential to explore historical processes which influenced its traditional
settlements. While urban transformation in the West evolved through somewhat gradual
stages of development compatible with cultural and technological changes, the urbanization
of Muslim countries has been abrupt. The forces of colonialism and then the modern
integration of the newly urbanizing nations' economies into the rapidly expanding world
market system have created urban systems in Third World Countries that owe more to
external influences than to pristine, locally spurred cultural development. A brief
discussion of the origin and evolution of the traditional settlements in Saudi Arabia will
help elucidate the factors that caused the departure from traditional urban forms to the
modern Middle Eastern metropolis. Using national government documents, interviews
with government officials and planners, review of master plans, municipal regulations,
journalistic accounts, and recent research and studies, I will examine the relationship
between government's intervention in urban development and the resulting urban forms for
the last six decades.
The third chapter is an investigation of how the contemporary built environments of
Saudi Arabia have come to their present structure and form. It constitutes a historical

13
overview of the economic and political developments which enveloped the new nation-state
and ultimately determined its contemporary urban forms. This will help as an introduction
to the nature and peculiarities of contemporary Saudi urban development. To cope with the
rapid urbanization, the national government has heavily relied on central, authoritarian
planning practices for speed and control, leaving no space for private institutional
organization input and creative, autonomous localism. The decision-making process,
including urban planning, has increasingly become the domain of the central government.
With improved oil revenues, orders and central funds flowed down the bureaucratic chain,
while fealty and information worked their way backup. Under the auspices of central
government, new towns and cities grew from independent agrarian villages and trade posts
to new, dependent urban constellations.
Chapter four is an overview of urban planning activity in Saudi Arabia. The early
municipal regulations and kinds of land allocation that set the standards for development
will be discussed. The early models of growth controls, manifested in street platting, city
planning and regional planning which supplanted the culturally-based space organizer of
the past, will be highlighted. Urban planning, though applied mainly in its physical form,
has been influential in controlling urban growth. At the same time, urban planning activity
has been instrumental in conveying and sustaining the authority's commitment to promote
social well-being through enhancing order in the built environment. In Saudi Arabia, urban
planning takes the form of organizing and controlling physical growth through the
preparation of town and city master plans and regulation of development. Capital-intensive
mega projects are entirely funded by the national government, sometimes lavishly.
Countless urban developments, speedways, parkways, landscaped housing projects and
large-scale infrastructural development have marked this transformation. Examples will be
chosen from different towns and cities around the country. Information will be gathered
from primary and secondary data such as public documents and published urban literature.
In Chapter five I address major cultural attributes that characterized the traditional Arab-
Muslim built environment and shaped their production.
Chapters six, seven and eight are an examination in detail of the three case
settlements, Riyadh, Arar, and Huraimla. In these chapters, I will investigate decisionmaking
processes that helped transform the physical environment to its contemporary
forms. The last chapter is a summary and conclusion of the case study, emphasizing the
characteristics of the Saudi Arabian urban development model. This chapter contains the

14
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Map of Saudi Arabia showing Riyadh, Arar and Huraimla and other major cities. Source:
R. Forget, in N. Safran (1988).

15
research findings: an evaluation and assessment of the Saudi urban experience and
characteristics in light of historical, cultural, and technological changes in the span of
the last five decades. Here, articulation of the aspects of the Saudi urban experience
will result in a model which I believe will be helpful in understanding urban
development and space formation in traditionally based sociopolitical systems
endowed with favorable economic opportunities. The model is a presentation of an
urban example in which state policy is analyzed in relation to leadership goals and
interests. In such a centralized, non-democratic decision-making environment, urban
policy has been conducive to the sustenance and perpetuation of traditional authority
ideals. This model will be contrasted to prevailing models of urban development, for
example, where market forces are working amidst democratic institutional (decisionmaking)
frameworks that maximize public involvement. In the Western model,
ecological awareness, economic efficiency, and social justice are the major concerns.
The competing market players and groups' consciousness will somewhat condition
the resulting "pluralistic urban forms."

16
Notes To Chapter I
1
Helen Safa, ed. Toward A Political Economy of Urbanization in Third World Countries (Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1982).
2 For good summary, see M. P. Smith and J. R. Feagin, eds. The Capitalist City (Padstow, Great
Britain: T.J. Press Ltd, 1987).
3 H. Chudacoff. The Evolution of American Urban Society (Englewood, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc,
1975).
4 David Clark. Urban Geography: An Introductory guide. (Baltimore, MA: The John Hopkins
University Press, 1982), 38.
5 Chudacoff, 1975.
6 Loenard Reissman. The Urban Process: Cities in Industrial Societies (New York: The Free Press,
1970).
7 C. Wilber and K. Jameson, "Paradigms of Economic Development and Beyond." In The Political
Economy of Development and Underdevelopment, edited by C. Wilber, 3-27 (New York: Random
House, 1988).
8 D. Harvey. Consciousness and the Urban Experience: Studies in the History and Theory of
Capitalist Urbanization (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1985). Harvey shows how
centrality, and hence Paris' urban growth, as well as the city's urban form, was enhanced due to
massive capital investments in the built environment and transportation which made Paris at the
locus of the country's economy and culture.
9 For a counter argument, see A. Lepietz, "New Tendencies in the International Division of Labor:
Regimes of Accumulation and Modes of Regulation." In Production, Work, Territory: The
geographical Anatomy of Industrial Capitalism, edited by A. Scott and M. Storper, 16-40 (Boston:
Allen and Nunwin, 1987).
10 C. Wilber and K. Jameson, "Paradigms of Economic Development and Beyond." In The Political
Economy of Development and Underdevelopment, edited by C. Wilber, (New York: Random House,
1988).
11 East Cam, "Urbanization and Political Behavior." In The Middle East city: Ancient Traditions
Confront a Modern World, edited by A. Saqqaf (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1987), 339.
12 Ibid, 339.
13 L. Reissman, 1970.
14 G. Hamdan. "The Identity of Egypt, Part 4 (in Arabic), Alam El-Kotob, Cairo, 1984, quoted by H.
M. Sobhi, in A. Saqqaf, op cit, 230.

17
15 Quoted by C. G. Pickvance, "Comparative Urban Analysis and Assumptions about Causality". In
Middle Eastern Cities in Comparative Perspective, 29-52 (London: Itahca Press, 1986). In this
analysis, Mullins espouses a Marxist rational of capital accumulation and class struggle.
16 Costello, V. F. Urbanization in the Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
17 This estimate of the Saudi population is based on the U.N. Department of International Economics
and Social Affairs' report, World Urbanization, Prospects 1990: Estimates and Projections of Urban
and Rural Populations and of Urban Agglomerations (New York: United Nations, 1990), 149. The
report projects a population of 17.1 million by 1995.
18 Shamekh , 1976.
19 On the role of Islamic Shariah in shaping traditional Arab-Muslim towns, A1 Hathloul, S. A.
Traditions, Continuity and Change in the Physical Environment: The Arab-Muslim City.
Unpublished Dissertation. Department of Architecture (Cambridge, MS: MIT, 1981); Akbar, J.
Crisis in the Built Environment: the Case of the Muslim City (Singapore: Concept Media Pte Ltd,
1988); Hakim, B. S. Arabic-Islamic Cities: Building and Planning Principles (London: Kegan
Paul International, 1986), and Hakim, B. S. "Islamic Architecture and Urbanism." In Encyclopedia
of Architecture, Design, Engineering, and Construction, Vol. 3, edited by J. Wilkes, 86-103 (New
York: John Wiley and Sons, c 1989).
20 See for example, Akbar (1988), Al-Hathloul (1981), Blake Blake, G. H. and Lawless, R. I. eds.
The Changing Middle Eastern City (London: Croom Helm, 1980); Brown, Kenneth, ed. Middle
Eastern Cities in Comparative Perspective (London: Ithaca Press, 1986b); and Saqqaf, A., ed. The
Middle East City, Ancient Traditions Confront a Modern World (New York: Paragon House, 1987).
21 For example, Abu-Lughod (1980,1987) questions the term "Islamic City." Bonine (1983,1985)
refutes the concept's validity in modern processes. However, Brown (1986) points to the persistent
usage of the term in contemporary urban research.
22 M. E. Bonine, "Urban Studies in the Middle East," Middle East Studies Association Bulletin 3
(October, 1976), 19-20.
23 Akbar, 1988.
24
A1 Hathloul, S. and Anis-ur-Rahmaan, "The Evolution of Urban and Regional Planning in Saudi
Arabia" Ekistics 312 (May/June 1985): 206-212.
25 Helen I. Safa, ed. Toward A Political Economy of Urbanization in third World Countries (Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1982), Bryan Roberts. Cities of Peasants (Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE
Publications, 1978), D. Drukakis-Smith. Urbanization, Housing and the Development Process
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980).

CHAPTER II
THE ARAB-ISLAMIC CITY: HISTORICAL PRECEDENCE
Do you know the rights of the neighbor....you must not build to
exclude the breeze from him, unless you have his permission...
A neighbor should not forbid his neighbor to insert wooden beams
in his wall. 1
- Prophet Mohammed
One can hardly disagree that traditional settlements in various parts of the Developing
World have lost continuity with their past, while at the same time retaining some elements
of their urban heritage. In the case of economically well endowed nations, the
transformation has been phenomenal as well as acute. Unlike the Western city which has
evolved congruous with other aspects of cultural change, the non-Western city has
developed deluged by Western intervention, culture and technology. As "foreign"
planners, armed with savoir faire and Western technical expertise, came to the rescue of the
problematic Third World city, in many cases their input has further complicated the
situation. As technology has shattered the distance barrier and made interaction between
world societies easy, non-western urban systems were abruptly discontinued. Now,
researchers dealing with urban problems and development have increasingly come to grips
with the need to address the transferability of technology in problem solving which must
continuously be devised to cater to local cultural exigencies. In the Middle East, there is a
pressing need to reinstate the missing link between the traditional medina and the
"contemporary incoherence," to use Keneth Brown's expression. The new imperatives of
the modern era must be brought in harmony with cultural needs. 2
This chapter is an overview to shed light on urban processes in the pre-Saudi Arabian
era which ended following World War One when colonial powers ceded independence to
most of today's Muslim countries. Jean Charles Pepaule wrote "Space, and habitat in Arab
and/or Muslim societies cannot be considered without reference to Islam." Commenting on
the nature of Islamic urbanization, Riaz Hassan stated that any "analytical study into the
development of Islamic urbanization must start with an examination of Islamic religious
traditions; for certain features of religious tradition of Islam are underlying factors in the
evolution of Muslim urbanization." 3 Conversely, the abandonment of traditional physicocultural
processes in the making of the contemporary Arab-Islamic built environments has

19
resulted in problematic urbanization. The modem urban formation lacks a strong reference
to the local heritage and identity. The new space-design is that of centralized planning and
municipal controls (devoid of social considerations) which supplant residents' control and
input in development.
The Muslim city was built reflecting its inhabitants' convictions. 4 Islam has nurtured
egalitarianism rather than elitist-despotism or materialist privatism. Such emphasis has
prompted Rapport to comment that the "Islamic city to an American has no order." 5
Europeans perceived the African village as lacking order, mainly and simply because it is
not laid in a geometrical form. Such parochialism has undermined the development of
sensible solutions to local problems.
Under the guise of modernization, many Developing and Third World countries have
sought Western technical advice and financial backing to plan the growing metropolis
awakened by the new international economic systems to which their nation-states became
connected. Modernization of the medina, upgrading it to the metropolis, has been looked
upon by each fledgling nation-state's political leaderships as a leverage for legitimacy. A
brief discussion of traditional urban processes, the structure and form of the pre-industrial
city in a West-East comparison will be first presented. The discontinuity of the "placid"
traditional Muslim city, and its subsequent substitution by the "chaotic" metropolis, I
argue, has not been due merely to technological factors, 6 the introduction of new planning
and architecture principles 7 and/or that of the transfer of residents' responsibility and
control over their neighborhoods into that of the institutionalized government municipality. 8
Rather, it is largely due to the sudden metamorphosis in the society's political economic
structure at the macro-level, which has caused lopsided societal development at the microlevels
of these countries cultural systems of which the urban sphere is one manifestation.
I. ISLAM (722-1000 AD): PHILOSOPHICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS
OF URBANISM
Documentation puts the Near Eastern Mesopotamia region as the cradle of urban
civilization which goes back to 5,500 B.C. when cities first appeared. 9 The long history of
urbanism in the Middle East has been the result of propitious, temporal as well as physical
conditions. 10
As a birth-place for the world's great religions, the area witnessed the
creation of many settlements and urban centers. Several factors have forged the

20
development of the Middle Eastern city: water resources; trade relying on highly demanded
old-time commodities, such as spices and incense; favorable political circumstances; and
numerous dynasties establishing their own capitals,'to name a few. A major factor that
spurred urban centers was Islam. 11 Since its swift expansion in the seventh century A.D.,
Islam has changed the Middle Eastern map, creating new towns and conditioning both
cultural systems and physical form of cities.
The Prophet Mohammed is believed by Muslims to have received Allah's revelation
and to have started the preaching of the updated, reformed Abrahamic faith in 712 AD at the
age of forty. As preached by the Prophet, Islam emphasizes monotheism, that is the
oneness of God. To its followers, Islam is more than a religion, it is a way of life
straddling two life-spans, the first life, dunia, and the life after death, akhirah. Islam
emphasizes the preponderance of the Divine Allah (God) over secular materialism. As
Muslims put it, there is no God but Allah. Allah is the Supreme being. He is omnipotent
and omnipresent, indivisible, invisible and unimaginable by human intellect both in look or
character. In a strict Muslim sense, A perfect God means that there is no sharer in His
Nature and His Attributes: "Say: He is God, the One and Only; God, the Eternal, Absolute;
He begetteth not, nor He begotten; and ther is none like unto Him." 12
Mankind is
considered the viceroy whose main purpose in the first life on earth, that is dunia, is to act
as a deputy for the Sovereign Allah. The worshipping of Allah is the raison de'etre for
human existence. All that surrounds mankind is both for their utilization and to help them
discover Allah. Allah says in the Koran,
I have not created Man and Jinn but for the sole purpose of worshipping
me. I need no sustenance from them nor do I need them to feed. 13
While promising the treasures of the hereafter, akhira, Islam denounces mammon as
deleterious, hence places a damper on materialistic luxury. 14 The 'first life', dunia, usually
is discussed with little importance and is viewed as a transitional passage on the path to the
real destiny- that is, either heaven or hell. Prophet Mohammed once said: "What is there
for me in this dunia The likeness of one's life on this earth, is that of a traveler who
stopped for some rest under the shade of a tree, soon to leave it with no return." 15
Though Islam expressively drew strong similarities between previous Biblical
messages, mainly that they all shared the call for worshipping one God, It repudiated both
Judaism and Christianity (though revered their followers as the people of the Book). The

21
Prophet taught that the Biblical accounts as they had changed through time were vestiges,
devoid of truthfulness and banal. They were either completely lost, due to lack of reliable
documentation, or changed for economic and political interests. Whatever had survived
contained outdated teachings which were ab initio designated as universal messages.
As verbally professed and illustrated by the Prophet' lifestyle, Muslims, rulers and
masses were instructed to shun luxury and self-glorification including the construction of
statues, burial tombs and sepulchers. Religiously, Muslim legions considered Christians'
elevation of Jesus to the status of god and the Persians' worship of fire as repulsive.
During their military advancement, early Muslims returned scornful of the Roman's
materialism, and looked upon their cities as expressions of mammon. Mohammed
instructed his followers that cupidity leads to calamity and resources should be
parsimoniously allocated to benefit the community. He lived a life in which he shunned
ostentation, though encouraged the community's members to procure their living with
hard, just work. Even the most sanctuary places of the city, the mosque, habitually
referred to as the house of Allah, should not be built at extravagant standards at the expense
of needy Muslims. A man's rights are perceived as sacred. His blood, privacy and
property are more sacred than the black Kabba, the most holy sanctuary place in the Great
Mosque of Makkah. Mohammed once said in one of his last speeches to his followers
I have gathered you to tell you that it is a great sin for one of you to inflict
harm on any fellow Muslim. For each Muslim's rights are more sacred than
the House of God itself (Ka'ba). 16
The early Muslim vanguards went out from the Arabian peninsula to subjugate nearby
nations and to introduce their populations to Islam. They considered their missions holy,
with a noble goal to "manumit" others out of the "slavery of their [created] fellow mankind
to that of the Creator [Allah] and from the darkness of kufr [the denial of God] to the light
of Islam, its righteousness and guidance as seen from an Islamic view. It was held that all
non-Muslims followed the wrong path, by not practicing Islam. 17 If not converted they
would be doomed to the eternal life in the Hell. Driven by such convictions, they took on
their shoulders the responsibility of introducing Islam to the unbelievers. This zeal was to
inspire emulation in the various epochs of Islam's history.
In 1902, Abdul-Aziz A1 Saud, the founder of today's Saudi Arabia predicated his
nationalist drive on a similar religious premise. By 1932, he managed to unify the different

22
lands comprising Saudi Arabia. The creation of the nation-state constitutes a watershed
between the society's pre-industrial traditionalism and the new era of modernity.
A. Islamic Expansion and Urbanization
From the advent of Islam in the seventh century, a new era of urban centers began to
emerge; however, its advent added to an already existing urban tradition, especially in the
Middle East. Islam made use of the urban heritage and built on it. Islam's swift expansion
resulted in laying the grounds for many of today's urban centers, some of which were
previously small settlements. The location of these towns was the result of several factors
including locations on major trade routes; propitious natural locations; the presence of a
major religious activity; or as a result of the rise of dynasties. Islam also fostered its own
urbanization; several types of cities can be pointed to.
The amsar, or military administrative, town was built as an army camp. It was built
either in the proximity of a pre-Islamic town, such as the case of Al Fustat (Cairo) or on a
site that was meant, by the Muslim armies, to be separate from neighboring settlements, for
example., Kufa, Iraq, or al Qairawan, Tunisia. The second, ribat or outpost towns, were
fortresses that grew from border garrisons to be nuclei for important cities such as Rabat,
Morocco. The third type, the amerriyah, or princely town was the outcome of the rise of
some dynasties to power, who considered the founding of their own capitals as an
expression of their power. Baghdad, Fez and Marrakesh exemplify this type. Finally,
there are the sanctuary tov/ns which developed spontaneously around a sanctuary, a
hermitage or saint's camp. Karbala city in Iraq is an example of this type.
The sojourn of the Prophet in Madinah is considered very important as a source or
example and precedent to be emulated (and simulated) for all aspects of Islamic community
including the building activity. Following his arrival in Madinah, the Prophet embarked
upon a campaign of preaching Islam. This took the form of, first, sending missionaries
carrying messages to the surrounding tribal chiefs and kings. If failed, then war, or jihad,
was waged. Fueled by the dreams of residing in paradise, Islamic legions advanced at an
unprecedented determination and success. To cease, or to stick to settled ways of life, such
as trade and agriculture, was a sign of retreat: a love for dunia. The exertion of oneself in
the spread of Islam, struggling in God's path Jihad, was given priority and great prize. 18
During this period of advancement, Muslims resettled, breathed new life into new towns

23
and/or transformed already existing towns and villages. The Mediterranean basins,
Damascus, Antioch, Alexandria easily fell under Muslim control. At the beginning,
Muslim invaders settled in the vicinity of the conquered towns, out of which the Muslim
sections grew with a distinctive character resembling the physical organization of Makkah
and Madinah. However, eventually Muslims founded purely Islamic cities such as Fustat
(later Cairo), Kufa and Basra. In al-Maghrib (North Africa) and al-Andalus (Iberia),
military outposts and encampments were developed into major capitals such as Qayrawan,
Fez, Marrakesh and, in Spain, Cordova and Seville. In East-West Asia, the new
settlements of Sultaniyya, Isfhan, Nishabur, Herat and Bukhara and Samragand were
brought into new urban centers.
The advent of Islam signaled a new era of political unity under the auspices of a
strong, growing and relatively permanent state in lands that had hitherto rarely enjoyed
security. The resulting political stability was the prerequisite for progress of Madinah,
which increasingly became a teeming center of the expanding empire. This stability set in
motion an urbanization process for centuries to come. As the Islamic empire expanded and
attained power, workers and resources were brought together from its expansive
surroundings. Cities sprouted on the frontiers and on the major routes connecting the core
with the enlarging periphery. Many of the new cities grew from tents and makeshift
encampments dotting the expanding empire. Like all states, the Muslim state, whenever in
strength, nurtured, protected and regulated the economic, social and cultural affairs of its
subjects and provided public amenities for regions under its control. Less than a century
following the Prophet's message, the Islamic empire encompassed a vast territory
stretching from the west shore of the Atlantic Ocean and the Pyrnees to the borders of'
China, in the east.
During the time of the great geographer, al-Maqdisi (9th century A.D.), the Muslim
world contained the major following metropolises: Asmara, Baghdad, known for its
nobility and virtue, Kufa in Iraq for its refinement, Basra for industry, and Misr (Cairo) as
a bustling trade center. Outside the Middle East, there was Balk known for its
ostentatiousness and Samragund touted for its craftsmanship. Classical Islamic urbanism
reached its climax at the height of its territorial expansion and cultural apogee, between 3rd
H. and 4th H. (9th and 13th centuries A.D.), during which time the classical type of city
was fully manifested.

24
The Prophet acknowledged the value of a collective community to mobilize armies to
spread the new religion. His success at uniting the pugnacious Madinah clans, and
winning the fealty of the fickle, and usually recalcitrant Bedouins has attracted scholarly
investigation. In his monumental study of medieval Muslim civilization, Ibn Khaldoun, the
14th century social thinker and Muslim historian, argued that Islam provided the most
important factor in the rise and the growth of Muslim urbanization. It substituted religious
affiliation for kinship as the rational for social organization. Ibn Khaldoun drew a
distinction between what he termed "primitive culture" (Bedouin/nomadic) and "civilized
culture" (hadara/civil). The primitive culture as he described it concentrated on cultivation
of land and domestication of animals in one locality, or while roaming the desert. Its life
was characterized by simplicity and the satisfaction of only the necessary needs. Pastoral
communities were small and self-sustaining; the food stuff was simple and was eaten
without processing; and clothes were made of animal products. Men found shelter in either
caves, tents or simple huts. All but the necessary tools and crafts were absent. Continuous
roaming necessitated minimum and light belongings. Finally, organized rational
knowledge was virtually absent.
Respect for authority, attachment to a certain locality and deference to the rights of
others were prerequisites to the civilized culture. Only through buttressing social
solidarity, could a transformation of 'primitive culture' to a 'civilized culture' take place.
An 'additional force' was required to spark such a process. In the Muslim civilization
case, Islam has served as the force behind the new loyalty, rooted in absolute belief in
Allah, and has become one of the most effective instruments for the rise of urbanization in
Islam. 19
The importance of a settled community, the town, to that of the pastoral, was
augmented by the introduction of the daily five mandatory prayers (with strong emphasis to
do them in group), structuring the daily routine, which served as a strong religious
gathering and social link at the neighborhood level. These prescribed daily prayers resulted
in the establishment of the neighborhood mosque, a Muslim institution and community
center that enhanced the social ties among the Muslim quarters' residents. The town's
status in society was induced vis-a-vis the village and nomadic folk life through the
indoctrination of mandatory Friday prayer, an obligatory worship for town people with a
fixed population of forty people or more. Such stipulation was sufficient to instigate urban
nucleus for future settlements. Though it seems felicitous by today's standards, such

25
differentiation between the town was a crucial stimuli in the predominantly pastoral
conditions of seventh century Arabia. The Friday prayer, meant to bring the community of
several neighborhoods together, required a larger mosque, jami. The compulsory mandate
of the Friday prayer has been an impetus attracting Bedouins, hence strengthening the
town-hinterland relationships. The jami institution has since become a place for
community gathering, education, and political leadership. In short, Islam devised a
hierarchical set of worship duties firmly grounded in spiritual canon encouraging
gregariousness in the community of believers bound by a common language, religion,
cultural background and place. Thus it restructured the semi-primitive Arab pastoral life
around daily, weekly and monthly congregational rituals, that have since stimulated the
interconnectedness of the otherwise insulated and pugnacious desert communities.
On the economic side, Islamic teachings are said to have introduced legislative norms
tailored to fit the needs of an active commercial, merchant community, an activity
conducive to the growth of towns. While addressing the significance of community, Islam
sanctifies private property. The followers of the faith are equal in the sight of Allah who is
the sole owner of resources, including land. Commercial transaction is encouraged while
usury is prohibited. Such encouragement paved the way for the development of the bazaar
economy with its guild-like merchant association, a peculiar aspect of the Middle Eastern
city under Islam. Arguments over the degree of their socio-political influence aside,
Muslim guilds developed under supporting Islamic political circumstance, and pro-market
tolerance. 20 They had their influence on the economic activity in the Muslim city,
providing capital and training for their members. Guilds were also a means for social
mobilization and political solidarity, regulating and protecting crafts. Even guilds '
controlled by non-Muslims enjoyed rights to execute their commercial activities. 21
B. Actual Town Building
Following the Prophet's arrival, Madinah, located inland in the littoral western plain
of the Arabian peninsula, was transformed into a bustling workshop of building activity
and education as well as military operations. Mohammed sent messengers to the various
settlements and tribal turfs asking them to accept the new religion. Tribal leaders and
curious Arabs flocked to Madinah to meet the new rising figure in Arabia, "the long
awaited Prophet." Though preaching in the cradle of Arabia, Islam disparaged the
religiously lukewarm Bedouins' habits, an attitude some historians perceived as sine qua

26
non to the transition to sedentary life. The social solidarity of the mobile Bedouin folks
was based on common ancestry, common interests, and common experience of life and
death. Nomadic culture nurtured the love of desert, personal freedom and loyalty to the
family and the tribe. Bedouins' continuous roving for seasonal staples, grass and water
nurtured their lack of attachment to a certain location. They grew indifferent to authority.
Their harsh environment taught them the art of endurance, occasionally at the cost of
others' rights.
It was the first year of Hegira, 1 H./622 A.D. when the Prophet Mohammed and his
best companion, Abu Bakr, reached Madinah (nee Yathrib) fleeing the polytheists of
Makkah. They entered the oasis to the cheering crowds of its inhabitants. The Prophet had
previously signed a treaty with their leaders. In the ecstasy, some attempted to hold his
camel's robe but the Prophet objected and asked them to let the camel walk until it stopped.
He told them the camel had been instructed by Allah to choose the place where the center of
the settlement, hereafter named Madinah Monaouarah (the city of light), would be located.
That place was to be the mosque of the Prophet. Abutting the shaded colonnade
designating the mosque, the Prophet constructed a room for himself and his wife, Aisha.
The early followers, Sahaba, were chiefly loyal new converts from Makkah and tribal
factions whose members preferred to settle close to the Prophet to learn from him and
enlisted themselves in his army to fight for the spread of the new message. Under the
urgency of providing shelter for the growing number of believers, Madinah residents,
Ansar, shared their homes with the Makkan Muslims, Muhajireen. In addition, the
Prophet allocated undeveloped land tracts to the new converts according to their place of
origin and tribal affiliation. The unit of distribution was called Khitah (pi. Khittat), a term
interchangeably used for quarter. The size of each khittah varied according to the number
of a tribe's members. Moreover, a number of small-size clans from different tribes could
join into one khittah.. Historical accounts of the settlements of the early Muslims in
Madinah show "that Medina at the time of the Prophet was organized into quarters [khittat],
and that each quarter was settled by members of one tribe or clan." 22
Before the Prophet's arrival to Madinah, Yathrib comprised a number of independent,
separated settlements belonging to the various tribes. They were called manazel (residents)
or biout (houses), terms which connote less-permanent quarters. Following the Prophet's
unification of the oasis tribes, these manazel became quarters within the growing city.

Those who fled Makkah with the Prophet, Muhajireen, to join the Muslim community
27
were granted non-arable lands donated by the Ansar and clustered in groups or around the
Mosque. The Prophet divided the land surrounding his mosque to dour (lots) and riba
(quarters). The fiefs, khittah, were distributed to both individuals and tribes alike, though
size corresponded to need, all for the owners' heirs. The internal distribution and
organization of these khitat was left to the owners. In some of these khitat, residents set
aside land in which they buried their deceased and built neighborhood mosques. During
the Prophet's life, the city grew enormously, while retaining its primeval tribal character.
Madinah housed four markets before the Prophet's arrival. Upon his arrival to
Madinah, he pitched a tent which he designated as a market next to the Mosque. He said
"this is our suq, it is not to be built or acquired (la-tatahajjaru), and no tax is to be levied on
it." 23 Following the Prophet's order, the suq was left as open space with no permanent
structures during the reign of the four Caliphs who followed the Prophet in ruling the
nascent Empire. It was not until Muawyyah bin Abi Sufyan (41/661-60/680) that the suq
was constructed. Until this day, the suq complex still occupies the same place and is
known with its historical name, al Manakhah (the place where camels are unloaded).
Commenting on Madinah's spatial organization and its morphology during the Prophet's
time and thirty years following his death, Al-Hathloul wrote
Information on the pattern of the city streets- their form and size and how
they were laid out- is lacking. To use information from later times, there
was during Muawiyah's reign what is known al-balat which according to al-
Samhadi's description covers most of the city's three major thoroughfares.
At some point at the end of this balat near al-musalla, its width during the
time of Ibn Shabbah (262H/876) was ten cubits while at its beginning near
the gate of Mercy, in the Prophet's Mosque, its width was six cubits. As to
Madinah's suq, it seems to have continued in its original site though other
specialized suqs evidently appeared in the area between the original one and
the Prophet's mosque. Within this area, Ibn Sabbah refers to several which
existed during his lifetime. Among those were the suq of date sellers, fruit
sellers, bakers, dyers, tailors, leather merchants, sellers of copper utensils,
and smiths. 24
The system of allotting khitat was copied by the four Muslim Caliphs, who were
elected by the sahaba community, in starting the new settlements. During the reign of the
second Caliph, Omar bin Al Khatab (13/634-23/644), the expansion of the Muslim territory
went apace. It included Syria, Iraq, and Egypt. In order to help administer the vast
territory, six amsar were designated to house the vanguards on the frontier. They served

28
as garrisons for the advancing Muslim armies, soon to become administrative centers for
their provinces. Basra and Kufa in Iraq were founded in one year (16/638) and Fixstat
(21/642) in Egypt prospered. However, Jawwathah and Jabiyah were deserted in later
times. Qayrawan was founded in Tunisia during the reign of the fifth ruler after the
Prophet, Muawiah. In other territories, Qazwin, Ardabil, Ray and Marw, were designated
as amsar for military outposts. The tradition of designating the mosque, abutted by the
suq, and the application of the khitat, as a system of planning, and the formulation of the
street patterns have become a standard procedure in the layout of new settlements carried
down by the first Caliphs following the Prophet's tradition. In those towns that existed
before Muslim control the application of the Islamic legal system, Shariy'ah, and residents
mundane aspects of faith has gradually transformed their urban forms with distinctive
similarity.
Al-Kufa originated from a military camp. The Caliph Omar instructed his viceroy,
Sa'ad bin Abi-Waqqas, to plat the new town. Omar ordered that a hierarchical system of
roads with various widths should include main roads, manahij, to be 40 cubits, 30 cubits
for the next major ones, and 20 cubits. Abi-Alhaiaji was assigned the task of actually
implementing the order of plating the new town. The Prophet set as a minimum width of 7
cubits for small lanes or passage ways, al aziqqah. Abi-Alhaiaji was assisted by an
appraisal committee in making decisions. As in the case of Madinah, the first structure to
be laid down was the congregational mosque, usually taking a square shape, including a
shaded area and the sahn, an open courtyard. The army leader's house was built next to
the mosque, and was usually referred to as the administrative house, Dar ul Imarah. The
open space of several manahij, major roads, were delineated around the mosque.
Omar also asked that an open market area be assigned for the town. Following the
Prophet's tradition, he ordered that the suq be left open with no.permanent structures.
Space was taken by vendors on the basis of first-come-first-serve. Vendors were allowed
to erect shades, with the major mosques as the only built structure in the central area. The
suq remained unbuilt during his reign. It remained unbuilt until the Khufa governor,
during the reign of the Caliph Hisham, (105/724-125/743), ordered the construction of a
permanent building for the suq. Khitat were assigned as residential spaces and distributed
to the major tribes. However, one large tribe could settle more than one khittah. Once the
tribe members decreased others were allowed to join. These khitat were subdivided by
each tribe to house the individual members. An open space, called saha, a common was

29
left unbuilt for the use of various functions as well as a cemetery. The khitat also included
their own neighborhood mosques for the daily prayers.
From the previous discussion it appears that the building process of new towns,
especially in the arnsar model (originated from military camps), conformed to the Prophet's
tradition of the Madinah example. It was a "system of planning" based on, first, the
significance of the mosque in umma (nation) of Islam, shown in the centrality of its
location as a place for worship and community gathering, and abutted by the governor's
residence. Second, the platting of the new town followed a pre-conceived system of open
spaces, the suq, and circulation, road networks with various widths, however were not
precisely defined or marked. Finally, there was the repetitive application of the khitat as a
unit of land distribution to the various tribes as residential quarters. The system was based
on the tribe as the dominant social institution. As tribes' members increased, hence town
population, demand for built land increased causing khitat to close in on each other, thus
consuming the available open space and systematically encroaching on the street network
which resulted in the meandering street system of the traditional Islamic town.
II. TRADITIONAL MUSLIM URBAN FORM
In light of prevailing technology, the pre-industrial city everywhere else in the world,
kept its size to the limits of the major mode of transportation within the city, that is the
"walking city." The limitation of technological know how was both a characteristic of the
pre-industrial town and a hindrance to its growth. Relying on technology as the
determining factor, Sjoberg (1960) argued that the pre-industrial cities of the world are
more similar than different; a characteristic that led Sjoberg to concentrate on the similarities
among the pre-industrial cities rather than the differences. 25 For example, he points out
common structural traits such as their small size, dominated by elites, and spatially
organized into the administrative, religious, a market at the hub of the town, and residential
quarters of household units dominated by adult males. A1 Hathloul stresses that, in
addition to Islamic influence on the Middle Eastern cities, climate and "the absence of the
wheel" were major factors that fostered the organic, compact organization of the Muslim
city. 26 The appreciation of technological and environmental conditions by the inhabitants
and the supremacy of the dictates of Islamic Shariy'ah led to the striking similarities of the
Muslim cities. Von Grounbaum noted this similarity alluding to the (1) individually walled
quarters, (2) the system of gates on each quarter, (3) the lack of open space in the city, (4)

30
the narrow, meandering streets and alleyways and (5) houses built around courtyards
which were designed to maximize privacy for its residents. 27 However, structural elements
of Muslim cities' urban forms aside, Islamic law, derived from the Koran and the
Prophet's teachings, permeated the building processes of the traditional Muslim city.
A. Islamic Legislation: The Role of Fiqh in Shaping the City
Literature has emerged emphasizing the significant impact of Islamic law, based on
the Koran and the biographical documentation of the Prophet's life (hadeeth), on Islamic
urbanization and the building of towns. 28 Muslim jurists adapted these two sources and
drew rulings which determined a wide range of cases, from land tenure to the design of
house fenestrations with respect to neighbors' privacy. S.N. Eisenstadt and A. Shachar
state that "The identity of the Islamic religious community depended on observance of the
Holy Law (Shari'yah) as interpreted by the ulemas [jurists] and enforced by the rulers." 29
Koran, God's revelation to Mohammed, contained Islam's philosophy, ethics, politics,
legislation, and all the essentials of the Islamic civilization in one volume, in the pure
Makkan language, Arabic. It was supplemented with documentation of the Prophet's life
referred to as Sunnah, the way of the Prophet. This was documented in the body of
hadeeth, constituting copious material on how a Muslim should live his/her life. Out of
Koran and Hadeeth, fiqh was developed as a body of literature on the application of the
spiritual dogma to the everyday life of the believer. Fiqh, or jurisprudence, was divided
into two major sub-fields: ibadat (the understanding of matters related to one's
performance of worship consistent with Mohammed's teachings) and muamalat (matters
that deal with various aspects of one's everyday life in relation to others). In addition to the
actual spawning of new Muslim sections and towns according to the Prophet's guidelines,
the jurists' application of Islamic law transformed the pie-Islamic built environment and
gave the new Muslim one an organic order.
Due to the immense documentation of the Prophet's life, Fiqh was left to open
interpretation by scholars. This resulted in sifting and sorting of. the material and was, by
the fourth century Hegira, resolved by the establishment of the Four Sunni schools of fiqh,
Mathahib Arba'a. 30 The Fiqh, or jurisprudence, includes practical rules set down by
common sense and a set of moral principles and values. Such guidelines were modeled
and were consistent with Islamic Shariy'ah and, in the urban sphere were based on the
prevention of harm, dharar, resulting from building activity and other urban activities. 31

31
The origin of the schools of thought essentially goes back to the early decades of the
second century of Islam. These early branches were developed under the surmounting
need to reevaluate legal practices during the growing Ummyyad dynasty reign
(41H./661AD-132/759). Under the vast expanding territory of the Muslim empire, jurists
and judges were overwhelmed by the tremendous increase in new cases and problems.
They attempted pragmatically to rule the cases in light of the established Islamic laws as
pronounced in the Koran. The scholars established various criteria by which rules were
either approved or rejected. What had started as a personal judgment on the part of
scholars, had materialized into procedures of agreement on such criteria, ijma'a, or
consensus of the Muslims.
Eventually, such agreement began to constitute the body of sunnah, actual customary
practices derived from traditions documenting Mohammed's life. By the second century
the term "sunnah" (literally means the divinely inspired conduct of the Prophet) evolved to
mean "the ideal doctrine established in the school and expounded by its current
representatives." 32 Sunnah evolved through crises of definitions and content, which by
the third century was resolved in the Muslim scholars' community and concluded in the
birth of Hadeeth science. Encompassing Mohammed's sayings and conduct, scholars
considered Sunnah to be inspired by God, therefore complimenting the Koran, Allah's
actual words revealed and quoted verbatim by Mohammed. In addition to Koran and
Sunnah, ijmaa', or agreement was considered a third source of legislation based on
majority rule by the scholars' interpretation and analogical reasoning, qias. The scholars'
acceptance of the ijm'a as binding, resulted in discarding the customary practice of ijtihad,
independent judgment, and the development of theoretical law was supplanted with that of
ijmaa'.
A1 Hathloul argues that such developments have become binding. He states "this
pattern of dominance of an unchallenged and long-standing tradition is repeated in the
contexts of the Arab-Muslim cities' built environment." A1 Hathloul commented, "From
that time onwards, jurisprudence was confined to the elaboration and detailed analysis of
established rules. This development substantially affected the way Muslim legal sources
were composed, since the role of jurists became that of commentators upon the works of
past masters." 33 Within this environment, a tradition of building developed in harmony
with the legal system which has since shaped the production of the traditional Muslim built

32
environment and resulted in the remarkable similarity between the traditional Arab-Islamic
physical environments.
As noted earlier, the expansion of Islam over a far-flung geographic area extending
between Spain and India resulted in the construction of new annexes around existing cities
and towns and the building of new settlements, hence resulting in a new episode of
urbanization in some regions in particular. Building activity paralleled population growth
of towns and building problems ensued. Solutions for such problems were derived by the
extension of Islamic law, based on the major schools of jurisprudence. The following
aspects of Islam's influence on traditional Islamic urban forms can be highlighted as
follows:
1. MAJOR LAND USES. The allotment of khittat to various tribes and clans was a
procedure Prophet Mohammed initiated to settle new converts in Madinah, and, later, was
copied by his companions who spread Islam in Asia and Africa. As pointed out earlier, the
khittah became the unit of distribution for residential purposes to dominant social units, that
is the tribe, based on the number of their members. The internal organization of the
individual khittah was then left to each group to decide according to their own needs.
Moreover, following the Prophet's precedence, his heirs ordered that new settlements be
organized around the Friday prayer mosque, jami, and a suq to be added and governed by
certain rules similar to those ordained by the Prophet.
2. LAND TENURE. Islamic jurisprudence played an important factor in shaping the
transformation process of the individual dwellings and estates. For example, the right of
shufa'ah, preemption, gave priority to the neighbor to buy a neighbor's property upon his
or her decision to sell it. This helped quarters maintain their character for longer periods of
time. Another example of the rule of fiqh, jurisprudence, in shaping building processes in
traditional Islamic societies was that of inheritance. Islam prescribed a detailed formula
concerning the distribution of one's inheritance. Islamic inheritance law laid down
procedures by which individual dwellings could be partitioned between family members.
The partition also called for the provision of access (passageways and new footpaths) to the
newly subdivided units, a process which led to the familiar tortuous circulation networks
and the irregular shapes of dwellings and blocks of Muslim cities.

33
3. THE CIRCULATION SPACE. The delineation of the minimum width of streets
was set according to the Prophet who ordered that streets, for public passage, should have
width no less than 7 cubits (3.23-3.50 m.). If such passageways were meant to serve for
cattle and sheep they should be 20 cubits. However, for footpaths, serving in between
dwellings for private passage, 4 cubits were required. Rulings concerning the use of
spaces adjacent to dwellings and other rights between neighbors on using private
passageways between them abound, which were grounded in fiqh. precepts. The jurists
also developed regulations relating to the height of streets; they used the height of a person
riding a camel to decide the minimum height of passageways. 34 For example, the eminent
jurist Sahnun, who lived in the third century (c. 854 A.D.), when asked about one incident
where a person who encroached on a public right of way and though the neighbors did not
object for the twenty year period following the construction, he ordered its demolition. Ibn
Kinanah (168H./802 A.D.), commenting on similar incident, condemned such an act of
encroachment and demanded legal punishment. Concerning one case where a person built
a mosque within his house and encroached on the street, the jurist Rabi'ah (c. 136H./813
A.D.) ruled that it was illegal. Malik, however, predicated his decision on whether such an
encroachment would harm street users. 35
4. ELIMINATION OF DHARAR (HARM). The principal of dharar (harm) is based
largely on the prevention of harm to other residents, including nuisance resulting from the
juxtaposition of incompatible land uses next to each other. Islamic jurists derived rules
from the Koran and the Prophet's Tradition, hadeeth, which ultimately determined the
location and functions of land uses in the traditional Muslim city. For example, uses that
created smoke, odor or presented a fire hazard were evaluated in terms of their impact on
residents and property values. Frequently, jurists invoked a verse in the Koran which
prohibits injury and harm among the residents 36 In one case, a neighbor who built an
uncovered sewer causing a bad smell to nearby users was ordered to cover it. In another
case, a man who used his residence as a tannery was ordered to remove the facility upon
the complaints of his neighbors. 37
Cases on ruins and structures that threatened collapse in the city were also subsumed
under dharar. The judge Ibn Rafi ordered one of his students, Ibn Arrami to walk in streets
and look for walls and other structures threatening to fall and demolish them. The Jurist
Malik did not allow one owner to wait till the next day to demolish a wall; he insisted to do
it immediately. The provision of light and air was also treated under dharar. Jurists,

34
although they could not find enough basis to order the demolishing of a building which
obstructed air and light for a neighbor, they expressed sympathy to those affected by such
acts.
The concern over harm in the form of infringement on the privacy of residents was
reflected in the design of fenestrations. This concern is best exemplified in the Hadeeth by
the Prophet, who was quoted as saying that if one looked through a hole into a private
residence and got hit by a stone and lost his eye, no compensation was required. 38 Omar
bin Al-Khattab, the second Caliph, ordered his viceroy in al-Fustat (Cairo) to examine the
harm inflicted by a neighbor who opened a window overlooking a neighbor's house. To
settle the dispute, Omar ordered a bedstead to be placed underneath the window where a
man could ascend on it; if he could see into the neighbors house then the window had be
sealed, otherwise it was allowed. The locating of doors was also regulated with regard to
neighbors' rights and privacy. It was reported that the eminent Muslim scholar, Malik,
said "One has no right to create something that will inflict harm or damage to his neighbor,
even when what is done is within his own property..." 39
Usually, a neighbor's complaint was stronger if the harm was made by a neighbor
who moved in after the first one. Some jurists maintained that a neighbor had the right to
object to a harm caused by a neighbor even if it was completed. Even, if harm to neighbors
resulted from the construction of a mosque, neighbors' rights were safeguarded at the cost
of modifying the religious building's structure. A muezzin who climbed to the top of a
mosque or the minaret to call for the five daily prayers was prohibited from doing so if it
caused him to overlook neighbors' courtyards or rooftops. Finally, the rooftops' openings
and heights where residents could oversee neighboring houses were also regulated. The
Muslim scholar Sahnun ordered a wall to be built on the top of a mosque and insisted that
prayers could not be made in the mosque until such a wall was completed.
5. ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS IN THE CITY. The aforementioned rulings
influenced the building processes in traditional Muslim built environments. The jurists'
decisions, however, required the provision of civil and legal duties that oversaw their
implementation. The qadi (judge) and the al-muhtasib (an officer in-charged with the
hisbah, that is the promotion of good and prevention of evil), in addition to other several
officers who were charged with building-related activities, played major roles in bringing
peace, justice and order to the city. The qadi's responsibilities comprised a wide range of

35
duties including the supervision of actual building processes, as was the case in Tunisia
where the qadi, or his representative, walked through the city and assured that threatening
walls be demolished even though no complaint was delivered to the court. In Madinah, the
qadi's duties included the measurement of streets' widths in front of houses to be built to
assure compliance with set standards and neighbors' rights of access and privacy. Judges
were reported to consult, ahl al-Khibrah (the experts) in matters of technical knowledge and
advice on damage, ownership disputes and assessment of transactions, rents and the
rebuilding of waqf (property donated as charity). 40
The mohtasiVs duties included the implementation of religious practices, such as the
supervision of the moral behavior of residents as well as worldly tasks. In the market
place, he was responsible for the protection of consumers through, for example, the
checking on the quality of goods. A1 Hathloul points that the "...muhtasib could intervene
on his own accord and he was at liberty to deduce principles of decision from custom (u'rf)
as distinct from revealed law (shara')." 41 In Morocco, amin-ul-mustafad collected taxes
and zakat (alms) on manufactured products and other goods, supervised the cleanliness of
the city and other civic tasks. However, another officer, the nazir, oversaw the provision
of drinking water for towns and built aqueducts and public fountains 42
B. The Role of Social Factors in Shaping the Design of
Neighborhoods and Dwellings
In Islam, the issues of privacy play a major role in its adherents' lives. Islamic
teachings discourage mingling between opposite sexes. Only those designated as mahrarn,
that is relatives who by Islamic instruction are prohibited from marrying the opposite sex,
are allowed to have access to the inner circle within a Muslim family dwelling and establish
social contact with its women 43 Such emphasis on the privacy of one's dwelling was
explicitly laid out as a precautionary measure to deter sexual interaction that might sway a
Muslim into an illegal sexual relationship, outside marriage. It is common in Muslim
tradition that not only unwanted harm is prohibited, but also the means and circumstances
that might lead to or encourage such practices. 44 Such discouragement has resulted in
physical division within the residential unit.
In an economically able Muslim family house, a duality of spatial organization is
discernible, the house is divided into three sections. The inner circle, harem (the family

36
quarters), is a private space designated for the private use of close family members,
maharim, men and women. The second section, is a semi-private one, designated for the
use of family members, however, upon the reception of guests or non-maharim, only men
can use that space. Women are confined to the private section with their women guests.
Occasionally, the semi-private space will be used by women guests in times of family
parties restricted to women only. The third domain is public space, predominantly male
quarters for receptions and entertainment. In Saudi Arabia, such spaces are called majlis,
and are entered directly from the street through a door or gateway vestibule, adjacent to
which is provided a bathroom area for performing ablutions and guest use. Nevertheless,
there is no strict emphasis on what sex uses what space. Depending on the number and
size of spaces in the house and the number of guests and gender, such spaces can be
shifted to attain the best use for the largest number. Guest men can be assigned to, say, the
courtyard or the roof, a typical private space in normal uses and vise versa. 45 .
The concern over privacy is also reflected in the layout of outdoor space. The design
of fenestrations in cities inhabited by a Muslim majority reflects this strict compliance of
residents with Islamic principles and guidelines. The placing of high windows in
otherwise solid facades fulfills the climate and privacy concerns. In addition to climatic
considerations, that is. to release hot air in rooms and enhance air circulation, higher
windows, sometimes higher than a camel rider, also precludes observing home dwellers by
those using the streets outside. Entrances to residential units in Muslim cities are set to
minimize passersby from seeing residents. Narrow, twisting alleyways, are laid to
maximize privacy for clusters of dwellings. Abu-Lughod (1987) commenting on gender
segregation in the Arab-Islamic City argued that the creation of turfs for males and females
is the main factor shaping the physical organization of the city brought by Islam. She
wrote" The object was not only to prevent physical contact but to protect visual privacy." 46
At major quarters, gateways are erected identifying spaces with a certain family, clan
or tribe. Such gates, in many instances, are closed at sunset, in an effort to both preserve
residents' privacy and security. In towns with various religious associations, quarters
evolved housing mostly inhabitants pertaining to a certain faith. In hot, humid coastal
cities, such as Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, court-yarded homes are replaced with extroverted,
multi story box-houses. In such areas, large windows are covered with mashrabia, a
hanging, latticed-decorated wooden structure designed to minimize glare, allow a cool
breeze to enter, and protect residents from obtrusive looks by street users. Finally, these

37
contrasted qualities, between the private and public in urban life, as conditioned by Islamic
religion, are considered by De Montequin as "essential factors which precipitated the
characteristic physiognomy and personality and therefore the environment, of the classical
Islamic city." 47
C. Physical Characteristics of the Arab-Islamic city
THE SUQ/BAZAAR. The commercial element in the traditional Muslim city consists
of a complex set of small, contiguous stalls occupying sides of passageways or branches
which are covered by vaults, canvas shades or domes. Shops provide goods and services
according to the size and wealth of the town. Markets usually exhibit similarity in terms of
their organization. The shops edge a commercial spine. The bazaar is divided into a
sequence of specialized markets that supplant one another along the spine. Different
locations contain similar specialized goods and services. Noxious industries and clean
shops are separated according to deliberate functional land use.
Due to the bazaar area's importance in settlement life and due to its use by many town
residents and outsiders, it required special supervision from authorities. In some cases, the
state invested in the construction of the suq out of a need for steady income. The
increasing importance of the suq.as a source of income for the authorities caused the
development of an administrative institution, the Muhtasib, to supervise the organization of
market activity and the collection of taxes. The Muhtasib was aided by manuals as well as
by having the authority to establish land use zoning regulations.
The urban craft guilds were also instrumental in controlling the economic activities of
the town. They supervised prices, quality of goods and the number of shops per
profession. The status of the suq economy was innovative to the degree that it was touted
as a major innovation of the Muslim city. 48 Various unique responsibilities were devised
for the organization and administrative responsibilities such as the role of the Muhtasib, the
Nazir and Amin al Mustafad (officials who took care of consumer protection, water
provision, and waste disposal). Greetz considers the suq as the representation of Muslim
culture, a social institution and its economic element. He contends that if Islamic
civilization can be characterized by one of its leading institutions, then its the suq. He
states that

38
What the mandarin bureaucracy was for classical China and the caste system
for classical India- the part most evocative of the whole- the bazaar was for
the more pragmatic societies of the classical Middle East. 49
Kenneth Brown (1986), adds citing from Greetz work,
The elements of this system are coherent and imply one another: a sharp
division of labour and localization of markets, a lack of standardization in
products, intensive bargaining over prices, extreme fractionalization in
transactions, stability of clientship ties between buyer and seller, itinerant
trading, occupation by ascription, the personal nature of reputation and the
preference for partnerships over relations of employer-employee. 50
The CENTRAL/CONGREGATIONAL MOSQUE {JAMI). At the hub of the town
was the religious element, which included the Friday (major) mosque surrounded by a
school, a library, bookstores, and perfume sellers. Surrounding the above "public and
noisy" functions were patches of residential quarters. They comprised a compact mass of
open courtyard, introverted housing resembling a "cellular urban texture." The house was
a private enclave that, to guard for more privacy, had L-shaped entrances. Walls were
solid, while the house life was internalized. Individuals' quarters were likely to be defined
by different religious groups or tribes. Quarters were also likely to have gates of their
own, where the quarter could be locked after dark. Other features of the traditional
(Muslim) city included a city wall, a citadel, inns and small markets in the individual
quarters. 51
The RESIDENTIAL QUARTER. Another element that has been typically associated
with the Islamic city is the "quarter," a neighborhood community that has been nurtured
under the Islamic influence, especially those in the Middle East and North Africa. Its
physical distinction as a "unit" of multiple residential "cells", has been the product of
political, religious, social and security considerations. Abu-Lughod attributes the
distinctiveness of the quarter as being due to political and administrative factors. By
shunning day-to-day matters of maintenance, the state under Islamic legislation, has
encouraged sub-state functional units of which the residential quarter is one. The quarter
was given a large measure of autonomy which largely operated on an ad hoc basis. 52
The quarter was largely inhabited by a homogeneous population who shared religious
association, place of origin, similar occupation or income. In the quarter, the residents

39
found intimate, lasting bonds of kinship and belief. Physically, quarters could be found as
subdivisions within the city, walled and have their own gates. Lapidus points to the
neighborhood community as the central aspect of Muslim urban life. The urban quarters of
medieval Islam, remarked Lapidus,
were small, integrated communities, by quasi-physical isolation, close
family ties, ethnic or religious homogeneity, strong group solidarity,
economic and administrative unity and spokesman elites, they were
analogies of village communities inside the urban agglomeration. 53
In Lapidus' comment on the intrinsic qualities of the traditional Arab-Muslim city, the
Muslim city is organized around socially homogeneous quarters based on ethnic or tribal
origin, religion, trade or the clienteles of political and religious leaders. The absence of
Western-like independent associations was equaled by strong ties in the quarters, a colloid
of different groups was conditioned more by social bonds, exemplified in the tribal and/or
religious association, than by income. Social relations constituted multiple personal ties, a
network of social relations between individuals and families within the discrete quarter.
Within the city, social relations constituted the major logic that shaped the organization of
its parts and outcome. Under Islamic Shariy'ah, residents enjoyed substantial authority
and control over their quarters, including the construction of their houses, the creation and
definition of semi-private space versus the public. Only in cases of disagreement among
neighbors was legal arbitration sought by the contending parties.
Fuad Khori argued that Western-born urban social ecology theory- whereby a core is
ringed by concentric circles of stratified residential belts comprising the totality of the cityis
not applicable within the Middle Eastern context. The twisted streets mirror social
agglomerations interwoven by kinship and traditional ties of neighborhood, rather than
income. He states that "Buildings are erected on plots subdivided according to inheritance
patterns. It is the social assemblage that matters more than the physical design; the urban
society is fitted into a social map, not a spatial one." 54
Islamic principles and practical reckoning with available materials and climate can also
be seen at work in the design of dwelling units. The elementary configuration of living
space was uniform, but not perpendicular (orthogonal). For example, in Saudi Arabia,
there are at least four traditional types of houses. They are: (1) the open-courtyard rural
house, which was incorporated into new urban areas, (2) the Madinah House, comprising

40
a number of rooms surrounding a covered courtyard, and (3) the Mashrabiyah House, with
its relatively multi-story structure containing a central courtyard, (4) the Q'ahah House, a
semi-detached, row-house with its unique latticed, projecting windows, usually found in
the coastal areas of west Saudi Arabia. Generally, the Q'ahah house form reflected the
internal arrangement of four covered rooms, delimiting a central open space, courtyard,
fina or semi-open hall, termed the durka'a. Doorways were deliberately placed so as to
avoid direct sight by neighbors and pedestrians. Family quarters may have a separate entry
and entry space (atfa or darb) usually opening on to a minor cul-de-sac and thence into the
public realm of the street. This conformation of the introverted house conformed to the
overriding sense of privacy, a major factor shaping the traditional physical built
environment.
Finally, circulation and public spaces in the traditional Muslim built environment
conformed to many factors except orthogonal organization of building cells and traffic
space. Circulation in the traditional Arab-Islamic physical environment has been secondary
to the built space, it was dominated by human scale rather than that of wheeled traffic. The
configuration of the circulation paths was the residual result of built up area. Typically,
residents conferred over the width and shape of traffic space once a resident decided to
expand his house. Circulation space comprised chief arteries, receiving major crowds from
the bustling center to the major gates and between major quarters. Secondary arteries led to
quarters, feeding the branching cul-de-sacs (darb) whose layouts were narrow and
meandering, deliberately built to inhibit intruding traffic. Cul-de-sacs represent the veins
that fed the residential "cells." Technological factors play in shaping the tree-like,
meandering traffic space. Galantay (1989) points to technological considerations such as
the usage of animal transportation and the lack of wheeled traffic in the design and
allocation of circulation space in (traditional) medina. Due to this technological constraint,
a town was essentially a walking one, encompassing a relatively small area of 1 to 3 square
kilometers.
III. THE ISLAMIC CITY MODEL: RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF
ISLAMIC URBANISM
Following Islam's precocious expansion, under Muslim rule, the Middle Eastern city
retained most of the prevailing architecture and city organization. The transformation of the
ancient Middle Eastern city to the Muslim city took centuries to complete. After a

41
checkered early history of eclectic growth, with the passage of time, Islamic Shariy'ah
codes began to leave their impression on the built forms. A new complex, differentiated
society emerged, replacing the old simpler culture divided according to tribal association.
"It was Islamic because religious communities evolved based upon schools of Islamic law,
creating a new context for organizing Muslim social and religious life." 55 Bonine (1983),
points that such change was attained when most of the regions' inhabitants, who came
under Muslim control, espoused the Muslim faith by the eleventh and twelfth centuries and
only then "we can speak of a truly Islamic urban society." 56
Due to the strong influence of Islamic law, Muslim towns transformed showing
distinguished characteristics, commonly referred to under the "Islamic City" model. This
rubric has evoked numerous writings that have either questioned its applicability or have
assented its plausibility. This has amounted to an unresolved debate stemming mainly from
its applicability to unspecified geographic and temporal limits in the vast regions inhabited
by Muslims, prior to the emergence of the nation-states of the twentieth century in the
various parts of the Muslim world following their emancipation from colonialism.
In this model, orientalists (historians studying Muslim culture) have emphasized
Islam's great influence on the towns inhabitants, the urbanization phenomenon, and the
internal structuring of towns that are dominated by a Muslim majority and/or under a
Muslim state. Developed by French orientalists studying North African towns during the
1920s, the Islamic City model postulates a community of believers living under the
jurisdiction of a Muslim state in which Islamic teachings override all aspects of its
practicing Muslims' life. 57 The combined adherence to Islamic teachings by the
inhabitants, under the auspices of the Muslim state, renders a spatial organization
conditioned by such teachings, given the environmental context. Cities are seen as
manifestations of Islamic religious ideals, and so the structure and the morphology of the
Muslim town reflects these ideals. However, variations abound in the Muslim world
largely due to environmental factors and the urban heritage which predated Muslim
influence.
The term, Islamic City, once used to designate the pre-industrial cities lying within
the confines of Islam, proves superior over other terms, for the Middle Eastern city. The
Middle Eastern prefix merely refers to a region defined by geographic boundaries; thus it is

42
ahistorical, a term which denies both time peculiarities and culture. Moreover, the wide
usage of the term Muslim/Islamic city by scholars attests to its convenience. 58
K. Brow (1986), commenting on the use of the concept of "Muslim City" in research
in Britain and France, contends that much of the researcher's work has been similar to
those concerned with the interpretation of change in urban life in European urban literature
which usually focuses on the "'progression' from the city of Virtue (the Muslim City) to
the city of Vice (the colonial city) to the city Beyond Good and Evil (the modern city)." 59
According to Brown, such studies of space, social structures and processes no longer
isolate the Islamic influence on urban life. However, the Sluglettes (1986), in their
historical study of Aleppo, reject the validity of the term "Muslim City" as the conceptual
tool for the study of the late 19th and 20th century city. They argue that "by the end of the
19th century new forms of identity and association, political, economic and ethnic, had also
become firmly rooted in the Weltanschauung of many Aleppines." 60
The model of the Islamic City recognizes the urban nature of Islam, where the city is
perceived as the place where, more than the village, adherents can fulfill the true Muslim
life. It also acknowledges that with the advent and swift spread of Islam, Muslim created
settlements. The model is also a formless, irregular, and haphazard collection of quarters.
The outcome is an organic organization of the city's elements. According to this model,
winding streets and cul-de-sacs result from the absence of civil authority. Sauvaget, who
lamented the dissolution of the Hellenistic structure of Aleppo under Islamic control,
describes the "formlessness" of the Islamic city as emanating from a "law of anarchy." 61
The basic premise for the Islamic city's model is that Islam is an urban religion
because it envisioned a large and complex social community that only a city system could
handle. An examination of Islam's basic traits makes it evident that Islam is a religion of
urban people. The Prophet Mohammed was born and raised in the urban enclave of
Makkah, a highly developed religious and trade center, fifty miles inland off the western
coast of the Arabian peninsula. In discussing the model's reference to disordered
organization of the city's built elements and the meandering street network, Bonine alludes
to its pre-industrial technology and its hot climate. Given these two properties, the Islamic
city was rationally organized for its inhabitants. 62 The narrow road network provided
protection from the scorching sun and the densely-packed buildings increased shadowed
surfaces, hence maintaining cooler spaces.

43
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE MODEL
According to Bonine (1983), the "Islamic City" model/theory poses a number of
problems. The major elements of the city (e.g., courtyard houses, the market place and
wall) can be found in other pre-industrial cities which share similar climatic conditions.
For example, the windowless massed outer walls of buildings, the public paths, citadel, the
narrow winding streets, all existed before Islam, and Bonine considers associating them
solely with Islamic Cities as "fallacious." Moreover, the religious significance of the
mosque is comparable to similar institutions in other societies. Sauvaget goes further by
saying that "all principal Islamic institutions were an adaptation or modification of earlier
ones, even the Great Mosque." 63 Although Bonine recognizes the significant input of
Islam on the region, he denies the applicability of the term Islamic City. He states that
"Islam is not necessarily an urban religion, nor did it necessarily foster urbanism".
Instead, he suggests the use of the term the "Middle Eastern City" to refer to the traditional,
premodern ME city.
In her work on Rabat, Janet Abu-Lughod (1980) raises questions on the term's
applicability to other parts of the Muslim world. 64 She points to the sheer objectivity of it,
by questioning the intellectual construction of the rubric Islamic city: how it designates a
religiously coined entity. She wrote that "The construction of the concept of the Islamic
city was an integral part of the colonial project of distancing, objectifying, and
dehumanizing the peoples who were to be treated as "lessers." 65
Abu-Lughod (1987), after reviewing the corpus of the Islamic City model, brilliantly
debased its underlying arguments and questions them as myths. She argues that the model
of the Islamic city grew on a mere "handful of cities are actually described" and "only
certain legal codes- on which the Islamic form of city is presumed to be based- have been
studied. She stated that:
Only gradually did it become clear to me how much a conspiracy of copying
and glossing had yielded this optical illusion....In short, most studies still
focus on a single case and try to generalize, rather than start with the more
fundamental question: why would one expect Islamic cities to be similar and
in what ways 66
She devises a modest list of five major factors as an answer to this question. She
rules out three factors (terrain and climate; technology; distribution and transportation) as

eing universal ones that can affect other built forms. However, she singles out two as
44
being Islamically-related. These two factors, place and time, play major roles in shaping,
but do not determine those connected with the legal and political system and the system of
social organization, both of which she points out could vary considerably in Islamic cities.
Since its inception, Islam has made distinctions between those who are adherents to
the faith and the non believers. This has been translated into spatial segregation which has
since created distinction between juridical classes through social distance. For example,
Christians and Jews, under Islamic law are considered dhimmis, the people of the Book.
Though not asked by Muslim legislation to live in separate quarters, such distinction, has
led to physical segregation by time. Abu- Lughod argues, although Islam has assured their
sanctity and defined their rights, this distinction indicated to outsiders that they were
supposed to live there and to insiders that they belonged within. Such religious segregation
has become more profound during colonial rule and the incursion of commercial Europe
which, for example, instigated the institution of Jewish ghettos.
But to say that Islamic Shariy'ah was the only factor in shaping the building process
and spatial organization is not similar to saying that it was the major factor influencing the
cities under Islamic governance. This is to portray Islam with anthropomorphic qualities,
like a surveyor or an architect who compels clients to build their homes the way his
drawing dictates. We should look more closely to the different temporal and geographical
factors, as well as to the role of minorities within the Muslim Cities and to the outside
influences. Technology was an influential factor; its availability, or lack thereof; the lack
of which has been a detriment to many cities in different cultures at different times.
In short, Islam influence on towns and cities was significant. The above discussion
illustrates the unique role of Islamic law in shaping individual dwellings, circulation space
and the prohibition of the juxtaposition of incompatible uses. We saw how the very
principle of promoting good and preventing harm was central to jurists, judges and other
civil personalities whose duties included bringing order and promotion of justice in the city.
Islam introduced numerous religious rituals and encouraged many moral attributes that
ultimately reflected in the production of an Islamic city, with institutions such as mosques,
waqf, madaris (schools), and the bazaar economy. As E. Wirth points
It would still be thinkable that Islam as a religion indeed has not essentially
formed the oriental city, that the legal and social order united with it

45
however contributed decisively to the spreading of the apparent forms of the
city, as they been built in the old Orient, in the whole of that part of the
world rule by Islam (emphasis added). 67
V. ISLAM'S UTOPIA
Above, I dealt with historical developments and legal, social and physical attributes
that gave traditional Islamic cities their personalities. Here, I will attempt to expound the
reason behind the overall tendency among Muslim rulers to shun due emphasis on the
embellishment of their cities resulting in the familiar utilitarian character of Muslim towns.
When comparing the early organically-conditioned urban settlement activity under the
fledgling Muslim rule, with their predecessors of the Hellenistic and Roman towns, laid
according to rectangular forms that included public and recreational spaces, an
unacquainted individual might find Muslim towns strikingly impoverished, haphazardly
organized and lacking physical order. However, when considered in terms of their
religious underpinnings and functionality, Muslim towns appear physically more simple
and modest than that of their predecessors.
The superimposition of an urban scheme or replica of a layout of "core" cities such as
Makkah, Baghdad, or Damascus by Muslims either on the existing conquered towns or in
the building of new ones is unknown in Islamic history. Especially during the early
period, Muslims were more interested in planting the seeds of faith than of building
colonies as did the Romans before them or the Spanish colonialists' imposition of their premade
plans, the Laws of the Indis. 68 In his discussion of the factors underlying the
remarkable shift in city morphology, which actually began to disintegrate in the second
century A.D., but was consummated in the Muslim era, Von Grounbaum wrote that pre-
Islamic orthogonal plans of Aleppo and Damascus were forsaken as it was replaced
gradually by organic forms.
However, others have argued that such deprivation of interest can be attributed to the
fact that early Muslim warriors were of Arab descent, and had personality traits of the
initial nomadic tribes. Their lack of interest in what Europeans have considered as
"rational" urban morphology, which they inherited from conquered nations, has been due
to the Arab nomadic lack of a strong material existence. Early Muslim warriors have also
been said to have been driven by "natural" impulses as the ruling factor behind their
expansion, as an explanation of their apathy for orthogonal structuring of the city. Due to

46
their natural instinct, they preferred simplicity and found "rational" forms distasteful, and
therefore, opposed them.
Unlike Western Utopias that emphasize the construction of a "model" living habitat
where free citizens enjoy a living environment that combines modern technology with a
natural setting, Islam introduced a Utopia of a unique character. In Islam, "utopia" (heaven)
does not exist on and should not be expected in this life, dunia. Rather, Islam draws a
vivid picture of an eternal life after death. 69 By suppressing due emphasis on dunia,
Islamic teaching has ranked dunia as secondary, if not a frivolous, value to the eternal life,
that is Akhira. Akhira is portrayed as the land of continuos peace and abundance,
evergreen, flowing rivers of pure water, wine and milk. Heaven is worry-free and everyouthful,
an experience which begins after one's death, all in return of the believers'
recognition of the oneness of God and its implications. This implies that due respect and
observance of ordained worships and social obligations as laid down in the Koran and
practiced by the Prophet in public or private life. Finally, economical factors may have had
their influence. Islam did not proscribe levying taxes beyond subjects' means. The rules
on what a ruler can collect from his subjects are well defined and numerous by sayings of
the Prophet which warn against burdening the believers beyond their capabilities or
unjustly. With limited financial resources available to the practicing Muslim rurler, less
attention and efforts will be given to embellishing the built environment.
The simplicity of Muslim faith, predicated on the oneness of God, with no specific
religious hierarchy serving as an intermediary between the servant and the Sovreign, that is
Allah. The workability of Islamic rituals and divine laws is simply laid down and is based
on rigorous documentation procedures (known as tautheeq). Such a detailed narrative of
the Prophet's conduct was made possible by his long tenure of twenty three years and this
has been reflected on the urban sphere. The Prophet discouraged emphasis on
materialism. 70 It was narrated how he shunned luxury and emphasized cleanliness. This
due emphasis on simplicity and parsimony explains why early Muslims vanguards did not
copy urban elements of the cities of classic Antiquity, such as the social space of the agora,
the recreational amphitheater, theaters and the stadium. Although, Muslims' concern over
cleanliness resulted in the maintenance of the thermae, even these public baths, hammamat,
were transformed into public spaces which were more modest and solely reserved for the
bathing and cleaning functions of one sex at a time.

47
So, Islam's perception of dunia antithetically runs counter to cultures such as the
Greek, the Roman, and post-Medieval city builders. Islamic teachings belittled the dunia
phase. 71 A saying of Prophet Mohammed states: "If the dunia (first life) value to Allah is
equal to the value of a mosquito wing, Allah would have not given any of it to a
nonbeliever."
It is this great emphasis on the religious doctrine which I believe consitutes the major
reason behind the indifference and lack of zeal among Muslim rulers toward the
embellishment of their cities. This overriding societal influence of religion during Medieval
Europe has rendered the European city similar to the traditional Islamic city's form, both
espoused organic built forms. 72 This helps explain the great similarity between its physical
organic order and tortuous road system, as shown in the centrality and eminence of the
Cathedral, and the meandering layout of the towns. Both the medieval European and the
traditional Islamic cities were also technologically lacking. In both, religious concepts
played a major factor that conditioned its society and influenced forms. 73 On the other
hand, European medieval towns had a political autonomy not characteristic of Muslim
ones.
SUMMARY
From the previous review and analysis, it appears that several factors shaped and
conditioned the traditional Arab-Islamic physical environment. These factors can be
divided into two groups, Islamic-related factors and non-Islamic related factors. The
factors that have to do with Islam are first, attitudinal as perceived by Islamic teachings and
traditions: life, dunia, is considered as a sojourn, a short stay that should be sacrificed by
one who is expecting to live another life which is portrayed as much more worthy. To
achieve the heaven (utopia), a Muslim should model his/her lives according to the Prophet,
who explicitly shunned luxury, warned against cupidity and perceived the personification
of riches as wrong (sinful). Muslim rulers were discouraged from squandering public
resources on the beautification of buildings, the building of monuments, and statues or the
construction of sepulcher for the reason of seeking self-glorification.
The second Islamically-related factor is legislational: the documentation of the Koran
and sunnah by the early Muslims and the subsequent development and elaboration by
Muslim scholars resulted in a specified legal body that, while relegating substantial

48
autonomy to the residents, underlined the traditional urban processes. They comprise the
right of way, a neighbor's right to buy the adjoining homes, shufa'ah (preemption) and a
guarded neighbors' rights, including privacy. Once settlements were established, concepts
and beliefs based on Islam governed incremental changes. Muslim law was set and
expanded by jurists to guide individual cases of acquisition and expansion of new property.
This process has been commended by some to be the major reason behind the striking
similarity between Muslim settlements' forms.
Third, economic factors also played an important role. Islam limits the state power of
extracting income through taxes by limiting the zakah, alms, which amounts to 2.5% of
invested capital. Islam also dictates the aspects on which such sums can be allocated. In
many other civilizations and non-Islamic states, rulers enjoyed unlimited rights to enforce
taxes at the cost of burdening their subjects. In return, these fortunes were squandered on
the embellishment of their palaces and capitols. Under Islam, waqf, a private institution
devoted for charity, was encouraged. It helped sustain charitable functions and services for
the public.
Finally, the city under the Islamic system mirrored its culture. The dense form of the
city evolved under Muslim rule consistent with its ecology. Throughout there was a
practical reckoning with available materials and climate through the adaptation of its form,
structure and components in tune with topography, climate and the prevailing technology.
The town's center comprised a compressed spinal-cord quality of the bazaar, the centrality
of the Friday mosque (jami) and the educational institutions and hospices clustered about it.
This core was interwoven with a web of public, semi-private and private spaces moving
from the core of the bustling and noisy suq to the quarter, to the neighborhood (inhabited
by extended family and those affiliated with it) to the compound to the home. An outward
homogeneity resulted from pro-contextual organization of space and form that rendered
modesty of residential architecture due to the use of local material in harmony with the
natural setting, all surrounded by the wall, defining its limits. As Abdullah Schleifer
succintly wrote: "...the uses of space become more ingenious and more organically (rather
than abstractly) creative- on site design by rule of eye rather than off-site scale." 74
Islam retained prevailing social and cultural norms which did not contradict its
teachings yet influenced the internal organization of urban forms. Since its inception, the
social life in the traditional Islamic cities was organized primarily around the family, tribe,

49
guild, all regulated in the light of Islamic Shariy'ah which were set in illustrative, simple
and clear spoken language. The extended family was a strong kinship unit, and the
individual duly encouraged, if not threatened, to maintain strong ties and reverence for it.
Tribal loyalties and family affiliations continued to play a strong role in the shaping of the
ecological and social structure of the Islamic city. Non-Islamic factors have had their
influence on the structure and form of the city as well. In pre-industrial societies, physical
forms were governed by the limitations of their technology. Moreover, environmental
factors and pre-Islam's influence also played major role in shaping the traditional Islamic
city.
The above picture has lost strength with the advent of colonialism, nationalism, and
technological know-how (modernization). But prior to these latest historical processes, it
is clear and widely acknowledged that Islam played a significant role in conditioning the
built environment in societies where Muslim populations comprised a majority. The term
"Islamic City" connotes both temporal and historical meaning. Geographically, it
distinguished a certain architecture and morphology that was shaped by residents' beliefs
and concepts of space as stressed under Islamic Shari'yah (the prescribed rules of conduct
based on Islamic teachings). Temporally, the concept of the "Muslim City" refers to a
distinct period of time from the seventh century A.D. to the onset of colonialism and the
adoption of nation-states during the 20th century.
Under the influence of external factors, first colonialism and later the integration of
most Arab-Muslim countries' economies to the world political economy, the Middle
Eastern cities of today have passed through radical historical processes that caused their
morphology to lose their predominantly, pre-industrial, Muslim-shaped traditional character
to the "contemporary city of incoherence" of today. 75 The new metropolis is characterized
by a physically decentralized structure that lacks reference to the past and is in a permanent
state of transition.

50
Notes to Chapter n
1 Translation of these Hadeeths were offered by Besim S. Hakim. Arab-Islamic Cities: Building and
Planning Principles (London: Kegan Paul International. 1988), 154.
2 See Kenith Brown (ed) Middle Eastern Cities in Comparative Perspective. (London: Ithaca Press,
1986).
3 Riaz Hassan, "The Nature of Islamic Urbanization- An Historical Perspective," Islamic Culture (July
1969): 233.
4
Kevin Lynch. Good City Form (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987).
5 Ramos Rapport. The Meaning of the Built Environment (London: Sage Publications, 1983), 89.
6 E. Galantay, "Islamic Identity and the Metropolis: The Search for Continuity" Urbanism In Islam: the
Proceedings of the International Conference on Urbanism in Islam (Tokyo: ICUIT, 1989): 1-24.
7
S. A1 Hathloul, Traditions, Continuity and Change in the Physical Environment: The Arab-Muslim
City Unpublished Dissertation, Department of Architecture, MIT (1981).
8 Akbar (1987), op cit.
9
Davis Kingsley, "The Urbanization of Human Population," In The City in Newly Developing
Countries: Readings on Urbanism and Urbanization, edited by Gerald Breese, 5-20 (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960).
A.E. J. Morris. History of Urban Development: Before the Industrial Revolutions (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1986), 1.
G. Sjoberg. The Preindustrial City: Past and Present (New York:The Free Press, 1960), 160,55.
Holy Quran, 112:1-4.
13 Holy Quran, 51:56.
14
On the hereafter, Muslims invoke many verses including this one in the Holy Quran, in which Allah
Says "The unbelievers claim that they will never be resurrected, Say to them (O Mohammed), Yes, by
my Lord, you shall surely be resurrected. Then you shall be told of all that you did. And that is easy
for Allah [that is to recreate life]." 64: 7.
Hadeeth.
1
^ Hadeeth.
17 The name Islam is derived from the word silm, peace. In Arabic, it means submission. By accepting
Islam, a person is expected to submit his life to Allah, and model his conduct to the teachings of the

51
Prophet. By doing so , a person may succeed in attaining peace from Allah's punishment and reside in
paradise.
Usually peace will be given a chance. When Mohammed commanded his expeditions' leaders, the
Prophet would ask them not to kill children, women nor elderly. Only those involved in military
confrontation were to be fought. War was the third resort after the choice of accepting Islams, and
hence becoming Muslims, and/or paying the duties by the non-believers in exchange for services
provided by the state such as defense (Non-Muslims are not required to join the army).
19 Riaz Hassan, "The Nature of Islamic Urbanization -An Historical Perspective." Islamic Culture (July,
1969), 235.
2
® Martin J. Daunton discusses both arguments in his paper "The Social Meaning of Space: The City in
the West and Islam." The Proceedings of the International Conference on Urbanism in Islam (ICUIT),
Vol.1 (October 22-28,1989): 26-58.
21 Islamic Encyclopedia of the Social Science.s "Guilds." Vol. 7 (New York: Macmillan, 1933).
22
Al Hathloul (1981), 30-41.
23
Ibid, 33.
24
Ibid, 34.
2^ G. Sjoberg, The Preindustrial City (Riyadh: Free Press, 1960).
26
Al Hathloul (1981).
27 S. Al Hathloul (1981); S. Al Hathloul, "The role of the Physical Environment of the Arab-Muslim
Cities," Riyadh, Arab city Institute.
28 S. Al Hathloul (1981), B. S. Hakim Arabic-Islamic Cities: Building and Planning Principles. (London:
kegan Paul International, 1986); J. Akbar (1988), for example.
29
S.N. Eisenstadt and A. Shachar. Society, Culture and Urbanization (Newbury Park: Sage
Publications, 1987), 206.
30 Shiism is a branch of Islam comprising 10% or less of the whole Muslim population worldwide "with
doctrines significantly different from those of the orthodox Sunni majority." C. Glasse.' "Shiism". In
The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam (San Francisco: Harper SanFrancisco, 1991),364. Some consider
the Sheit's Jafry as fifth school. However, unlike the Sunni four schools of fiqh whose scholars all
agree that the Prophet was the actual person and pay due respect to his successors, the four Khualafaa
Arrashidoun (righthly guided Caliphs), the Sheit adherents, profess reverence to the Prophet, consider
his nephew Ali bin Abi Talib and his decendents as imams, who have some holliness characterisitcs.
Ali, due to early political conflict lost succession to the ledership of the Islamic nation. This
disagreement has caused schism in Islam since the Sunni schoolars vehemently repudiate the concept of
imam as defined in the Shiet sect.
31 See Besim S. Hakim (1986).

52
32
NJ. Coulson. A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964), quoted in A1
Hathloul, op. cit., 4.
33
A1 Hathloul (1981), 17.
34
See B.S. Hakim (1986) for elaboration.
35
A1 Hathloul (1981), 85.
3
6 Allah Says in the Holy Koran, "And diminish not the goods of the people, and do not mischief in the
earth working corruption." Koran, Arberry: 183.
37
B. Hakim (1986), 32.
3
® Hadeeth.
39
Quoted in A1 Hathloul (1981), 108.
4
® By encouraging waqf (charity geared toward the benefit of the public) Islam helped socialize private
property.
41
A1 Hathloul (1981), 135.
42
J. L. Abu-Lughod, Rabat: Urban Apartheid In Morocco (Princeton, Jew Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1980).
43
Koran, Chapter on Women.
44
For example, in the case of drinking alcohol, in addition to abhorring its use for drink, Islam considers
those who sell it, carry it, and use its money to be equally sinful.
4
5 This simple gender-space configuration has been labeled by some Sufi-oriented scholars as Zahir and
Batin. TTie former means the outer, while the later signifies the inner. Such distinction invokes
mystical connotations to otherwise direct and simple implementation of Islamic teachings by the
residents and enforced by legal authority.
46 Janet L. Abu-Lughod, "The Islamic City-Historical Myth, Islamic Essence and Contemporary
Relevance," International Journal of Middle East Studies 19 (1987), 167.
47
Francois-Auguste De Montequin, "Religious, Social, and Physical Qualities of Islamic Urbanization."
Hamdard Islamicus 1 (Spring 1983), 64.
4
& K. Brown, "The Uses of A Concept: The Muslim City." In Middle Eastern Cities in Comparative
Perspectives, edited by K. Brown (London: Ithaca Press. 1986b): 73-82.
4
9 C. Geertz, H. Geertz and L. Rosen. Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society. Three Essays in
Cultural Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University). Quoted in Kenneth Brown (1986), 76.

53
Kenneth Brown (1986b), 77.
M. Bonine, 1988, op. cit. E.Y. Galantay, C. Mechkat, in A. Saqqaf (ed.) The Middle East City:
Ancient Traditions Confront a Modern World (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1987): 5-41.
52
Abu-Lughod (1980).
I. M. Lapidus, "Muslim Urban Society." In Middle Eastern Cities, edited by I.M. Lapidus (Beverly
and Los Angeles, 1969), 196-97.
54
Fuad Khori, "Ideological Constants and Urban Living." In The Middle East City: Ancient Traditions
Confront a Modern World. (New York: Paragon House, 1987) p.72.
M.E. Bonine, "Cities of The Middle East and North Africa." In Cities of the World, edited by
Stanley D.Brunn and J. F. Williams (New York: Harper & Row, 1983), 281-321.
56 ibid.
57 For convincing discussion and critical review of the term Islamic City see Janet L. Abu-Lughod, "the
Islamic City- Historic Myth, Islamic Essence, and Contemporary Relevance." International Journal of
Middle East Studies 2 (May 1987): 155-176.
5^ For example K. Lynch Good City Form (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987) states that "The
Islamic city, for example, was intended and widely understood as an expression of the fundamental
religious concepts of that society." A. Saqqaf (op cit.) distinguishes the Islamic city from the Middle
Eastern one; the latter is mostly used to refer to the industrial era starting with colonialism.
59
K. Brown, 73.
60
M. Farouk-Sluglett and P. Sluglett, In Brown (1986), 286.
61
Ibid.
62
M. Bonine (1983).
63
Ibid.
64 Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Rabat: Urban Apartheid In Morocco (Princeton: N.J. Princeton University
Press, 1980).
65 Janet L. Abu-Lughod. "What is Islamic About a City Some Comparative Reflections." In The
Proceedings of the International Conference on Urbanism In Islam (Tokyo, Japan: ICUIT, 1989), 212.
66 Abu-Lughod (1987), 160.
67 E. Wirth, "Die orientalsche Stadt," Saeculum 26 (1975): 45-94. Qouted in B. Hakim (1986), 180.

54
68 Islam means submission. It instructs adherents to follow a certain way of life compatible with what is
revealed in the Korna and the way the Prophet did in practice. Unlike, Jesus who preached Christian
teachings in a few years that ended in tragic turmoil which ended his teaching tenure, Mohammad lived
long enough, 63 years, out of which 23 years was in actual prophethood.
69 Though not immediately after death. According to the Prophet's teachings, once the corpse is buried
his/her sole returns to body. Depending on the person's conduct on earth, the grave will be either a
piece of heaven or one of torment.
70 Only in terms of self-aggrandizement and material sense. This is clear from the Hadeeth in which the
Prophet was quoted saying" Work for your life (e.g. in terms of prolonging good deeds and
maximizing good conduct as laid in Islamic teachings) as if you would live for ever, and work for your
second life as if you would die tomorrow." On the other hand, in another Hadeeth, he said," if the day
of judgement has been engaged while you holding a seed, go ahead and plant it."
71 It was narrated that the Prophet once said: "Ad-dunia is cursed [by Allah], whatever in it, save what has
been done for the sake of Allah."
72 Only when the popes of Rome, in their attempts to rejuvenate the Christian faith, had embarked upon a
campaign to embellish Rome to attract and mesmerize the faithful. In 1300 following the debacle of
the last crusade expeditions, indulgences were sold to stimulate Christian enthusiasm and to assist in
the financing of the embellishing of Rome. A.E. J. Morris, History of Urban Development: Before
the Industrial Revolutions (New York: Jhon Wiley & Sons, 1986), 140. They opted rationally ordered
urban forms emphasizing a system of broad, straight avenues conforming to gridiron based districts and
the closing of vistas by the careful placing of monumental structures and statues. Buildings are
integrated with the surrounding open spaces in geometrical perfection.
73 A counter argument may hold that it also had to do with technology. Still, the technology of the
Medieval city was little improved, if not similar to that prevailed in the Greek and Roman cities, which
opted and utilized orthogonal layout in the construction of their cities and outposts, such as the castra,
the Roman fortified legionary camps.
74 Abdullh Schleifer, "Islamic Jerusalem as Archetype of a Harmonious Urban Environment." In the
Middle East City: Ancient Traditions Confront a Modern World, edited by A. Saqqaf (New York:
Paragon House. 1987), 171.
75 See K. Brown (1986b), 74.

CHAPTER HI
FORCES OF CHANGE IN SAUDI ARABIA: NATION-STATE
FORMATION, URBANIZATION AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
For all practical purposes Saudi Arabia is a closed country to the
Christian world. Fewer than a hundred Europeans or American
have visited its desert fortresses in modern times. No non-Moslem
journalist has ever been officially permitted to visit its capital at
Riad. Yet this huge country is the heart of the Arab world (it
contains Mecca) and its King, Ibn Saud, only a remote and mystery
figure to outsiders, is non of the world's strong men. 1
-Life Magazine, 1947
The intent of this chapter is to shed light on historical events and political
developments leading to the emergence of Saudi Arabia from a tribally-based and organized
society to one in which authority and significant decision making are increasingly assumed
by the central government. Since the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire at the turn of
this century, dramatic developments have taken place, culminating in the formation of the
new nation-state. The promulgation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on September 23,
1932, has ushered a dual reciprocal process in which the society has gradually
transformed, supplanting its millinea-long essentially traditional nomadic and agrarian
modes of living with a new process of institution building and the consolidation of national
authority. The financial resources available through oil revenues have been ploughed into
the development of the country's infrastructure and industrialization of the economy. In
Saudi Arabia, in 1950, only 16 per cent of the Saudi Arabian population was urban. By
1970, this figure had risen to 49 per cent, and to 77 per cent in 1990. Concomitant with
these major changes, Saudi urban structures and forms have mutated.
I. STATE AND SOCIETY
The state is the consolidation of dispersed authority of a traditional society into a
central power and control. "Nationalism is the belief that each nation has both the right and
the duty to constitute itself as a state." 3 According to C. E. Black, central authority and its
rationalized functions owe their existence to the rule of law, which is maintained by the
bureaucracy specifically created to facilitate its implementation, and to the improved rapport
between the state and the citizen. The replacement of capricious and arbitrary rule of
individual statesman with the rational legal system is the hallmark of modern developments

in the political domain. Rapport between the state and the individual amidst an open
environment which upholds citizen's rights has fostered the democratic system. This
56
rapport has been achieved through various means including the use of propaganda, popular
enlightment or police powers. Even in nations that grant limited freedom and rights to their
subjects, the use of economic incentives and propaganda is sought to maintain popular
approval. 4
In Europe, nationalism developed by kings to gain control over landlords and tribes
and to abridge the power of the religious ecclesiastics. Yet, the emergence of
industrialization in the nineteenth century ushered in rapid social, political and economic
developments. In his account of the emergence and rising role of the modern state in
society, Douglass C. North, stated "The revolutionary technology of the 19th century
radically altered the production and distribution of the goods and services." This was
paralleled with a tremendous increase in specialization and division of labor, resulting in
drastic changes in relative prices. The traditional structure of the family, economic
organization and the polity was transformed, accordingly. Out of this milieu, new interest
groups emerged leading to political pluralism supplanting traditional social associations.
Therefore,
The demand for new institutional forms of organization to undertake functions
undertaken by the family in traditional economic organization could not be
completely realized by voluntary organizations because of moral hazard,
adverse selections, and the demand for public goods. The growth of
government is a function of demand arising from the redistributive effort of a
growing number of effective interest groups and the inability of voluntary
organizations to completely meet the new needs of the family and of economic
organization. 5
In developed capitalist nations, the state steers the society, collects taxes, and
provides legal guidelines and protection for private ownership. Nationalism, it has'often
been argued, makes for national integration, but "Nationalism and other forms of ethnic
consciousness often stimulate political disintegration, tearing apart the body politic." 6
Nationalism is essential to modernization which, according to Karl Deutsch, involves social
mobilization and change. Social change like increases in literacy, urbanization, exposure to
mass media, industrialization coupled with an increase in income per capita expand "the
politically relevant strata of the population" who in turn press for more government
services. These functions increase political awareness and participation and shifts

attentions from the local level to the national level. 7 In other words, nationalization
coupled with modernization fuels mass mobilization and results in more political
participation, which distinguishes modem politics from traditional politics, and is a key
element in political development
57
Such developments have triggered a phenomena of migration to the cities which, in
the lapse of a few generations, has resulted in the concentration of 45 percent of the
O
world's population in urban centers. Concomitantly, improvements in health provisions
have decreased the number of infant mortality and have prolonged the expected lifetime,
causing a sharp upward kink in world population. The social unit of the agrarian society,
the tribe, has drastically mutated into the mobile nuclear family as the new social unit, and
is more prone to migrate in pursuit of economic trends in the industrial age. Modernization
attempts have expanded the role of women as production relies less on muscular strength
and more on the machine. Improved communication systems have facilitated and increased
access to information, increasingly suffusing the society, while technological
breakthroughs in transportation have shortened travel time, hence allowing fast and easy
mobility. All in all, these and other complex developments encourage and reinforce the
process of social mobilization, which is spatially translated in the physical migration of the
population away from its rural habitat.
II. MODERNIZATION, URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND URBANIZATION: THE SAUDI
MODEL
A. The Saudi National Developmental Model
Like other nation-states, the Saudi Arabian government chose to modernize its
underdeveloped society, a process which threatens the integrity of traditionally based
regimes. Due to oil affluence, the Saudi government opted for a policy of rapid
development resulting in remarkable consequences causing dramatic shifts in the society.
This decision to pursue modernization hinged on the pressures to maintain internal integrity
and to stave off external threats aimed at destabilizing the fragile Saudi political system in
its early decades. Militarily, the state has followed a multi-throng policy, emphasizing the
strengthening of the country's defense capabilities to thwart outside hostilities and,
internally, to deter fragmentation of the nation's sub-regions, traditionally susceptible to
segregation by tribal affiliations.

58
The enlistment of large sums of national financial resources and man power in the
consolidation of the new nation-state resulted in a tremendous allocation cities and
indirectly resulted in an increase in urban living standards of the population. In the civil
domain, the Saudi government has tried to create a stable, modern economy centered
around a central bureaucracy heavily dependent on oil revenues. Government intervention
in the national urban process, which goes back to the Hijar settlement program of 1912,
was seen as a necessary measure to defuse centrifugal tendencies that prevailed for
millennia as well as to convey legitimacy on the Saudi Monarchy.
The economically impoverished and politically fragmented character of the society has
changed due to the dramatic events during the early part of this century. By utilizing
power, diplomacy, religious legitimacy and ancestral claims to dynastic inheritance, Abdul-
Aziz Bin Abdul-Rahman Faisal A1 Saud succeeded in his campaign to unify the various,
isolated parts of the Arabian Peninsula. 10 Felicitous political changes both worldwide and
on the local level, gave Abdul-Aziz an opportunity to reclaim his forebears' control over
vast parts of Arabia. A watershed event occurred in 1902/1319 when Abdul-Aziz, with a
mere forty of his acolytes, invaded Riyadh killing its Rashidi viceroy and brought the preindustrial
settlement of approximately five thousand inhabitants under his family control.
This incident was followed by a series of battles between the rival dynastic powers in
Arabia which culminated in 1926 by the ceding of Jeddah to Abdul-Aziz. In 1932 the
country was officially named the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a hereditary monarchy
appealing to traditions and committed to modernity.
Saudi Arabia's sociopolitical system is based on traditional principles and practices
heavily rooted in Islam. Legitimacy of the ruling A1 Saud family is based on a combination
of tribal-dynastic roots and appeal to Islamic orthodoxy. Although an absolute monarchy
not bound by a written constitution and a representative body of citizens, its absolutism is
tempered by, first, the supremacy of Islamic Shariy'ah which presses for equality and
rapport between the governor and the governed (the ruling system considers its application
of Shariy'ah as the main source of legitimacy), secondly, by widespread tribal
interrelatedness through conjugal ties between the royal family and the major tribes and
leading families of the country; and, finally, by the presence of the informal majlis (which
literally means a place to sit), touted by the Saudi officials as a substitute for the Western
democratic system as well as being "consistent" with Saudi culture. The majlis is a Saudi
invention par excellence. It is an informal institution in the sense that it does not adhere to a

59
written document spelling out its structure and application such as governing procedures
and methods of amendments. Still, the majlis, though shunned by the majority of the
urban middle classes, increases public access, in person, to the King, the senior royal
members, and governors of the various regions of the country. In such gatherings,
individuals are encouraged to voice their concerns in person or to deliver written appeals
and complaints.
Like his forebears of the first two realms, Abdul-Aziz predicated his nationalist
movement on the puritan ideals of the eighteenth century reformer Mohammed Abdul-
Wahhab. He placed his dynasty at the top of the country's political control, appealing to
the classical Muslim image. He governed the Kingdom, as he had earlier governed the
Sultanate before he added Hijaz (the western part of Saudi Arabia comprising the historical
cities of Makkah, Madinah, Jeddah and the surrounding region) to his domain in 1924. As
an absolute ruler, he vested himself with full executive, military, legislative, judicial and
religious powers. During the first decades prior to the promulgation of the Kingdom,
Abdul-Aziz governed his domain according to the Najdi traditional role of the town amir
and the tribal sheikh. The royal court administration apparatus was limited to simple
bookkeeping handled by the literati, a group limited to a handful of religious scholars.
Abdul-Aziz ruled his domain directly without ministerial intermediaries, relying on the
customary tribal methods of governance aided by a small number of advisors of his court.
The defeat of the Hashimites in 1924-25 revealed Abdul-Aziz's customary system as
anachronistic, especially when compared with the far more developed administrative
Turkish system. The Turkish administrative structure in Hijaz furnished a model for the
new state government departments under Abdul-Aziz and the institutional framework for
future ministerial government at the center. Being the Muslim leader of the two holy cities,
he could not avoid the pious Muslim pilgrims who mounted their expectations on the new
custodian of Islam's most holy places.
King Abdul-Aziz's campaign to unify the country culminated in the takeover of
Jeddah which was ceded to him following a long siege in December 17,1925. Following
the takeover of Hijaz, Abdul-Aziz immediately embarked upon reforms in the
administration, introducing a constitution for the new Kingdom, in August 1926, which
provided for autonomous institutions modeled after existing Hijazi Ottoman ones. The
early government structure comprised seventeen offices, all essentially geared toward the
King and the royal court's immediate affairs and services. They included administrative

60
departments to handle the growing government functions, health clinics, royal guest
department, security and army, among others.
Abdul-Aziz authorized the creation of a small advisory body on legislative matters,
called Majlis Ashshura (Consultative Counsel) as well as local municipal, village, and
tribal counsels. In 1931, six departments were established to handle provincial affairs of
which each respective department's head formed Majlis al Wukala (Council of Agents).
Abdul-Aziz denied the Hijaz region constitutional autonomy, for Hijaz, traditionally the
center of power in Arabia, demanded careful attention by the new Najdi control. The King
ruled through his viceroy, Faisal, who was no less absolute in the province than elsewhere
in the country. However, the King gave the Hijaz region representative institutions over
which his second son, Amir Faisal, presided.
These institutions were later to grow into ministries. They included the agency of
finance, foreign affairs, and defense. Their purview expanded beyond the Hijaz area to the
entire nation during the decade of the 1940s. Following the Najdi control, Hijaz's cities of
Jeddah and Makkah progressively lost their institutions, hence centrality in the nation's
political sphere, to the new capital, Riyadh. The growth of state apparatuses was
culminated in the promulgation of the Council of Ministers in October, 1953, one month
before Abdul-Aziz's death. These developments marked the transition from the
chieftainship of the old order to the bureaucratic ministerial administration of contemporary
Saudi Arabia.
Generally speaking, the political development model which Saudi Arabia has been
following since its founding by Abdul-Aziz and later carried by his heirs corroborates what
Huntington and Nelson describe as the autocratic model of development. In this model,
power is concentrated, formal political participation is nullified, economic growth is
enhanced and socioeconomic equality is promoted as a way of securing appeal to legitimacy
among the governed masses. 11 To secure its control, Huntington and Nelson argued, the
government must maintain control of power and create an effective bureaucracy to
implement policy. In less endowed developing countries, such a task is formidable. In the
case of Saudi Arabia, the government used its oil revenues to attain wide leaps in pushing
for modernization without duly disturbing the delicate balance of social groups, whether
traditionalists, secularists, upper or low income groups, while excluding the urban middle
class from politics. In short, in the Saudi model of development, accelerated modernization

61
was espoused to create outlets for the steadily increasing oil affluence, to stave off external
threat and to convey legitimacy in the face of rising expectations of the growing urban
middle class. 12
National development has become the vehicle to attain national integrity, economic
prosperity and the means to attain better standards of living of the population, a common
goal for modern economies. However, theoretically, the pursuit of development has been
accompanied with numerous problems, which, if not well understood, may result in
negative social social, economic and political outcomes. Samuel Huntington stated
The principal threat to the stability of traditional society comes not from
foreign invasions by foreign armies, but from invasion by foreign ideas...The
monarch is forced to modernize and to attempt to change his society by the
fear that if he does not, someone else will. Nineteenth-century monarchs
modernized to thwart imperialism, twentieth-century monarchs modernize to
thwart revolution. 13
As the discussion unfolds, the relationship between the political economic
characteristics of the nation-state and urban change will be elucidated. Urbanization, urban
development and urban policy will be discussed in light of the dramatic changes in the
national economy while adhering to an essentially "rigid" political framework of the
traditional monarch manifest in a centralized decision-making process and an absence of
formal citizens' participation.
B. Early Urbanization: The Hijar Settlements and Bedouin
Sedentarization
Saudi Arabia was the traditional home of Middle Eastern nomadism which was
estimated to form 50 per cent of the country's population in the 1930s. 14 The nomads
pastoral, mobile life involves migratory animal husbandry, while taking advantage of
seasonal and geographical variations. This can only be explained in terms of the harsh
physical environment of the Arabian peninsula. Before the 1980's agricultural programs,
only 0.13 per cent of the Country's total area of 2.2 million square kilometers was
cultivated; 80 per cent of the country was desolate desert used for grazing. Starting with
the capture of Riyadh in 1902, Al-Saud adroitly proceeded to consolidate the Country's
regions despite their poor potential for unification. 15 With magnanimity, religious fervor
and political flair, the King managed to win the fealty of the regions' settlements and the
fickle and powerful nomadic bedouin tribes, with largesse, force, or conjugal relationships.

62
Alan George points out that "with the twin aims of creating the basis of a centralized
political organization, and or reviving the ideals of the Wahhabism, King Abdul-Aziz
established the Ikhwan, or Brethren, a religious organization modeled on the Wahhabi
movement." 16 It was an organization whose ideology was based on a return to strict
fundamentalist ideas. King Abdul-Aziz's effort to tame the Ikhwan political power took the
form of settling the leading tribal factions in rudimentary-built colonies known as hijar
settlements (singular, hijrah). 17 The term hijrah invokes the concept of reliving the faith as
modeled after the Prophet Mohammed's flight from Makkah to Madinah at the dawn of
Islam. It connotes the move from the land of polytheism to the land of Islam.
The Ikhwan movement was the reification of Wahhabi religious reform in the
nomadic population of Arabia. In the physical sphere it was manifest in the Hijar program
which was started by Abdul-Aziz in 1912 to settle the recalcitrant bedouin tribes. 18 The
King sought to establish Hijar, first, for religious-militancy and control, but later for
agricultural production. Agriculture was encouraged "to be the basis of economic life and,
most important, the reformed religion the basis of social and spiritual life." 19 While the
professed goal was to encourage the bedouins to settled forms of life based on communal
religious organization, the hijar initiative was taken for political purposes as well. The
predetermined locations for sedentary living meant close supervision by the government
and quick mobilization of forces when needed. The sedentarization was meant to help
nomads abandon their roving life-style and to enlist them as reservists in the army for
Abdul-Aziz's expeditions. They carried the major burden of policing the tribal areas and
helping the King consolidate his authority at a time when no standing army was available to
him. In the course of King Abdul-Aziz's forty years sponsorship of the hijar's colonies
program, two hundred settlements {Hijar) were established in the central region (Najd)
alone.
One of these settlements, Al-Artawiyah, which belonged to the powerful Mutair tribe,
boasted a population of over 10,000. Although the hijar settlements owed their start to the
religio-political designs of Abdul-Aziz, their subsequent growth hinged on the agricultural
programs of the government. Once Abdul-Aziz amassed financial strength to establish his
own standing army, the military purpose behind the hijar program gave way to the
economic. For example, when some of the Ikhwan factions opposed Abdul-Aziz's
decision to suspend the long-practiced expansionist religious military raids, jihad, to
advance the Saudi-Wahhabi domain into nearby Arab territories of the new Arab nation-

63
states, Abdul-Aziz mustered his military capabilities from townspeople and loyal bedouins,
defeated the disobedient bedouin chiefs and ordered the demolition of their settlements.
Only those who showed allegiance to the King were issued weapons and their leaders were
awarded subsidies.
The process of settling pastoral herdsmen in hijar colonies continued apace during the
following reigns of the Saudi monarchs. The government followed the same vision which
perceived the pastoral life as anachronistic and the population as useless for the new era of
modernization which called for an active, educated labor force. By 1982 the number of
hijar settlements reached 4,020, dotting the various parts of the country. 20
Nevertheless, the hijar experiment was less than successful. A study by the Ministry
of Interior in 1982 concluded that 68 percent of the established hijar did not qualify for
permanent development. The failure was attributed to several factors. They included
physical obstacles, such as the lack of water, arable land and distance from markets and
transportation. Social factors such as the status and prestige associated with being a head
of a clan or rivalry between bedouin tribal chiefs enticed groups to apply for land for new
settlement despite the unqualified nature of the location for growth or growth potentiality.
Financial benefits provided by the government to the head of a settlement enticed some
potential elders to apply for a land grant from the state to establish a new hijrah. Finally,
technical reasons were also cited. Responsibility for the sedentariztion program was
dispersed among various government agencies who made decisions without coordination
and rational justification. 21
In Saudi Arabia, there are 10,365 "villages and hijar," as classified by a study by the
Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affair (MOMRA) 22 The Ministry of Interior puts the
number of hijar at 4,020 which leaves us with 6,345 villages in the Kingdom. A study by
the MOMRA found that the average number of people living in "villages and hijar"
settlements was 251 inhabitants occupying an average of 40 residential units. In addition,
there are 4,636 names that refer to a small number of residential units and built structures
scattered in the vicinity or out of the boundaries of actively inhabited settlements which did
not qualify for the definition of village or hijrah. In many instances, especially in the case
of hijar, residential units were haphazardly scattered in the desert with no reference to a
plan, resembling bedouin's tent camps. This resulted in difficulties stemming from future
needs to supply basic public services and utilities and the laying of streets. In order to curb

64
such a chaotic sprouting of hijar, measures have been taken to abort unpromising locations,
including the denial of government housing loans to its inhabitants.
Abdul-Aziz's first attempts, and the Saudi government's later efforts to settle the
roving bedouins were rooted in several factors. Hijar programs have been promoted for
religious, military, political and economic reasons. Nationalism required a civil population
glued by national allegiance rather than recalcitrant herds of men and livestock bound by
tribal association. I consider this intervention by the state to be the inception of state
intervention in Saudi urban development which was to continue in the developmental
programs of the various monarchs. Economically, urbanization was induced by connecting
the national economy to the international market system. Politically, the government's
modernization programs have become means to attain political stability and economic
prosperity in line with the prevailing cultural imperatives.
HI. POLITICAL STABILITY, GROWTH OF BUREAUCRACY, AND OIL ECONOMY
A. The Saudi Economy: From Traditional Subsistence to Oil Economy
For centuries, the Saudi society has engaged in agricultural production, pearl diving
and fishing, trading and the nomadic nurturing of livestock by nomads. Prior to the
creation of Saudi Arabia in 1932, an integrated national economy did not exist. Industry
was limited to production of simple tools by craftsmen who lived in small towns and urban
centers of the Hijaz in western Saudi Arabia (where the two holy cities of Makkah and
Madinah are located). The Hijazi dwellers of Jeddah, Makkah and Madinah were
essentially urbanites who practiced trade and commercial activity because of the annual
influx of pilgrims visiting the holy places in Makkah and Madinah. Jeddah served as an
entrepot on the Red Sea and as a gateway to Makkah, taking advantage of its littoral
location along the the Red Sea.
The traditional economy of towns was that of the bazaar economy. Merchant and
trade economies were located mainly in major towns and cities. The traditional economy
was based on customary inheritance of family occupations or crafts. The family head
supervised whatever craft he inherited from his father and so he handed down the
profession to his progeny. He maintained the quality of the family craftsmanship on which

65
his extended family's living depended. Usually, households of an influential craftsman or
trader lived side-by-side in the same locality.
Unlike a firm economy, which "is based on rationalized production and capital
accumulation for further investment and expansion," the traditional bazaar economy is said
to inhibit "capital accumulation and represents a way of life and means of absorbing surplus
labor; it is not conducive to development.. .and can hinder the expansion of the firm
economy." The bazaar economy refers to a large number of small, highly competitive
enterprises which rely on intensive use of labor. Due to its family orientation, the bazaar
economy is risk-minimizing rather than profit-seeking through increasing productivity. 23
Interestingly, we will come to see that the Saudi bureaucracy has grown resembling that of
the bazaar institution, in the sense that its growth was conditioned by the paternalistic
commitment to provide citizens with employment. Unlike the Western development model
in which the polity is either supporting as joint player in a developing, industrialized market
economy, in Saudi Arabia the bureaucracy has become the chief player in the national
economy and urban development.
Due to the country's harsh ecology and especially during its early formative decades
the country was plagued by problems of finance. Poverty was the overriding character of
society. In the opening decades of Saudi rule, Abdul-Aziz's resources were limited to his
realm, which then did not go beyond the borders of the middle region, Najd known for its
utter lack of resources. His amirate's annual revenue may well have amounted to no more
than $250,000. The conquest of the fertile A1 Hasa region in 1913 was estimated to double
Abdul-Aziz's annual income. During the early decades of the war campaign of unification,
King Abdul-Aziz survived on foreign subsidies and Islamic proscribed taxes (called zakat).
The expansion of Abdul-Aziz's realm to include Hijaz was both religious and economic.
Religiously, the inclusion of the two holy cities of Makkah and Madinah was consistent
with the religious undertones of the two-century Wahhabi puritan movement.
Economically, the relatively active Hijazi economy looked highly attractive on material
grounds. Once Hijaz fell under Abdul-Aziz's control in 1924, annual revenues rose
considerably to an estimated $20 to $25 million, according to Philby. But revenues from
Hijaz always correlated with the success of the pilgrimage season. During the 1930s, the
Saudi revenues, including the annual income from the pilgrimage, amounted to less than
five million English pounds.

66
Recognizing the need to administer the fledgling and tenuous nation-state, Abdul-Aziz
laid the foundation of a modern state by creating the infrastructure of the administration.
This government structure was soon to proliferate into a centralized, bloated bureaucracy
that was deliberately nurtured to offset other traditional institutional forms of political
leadership and to lump decision making powers at the center. It constituted the only
decision-making organ in the country over which the King presided and had the final say in
treasury expenditures and command of the administrative and defense apparatus. Once the
unification of the new state was completed, Abdul-Aziz was faced with increasing burdens
of modernizing the state to meet its contemporary functions, a double pressure on Abdul-
Aziz since his takeover of the traditionally urban and cosmopolitan Hijaz from the
Shariefian descendants of Prophet Mohammed. Abdul-Aziz was in a race for time, for the
wounds his battles caused during his conquest of the various tribal and urban dwellers
were still fresh. A key factor in giving continuity to his dynasty was to establish the
administration and to secure a modern economy that would eventually weaken the
marauding and contumacious tribal factions within his confines. Although King Abdul-
Aziz managed to create such an administration, its structure and size was limited by his
desire to keep it tractable.
This financial impasse was aggravated when cheap Japanese pearls were introduced
in 1930, causing the prices of the pearl industry, a mainstay of eastern towns' economies,
to fall by as much as 90 percent in a matter of a few years. The direct result was acute
unemployment in the secondary effects on traders, laborers, boat builders and farmers
throughout the economy.
Moreover, during the worldwide depression of the 1930s, the number of pilgrims
declined sharply and virtually ceased during World War n, as normal transportation was
disrupted. This loss was critical because until the discovery of oil pilgrims accounted for
substantial dividends to the national treasury due to the imposition of a head tax on them.24
The number of pilgrims fell from an average of 130,000 a year between 1926-29 to 80,000
in 1930,40,000 in 1931 and less thereafter. At the highest level of the pilgrimage (hajjj)
traffic, state income leveled between $20 to $30 million. Hajj income comprised one-third
to one-fourth of the government income in 1933. To promote pilgrimage, King Abdul-
Aziz applied strict security measures to ensure the safety of pilgrims. Hitherto, pilgrims
used to pay for safe passage though tribal territories.

67
The decline was also partly caused by the crash of sugar and rubber prices in Java
and Malaya, whose Muslim population accounted for a significant number of foreign
pilgrims. Pilgrimage dues accounted for $30 million a year. Between 1920s and 1930s, in
order to boost the sluggish hajj season, Abdul-Aziz allocated modest improvements for the
holy cities in a desperate effort to encourage pilgrims. In addition, he applied strict security
measures to ensure the safety of pilgrims. Hitherto, pilgrims used to pay for safe passage
though tribal territories. This economic situation was drastically altered following the
discovery of oil in the late 1930s. King Abdul-Aziz abolished pilgrim dues charged to
Muslim pilgrims one year before his death in 1953.
B. Oil: A One-crop Economy
During the early decades of the twentieth century the world demand for oil as a major
energy source tremendously increased. For example, the conversion of the British navy
fleet from the use of coal to oil between 1914 and 1930s, and the booming use of
automobiles worldwide catapulted the demand for oil supplies and sent oil companies
franticly searching for more oil concessions overseas. Abdul-Aziz was tuned to the
promising news of oil ventures around the country. The first attempts to obtain Saudi oil
go back to 1923 when Abdul-Aziz awarded the first concession ever given in Saudi Arabia
to a British company in the Eastern area. Having failed to find promising quantities after
four years of exploration, the British did not renew the agreement and their operations
ceased.
The discovery of oil in Bahrain in 1932 by the Bahrain Petroleum Company, an
Anglo-American company, inspired new efforts to try the Saudi soil across the Gulf
shores. With unwonted alacrity Abdul-Aziz awarded a sixty-year concession to Standard
Oil of California (SOCAL) to start exploration for oil in the A1 Hasa province. An
agreement was signed in May 29, 1933. The Saudi concession to an American oil
company, which covered almost the entire Eastern Province, or one third the country's
land, represented a major break with the British monopoly of petroleum concessions in the
area. The American deal entitled the Saudi government to 100,000 pounds of gold as a
downpayment, which though meager, was a God-send and saved Abdul-Aziz's insolvent
treasury. After untoward trials in what seemed a futile effort, the SOCAL staff tried
digging deeper at well number seven. In March 1938, a vast underground reservoir of oil
was struck in the vicinity of Dammam, a small fishing settlement in the east province of the

68
country heralding a promising future. However, it was not until May 1,1939, that oil
revenues finally reached an annual share of about 200,000 pounds in royalties from
SOCAL. The discovery of oil was the deus ex machina that relieved Abdul-Aziz's
financial impasse.
As oil was struck in 1938, construction work for the industrial infrastructure started
immediately and exports began in 1938. With the admission of American oil companies,
the oil industry and further explorations required the mustering of skilled labor, modern
technology, oil processing and heavy equipment and machinery, advanced construction
methods, transportation and, communication networks, and other supporting facilities. A
rudimentary road network and shipping facilities were first laid to facilitate the increasingly
expanding oil activities. The placid and bucolic agrarian and pastoral communities of the
Eastern Province were gradually transformed into a boisterous hive of oil exporting
industry.
The Saudi population first met the new technology with a somber attitude. Change
was too fast and dramatic to be comprehended by the traditional society. The religious
ranks of Ulama (religious scholars) especially, reacted with caution as they were perplexed
over what to permit as consistent with their understanding of Islam and what was
consistent with local traditions. Nevertheless, the guarding of traditions became secondary
to Abdul-Aziz's progressive ideals as oil revenues started to pour into the state treasury and
allocation in modernizing the government and the traditional society was a matter of time.
For the discovery of oil in the late 1930s strengthened Abdul-Aziz's aplomb over the
Kingdom during its formative decades. Politically, oil revenues complemented King
Abdul-Aziz's adroitness and proved helpful and timely in placating and lubricating the
demanding, contumacious political factions. Economically, oil income has engaged the
population in modernization programs for the last forty years.
The flaring of World War n caused a pause of oil exportation and struck the callow
national economy with imminent depression. So in the first dozen years of the concession,
the Saudi exchequer received, in addition to token annual rentals, a total of $6.8 million in
loans from the oil company against future royalties. The depleting treasury of the Kingdom
was compounded by a severe drought that caused livestock to perish and the already
meager agricultural productions to dwindle. In the face of a glaring famine, tribal powers
stepped up efforts to break the new centralizing order while the old centrifugal tendencies

69
toward a polyarchy of tribes lurked in the background. Again, Abdul-Aziz met the
clamoring tribes and scornful town populations with subsidies, hence maintaining the
buoyancy of the dynasty. This time, financial backing came from Americans who
recognized the vitality of the Saudi oil to the U.S. economy. This anticipation for future
economic interests, was translated in the U.S. foreign policy in a declaration by President
Roosevelt in 1943 that "Saudi Arabia as a state is vital to the defense of the United
States." 25 In 1948, Abdul-Aziz received a hefty $17.5 million from the United States,
sufficient enough to stave off the economic hardship of the time.
With the news of the discovery of large oil reserves, the Getty Oil Company was able
to obtain a sixty year petroleum concession in the neutral zone between Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia and had equal rights with Kuwait over the exploration of oil. Soon after, the Saudi
government granted the Japan Petroleum Trading Company, Ltd a forty-four year
concession which covered the water coastlines of Saudi Arabia in the Neutral Zone.
Operations started in 1959 and oil gushed in 1960. In 1965, the French succeeded in
winning a concession agreement when the Saudi government concluded an agreement with
Societe Auxiliarie de la Regie Autoin. At the request of the King, who shied away from the
increasing numbers of foreigners in his conservative territory, the oil companies, including
SOCAL which was renamed ARAMCO (an acronym for Arab American Oil Company) in
1944, built their community camps segregated from the nearby towns and settlements.
ARAMCO started with a massive construction project encompassing hundreds of single
family homes, bachelor apartments complemented with a club, shady and landscaped
gardens, recreational facilities and shops, a scheme hitherto unbeknown to the preindustrial
society. This project was jealously dubbed "little America" by some Britons.
King Abdul-Aziz's achievements must be judged in light of the tremendous energy
and the time which he devoted to unifying the nation-state. In light of the contextual
circumstances surrounding the creation of the nation-state and the polity, Abdul-Aziz must
be acclaimed for his progressive efforts to set up the various departments and offices
handling increasingly specialized modern functions while maintaining the integrity of the
new nation-state.
In addition, in terms of physical developments, King Abdul-Aziz's reign and life
witnessed the establishment of substantial infrastructure, considering the meager income
available to him and the overall xenophobic society. In 1925, the first Hospital was

70
established in Makkah, followed by construction of another one in Riyadh in the following
year. In 1932 there were 3,000 cars in the country and only 239 kilometers of surfaced
roads as late as 1953. 26 Prior to the establishment of the road network, the journey
between Riyadh and Makkah by an automobile would consume fifteen days on desert
tracks that exhausted cars and trucks as well as petrol. It was not until 1949 that the King
authorized the construction of a tarmac road from Jeddah to Madinah. A railway from the
Arabian Gulf to Riyadh was built between 1947 and 1951.
In the Eastern Province, the oil companies' were engaged in massive industrial plans
transforming the historically pre-industrial region into a center of construction activity. Oil
companies carried out significant improvements in the form of ports, pipelines, and oil
company's residential and industrial complexes. New towns sprouted to house the work
force engaged in the new industry. Towns such as Al-Khobar (the first city in the Kingdom
ever to start from planned origins), while Ath-thoqba, and Dhahran grew from labor camps
and companies' office and residential quarters. Dammam, historically a sleepy fishing
town, witnessed unprecedented growth as a major commercial port. It was shortly to
receive a further boost to its status when the provincial governor of Hufuf moved the seat
of the eastern province government to Dammam. Michael Field noted "It was with these
developments, it is generally agreed, that the modern Eastern Province business centers of
Dammam, Dhahran and Khobar- which was still a collection of barasti [structures built of
makeshift materials] when the first petrol station was opened there in 1946- began their
development as modern cities." 27
During the early decades of the Kingdom (1932-1952) the treasury of the state was
still in its rudimentary phase- the King assumed final and absolute say on its disposal.
Inefficient disposal of oil revenues was widespread, for at that time the country had no
banking or formal education systems and the King's advisors and other fledgling
administration posts were given to Arabs from nearby nations. The King's staff was
limited and lacked expertise of finance. In 1946, the King's receipts from oil revenues did
not exceed $10.4 million. Five years following the end of World War n, the government's
treasury received a whopping sum of $165 million. By the end of his life, Abdul-Aziz was
receiving over $3 million a week. Revenues from oil continued to grow in leaps and
bounds, so by 1957 they exceeded $300 million and in 1965 the national income surpassed
$650 million, a fabulous figure when compared to the days of poverty (Table 3.1).

71
Table 3.1
Oil Production and Revenues, Selected Years
Year
Daily Production
b/day
Price
(U.S. dollars per
Annual
Revenues
Barrel)
1938 1.4 -
0.1
1940 13.9
-
1.2
1950 546.7 1.75 56.7
1954 961.8 1.93 236.3
1957 1,130.8 2.08 296.3
1959 1,152.7 1.90 313.1
1960 1,313.5 1.80 333.7
1964 1,896.5 1.80 523.2
1970 2,799.1 1.80 1,214.0
1971 4,768.9 1.80 1,884.9
1972 6,016.3 1.80 • 2,744.6
1973 7,596.2 2.85 4,340.0
1974 8,479.7 11.25 22,573.5
1975 7,075.4 12.4 25,675.8
1976 8,577.2 12.4 30,754.9
1977 9,199.9 13.00 36,540.1
1978 8,301.1 12.70 32,233.8
1979 9,532.6 24.00 48,435.2
1980 9,900.5 32.00 84,466.4
1981 9,808.0 34.00 101,813.0
1982 6,500.0 34.00 70,478.6
1983 5,100.0 29.00 37,351.6
1984 4,700.0 29.00 31,470.3
1985 3,100.0 28.00 18,322.9
1986 4,689.8
-
13,554.8
1987 3,991.0 - 17,489.3
1988 4,928.1
-
16,638.0
1989 4,863.5
- -
1990 - 31,122,2
Sources: Saudi Aramco, 1989; Ismail M. Duais, 1986. (Numbers are rounded to nearest decimal). Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Research and Statistics Department, Annual Report,
1410/1411H (Riyadh: Ayyobi Printers, 1990), 190.

Overwhelmed by the new wealth, the nouveau riche royal family members
constructed palaces and orchards and began spending on luxurious belongings hitherto
considered contradictory to the austerity imposed by puritan Islamic traditions and
72
prodigious by desert standards. According to H. St. Philby, during the early the 1950s,
the construction of Amir Abdullah's palace, presently the heir to King Fahad, cost 400,000
English pounds, while a palatial house in the heart of Riyadh, where land prices had
already began to soar, cost 15,000. He lamentably wrote
Sad to say, the King remained alert enough to be aware of the extravagance
and display on which his family and court spent oil revenue that was
increasing almost hourly. Princes lost count of the noughts. Salesmen
crowed round them like vultures after prey, and during the first years of
plenty tempted them to endless expenditure on glitter and luxury; in Riyadh
the largest of the new palaces consume three times as much electricity as the
rest of city put together. 28
The rest of the money went to establishing a standing army, a state-financed education and
health care and the laying and surfacing of limited road network to meet the increasing use
of automobiles.
These dramatic improvements in the national economy were too fast for a traditional
leadership to handle. The King's administration suffered from its tribal perception, which
did not differentiate between what was for the King and what was for the people. Oil
revenues were considered the property of the King. Commenting on the effects of these
developments on the national scale, Howrath noted "while the members of the royal family
wanted heavenly gardens, splendid cars and concrete palaces, Abd-al-Aziz wanted a royal
railway from the Persian Gulf to Riyadh and then an extension to Jidah. The shrine was
regarded by all of the advisors living in the country as an old man's folly." 29
Nevertheless, the project, which was completed in 1951, profoundly altered the economic
status of Riyadh and contributed to its growth as a modern capital during the 1950s. The
completion of the railway coincided with the King's decision to demolish Riyadh's
historical wall, ushering in the new era of the metropolis. The railroad served as the major
means of transportation to the capital, which lay in the midst of the desert, until a paved
road was laid in 1962 relieving the railway of its traffic and simultaneously encouraging the
growth of new settlements which dotted the road and catered to the needs of travelers

73
With the shift from traditional, bazaar urban economies to a modern economy based
on oil exportation, dualism in urban economies emerged. This was characterized by the
developing export-oriented commercial sector juxtaposed to the peasant agriculture and
bazaar economies. Dualism refers to the presence of a modem sector, which endows cities
with great economic opportunities, isolated from the subsistence activities of the
population. In developing countries' literature, the phenomenon of dualism has been used
to understand how cities continue to attract population. Moreover, dualism is argued to be
fostered by the growing importance of the state in the economy. Economically speaking,
the immense income furnished by oil exports has enabled the Saudi state to usher in
economic growth in urban centers, while still leaving considerable funds for the
development of rural areas.
The changes brought by oil affluence were far reaching in all aspects of the society,
including its physical environment. "Oil", wrote Philby in the late 1950s,
has a twofold effect on the social economy of Saudi Arabia. In the first place,
the wealth derived from it has created a desire for comfort and 'progress' on
Western lines among the princes and well-to-do citizens of the country...The
motor car, with its facilities for picnics, is a powerful agent in the direction of
progress; and it would seem but a matter of time,when Westernization will
become as general in Saudi Arabia as in its sister borderlands. 30
The early government expansion of services resulted in slow urban growth as locals
were attracted to work in the burgeoning government bureaucracy. The peasants, selfemployed
petty traders, craftsmen, and nomads have gradually become wage-earners, as
the economy transformed from a self-sufficient, domestic economy into an export-oriented
one adapted to the international economy.
IV. TWO DECADES OF TURMOIL (1953-1973): DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE
AFTER KING ABDUL-AZIZ
King Saud, at the age of 53, inherited the fledgling administration after his father's
death and followed in the same steps as his father in governing the country. King Saud
inherited the callow polity with defined national boundaries, a functioning administration,
and a standing army, which though ill-equipped and trained, was by far superior to the
poor-armed tribes. The expanding affluence of oil has since placed the King with an
advantageous position vis-a-vis the undeveloped traditional sociopolitical institutions.
King Saud, though lacking his father's enthusiasm and adroitness, was ready to launch

74
modest efforts toward modernization which principally aimed at improving the population's
welfare. It also aimed at coaxing the society into the twentieth century and kept the society
in motion, yet in harmony with the state's vision. However, King Saud's reign was
marked with diffidence and was also known for its indulgence of royal family members.
Howrath wrote
Back in Riyadh, they [the princes] had to find something to spend their
money on, and among their thoughts were palaces...Saud embarked on a
concrete edifice decorated in pink and gold, set in walled gardens equipped
with swimming pools and fountains (supplied from artesian wells Americans
had drilled), and with singing birds in cages, mosaic terraces, thousands of
electric lights among the shrubs, and flood-lit minarets with loud-speakers on
top for the call to prayers. It was said to have cost 4 million, and after a few
years he...built another on the same site which, by the same rumour, cost 11
million, and was even more garish and tasteless than the first. 31
King Saud was faced with domestic, political, and economic turmoil as well as
external political challenges. These mounting crises of the 1950s were partially caused by
lopsided developments within the system. The Saudi society was undergoing rapid
development, while at the same time the administration's functional specialization was
lagging and decision making was centripetally crystalizing, so much so that when King
Saud committed an official visit to Egypt in 1954, the administration came to a standstill.
However, the 1950s was a decade of political upheavals in the Middle East. It witnessed
the fall of Arab monarchies and the rise of revolutionary regimes on popular sentiments and
the appeal to elusive slogans of wealth-sharing and Arab nationalism. The new middle
classes in the Arab world that were spawned under colonialism and fostered by the
modernization programs of the previous traditional monarchies, demanded political
participation, faster change and more equitable distribution of wealth. In 1952 King
Farouq of Egypt was toppled in a coup d'e tat by the military. In 1958, the Shariefian
monarch of Iraq, King Faisal, was assassinated and his royal house members were brutally
slaughtered in a humiliating showdown. His monarchic government was replaced by a
revolutionary military junta. Prince Abudullah of Jordan was assassinated to be acceded by
his young grandson Hussain whom later the Syrians plotted to overthrow.
Such developments in the Middle East spawned anti-system ideologies in the
Kingdom which were further complicated by a widening gap in the distribution of wealth.
In 1953, Saudi ARAMCO workers went on strike twice demanding better working
conditions. In 1956 they demonstrated when the government intended to renew the lease

75
which gave the United States access to the use of the Dhahran air base. With swift
response, the government issued the Royal Decree in 1956 which outlawed strikes of any
kind and promised imprisonment for participating citizens and deportation for foreigners.
Economically, the 1950s witnessed multiple financial crises. The national treasury
weakened following Aramco's decision to reduce its production due to falling worldwide
oil prices. A financial crisis in the country's one-crop oil economy ensued which translated
into major cuts in payments to contractors, non-payment to importers for imported goods,
and interruption and reduction of subsidies to tribal chiefs. The interruption of the
previously steady rise in income of the population, coupled with the increasing
moneytization of the economy, introduced the country to waves of inflation sending basic
commodity prices soaring sky-high as gold and foreign reserves sunk to their lowest level.
The Saudi currency, the Riyal, was devalued to half its value in the market thus raising the
public debt in early 1958 to an unprecedented 1.8 billion Riyal. These problems caught the
administration unprepared and caused commotion within the senior ranks of the royal
family. The crisis was resolved by delegating more responsibilities to. Crown Prince
Faisal, who was showing potency and shrewdness in his direction of progressive
government posts and ministries.
These dramatic developments signaled danger to the political stability of Saudi
Arabia, as questions over the Monarchy's legitimacy surfaced, especially by those who
were tuned to Egypt's Nasir, a well spoken demagogue who advocated Pan-Arab socialist
ideology which engaged popular sentiments in the Arab World. His preaching caught
desperate Arab followers in the political and intellectual vacuum that followed the departure
of colonial powers. Nasir called for Arab nationalism and abetted Arabs to revolt against
their monarchies which he perceived as anachronistic and obstacles to Arab unity. Such
pressures were reflected in domestic policy in the form of a vision of economic
development and administrative reform. Faisal introduced many reforms which, while they
successfully mollified the crisis and promised progressiveness, reinforced divisiveness
over the common goal of modernization under the nation-state.
A. The Ten-Point Reform Program of 1963
Saudi Arabia underwent dramatic changes in the general direction of modernization,
particularly during the 1950s and 1960s. Such changes were both spontaneous and

76
deliberate. They were spontaneous because they were incurred as byproducts of the
modernization process, that is the exposure of the population to the outside world due to
contact with expatriates and travel abroad. They were deliberate in the sense that they
emanated from direct state intervention in the form of national development, including
urban policies. Change necessitated the proliferation of news media and propaganda
emanating from other regimes, all having profound effects on the society. For example, in
1953 there were only two newspapers in the country, the official Um ul-Qura and Al
Madinah Almonaourah. By 1966, the country had a dozen daily newspapers and weekly
publications and television broadcasting was introduced in major cities despite explicit
resentment by the Ulama. In 1985 the number of publications rose to 68 daily, weekly and
monthly publications and by 1989, the number reached 73. 32
These spontaneous developments have been supplemented by government policies •
toward modernization. Historically, national modernization policies, points George
Lenczowski, "could vaguely fall into two categories: the first, whose main objective was
the techno-administrative and military strengthening of the state (such as the policies of
Mohammed Ali in Egypt, Selim HI and Mahmoud n in Turkey), the second, which aimed
at broader and deeper socio-political progress (such as the policies of the Young Turks or
the Persian Constitutionalists). The Saudi modernization model, Lenczowski contends,
straddles both categories, primarily fitting into the first one, with some practices belonging
to the second. "This is so because reforms have been launched within the existing
framework of political and religious legitimacy; no questions were encouraged regarding
the fundamentals of this framework." 33
The establishment of the Council of Minsters, in 1953, is considered the crucial step
toward modernization. The introduction of a regular state budget in 1952-53 constituted
the first attempt to separate the state treasury from the King's private purse. This step was
followed by the creation of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) in 1958, the
country's central bank, the Development Board, and in 1957, King Saud University in
Riyadh, the first learning and research institution with specializations in secular,
technological and scientific curriculum. The process of functional specialization of the
government departments rose to a crescendo in the 1960s. The state inaugurated the
Petroleum and Mineral Authority (Petromin), an agency devoted to the development of
subterranean resources of the country. The decade also witnessed the proliferation of

77
primary and secondary schools, including girls' education, teachers' colleges, hospitals
and clinics.
Faced internally with a bloated administration, sluggish economy, and rising popular
resentment, and externally with widespread hostile political changes, Crown Prince Faisal
introduced a ten-point program which promised swift reform and opened the door for
employment in the government. The reform bill promised an efficient allocation of national
income and comprehensive modernization program, hence appealing to the business and
merchant groups. It also won the support of the Ulama (religious scholars) due to its
renewed commitment to religion and to the religious laymen because of its support for
religion. Such a strategy has been characteristic of the national government's tradition of
maintaining a delicate balance between traditionalists and secularists, seeking modernization
within a framework of traditional acceptability.
The reappointment of Faisal as prime minister on October 17,1962, closely followed
the outbreak of the revolution and civil war in Yemen. Nasir of Egypt, whose Arab
nationalism prior to the events in Yemin were mere rhetorical propaganda, took the
opportunity and sided with the new military junta in Yemen, thereby posing imminent
threats on Saudi borders. Faisal who was in the United States for medical treatment, met
with U.S. President John F. Kennedy who ascertained the United States' commitment
toward the integrity and security of the country. In a letter dated January 8,1963,
President Kennedy encouraged Faisal to launch a program of "energetic reform and
development; and in consideration of the above, pledged American support to 'the
maintenance of Saudi Arabia's integrity.'" 34 The letter emphatically reflected the
importance that Washington placed on Saudi Arabia due to the vitality of oil to the
American economy.
The United States' renewal of its commitments to safeguard the Kingdom and its
political leadership was reflected upon Faisal's joyous return to the country. His
commitment to change and progressiveness lifted hopes in the population after a decade of
widespread "financial mismanagement, extravagance of the palace-pampered princes, and
an inconsistent foreign policy..." which was deemed incompetent in light of the dramatic
developments in the region. Upon his arrival and encouraged by the Kennedy
Administration, Faisal introduced a ten-point, reform package aimed at lifting the country
from its financial morass and fine tuning the sluggish performance of the national policy

78
making apparatus. The ten-point reform bill as introduced by Faisal can be summarized in
the following points:
1. The introduction of a basic law (a constitution) while adhering to Islamic law. It
promised the establishment of a consultative council, Majlis Ashshura.
2. The enactment of provincial legislation that would regulate the system of local
governments.
3. The creation of an independent judiciary and authorization of the establishment of a
supreme judicial council and a ministry of justice.
4. The promulgation that the structure of the judicial council would comprise
members selected from both the lay jurists and the ulama community.
5. A commitment to the spreading of Islamic information.
6. The proclamation of reform and support of the religious agency responsible for the
application of Islamic teachings concerning the preserving of public morality.
7. A new program of state social obligations including the development of the
education system, the provision of student scholarships, social security and the provision
of Islamically compatible means of recreation for all citizens.
8. A pledge for regulating economic relations and the enhancement of commercial
activity and the introduction of legislation to assure progress and prosperity and economic
investment.
9. A pledged for economic developments, including improvements in roads, water
resources, industry and self-sufficiency in agricultural production.
10. The abolishment of slavery hitherto practiced in the country.
The package was timely. It set forth an environment for a new round of
modernization endeavor carefully intertwined with a proclaimed commitment to preserve
the Islamic heritage of the Kingdom. The ten point reform simply reflected a long-awaited
upgrading of the administrative apparatus to meet the rising expectations of the urban
classes, who were exposed to foreign sociopolitical concepts and technology. It reflected

79
the urgent need to shift gears to uplift the states' sagging reputation and appeal. For the
United States, Faisal's reform was timely as well as necessary to stave off the widespread
revolutionary tides in the cold war era. To the U.S. economy in particular, and the West in
general, a traditional monarchy, yet politically stable system seemed safer than a secularist
and progressive system whose future was uncertain. According to Lenczowski, in the
"pragmatic" sphere, Faisal scored an impressive success in the implementation of the
program. With unusual speed, he restored the financial system, paid-off all debts,
stabilized the currency and balanced the budget More important to this study, he
earmarked special funds for national development. "Development itself began emerging
from the stage of planning into the stage of execution." 35
The development program accompanied the inauguration of numerous construction
projects and substantial improvements in the infrastructure which were deemed necessary
for future development. Foreign firms flocked to the country to execute the ambitious
road-building, new airports and upgrading and expansion of telephone networks.
Complex engineering projects were handled by foreign contractors who brought with them
herds of laborers and professionals to build modern utilities in the rapidly growing towns
and cities. Faisal also opened the door for Saudi employment in the government sector.
By 1966, private business boomed under the prevailing, encouraging governmentsponsored
modernization.
However, the implementation of the ten-point reform bill fell short of what was
promised. The first point which pertained to the endorsement of a constitution defining the
mechanisms to regulate the national decision-making process guaranteeing more input on
the population's part was not fulfilled. Such a failure coincides with Huntington's
projection which states "the modernizing reforms of the monarch require the absence of
elections, parliament and political parties." 36
B. Institution Building and Consolidation
Since the establishment of modern Saudi Arabia, the disintegration of certain modes
of socioeconomic organization and the appearance of modern forms have proceeded in
tandem. For example, the detribalization of the Saudi population has coincided with a
massive and continuous movement of people from the desert and rural areas to urban and
rural centers. Change has also been taking place in the form of abandoning traditional

80
occupations. The emergence of the modern economy has gradually attracted the population
into wage-earning employment in the government and the private sectors. For millennia,
the Arabian Peninsula has been the home land of the nomads who have maintained a
symbiotic relationship with the princely agrarian settlements' population. However, it must
be noted that there is no clear cut delineation distinguishing the nomads from those living in
the settled agricultural populations or urban centers. In addition to simple economic
exchange and barter, conjugal relations have been maintained between the two, hence
blurring the widely held demarcation which views bedouins as totally unbound by land
locality and isolated from sedentary populations.
This conceptual rigidity regarding the classification of the Saudi population has
obfuscated the process of sedentarization in which the bedouins move gradually from one
life style to another. Ostensibly, this involves a gradual and slow process often combining
the two, or elements of both before they are absorbed into the sedentary mold. Recent
studies have focused on such a process in response to the changing economic climate37
An improved national economy and political stability have set in motion a process of
sedentarization among the previously roving nomads. In terms of the resulting settlement
pattern, they have been classified as nomadic, semi-nomadic and settled-bedouins. The
first constitutes the original and historical form of nomadic herdsmen who roam in familiar
territory seeking the sprouting grass following the scanty rains of the winter "taking into
consideration the state of pasture and the accessibility to the market". 38 They make their
livelihood by selling goats, sheep and their byproducts.
The semi-nomads are half-settled segments of the bedouins who choose to settle in
the proximity of urban centers and towns. Their decision to return to the desert life hinges
on many factors such as economic and familia. The third group are those accustomed to
the settled norms of towns. By and large, until the whole-sale provision of free-interest
housing loans by the government, in the mid-1970s,they squatted on vacant interstices
within the towns or inhabited the periphery in huts, houses built of makeshift materials and
tents forming their own distinctive hamlets. In towns amidst agricultural hinterland, they
are attracted by the increase in agricultural opportunities due to the introduction of
government's incentives to farmers. Others are enticed by employment in the burgeoning
public and private sectors, while others have engaged in the growing and lucrative smallscale
manufacturing, construction and service economy.

81
This intermittent process of sedentary among the bedouins has persisted for centuries.
In more recent times of the Saudi reign, the two factors, growing oil economy and
prolonged droughts, have worked together to expedite the influx of both village folks and
bedouins to the seemingly merciful confines of the city. As first recipients of oil income,
cities have increasingly become the embodiment of secure income outlets and its improved
sanitary provisions have drastically swayed bedouins and villagers alike to forego the
39
precarious wilderness and rural poverty. The increasing demand for laborers in the
fledgling oil industry in the Eastern Province and the government civil and military labor
force has provided promising opportunities attracting throngs to the urban centers including
foreigners. New settlements sprouted near Aramco's water wells and oil installationsthanks
to the explosive growth in the national economy.
Most importantly, the society's response to the new economic imperatives and
realities was, in the political sphere, reflected in the shuffling of the society's associations
and loyalties. The erosion of the traditional social, economic and cultural bases of the
society have been paralleled by a similar process of institutional development and
organization. The emergence of a strong and central government has gradually undermined
the traditional authority of the bedouin tribe and dynastic squirearchies dominating the
Peninsula's villages, and have paved the way for significant changes in the national life.
The branching of the public administration, which began during the early years
following the founding of the Kingdom, was culminated in the creation of the Council of
Ministers (CM) in October 1953, during the last days of King Abdul-Aziz's reign, a step
which constitutes a closing chapter in the country's modern history. The creation of the
Council marked the transition from one man rule to ministerial administration. CM
heralded the proliferation of government specialized departments reflecting the need to meet
the growing functional and administrative complexities of the new nation-state, thanks to
the increased oil revenues which poured into the state treasury. Economically, such
proliferation has paralleled the gradual increase of state economic strength following the
discovery of oil in commercial quantities in 1932. Al-Said wrote:

82
The mushrooming of governmental institutions represented an attempt to cope
with the condition of 'rising expectations'. As the citizens hear of the
building of new schools and municipalities in neighboring towns and cities,
delegations would go to the capital and demand similar privileges. As a
result, limited and understaffed ministries of yesterday were giving way to
larger and more numerous ministries and bureaus. 40
The steady growth of the Saudi government bureaucracy and apparatus has been
accompanied by a process of weakening traditional and local power centers. In its efforts
to dissolve traditional, competing political factions of the traditional era, and instead of
building on the already established representative tribal system of the past and its cultural
heritage, the state forewent traditional nodes of authority, for examples, the city notables
and bedouin chiefs, as residual of tribal structures. The swearing of the King at the top of
the government echelon meant the dismantling of the strong traditional loyalty of the
population to the tribe and the extended family. This process has taken two forms. In the
case of towns, the process of weakening the traditional forms of authority can be discerned
in the diminishing powers of the old system of city "notables." Such a weakening has
paralleled the shift of authority to a central government and its branching bureaucracy at the
national level. Hence, the city and town notables, the bedouin sheikh, and provincial emirs
were denied active representative roles under the new nation-state. 41
The old system of
the quarter of the traditional Islamic city, which organized around the tribe and place of
origin and enjoyed semi-autonomous control by its residents, crumbled. It was supplanted
by a new system of central bureaucratic control and hierarchical administration.
The process of debasing city notables similarly occurred in the bedouin tribes. The
increasing centrality of the national government in the local affairs of the society has
undermined bedouins' loyalty to the tribe, a sacred relation for millinea. This development
was best evident in a study in which the authors state
Even among bedouins, we are told, the older tribal and sub-tribal allegiance
are being replaced by the idea that the center and the tribal head or his
subordinate is seen as the source of effective power and the place for
submitting petitions and bringing requests. Wealth has loosened the
connections between tribal leaders and the common man, and the rise of a
wealthy central government has, together with this, promoted a more direct
relationship between the people [at large] and [those at] the top 42
From the previous direct and autonomous control of the Saudi subjects, tribal
sheikhs, provincial emirs and city notables roles were reduced to that of consultation and

83
petitioning of the central government for their populace. Al-Said (1982) wrote "The central
government never felt that this was more than a mere privilege to suggest, and when it
deemed it necessary, its plans and projects were carried out despite the notables'
objections."43 Emirs of provinces have since served as representatives for the central
government, overseeing state ordained civil tasks and police powers, executing state's
projects, and supervising the subjects.
No effort was made to sustain and incorporate the traditional system of authority.
Instead, the expansion of central state control took the form of provincial branching of the
bureaucracy, new functions obviated the old ones, and bureaucratic procedures supplanted
traditional consultative decision-making at the local community level. Early government
projects such as those from the 1930s to 1950s were slow and simple (e.g., digging water
wells; building dams, roads, schools, health clinics; and providing police protection) and
did not significantly alter the old system of authority. However, due to the the dramatic
political and economic developments of the 1960s and 1970s, the mushrooming of
government services included the establishment of new branches within the ministries. The
rapid growth of state departments called for employing not only out of town and regional
personnel but foreigners as well. For example, between 1962 and 1967, the number of
government employees doubled. It was then that the traditional powers and representatives
of the multi-power traditional authority system were radically challenged and altered. The
buttressing of central control was the government's national priority to stave off the
centuries-long tendencies of fragmentation and provincialism.
This process of modernization under the auspice of the central power has been
complemented with the national educational programs which have promoted the a new
values of the nation-state, hence becoming a catalyst for new national consciousness.
Generous allocations in the creation of new schools, universities and other learning
institutions which provide free education to citizens and scholarships to study abroad were
designed to encourage the break with the historical isolationism among young people, all
meant to prepare the population for economic prosperity in the future. During the last two
decades, the student population has increased from nearly 600,000 to 2,500,000.
Simultaneously, this process of national homogenization has gradually altered the
millennia-long tradition of the identification of locals in reference to their tribal or towns of
origin.

84
Technology constitutes a third factor in shaping the departure of the society from its
traditional past. The improved national economy accelerated the use of automobiles and
other forms of transportation. While in 1970 there were 8,000 kilometers of paved road
network, in 1990 it reached 32,000. The increased use of telecommunication systems
eased the otherwise difficult dismantling of isolated enclaves of populations. The number
of working telephones lines increased from 29,000 in 1970 to 1,500,000 in 1990. With
the building of roads and installation of telephone networks, travel became easy and safe,
allowing extended family members to maintain contact The state's ownership of mass
media channels, such as radio and television, and state regulation of the press, coupled
with central education programs, all have facilitated the creation of national values
conducive to the larger, modern society. In addition, the establishment of a standing army
and effective and organized police power have assured security making transport routes
safe, easing both travel and the movement of goods and products. In short, the combined
effects of these factors have paved the way for the process of substituting the state and the
mobile nuclear family for the clan and the tribe as the major social units in tune with the
modern needs of the modern age.
The new centralized decision making took place at the village, town and city levels.
As the bureaucracy expanded, the notables' influence as a viable social force different city
neighborhoods, gradually diminished. The social ranks of the town emirs, and bedouin
sheikhs declined with their death or mere passage of time along with their multi-power
traditional institutions. Meanwhile, the eclipse of traditional authority as represented by the
provincial and town's emir, the bedouin sheikh and city notables have eased the historically
latent provincial particularism, hence expediting the consolidation of the centralized nationstate.
This encroachment constitutes a great inroad into the old system. It was an
inevitable outcome, argues A1 Said, not" a response to the state's need for asserting its
authority nor the removal of local obstacles for the implementation of its plans and projects"
by the central government. Rather, "it was a natural outcome, of the tendency to confer
more power on the central government, due in no small measures to the Council of
Minsters' emergence as a viable source of authority." 44
While in Saudi Arabia the reform programs emphasized modernization in the social
and urban spheres, little effort, if any, has been awarded to political development.
Contrary to Huntington's theory, the modernization steps have not undermined the status
quo. The "traditional reformer" as applied to Saudi Arabian government, has scored wide

85
leaps toward modernity. And instead of isolationism, the Saudi government has opted for
accelerated development affecting all aspects of the society. By 1990,77.3 percent of the
Saudi population lived in cities designated "urban," that is settlements inhabited by 5,000
and more. 45 Change has also been reflected in the steady growth of the middle class
paralleling the government's massive allocation in education, infrastructural development,
and industrialization which have had the impact of promoting the private sector and
recruiting considerable employment in the public sector. The freeing of the populace from
low-earning agricultural and handicraft occupations has created a labor force dependent on
the state. This dependency on government employment has supplanted allegiance to the old
ruling classes of the settled village-states and tribal association. Nevertheless, acute exodus
to urban centers at the cost of abandoning poverty-ridden rural areas, characteristic of
modern urbanization, has been tempered by the state's agricultural incentives.
C. Agricultural Development and Policy
Saudi Arabia's topography is essentially an expanse of desert; out of the country's
one million square miles, only 1.3 percent of the land is suitable for settled agriculture.
The agricultural population sparsely inhabits the desert oases and the southwestern
mountainous slopes. Agriculture in Saudi Arabia was historically carried out by the settled
agriculturalists and by semi-nomadic bedouins who in the better rain-watered areas
practiced cereal cultivation as a supplement to animal husbandry. The transformation of the
Saudi Arabian society from its pre-industrial, agrarian and pastoral ways of life to an
urbanized, developing society has come at the expense of its traditional economy. Since
the 1940s, oil has gradually replaced agriculture as the mainstay of towns' subsistence
economy. Also, the oil industry and state jobs encouraged nomadic bedouins, who have
traditionally provided the needs of towns' population for meat and dairy products, to
abandon their pastoral life.
Traditionally, industrialization requires the moving of national resources out of
agriculture to manufacturing, a substitution of capital for labor, and the freeing of labor to
move from agriculture to industry, all results in outmigration from farms. This is because
industrialization entails the adoption of advance of technology in agricultural production.
The confluence of urbanization, foreign migration, and rising living standards, rendered
local agriculture, still primitive and reliant on inefficient methods geared to a subsistence
economy, unable to meet the increasing demand for food. The oil affluence, though

86
directly targeted at the urban centers during the first decades, reflected indirectly on the
rural areas by an exodus to the major centers. The growing city offered far better wages
and services, particularly in the booming oil and construction industries and the expanding
public sector attracted both nomads and villagers. For example, during the early 1970s, the
oil company offered an average annual wage of $2,675 for an unskilled laborer, while a
self-employed worker in agriculture received an average annual wage of $250. 46
Moreover, due to incessant migration, farmers suffered the loss of both supply of labor and
falling markets.
Unable to modernize apace with growing demand, agricultural production dwindled
as young farmers sought formal education and moved to the promising city. Compounded
by the influx of foreigners, urban population multiplied and with its nominal growth and
the rise in living standards, the demand for food production soared. The rising gap
between demand and production was immediately countered by rising foodstuff imports.
In addition, the government introduced various incentives to boost the meager agriculture
output. During the 1940s, King Abdul-Aziz contracted an American team to conduct a
study to assess and identify the agricultural potential in the Kingdom. In 1948, the first
department to handle agricultural development was created. Its first tasks were to help
farmers obtain ground water by mechanical means and dig new wells to increase output It
also supplied seeds and provided professional help to farmers on modern farming
techniques.
These efforts fell short of their goal. During the 1950s, local agricultural production
lagged and food shortages persisted. Incentives were increased comprising subsidies for
seeds and fruit trees, low-cost rents for agricultural machinery, government-paid
agricultural education and training, experts' advice in the use of chemical insecticides,
instruction in food preparation, the establishment of nurseries to supply farmers with
needed trees and to provide transplantation, and free veterinary treatment and checkups.
Moreover, financial backing included free-interest loans to help fanners buy equipment and
other necessities to expand production. In addition to direct incentives in the agricultural
sector, the government endowed rural areas with services to counter city-ward migration.
Hospitals in major towns, and health clinics in some villages as well as mobile clinics for
desolate areas were built and provided. This commitment to the rejuvenation of the rural
sector stemmed from the government's effort to allocate national income to attain a
"balanced" urban-rural growth and minimize over-urbanization in the form of concentration

87
of surplus population in urban centers while rural areas continue to lose its agriculturalists.
The state perceived the pursuance of agricultural self-sufficiency as a viable national goal to
minimize national dependence on food imports.
In his national address to the Saudi people in 1985, King Fahad A1 Saud highlighted
the government's approach to the development of the Saudi Arabia's various regions. He
stated that "Our goals are to provide all citizens, whether in villages, cities, or distant areas
the same [public] services...the goals of the Kingdom are those of sustaining the pillars of
Allah's [Islamic] shariy'ah and the implementation of it in all aspects, then to use all
resources that Allah has bestowed on us and exert our utmost efforts to attain the
comprehensive development and the rise of the standard of living." 47 Rural areas were
bestowed with considerable national funds in the form of subsidies and social services to
fanners, including housing loans, similar to hose for urban centers.
This commitment was translated in the continuing improvements in rural services
including increase in the number and quality of public schools in urban and rural areas at an
accelerating pace. 48 However, while these efforts were meant to promote agriculture and
to achieve balanced regional growth, their overall effectiveness is questionable.
Traditionally, nomads' children begin tending the livestock in their early years and
schooling attracts them away from this endeavor, thus causing the departure from
traditional habitation, which hitherto supplied meat and dairy products to towns' people.
The government's education policy also provided stipends for students and free education
at the college level. This encouraged young ruralists and bedouins alike to seek formal
education and eventually to move either to the growing service sectors or to urban areas, in
both cases the farming industry suffers a loss.
In 1963, some 475,000, or 72 percent, of the economically active nationals were
designated 'agricultural workers and bedouin'. In 1975,52 percent of the national work
force was involved in 'agriculture and fishing'. By 1986, the proportion of Saudi nationals
working in agriculture dropped to 11 percent of the total Saudi labor force. 49 This is due to
the country's dependence on foreign expatriate labor to meet the expanding needs of the
modem economy, in general, and agriculture, in particular. However, though Saudis,
particularly the young, have increasingly abandoned agricultural activity, city-ward
migration among Saudis has been alleviated, thanks to the government's policies and

88
subsidies which have resulted in the creation of government employment, improvement of
services and living conditions in rural areas.
The 1970s construction boom resulted in the importation of large numbers of foreign
expatriates, which resulted in a shortage of food stuffs. The state had to rely on foreign
food production to import between seventy-five to eighty percent of its food needs from
abroad. 50
In 1971, the bill for foodstuffs accounted for 31.6 percent of imports totaling
SR 3,197 million (in 1971 four Saudi Riyal (SR) equaled $1.00 in U.S. currency). This
shortage in local agricultural production prompted substantial inducements by the
government to help farmers improve their agricultural techniques and bedouins to practice
settled farming on a larger scale. Investments in modern agriculture, specifically in poultry
and dairy farms multiplied. The Third Development Plan of 1980-85 earmarked
considerable incentives to attain "self sufficiency" in some food productions deemed
strategic for national security such as wheat. By 1987, foodstuff imports were reduced to
17.1 percent, though in nominal terms the value rose to SR 12.9 billion (1987 the
$1.00=SR 3.75). 51
This commitment has conditioned the restructuring of the country's national spatial
network. The allocation of agricultural subsidies, housing loans and other cash benefits in
rural areas constituted strong economic incentives to farmers to retain their rural life.
Consequently, the high demand for laborers for the modern sector of the economy was met
by importing foreign laborers. Commenting on the effects of the government agricultural
programs, Clive A. Sinclair and J.S. Birks wrote
Paradoxically, the government's recent attempts to transform farming in Saudi
Arabia (other than by instigating major large-scale projects) through the
extension of loans and grants to small fanners with the object of aiding their
mechanization and modernization have been instrumental in the preservation
of a subsistence-based traditional rural sector. Loans and grants taken by
farmers are not always used for investment purposes and are often spent on
consumption. If invested, then the capital so provided remains underutilized,
either because of poor management or for want of sufficient labor inputs.
Thus grants and loans to farmers, directed toward investment in small-scale
agriculture, are taken as income by the fanners. 52
In many Developing countries, economic disparities between regions result in
massive city-ward movement leaving the rural areas in its historical penury. In these
countries, the concentration of industrial development in growth centers is rationalized on

89
the premise that Ml benefits of external economies will be maximized. This leads to dual
structured economies in which the majority of state energies go to the one or a few urban
centers where intense and rapid growth occurs while the periphery is left to decline and
stagnate. Due to the peculiarities of the Saudi development (i.e. the reliance on oil riches)
this situation has been largely avoided. The agricultural programs of the government have
had their share in conditioning the contemporary spatial organization of the Kingdom.
Starting with King Abdul-Aziz' hijar (agricultural-religious colonies program to settle the
bedouins) the emphasis on developing the rural areas by the government has alleviated the
widening gap of economic opportunities between the city and their rural hinterlands. Due
to government subsidized agricultural programs, the local production of major food items
such as red and white meat, milk, vegetables, fruits and fish, is said to meet 70 percent of
the national demand. 53
D. Industrialization and Saudi Industrial Policy
Traditionally, Saudi Arabia is a non-industrial country in the modern usage of the
term. In 1954, there were five industrial establishments worth a total capital of SR 42
million. Modem industrial activity owes its start to the enlistment of foreign capital to
exploit the oil reserves of the country. This constituted a radical shift eclipsing the
country's pre-industrial modes of production of urban handicraft and heralded an epoch of
industrialization and economic growth. Yet, since its inception, the oil industry has been
highly capital intensive, it demanded a low number of labor force (only 1.1 percent of the
total Saudi nationals work in the oil industry, whose share in the Gross National Product
(GNP) amounts to 38 percent). 54 Table 3.2 illustrates the distribution of the Saudi labor
force by major economic activity.
In the 1950s there were only few private Saudi firms which existed in the Eastern
Province due to Aramco's support. They were largely geared toward the oil company's
generated services. The construction boom in the cities stimulated the growth of some
small industries manufacturing building materials, furniture and other household needs.
The private sector's interest in industrial investment has been growing slowly, dependant
on, first, Aramco's needs since the 1940s, and, later, on the government's generous aid.
This slow development of a bona fide industrial sector can be attributed to several factors.
Firstly, faced with fierce foreign competition, the traditional one-man shop handicraft
industry has gradually given way to an onslaught of imported mechanized products.

90
Owners and their apprentices joined the wage-earning labor force while their young family
members joined the schooling system. The bazaar-oriented self-sufficient economies have
transformed into consumer-oriented economies which offer higher income attracting urban
merchants, traders, and countrymen alike.
Table 3.2
Distribution Of The Labor Force, Saudis and Non-Saudis, By Economic
Activity.
Type of Services Finance Trans- Trade Constru-Utilities Manufac Mining Agricult-
Activity portation ction -turing ure
No. of 765,000 33,000 125,000133,000 53,000 32,000 37,000 51,000 145,000
Saudis
Percent. 55% 2% 9% 10-% 4% 2% 3% 4% 11%
Non- 620,425 59,500 105,230 461,763 820,334 32,978 283,004 10,503 91,595
Saudis
Percent. 25% 3% 4% 19% 33% 1% 11% * 4%
Total 1,385,4132,500 230,230 594,763 873,334 64,978 320,004 61,503 236,595
* Number of workers is less than 0.5%
Source: Ministry of Planning. Fifth Development Plan: 1410-1415/1990-1995. Riyadh: Ministry of
Planning Press, c.1989.
Secondly, the vigorous development programs of the state, coupled with promotion
industrial policies favoring Saudi establishments in particular, created a lucrative business
environment. Considerable sums of national income were channelled into nonproductive
sectors such as construction and trade, finance and services, which account for 28.1
percent and 31.4 percent of the national labor forces respectively. Therefore, private
investment has concentrated in the lucrative growing construction sector during the 1970s
and early 1980s. Since the mid-1980s, it concentrated on the growing markets of services
and consumer goods.
To encourage Saudis and foreign industrial enterprise, the government introduced the
Protection and Encouragement of National Industries Ordinance in 1963. Under this
Ordinance, Saudi entrepreneurs were entitled to free land for their factories, custom-free

91
imports of raw materials and machinery and protection against imports. But these efforts
produced meager results. Peter Mansfield noted
By the end of the 1960s some 180 small firms had been licensed, about half
of them related to the building industry and the rest in food processing,
clothing, and printing. Of the eight thousand so-called manufacturing
establishments at that time, 90 percent were no more than workshops
employing two or three people-bakers, shoemakers, carpenters, etc. 55
The manufacturing sector comprises 14 percent of the Kingdom's labor force (Table 3:3).
Given these factors, Saudi industry proceeded slowly and depended on state cosponsorship.
The industry fed directly or indirectly on government expenditures and
subsidies rather than being itself a major source of government revenues through taxation.
For example, by the mid 1970s, there were only 300 factories in the country, with a total
capital of $100 million. Due largely to state incentives and subsidies, the number of light
or conversion industries rose to 600 establishments by 1982 with a total capital value
approximating $7 billion. These industries were mainly, small-scale establishments
(occupying smaller industrial plants manufacturing items including door-frames, furniture,
and nails) whose owners essentially imported most of the raw materials for industrial
assembly for the local market and relied on foreign expatriates for labor. Moreover, these
small-scale and medium size industrial businesses were given priority to supply public
project needs. The private sector grew heavily dependent on the state; yet despite its great
backing, the private sector's contribution to the national gross product was estimated at
only 37.8 percent. According to the Fifth Development Plan,
Over the last four plan periods, the government sector has accounted for
between 55 percent and 75 percent of the total investment in the economy.
Furthermore, much of the remaining investment, which was undertaken by
the private sector, was financed by government development agencies.
Although the private sector has accumulated substantial financial assets as a
result of strong economic growth in the past, only a relatively small fraction
has been invested within the Kingdom. 56
The meager involvement by the private sector was attributed to, first, the provision of
interest-free loans by the government, as opposed to those offered by private institutions,
and secondly, to the "difficulties of finding viable new investment opportunities, given the
relatively small domestic market." 57 The slow response by private capital was attributed to
the difficulty to switch "speedily and successfully from government-led economy based on

92
TABLE 3.3
Estimated GDP Contribution by the Private Sector* and Employment by
Sector (1410/1989)
Value Added Estimated Private Sector Employment Employment
(SR billion) Share (%) 1989 Distribution
(%)
PRODUCING 88.0 79.4
SECTORS
Agriculture 22.2 99.0 569,200 9.9
Other Mining 1.7 95.0 3,500 0.1
Manufacturing 33.1 48.6 374,900 6.4
—Petroleum Refining 17.9 18.0 14,600 0.2
—Petrochemicals 4.9 63.0 6,200 0.1
-Other Manufacture. 10.3 95.0 354,100 6.1
Public Utilities 0.8 18.0 126,900 2.2
Construction 31.8 95.0 944,100 16.4
-Sub-Total 2,018,600
SERVICE
SECTORS
Trade 28.2 99.0 898,300 15.6
Transport, 21.7 15.0 262,300 4.5
Communications
Finance, Real Estate 23.0 95.0 262,300 1.7
Community and 9.9 90.0 99,000 31.6
Personal Services
Sub-total: Non-Oil 170.8 77.2 3,081,600 53.4
Producing/Service
Sectors
Gov.Sector ^
56.2
-
624,800 10:8
Sub-total: Non-Oil 227.0 58.1 5,725,000 99.2
Sectors
Crude Oil/Gas Sector 122.3 46,800 0.8
Total Employment 5,771,800 100
Gross Domestic Product 349.3 37.8
Excludes non-civilian employment and includes daily wage workers not classified as civil servants.
Source: Fifth Development Plan, 1410/1990-1415/1995.

93
oil exports and infrastructural investment to a free-market in less than 20 years" giving its
eo
traditional culture and values. Islamic teachings strongly discourage interest-baring
lending methods as practiced by Western-like banking firms.
This "conventional" approach emphasizing small-scale private-sector industries, was
altered when, beginning in the early 1960s, the government showed a new interest in
exploiting relatively cheap crude oil and previously wasted natural gas for large-scale
capital-intensive industry. During the course of its developmental experience, the Saudi
polity has come to recognize the great potential for economic diversification, hence
reducing its dependence on the exportation of crude oil. New emphasis was awarded to
petrochemical and heavy industries. The objective was to engage the society in effective,
productive industrial activity using oil and natural gas. In 1960, the government
approached foreign companies with the idea, but to no avail. In 1961, Petromin was
established by the the government to handle the marketing of oil products and to pioneer
mining efforts for other non-fuel natural resources.
State support for industrialization was increased when King Faisal ascended the
throne in 1964. In 1965, the Saudi Arabian Fertilizing Company (SAFCO) was launched
on the concept of utilizing cheap and abundant local natural gas, previously left to burn
unused. A joint-venture contract between Petromin and Dr. Armand Hammer, of the
Occidental Petroleum Corporation was signed to build facilities and assume production.
Following a decade of sluggish functioning, and falling urea prices world wide, SAFCO
performance was improved by late 1979 due to change in management and rising urea
prices. SAFCO provided the backdrop for the petrochemical industry, a benchmark in the
Saudi industrial development during the 1980s, for such shift from "conventional
approach" to that of capital-intensive, petrochemical industries utilizing local oil and natural
gas, offers better prospects for efficient allocation of national resources and minimizing
dependency on foreign labor.
In its announcements and publications, the government has acknowledged the
depletable nature of the country's large oil reserves. The second and third Five-Year Plans
of 1975-85 gave priority to develop the productive sectors of the economy, manufacturing,
non-fuel minerals, and agriculture. The first and second Five-Year Plans were adopted
with the vision of expanding the infrastructure and services deemed essential for the
efficient functioning of the productive sectors such as education and training, water and

94
electricity, transportation and communications, and banking and finance. Farouk Akhdar,
Secretary General of the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu, summarized the thrust
which underlies the Saudi developmental activities in the industrial sector. He wrote:
The fundamental goal of Saudi industrialization is to foster the diversification
of the economic base in order to reduce the Kingdom's overwhelming
dependence on the oil sector, to achieve greater economic sufficiency and
protection from external supply disruptions, and to gain the cost advantages
from domestic manufacturing activity. 59
To achieve these objectives, the government has followed a strategy of promoting
investment in the manufacturing industry by offering a wide range of financial, tariff, and
other incentives to qualified Saudi investors. For large-scale industrial projects beyond the
capabilities of the private sector, the state has entered into joint-venture partnerships with
foreign firms who are assigned managerial, technical and marketing tasks. Under the first
two approaches, or "conventional paths," the state provides incentives and subsidies under
the industrial promotion programs. By 1990, there were 2,160 working factories and 400
new factories to be added in the period 1990-1995. But with improved state assets in the
1970s, the government espoused a radical approach aimed at the construction of two
"large, completely new hydrocarbon-oriented industrial cities." Akhdar continued "the
urban industrial complexes at Jubail and Yanbu constitute the centerpieces of the
Kingdom's heavy industrialization program. They reflect the government's commitment to
develop a large-scale, hydrocarbon-based and energy-intensive industries such as
petrochemicals, fertilizers, and iron and steel". 60 In short, the industrialization of the
Kingdom owes its character and direction to the state's vision, initiative and cosponsorship,
and not to an established private sector.
E. The Emergence of the Middle Class
The combined effects of the creation of the nation-state, the connecting of the local
economy to that of the international economy, and the political framework of the state, all
set in motion the process for social stratification. One manifestation of this transformation
is the emergence of the middle class. As noted earlier, the massive financial allocation for
state-sponsored education and modern technology, among other things, have weakened the
previously strong influence of the clan. Upward mobility in the new economic order has
increasingly been based on ascription and educational background, rather than family

95
determined by social status. The burgeoning bureaucracy and the service-import business
have required backgrounds in formal education rather than apprenticeship. As
transportation technology rapidly improved, occupational opportunities have become
unbound by geographical locality. The prosperity brought by the discovery of oil enabled
many people the chance to enter the business world. This process is well illustrated in
Gary Samore's words:
The rapid pace of the development in Saudi has given birth to new social
groups- administrators, skilled labor, army officers and professionals- that are
not part of either the religious hierarchy, the ruling family, or the tribal
order...Modernization has lured young bedouins from the desert to the city,
weakening the tribal structure. 61
With the improvements in the economy, the society gradually started to distance itself
from pre-industrial modes. This distancing occurred slowly during the first three decades
of the Kingdom, but rapidly during the 1960s and 1970s. Concomitantly, cleavages of the
essentially mono-class society ensued due to the increasing gap in the distribution of oil
wealth and the specialization of labor. The 1950s witnessed the expansion of the wealthy
echelon comprising royal family members emerging at the top of a majority of the
population essentially mired in pre-industrial poverty. An upper middle class started to
form, encompassing administrators, the King's aides and royal entourage (retinues), and
the merchant class (and shopkeepers) whose members rushed to reap the opportunities of
the rapidly expanding import business. The merchant class expanded, paralleling the
increase in the standard of living.
The new middle class swelled corresponding to the growth of the modern economy.
It encompassed managers, engineers and skilled technicians who grew to hold assets in
towns and cities diversifying the private business with specialized shops, mechanized
garages, transportation operators, chauffeurs and taxi drivers, and the like. In addition to
the merchant class, both a new growing administrative and professional strata began to join
the ranks of the burgeoning middle class. The transition to the industrial modes of
production was characterized by a far flung division of labor and the imposition of a system
of wage-earning working and professional classes. In the span of fifty years, the
traditional, economically impoverished society mutated to an urban, educated class
involved in the modern economy. Between 1965 and 1985, in nominal terms, the middle
class grew from 14,900 to 113,200, while its proportion within the Saudi labor force grew

96
2.1 percent to 8.1 percent during the same period, attesting to the emergence of the new
middle class as a substantial factor in the Saudi society. 62 All in all, the introduction and
growth of the bureaucracy has swelled the middle class, traditionally limited to the small
merchant and landed aristocracy classes. Later in this study, I will show how this growing
middle class selectively opted the new suburbs where land subdivisions are laid according
to the grid and the villa, instead of the courtyard house and the organic compact layout both
governed by religious and physical factors.
V. URBANIZATION AND URBAN RESTRUCTURING OF THE NATION
Urbanization is a function of increase in national population living in cities and the
increase in the number of settlements designated as cities, while urban growth is a function
of the rate of natural increase (births minus deaths) and city-ward migration. But this does.
not answer the question as to why urban growth proceeded so much more rapidly than did
the total population growth (3 percent per annum). Urban growth in Saudi Arabia has been
extremely rapid (running at from 10 to 12 percent per annum) natural increase, rural
migration and immigrants from outside the country, especially during the 1970s (Table
3.4). One powerful force in shifting population from rural to urban locations was the direct
and indirect impact of the rapidly expanding oil industry. (The direct impact is that of
urbanization spurred by the oil industry's need for workers while the indirect impact is
related to oil revenues available to the state which in turn allotted money to modernizing the
society.)
Foreigners rushed to the Kingdom to fill the demand for semi-skilled and
professional occupations created by the new oil industry (Table 3.4). In the Eastern
Province, where oil activity is prevalent, old towns prospered and new ones sprouted to
house the increasing urban population. In other parts of the country, nomad, rural-and
foreign migration increased in response to the growing government employment, services
and investment which targeted urban centers first.
Due to the kaleidoscopic developments at the national level, the urban sphere has
mutated exhibiting change in a profound fashion. Firstly, the new oil industry offered
good job opportunities, attracting both bedouins and agriculturalists to the gradually
expanding oil industry in the Eastern Province. For example, by the mid-1970s the
average annual income for an unskilled worker in the oil industry averaged $2,675, while a

97
self-employed peasant earned a meager annual income of $250. 63 In addition, the
provision of services in the oil-producing region's towns has aggravated urbanization
pulling, bedouins and peasants from the vagaries of rural life into large towns. In 1970,
the agricultural sector accounted for 40.4 per cent of the Saudi labor force and, by 1975,
the agricultural labor force declined to 28 per cent. 64 By 1989, it decreased to eleven
percent. Another major indicator of the transformation of the society is the diminishing
proportion of the bedouin population in the country's demographic composition. From a
majority at the birth of the Kingdom, by the 1980s, their share of the population decreased
to ten percent. 65 Secondly, urban change owed its impetus to the indirect effects of the oil
industry. Since the formation of Saudi Arabia, the Saudi monarchs have vigorously
engaged in spending oil revenues on the non-oil producing parts of the country to convey
legitimacy, as well as to maintain order and security.
TABLE 3.4
Foreign Employment Growth
Year
Migrant Employment
1962/63 60,000
1966/67 240,000
1975 723,400
1980 1,023,600*
Source: C. A. Sinclair and J.S. Birks (1982), 164. * This number comprises two-third of the national labor
force.
The shift from the traditional subsistence economy to a modern economy based on
exportation of crude oil meant the connecting of the country's economy to the international
economic system. This disrupted the spatial stasis of the society which hitherto took the
form of scattered, isolated populations with disintegrated traditional economies. A new
situation of "commercial dependency" emerged in which the entire national economy has
become organized around and conditioned by the exploration of a stable commodity, that is
oil. This was reflected in the sprouting of new towns in the oil-producing East Province.
In Third World countries, foreign capital has been instrumental in transforming traditional
economies into modern ones geared toward the Developed world markets' needs. This has
resulted in a dependency situation whereby developing countries' economies rely on those
of the developed world. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the exploitation by foreign capital of a
natural resource, that is oil, renders the entire national economy organized around the

development of crude oil, creating a dependency relationship at the world level. This
98
situation resembles that of the "enclave economy" which tends to produce two effects that
greatly condition the spatial structure of the dependent economy. 66
First, it triggers a process of concentration of population and activities around the
enclave resource, that is oil. Second, a process of urbanization occurs connected more to
the indirect effects of the enclave economy, than to the economic activity itself. For
example, in Chile, the main economic resource of the government was royalties on copper
production collected from foreign companies. These royalties accounted for 80% of the
Chilean government foreign currency and 60% of its resources between the 1950s and
1980s. Following the nationalization of the copper industries, the Chilean government
received revenues from mine extracting directly. According to Manuel C as tells,
This created a huge government sector that actually redistributed the money
through the entire economy. The milk cow of the Chilean economy is the '
copper sector. With the demand generated by state expenditures and salaries,
you have the rest of the weak manufacturing sector [sic]. All of this produces
centralization of resources in the hands of the public sector, therefore totally
centered in the capital city. This is also the case in Venezuela where Caracas
grows on the basis of the oil money given to the government, then uses it to
expand the construction sector in the capital. 67
The utilization of oil has been the catalyst for much of Saudi Arabia's urbanization
and the mainstay of a strong economy, raising the standard of living and stimulating urban
development. For example, Riyadh, the seat of the national government where oil
revenues allocated, grew from a pre-industrial settlement of five thousand at the turn of the
century to a small city of thirty-six thousand inhabitants in 1950, and into a bustling
metropolis of 2 million by 1992. 68
Dammam, located at the locus of oil activity, was
transformed from a sleepy fishing hamlet, on the Arabian Gulf shores, into a prominent
city of four hundred thousand people.
Parallel with the growth of the oil industrial activity, the government has recognized
the vitality of strengthening its defense capabilities. Militarization has become a powerful
stimulus for Saudi urban settlements. In April, 1948, the government granted a five-year
lease to the U.S. Navy for its use of an air base in Dhaharan. Dhahran was a growing
town situated at the locus of oil activities to guard the oil installations. The lease was
renewed for another five years in 1951. Another large scale army base was constructed in
1950 in the agricultural town of Kharj, fifty miles south of Riyadh. The base included a

99
small-arms and ammunitions factory, warehouses, and training facilities at the staggering
cost of SR87 million by the standards of that (ten percent of the annual allocations for
1951-52).
The process of urban militarization continued, paralleling the exceptionally high
allocations in building military power. In December, 1964, following King Faisal's
accession, Minister of Defense, Prince Sultan A1 Saud declared that the government would
develop its army. Three major military bases were to be built in Hafir al-Batin (King Khalid
Military City), at Tabuk and at Khamis Mushayt. The undertaking of these mega-projects
spanned the next fifteen years. The bases were located in the vicinity of major towns
according to national security criteria. The resulting urban form represented a bipolarity, in
which two different forms were juxtaposed each referring to different functions and
economies. The new "military cities" formed magnets attracting population and boosting
the urban economies of their nearby towns. The combined construction activities of these
military towns and the massive allocation in social services and infrastructural
developments between 1970, the time of the debut of first five-year plan, and the third fiveyear
plan (1980-85) caused what is commonly known as the decade of the "construction
boom." The cost of these plans was estimated at $9.2 billion, $182 billion, and $337
billion respectively, totaling $ 528.2 billion. By comparison, Saudi oil revenues between
1972 and 1982 totaled $460.3 billion. The annual imports between 1975 and 1981 soared
from SR 14.8 to SR 135 billion ($1.00=SR3.5).69
The oil industry has also been responsible for the growth of towns in other parts of
the country not related directly to the oil industry. For instance, the need to transport crude
Eastern Province oil from the oil fields to the Mediterranean Sea required the construction
of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline) which was completed in 1950. A road was
constructed alongside the pipeline and several water wells were dug to provide drinking
water for the oil-pump stations' staff. Bedouins settled permanently as they-were attracted
by water and work opportunities and soon started urban enclaves. Arar, al-Qaysumah, and
An Nuairiyah towns were originated anew from these bedouin encampments in the early
1950s. Arar has become the regional center of the Northeastern region and by the early
1960s housed a population of 11,171 serviced with a bank, a hospital and schools. By
1987, it boasted a population of 65,000. 70

100
The combined effects of oil exploitation and the state's modernization programs have
drastically altered the traditional urban system. A new urban network has emerged with
minimum reference to the physico-cultural environment In the urban literature of
Developing countries, the restructuring of the national economy to adapt to the needs of the
international economic imperatives, it is argued, has resulted in the spreading of
nationalism, economic development and urbanization in traditional societies. Five
repercussions in the national urban development can be pointed to for their relevance in this
study. 71 First, by accelerating the process of industrialization and integration to the
international economic system, the rate of metropolitan growth increases. Industrialization
induces migration to the urban centers which undermines traditional forms of production in
rural areas. For example, between 1974-84 the area of Jeddah has multiplied 49 times its
previous size. Doxiadis Consultants estimated that by the 1960s, 85 percent of Riyadh's
household heads were born outside the city and that migration accounted for 70 percent of
the city's annual growth rate. 72
Second, the internal pre-industrial structure of the national economy was weakened
while the international linkages were strengthened. The ramifications of such restructuring
are profound. In most developing countries, the concentration of industrial development in
growth poles is encouraged as economic strategy by national authorities to reap maximum
benefits of economies of agglomerations (benefits which expected to accrue when
economic activities take place near each other). A duality in the economic structure emerges
as an urban center witnesses rapid growth whereas a rural periphery's economy is either
stagnant or declining. This results in an influx from the periphery to the center creating a
situation of "over-urbanization" characterized by acute shortages in urban services, severe
unemployment and the emergence of marginal population working in the informal sectors
of the economy. In some developing countries, such factors result in primacy where a city
dominates the national urban structure. In Saudi Arabia, the allocation of oil revenues
outside the oil-rich regions in the form of modernization programs followed political
criteria, that is political stability and national security. Thus, Saudi cities which had had a
major role in the- traditional urban economy such as Makkah and Madinah have lost rank to
the administrative city of Riyadh; and the fishing settlements of Dammam, Khobar and
Dhahran prospered owing their growth to the oil industry. The industrial complexes of
Jubail and Yanbu witnessed unprecedented growth in lieu of the government's effort to
diversify the national economy based on petrochemical industries. Table 3.5 illustrates

101
TABLE 3.5
Top Cities with Population of more than 30,000 (1974) and Their Share of
Private Sector Establishments
CITY
NO ES TABLIS H-MENTS
(1981) 3
%OF COUNTRY'S TOTAL
Est
Riyadh 30,611 21.1
Jeddah 28,651 19.8
Makkah 12,332 '8.5
Attaif 6,735 4.7
Madinah 7,906 5.4
Al-Hasa/Hufuf 5,458 3.8
Dammam 6,828 4.7
Tabouk 2,719 1.9
Buraidah 3,281 2.3
Khamis-Mushait 3,002 2.0
Khubar 3,446 2.4
Najran 1,762 1.2
Hail 2,721 1.9
Jaizan 1,335 1.0
Abha 1,911 1.3
Arar 1,245 0.9
Sources: (Y)The Statistical Indicator, Ministry of Finance and National Economy, (2) Atlas of Saudi
Cities. Ministry of Municipalities and Rural Affairs, (3) Statistical Year Book (1989) Ministry of Finance
and National Economy.

102
how changes brought by the new political and economic developments shuffled the national urban network.
Third, with the transition from a traditional subsistence economy to an exportoriented
economy, urbanization accelerates creating substantial infrastructural problems.
As urban areas become recipients of throngs flocking to the city for jobs and proximity to
services limited to urban centers, the demand for urban services expand more rapidly than
supply. This leads to rapid increases in urban land and housing prices, overcrowded
housing and shortages of essential services. During the early decades prior to the 1970s
increase in world oil prices, the majority of Saudi cities suffered infrastructure shortages.
However, after the launching of the Five-Year Development Plans this situation has been
assuaged in Saudi Arabia. The increase in oil revenues allowed for the allocation in the
development of the urban infrastructure paralleling the urbanization process and industrial
development.
Fourth, acceleration of the urbanization process places pressure on urban land
available for development leading to speculation in the real estate market and, if housing
production lags, a housing problem ensues affecting both lower and middle income
groups. In Saudi Arabia, the Five-Year Plans called for massive allocation in
infrastructural development transforming the country's major cities and towns into a flurry
of construction activity. Numerous foreign firms were called upon to participate in what
became known as "the construction boom" of the 1970s. With the advent of the
construction firms, an influx of expatriates were imported to achieve the targets of the Plan.
N. C. Grill estimated that seventy per cent of the 2.5 million Saudi labor force was being
imported. 73 This resulted in an unprecedented housing shortage and, in some areas, rents
rose to a price equal the property's market value.
The housing shortage was augmented by a city-ward migration by ruralites and
bedouins as demand increased for labor both in the private sector and the rapidly growing
public sector traditionally reserved for nationals. Finally, due to economic transformation
and accelerated development, especially in economically less endowed Third World
countries, a massive proliferation of squatter settlements occurred as the private housing
market failed to meet the increasing demand. Until the 1970s, accelerated migration
resulted in a recrudescence of shanty towns dotting the city periphery and undeveloped land
within the urban areas. 74

103
SUMMARY
In what seemed at the beginning a mere escapade, King Abdul-Aziz A1 Saud
commanded a successful campaign to reaffirm the King and his family's control in the
political affairs of Arabia. The emerging political structure as established by Abdul-Aziz
has been essentially traditional: a monarchy immersed in the values of an Islamic based
tribal and agrarian society. In the Saudi political structure, the monarch rules as well as
reigns and the actual powers of the government are symbolically shared with other
traditional institutions and groups, but in all respects the King has the final say. The King
is vested with absolute power carefully intertwined with religious legitimacy as defined by
the state and supported by the religious body.
Especially during the last two decades, due to excessive government sponsorship,
economic development has progressed at a rate unmatched by most other nations. The
economy has grown to a rank within the 20 largest economies of the world, while the
Saudi population accounts for only .02 of the world's population. In the Saudi Arabian
model, urban development and urbanization owe their impetus to the profound
repercussions brought by the oil economy. Whereas, their character and intensity have
been imbued by the society's political context, urbanization and urban development
followed closely the political system's vision of how to modernize the country in line with
its political leaders' interests. The modernization programs have been replete with the
monarchy's efforts to maintain legitimacy, security and control, while appealing to the
preservation of Islamic traditions conducive to its sustenance. The distribution of oil
wealth has also been a function of the society's developmental stage. To a large extent, the
urban process has become the means to maintain political stability and to attain economic
prosperity rather than the by-product of development itself.
Such socio-political and economic contexts have forged a peculiar urban planning
paradigm. The confluent effects of the cultural context at the macro level- political,
economic and social- have resulted in the making of an urban planning model at the micro
level consistent with the national political and economic culture. In the following chapter, I
will explore the evolution of urban planning in Saudi Arabia. Urban planning has evolved
to reflect the country's centralized decision-making political framework at the national level.
Urban planning has also been wrought under the imperatives of rapid urbanization amidst
considerable influence of foreign planning practices.

104
Notes to Chapter III
Noel Busch, "Life Visits Saudi Arabia." Life Magazine 14, No. 22 (May, 1943), 69.
United Nations, Department of International Economics and Social Affairs. World Urbanization,
Prospects 1990: Estimates and Projections of Urban and Rural Populations and of Urban
Agglomerations (New York; United Nations, 1990), 112.
Kenneth Minogue, "Nationalism" In The Social Science Encyclopedia, edited by A. K. and J.
Kuper (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 551.
C. E. Black. The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History (New York: Harper
& Row, Publishers, 1966).
Douglass C. North, 1988, "Ideology and Political/Economic Institutions," Cato Journal 8
(Spring/Summer 1988), 23. According to North, the revolutionary technology of the 19th century
radically altered the production and distribution of the goods and services. Accompanying this
technology was an enormous increase in specialization and division of labor, and consequently radical
changes in relative prices, which altered the traditional structure of the polity.
Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics (April 1965),
406.
Karl W. Deutsh, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science
Review IV.(September 1961), 493. Quoted in Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and
Political Decay," World Politics (April 1965), 388.
United Nations (1990), 2.
Mark Heller and Nadav Safran. The New Middle Class and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia.
Harvard Middle East Papers, Modern Series: Number 3 (Cambridge, Mass.: Center For Middle
Eastern Studies, Harvard University, 1984); Samuel Huntington. Political Order in Changing
Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
The history of A1 Saud's dynasty's struggle to gain control over central Arabia and other parts goes
back to the eighteenth century. In 1744, Mohammed bin Abdul-Wahhab, a descendant from a
religious house approached Mohammed bin Saud, the ruler of the small town of Deriyah, located in
the vicinity of Riyadh. He convinced Ibn Saud to join him in reforming the religious practices of
the people, whom both agreed, failed to maintain the essence of Islam according to its pure origins.
The history of A1 Saud is divided into three realms spanning the following periods, 1744-1803,
1824-1891, and the third realm, 1902-presenL The outstanding efforts of the founder of today's Saudi
Arabia, King Abdul-Aziz A1 Saud (1890-1953), resulted in the creation of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, a monarchy presided over by the King and his progeny.
In Saudi Arabia there has been a system of contact between the King and other government's political
leaders which is called majlis. It has been argued to be an approach to make public demands and
concerns reach the King or his aides. It is commonly used by the public to petition requests for

105
financial support, complaints, requests for governmental services and the like. It is not governed by
documented procedures or based on legal powers.
12
Mark Heller and Nadav Safran. The New Middle Class and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia.
Harvard Middle East Papers, Modern Series: Number 3 (Cambridge, Mass.: Center For Middle
Eastern Studies, Harvard University, 1984), Nadav Safran.Saittft Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest For
Security (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).
Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1968), 155.
Ahmad A1 Shamkh. 1975. Spatial Patterns of Bedouin Settlements in Al Qasim Region, Saudi
Arabia, Ph.D. Dissertation (University of Kentucky, 1975).
For a quick reference on economic resources available to the government in the pre-oil era, see
Michael Field, "Saudi Arabia: The Eastern Province Before Oil," Middle East International 86 (Aug,
1978):27-29.
16 Alan George, "Bedouin Settlement in Saudi Arabia," Middle East International 51 (September,
1975), 27.
17 Along with the majority of the inland area, the population of Najd, the Ikhwan (Muslim
brotherhood), adhered to the dominant puritanical religious movement led by the eighteenth century
reformer, Mohammed Bin Abdul-Wahhab. During the early period of King Abdul-Aziz's reign, they
comprised a fighting force of 73,000 by some accounts.
18 King Abdul-Aziz also made use of technology when he installed eleven wireless stations and four
mobile stations which he utilized to control the bedouins. E. Monroe, Philby of Arabia (London:
Quartet Books, 1980), 172.
19
A. George (1975), 28.
20 H. S. Al-Musallim and A. F. Al-Quraishi, "Al Istitan wa-al Qawuai'd allati Tah'kum Nomu wa-
Takween Al Hijar." (Sedentarization: the Rules that Govern its Growth and Formation) Second
Conference for Municipalities and Rural Communities. First Edition. (Riyadh: National Guards
Press, 1985).
21 Based on previous trials, the Council of Ministers (CM) issued several decrees to avoid past
mistakes. See for example CM Decree 3 dated l/l/1403h (1983) which authorized the Ministry of
Municipalities and Rural Affairs to oversee the activity. The government control over the new hijar
was strengthened by issuing the Royal Order 11671 dated 16/5/1401h (1981). The Order stipulated
that lands granted for hijar settlements are not private grants that entail recipients to sell or cede the
land without state authorization. Moreover, Royal Decrees 10607 dated 8/5/1401,11398 of
14/5/1402h (1981) ordered a halt to new settlements unless justified by due feasibility studies.
Source: Al-Musallim et. al. op cit.
22 This is valid if both studies of the two ministries use the same definitions of what constitutes hijrah.
The 1974 census lists the total number of settlements ("localities") at 20,995. See Kadi and Ibraeem
(1981), 10, below.

106
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
According to Clifford Geertz. In Bryan Roberts, Cities of Peasants: The Political Economy of
Urbanization in Third World Countries (Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications, 1984), 110.
King Abdul-Aziz abolished pilgrim dues charged to Muslim pilgrims one year before his death in
1953. Pilgrimage dues accounted for $30 million a year.
U.S. Government Publications, Foreign Relations of the United States (1974) pp. 734-36, cited in
Michael G. Nehme, Saudi Arabia: Political Implications of the Development Plans. Unpublished
Dissertation, Graduate Program in Political Science (New Jersey: Rutgers University, 1983), quoting
President Roosevelt, 48.
Ministry of Transportation. Roads of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Pictures, p. 1. In 1953 there
were only 239 kilometers of paved roads. In 1962, the number reached 3,245 km, and in 1979, the
asphalt roads length reached 20,134 km. By 1990,32,000 kilometers of asphalt roads were
constructed and 66,600 km of dirt roads were surfaced connecting distant small agricultural and
nomads' settlements. Source: Ministry of Planning. Fifth Development Plan. Ali Johany, "The •
Saudi Economy: Yesterday's Performance and Tomorrow's Prospects." In Saudi Arabia: Energy,
Developmental Planning and Industrialization, edited by R. El Mallakh and D. H. El Mallakh
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1982): 1-14. For the figure on the number of cars in 1933, see
Captain C.C. Lewis, "Ibn Saud and The Future of Arabia," International Affairs (July, 1933): 518-
534.
Michael Field, "Saudi Arabia: The Eastern Province Before Oil." Middle East International 86
(August 1978), 29.
Elizabeth Monroe (1980), op. cit., 274.
David Howrath. The Desert King (London: Quarter Books, 1980),170.
H. St. J. B. Philby, "Riyadh: Ancient and Modern," The Middle East Journal 2 (Spring, 1959), 140.
Howrath, 198.
Faraj F. Al-Mawled, "Political Geography of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia," Saudi Studies
(Riyadh: Diplomatic Studies Institute, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1986). 'In Arabic.
George Lenczowski, "Tradition and Reform in Saudi Arabia," Current History (February, 1967), 99.
Ibid, 100.
Ibid, 101.
Samuel Huntington (1968), 168.
See Motoko Datakura's Bedouin Village. (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977) and Donald P.
Colse's Nomads of the Nomads (Arlington Heights, HI: AHM Publishing, 1975).

107
Abdul-Rahman H. Al-Said, "The Transition from a Tribal Society to a Nation-StateIn Saudi
Arabia: Energy, Developmental Planning and Industrialization, edited by R. El Mallakh (Lexington,
MA: Lexington Books, 1982), 101.
39
See government expenditures on selective cities' municipalities in Chapter 4.
40
Ibid, 102.
Royal Decree number 41/1/1 of 1359/1940. Hasan Sa'ad Bin Said, Ministry of Interior: Security
and Development, p.72.
4^
Thomas ODea, ed. Aramco Special Study Group, "Social Change in Saudi Arabia: Problems and
Prospects," (Dhahran: Arabian American Oil Company, 1963), 70. Quoted in A1 Said, 101.
43
A1 Said, 102.
44
Ibid, 103. I do have difficulty accepting this rather simple argument The abolition of traditional
multi-power systems is consistent and an inevitable outcome of the emphasis on central authority
manifest in the King as the head of the bureaucracy.
45
A 1990 UN report estimates the Saudi population at 14.134 million. United Nations (1990), op.
cit. The first and only official census of 1974 lists a total population of 7,009,466 living in 20,995
"locality." Omar A. Kadi and Hazim, M. Ibraheem, Takhteet al-Mudon fee al-Mamlakah al-Arabiyah
Assa'udiyah [City Planning in Saudi Arabia] (Riyadh: Saudi Arabian Press Ltd., 1981), 12-15. In
1974, there were 16 cities with 30,000 inhabitants. By 1987, the number of cities with such
population rose to 23. MOMRA, Atlas of Saudi Cities, Existing Conditions, 1407H (1987).
^ Alan George, "Bedouin Settlement in Saudi Arabia," Middle East International 51 (September,
1975), 28.
4^ H. S. Al-Musallim and A. F. Al-Quraishi, 459.
4
® The number of students receiving elementary education rose from 122,905 in 1961/2 to 422,744 in
1970/1 and by 1989 it reached 1,694,394 Source: Ministry of Finance and National Economy
1409/1989. Table 2-8. However, the total number of students population amounts to 2,500,000.
Source: Fifth Development Plan, 1990-95.
4^
Numbers refer to nationals only. There were 4% of non-Saudis engaged in agricultural activity in
1986. Source: Maslahat al-Ihsa'at al-A'amah (General Statistical Agency). Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Labor Force in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: 1986.
Gasssan Salamah, "Saudi Arabia: Development and Dependence,"The Jerusalem Quarterly. 20
(Summer, 1980).
51 Ministry of Planning, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Achievements of the Development Plans: 1390-
1407 "1970-1987 (Riyadh: Ministry of Planning Press, 1987), 204-7.

108
52 Clive A. Sinclair, and J. S. Birks, "Manpower in Saudi Arabia, 19801985," In R. El Mallakh and
D. El Mallakh(1982), 162.
53 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, Fifth Development Plan, 1410/1990-1415/1995
(1989), 197. It must be noted here that there are implicit costs involved in figures of increases of
domestic subsidized production. Calculations of benefits and costs must include consumption of
water, loss of currency to foreign labor and machinery, for example. This point also applies to the
(nominal) increases in figures of industrial production.
In Saudi Arabia, more than 4 million individuals (50.1%) of the total number of those who live in
the Kingdom, twelve years and above, comprise the working force. The remaining 49.9% of the
total number of those who live in the country are distributed as follows: (1) 23% are household
wives and other individuals whose work is house-related such as maids, (2) 21% students, (3)
3%.unable to work, and (4) 3% others. The Saudi nationals comprise 1.5 million of the total
number (or 36.6%) out of which men account for 92.9%. The number of non-Saudi laborers is
estimated at 2.5 million (63.4%) of the total labor force in the Kingdom. Source: Maslahat al-Ihsa'at
al-A'amah (General Statistical Agency). Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Labor Force in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia: 1986.
55 Peter Mansfield, 77 ~ New Arabians (Chicago: J. G. Ferguson Publishing Company, 1981), 166.
56 Ministry of Planning. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Fifth Development Plan, 1410/1990-1415/1995
(Riyadh: Ministry of Planning Press), 141. Especially since the debut of the five-year development
plans, the government established specialized credit institutions such as the Real Estate Development
Fund, Public Investment Fund, Saudi Industrial Development Fund, Saudi Arabian Agricultural
Bank, Saudi Credit Bank, and Specialized Credit Programs. The assets of these institutions amounts
to SR 197 billion in 1989, only ten percent less than the combined assets of all commercial banks.
During the course of their activity, they provided more than SR 234 billion.
57
Ibid, 141.
58
59
"Back in Business," The Middle East (August, 1990), 26.
Farouk M. Akhdar, "The Philosophy of Saudi Arabia's Industrialization Policy," In R. El Mallakh,
17
60
Ibid, 17.
Gary Samore, The New York Times (Sunday, October 18,1981), 14. Quoted in Nehme, Michael G.
Saudi Arabia: Political Implications of the Development Plans. Unpublished Dissertation (New
Jersey: Rutgers University, 1983), 11.
62 Mark Heller and Nadav Safran, "The New Middle Class and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia,"
Harvard Middle East Papers, Modem Series: Number 3 (Cambridge, Mass.: Center For Middle
Eastern Studies, Harvard University, 1984).
63 Alan George, op. cit

109
64 N.C. Grill, "Urbanization In The Arabian Peninsula," Occasional Papers Series (Durham, U.K.:
Center for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Durham, 1984.), 35.
65 Gasssan Salamah, op. cit.
66 Dependency theory postulates an exploitative integration of Third World economies into the
international capitalist market system. Some argue that such a relationship has been present since
the formation of the international/imperial banking in medieval Europe (Wallerstein, 1966).
Although I accept that Developing nations have developed dependent on Developed countries capital,
and technology, my analysis does not necessarily follow the intentional/exploitative thesis of
classical dependency theory.
67 According to Castells, the historians of Latin American note that commercial dependency has four
types: (1) the "enclave economy," (a form of "dependency based on the exploitation by foreign capital
of a natural resource"), (2) agricultural import-export dependency such as the case of Argentine's
cattle production, (3) plantation economy in which the economy is based on large-scate production of
particular crops such as cotton, sugar, coffee, etc., and (4) subsistence economy in which the process
of production in the country and the world market is lacking. This was the case of Saudi Arabia
prior to the exploitation of oil. In the case of the plantation economy, we find a national spatial
structure comprising large rural settlements. The population inhabits the countryside in large
villages linked with small towns which become the control centers. A low level of urbanization is
the norm with the presence of one central, large city. Manuel Castells. "Urbanization and
Dependency in the Third World." Class Notes (Transcribed from audio tape). PLUS 508, School of
Urban & Regional Planning, Los Angeles: University of Southern California (Spring, 1984).
68 The United Nations' report, World Urbanization, Prospects, 1990, estimated Riyadh's population at
2 million in 1990 and 2.7 by 1995, op cit., 192.
69 Nadav Safran (1988).
7
0 Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs, 1987, op cit.
Manuel Castells, op cit
72
N.G. Grill, 3.
73
N. C. Grill, 49.
74
Manuel Castells, op.cit

CHAPTER IV
URBAN PLANNING:
NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND CITY PLANNING
In the preceding chapter, I focused on the socio-political and economic processes of
formation, growth and location which primarily determined the shift, organization and
distribution of the contemporary spatial network in Saudi Arabia. The operation of these
forces was largely affected by the oil economy and political circumstance of the nationstate.
The scale of urbanization must not be underestimated. The pace of urbanization in
the Arab Gulf states, with urban percentages reaching 96 percent, has not been matched by
any other major areas of the world. 1 In Libya, eighty-one percent of the population is
urban, more urban than Italy. 2 A consequence is inevitable dependence on Western
planning expertise, due to Western precedence in the field. The restructuring of the
national economy under the aegis of the new nation-state spurred the urbanization process
and Saudi towns and settlements became foci of unprecedented growth, exhibiting
overcrowding, high levels of chronic deprivation and poverty. Generally speaking, the
internal organization of urban forms remained free of public accountability so that urban
development took place in an unregulated and uncontrolled fashion, resembling traditional,
organic forms. The outlying fringe of towns underwent rapid, uncontrolled growth,
lacking infrastructure, public services and social amenities. Old neighborhoods suffered
overcrowding and chronic traffic congestion as traditional tortuous circulation space,
designed for pedestrian and animal transport became clogged under the increasing use of
the automobile.
During the early decades of the Kingdom (1930-1960), new neighborhoods sprouted
housing waves of 'urban villagers' in substandard residential stock, while bedouins pitched
their tents and constructed makeshift dwellings in undeveloped sections of towns or
scattered on the periphery, forming the hilal, communities of relatively homogeneous
inhabitants sharing tribal lineage or place of origin. 3 Under these circumstances, the
government introduced a series of measures to circumscribe urban development and to
direct it toward socially desirable goals. These measures were ad hoc and applied with
limited social and environmental considerations. Later, these efforts developed to what is
currently referred to as urban and regional planning in Saudi Arabia, an elitist and
technocratic activity solely done by the central government.

Ill
My discussion starts with a historical overview of the development of urban planning
in the Western hemisphere. This is meant to set the stage for a comparative development of
the planning profession in contrasting cultures. Overwhelmed by rapid change, local
authorities in many Developing countries relied on Western models to assuage negative
outcomes accompanying rapid urbanization. Western planning consultants were hired to
draft wholesale master and comprehensive plans. For example, in a period of a little less
than two years, an American consulting firm was hired by the Libyan government to
complete thirty-five long term master plans for Libyan towns and cities. 4 Moreover,
Western paradigms have also come into vogue through the training of architects and
planners of the host countries in Western institutions. The unguarded use of imported
architecture and urban planning paradigms presents a paradox. Stefano Bianca wrote
Hence Muslim societies are facing an ambiguous situation: in most
countries, Islam still provides firm religious bonds and a strong
sense of community. On the other hand, western institutions,
political, economic and educational systems have been adopted,
which to some extent contradict the Islamic way of life....The tools
of European civilization imply a value system and an ideology of
their own, which is inseparable from the corresponding
techniques....Therefore, an indiscriminate use of these tools in the
Islamic context will necessarily mean a cultural struggle and
penetration by alien ideological concepts. 5
On the one hand, there is a deep concern over reaffirming traditional values and
bringing identity to the contemporary built environment. On the other hand, due to rapid
development, their was little time to ponder on the device of culturally-based design models
and policies. Instead, governmental planning organs fell on Western models. To Rowe,
the process of contemporary urban development sharply contrasts the past and draws
heavily on post-War Western architecture and planning models. Unlike its Western
counterpart, the Western models employed in Saudi Arabia, have not passed through
critical assessment as they have been maintained essentially in their original forms 6
I. THE ORIGINS OF WESTERN URBAN PLANNING AND THE ROLE OF WESTERN
CONSULTANTS
In Europe, Galantay wrote, "Christianity strove to enhance its identity with respect to
Judaism and to Islam, and fell back on classical traditions by embracing rationalism. Thus
Abelard claimed logic to be the preeminent Christian science and St. Thomas Aquinas
argued that a city must be the 'perfect and absolute assembly of its parts' which encouraged

112
the search for geometrical regularity in town planning and architecture." Rationally
organized towns were reintroduced in the planning of European towns in the 12th and 13th
centuries. The orthogonal grid became associated with a sense of Christian prosperity
while the "Islamic labyrinth" was linked by Christian theologians to evil, "the perfection of
Zion contrasted to sinful Babylon." Galantay argued
During the reconquest of Spain, the narrow streets of Moorish
towns, were decried as "deformitats" which called for street
widening, regularization, and the creation of more public space to
correspond to the extroverted Christian lifestyle....Stereotypes die
slowly and even 19th century orientalists- like Richard Burtoncontributed
to the notion of the Islamic maze as a titillating hive of
sins... 7
"It is sad," Galantay continues, "that this caricatural evaluation has been assimilated by a
number of Western-trained Islamic politicians who consider the Medina as an eyesore and
an obstacle to modernization." 8
Modern urban planning emerged in Europe and North America during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a response to the negative byproducts of the
industrial city. The influx of masses seeking employment and better services in the
industrial city, led to squalid urbanization, for change brought by industrialization was too
rapid for the essentially pre-industrial city system to handle. The industrial metropolis
became a breeding ground for disease, crime and revolutionary sentiments. The debate
over whether the living conditions were significantly worse in the industrial city than they
had been in the countryside prior to industrialization aside, the mass shift from rural to
urban employment resulted in a concentration of deprivation manifest in the proliferation of
the overcrowded urban slums amidst smoke, soot and waterways filled with household and
factory refuse. The persistence of these viles posed a threat to the ruling elite and middle
class, who no longer could be isolated from the squalid conditions of the workers'
neighborhoods.
The laissezfaire approach, which emphasizes a self-regulatory market system with
minimum government intervention, to economic growth during the early period of
industrialization proved insufficient to address those conditions and societal consciousness
arose in search for causes and solutions. In the West, government rule was augmented
following the establishment of a vigorous private sector. Though this took various forms,

113
the modern state, advocating the "public interest," arbitrated between various interests to
maintain a stable, dynamic society to raise subjects' welfare. 9 For example, in their
discussion of the baroque city and urbanism, Hohenberg and Lees noted that "Most of the
capital for actual construction was private." In the United States, prior to the beginning of
this century, urban planning was essentially physical and backed by wealthy private
sponsors. In contrast, in modern non-Western societies, the state, more than private
entities, has become the principal navigator of development. 10
Three responses emanated from the city's deteriorating conditions in the nineteenth
century. 11 First, a rural Utopia or a rejectionist response advocated the return to the
predominantly rural context of the medieval period. The second response took a
compromising approach to reform some features of the industrial society. This response
called for controlling the urban industrial milieu, and eventually such efforts culminated in
such planning approaches as the Garden City movement. The third response was the
radical one. Although it accepted industrialization as a necessity and reality of the times,
the radical response proponents advocated revolt against established means of distribution
of resources in the society. The proponents called for massive reconstruction by which
existing institutions, values, and social mechanisms would be supplanted by a new social
system. Mannheim disparaged the revolt response as wish fulfillments "chiliasm". He
considered them as projections of dreams, "the social Utopias." 12
The evolution of modem Western planning owes considerably to the Utopias of the
nineteenth century. Utopias were based on social theories which advocated certain desired
values and practices by presenting them in an ideal state or society. They were projections
of their authors' conceptions of ideal living habitats. The tradition of Utopian response to
the deteriorating city reflected the need to confront the ailing social conditions of the
industrial city. Utopias sought the eradication of major social malaise brought by rapid
change, through the use of intelligent physical design, a tradition to be copied in future
urban reforms. From Robert Owen's A New View of Society (1813) to Frank Lloyd
Wright's blueprints of the Broad Acre City, such efforts were essentially reactionary. They
envisaged a trouble-free, self-sustaining village that combined the good of the countryside
with the free air of the city, all geared toward the social, educational and employment needs
of the inhabitants.

114
By the end of the 19th century, Utopia idealism took a more vigorous and elaborate
direction. In his influential 1898 work, To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform,
Ebenezer Howard launched a new critique to the twin evils of the society, the depopulation
of the countryside and overcrowding in the city. He introduced the Garden City, a place
that combined the positive aspects of both the city and the countryside. He defined the
Garden City as "a Town designed for healthy living and industry; of size that makes
possible a full measure of social life, but not larger; surrounded by a rural belt; the whole of
the land being in public ownership or held in trust for the community." 13 He envisioned
garden city communities of 32,000 people each. Each of the six garden cities would circle
a central comprehensively planned city of 58,000 residents. Howard's ideas resulted in the
building of two garden cities, Letchworth in 1903 and Welwyn in 1919 and in the U.S.,
France, Sweden, Japan and elsewhere.
Concurrently, the degradation of the industrial city aroused scientific research and
inquiry. The literature shows two contrasting approaches to solving the problems of urban
deprivation. The radical approach of Marx and Engels was revolutionary and proposed the
overthrow of the social and political systems which they blamed for turning the city into
dark enclaves of misery and exploitation of the working class. The conservative
alternative, essentially of middle class origin, opted for a greater role by the state. This
alternative perceived it to be the duty of the state to make up for the industrial era's worst
excesses. Planning developed along three trajectories: the 'hygienic type of planning which
gave birth to the Sanitary Reform movement and many national public health acts
incorporated into building requirements which sought to reduce levels of morbidity and
early mortality. 14
Another trajectory was the City Beautiful Movement, a response to laissezfaire,
which emphasized the city as one planned unit, as a work of art, set in a master plan which
specified land use, supplemented by comprehensive zoning ordinances to assure its
implementation. The third approach was the architectural tradition, it perceived the city as
an artifact, a product of sculptured built spaces and forms. It viewed the city more as a
product than as a process. Hausmann's reconstruction of Paris, and the restructuring of its
boulevards for purposes of crowd control belongs to this tradition, as does Burnham's
1909 Chicago Plan, Le Corbusier's monumental Radiant City designs, and the Italian
Futurist New City movement advocated by Marinetti in 1909, a comprehensive high rise,
elevated high speed urban habitat designed on a grand scale. These Utopian designs placed

115
more importance on "means" and implementation as compared to the earlier ones
characterized by unrealistic idealism. The construction of these conceptional cities were to
be attained through the mass production methods made possible by modern technology.
This approach was summarized in Le Corbusier's Toward a New Architecture (1925).
Another approach took the form of extensive central government planning as
exemplified by the British and Western European experiments in new towns. By bringing
public-owned land under state planning agencies, development plans are drafted and
mechanisms for private participation are laid down. In these examples, public ownership is
the key. For instance, Stockholm's ownership of vast vacant land made possible the
development of housing as well as the public transportation system and are good examples
of comprehensive planning. While commended for providing accessibility to the elderly
and the politically underrepresentated groups such as teenagers and housewives, planned
public development has been criticized for several shortcomings including imposing
"technocratic concepts upon a passive clientele...unpopular high-rise housing, a neglect of
social facilities, and in the U.S. extensive displacement of the poor in the interests of
subsidized commercial development." 15
During the 1930s and 1940s, the controversy over the need for government
intervention to bring direct social change and to maximize socially desirable ends reached
its peak. The proponents for intervention included Karl Mannheim, Rexford Tugwell, and
Barbra Wooton who confronted free market laissezfaire supporters represented by
Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig Von Mises. For them, the debate seemingly settled on the
need for planning in a capitalist society. In a free-market democratic society, the argument
for planning has been justified on four grounds. Firstly, the economic justification is based
on the widely accepted view that markets cannot perfectly attain competitiveness (i.e. the
Pareto efficient allocation is not realized) and due to the notion .of 'market failure'. Both
classical and neoclassical economists have agreed that even perfectly competitive markets
suffer from the presence of (i) public goods, (ii) externalities (spillovers), (iii) prisoners'
dilemma situations (a case in which one's pursuit of his own self interest does not lead to
an optimal outcome for society), and (iv) distributional issues. 16
In short, modern urban planning in Europe and North America was born in response
to the industrial revolution and the squalid conditions brought by the shift from cottage
industry to the large factory mass production enlisting throngs of the working class. The

116
resulting adverse conditions inspired social consciousness in the form of Utopias and
philanthropy, and later in the institutionalization of urban planning. With the improvement
of the physical environment, early planners expected the major social ills in the city to
disappear. In the West, modern urban planning emerged in an open political environment
and reflected the imperatives of its economic systems, and governments' involvement in
urban development in various degrees reflected citizens whose votes affected the political
process. In contrast, in many developing nation-states, planning is de facto activity which
lies within domain of the central state.
II. URBAN PLANNING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
In Developing countries, rapid transformation occurred amidst dismal political and
economic environments. The transition from traditional, pre-industrial social systems into
modern urban conglomerations was initiated by colonialism and later augmented by the
subordination of internal economies of the newly formed nation-states to the world's
political economic system. The inteijection of foreign powers in the path of cultural
development precluded the development of local processes compatible with and geared
toward local culture's needs. The departure of these colonial systems left behind a political
vacuum which was filled by despotic military regimes and traditional monarchies. In the
wake of Western technology, traditional urban design and building processes were
rendered obsolete, less capable of meeting growth demand under rapid urbanization. The
substitution of the traditional ways of life and building techniques necessitated new
concepts of spatial organization, at the individual building level as well as on the city scale.
Imported planning paradigms and construction methods, coupled with the introduction of
the automobile, aborted old ones and pre-empted indigenous development under inertia.
Overwhelmed by rapid urbanization, the fledgling states took the task of urban planning.
Urban planning has inherently become the prerogative of the state, an activity which has
since remained sealed from the public.
To a very large extent, the colonization of non-Western territories by European
powers forged the map of the modern world. By the time of their departure, these
territories were transformed into distinctive geographic territories with economies
established during colonization. New nation-states emerged supplanting colonial control,
predominantly governed by authoritative political systems. The newly established nationstates
inherited a centralized framework of administration. Regarding this point, Reissman

117
states "A more important problem consequent upon colonialism is that it generally restricted
the development of an effective indigenous leadership." 17 Many Developing countries'
governments are guarded about the extent of their power and influence. They perceive
efforts to uncover society's negative aspects as a form of sedition. In some authoritative
regimes, the authorities may resort to macabre witch-hunt expeditions aimed at individuals
who remonstrate or criticize the state or point out shortcomings and negative traits or
practices of the system. The stability and security of many of these regimes has been
achieved through police power and centralization of authority. Even critical inquiry such as
Jacob Riis' in the US is likely to be suppressed.
Given the centralized nature of Arab countries political systems, the modern
development of the Arab city proceeded with little autonomy. Control of local affairs is
vested in the central government, whereby centralized decisions and policy making are
equally applied in various localities. Therefore, this lack of local superstructure of political
and legal relations is reflected in increasing similarities in settlements forms. G. Bear wrote
The Arab city, like the village, was never an 'organism' but only a
conglomeration, and even today it has few institutions of self-rule.
The Arab town of the Middle Ages was without independent or
autonomous municipal institutions. Since then, the inhabitants have
had some share in their city's management, and in most Middle
Eastern Arab cities there is a baladiya (municipality). But even
now, central authorities have a firm hand on these bodies'; in Egypt
they are composed of representatives elected and appointed by the
authorities,....In Saudi Arabia, too, most of the members of the
municipalities are appointed. 18
The administrative-legal organization of the Arab Middle Eastern city grew
subservient to the central bureaucracy. In most cases, local autonomy is usurped by the
central authority where conflict persists between the various state agencies and interests. 19
Towns and cities' governments have no established procedures and rights to obtain semiautonomy
through charters or to create city governments and exercise political and
economic decision-making over their jurisdiction. This renders these entities dependent on
the central government's bureaucratic guidance and financial aid, which shoulders
enormous responsibilities on the central government and calls for a bloated bureaucracy.
Moreover, a lack of open political life impedes citizens' participation and input at the cost of
great potential for locally creative leadership and effective handling of communities' affairs.
Consequently, the local governments and city municipalities have become emasculated.

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Instead, the emerging system "is based on dual organization of the municipality and the
province. The most salient feature of municipal administrative system in the Near and
Middle East is the extensive scope of national control ." 20
From the previous review, it was made clear that, in the West, modern urban
planning materialized from the progressive and reform movements headed by politicians,
lawyers, philosophers, idealists and design professionals. Their efforts and views
culminated in the institutionalization of modern urban planning in the early decades of this
century. In the Western context, urban planning matured through subjugating its activity to
open debate in a favorable political environment. The urban planning profession has been
modified over time, incorporating socioeconomic considerations. According to John
Dyckman et al, planning practices
grew up with local government reform, and with the conviction that
such government could be made 'fairer' and more efficient by the
application of rational methods, by the strengthening of an
'impartial' professional bureaucracy and by liberal infusions of a
supposedly value-free science....This is strongly the case if
'rationality' is more broadly rendered to mean confidence that wellconsidered
means will be effective, and that the quality of
governance can be improved by the application of rational
methods. 21
Claus Offe, a German sociologist, distinguishes three processes of policy
formulation: (1) bureaucratic policy making (corresponding to Weber's ideal-type), (2),
policy making through interest group conflict and bargaining, and (3), policy making by
end-means rationality or planning. 22
Urban planning is a decision making process which
deals with the production of a "designated result such as a particular pattern of land use or
specific level of economic growth." 23 In the pluralist literature, planning is viewed as a
method of policy formulation which involves the coordination of means-ends relations in
line of defined objectives. This approach is rooted in the democratic character of the
"pluralist bargaining order-terms that refer to an idealized system of political decision
making, based upon plural sources of power, plural points of access to government, and
plural, competing interests." 24 On the other hand, 'synoptic planning' advocates the
making of decisions by intellectual problem solving. It was disparaged for being
inconsistent with democratic ideals, for it substitutes expertise opinion for public
participation. 25 Writing in 1944, Friedrich Hayek recognized the innate proclivity of

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planning toward expertise and technically based decision making. Hayek believed such a
tendency is "subversive of both liberty and democracy." 26
Many non-Western countries have blindly adopted physical aspects of Western
planning. This is largely due to these countries governments' need to shift from rural,
traditional economies to modern, diversified economies, as they engage their societies in an
irrevocable process of industrialization. Hie reliance on the mostly technical Western
planning paradigms was largely to protect these states' allocation and investments, for
national development programs enlist enormous national resources, a task which is hardly
sustained without such expertise. John Dyckman et al states, "What is most commonly
expected of the Western planning expertise are the qualities-speed, order, efficiency,
organization, structure, accountability- which lenders, donors and local leaders find
missing in their indigenous management practices. In many countries this is what is meant
by 'modernization.'" 27 Due to its complex technical paraphernalia and elegance, lay
citizens, bureaucrats, and politicians commonly defer to Western planning, though a
profession born within the neoclassical economics. At home, neoclassical economics has
been criticized for its tendency to exclude issues from legitimate political considerations. In
addition, it has been argued that neoclassical (standard) economics encourages a sanguine
view of the status quo and disseminates the comforting illusion that the market is capable of
effectively reflecting the aspirations of the sovereign actors 28
II. PLANNING PROCESS, POLICY MAKING AND URBAN PLANNING IN SAUDI
ARABIA
At best, the planning model of Saudi Arabia resembles the 'synoptic planning'
approach. Urban development in Saudi Arabia is shaped by several factors, one of which
is urban planning, an apolitical activity performed within a given agenda sealed from public
scrutiny. The planning process in the Kingdom is a projection of the central government'
political character. Policy formulation and decision making also fall within the purview of
the bureaucracy, a complex organization encompassing twenty three ministries all which
affect the urban process to various degrees. The King presides at the top of the
bureaucracy which deals with the application of fixed rules to cases. The application of
these top-down decisions has resulted in the production of urban forms that share similar
features, the grid iron layout, rectangular land subdivisions, and utter lack of relevance to
the physical environment, among others. All in all, the Saudi urban planning model is a

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highly technical one, in the sense that it is devoid of formal public participation (see the
majlis forum in chapter two).
The practice of contracting foreign expertise also extends to the domain of urban
planning. Constrained by time and contract costs, foreign planning consultants tend to be
inattentive to the host society's history, culture and the institutional framework. Many
consultants either rely on mediocre studies or stay aloof from studying local culture and
confronting local politics. These studies' effectiveness depends upon the host country's
governments' willingness to implement the plans and to subject findings and outcomes to
public and professional scrutiny. It also depends on local planners' capabilities to handle
the implementation stages and feedback process, which is usually of long duration. In this
chapter, I will focus on decision making processes that are directly related to the
organization of spatial development, which loosely constitutes the field of urban and
regional planning.
In the Saudi urban domain, the transformation of the built environment and the
resulting rigid character it came to embody was a function of several factors including (1)
the unguarded application of Western planning architecture and planning models, (2) the
lack of local adept expertise and well developed indigenous institutions capable of offering
solutions for the emerging transitional problems, and (3) the overall dismal political
environment incapable of advocating independent initiative and allow for self-evaluating
mechanisms, based rationality and open to popular scrutiny. 29
Faced with a phenomenal rate of urbanization that has been running from 10 to 12
percent per annum during the booming decade of the 1970s, the Saudi government has
resorted to various forms of planning practices to assuage urbanization's negative
byproducts- overcrowding, substandard housing, lack of sewage systems, public and
social services. Between 1950 and 1985, the level of urbanization in Saudi Arabia
increased from 10% to 75%. 30 For example, Dammam, at the center of the oil industry
activity in the Eastern Province, has transformed from a sleepy settlement of 300 huts in the
1930s to a teeming city of 450,000 people in 1986. Ninety percent of Dammam's housing
stock was built during the last twenty years and 35 percent in the last five years (Table, 1).
Riyadh, the capital of the country, sprang from a burgh of 19,000 inhabitants in the 1920s
to a bustling metropolis of an estimated 1.3 million people in the mid-1980s. The
discovery of oil in 1938 has become the catalyst for an unprecedented urbanization process.

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With oil income available to the central government, such income has been used in the
modernization of the traditional society. During the reign of King Faisal, rising oil
revenues became large enough for the government to shift the economy into higher gears
which ultimately expedited the transformation of the physical environment.
A brief discussion of the development of government national planning apparatus and
policy formulation in the Kingdom is needed to elucidate the direct role of the government
in shaping the contemporary built environment. I will review the planning system, its
components and processes in the Kingdom, the understanding of how urban planning
evolved as pliant and confined to the public sector, how it fits into the bureaucratic
organization, and how it has been wrought at the national level. As such, national planning
and urban planning have become instrumental in conveying a noblesse oblige notion of a
paternalistic leadership and views through the making of national policies that have been
proclaimed to be in the best interest of the population and to produce satisfied and
productive citizens. These policies have resulted in profound ramifications on the built
environment. In Saudi Arabia, there are no property taxes or other forms of taxes that local
municipalities can levy on local residents and businesses to support their own services,
save nominal fees such as specific application processing . Instead, the national
government provides all local expenditures including staff salaries and projects. In return
for such a privilege, local initiative is substituted by top-down decisions mandated by the
national government, hence emasculating local government's initiative. 31
As decades unfold, the government assumed a larger role in the economy, hence the
transformation of the built environment. During the early decades of its formation, the state
called upon Aramco to assess the various problems that growth brought with it. Whether
due to little interest or lack of a basic understanding of the local culture, the oil company's
surveyors relied on the gridiron pattern in the laying of the new parts of the traditional
settlements, as opposed to emulating vernacular urban design and planning while
considering modern technology. It was rationalized for its expediency and flexibility for
rapid growth. The imposition of the grid system on the local urban system, with its
setback concept, have since popularized the villa as the preferred residential unit. Both new
concepts called for the utilization of vast area as opposed to the compact old town forms.
For example, the proportion of land required for circulation space was multiplied based on
the anticipation of the increased use of the automobile in the future. This great emphasis on
vehicular circulation contrasts those of the traditional built environment, where circulation

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space had a secondary status to that of built spaces. In the historical settlement forms, the
configuration of the circulation space was confined to the residual unbuilt space, delineating
the edges of the community and served as open space for social interaction.
Furthermore, in 1951, Aramco and the Saudi government introduced the Housing
Ownership Program (HOP) to help counter the spread of shantytowns doting the rim of the
planned communities. Aramco's Saudi workers were entitled to a free-interest loan
amortized through installments that were taken from stipends. The land was provided free
by the government and potential applicants were required to design their own units. The
HOP set the popularity of the construction of the villa type in the new subdivisions for it
mandated that Saudi employees construct their houses in the newly laid gridiron network.
The project proved successful, for the population associated rising income, prestige and
technological conveniences with the construction of new concrete, detached houses.
Aramco's platted developments for its Saudi working force with their rectangular street
network and detached villa houses became the progenitor which other towns emulated in
their growth. Even in cases where lots were too small to allow for a surrounding yard, the
new homes were adorned with wide windows, small balconies and doors that opened
directly into the infinite rectangular street network, an aberrant to the convoluted tree-like
circulation space of the traditional built environment. Their fenestration ignored climatic
considerations and privacy, neighbors no longer had established procedures to protest
being exposed by next-door buildings' windows and balconies.
For purposes of simplicity, the development of national and urban planning will be
chronologically organized. National and urban planning has developed through stages,
however overlapping. They include (1) the introduction of legislative urban growth
controls and the emergence of the organized municipalities, (2) the construction and
development of new towns and planned communities, (3) the emergence of city master
plans and comprehensive planning, (4) comprehensive national planning and the adoption
of the five-year national planning approach,and (5), the construction of new industrial
towns. But first an overview of the political character and administrative structure of the
government and their relation to the planning system is necessary to facilitate a clearer
understanding of the planning practice in the Kingdom.

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in. SAUDI GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND DECISION, AND POLICY-MAKING
PROCESS
At the top of the policy making structure is the King, who by definition commands a
great degree of control in all decisions. The King is aided by advisors and institutions all
of which form the structure of the decision-making process. The King presides over the
cabinet of the government ministries or Council of Ministers (CM), a legislative body
created in 1953. By 1975, the CM comprised twenty-three ministers heading the various
bureaucratic ministries, departments and agencies. 32 Several ministries and government
departments are vested with the responsibilities of making decisions of direct and indirect
impact on urban development. Despite the considerable purview of these ministries within
the areas of their authority, the King retains the final say and the ability to bypass the
system.
Beleaguered by the increasing urban problems, the government introduced the
municipality, an organization which was created to shoulder the responsibility of
establishing order in the built environment. It was a governmental institution that was
perceived as part of the central bureaucracy and received its financial strength from the
King. Under the Saudi political order, cities and towns are denied legal personality, that is
the right of denizens to.establish constitutional powers delimiting domains of authority
between the central government and the city. Since citizens are not required to render taxes
to the government, city politics were never considered. The traditional forms of autonomy
exercised by the city notables within the quarters were gradually eclipsed by the rising
power of the state, which supplanted them with government organs under its control. 33
The modern civic organizations created under the auspices of the state, such as the
municipality and the imarah (town's governorship), were administrative organs of the
central bureaucracy. 34
The government financed development of modern towns 35 and
therefore held ultimate authority over the form and scope of local control and
administration.
The emergence of concerted efforts at modern, comprehensive (national) planning
activity in Saudi Arabia since the late 1960s and 1970s emanates from the government
decision to shift to a modern diversified economic base. An executive planning board was
first established in 1960. A council of Minsters' Resolution No. 430 mandated its
replacement with the Central Planning Organization (CPO) in 1964. It was entrusted with

124
several tasks including economic analyses and studies, submitting periodic economic
reports on the economy, economic progress and trends, the preparation of the five-year
economic development plans attached with estimates for implementation and forecasts,
which afforded advisory assistance to the King, government ministries and independent
agencies, foreign and local, etc. In October 1975, the CPO was elevated to the Ministry of
Planning (MOP). The MOP is bestowed with various research responsibilities including
the monitoring of development process and the formulation of the five-year development
plans. Designed at the central government, these plans outline the structure of allocating
national resources, by sector, space within a time framework. These developments were a
result of previous several government experiments which go back to the 1930s. The
emergence of the Saudi model of urban planning reflects the Kingdom's cultural
characteristics, paramountly its political centralism and economic affluence.
Formal, comprehensive planning began in earnest in the 1970s. The decade brought
the first national Five-Year Plan which endowed more towns with the status of
municipality, hence increasing the number of such settlements from 54 to 162 by 1980. In
one decade, the first two Five Year Plans provided master plans for 72 cities. They
stipulated civic beautification and infrastructure. The master plans also contained copious
documents that included land use, building codes, traffic requirements, and land
development guidelines.
IV. URBAN PLANNING: MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT, ORDINANCE AND
COMPREHENSIVE ZONING
Modern urban planning per se in Saudi Arabia has its roots in the government's
desire to improve accessibility and provide services in the holy cities of Makkah and
Madinah during the 1930s. These efforts took the form of street widening and
improvements of sanitary provisions to meet the needs of the rising demand for urban
space in the holy cities. The goal was to accommodate more pilgrims. Economically,
pilgrimage (hajj) constituted a substantial component of the nascent, impoverished
government treasury (reaching up to one-third the annual income). As oil revenues
increased, in 1952, King Abdul-Aziz abolished the dues charged to Muslim pilgrims,
forgoing a source of income that brought an approximate $30 million annually. Politically,
these efforts were a reflection of King Abdul-Aziz's (the new Najdi ruler of the holy
places) efforts to cultivate the world Muslims' confidence as the new guardian of the holy

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sites. The King, who was advised by a coterie of educated advisors from nearby Arab
countries, acknowledged the need to devise a system of regulations and procedures aimed
at enhancing order in the built environment and to monitor growth.
Urban and regional planning in the Kingdom has evolved with two distinct eras (A1
Hathloul and Anis-ur-Rahman, 1985). During the first era (1930 up to early 1970s) urban
planning in Saudi Arabia was essentially an incremental and ad hoc process which
responded to day-to-day problems and needs. Starting with the 1970s, the second era of
urban and regional planning emphasized a form of 'holistic approach' in which emphasis
has been placed on preparation of regional and urban plans based on evaluation of existing
conditions.
Prior to the 1970s, the common practice was platting of subdivisions in the outlying
parts of the towns and cities, many of which were distributed free to those interested in
building their own homes outside the walled towns. As demand for land rose, so new
tracts were thrown at the periphery. So to speak, free land was only available in the
rectangular new annexes at the periphery. In most cases, petitioners for free land had to
abide by the municipal regulations which sanctioned the setback concept, hence
encouraging the villa type. As such, and due to numerous measures that were followed by
local municipalities in complying with statutes issued periodically by the central state since
1357/1938, the grid pattern and the villa on a square lot were gradually adopted through
master plans, zoning regulations and decrees, directives and circulars. 36
It was a formative era because the measures that were taken by the government had a
lasting impact on the future of urban development and planning in the Kingdom. Such
measures were reactionary, essentially taken in response to day-to-day needs and problems
in major urban centers and settlements. It gradually introduced measures and regulations
aimed at controlling growth and enhancing order and scenic qualities in the build
environment. The movement to systematic urban improvements and the adoption of
statutory powers over subsequent urban development presents a turning point in the urban
processes in which the state has assumed a larger role than the putative purview it exercised
in the traditional built environment. The second period dates back to the early 1970s.

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A. The Formative Era, 1930s and 1940s
Royal Order number 8723 of 1937 (20 Rajab 1357 H) heralded the government's
preemptive right to the regulation of urban growth and development. It sanctioned the new
"Capital Trusteeship and Municipalities" (CTM) as the first formal statute concerning the
regulation of urban growth in the holy city of Makkah, which, during the 1930s and
1940s, was the holy and administrative capital of the Kingdom. The Order specified the
responsibilities of the newly-established municipalities. It specified regulations, measures
and procedures of guiding and monitoring town's new development, beautification works
conducive to scenic qualities; and designating the distribution of sellers in the suq area. It
also mandated that the municipality had the right to monitor housing development; protect
public spaces; widen streets; and create open areas for the public. The municipalities were
given the authority to develop zoning and building regulations and building codes. This
Order was followed in 1941 by the Roads and Building Statute which indicated the
authorities' need for some form of town planning under rising pressure for physical
improvements in Makkah city. "The statute concerns itself mainly with three issues:
planning procedures, building codes, zoning and the right-of-way. It was through this
statute that the setback concept was introduced in Saudi Arabia with the sole objective of
meeting the need for future street widening." 37 Along with the rise in urban growth, came
an increase in state intervention in urban development.
In 1345/1925, the government established Municipal Councils in major cities. The
General Regulation of Metropolitan Municipalities was issued in 1357/1937, the first selfstanding
regulation to deal with municipal organization. In 1382/1962, the Council of
Ministers issued resolution No. 808 which delegated the task of overseeing municipal
affairs to the Ministry of Interior (MI). The MTs Municipal Services Department was
transferred with the Council of Minsters' resolution No. 517 of Ramadan 1382/1962 to the
Agency of Municipal Affairs(AMA). The AMA's was entrusted with the function of
supervising the municipalities' various activities, including water and sewer systems,
drainage of rain water and discharge, and the responsibility of urban planning, direction
and control. In 1395/1975, the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs (MOMRA) was
established as an independent, high-level organ, a step that reflected the growing
significance of urban affairs at the apogee of the urbanization process. The MOMRA has
been charged with the development of municipal organizations at qualified urban
settlements and village clusters. By 1985, the ministry has grew to oversee 98

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municipalities, 43 village clusters and the provision of water and sewer services (in cities of
17,000 inhabitants or more). The MOMRA's Deputy of Town Planning (DTP) was
charged with the task of conducting studies related to urban growth and management
issues, drafting comprehensive regional and city master plans for the various cities, towns
and regions. The total outlays of MOMRA during the first three five-year Development
Plans (1970-85) amounted to SR 174 billion.
Nevertheless, during the early decades of the Kingdom (1930-1950), the
government's input and intervention remained characterized by a virtual lack of locally
developed traditions of government-led urban planning and dearth of financial resources.
The early efforts were essentially sectorial, limited to monitoring city growth and building
activity, especially in the overcrowded cities' cores (early demolishing took place around
the Holy Mosques of Makkah and Madinah, and the Governor's Palace in Riyadh) which
were faced with an onslaught of city-ward migration, proliferation of state organizations
and functions, and the increasing introduction of technology, that is the ubiquitous
automobile. By the 1950s, the automobile had become a primary factor in determining the
landscape of the metropolis. The process of issuing a new regulation resulted from the
need to counter certain problems at a certain locality. This prompted the need for
intervention: a recommendation to a problem must first be sanctioned by the pertaining
ministry at the capital, whose staff, depending on the nature of the problem, may obtain a
royal approval from the Council of Ministers. Prior to the development of fully grown
specialized ministries, the municipality was responsible for various town services, such as
health, road grading and water provision. The police power, however, laid in the Emir's
(governor) puryiew, who, like the municipalities, performed under the Ministry of Interior.
Municipalities implemented numerous eclectic resolutions and ordinances ordained by the
central government. The accumulation of such experience has had a mixed result on the
course of urban development. On the one hand, the accumulated experience meant sharing
useful information. On the other hand, an experience that might have proven practical in
one locality may as well become a binding requirement for subsequent development for all
areas of the country. Procedures to repeal legislation that is not pertinent for some localities
do exist but usually take tremendous effort and require a long time.

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V. PLANNED TOWNS AND COMMUNITIES
The process of planned communities in Saudi Arabia constitutes the most profound
exercise by the private (oil) company (Aramco) and the government starting in the late
1940s. Comprehensive, national and urban planning and policy making in the modern,
systematic fashion was yet to be used by the 1970s. These planned communities represent
direct intervention by these entities to cope with rapid urbanization. The process can be
divided into (1) early planned American oil towns, (2) planned Saudi workers communities
in the Eastern Province,(3) planned royal suburbs and communities built by the
government for administrative purposes- an experience which will be discussed in Chapter
4, and (4) new towns built by the government for Industrial purposes.
A. Early Planned American Oil Towns
As oil operations by were resumed following the end of World War Two, more
Americans and other nationals were admitted to Saudi Arabia. Aramco constructed three
major settlements at the major oil operations as "outposts of American civilizations." 38
Dhahran was built anew for Aramco's headquarters and housed the majority of Americans.
It was situated on a hilly site, twenty kilometers east of the Gulf shores to the east. The
second major town, Ras Tannurah, was constructed anew on the Gulf coast where a
complex of oil processing facilities were concentrated, including a major refinery. The first
oil ever loaded onto an oil tanker was in May 1939 with the presence of King Abdul-Aziz.
Abqaiq town was located to serve the great oil field inland. In total, these towns comprised
6,400 Americans including some of whom had families.
Due to the wide cultural gap between the Americans and the predominantly rural and
nomadic Saudi labor force, the towns' plans mirrored the oil company's policy of physical
segregation according to ethnicity. Solon T. Kimball wrote, "Each town section is divided
into five distinctive sections that correspond to internal social divisions or economic
functions....Their internal divisions reflected the bureaucratic structure of an American
corporation, divisions that are sharply accentuated by the coincidence of status levels and
national origins." 39 The rational of maximizing oil operations was mirrored in the physical
and social organization of Aramco's towns forms, with the ultimate goal of speeding "the
flow of oil to an industrial civilization." The oil town core comprised the administrative,
commercial, operational and service areas. It was located next to the industrial systems, a

129
bustling plexus/center of immense oil processing operations, using a labyrinth of pipelines,
power connections, and numerous towers needed for refinery, processing and transmission
of oil. The array of commercial services were exclusively geared for the use by the 'senior 1
staff, a group largely composed of Americans and a handful of other nationals. Kimball
viewed the spatial segregation of these communities as a reflection of the wide gap between
two contrasting cultures, the Aramco "civilized" Americans living in the "Senior" planned
communities, and the backward Saudi labor force confined to shantytowns with their
families.
In addition to the the core of operations, there were four other sections, assigned for
residential uses. The first was the 'Senior' staff. It resembled an American southwestern
tradition of planning. In Dhahran's Senior, the residential units were single-family, onestory
dwellings built of wood and stucco with sloping roofs, each home was surrounded
by a lawn and yard and enclosed by a hedge. All units were air-conditioned and adequately
furnished. Dhahran's layout was a combination of grid iron style and curving streets and
cul-de-sacs, and irregular blocks. Streets and walkways were paved, curbed and lighted,
and all serviced with the required community services, recreational facilities and a
controlled access to the camp. The recreational areas possessed an auditorium, a luxurious
club, that included bowling alleys, library and dining area and a terrace for outdoor social
functions. Other towns included recreational areas that had baseball diamonds, tennis
courts, soccer and football fields and golf links.
The senior staff housing units varied in style and size. The higher officials in the
upper echelon of Aramco's bureaucracy occupied larger, elaborate and better equipped
residents. Lower-in-rank American employees lived in modest ones. The higher-income
singles were housed in multi-roomed modern buildings with communal space for cooking
and entertaining. Other "bachelors" were confined to barack-type dormitories which
contained many conveniences. The American residential camps included elementary,
junior-high schools, a hospital in Dhahran and medical clinics in Ras Tannurah and Abqiq.
The second residential area, the "intermediate" camp, was constructed for Aramco's labor
force who were rated primarily "semi-skilled and supervisory." This group was classified
as "other nationals", expatriates from Arab, Mediterranean and African countries. They
were confined to the barrack-type buildings built of concrete and cement blocks. The
"general" camp constituted the third section of the Aramco town. It was inhabited by the
Saudi employees and workers. It was constructed with concrete and cement-block

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materials, and, like the intermediate section, had modest recreational facilities. Both the
"general" and the "intermediate" residential sectors of the city were designed for bachelors.
The fifth section was neither planned "nor welcomed." It was an assemblage of
haphazardly scattered residential structures built of makeshift, scrape materials, palm-leaf
barastis, and some of cement blocks. "To the Western eyes it is reminiscent of
Hoovervilles of depression days," noted Kimball. As Saudi employees' families were not
considered in the construction or planning of early Aramco towns, Saudis found in these
shantytowns the only nearby place where they could bring their families. Aramco had left
them no choice. Kimball noted,
Here the employees, mostly Saudis, may bring their families. One
can see occasional sheep, goats, and buros, and the camels tethered
nearby may belong to an employee or his visiting relatives. One
also finds an incipient native suk or market, perhaps a garage and
gasoline pump, and other evidences of an emerging indigenous
community life. Both Aramco, and the government are disturbed by
these settlements, and efforts are under way to encourage their
replacements by the development of planned Arab type towns
through subsidies and other devices. 40
Early in the 1950s, Aramco launched its Housing Ownership Program (HOP), as a
step to eradicate the gap of spatial differentiation, though social segregation was to last for
decades to come. Separate planned (or rather platted) communities gradually emerged
around the Aramco "enclaves", however, at standards much more modest than those
available for the senior staff. These communities were mere annexes, subdivisions which
were platted in a rectangular pattern, to allow for the construction of "decent" houses for
Saudi personnel under Aramco's HOP. Unfortunately, no genuine attempt was taken by
Aramco's design team to assimilate local architecture heritage and planning values in order
to recreated new physical environments modified to accommodate modern technology for
the Saudi working force. Instead, the Saudi-Arab worker communities, commonly known
as "cities of laborers" were neither designed with respect to traditional values of physical
design nor incorporated modern (Western) urban design and planning as illustrated in the
fully equipped residential sections built for Aramco's American staff, the 'senior 1 . This
tradition of foregoing architectural heritage and planning values and the laying of openended,
unconfined gridiron network, lacking the necessary community and recreational

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services, for the new annexes of existing cities has characterized subsequent urban
development. To Aramco's planned Saudi communities we now return.
r
B. Planned Arab Communities in the Eastern Province
In 1935, Al-Khobar was a settlement of fifteen huts. Its pre-oil growth owes to the
migration of members of the Dawasir tribe from Bahrain in 1923. Upon their arrival, the
Dawasirs settled in Al-Khobar and Dammam where they worked mainly in pearl diving.
Prior to the actual exploitation of oil in commercial quantities, AUchobar and Dammam's
growth was largely governed by its population's natural birth growth. Al-Khobar status
improved when in 1935, a small dock was built by the oil company to facilitate the
importation of oil drilling equipment and other materials from Bahrain.
In 1938, in its effort to encourage sedentarization in the potentially prosperous oil
region, the government allotted free land to settlers in Dammam and Al-Khobar. The land
distribution program, the first in the region, granted land to individuals on several
conditions including (1) all citizens have the right to request a piece of land to be built
according to the conditions and regulations, (2) no rent should be levied for the first ten
years, (3) henceforth, annual rent is to be collected, (4) building activity must be completed
before the lapse of a two year period, (4) structures should not exceed one story, structures
on waterfronts can be higher, and (5) that grantees should only use concrete and stone to
erect their homes. Until 1939, Al-Khobar's homes were all huts built of palm reeds and
trunks, with the exception of one structure constructed of rubble rocks quarried from the
sea shore. The small building belonged to the town's Ameer (governor). 41
In 1947, under the surmounting need to house the Saudi laborers working in the
growing oil industry in the country's eastern province, the Governor of the Eastern
Province, Saud A. Bin Jiliewy, requested the help of the oil company, ARAMCO, to
prepare a plan for the towns of Dammam and Al-Khobar. The new extension to the old
organically-built towns were laid out in a grid iron pattern for expediency purposes. Al-
Khobar was planned according to a gridiron layout comprising rectangular lots of 130 by
200 feet serviced by a north-south oriented road system of various widths ranging from 40
to 60 feet wide. The network was connected to a major road spine adjacent to the
waterfront, named Prince Talal street. Under rapid growth, another planned annex was

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added to the city in 1951, only to be followed by a new extension in 1953. The 1960s and
1970s brought exploding growth to these cities as well as many other Saudi cities.
In the early 1930s, Dammam was a small hamlet of 300 residential huts, nestled on
the Arabian Gulf shores. Now at the locus of the industry, its population historically
thrived on fishing and pearl diving. Its subsequent growth owes to its location next to the
first oil well. Its production of crude oil lured waves of migrants for decades to come. The
traditional compact form of the town was soon to witness a fury of building activity as
more migrants settled in the vicinity of the oil company's drilling and exporting operations.
Under surmounting growth, ARAMCO staff picked a large parcel of land outside the old
organically organized town of Dammam. An adjunct thoroughfare (called then King Saud
Street) was laid paralleling the shoreline with narrower streets of 700-1000 feet width were
laid branching from the main street which formed the major arterials. The interstice blocks
were subdivided into rectangular lots of 300 by 600 feet. By 1950, Dammam's growth
was phenomenal and the municipality was forced to extend the gridiron network to
accommodate the increasing demand for lots. Learning from previous experiment, lot sizes
were considerably reduced to dimensions of 150 by 300 feet. In contrast with the
traditional built forms, the emphasis on vehicular access resulted in a circulation space of
55% of the total land uses. In a mere few years, 1952- 1957, the area of Dammam tripled
from 170 to 925 acres. 42
The planning of new, undeveloped tracts of land continued apace with the increasing
numbers of immigrants flocking the oil region. Outside Aramco's Dhahran planning
compounds' senior complex, a new working class shanty town, Nehedain, of makeshift
structures was built of scrape materials, mud, tin cans, reeds called sarifahs or barastis,
and tents grew rapidly lacking potable water, electricity, and sanitation facilities. Its
squalid conditions and impoverished population contrasted with the high standards to
which Aramco's compound was built, perhaps the major factor which led to its subsequent
relocation to a new site, Aththuqbah, five miles away on the road to Al-Khobar. Following
several outbreaks of fire and under pressure by the oil company which cited the potential
fire hazard to oil installations, ordered the relocation of the Nehedain residents to
Aththuqbah new town. A committee was formed comprising government officials. The
members prepared an inventory of the Nehedain's houses which amounted to 420 homes.
In 1953, the government committee commandeered their property at reasonable

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compensations plus a thirty percent bonus to help them defray construction costs for their
new homes in Aththuqbah where they were allotted free lots. 43
During the 1950s, more new towns were laid anew to house the increasing number of
workers enlisted by the oil company. By 1952, the Aramco employee population reached
20,400 in 1956, of which 3,000 Americans, 13,400 Saudis, and 3,000 were other
nationals. In 1953, Rahima was planned anew to house Aramco workers who worked in
Ras Tannurah refineries and loaded crude oil into large tankers. In 1955, the town of
Rakkah, a village located between Dammam and Al-Khobar, and in 1956 Othailieah were
planned. Several other towns followed suit such as Annuairaiah, Onack and Saihat (1954)
and Qatif (1960). The gridiron system was the common feature in the design of all of these
planned communities. Concomitant with the planning of new towns and communities,
Aramco introduced its Home Ownership Program (HOP) in 1951 to enable its workers to
build their own homes. The plan provided free-interest loans to build on government land.
Interest-fee loans were extended for the construction of municipal water and sewage
systems. Aramco also provide technical assistance to improve power plants. Such direct
aid by Aramco also resulted in a multiplier factor in these towns' urban economies such as
the construction industry. The HOP created a prosperous market for locally produced
cement, concrete building blocks, and iron grill-work which went into the construction of
these houses. Starting in 1946, Aramco encouraged Saudi entrepreneurs to establish local
businesses geared toward the needs of the oil company.
VI. PLANNED URBANIZATION, COMPREHENSIVE URBAN AND REGIONAL
PLANNING IN THE 1970S
Building on previous experience, the Saudi authorities came to consider the vitality of
dealing with urban development and growth at the national level, thanks to the steadily
improving economic conditions and, in the 1960s', to the reforms during King Faisal's
reign which culminated in the early 1970s in the government's adoption of comprehensive
national planning process based on the five-year development plans and other series of
urban and regional comprehensive plans. With the introduction of regional studies, the
emphasis has been shifting from "national prototype planning" to another one in which
more attention is paid to local perspectives.
A. City Master Plans

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Due to a lack of indigenous expertise, the government sought foreign consultants to
prepare comprehensive regional and master plans for several important cities and regions of
the Kingdom. In 1388/1968, Doxiadis Associates, Consultants on Development and
Ekistics of Athens, Greece, was contracted to prepare the first master plan for the city of
Riyadh. The agreement stated that
the Master plan study will identify, in quantitative terms, present and
future needs affecting the urban development of Riyadh, will
formulate policies, and will prepare a Master Plan and Programme to
ensure the proper development of the city up to the year 2,000.
The significance of Doxiadis Associates' Riyadh Master and other consultants' plans
for towns and cities is that such plans dealt with the city as a whole, a system of interrelated
social and economic variables extending over space. For the first time in Saudi urban
planning, these plans introduced the tradition of charting future development based on field
studies. The Doxiadis plan was submitted to the Council of Ministers in 1971 and adopted
in 1973. Upon its adoption by the CM it became a legal document.
The Plan introduced a set of zoning laws for the various land uses based on the
assumption that were derived from land market mechanisms in Western societies. 44 For
example, the Plan laid down residential areas postulating modern occupations or classes,
replacing kinship based quarters which traditionally formed the city. It comprised a
physical pattern of two-by-two square miles super-blocks. Originally, the residential
super-blocks contained a sub-center assigned for commercial, recreational and public
services (these core services were never realized). Moreover, the villa, a Mediterranean
housing unit situated in a relatively large lot was indoctrinated, thanks to the setback
requirements attached to the Doxiadis Plan. It has become a binding physical framework of
which has encouraged the already spread-out urban form. In short, it set an irrevocable
process in which the grid has been institutionalized as the preferred pattern for Riyadh
future growth, a progenitor to be emulated by other cities and towns.
The "second era" witnessed a concerted effort to deal with city and regions with
respect to national socioeconomic objectives, thanks to the dramatic increase in oil prices
during the 1970s resulting in expanding government sponsorship of massive infrastractural
works and economic development. Accordingly, cities and towns witnessed
unprecedented growth as the number of their population multiplied. Migrants from rural

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settlements, nomads and expatriates flocked the country's major towns and urban centers
which placed pressures on the already burdened social services and infrastructure. In lieu
with its commitments to modernize the country and raise its subjects living standards, the
government's allocation in the urban sphere was to get the lion's share of the budgetary
expenditures. Along with the five-year Development plans, the government introduced a
series of comprehensive urban and regional plans. A1 Hathloul and Anis-ur-Rahman
contend "During this successive transformation of objectives and convergence from
national to local perspective, the plans increasingly became more and more space
specific." 45
Albeit this shift, little local input is discerned as opposed to the prevailing centralized
plan-making at the national government level. Local Emirates, municipalities and other
concerned government agencies were consulted for evaluations and recommendations that
central organs took into consideration in budgetary allocations. However systemic
impediments of the growing bureaucracy, hinder many keen efforts. For example,
requests pass through long, rigid chain-like process and likely to get entangled in official
bungling. Since there are no local and city governments and no local income generating
systems, such local entities have to rely on central government's financial backing and,
hence go through the bureaucratic system.
Lacking local expertise in the field of urban and regional planning, the government
had to rely on international consultants to prepare comprehensive regional physical plans
for several cities and towns. "These plans were conceived in the context of national
socioeconomic objectives spelled out in the First Five-Year Development Plan (1970-1975)
and provided useful physical inputs for the public and private development programs." 46
Still, these early attempts in regional planning were short of articulating urban growth
trends at the national level. In light of the rising concern of rapid urbanization, the
government moved to upgrade its Deputy Ministry of Interior for Municipal Affairs to an
independent Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs (MOMRA) in 1975. The MOMORA
was to be solely entrusted with functions related to municipal, urban and rural
development. The previously Directorate General of Town Planning was given the status
of Deputy Ministry of Town Planning (DMTP).

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Apart from the formulation of an entire hierarchy of development
plans, certain other related activities and processes, such as enabling
legislation, plan implementation, creation of urban and regional
planning institutions and on the job training programs, necessary for
institutionalizing the planning process, were also initiated. 47
The DMTP supervised the launching of "Action Master Plans Projects" for seven
major cities in the Kingdom. This effort constitutes the third major endeavor to treat city
development comprehensively, modeled on Doxiadis' Master Plan and regional master
plans for the country's five regions. Each master plan comprises fifteen "technical" reports
dealing with two subgroup of subjects: the "background studies" and reports concerned
with "applied aspects" of urban planning, that is the implementation phase. The DMTP
requested that firms help create planning departments to supervise implementation and
feedback. In addition to these three "generations", MOMRA in collaboration with the
United Nations staff, introduced a three-spike Physical Planning Project aimed at
developing a National Spatial Strategy, a professional training program, and supervising
the international consultants working with the Action Master Plans for the selected cities.
B. National Planning: Five-Year Development Plans
The impact of government preemptive urban decision-making and underwriting of
urban development was shown best during the 1970s and the 1980s. The 1970s brought
an unprecedented world demand for oil. Oil output virtually doubled between 1970 and
1973. Oil prices rose sharply, doubling in the same three years from $1.80 a barrel in
1970 to $5.12 in October 1973, to a whooping $11.65 a barrel as of January 1974.
Accordingly, oil revenues rose from $1.26 billion in 1970 to $3,107 billion in 1973, leaped
to $22,574 billion in 1974, and jumped to a phenomenal $98.1 billion in 1982. 48
In one
mere decade to 1975, the annual budget multiplied one hundred and ten times. 49 This oil
wealth has enabled the government to embark upon vigorous national and urban planning
schemes aimed at increasing the living-standards of the population by all feasible means
(higher income, better housing and hygiene, etc) and by upgrading the built environment
for projected future economic prosperity. Though progressive, these schemes were
wrought without public input.
During the last few decades of its promulgation, however, the Kingdom has pursued
a policy of balanced budgets starting in 1947. Compounded by extravagance spending by

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the royal family, old-fashioned dispensing of the King's purse reflected the
administration's early stages of callow development. This approach proved insufficient to
run a modern nation. Peter Mansfield noted, "Although oil income was rising steadily,
Saudi Arabia fell heavily into debt, and Aramco stopped giving advances on future
revenues." 50
The reign of King Saud, which was marked with wasteful spending,
witnessed little increase in spending on roads, schools and hospitals. But it was not until
March 25,1958 when Crown Prince Faisal assumed vast powers leaving titular authority
to his elder brother, King Saud. It was then when more resources found their way to more
people. However, the bureaucracy was to grow haphazardly since the days when King
Abdul-Aziz himself oversaw the entire administration.
Through its short experience of development, the Saudi polity came to recognize the
significance of planned development to maximize the utilization of national, material
resources and manpower. In 1963 the new Supreme Planning Board was established. But
it was not until 1969 that the Cabinet of Minsters authorized the establishment of Central
Planning Organization. By the late 1960s, King Faisal's reforms were to culminate in the
shift to long-term national planning and policy making as early as 1966. To many
observers, Faisal's sagacious brilliance is rare. 51 He was acclaimed for his success in
leading the "country with gentle insistence from medievalism into the jet age." In one of
his speeches he outlined the future course of comprehensive planning. He announced:
We are going ahead with extensive planning, guided by our Islamic
laws and belief, for the progress of the nation...We have chosen an
economic system based on free enterprise because it is our
conviction that it fits perfectly with our Islamic laws and suits our
country by granting every opportunity to the people giving
incentives to every individual and every group to work for the
common group. This does not mean leaving everything unchecked,
for we will interfere when the Government finds it necessary to do
so, but without harming the basic principles involved and in order to
correct any errors that may have occurred and secure social
justice. 52
For the first time, the government formulated objectives, goals and policies and
emphasized coordination between the various public agencies to attain desirable
development targets in the various sectors of the economy. In 1970, the government
introduced the first of its five-year plans, a document outlining the course of government
investment and allocation by economic sector during the five year period the plan covers.

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The design of these plans was within the purview of the Central Planning Organization, an
agency that was elevated to a ministry in 1975. The Ministry of Planning was aided by
foreign research and planning advisory groups including the American Stanford Research
Group and the French SECT International. Since 1970, these plans have had the ultimate
goal of diversifying the economy from the previous deadlock reliance on oil production.
While having this major, long-term goal in focus, these five-year development plans have
been means to channel enormous financial resources into the development of infrastructural
capabilities, a platform to facilitate national development.
The comprehensive national planning process in Saudi Arabia is outlined in the Fifth
Development Plan. 53 The Saudi Planning system is predicated on a "philosophy of
achieving economic and social development within the framework of a free market
economy based on Islamic values and concepts." 54
The emphasis on Islamic values, it
was stated in the Plan, has contributed greatly to social, economic and institutional
development and have been reflected in the government's preference for a free market
economy. In line with Islamic commercial principles, the government has extended to the
private sector full opportunities to participate in the development process. National
planning activity in the Kingdom is sought to:
1. provide long term conceptual vision to guide development;
2. provide organizational framework for coordinating die
development efforts of the private sector and the government to
guide and initiate structural change;
3. direct government resources towards achieving the long term
development objectives for the economy and towards ensuring the
availability of essential public services;
4. strengthen the on-going management of the economy through
periodic reviews and preparing for emerging conditions which could
seriously affect the development process 55
The national planning system comprises three key elements. The first element is the
formulation of a national development strategy outlining the long-term objectives and
setting the strategic principles for development. Second, the five-year plans which contains
guidelines and directions to be followed for the next five year period. The five-year plans
are essentially middle-range, intermediary reflections of the national development strategy.
The third is the management of Plan implementation, which essentially deals with feedback
reports to monitor, evaluate and assess the Plan's performance.

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The five-year plan comprises (1) the Plan Document, an outline of objectives,
policies, and development targets the government deems timely toward assuring a
functioning polity and healthy economy, (2) the detailed operation plans which are reports
that were prepared by the various government ministries' agencies and departments. Based
on previous performance, identification of problems and suggested solutions to current
needs, the various public agencies draft proposals outlining their needs and future action
plans, (3) in addition to the government's major departments, the provincial offices of
governors, emirates, prepare Emirate Reports. These reports deal with and assess existing
socioeconomic conditions and identify future needs, (4) The five-year plan provides
valuable information and policies on the economic course and structural shifts the
government would take during the next five years. Such information and projections are to
be used by the private sector to adapt to business opportunities generated by government
investment. Finally, the last key element in the planning system is the "Management Plan
Implementation" (MPI). The MPI refers to annual reports prepared by the Council of
Minsters, a progress report to monitor, evaluate, and assess the plan's performance.
Though focused on the urban areas, the first five-year, 1970-1975, Development
Plan was the first government step toward a comprehensive planning framework of
national economic development. The plan foresaw the need to follow the systematic
coordination of government investments in the construction of a modern infrastructure, the
upgrading of government services, and the development of human resources. By starting
with these goals, the state sought to lay the grounds for achieving long term strategic goals.
The second plan (1975-80) heralded country-wide planning and development. It had
the goals of (1) the maintenance of Islamic moral values, (2) ascertaining the state's need to
develop its defense system and capabilities and strengthen national security, (3) pursuing
high rate of economic growth, (4) to reduce the Kingdom's dependence on the exportation
of crude oil by diversifying the national economy, (5) developing human resources through
education, technical training and provision of better health services, (6) fostering the wellbeing
of the population and maintain social stability amidst the ongoing rapid change, and
(7) continuing the establishment of physical and social infrastructure systems essential to
the performance of the economy. The second five-year development plan witnessed the
establishment of the Ministry of Industry and Electricity, the Royal Commission for Jubail
and Yanbu, the creation of Saudi Arabian Industries Corporation (SABIC) in 1976. The

140
emphasis on modern industry mirrored the government's interest in minimizing the national
economy dependence on oil exportation through the diversification of the economy.
The third plan (1980-1985) and the fourth plans were essentially a continuation of the
second plan. They aimed at accelerating the construction of the physical infrastructure to
attain the major goal of a diversified economy, less dependent on the precarious, fluctuating
world demand for crude oil. Its emphasis on agricultural self-sufficiency in selected crops
such as wheat and foodstuffs including poultry and diary had a profound impact on the
national urban network by slowing the otherwise mass migration to the major urban
centers. The fourth five-year plan (1985-1990), however, channeled a larger proportion of
expenditures on health, education and training programs to achieve a professional, skilled
manpower.
C. Comprehensive, Urban, Regional and Rural Planning
Finally, the process of urban planning has been extended to include regional
development plans for Hail, Tabuk, Makkah, Qassim, Baha, A1 Qatif, Jazan and Alhasa.
This time it attempted to bring the boundaries conterminous with the administrative
boundaries of the emirates (regions' governed an amir who is now nominated by the
Minister of Interior) to prevent overlapping between jurisdictions which caused several
conflicts and delays. Upon completion, the Kingdom's various regions will be covered.
"When completed, the regional plans will serve as coordinating tools at the emirate level
where most development decisions are taken." The plans will also be used for vital
information upon which future budgetary programming and intra-regional decisions are
supposed to be based and coordinated. 56 Unlike the "prototypical" models of the
municipal subdivisions and previous master plans, based on previous experience, the
DMTP's staff were able to ratify some local architecture and urban land patterns such as the
easing of zoning regulations to allow for the rural way of life, courtyard houses, narrow
and deep lots which are sought for economical development.
D. New Towns Built By the Government For Industrial Purposes
Until recently, the government has followed two approaches to industrial
development which had direct impact on the formation of the contemporary built
environment. The first attempts to impose zoning laws, building codes and growth
controls, stemmed from the government's knowledge - that is the municipality- of the need

141
to sort urban activities into distinct zones. Land use assigned for industrial activity sic was
introduced with the debut of the city master plans. As such industrial space was mainly
allotted for "auxiliary" industries such as auto repair and, "assembly industry" involving
establishments specializing in manufacturing furniture, light fixtures, fabricated metal
products and stone, clay and glass products, geared toward popular demand. As cities
grew, with their growth auxiliary industries increased. In addition to their noxious and
noisily by-products, these industries are run by foreign labor, the majority of which are
bachelors. Prior to the segregation of urban land use according to activity, these industries
were located within industrial use, causing resentment by the conservative population.
In order to encourage these industries to relocate and pick up the increasing demand
for service industries, the government assigned considerable land area in the least desirable
sections of cities and towns as "industrial zones". Depending on the current theme of
government development programs, industrial establishments are offered numerous
incentives, including nominal rents for industrial lots (the government offers such land at
minimal rents as one thousandth the market value). In Riyadh, for example, the industrial
land use amounts to 3.8% of the total (developed and undeveloped), in Jeddah 6.5%, in
Dammam 8%, while in Makkah 1.5%. The proliferation of these "assembly industries"
owes considerably to the government promotion programs aimed at rejuvenating the
industrial sector. The first government promotion program to provide incentives for
assembly (auxiliary) industries was not part of the efforts to restructure the national
economy, rather such industries where merely to provide for increasing demand for
services and assembly manufacturing.
The second major industry-related influence on the shaping of the contemporary built
environment was the construction of new industrial towns of Jubail and Yanbu by the
government. Such steps are viewed as a departure from the previously-followed
"conventional approach." The adoption of the new-city approach was a direct consequence
to the national industrial policy to diversify the national economy, hitherto relying on the
exportation of crude oil. The idea to utilize the locally produced oil and natural gas in the
production of petrochemicals, though goes back to the 1960s, and materialized in the
1970s. In 1970, Petromin picked Jubail, a previously placid fishing town on the shores of
the Arabian Gulf, as the site for the new multi-billion dollar industrial complex. Jubail was
projected to be a growth pole bestowed by its proximity to the Berri crude oil and gas fields
and the deep-water channel which makes anchorage for large-vessel tankers possible. In

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1973, the U.S. Bechtel Corporation was contracted to draw up a master plan based on the
needs of several industries to be executed at various phases. The presentation of the city's
industrial plans in 1975 coincided with the birth of the Royal Commission for Jubail and
Yanbu, on the Red Sea coast. Yanbu was to be fed with a crude a pipeline crossing the
country to the west.
Bechtel was given a 20 years management contract starting June, 1976. The same
year witnessed the take over of Aramco by the Saudi government. Since its inception,
Aramco comprised a consortium of American oil companies, which had entertained
considerable control on the oil industry. By 1976, the government had gained "de jure"
control of Aramco. According to Steven, "This assumption of control marked a watershed
in the sense that Saudi Arabia was now theoretically in a position to directly implement
policy with respect to oil operations, whereas previously the control of the government had
been exercised in a more informal and indirect way."57
In August, 1976 the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) was
formed to act as an arm for the Ministry of Industry and Electricity. The subsidiary of
Bechtel, the Arabian Bechtel Company Limited, was assigned the task of preparing
infrastructural plans for the two industrial cities including supervising grant contracts. The
industrial city of Jubail was chosen to house the largest industrial harbor in the world, to
accommodate a population of 300,000 by the year 2,000 working in the petrochemical
complexes, oil refineries, a steel mill, and over a dozen other supporting industries. The
total bill of this adventure is estimated to reach $40 billion. These colossal ventures have
been argued by critics to be risky, given the context of the society's development phase and
world competition. Moreover, although the goal is to diversify the economic base of the
country, such industries are heavily dependent on the country's oil and gas reserves.58
The two multi-billion, mega-projects, oil-industrial complexes of Jubail and Yanbu
comprise two new experiments in Saudi Arabia's urban and regional planning. The
government-built town of Jubail is located on the Persian Gulf. .Originally, it was a small
coastal town with fishing and pearl-diving constituting the mainstay of its inhabitants'
living. A new massive master-planned city was laid in the vicinity of the quaint old town,
on a government-owned site of 1,030 square kilometers. It is projected to house a
population of 290,000 at its final developmental stage in 2010. On the west coast, the
government established the industrial Yanbu, anew. The wholly planned and fully-serviced

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Yanbu occupies public land of 80 square kilometers. Yanbu, which boasted a population
of 20,000 in 1977, is projected to be inhabited by a population of 150,000 upon
completion in the year 2010. The population is expected to engage mainly in the industrial
complex designed to use cheap energy made available by the construction of a 725-mile,
trans-peninsular pipeline bringing crude oil and natural gas from the Eastern Province. The
preliminary construction cost for both towns, paid for by the government, is $7.7 billion of
the running estimated cost of $12 billion(1983 estimates). The construction stage, starting
1977, required the importation of a large workforce. At the peak of the construction
activity in 1982, the number of foreign laborers involved in the construction of the new city
exceeded 30,000 workers. The cost includes infrastructure and public services, the
industrial plants, and ports as well as 33,000 housing units. 59
The master plans of the two industrial complexes were rationalized to attain maximum
functioning of the towns' urban economy, that is industry. The two industrial complexes
were organized around the exploitation of the rich natural reserves of hydrocarbon and
mineral resources featuring world-scale primary industries, capital and energy-intensive
manufacturing products to participate in the growing world markets. They are also
designed to allow for private sector input primarily in the secondary industries and the
support of light manufacturing industries. 60
The Saudi model industrial towns experiment represents a milestone in the history of
urban and regional planning in Saudi Arabia, with calculated emphasis on economic
efficiency in tune with national economic goals confessed in the Five-Year plans. It reflects
the Saudi government's need to reap greater benefits out of its natural resources in a time of
high world demand. Structurally, the decision to create the new towns reflects drastic
changes underlying urban growth and form; in the traditional built environment the urban
form was essentially governed by local imperatives, while in the modem, policy decisions
are made by the national government and geared toward international market exigencies.
The modern settlements function within a national urban network, they are physical
embodiment of the new nation-state system. Urban forms have transformed accordingly.
VII. ANALYSIS & EVALUATION
In the classical definition of the profession, urban planning has been basically
concerned with the location, character, intensity and land needed for the various urban

144
functions. 61 This emphasis on the spatial aspects of physical design has had a definite
impact on the early development of urban planning with the city as the dominant focus.
Soon, such architectural urban design and other civic-minded solutions to urban
predicaments proved ephemeral. With experience, such emphasis has shifted as urban
issues have attracted various disciplines such as economics, urban politics, sociology and
urban geography. It became realized that unless urban planning was extended to the
planning economic and social resources, its solutions to urban growth problems would be
incomplete.
The traditional Arab-Muslim city, or medina, organization reflected the emphasis on
the privacy of the family and the semi-autonomy of the tribe. Quarters developed were
distinguished and personalized reflecting their inhabitants who had a great say in the
building of their neighborhoods and the running of their internal affairs. 62 The design of
city master plans and building codes lack established connection with the religiously-based
building processes of the past, namely, the concern over privacy and traditions. The
contemporary metropolis is a result of the pressures of rapid urbanization, reliance on
Western models of architecture and planning, the economic peculiarities of oil and the
Kingdom's political system.
While the embryo of systematic intervention in the built environment goes back to the
municipal decrees of the 1930s, the genesis of modern comprehensive planning reposes on
the introduction of the city master plan and the five-year development plan both launched in
the early 1970s. As such, the history of development of urban planning in Saudi Arabia is
a tripartite one which comprises the following stages, (1) the earlier municipal legislation of
urban growth, (2) the building of planned communities, and (3) the comprehensive, topdown
approach to urban development. In their own terms and given the short history and
external influence, these efforts were impressive. However, shortcomings abound. These
plans were perfunctorily wrought by foreign consultants first, and later by callow Saudi
planners and technocrats educated and trained at Western institutions and aided by foreign
expertise. Due to time constraints and costs, foreign consultants were less likely to allot
considerable effort to understand cultural process in their host societies. Aside from the
copious studies on existing conditions, problems and trends, given the political
imperatives, their solutions were little more than rationalized, colorful maps for the various

145
land uses backed with detailed zoning regulations. 63 Such sorting of land uses have been
largely based on assumptions peculiar to land market in Western societies.
These plans were a manifestation of assumptions such as those of Western welfare
economics which view zoning as a way for public authorities to rectify defects (e.g.
negative externalities) in the land market, such as the separation of incompatible land uses.
For example, Doxiadis Plan created large residential tracts with subdivisions that gave few
residential units per acre in the northern Riyadh while residential uses with more units per
acre were located in the south-east parts of the city. Lots were rectangular, and the city was
zoned so that the northern areas were given larger lots, hence encouraging higher-income
households to live in the north and lower-income groups in the unpopular southern part of
Riyadh where lots were smaller. The Plan introduced an economic social order to the city,
one that sorts income groups in space, in contrast to the mixed and semi-autonomous
traditional quarter system. Hitherto such income-based division, in contrast to sociallybased
traditional organization, not applicable to the traditional Arab-Islamic built
environments. It also institutionalized the concept of the setback, thus encouraging the
villa, a housing unit surrounded by open space.
The fission from the traditional design standards of the medina was culminated by the
adoption of Doxiadis' City Master Plan for Riyadh in 1973 by the Council of Ministers.
The approach of contracting Western consultants to prepare master plans was in vogue in
many Third World and Developing countries. They were archetypical solutions to rapidly
expanding cities. Master city plans are long-range, multi-phase conceptualizations of a
town's future growth. They constitute comprehensive land use and infrastructure
development plans, projected in tune with vigorous national economic growth schemes, all
sought to facilitate economic prosperity and social stability through manipulating the spatial
system. Along with the housing loans provided through the REDF, Riyadh's new Master
Plan institutionalized the grid and indoctrinated the villa as the preferred form of laying new
districts by setting rectilinear lot-sizes, and enforcing set-backs regulations. 64
Yet, as was the case in many Developing countries whose societies undergo massive
transformation, these plans were more technical documents than realistic programs which
reflect the communities' individual needs and the actual requirements of these cities. They
reflect an elitist form of decision-making process in which planners attempt to meet central
authority goals and claim foresight on behalf of those affected by their decisions. A recent

146
report by the prestigious High Commission For The Development of Arriyadh (HCDA)
reads:
Past development projects [due to rapid growth] soon became
obsolete...public utilities and other development projects were often
designed and built without reliable existing data or an up-to-date
systematic development strategy. Private investment in commercial
and industrial projects were often made by imitation and intuition
without accurate measures of the expected economic returns. 65
This corroborates Brian Berry's observations on the usually perfunctory physical
planning approaches employed in Third World and Developing countries. "It is a planning
at the municipal level within highly Centralized national government." 66 The approach was
often "sectorial or project oriented" (for example, documents that illustrate land use,
transportation, or a housing project). These plans were usually assembled by international
consultants without diligent regard to conte;:t\ial imperatives or a deep study of
consequences and their relationship with the surrounding urban networks. Foreign
schemes abound and Western-born models such as those of the "City Beautiful" planning
approaches are marketed by foreign consultants. Moreover, these efforts do not coincide
with national planning because the latter tend to be economic and the former (the municipal)
tend to be physical (Berry, 1973) 67
SUMMARY
Several factors have forged the Saudi planning model. The government has opted a
policy of managed free-market economy, which they justify as being consistent with
Islamic values as explicitly laid in each five-year development plan. Technically, this
model closely resembles the "indicative planning" approach employed by France and
elsewhere. The indicative planning approach is justified as offering information required to
guide investment and make other rational market choices. In the model, the top planning
commission(s) begins the planning process by setting preliminary overall targets, while
outlining the general course during the following five years that each plan is to last.
Two characteristics of the Kingdom's urban planning, in particular, and national
planning, in general, can be outlined. First, urban planning remains an activity wrought at
the central or national government level in isolation from local city government and general
public input. As such urban planning has been essentially technical, one that relies on

147
imported models, chiefly Western. The Saudi planning model aims at aiding in the
allocation of national resources, coordination of various government agencies' activities in
the built environment in light of the national five-year development plans. As far as goals,
it is a 'functional' mode of planning in which planners assume the goals to be given in a
situation and are rational with respect to the means only. 68
Second, despite the touted commitment to the preference for the application of Islamic
Shariy'ah, as the sole principle on which policy making system is predicated, such
commitment has been confined to loaded officials' announcements, it yet been extended to
the sphere of urban planning. Traditionally, as in the case of the Islamic city, the state has
maintained a somewhat laissez faire position toward the local affairs of building processes.
Such attitude was evident in the structural organization of traditional Arab-Muslim towns
comprising autonomous quarters of which internal affairs were left to residents discretion.
The modern practice of city master plans and government-ordained building codes lacks
established connection with the Islamically-based building practices of the past, namely, the
concern over privacy. While modern Saudi built environments have ignored efficiency
(e.g. no property taxes, sprawl and disregard for environment), the form of traditional built
environments reflected climatic solutions and adhered to social-religious values.
Yet, the contemporary metropolis is a result of the pressures of rapid urbanization,
heavy reliance on Western models of architecture and planning, the economic peculiarities
of oil and the Kingdom's political system. The transformation of the medina to the
contemporary metropolis has been a byproduct of the modernization process consistent
with the leadership's vision, influence and affluence. All in all, the government planning,
of which urban planning is one facet, has been open to technically-rational innovations, as
long as such practices do not involve the questioning of the established government's
preemptive right to decision making, allocation of national resources and the distribution of
power and wealth.

148
Notes to Chapter IV
1 Michael E. Bonine, "The Urbanization of the Persian Gulf Nations." In The Persian Gulf State: A
General Survey, edited by Alvin J. Cottrell, C. Edmund Bosworth, R. Burrell, K. McLachlan, and
R.M. Savory (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press), 272.
2
On the figure of Libya see Ervin Y. Galantay, "Islamic Identity and the Metropolis: the Search for
Continuity," The Proceedings of the International Conference on Urbanism in Islam Vol. 1,5-24
(Tokyo, Japan: October 22,-28,1989), 7.
3 Ahmed A. Shamekh, Spatial Patterns of Bedouin Settlement in Al-Qasim Region, Saudi Arabia
Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (University of Kentucky, 1975).
4 John Friedmann, "Intention and Reality: The American Planner Overseas," A1P Journal (May 1969):
187-194.
^
Stefano Bianca. "The Threat to Historic Islamic Cities Through Western Style Development: The
Case of The Holy City of Medina," Islamic Quarterly 2 (1982), 109.
6 Peter G. Rowe discusses this 'paradox' in his article "Dual Aspects of Tradition in Saudi Arabian
Housing Development. In Housing Culture and Design: A Comparative Perspective edited by Setha
Low and Erve Chambers (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989), 303-334.
7 E. Y. Galanty, (1989), 6.
8
Ibid., 7.
9 G. Clark and M. Dear distinguish between four (functional) theories of the state: (i) "supplier' of public
or social goods and services; (ii) "regulator and facilitator' of the functions of the market place 1 (iii)
social engineer', the state intervenes in the economy for its own policy objectives; and (iv) 'arbiter'
mediating between the society's classes. "The State in Capitalism and the Capitalist State". In
Michael Dear and Allen J. Scott (eds.) Urbanization and Urban Planning in Capitalist Society (London:
Methuen) 1981. pp. 45-61.
1
0 P. M. Hohenberg and L.H. Lees. The Making of Urban Europe, 1000-1950 (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1985), 157; John Hancock, "Planners in the Changing American City,
1900-1940," In American Urban History: An Interpretive Reader with Commentaries (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1973); L. Reissman. The Urban Process: Cities in Industrial Societies (New
York: The Free Press, 1970).
11
David Clark. Urban Geography (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1982).
12
Quoted in Reissman (1970), op. cit., 42.
1
3 This definition was adopted by the Garden Cities and Town Planning Association in 1919 with Hoard's
approval. Ebenezer Howard. Garden Cities of To-morrow (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1946), 26..
1
4 Peter Self, "Urban Planning". In The Social Science encyclopedia, edited by A. Kuper and J. Kuper
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 876.

149
15
Self (1985), 877.
16
Ibid.
L. Reissman (1975), op. cit., 156
G. Bear, "The City" In Readings in Arab Middle Eastern Societies and Culture, edited by Abdulla M.
Lutfiyya and Charles Churchill (Paris: Mouton. 1970), 641. In fact, in Saudi Arabia, all heads and
members of municipalities are appointed by the central government.
19
M. Bonine, (1980), op. cit.
20 Tarik M. Al-Soliman. "The Characteristics of Planned Communities and Their Impact on Urban
Development and Residents Perceptions". In Urban and Rural Profiles in Saudi Arabia, edited by K.
M. Al-Ankary and El-S. El-Bushra (Berlin: Gebrudner Borntraeger) 1989. p. 62.
21 John Dyckman, A. Kreditor and T. Baneijee, "Planning in an Unprepared Environment: The Case of
Bahrain," TPR , Vol. 55, No. 2 (1984), 216.
22 The term bureaucracy refers to a system of organization "characterized by hierarchical chain of
information gathering and command, conscious adaptation of means to ends, intraorganizational
specialization, and separation of ownership and management." In addition to bargaining and democracy,
bureaucratic organization is a non-market process that supplements market mechanisms in a managed
capitalist society. John Elliot. Comparative Economic Systems (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth
Publishing Company, 1985).
23 Foglesong, op. cit., 15. Foglesong espouses a Marxian approach to explain the meaning and
significance of the rule of planning and planners. He argues that neither the 'pluralistic-liberal
paradigm 1 nor the progressive development planning approach can deliver a full understanding of the
emergence of urban planning in a capitalist society. Rather, urban planning is best understood through
Marxian analysis which emphasizes the structures and contradictions of American capitalist democracy.
Foglesong probes questions such as how and what type of powerful interests were incorporated into
planning policy and what the role planners play in such a context.
24 ibid., 16.
25
The term "synoptic planning, "was coined by Charles Lindblom in his criticism to decision making
processes by intellectual problem solving. It involves the identification of goals and policy means
which most efficiently attain with the goals. Lindblom argues for what he terms as "muddling
through" approach to policy making. For example, he denies the rational comprehensive planning
model as an ideal, argues for the replacement of 'validity as a criterion in decision-making process for
agreement, and calls for political market Choices rather than knowledge (In A. Faludi (1983)). In his
later works (1977) he modified his position on planning to accommodate for a degree of national
economic planning as a way to maintain democracy.
26 in Foglesong, op cit., 8.
27 Dyckman et al, op cit., 215.

150
28 Klosterman, op. cit.; M. M. Feldman, "What Kind of Economics For What Kind of Planning (1987):
5-20.
Friedmann (1961); Dyckman et al (1984), op. cit..
30 K. M. Al-Ankary and El-S. El-Bushra, op. cit., Table 6, p.10. Concerning this figure, the authors cite
Grill, (1984), p. 2; El-Bushra (1980), 215; Muawad (1987), 190; Population Reference Bureau, Inc.
(1987).
It must be emphasized here that local public departments, such as the municipality, do exercise certain
powers within the domain of defined operations. Local department or agencies can press for certain
exemptions or pass recommendations to their regional or national headquarters. But such requests must
be ratified by high ranking ministry executives, if not by the Council of Ministers. What is lacking is
system by which residents can exercise considerable influence on the urban process at the local
community level.
32 The creation of the Council of Ministers was the final stage in King Abdul-Aziz' national consolidation
of the Kingdom (Royal Decree date October 9,1953 (I Safar, 1373 H)). Fouad Al-Farsy. Saudi
Arabia: A Case Study in Development. (London: KPI) 1986. Paul J. Setevns "The Interaction between
Oil Policy and Industrial Policy in Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia: Energy, Developmental Planning,
And Industrialization , edited by R. El Mallakh and D. H. El Mallakh, 27-45. (Lexington, Mass.
Lexington Books, 1982).
3 3
Ahmed H. Dahlan, "The Saudi Arabian Council of Ministers: Its Environment, Its Role and Future,"
In Politics, Administration, and Development in Saudi Arabia, edited by Ahmed, H. Dahlan, 61-80
(Brentwood, MD: Amana, 1990).
34
N.H. Samman, "Saudi Arabia and the Role of the Emirates in Regional Development" In Politics,
Administration, and Development in Saudi Arabia, edited by Ahmed, H. Dahlan, 85-96 (Brentwood,
MD: Amana, 1990).
35
Aidros A. S. Al Sabban, "Saudi Arabia Municipalities: History, Organization and Structure," In
Politics, Administration, and Development in Saudi Arabia, edited by Ahmed, H. Dahlan, 97-127
(Brentwood, MD: Amana, 1990).
36
Al Hathloul, 1981.
37 Saleh A. al-Hathloul and Anis-ur-Rahmaan, "The Evolution of Urban and Regional Planning in Saudi
Arabia. "Ekistics, 312 (May/June 1985), 206.
Solon T. Kimball, "American Culture in Saudi Arabia" The New York Academy of Sciences Vol. 18,
No. 5,469-484 (March, 1956).
39
Kimball, op. cit., 471, 73.
40
Ibid, 473.
41 The use of concrete structures and cement blocks was introduced in 1950 for the first time in the
Eastern Province. Mr. Ahmad Al-K'aki imported skilled builders from Lebanon and Syria to build his

151
big multi-story apartment buildings with commercial spaces on the street level on prospering Khalid
Street in Al-Khobar. He hired an Arab architect, Niqulla Salem who introduced the Mediterranean
multi-story style to the region. In the new residential units, no space was assigned for livestock for
household production, a storage room for dates and foodstuffs, or a water well. Unlike the traditional
introverted homes, the new units were adorned with wide windows and doors opened onto wide, straight
streets, all to meet the new building codes of the municipalities. The architectural style that was opted
by Salem was more suited to the Mediterranean region than to the hot and humid climate of the Eastern
Province. The new style was to inspire mass emulation. Abdullah N. Al-Subaie, The Discovering of
Oil and its Impact on the Social Life in the Eastern Province, 1352/1933-1380/1960: A Study in
Social History. Second Edition. (Riyadh: Asharief Press, 1989.), 160.
42 Ibid, 170.
43
Al-Subaie, 1989.
44
As will be discussed in detail in the chapter on Riyadh, the Doxiadis plan was based on experience
accumulated in Western physical urban planning. Lots were rectangular, and the city was zoned into
areas each with a certain lot sizes- so that the northern areas were given larger lots, hence encouraging
higher-income households to live in the north and lower-income groups in the unpopular southern part
of Riyadh where lots were smaller. As such the Plan introduced an economic plan to the city, one that
sorts income groups in space, in contrast to the mixed and semi-autonomous traditional quarter system.
The plan institutionalized the concept of the setback, thus encouraging the villa, a housing unit
surrounded by open space.
45
Saleh A. Al-Hathloul and Anis-ur-Rahmaan, 206
46
Ibid., 209.
47
Ibid., 206.
4
$ Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Ministry of Planning. 1983. Achievements of the Development Plans:
1390-1403 (1970-1983), 2.
4
9 Interview with the Saudi Minister of Financial Affairs and National Economy, Al Ahram, Cairo,
Egypt (July 26,1975), 5, cited by Al-Farsy, op cit, 82.
50 Peter Mansfield. The New Arabians (Chicago :J.G. Ferguson Publishing Co, 1981), 163
51
Willard A. Beling. King Faisal: and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia, edited by Willard A. Beling
(London: Croom Helm, 1980).
52 Fouad A. Al-Farsy. "King Faisal and the First Five Year Development Plan". In King Faisal: and the
Modernization of Saudi Arabia, edited by Willard A. Beling (London: Croom Helm, 1980), 61.
53 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Ministry of Planning. Fifth Development Plan, (1410/1990-1415/1995),
399.
54
Ibid, 3.

152
55
Ibid, 399.
56
Ibid.
57 Paul J. Stevens "The Interaction between Oil Policy and Industrial Policy in Saudi Arabia". In Saudi
Arabia: Energy, Developmental Planning and Industrialization, edited by R. El Mallakh & D. H., El
Mallakh (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1982), 27.
58 Paul J. Stevens, ibid. Critics point to the difficulties that accompany switching speedily from a
government-led economy based on oil exports and infrastructure investment to a free market in a span
of two decades. They question the success of the Kingdom's commitment to attaining a free market
economy modeled on the West while at the same time placing due emphasis on preserving its Islamic
heritage. For a comprehensive discussion on this issue see "Saudi Arabia: Riyadh and Jeddah Business,
"The Middle East (August, 1991)
59 Stuart McMinn, John Robertson, and Hassan Reda. "Socio-Economic Development of the Yanbu
Sub-Region, Saudi Arabia: The Impact of the Construction Workforce". Third Planning Review. Vol.
5, No, 4, November, 1983, 311-332.
60 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 1989. Ministry of Planning. Achievements of the Development Plans:
1970-1987 and Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu. Introductory Information.
61 Abdul Khakee, "Urban Economics, Urban Geography and Planning." Planning Outlook 24 (1981):
72.
62
Akbar (1988), op. cit.
63
Friedmann (1969); Dyckman et al (1984), op. cit.
64 In Riyadh the villa type comprises 37.9% of the residential stock. Source: High Commission for the
Development of Riyadh 1987. Land Use Survey: Summary Report (Riyadh: Al Shathry Consulting
Engineering).
65 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. High Commission For The Development of Arriyadh. Demographic
Transportation Land Use And Economic Studies For The City Of Arriyadh: Executive Summary
(Riyadh: National Offset Printing Press, 1987.), 4.
66 Brian Berry The Human Consequences of Urbanization (London: Macmillan, 1973), 104.
67 it must be noted here that there is tremendous effort, especially on the part of the HCDA and the
Deputy Ministry for Municipal and Rural Affairs' Deputyship for Town Planning to come up with
more detailed and accurate data base systems. Such efforts are led by highly dedicated Saudi and foreign
professionals committed to create planning schemes compatible with the socio-political and economic
context of Saudi Arabia.
6^ Friedmann (1966), op. cit.

CHAPTER V
MAJOR TRADITIONAL URBAN ATTRIBUTES AND THE EMERGING
URBAN FORMS
Modern cities are characterized by their high level of internal differentiation. The
ever changing modes of urban activities are sorted in space. Living standards and styles,
working conditions, supply and demand, all are parameters which shape the spatial map
of the city. Sets of zones, and residential neighborhoods are formed or transformed
exhibiting peculiar physical qualities, functional organization, and distinctive
demographic composition replete with social character and problems. Such spatial
features are repeated, though no one composition completely resembles another.
However, cities do show overall similarities, which point to correspondent factors
underlying the formation of their urban tissue. Work, residential, recreational and service
activities all compete for place in space. The understanding of internal patterns,
processes and structures of such built environments has attracted scientific inquiry. In the
West, several theoretical approaches have been devised to deal with urban queries and to
unravel the very processes that shape the spatial map. 1 Such theoretical discourse has
been transmitted by Western and Western-educated planners to many non-Western
societies in the form of master plans and proposals for solving urban problems and to
guide development.
In the previous chapters, I discussed the cultural setting of the new nation-state: its
modern history, socioreligious institutions, political structure, economy and the resulting
mode of national and urban planning. I now turn to the emerging urban forms. Like
many developing and Third World countries experiencing rapid economic growth, urban
population has increased in Saudi Arabia. As previously mentioned, the Saudi
government turned to Western expertise to tackle negative aspects of urbanization.
Western planners, overlooking local urban traditions, considerably altered the traditional
built environment and encouraged the wholesale adoption of Western-inspired urban
forms.
As shown in Chapter Three, traditional built forms were reflected in towns'
dominant subsistence economies, which barely fed their denizens, a fact which explained
the rural-pastoral homeostasis. Towns lacked economic vigor to spark urbanization.

154
However, lying in one of the backwater regions of the aging Ottoman empire, most of
Arabia's traditional settlements floated in a semi-political vacuum. Generally speaking,
settlements were ruled by tribal dynasties. The larger princely settlements reflected the
magnitude of power nodes, such as Riyadh, Diriyah, Buraidah, and Hail in the north.
These settlements of petty traders, craftsmen and peasants and other smaller settlements,
in one form or another, joined other major centers in mutual economic and security
agreements. The politically dominant towns served as centers of sub-regions which
included their own hinterland of smaller villages. Also, the traditional system of
affiliations and loyalties between the inhabitants of Najdi towns ascribed to an intricate
network of tribal associations.
In this chapter, I will discuss dominant cultural attributes of traditional built
environments in Arabia. In the following chapters, I will examine how the modernization
programs under the new nation-state have substituted centralized forms of bureaucratic
organization, government-subsidized urban economies, and Western forms of architecture
and urban design and planning for traditional cultural attributes. It must be emphasized,
however, that the modernization of the contemporary Saudi built environment is a result
of the emergence of the national political economic structure which relied on Western
technology to appeal to the rising aspirations of the population and to tackle rapid
urbanization.
I. TRADITIONAL CULTURAL URBAN ATTRIBUTES
Traditional Muslim built environments exhibited several characteristics. They
included (1) a considerable degree of autonomy in the running of local affairs, (2)
subsistent economies, (3) traditional forms of land ownership marked with spontaneous
conversion of undeveloped land, and treating land as a social resource, (4) socially
informed and environmentally compatible organic growth, (5) self-help and communitysupported
production of mixed-income houses, and (6) a great degree of the
responsibility for providing public services fell on the shoulders of the inhabitants with
minimum intervention by the governing body.

155
A. Semi-Local Autonomy and Government and Control
Traditional town rulers enjoyed semi-autonomy and inhabitants exercised exclusive
rights in the regulation of local growth. Amirs had substantial local powers in the control
of local affairs of settlements. The organization of a settlement's form largely comprised
sub territorial enclaves denoting quarters dominated by large families represented by
notables who were consulted by the amir in local and inter-settlements matters. Under
the traditional form of leadership, local rulers relied on a combination of personal
discretion, Islamic legal advice, consultation with prominent town inhabitants, and if
necessary, coercion to maintain their power. In some cases, authority of amirs spilled
over and influenced tribes and villages living within their vicinity. As such, the
"...environment was shaped through mutual agreement and time-tested convictions with
minimum intervention from authorities." 2
B. The Economy
Agriculture was the mainstay of most of Arabia's settlements, while coastal
settlements added fishing and other maritime means of livelihood. Makkah and Madinah
were exceptions. The consecration of Makkah and Madinah as holy cities following the
advent of Islam in the seventh century A.D. bestowed prosperity on the two towns, thanks
to the pilgrim-related economy. Still, most of Arabian settlement economies were limited
to simple forms of bazaar economies of the Middle East: a family organized activity,
typically a risk-minimizing one rather than profit-seeking venture. Due to dispersed
political control, geographic isolation and the precarious harsh environment of the desert,
economic growth was inadequate to stimulate economic prosperity and urbanization.
Riyadh and Huraimla typified the norm in central Arabia, in which a majority of the
population was involved in agriculture whose surplus fed a small population of literati,
petty traders and craftsmen. Inhabitants bartered commodities (e.g. grain and dates) in
exchange for services and goods, especially in central Arabia. The use of specie and
coins was rare. 3
Traditional Muslim towns relied on Islamically established methods of collecting
taxes (e.g. zakat) and fees from those living within their confines and the hinterland. 4
Such teachings guarded individuals against exorbitant taxation, hence limiting revenues
to political leadership. 5 Islamic institutions, specifically, waqf (religiously-inspired

156
foundations whose benefits were dedicated to the public) were instrumental in paying for
buildings and the running of bridges, schools, drinking fountains, mosques, roadhouses,
all of which today are shouldered by the central government. 6 In short, traditional town
economies were informal, intervention by political authorities was minimal. The
informality was derived from freedom of entry, reliance on local resources, family
ownership, small-scale operation, intensive labor and skill acquired through
apprenticeship
C. Urban Planning and Design
In traditional built environments, town building was largely the outcome of
customary building practices based on an accumulation of locally developed experience
and adaptation to local resources. In comparison to modern built environments, land uses
were limited, paramountly residential. Endogamy and kinship, rather than land prices
sorted inhabitants in the settlement. Animated technology explained the compactness of
built forms and the lack of transportation technology impeded sprawl, a common feature
in Saudi Arabia's contemporary forms. Concern with security and control placed a
premium on space. Circulation space was minimized, narrow and functionally
proportionate to pedestrian flow. It was a residual of residential and other built spaces. 7
At the level of individual buildings, town architecture conformed to Islamicallyinspired
social norms, which reflected on the overall patterns of town morphology. 8 For
example, fenestration conformed to mutually tacit agreements of respect for privacy
between neighbors. 9 Internal organization of space reflected climatic concerns, for
instance, the presence of a courtyard, and especially in well-to-do households, genderspecific
as well as ecologically compatible concerns. The emphasis on clustered and
attached residential units of non-regular lots fed by a tortuous and shaded street network
contributed to a benign macroclimate in the torching summer of Arabia, as opposed to the
microclimatic approach in the modern individual villa model and other free-standing
buildings using modern technology (e.g. electricity and insulation) leaving large areas of
the city prone to adverse weather conditions.
While growth adhered to experience and social norms, physical organization of
towns according to a preconceived plan, with distinct uses and a program of
implementation, was unknown. No central (e.g. royal) statutes, no large-scale

157
development, no master plans, and no strong legislative controls existed. None of the
apparatuses typical of modem urban planning under an established state were developed.
The modern modes of transportation and systematic intervention and large-scale urban
production under the auspices of a powerful central state seemed, prior to the discovery
of oil, centuries away. Finally, adding new land uses such as houses, commercial uses or
farmland was done only after securing the affected parties' rights.
D. Land Ownership and Distribution.
Settlement growth was slow and simple, residents encroached on raw land as need
arose. Incremental appropriation of new land conformed to the slow demographic pace,
increases in population were occasionally countered by abrupt natural disasters and
random fatal clashes among settlements' populations and or with marauding nomads.
Austere, subsistence economies offered limited financial resources, a factor which
diminished the economic viability of town expansion to the political leadership. Under
such conditions, urban growth was economically irrelevant, for land was perceived as a
social resource, rather than for its exchange value. Moreover, the Islamic principle of
shufah was acknowledged under the Islamic legal code. Under the shufah principle, a
neighbor was given priority to buy next door properties at the given exchange price. As
such, shufah helped form quarters which housed relatives though they belonged to
different incomes categories.
Documentation of growth, legislation and building activity was virtually
nonexistent. Typically, ownership was established once converted into urban or
productive uses. Legal registry of property was seldom needed, if required it was usually
handled by the town's clergy. Property title was based on conventional recognition by the
community. 1 ' 3 Land ownership was identified with its users. If a dispute arose, witnesses
were summoned and the amir or the qadi resolved the dispute. Finally, lots were
irregular, development (e.g. buildings and farmland) determined land layout and,
ultimately, the town's configuration (whereas in modern built forms, lot dimensions are
set beforehand, taking the form of large parcels laid at one time.

158
E. Home Ownership
In traditional towns, homes were built by residents according to simple building
practices utilizing mostly available and locally produced building materials. As the size
of a household increased, rooms or new dwellings were built, and if space was available,
attached to old ones. Conversely, following the death of a head of a household, family
members were allowed to subdivide a house, or an estate, between those eligible under
the Islamic legal system of inheritance. If the will stipulated a partition of property
among family members, a large house was converted into smaller units. Consequently,
new afniah (e.g. courtyards and semi-private spaces abutting the house) and alleys were
made to provide for accessibility to the new units. Willy-nilly, this accounted for the
modifications of already built buildings resulting in the tree-like, tortuous passages, and
the numerous cul-de-sacs feeding clusters of residential units in a typical Muslim city.
Occasionally, a gate was installed at the beginning of a cul-de-sac leading to a cluster of
homes belonging to an extended family.
In the case of the construction of an annex or a new house, family members,
relatives and neighbors helped both physically and financially in the construction effort.
As in the case of marriage, a household head could borrow from individuals to help pay
for the needed material or labor. No loaning institutions (e.g. banks or public agencies)
existed. In central Arabia, houses were built using millennia-old construction methods
(load-bearing walls of sun-dried mud bricks and tree trunks, branches and palm reeds).
Construction took a relatively short time, for example, fifty days for a mid-size house. 11
Better off households could hire a professional builder to do the construction.
F. Public Land Use and Infrastructure
"In traditional societies," Eric Monkkonen wrote, "individuals shared enough
central cultural conceptions to create and maintain an operating vision of order." 12 In
traditional Muslim towns, inhabitants maintained their neighborhoods. Cities that served
as seats for princely powers and centers for a larger periphery, were endowed with
economic advantages and tax income. They were bestowed with public baths, street
lights, paved roads and waste water disposal systems, such as sewers, which were largely
paid through imposed fees and taxes. Also, provisions for public facilities, such as
mosques, water, shelters and schools were largely made possible through voluntary

159
charities, waqf. For instance, in Riyadh, early in this century, there were 42 water
fountains and washing facilities (masagi), all provided through the institution of waqf,I 13
However, towns in poor regions lacked infrastructure. In such regions, settlements were
little more than dormitory communes of mere self-supporting residences and pedestrian
precincts: settled communities whose members were glued by a mutual concern for
survival. Inhabitants collectively participated in the maintenance of their habitat and
contributed to decision making affecting their everyday lives. 14
Islamic teachings offered moral incentives which encouraged a sense of
responsibility among the faithful. For example, the moving of objects that could
potentially harm passers by was highly encouraged and directly related to God's pleasure.
It was documented that Prophet Mohammed said, "A man was walking in a street who
found a branch of thorns and removed it, then Allah thanked him and forgave his
misdeeds." 15 Maintenance of streets and elimination of refuse was performed by
residents' who were bound by mutual commitment, the equivalent of modern time's
imposed penalties by the municipalities against those who committed infractions. 16 Solid
waste was channeled into underground trenches while washing water refuse was routed
into dug holes and left to vanish in the hot weather. 17
H. MODERNIZATION ECLIPSES SOCIETY'S TRADITIONAL URBAN FORMS AND SPURS
THE METROPOLIS
The traditional form of habitation characterized Arabia's landscape for centuries
until the dramatic developments of this century when gradually the above cultural
attributes were dwarfed under the emerging nation-state and its far-reaching
modernization efforts. The modernization programs of the Saudi government first
focused on the development of the bureaucracy and national security capabilities. By the
1950s, direct urban development became an integral part of the state's intensive
modernization. Western planning consultants employed urban models implicitly based
on preconceived notions of urban land use systems found in free market economies. As
Dykman et al noted,

160
In Western parliamentary or elected democracies, for example, the very
notion of planning presupposes the existence of a political market; interest
group representation; a culture of 'rationality;' and a bureaucracy committed
to Weberian reason, or a rational application of means to received ends.
These conditions are taken as the essential environment in which the
implementation of all policies, including planning policies, must be
realised. 18
In the following three chapters, I explore the urban transformation of three Saudi
urban settlements that vary in population size, urban economies and genesis. While
imported technology (e.g. transportation, electricity, etc.) was changing the face, pace and
space of the contemporary Saudi built forms, the government has been the larger force
and catalyst of this urban transformation. It manifests itself in the underwriting of nationwide
modernization, thereby triggering urbanization. I will discuss in detail the impact of
oil industrialization and government modernization programs on the creation of Arar ab
initio, and the transformation of the local agrarian economies of Riyadh and Huraimla's
into a modern planned settlements.
In the case of Saudi Arabia, the implementation of Western urban planning has
proved inattentive to the country's physical context and incongruent with the prevalent
political environment. 19 As shown in this study, the Saudi major cultural attributes (i.e. a
traditional monarchy ruling an Islamically-inspired society, largely relying on oil
revenues) must be contrasted to those prevalent in Western capitalist democracies. This
study aims at increasing knowledge of non-Western societies and addresses the complex
role played by the state. I stress caution against "packaged" universal approaches to
urban planning and development. As previously mentioned, the emerging urban planing
paradigm in the Kingdom, while retaining aspects of Western planning such as
infrastructure and transportation planning, has been duly centralized, emphatically
apolitical and highly technical. At the same time, the centralized character of the state
emasculated local control and initiative in the various communities of the country, thanks
to the preponderance of the central state's fiscal strength, based largely on oil revenues.
The underwriting of local urban economies by the central government eclipsed traditional
subsistence economies of cities, towns and settlements.
Since the Saudi government does not collect taxes, investment in long-range, largescale
infrastructure and industrial projects and social services (housing, education, health,
culture, etc.) are deemed a sort of noblesse oblige. 20 Bestowed with oil affluence and

161
faced with increasing world demand for oil by the industrialized world, the Saudi polity
has sought modernization of social and infrastructure developments to attain "economic
independence." In theory, industrialization involves a whole set of political, social,
demographic and economic consequences of profound magnitude which alter the physical
environment. A social revolution of this magnitude requires a supporting ideology
geared toward progressive reforms in the society's organization and critical values. In
Huntington's words,
Economic development encourages industrialization, expands transportation
and communication, spreads literacy and education, and improves
urbanization, all of which lead to a rise in political consciousness, the
mobilization of new groups into politics, and the multiplication of political
demands. 21
In the West, various democracies supplanted the older forms of oligarchy and
monarchy. In the Middle East under the aegis of colonial powers (c. late eighteenth and
the first half of the twentieth centuries), great leaps to modernization were wrought by
traditional elites vying to adapt to the changing socio-political aspirations of their
populations and economic changes brought by world market conditions. 22 As such,
modernization brought with it societal metamorphoses reflected in the emergence of the
middle class which played a vital role in the political sphere 23 In Saudi Arabia, the
emergence of the middle class owes its character to the modernization programs
orchestrated by the government. 24 The government's generous allocation of oil revenues
in modernizing the society and the built environment must be seen as a legitimizing
factor a traditionalist political system is arguably to undertake to stave-off threats to the
political status quo. 25 Commenting on the November 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque
in Mecca by Islamic insurgents, Nadaf Safiran wrote
After putting down the insurrection by force, the regime responded,
typically, with some measures designed to appease the underlying concerns
of the rebels and to enhance its image as an enforcer of tradition, and others
designed to reassure new classes, whose interests were bound with
continuing development and change. The new classes included an industrial
proletariat, a mercantile bourgeoisie, and a so-called new middle
class....Because that class has fed directly or indirectly on government
expenditures rather than being itself a major source of government revenue
through taxation, it has so far lacked the incentive that has prompted
Western bourgeoisie to seek participation in and control of political power. 26

162
In Saudi Arabia, the state has contributed immensely to the production of space,
hence market models cannot be solely accounted for to fathom the transformation. The
internal organization of urban function and space has been greatly affected by the
government's views on how to allocate national resources mainly derived from oil. This
oil and its petrochemical by-products are a national, natural asset and the state deems that
the population should share in their bounty. To assure control, the monarchic
government has led the modernization, combining tradition with modern technology.
Foreign firms and think tanks were called upon for advice to plan and to lay the
foundation for "modern" cities in the Kingdom. The urban sphere was effectively used to
convey the central authority's efforts toward modernization. Yet, Western consultants'
comprehensive plans have carried with them values and conceptions peculiar to the West,
about its market processes, social-political convictions and climate. The Saudi economy
is a highly managed form of capitalism, an off-shoot that blurs state and tradition (which
cannot be separated from religion) and takes the present distribution of wealth as given.
No taxes are imposed by the government, which relies solely on oil wealth for its
expenditures. In return, the government has retained its prerogative to orchestrate
development while retaining traditional elements conducive to its power and control.
The aforementioned cultural attributes will be discussed in the following chapters as
I explore the major developments that caused the transformation of Saudi built forms. As
major themes, these cultural attributes will be examined in light of the changing role of
the state in the society at large and in modern urban development. I will focus on
government program impacts on the elements which characterized traditional built forms.
The inevitable emergence of the centralized nation-state with substantial powers and'
through profound modernization programs engendered itself on the society's urban
systems.

163
Notes to Chapter V
1
Six major approaches can be identified. First, is the ecological-competitive approach. It attempts to
account for the struggle which presses on the "natural" proclivity of social groups to compete for
territory. Second, is the "trade-off" approach, rooted in neoclassical economics. It emphasizes the
mapping of intra-urban land uses under market-pricing mechanisms. Land is viewed as a commodity
and its status reflects supply and demand forces. The third and fourth approaches, social area analysis
and factorial analysis, are extensions of the basic ecological view. They investigate the social and
economic factors underlying intra-urban structures. The fifth is the conflict/management approach
which seeks the understanding of spatial organization using political science, power analysis and
conflict in society. It goes beyond the static and impersonal forces largely emphasized by the
approaches dealing with the market mechanisms and the equilibratory tendencies of the ecological
approach. It ponders the role played by influential groups and the character of constraints imposed
upon actors in the city. Finally, there is the Marxist approach which attempts to explicate the
production of space as a function of class struggle and the accumulation process. The capitalist class'
adamant efforts to reap greater profits through manipulation of rents, inevitably result in a geographical
outcome exhibiting contradictions peculiar to a capitalist society. For the purpose of simplification the
first four can be lumped into one group, the substantive, static "socioeconomic" approaches, and the
last two as the "intentional" paradigms. See for example, D. Clark, Urban Geography (Baltimore: The
John Hopkins University Press, 1982).
2
J. Akbar, Crisis in the Build Environment: The Case of the Muslim City (Singapore: Concept Media Pte
Ltd, 1988), cover page.
3 This was mainly in most settlements of pre-Saudi Arabia. The use of coined money increased in
1344H./1924 when under King Abdul-Aziz, local money was produced. Al-Washmi, op. cit, 111.
4
For detailed sources of revenue in the Islamic city, see Ahmad A1 Abbadi, "Min Mathahir al-Hayat al-
Iqtisadiyah fee al-Madinah al-Islamiyah" [Aspects of Economic Life in the Islamic City] A 'lam Alfikr
(April/May/June, 1980): 127-160.
5 Compare this to the medieval European city, in which a patrician elite class maintained control over
lower classes. According to Sjoberg (I960:), "Regressive taxation is well ingrained in the feudal
order, firmly buttressing the existing class structure." G. Sjoberg, The Preindustrial City, Past and
Present (Glencoe, 111: Free Press, 1960).
6 As mentioned in Chapter two, Muslims, emulating Prophet Mohammed, have traditionally looked to
the life after death for eternal abode. This notion of "utopia" had a major impact on individuals' lives
and ultimately on the production of uniform physical environments. TTie waqf institution is rooted in
the documented Hadeeth quoted after Prophet Mohammed who said, "When a person dies, his work
[accumulation of deeds needed for salvation in the hereafter] terminates except for three things: ongoing
charity, useful knowledge, or a good son who prays for him." Also, the Prophet said, "The work
and good deeds of a believer that continue after his death are: disseminated knowledge, leaving a good
son [i.e. who prays for him], or a Qur'an for inheritance, a mesjid which he built or a house for
travellers, opening a stream, or a charity created from wealth which continues after death." This saying
was documented by Ibn Majah. Source: B. Hakim. Arabic-Islamic Cities: Building and Planning
Principles (London: Kegan Paul International, 1986), 149. As such, residents, therefore, competed in
establishing charities.
7
I emphasize here that my discussion of cultural attributes underlying urban processes may not
necessarily be taken as an argument for the application of traditional principles- as they are- to the

164
modem Saudi city. Clear understanding of traditional principles must carefully precede gradual
application of pertinent values. They must be tested in light of social desirability and political
visibility and their compatibility with the modern technology.
8 Prophet Mohammed's teachings were so comprehensive that they dealt with the construction of
buildings. For example, he stated, "God did not order us to cover stone or clay." Also, Prophet
Mohammed prohibited a person from sleeping on an unscreened roof or terrace. A commitment to
follow the Prophet's guidance would necessarily imply adding screens to houses roofs, an element
which affects facades' configuration. Translation in Hakim (1986), 150.
9 In the Holy Qur'an, Allah says, "Say to the believers that they should lower their gaze and guard their
modesty, that will make for greater purity for them, and God is well acquainted with all that they do."
(24:30). Also, Prophet Mohammed was quoted as saying, "He who looks into a house without die
occupants' permission, and they puncture his eye, will have not right to demand a fine or ask for
punishment." He also said, "On the Day of Resurrection lead will be poured in the ears of anyone who
eavesdrops on others who dislike him." Source: Hakim (1986), 151.
10 Prophet Mohammed's rulings on the condition of ownership is binding to most schools of
jurisprudence which serve as the basis of the Islamic legal system. He was quoted as saying,
"Somebody who gives life to a dead [undeveloped] land can claim it, and no tyrant has rights to it."
This Hadeeth (saying) was narrated by Abu Dawood via Bin Azzubair, source, Hakim (1986), 149.
According to Akbar (1988: 26-32), most of Islam's school of jurisprudence endorse the revival of dead
land outside urban area without state consent. However, one of the four schools qualifies this rule: the
appropriation of undeveloped land that lies within urbanized area requires permission of the state. The
state does not have the right to landownership unless parcels are given to it voluntarily by owners.
11
This construction period was to build a 3,000 square cubit house (1 meter = 2.4 cubits). Small houses'
area averaged 90 square meters (500 square cubits), and soil used to produce mud bricks were taken
from the foundations' soil. For a detailed description, see A. A1 Washmi. Arriyadh: Madinah wa
Sukkan, Kaifa Canat wa Kaifa Aa'shou, (Riyadh: National Guard Printing Press, no date of
publication): 22-49 (in Arabic).
12
Erik Monkkonen. America Becomes Urban: The Development of U.S. Cities & Towns, 1780-1980
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), 90.
*3 According to Islamic teachings, water is a public good. Prophet Mohammed said, "Muslims are
partners in three things: water, pasture and fire." Narrated by the companion Abu Hurairah. Translated
in Hakim (1986), 148.
14
The explicit recognition of the individual responsibility toward his/her neighbors is said to have a great
impact on traditional Muslim built forms (Akbar, 1988). Prophet Mohammed warned against
indifference to neighbors, let alone harming them. Also, Islamic teachings strongly called for
cleanliness as an aspect of faith. Prophet Mohammed was quoted as saying, "Keep yourselves clean as
Islam is clean," and "God be praised is good and He loves goodness, [He is] clean and He loves
cleanliness, perfect and He loves perfection, so clean your 'fina.'" Fina refers to an open space such as
a courtyard or the immediate space outside a house. It was also narrated that the Prophet said, "Avoid
the three accursed: exerting in the streams, in thoroughfares and in the shade." This Hadeeth was
narrated by Abu Dawood via Ma'adh, who heard it from Mohammed.
Translated by the author with modification from Hakim (1986), 147.

165
The relationship between neighbors is highly guarded in Islam. In the Qur'an Allah says, "And serve
Allah. Ascribe no things as partner unto Him. [Show] kindness unto parents, and unto near kindred,
and orphans, and the needy, and unto the neighbor..." (Qur'an, 4:36). Several quotes from Prophet
Mohammed point to this close-to-sacred relationship. Mohammed was quoted as saying, "He whose
neighbor is not safe from his harm and dishonesty, will not enter Paradise." He also said, that "The
archangel Gabriel kept exhorting me about the neighbor to the point that I thought he would grant him
the right of inheritance." He also said, "By Allah, disbelieves a person who sleeps with a full stomach
while his adjacent neighbor is hungry. Mohammed was also quoted as saying, "In the Day of
Resurrection, the first adversaries are two neighbors."
17
Muslim jurists relied on incidents involving Prophet Mohammed's experience and expanded them to
similar cases. For an illustrative discussion on Muslim jurists' ruling concerning harm and cleanliness
in the Islamic city, see Chapter 1, "Islamic law and neighborhood building guidelines," in Hakim
(1988).
John Dyckman, A. Kreditor and T. Baneijee. "Planning in an Unprepared Environment: The Case of
Bahrain" TPR 2 (1984): 214.
19
For discussion of applicability of "Western-developed urban models, see B. J. Walter "Planning for
Whom" In Urbanization, National Development, and Regional Planning in Africa, edited by S. El-
Shakhs and R. Obudho, 93-109. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974; John Freidmann, "Intention
and Reality: The American Planner Overseas," A1P Journal 3 (May 1969): 187-194.
20 The government collects the Islamic taxes (zakat). They are levied on invested capital (2.5%),
livestock and some types of personal property and belongings, such as gold, silver and jewelry, among
others. The government's reliance on oil revenues diminishes its needs for revenues from zakat. There
is no income or sales tax. Still, some government departments require fees in return for rendering
services such as application processing, permit issuing and the like.
2
* Samuel Huntington. Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968):
159.
22 See for example, Janet Abu-Lughod, Rabat: Urban Apartheid In Morocco (Princeton: New Jersey:
Princeton University, 1980); M. Bonine, "The Urbanization of the Persian Gulf Nations," in The
Persian Gulf State: A General Survey, edited by Alvin Cottrell, C. E. Bosworth, R. Burrell, K.
McLachlan, and R. M. Savory, 225-278 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1983); and Saad
Eddin Ibrahim, "Cairo: A Sociological Profile," in The Middle East City: Ancient Traditions Confront
a Modern World, edited by A. Saqqaf, 209-226 (New York: Paragon, 1987); S. El-Shakhs,
"Development Planning in Africa: An Introduction," in Urbanization, National Development, and
Regional Planning in Africa, edited by S. El-Shakhs and R. Obudho, 3-12. New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1974; and Bob J. Walter, op. cit.
23 In many Developing countries, the middle class has contributed to coup d'e'tats and advocated
revolutionary change once it reached a mature level (Heller and Safran, 1984).
24
Ibid.
25 Samuel Huntington. Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968):
155.

166
According to Safran, between 1970 and 1980 the new middle class had increased from 22,200 to
86,200, or from 2.5 percent of the Saudi labor force to 7.2 percent. Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The
Ceaseless Quest for Security (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 226.

CHAPTER VI
RIYADH: FROM WALLED TOWN TO METROPOLIS
I. RIYADH'S DEVELOPMENT: 1900-1953
A. The Walled Town
Riyadh's significance in modern history dates back to 1240H/1824, when it was
chosen by Imam Turky Bin Abdullah Bin Mohammed Bin Saud for his new settlement.
The decision was taken by Imam Turky following the destruction of Diri'yah, the previous
power base of the Saud house, the ancestral father of today's A1 Saud clan. 1 In 1744,
Mohammed Ibn Saud, with the aid of a maverick religious teacher, Mohammed bin Abdul-
Wahhab, agreed to expand the domain of Ibn Saud on the principles of Islamic reforms,
commonly referred to in the West as Wahhabism. 2 The two men's expansionist drive
based on religious reform intermittently spanned two centuries, during which the control of
Arabia was dominated by A1 Saud. This control was discontinued between 1883 and
1902, when the Ottoman's viceroy Ibn Arrasheed of Hail in north Arabia, was able to lay
control over Riyadh, causing Abdul-Aziz's father, Abdul-Rahman Bin Faisal, to flee to
Kuwait, and hence closing the second realm of the A1 Saud's dynasty (1824-1891).
However, following propitious regional and worldwide political tides, Abdul-Aziz, at the
age of 19 years old, managed to recapture Riyadh in 1902 and started a series of battles,
conquests and treaties with Arabia's influential tribes and towns' rulers which ended with
him being the King of a new nation-state, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
King Abdul-Aziz's campaign to consolidate the country under his control concluded
with the ejection of the Hashimites from the Hijaz (Western Saudi Arabia) in 1925 and the
eventual suppression of the Ikhwan's (Islamic brotherhood) rebellion in 1929. 3 On
September, 23 1932, the country was officially named the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Riyadh, then a little walled town, which served for close to thirty years as the springboard
for King Abdul-Aziz's campaigns for the conquest and the unification of the country,
retained its status as the seat of the government in conjunction with Makkah, the religious
capital.
Riyadh, which lies about 600 meters above sea level, is located at the heart of the
Kingdom's central region of Najd. The city is 460 kilometers west of Dammam on the
Arabian Gulf and 1,100 kilometers east of Jeddah on the Red Sea. Riyadh lies on a

168
plateau, 25 kilometers wide, overlooking the Hanifah wadi (valley), one of the major
arterial wadis (Batha, Ghuberah, Wubayr and Namar) transversing the region. Wadi
Hanifah is the most important wadi in the whole region of Najd. The spine-like dry water
bed of wadi Hanifah threads together scattered agrarian settlements constituting the fertile
region of Al-A'arid. Riyadh thus lies at the confluence of these major wadis, whose
seasonal, intermittent rainfall supplied the oases with rainwater, barely sufficient to sustain
subsistence agriculture, the mainstay of the Najd's agrarian society. These arterial wadis
and their tributaries endowed the town with a water source making possible the
development of crops and palm date farms hence giving the mud town its name Riyadh,
which literally means 'gardens'.
In an account of her historical crossing of the Arabian peninsula from sea to sea in
1937, Geraldine Rendel, wrote:
To land in Saudi Arabia is to enter both an older and a newer world. An older
world, because its social philosophy still holds so much of the best of the
Middle Ages; a newer one, because it is one of the newest of the larger postwar
states...Ar Riyadh is surrounded by mud-brick walls with towers at
intervals. We entered the city by the Thumairy Gate, which leads up a wide
street with high houses of mud and limestone built straight onto the road, to
the Palace Square. 4
According to Rendel's account, Riyadh's form corresponded to the familiar layout of
traditional (preindustrial) Islamic cities. 5 It consisted of a central mosque, a palace, the
commercial complex, suq, and residential uses. King Abdul-Aziz's palace dominated the
focal point of the walled, walking city. The palace, which was higher than the rest of the
town's buildings, was a fortified structure with two 'massive' towers and was surrounded
by a network of smaller mansions, occupied by the royalty, accounted for a considerable
part of the city area (Figures 6.1, 6.2).
The Bazaar abutted the Palace square from the east. The northend was closed by a
double colonnade, misbah. Next to the square was the Great Mosque, which in addition to
the other eleven neighborhood mosques served the religious needs of the population. 6 Due
to the increasing number of transients who paid tribute to the King, the market grew
disproportionately to the town's remaining areas giving the town a population of 60,000 at
the end of the fifth decade. The suq comprised a series of clustered tiny shops with
dimensions, each about five feet wide by six feet in length containing goods, coffee pots

169
iMusmak
Built Area
'-'r.identiriod La wet
GATES
1. Suwailim
2. Dhuhairah
3. Thurrairi
4. Giri
5. Unidentified
6. DuKnnah
7. Hi identified
8. Hiraigib
9. Mathbah
Mosques
This plan is prepared by the author to construct the physical layout of old Riyadh, based on information gathered from
literature, a small scale f 1:60000) aerial photograph taken by ARAMCO in 1950. and other photographic mapping of 196-1
by the Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals. The layout of ccniral areas and of areas adjacent to the wall, was difficult to
identify, because of the heavy destruction to which these pans were subjected.
Figure 6.1
Riyadh still a walled town in 1950. Source: Al-Hussayen (1989).

170
RIYADH CITY
and environs 1987.
Figure 6.2
A. Riyadh during the 1930s, Source: Daghistani (1985); B. the eastern (Batha) side of the
wall where Aththemairy Gate existed. Source: El-Haj (1989).

171
and saucepans, wooden chests of tea or other foodstuffs, carpets and the like. The market
area also contained stalls where people would purchase hot tea or coffee. More commercial
exchange was transacted in the open space formed by the built area. Merchants and
craftsmen used their houses in which to conduct their occupations and transactions,
assigning an outside room for storage, production and exchange (Figure 6.3).
The town square was used for a variety of public functions including the housing of
Bedouin who, following the traditions, were allowed to camp for three days with free
subsistence. Although the green-belt of farmland surrounding the walled city seemed more
valuable than the mud complex, the city owned capital and political stock sufficient to
justify the defense system to protect its inhabitants from frequent outsiders' attacks. The
walled city also housed those working in guild crafts and the literate, who made their living
by teaching religious texts and writing skills. Finally, the walled town was distinctive for
its limited land use specialization. Multiple functions could be executed in a single space.
For example, the mosque served as a place for worship as well as a school and the
community gathering place. The shop, which was part of the merchant's residence, was
used for production tasks and also for exchange.
In addition to the busy core, there were seven major neighborhoods, hilal. 7 These
walled districts reinforced the segmentation of the major social groups comprising the
towns social composite. The dwellings faced inward to the quiet and cool courtyard,
presenting blank walls to the street. The relatively commodious, multipurpose and lightfilled
courtyard offered a microclimate of cool breeze and shade which contrasted with
scorching temperatures outside. The courtyard served several familia functions and
conformed to the social emphasis on privacy. This compact mass resembles a mosaic of
solid and void formed by shaded and open surfaces and built volumes, interspersed by
courtyards, and conformed to societal imperatives. At dusk, the city was sealed from the
outside world and town life was reduced to naught with the closure of the gates.
The traditional form reflected the emphasis on social factors of the population such as
kinship. For example, residents' concern over social ties explained the juxtaposition of
low-income and well-to-do households and the construction of smaller and larger houses
next to each other. In the absence of land speculation, land was perceived for its use value,
not exchange value, as a social resource and not a commodity. Ostentation was seldom
displayed by the few privileged families, reflecting the overriding sense of privacy in a

172
>^«rrr
iiSV
)&&&£
trnmfm
Figure 6.3
The old suq (market) was located outside the major mosque and comprised small
structures. Source: El-Haj (1989).

173
town inhabited mostly by the underprivileged. Due to technological limitation, vertical
expansion was not feasible and buildings were attached to one another to take advantage of
the existing adjoining wall and to minimize walking distance. The clumping of buildings is
intensified by the limited space allowed for circulation, mere passageways for humans and
animals. The meandering, narrow circulation space was confined to the residual interstices
between the built quarters.
The urban outcome of the traditional form was natural. Builders recognized
technological means (building methods and the transportation mode), and economized in
both dwelling space and circulation space. With towns people's security at stake, the
tortuous network was carefully laid down for defense purposes, it was puzzling for the
unaccustomed intruder. Such defensive measures were the product of centuries of
inherited experience. The end product was a compact town with clearly defined open
spaces, social turfs, edges, neighborhoods, and quarters, easily discerned by locals. The
compact traditional building process placed great value on efficiency: the carefully arranged
street network and houses paid due respect to means, nature and social values. The
collective respect for contextual factors was a matter of survival in a desert environment.
Riyadh was essentially a single-material town: sun-dried mud was used for all the
buildings giving it a rare architectural unity. The walled town was estimated by H. St.J.B.
Philby to measure 700 yards along its north wall, and about 650 yards east-west, or
approximately 100 acres. He estimated the town population at 19,000 people in 1919. By
the 1930s it reached 30,000.
B. The Social Fabric
The walled town of Riyadh prior to the promulgation of the nation-state in 1932, was
typically preindustrial, one that lacked inanimate technology and maintained a rigid class
structure. The prevailing society was virtually entirely dependent on animate sources of
energy, human and animal. Due to the lack of modern technology, division of labor was
minimum, most of the population were peasants tied to the land, supporting themselves and
a small elite. This dearth of specialization precluded the development of a complex class
system. Najdi towns' social systems had a ruling squirearchy, a religious literati and the
general populace, largely involved in agriculture. Aside from paying taxes to influential
regional rulers, the rulers of these settlement enjoyed full control of their subjects. While

174
Najdi town rulers set the pace for those who lived under their influence in the towns and
associated farm hinterlands, tribal chiefs shared power with the town's squirearchies, a
balance that was evident in the symbiosis the two major societal powers maintained. This
multiplicity of power precluded the emergence of a political leviathan that could impose
itself on all and manipulate the isolated regions' population into one nation. Within Riyadh
proper, social power was crystalized in the ruler and an upper privileged class comprising
the religious strata. Both commanded the key positions in the social structure.
Riyadh was a subsystem, it was part of the broader social order comprising rural
areas and pastoral nomads. In addition to its' somewhat more developed physical
structure, Riyadh's political vitality and economic centrality supported a social structure
constituting craftsmen, merchants, clergy and political aristocracy whose matrimonial
lineages both contributed to its prominence and determined the status of other families in
the town. Unlike the conjugal family unit characterizing the class structure of an industrial
society, the Najdi family structure was rigid, one which was based on the extended family
system which in turn fit into a complex network of a larger tribal organization, sometimes
straddling both those of towns and the nomads. The family was a comparatively closed
and inward-oriented, patriarchal unit. The husband ruled the unit and presided over its
outside engagements. The women spent a great deal of their daily life in familia tasks
within the confines of the household or the farm.
The traditional (Najdi) society, though classless and casteless in the literal sense, has
a social division of classes that has been maintained for centuries. The ruling elite derived
their command and power from a well established tribal majority. The larger families
whose members belonged to known tribal branches are derived from and organized into
gabilis, locals who belong to well-established and extended families whose pedigrees are
documented. There are also the khadhiris, families of "doubtful" origins. They do not
belong to the known Arab tribes. They descended from one or a combination of African,
Persian, or Indian origins and the like. There was also the slave population, largely of
African descent. They were bought or exchanged in the barter economy of Arabia or taken
as prisoners of war. These social divisions were deeply entrenched in the social fabric and
straddled both the social and economic spheres, so much so that some occupations became
associated with each social group. However, it must be noted that due to Islamic
teachings, a degradation into a caste-like segmentation was drastically alleviated. Sjoberg
(1960) agrees. He stated "Undoubtedly, the egalitarian orientation of the traditional

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Muslim center, when compared to the Hindu city, has induced in the former somewhat
greater vertical and horizontal mobility." For example, there were no impediments for a
khadhiri dweller to excel in business. He could join the religious stratum, by seeking
education, and gain scholarly status earning him a status unmatched by a gabili denizen. 8
The fourth social group was the bedouins whose contact with towns' inhabitants was
precarious, ebbing between hostility during drought times or amicability during times of
abundance. Traditionally, bedouins perceived the settled town life as a rut and its incomeearning
occupations and life styles as demeaning. This cultural perception had hitherto
limited bedouins' interaction with towns' people to the form of simple trading activity
exchanging goods following the Friday congregational prayer. With modernization, the
lines between such social groups have increasingly been blurred. Moreover, the impact of
modernization on the Saudi family structure is profound. Currently 67 percent of Riyadh's
households are nuclear families. 9
C. Early Suburbanization, Uncontrolled Development: A1 Murabba'
The preindustrial walled town's social diversity was limited by the latent potentialities
offered by its desert ecology, coupled by the utter lack of advanced technology conducive
to a well established division of labor. The emergence of a developed, complex power
structure under King Abdul-Aziz, coupled by the flow of oil revenues, paved the way for
far-flung changes in the society's cultural aspects, including that of urban development.
These changes were reflected in the physical expansion of communities in the town. The
importation of modern technology constituted a major factor in the creation of large,
permanent urban communities outside the wall. The improvements in water-drilling
technology allowed for agricultural surplus, freeing peasants and bedouins to engage in the
increasing work opportunities in the modern economy. Transportation technology and
road building enabled farmers and bedouins to deliver crops, livestock and other foodstuffs
to the growing town.
During the 1940s and 1950s, better security, economic growth and more imports of
automobiles inexorable loosened the ties that once bound the urban functions of society to
tightly defined cores: decentralization began to operate. Modern transportation technology
and communication then set in motion the process of suburbanization. In addition, modern
telecommunication has been substituted for the face-to-face contact and physical movement

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of the older city. The political security under King Abdul-Aziz guaranteed order needed to
facilitate economic progress and specialization in the society. The relative political stability
coupled with improved economic conditions under King Abdul-Aziz triggered a city-ward
migration, hence increasing the demand for more dwellings. Riyadh was soon to grow
beyond its walls. H. St. J.B. Philby wrote:
In olden days people had been forced to congregate together in towns and
villages for mutual protection against the prevailing insecurity and had built
walls and kept them in repair. The peace of modern times had resulted in an
universal flight to the palm-groves with the resultant break-up of the village
community, which was now satisfied with Riyadh as the great shoppingcenter....
10
Riyadh's rising prosperity came with the King's decision to keep it as the political
and administrative capital of the nation-state but at the cost of crowding. The royalty stood
at the apex of the new wealthy class eager to abandon the compact, walled center. King
Abdul-Aziz was the first to set the fashion for this desert suburbanization. In 1938, at his
behest, a new palatial complex, al Murabbaa', was built to accommodate his growing
administration, two miles northwest of the walled town. The royal compound included a
spacious mansion, a royal guest house, administrative buildings and a garage for himself
and his royal entourage. The royal suburb was linked by a concrete motor track to the old
town. For the first time ever, the automobile was imposed on the pre-industrial urban
form, and accounted for in subsequent development (Figure 6.4).
One more reason behind this spate of early immigration was the improvements,
though meager, in beter services made available by the fledgling government. This resulted
in attracting local migrants to the new national capital seeking the hospitality of the royalty,
city services, and work opportunities. Shantytowns emerged in the vicinity of the city in
addition to the nomads who camped in the open space within the walled city. In such a
desert environment, water had a crucial factor in the fueling of city-ward migration. The
increasing oil royalties enabled the King to order the installment of motor-driven pumps to
obtain water from deep grounds, hitherto inaccessible by animated means. As new water
supplies were tapped using the new technology, herdsmen and ruralites alike rushed to the
growing captial. D. van der Meulen, a Dutch diplomat who spent time in the Kingdom
from 1940 to 1952 captures the situation of the day. He wrote

177
In the oases and towns, property owners were shown how to improve their
estates....Teams of well drillers were soon busy in and around Ar-Riyadh.
Water was provided for men and camels at public drinking places inside and
outside the towns. The surrounding tribes soon learnt that Ar-Riyadh could
in [the] future be depended upon for water. The first necessity of life being
thus assured, the King in his widely-famed generosity would take care of the
second necessity: food. So they set up their tents near the walls of the town
and of the palace with the ever-flowing water and the food-distribution centers
near-by. The town spread far out into the desert....people now started to
build houses on the desert plateau. They were now no longer tied to the
vicinity of the old wells, for the new pumps would provide water. On
patches of desert gravel people built their new houses and put mud walls
around them as soon as the drillers had made sure that water could be raised
with pumps. Then within their walls the desert would disappear, for water
makes the desert of Arabia blossom everywhere.... 11
Serving as a major driving force behind suburbanization, water drilling technology
helped in the provision for water in abundant quantities, a factor which in turn encouraged
the germination of new development in the vicinity of the walled town.
In the past the population's obsession with security nurtured a xenophobic attitude.
This was expressed in the maintenance of the town's wall. Once political and economic
conditions prevailed, those who could afford it sought houses outside the wall. In such a
relatively distant area (i.e. distant from the old walled city), owners established the custom
of building a wall around their houses, an urban element which came to dominate the
modern landscape. Traditionally, houses were built attached, sharing the outside walls
with their neighbors. As already noted, such practice was opted for reasons of space
limitation, and security as well as climatic, houses shielded others from the scorching
desert heat. A wall was often built around the town whereas in some cases, house walls
comprised some portions of the settlement's outside wall and a free-standing wall was built
to fill in the gap in cases of an open space. Farms also were surrounded by walls, though
more to demarcate property lines and to provide privacy- for women shared the
responsibilities of tending crops and livestock- as well as to protect against scavenging
livestock, rather than for protection from looters.
Another cultural factor that was behind the increasing popularity of Riyadh and thus
the flurry of immigration is the custom of distributing largesses and food by the King. The
practice, which was rooted in Arab culture, is an expression of chiefdom. As more
revenues poured into the royal capital, the King skillfully used them to win the fealty of

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tuiittk"!
Figure 6.4
(1) The palaces of King Abdul-Aziz in the walled town; (2) the King's new al-Murabbaa'
palace (c. 1939); (3) court's members such as the King's brother construct new palaces
outside the walls. Source: El-Haj (1989).

179
tribal chiefs and influential town rulers (henceforth, umara: singular amir) According to
Mansfield, "Oil revenues were part of the Kings' Privy Purse, and he continued to
dispense them with the same openhanded generosity to his family and to loyal shaykhs as
when there were no more than a few hundred gold sovereigns in his coffers." 12 During the
1940s, the royal palace of al Murabba' radiated opulence in an impoverished society that
experienced the nadir of depravity. Riyadh was soon to endure thousands of well-wishers
at a time, mostly bedouins who camped in the towns vicinity waiting for the royal palace to
approve their annual subsidies.
The well-to-do citizens of Riyadh found relief outside the wall from the cramped
quarters within the city. The royalty, who were among the first to reap the benefits of
affluence, used their wealth to create insulated enclaves beyond the city proper, hence
escaping the constraints of traditional commonplace urban life. Members of the court
sought the surrounding farms to construct recreational outing pleasure compounds. New
"urban villagers" brought increasing alienation to the previously quaint settlement's
residents who virtually all knew each other. The surrounding green belt, to which the
city's name, Riyadh (the gardens) referred, was the first casualty of that expansion.
Hamlets sprouted in close proximity to the town, and soon grew into suburbs.
During the 1940s and 1950s, the city witnessed waves of rural migrants and
foreigners, mainly from nearby Arab and Muslim countries, who flocked to the growing
Saudi capital. They were lured by employment opportunities in the growing government
sector, improved educational institutions and job openings in the lucrative commercial
sector and ancillary industries. While the nationals preferred the newly-built traditional
"mud communities" sprouting outside the city walls, foreigners opted for the (newlyintroduced)
multi-unit apartment buildings. The new apartment buildings were soon to dot
the major thoroughfares, creating a formidable barrier that encircled the mud communities
and filled in the interstices between the radiating tarmac roads. Urban in-migrants squeezed
into the already tiny homes and encroached into what ever open space was left as housing
production failed to cope with the large demand.
Nevertheless, Riyadh maintained its preindustrial compactness during the 1930s and
1940s due to technological limitations and a financial squeeze. The majority of Riyadh's
denizens walked to work. Since walking was the only mode available for most of the city
dwellers, it determined the shape and size of the city prior to the demolition of the wall in

180
1950. Although a 1950 map shows a compact traditional town, filled up to the walls, mean
houses straggled along the dirt road tracks leading out the main gates. Meanwhile, royal
court estates sprang up outside the town, forming nuclei for future communities such as
Ashshmisy, Annasriyah, Al-Bedi'ah, and Al-Oraija (Figure 6.2). The increasing use of
the automobile contributed greatly to the explosive horizontal expansion of the compact city
into sub-nuclei dotting the city rim, while uncontrolled ribbon-development set the pattern
for the town's road network for decades to come.
At the core, on top of the compact, even grain form of the town, the new industrial
and commercial ways of the modern era of the nation-state had begun to lay some of the
patterns of the coming metropolis- especially the beginning of a downtown, characterized
by some multi-story high-rise buildings containing commercial, apartment and
manufacturing units . By 1948, electrical lights were used to illuminate Riyadh's main
streets and squares.
At the fringe, communities proliferated, exhibiting contrasting standards. The
'modern' sections of the city were carefully planned and constructed by several ministries
without coordination with the Municipality of Riyadh, or other established planning
authority. Such large scale development fell virtually within the jurisdiction of the
individual governmental agencies, who gave its development priority and attention.
Characteristically, early modern communities were platted following a Royal decree or at
the behest of the King. As government's needs for modern facilities grew- such as an
airport, a hospital, or a military complex— tracts of land were platted for the construction of
the new buildings. New development generally took place at the periphery where most
undeveloped land belonged to the government. New "planned" peripheral developments
were usually serviced by well-paved and landscaped thoroughfares comprising the
spikelike major tarmac roads which continued into the outskirts (desert). These
thoroughfares, some of which led to other major regions and important cities within the
Kingdom, took the form of radiating tentacles, reaching out for resources that contributed
to the city's impressive growth.
D. Demolishing The Wall: State Intervention and Inception of Urban
Transformation, c. 1950s
Riyadh's growth during the early decades of the Kingdom (1930-1960) reflected the

181
improved economy and its increasing centrality and preponderance in the national system.
Ribbon development proceeded swiftly along the new tarmac roads leading to the new
Royal complex of al Murabbaa'. The new airport, six kilometers to the north of the walled
town, and the railroad station, located three kilometers to the east, all served as magnets of
future growth. Major roads radiated from the town to the surrounding towns far in the
desert. In addition to the gradual loss of architectural heritage, the green belt was sacrificed
to accommodate an ever-growing immigrant population. This was at the expense of the
palm groves which were mercilessly cut to make room for new dwellings to accommodate
an ever-growing population, drawn mainly from the indigenous population. The value of
land rose sharply until it exceeded the value of the date harvest; their palm groves were cut
to make room for dwellings. Soon after, the new hilal (singular hillah), communities,
were to acquire their own name and character, some of which were inhabited by residents
of the same towns of origin, such as Hillat al Qusman and Hillat Addawasir. In addition to
the royal al Murabba estate, which took the royal aura, the new suburb, al Futah, housed a
score of the King sons' palatial mansions on the road connecting al Murabbaa' with the old
walled town. Other suburbs were soon to emerge reflecting the growing population of the
city and the improved economic conditions- all had to accommodate the automobile. 13
Batha community was the first to house newcomers from outside the city. It grew on
the eastern side of the wall to meet the new element of the population, a growing working
class composed of chauffeurs, mechanics, semi-skilled and unskilled labor forces,
expatriates who flocked to the country to work in the nascent, yet burgeoning government
apparatuses and in the labor market it created. They were immigrants coming from Arab
and Muslim countries drawn by the lure of good salaries. Comprising such a
heterogeneous population, Batha was lamented by Philby as "an unpleasant community, a
running sore on the flank of the society which, at that time and every level, was a model of
good manners and moral rectitude". 14 Soon the erstwhile sparse mud communities were to
coalesce into one compact mass.
Immigrant mud communities proceeded apace, repeating the traditional forms of the
typical sinuous circulation system, while bedouins shantytowns' were strewn about with
little attention paid to uniformity. New streets were laid out as needed, usually following
the tracks naturally established by men and animals as they took the most convenient paths.
Overwhelmed by growth, the nascent Riyadh's municipality staff resorted to the gridiron
system to plat a new community at the southern side of the wall. In 1944, the Manfohah

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community was the first in the history of Riyadh to be platted by the new municipality
according to a gridiron layout in order to control the fast growing population of bedouin
and rural migrants. Land was subdivided into residential lots of 8-by-8 meters and
serviced by streets, eight meters wide. The platting of land into rectangular or square lots
for residential uses was the easiest, cheapest and most clear way of dividing land for rapid
development.
Interestingly, this very first land sub-division was laid to house bedouins and other
underprivileged immigrants, not the established residents of the city. By then, the
privileged opted for the north and west sides of town, following in the steps of the early
attempts by the King and his kin, and in the vicinity of the newly built administrative
buildings. Though aimed at curbing unplanned, illegally constructed groups of houses and
tents at the periphery, the Manfohah experiment was later to be limited to new subdivisions
for land speculation. The sprouting of squatter settlements housing bedouins and
immigrants, continued to tarnish Riyadh's development for decades to come.
This urban development would have not occurred had it not been for the improved
political and economic conditions of the country. King Abdul-Aziz's firm control helped
sustain the political cohesion of the country during its impoverished, boisterous formative
decades before the discovery of oil. His avid leadership was further bolstered when oil
production was finally attained in commercial quantities in March 1938, heralding the end
of centuries of austere poverty and enhancing the country's autarchy. But it was not until
the end of WWII when, in 1946, substantial dividends were to start reaching the
government treasury.
After his visit to Egypt in 1945, King Abdul-Aziz returned with an overwhelming
admiration for Egypt's prosperity. During his visit, he was presented a Dakota plane as a
gift from President Roosevelt during their summit meeting at the Suez Canal. With more
national income derived from the increasing oil revenues, he returned with a firm resolution
to rejuvenate his poverty ridden, backward country. At his behest, a landing ground was
laid for his plane, and a 577 kilometer railroad was constructed, connecting Riyadh with
the Persian Gulf. With the arrival of the first train from Dammam in 1951, the economic
position of Riyadh was greatly enhanced, due to the sharp drop in transportation cost,
without which the movement of essential commodities and the future modernization of the
desert town would have been impossible. The new landing airfield was soon to develop

183
into a nuclei of the Matar suburb, six kilometers north of the old city. In 1950 King Abdul-
Aziz ordered the wall system to be demolished to allow for the expansion of the new
neighborhoods. Alas, no attempt was made to save some of its parts, gates or the land
which it once stood.
Construction of the rail road station and the airfield added to the political centrality of
Riyadh in the nation's modern urban system. The locational vitality of the city was to be
further enhanced during the 1950s and 1960s by the national road system which was
knitted in a way confirming the city's pivotal location in the heart of the Kingdom. This
was evident in the increase in government appropriations for roads, which jumped from
SR66.2 million in 1961 to SR474.1 million in 1967.15
Despite its' notable increase in size, Riyadh expanded in accordance with local
cultural building principles, in a compact form adhering closely to religion and traditional
social norms. This compatibility can be attributed to several reasons: i) the poor economy;
ii) the relatively homogeneous population composition, mainly comprising locals; iii) the
adherence to traditional, bland architecture and rudimentary building materials; and iv) the
fact that social values were still governed by stern Islamic principles, with great emphasis
on privacy and community cohesiveness shown in the introverted dwellings built around
the courtyard, the design of fenestrations with respect to neighbors' privacy and right of
passage, and solid facades with high windows showing a blind face to the meandering
streets. The circulation space took a secondary significance to the residential space, though
increasingly it accommodated the automobile. The 1950s were yet to usher in an
unprecedented progressive construction flurry beginning with the Capitol. The rate of
economic growth of the city surpassed that of the country's economic growth as a whole.
Between 1950 and 1968, Riyadh enjoyed steady economic growth reaching about 126
percent in comparison to that of 1950 (Doxiadis, 1968). The old seven neighborhoods of
the walled town became 22 neighborhoods (hilal) by 1966 and were serviced with
municipal amenities, and by 1990 this number jumped to 141 neighborhoods (or submunicipalities).
16
E. Urban Planning: Municipal Legislation, and Early Urban Growth
Controls, c. 1950s
By definition, organic growth means that a town developed from, or was based on

184
village settlements. Until the introduction of municipal regulations, building codes and the
application of platting new land subdivisions, the forms of Saudi towns were effectively
determined by the collective will of its individuals. Early growth corresponded to
contextual imperatives; structures and buildings were built around original walking routes
and respected property lines, all with respect to topography. Under pressure of growth,
Riyadh began to endure overcrowding as more immigrants squeezed into the available
buildings. Upon arrival, some countrymen shared their homes with relatives or contracted
amateur builders to construct traditional mud houses. The quaint residential passageways,
originally built for walking traffic, were transformed into raucous streets, in which
pedestrians and cars competed for access, so that residents inhaled dust composed of
animal manure and car exhaust. Alleys, streets and empty lots served as playgrounds for
children and youth as well as places for garbage and other household refuse. This growth
was soon to be followed by small, expediency-grid residential developments interspersed
by small corner-stores, dakkakeen, as the tempo increased around the 1950s.
Like all other municipalities, Riyadh Municipality lacked political control over its own
territory and instead reflected the interests and views of the state leadership. 17 As early as
1932, the King ordered the establishment of a small office to handle perfunctory civic
tasks. In 1933, this office was elevated into the Municipality of Riyadh to oversee new
urban development, a process which amounted to little more than land subdivision, permit
processing, street cleaning, and garbage pickup. The scale of operation dramatically
expanded in the following decades. The Municipality was expanded in 1953 to the wellstaffed
Amanat Madinat Ar-Riyadh (The Trusteeship of the City of Riyadh) headed by a
royal family member, appointed by the King. The Amanah reflected the national
government's views toward development: a commitment toward the betterment of the city,
all paid for by the state, all justified as noblesse oblige on behalf of the King.
The Amanah's activities included the preparation of undeveloped land for future
growth, overseeing the implementation of building codes and issuing construction and
small business permits, sanitary ordinances and other hygienic regulations. As such, the
Amanah essentially practiced growth-control rather than planned development. At the
periphery, Municipal staff systematically subdivided residential lots into a grid system of
lots with a minimum 500 m 2 and street widths of 15 meters. The wealthier northern and
western parts of the city were zoned for concrete structures with setbacks, while poorer
southern and eastern mud communities were left to grow without such controls. Planning,

185
as practiced by Amanat Ar-Riyadh did not mean the allocation of the city's scarce resources
over a span of time, that is five or ten year projections. Rather, since municipalities' funds
(such as staff salaries and activities) were mostly provided by the national government,
mayors and other officials did not endeavor to coordinate with the economic side of urban
development. For example, new public and private investment in the city did not conform
to any integrated program for housing, open space, public utilities, transportation,
municipal services, employment and welfare. 18 The municipal planning was disjointed
and marked by lack of an integrated network of circulation, open and recreational space and
civic facilities. In short, the decades prior to the wealthy 1970s witnessed the production
of sterile urban environments with no frills.
Decisions pertaining to large scale development or concerning building activities .
laying within property owned by the government were taken by respective departments.
This left the Amanah with jurisdictions only over routine practices (such as the issuing of
building and business permits, inspection, and documentation) mainly at the center and the
surrounding districts. The Amanah's "growth control" tasks were carried out by a limited
number of magistrates who followed royal instruction. The staff was composed of Arab
engineers and, later of Saudi technocrats. The energies of the small Municipal staff were
consumed by day-to-day needs of residents, private and public construction contractors,
determining street grades and set back lines, and land owners obtaining approval for land
subdivisions, and small businesses filing for business permits. The Municipality was an
organization that applied banal bureaucratic procedures to urban development, devoid of
traditional values and citizens' participation, both of which previously helped shape
processes underlying traditional forms. The reinstatement of these cultural attributes would
have alleviated the rather centralized, governmental process, but this did not occur.
F. Land Tenure
The departure from traditional environmental patterns was evident in the adoption of
rectangular land subdivision, which was opted to accommodate the flurry of migration.
Land subdivision constituted the main process by which undeveloped, so-called "white"
land, whether rural or public was converted into urban use. Historically, Arab-Muslim
towns grew incrementally, converting outlaying land into built space by residents, a
process which conformed to net population growth. As Riyadh and other major Saudi
cities underwent rapid population growth (averaging 9 percent per annum) the pressure for

186
new urban land intensified. This was manifest in horizontal sprawl, compounded by the
population's preference for the single family dwelling, the generous housing subsidies,
bureaucratic procedures, all of which encouraged the modern leap-frog development pattern
(Figure 6.5 ).
Technological improvements (e.g. the introduction of the automobile) fueled urban
sprawl, a contrasting pattern to the compact medina. To meet such expansion, the
Municipality shifted to the wholesale adoption of the land subdivision process. Starting
with Manfouhah, in 1948, Riyadh's Municipality devised its first tract development based
on rectangular street and residential blocks. As noted earlier, it was a grid of convenience,
the quickest and most equitable way of laying out new annexes to rapidly growing towns
or those laid down anew. Moreover, with an increased demand for land, land speculation
became a new venture for personal riches, and land subdivision with the grid proved a
good means for the growing, profitable land market.
Old mud buildings were demolished in the historical center and vast tracts of land at
the periphery were subdivided by land owners and sold in a land speculation frenzy that
siphoned large amounts of the population's savings. For land owners to liquidate their raw
land in the lucrative land market and to qualify for government-paid services, they were
required to obtain approval from the Municipality. The Municipality subjected such land to
its planning-by-laws procedures which governed the layout of the subdivision, mainly the
freeing of thirty percent of land for public uses such as streets and, depending on the size
and location of the land, open space and land for public services. Land owners were not
obliged to build necessary infrastructure, for it was the responsibility of the government.
Consequently, "land has been subdivided with diminutive reference to any rate of
development or occupancy, which has resulted in an enormous proportion of the
subdivided plots remaining vacant." 19
Several factors accounted for the suburban development and speculation. First, the
relatively sudden demand for land was brought about by the government itself to fulfill its
developmental targets as outlined in its ambitious first three five-year plans. The
implementation of the first two national development plans (1970-1980) emphasized the
need to establish infrastructure deemed viable for the realization of economic independence
in the near future. The government's investment in the physical and social infrastructure
had the impact of oscillating demand for urban land throughout the Kingdom. These

187
[AOH
\*-\K il
1975
Figure 6.5
Riyadh's spike-like growth followed the roads radiating to major cities and towns (dotted
line denotes Doxiadis' 1971 Plan). Source: SECT

188
development plans facilitated the tremendous economic growth in the Saudi cities' urban
economies, sponsoring a heavily subsidized private sector and housing programs for
individuals. 20 The housing programs, especially the Real Estate Development Fund,
encouraged citizens to build and buy new housing units, essentially single-family units at
the periphery.
The implementation of the five-year plans also allowed for massive public
expenditures earmarked for the construction of new government projects, some of which
were mega projects, including complex, modern road systems, government agencies'
headquarters, public housing, military and educational facilities and the like. For example,
the newly built Diplomatic Quarter occupied an area of eight square kilometer; the
construction of the King Saud University's new campus added an area of nine square
kilometers to the city's map; and development of the King Khalid International Airport at
the city's northern side, devoured 250 square kilometers within the city's confines.
Moreover, bureaucratic regulations made it difficult for a government agency to buy or
switch a land it owns. If a need to build a new project arose, such agency either uses the
land they have, or they must face the prospect of lengthy, procedural red-tape to exchange
such land, a factor that contributed to scattered growth. Instead of seeking lands that were
already vacant within the serviced lots, such agencies were forced to build new projects on
whatever land they had, for if they waited, government funds might be taken away by the
end of the budgetary year.
Second, prior to the 1970s, most of the peripheral land was allotted to a few elite
figures. These citizens were to reap tremendous profits in the booming decades of the
1970s and early 1980s. Consequently, large sums of savings were channeled into the
urban land market, hence resulting in a real estate frenzy, following the rise in demand for
land generated by the inauguration of housing programs and other large scale development
sponsored by the government. Alas, great amounts of citizens' savings could have been
saved had the government directly disposed of such public land to citizens at real
(noninflated or subsidized) prices and used the money in the realization of programs of
beneficial outcomes to all societal members. Also, this approach could have helped cut
housing costs for many otherwise qualified loan recipients, for land cost accounted for up
to half the cost of building a new house.
Third, the enlarged city area, despite the prevalence of large portions of undeveloped

189
land, reflected the Saudi economy. Although predicated on religious rationale, the
government does not impose property or income taxes. The collection of Islamic taxes,
zakat, has not been attempted on an organized and comprehensive level. This can be
attributed to the fact that the state relies on oil revenues for the majority of its income. As
such, land owners felt no pressure to liquidate their properties or invest in the development
of their vacant lots to cover taxes. This tendency to hoard un-taxed land for future
speculation, has immensely contributed to the spreading of the city's area (Figure 6.6).
Thus, land owners filed for land subdivision at the municipality only to have it on the
market waiting for a lucrative cycle of real estate speculation. The boom of the 1970s
ended in a painful bust that caused substantial loss to many citizens.
Fourth, religious factors contributed to land speculation which led to the platting of
more land than the actual need. The Kingdom's population is largely composed of
conservative, practicing Muslims. The lack of Islamically-sanctioned, competing
investment opportunities for citizens to invest their savings led many individuals to invest
in the high, quick-yielding land market. Islam's teachings, as defined by the leading
religious scholars, prohibits interest-bearing investment practices that are risk-free,
predetermined returns. Those who seek such approaches are considered sinners and,
unless they cease such investment, are promised retribution by Allah. 21
Finally, by the 1960s, the land market had become an easy access to riches. For
example, land prices rose especially at the business central district CBD area, where they
were reported to range between SR 1,000 and SR 3,000 per square meter in the core, and
dropped to SR 100-500 for residential land immediately adjacent to the core, while, at the
periphery, land prices varied between SR 50 and SR 150. Increasingly, economic forces
concentrated opportunities within the core while at the same time making that core
increasingly expensive and unfavorable to the rising ranks of the population. The flight to
the periphery, where affluent members of the society lived in palatial compounds, was
inevitable. Yet, it was during the 1970s that land prices skyrocketed, reaching as high as
SR 1,000 per square meter at the periphery.
The combined effects of government allotting large tracts of public land to just a few
tycoons and of government implementation of vigorous modernization programs, and the
society's stem religious convictions, all forged the modern land tenure. Under salubrious
socioeconomic circumstances, rapid urbanization ensued and with it came a capitalist

190
Figure 6.6
Riyadh 1976. The 1970s government modenization programs fueled a frezied speculation
in the land market. The process of land subdivision proceeded beyond the 300 square
kilometers denoting Doxiadis Plan of 1971 (dotted line deontes Doxiadis Plan.). Source:
SECT International/SEDES (1977).

191
notion, that is, the realization of land for its exchange value rather than its use value,
characteristic of traditional built environments. Now, land became the means for capital
accumulation, but without levying taxes (e.g. zakat), the prospect of socializing such a
social resource was eliminated. Had such a tax been imposed, it could have been utilized
by the public municipality to defray the social cost associated with development.
The implication on the city spatial structure was logical, denizens sought the
periphery for cheap land, and for public services guaranteed by the government. The
resulting urban form was rational, a repeated pattern of land subdivision marked by lack of
uniformity and leap-frog urban sprawl. In 1986 undeveloped land accounted for 64
percent of the city's metropolitan area. This sprawl has been tempered by the well-devised,
hierarchical road network forming the framework binding the city's scattered parts.
However, the failure to implement the Doxiadis plan's super-block system of orthogonal
residential districts, each including its own subcenters (these subcenters originally were
meant for residents' shopping areas, schools and recreation), precluded the possibility of
creating balanced spatial structure for the city as a whole, comprising a dominant central
CBD complemented by these subcenters.
This form of sporadic development in the 1940s following the inception of the
Kingdom in the 1930s, was exacerbated in the 1950s, and took momentum in the
construction boom decade of the 1970s. The outcome is that vast areas of the city are
vacant (currently, 54 percent of the subdivided area is undeveloped). This was
encountered in 1986 when the Council of Ministers adopted what they called the Urban
Domain (No.13, 9/1/1406 H. (1986)) to put growth under check. The U.D. was adopted
in response to incessant building activity at the periphery, which was guaranteed free statepaid
public services and infrastructure. The new UD was applied to 199 major Saudi cities
and towns, in a serious attempt to counter future sprawl.
G. The Emergence of New Architecture and Building Methods
Traditionally, Najdi towns were constructed from load-bearing mud bricks while
roofs were built of wood beams, over which was placed branches, bushes and mud in
three layers. This ancient building technique limited a room's size to a few yards and
buildings heights to a maximum of three stories. Building materials were largely obtained
from the surrounding environment and assembled according to traditional methods. The

192
limitation of local ingredients and stern architecture reflected the desert environment and
dearth of technological know how. Interior design was typical. Several rooms opened to a
colonnade surrounding the courtyard, creating a micro-climate of shade and cool air. A
kitchen was built adjacent to a roofless area reserved for livestock. The house roof was
used for sleeping in the hot summer nights as well as for other familia activities (Figure
6.7).
Under the combined effects of improved economy and political stability, traditional
building industry could not match Riyadh's unprecedented population growth. With
increasing oil production came improved income and prospects for growth in the nation's
cities seemed inevitable. The oil company, the government, and wealthy merchants
anticipating rising demand for built structures, turned to external supplies for new building
materials and techniques. Likewise, new architectural design concepts and styles were
copied and sought, for such styles were deemed suited to the new building materials and
techniques. Social status was also increasingly associated with new, modern building
methods and design (Figure 6.8). Reinforced concrete allows for wider spans, hence
larger rooms. It also allows for larger, wider windows to be filled with the newly imported
glass, uncommon in traditional construction. Electrical wiring and modern plumbing
became synonymous with the imported architecture. Large structures could not be realized
by using traditional mud bricks and modern technology substituted passive cooling
methods (e.g. the courtyard) which constricted design to few options. Now, large
windows could be boldly made without concern for heat or sandstorms, thanks to the
widespread use of modern air cooling systems.
The need for tending livestock within the household to provide for its food gradually
diminished, thanks to the rise in imports of foodstuffs now available at most
neighborhoods' dakakeen, small grocery shops. Consequently, the enclosed, roofless
space for livestock in the traditional Najdi house disappeared as a household element.
Along with the courtyard, it was transformed into an outer yard encircling the villa, howsh
or hadiqa (garden), which was formed by the new setback requirements. 22 The howsh, or
the outer, open space surrounding the detached villa and enclosed by the outer wall, now
serves as a playground for children, and may contain a swimming pool, or parking space
for the car, and has become an established de rigueur. The modern walled housing unit
constituted a compromise between the Western villa and the Middle Eastern-Muslim
tradition of enclosure. The size of the howsh has now come to symbolize the status of the

193
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Figure 6.7
Riyadh (c. 1940s): "Traditional suburbanization" adhered to conventional architecture with
modifications to accommodate the automobile. Note the Juxtaposition of larger residences
nest to smaller ones. Indoor spaces circulated a courtyard which served social purposes
and suited the harsh environment of the desert. Roofs were used for sleeping in the
summer by extended families, which called for subdividing the roof into smaller spaces.
Source: Daghistani (1985).

194
Figure 6.8
The proliferation of the villa house as the preferred form of residence was a result of the
population's improved living standards, acculturation, introduction of new imported
building materials, zoning regulations and adaptability with new technology. Source:
Author (1991).

195
household itself. Wealthy people desired larger lots or combined several small lots into one
large one, and many built their homes at principal arterial streets as an expression of status.
The less endowed citizens built their residences on narrow streets and alleyways behind
large mansions.
Acculturation, that is the impact of external cultures on the local population, has
played a major role in the shift to contemporary architecture and urban design in Saudi
Arabia. For example, during the 1940s, the American ambassador resided in a house in
Jeddah, on the West coast, that was built by a wealthy Syrian merchant. The house was
built with aberrant architecture and used imported building materials. Its style (a detached
structure with balconies and fenestration that suited moderate climate) was largely
borrowed from the villa house, dominant in the Mediterranean Arab countries (Figure 6.9).
Its architecture was an aberration to the prevailing Jeddah house adorned by latticed
windows. The role of wealthy Saudis in shaping contemporary architecture cannot be
underestimated. In the early 1950s, a wealthy Saudi, named Ahmad Kaki, hired a
Lebanese architect, Niqula Salam to design a multi-story apartment building in Al-Khobar.
He hired skilled builders whom he brought specifically to construct his buildings. The new
style was built with steel-reinforced concrete structures (foundations, slabs and beams) and
with walls of cement bricks. 23 Skilled laborers applied electrical and modem plumbing
installations to these new structures badly needed by the oil industry. Soon after, the
affluent nationals began to incorporate the new construction technology, one of the various
novelties the nation's rising income helped introduce.
Government policies and propaganda played a major role in enforcing the use of new
building materials. 24 For example, the first royal decree ever issued by the new state to
regulate land distribution was the fourteen-point ordinance of 1358h/1938. It spelled out a
set of conditions attached to allotting new land to citizens in the cities of Dmamam and Al-
Khobar, at the locus of the industrial activity. It was an effort to encourage the settling of
laborers. It was mandated that recipients use either stone or cement blocks in the
construction of their units. 25 Using imported expertise, the government sought the
construction of large complexes for its ministerial departments, military complexes and the
like, all relying on mass-produced cement and steel construction methods.
Under conditions of expediency, the American oil company (Aramco) used modem,
imported building materials to construct its new industrial complexes, towns and

196
mmm®,
Figure 6.9
American Ambassador's house in Jeddah. This and other modern residences were built by
wealthy Saudis who inspired emulation by the masses. Source: M. Williams (1945)

197
communities. Aramco introduced assembly plants to produce building materials locally.
Moreover, the oil company built luxurious guest houses for its visitors, among whom
many were royal family members. The commodious, well furnished and air-conditioned
accommodations were supplied with swimming pools, lawns, terraces and other
architectural elements and design concepts hitherto unbeknown to the isolated society.
Soon the King and other royal family members were to demand the construction of similar
buildings serviced with Western conveniences. King Saud's palatial complex at Al-
Nasiriyah was an example of this process and an exemplar that was emulated in subsequent
development. The rich were next to emulate the modern architecture which was deemed
suitable for the times. The superiority of the versatile cement and steel construction was
unmatched by the standard method of mud design.
Thus with the improvement of the national economy, residents started to experiment
with new design styles and building materials. New construction methods and materials
(concrete, cement tiles and bricks) were introduced at an increasing pace. The standard,
essentially one-material, mud house was supplanted with the villa, built with reinforced
concrete structure adorned with glass, marble and other finishing materials forming the
gingerbread facades of contemporary, stucco houses, commonly referred to as the villa.
The contemporary villa is a two-story, closed mass box, onto which many additions
and adornments can be grafted to suit individual needs and tastes (Figure 8). It offers a
broad range of spatial and functional arrangements, thanks to the versatile method of
reinforced concrete. In most cases, residents are left to improvise their own facades
without intervention by the municipality. However, many Saudis entrusted the design and
construction of their homes to incompetent designers and contractors, resulting in a
hodgepodge, pretentious and gaudy architecture. Developers sought the construction of
residential compounds and apartment buildings with ghastly styles. Individual house
builders and major contractors paid the minimum to hire architects, drafters and novices
who found in the construction boom an ample opportunity to experiment with whatever
styles and forms they could imagine.
The villa became the conventional style in most Saudi cities, towns and villages alike.
It comprised several rooms organized around the family room, saalah, usually located at
the center of the home. Downstairs, there exists a duality of space attesting to the
segregation between sexes. A front section is usually preserved for guests, predominantly

198
men. It includes a vestibule which leads to the majlis (a formal reception area), a large
dining room, a space for washing hands and a bathroom. The remaining part of the house
is the family space. In addition to the central saalah, it includes a women's receptionsetting
area, a kitchen, bedrooms and a private bathrooms. The women's reception room
may also be used as a winter family room, so within the same house, space is used for
different functions and sexes at different seasons. The upper floor is exclusively used for
sleeping. An outside annex comprising several rooms may be used as a larger kitchen for
larger families and to avoid cooking odors within the house and allow for male servants to
use the outside utility rooms such as laundry and storage rooms. A front side annex may
also include space for entertainment, guest rooms and a bath. Traditional architecture has
been supplanted with modern eclecticism, one which exhibits rigid organization of internal
space and, mostly shoddy, prosaic and gaudy outer forms fusing discordant elements and
styles into a "messy whole."
The tendency in developing countries in which "new forms and materials because of
their 'high' status are adopted and preferred to traditional solutions though traditional
solutions frequently respond more effectively to climate" is well documented. 26 The
prevailing traditional architecture was linked to the austere poverty of the past and so
perceived as anachronistic. The wholesale adoption of imported architecture was captured
in the comprehensive study which preceded the construction of the Diplomatic Quarter. In
1978, commenting on the new paradigm, the authors stated,
In fact, regarding the appearance of modern Riyadh as a city, it seems that in
recent town planning and house designs, persistence of traditional principles
of Najd urban culture would have been more desirable than the wholesale
adoption of western architectural styles which present-day Riyadh features. 27
The new imported paradigms were associated with modernization, a loaded term
which, among others, meant the introduction of new, imported design concepts, building
technology and convenient living styles, all conformed to the new modernization
philosophy of the state. 28 Modernization was the motto of the nation-state, a broad,
elusive concept that justified the flooding of the traditional society with up-to-date
materialism and technological know-how. The gap between traditionalism and modernism
apparently has been too wide to be comprehended by a the majority of the society. Cultural
alienation resulting from churning masses into cities was defused by repeated
consumerism. Largely, modernization came at the cost of gradual substitution of local

199
heritage in an era of technological openness to the outside world, especially to the building
technology. Individual structures, transportation and other land uses which comprise
modern urban forms, were first to exhibit the incorporation of new trends in
modernization. In short, the new architecture, though synthetic and spacious, became
synonymous with, and a symbol for, modernization.
The commodious suburban villa, set in an ample lot and served with wide paved and
lighted streets summed up the blend of property, union with the family, status and
modernity. On the city scale, the accumulation of these stern forms has created a
forbidding aura which has altered the quality of the contemporary built environment. Still,
the suburban villa, though lacking the picturesque setting of its Western counterpart, offers
a contrasting quality to the crammed substandard mud residences of the old communities
increasingly occupied by single casual laborers and other immigrants.
II.
BUILDING THE ROYAL CITY, I950S-1960S
A. King Saud (1953-1964): the 'Master Builder'
From a mere pre-industrial, placid burg, Riyadh expanded to a bustling hive of
incessant building and construction. From its primeval penury, the Capital became the
showcase of government pride, conveying a sense of legitimacy for the growing influence
of the government in an era witnessing the crumbling of monarchies in nearby Middle
Eastern countries. In the fiscal year of 1947-48 the annual national income was SR 215
million. By 1952-53 it rose to SR 758 million. By 1955, revenues reached SR 1,335
million. With the growth of the government treasury during the 1950s, the Capital was the
first to snatch its share of government allocation. It was the seat of the Royalty and the
government. "Riyadh and its Dependencies" occupied a budgetary category of their own
amounting to SR. 152 million, the highest among the thirteen official budget categories for
the 1952-53 fiscal year totaling SR. 758 million. This was best shown during the reign of
King Saudi who inherited the growing polity from his father. King Saudi sought the
modernization of the country, first and mainly in the physical sphere, hence starting a
tradition of Saudi urban "euthenics".

200
1. Annasiriyah: The Royal Suburb
The modernization of Riyadh is epitomized in the new urban development programs
during King Saudi's reign. H. St. (1959) hailed King Saudi's zeal for building. During
the King's worldwide travels, he "had acquired a taste for elegant buildings and ornamental
gardens; and it was while he was still crown prince that he sponsored the first real
experiment in the modernization of Riyadh." 29 As noted, he started with the construction
of his own royal estate, a four-acre garden plot called Nasiriyah, three miles to the
northwest of the old city. Soon after, this little estate was expanded "into a hundred-acre
pleasaunce of lawns and flower-beds, tree-lined avenues and bowers of flowering shrubs,
orangeries and orchards...to say nothing of its swimming pools, its tennis courts and other
recreational facilities." 30 To Philby, Nasiriyah represented the first step toward the
"modernization" of Riyadh. It was here that Saud "decided to develop an estate worthy of
his high rank and his progressive views." The walled royal suburb housed scores of
colossal, opulent palaces and 405 villas. It included a large mosque and a fine school
completed with modern facilities. At a later stage a zoo was even added. The bill of
Nasiriyah was exorbitantly high reaching SR 44 million ($11 million), a phenomenal price
for the 1950s.
Considering the context, time and scale of Nasiriyah's development in the history of
the Saudi Arabian urban development, Nasiriyah can be considered as the Saudi Arabian
version of Chicago's World's Columbian Exposition of 1893. With its aberrant
architecture and its wide boulevards laid mostly on a grid street layout, Nasiriyah
profoundly altered the traditional urban order and served as a lasting progenitor, a model
for future emulation in other urban development. The builders of Nasiriyah had sought to
satisfy the King's hunger for modernization and prosperity (Figure 6.10).
2. Al-Malaz: Planned Community for Administrative Purposes
The modern section of Riyadh is best exemplified in the birth of the new suburb, al
Malaz. Following the transfer of government ministries to Riyadh in the late 1950s, the
government sought to attract the Hijazi government employees to Riyadh. At the behest of
King Saud, a 500 acre satellite suburb, al Malaz, was inaugurated four kilometers to the
north of the walled city. Extolled as the New Riyadh, the al-Malaz project was a largescale
housing development encompassing 754 single family houses, 180 apartment units

Figure 6.10
Riyadh: King Saud's royal suburb, Annasiriyah (c. 1950s) was built with aberrant
architecture. Source: Daghistani (1985).
!$ * wSIV
Figure 6.11
The row of ministries was part of the government's Al-Malaz ("New Riyadh") large-scale
project during the 1950s. ITie architecture and urban planning used in Annasiriyah and Al-
Malaz inspired monumental scale adoption of the new paradigm in subsequent
development. Source: Daghistani (1985).

202
for married employees and approximately 160 apartment units for unmarried employees.
New Riyadh included public buildings such as a municipal hall, a library, fire station,
schools, markets and recreation and health facilities (Figure 6.11,6.12).
The al Malaz development signaled a departure from the old laissez-faire attitude and
heralded a new era of government intervention in the housing market as a major supplier,
financier and subsidizer. The villas were sold to government officials at long-term loans.
The al-Malaz planners followed the gridiron network with a hierarchical street network
comprising a 180 foot wide highway bifurcating the new suburb, major roads of 100 feet,
collector streets of 60 feet and service passageways of 30-45 feet. This network fed
residential blocks of 150 by 300 feet which were subdivided into rectangular lots of 25 feet
deep with lengths varying from 25,75, to 110 feet. Due to its complexity and scale, the
Al-Malaz project can be considered as the major attempt to coordinate the allocation of
several urban elements in space, with special attention to the overall urban system. As
such, unlike the laying of gridiron residential annexes in the Eastern Province's towns, the
Al-Malaz model was characterized by its diversified functional elements which were built to
enhance Riyadh's centrality in the nation and boost its administrative capabilities (Figure
6.11). This intervention was to culminate in the massive housing programs yet to be
introduced in the mid-1970s, with the establishment of the Real Estate Development Fund
(REDF). By the end of the 1950s, Riyadh boasted a population of 300,000, and covered
an area of about 100 square kilometers as opposed to the original 100-acre 'heart of Arabia'
(Figure 6.12).
3. Urban Reconstruction at the Historical Core
The core had its share of King Saud's zeal for reform and he committed himself to the
task of remodeling that part of the capital. Increases in population and government ushered
unprecedented economic growth in the historical core. Both catapulted demand for
consumer goods which caused the expansion of a modern downtown area, and the sorting
by location of some economic activities hitherto unbeknown to the traditional population.
Economic growth also resulted in the development of some fairly distinctive residential
districts reflecting a sociospatial stratification of a modern urban society, though with a
great deal of spatial intermingling still extant.
The traditional fabric was the first to suffer from rapid change. The historical clay

203
LOCALITY
PLAN V
Figure 6.12
Al-Malaz was built to house the government's civil employees in Riyadh. The platting of
the large-scale development featured a gridiron subdivision and the villa model which were
was widely copied in subsequent land subdivisions by land owners and municipalities
throughout the natibn. It was a radical shift from traditional architecture and urban
planning. Source: A1 Hathloul (1981).

204
mosque and the large area of houses around it were leveled. On their ground a new, larger
mosque was built of concrete, with two tall minarets. The old palace of Imam Turky was
replaced by a huge complex comprising housing and law-courts, offices for the governor
of Riyadh and audience chambers for ceremonial occasions. Modern shops were erected
lining the streets converging on the new center and radiating from it. The old, unassuming
clay houses were dwarfed by new, pretentious high-rise buildings. Other mud houses
were gradually demolished to make way for vehicular roads, as well as for concrete and
masonry buildings. The scene of the demolishing activity was recorded by H. St. Philby
in April, 1960. He wrote to a friend
I spent my 75th birthday watching the bulldozers knock down half of my
property for a new road through the town. The house itself has been spared,
though deluged with dust, but all the courtyard, guest rooms, garage and
servants quarters are gone. I am not going to move.... 31
A road program was undertaken to link al Murabaa palace, Nasiriyah, and the new
airport, along with the railway station by a wide two-way boulevard, divided by a central
line of flower beds. The traditional walled city's narrow, crooked streets were looked
upon as an anachronism, therefore an impediment to progress. Its unsuitability for the
modern era was made obvious by increasing motor traffic. In general, "the resulting
physical patterns of development are no longer 'incremental' and irregular, but rationalized
to exigencies of the new technological order" (Brown, 1980).
King Saud's aplomb in the country's power hierarchy meant the rising significance of
Riyadh, his ancestral headquarters, thus the restructuring of the Country's national urban
network. Historically, the Western region of the Arabian Peninsula is the birthplace of
Islam and the ground of the two Holy cities of Makkah and Madinah. It has been
considered the heart of the Muslim world. Nevertheless, as we saw, Riyadh was adopted
permanently as the nation's capital, following King Abdul-Aziz's victorious conquer of
Hijaz in 1926, leaving titular significance to Jeddah and Makkah despite their previous
epithets as administrative and religious capitols. In 1953, Riyadh's status as the seat of the
Saudi government was further enhanced by the government's decision to transfer the
government ministries and other agencies to Riyadh from the cosmopolitan Jeddah, the
littoral commercial center on the Western coast and gateway to Makkah. An imposing row
of modern buildings to house the new ministries and the growing military apparatus,
including a staff college and military hospital, was built by the government on the road

205
leading to the airport.
In contrast to the traditional architecture, both in style and scale, the modern row of
ministerial structures were built to show sturdy engineering and flatulent exhibitionism, an
exercise in vanity reflecting the rising influence of the nation-state. Three more hospitals, a
maternity clinic and several institutions were built to cope with the increasing demand for
health care. Furthermore, Riyadh's vitality was enhanced by significant water discoveries,
making the city more attractive for city-ward migration especially during the long drought
years between 1957-1964.
City-ward migration continued apace approximating significantly high levels of 9 per
cent per annum between 1968 and 1977, or an annual increase of 93,000 inhabitants. 32
This resulted in the spatial expansion of Riyadh. The city expanded by annexing nearby
villages to the south and east. In the north, new, planned districts proliferated to
accommodate the rapid increase in population. The expansion took two basic types:
ruralized, sparsely controlled growth of low income districts and planned development.
The ruralized section was likened to Abu-Lughod's findings on Cairo.
...the housing in these ruralized districts is grouped mainly in small villagelike
clusters, and the buildings are primarily one or two stories in height and
are made of bricks or mud-bricks. In fact, these districts resemble Arabian
villages more than they resemble the modern section of Riyadh in their
physical and socioeconomic features. 33
B. King Faisal's Socioeconomic Reforms: 1958-1974
Despite the remarkable strides in physical planning and urban development, the 1950s
and 1960s were distinctively disharmonious. The combined effect of incessant migration,
the introduction of the automobile, the application of banal urban growth controls by the
municipality and the increasing cleavage between income distribution shredded the
historical harmony of the mud town, expediting its demise. The incremental growth had
lost its pace as the leap-frog growth pattern took place in the form of construction of palatial
suburbs and governmental land uses which continued to lead sprawl, and were built at a
scale and style duly contrasting those of the historical core, itself undergoing more
demolishing of its mud buildings to allow for the construction of roads, apartment
buildings and shops.

206
Riyadh's population increased from 82,000 inhabitants to 300,000 by 1968, out of
which seventy percent were migrants. As oil revenues multiplied, society's living
standards improved. Increase in car ownership during the 1960s was phenomenal,
fluctuating between 24 percent and 40 percent in the period 1962-67; the number of
vehicles jumped from 3 per 1,000 inhabitants to 8.8, despite the very high increase in the
city's population. 34 The number of registered vehicles continued to increase dramatically
in the following decades. It increased by twenty fold between 1971 and 1987, from about
168,000 cars to 4.5 million nationwide. To seize this growth, the national road network
was expanded vastly from 5,000 kilometers in the mid 1970s to 90,000 in 1987, 35
Unfortunately, however, the increase in car ownership led planners to perform major
demolition in the historical city. H. St. J. B. Philby, who first came to Arabia in
November 1917, and spent the rest of his life in the country, correctiy augured the city's
future growth. During the late 1950s, Philby gave a good sense of this process of change
at its inception:
...watching and recording, step by step, the process of change, at first
gradual and tentative, but later with ever increasing and almost reckless
tempo, by which the transformation scene which greets the visitor of today
has been achieved. It still is very far from complete and there is no knowing
how far it will go; but building, and ever more building, is the order of the
day: to say nothing of the accompanying demolition of old-style houses (of
clay) to make room for the concrete and stucco monuments of exotic Western
architecture. 36
The 1950s and 1960s were also decades of political turmoil and economic crises.
Since the founding of the Kingdom in 1932, the King and the royalty were the major
recipients of oil revenues, thus spearheading the trend of change. Mansfield stated, "The
effect on some of the royal princes, of whom there were now more than 2,000, was
devastating. They wanted to acquire all the products of Western consumer society as soon
as they saw them, and there were plenty of unscrupulous salesmen ready to provide them at
inflated prices." 37 By the mid 1950s, the royalty's prerogative right to oil wealth resulted
in widespread resentment by the population, increasingly exposed to outside ideas and
political values. Feeling the soaring popular resentment, the monarchic state felt the need
for reforms. Unable to steer the nation, King Saud was forced to step aside as senior royal
family members agreed it was time to shift gears.
His successor, King Faisal's contribution had more indirect than direct repercussions

207
on the urban scene. His reforms were structural, aimed at long-term socioeconomic goals
to stabilize the agitated masses. They were political to circumvent the anti-establishment
political tides that swept the Middle East compounded by the indulgence of royal elites. He
swiftly embarked upon prudent steps to play down the widening gap between the elites and
the majority. Upon accession in 1964, Faisal ordered Annasiriyah's wall to be
demolished, an element he viewed as a physical embodiment of royal indulgence and of the
bifurcated society.
During the 1960s, the growing demand for housing had already brought about
change from small-scale, sporadic uncontrolled individual street development to the layout
of extensive tracts of land based inevitably on the gridiron. Aside from the government
employees' suburb of al Malaz and the royal suburb of Nasiriyah, both built during King
Saud's reign, Riyadh's suburbanization did not take the form of a "coherent whole."
Subsequent growth lacked predetermined attention to open space, public services and
community facilities. As need arose for a school, a health clinic or a police station, the
government had to either buy or rent residential buildings and convert them according to the
new need or rent them. It was not until the 1970s, when improved government revenues
allowed for the provision of open space and recreational facilities.
The modernization of Riyadh abided in the following decades paralleling the
expansion of the government bureaucracy. The number of government employees grew
from 36,800 in 1968 to 84,500 in 1977, to 185,600 in 1986. By 1988, the government
sector comprised 205,000 out of the City's total employed man power of 518,200,
including non-Saudis. Riyadh's share of national government workers rose from 40 per
cent in 1977 to 45 per cent in 1986. Moreover, average annual income of government
employed personnel was SR 63,400 ($16,900), 22 per cent higher than the average in the
private sector. 38 It is this growth in government bureaucracy and privileges which
constitutes the backbone of Riyadh's urban economy. The spatial order of the city has
grown containing a projection of this preponderance of government power and leadership
values. The 1950s' motto of 'New Riyadh' became the 'City of Future' in the affluent
decades of the 1970s and 1980s.

208
HI. PLANNING THE 'CITY OF FUTURE': THE INTRODUCTION OF CITY MASTER
PLANS AND EFFECTIVE URBAN POLICIES IN THE 1970S AND 1980S
The impact of preemptive government decision-making and underwriting of urban
development was shown best during the 1970s and the 1980s. The 1970s brought an
unprecedented world demand for oil. Oil output virtually doubled between 1970 and 1973.
Oil prices rose sharply, doubling in the same three years from $1.80 in 1970 to $5.12 in
October 1973, to a whooping $11.65 in January 1974. Accordingly, oil revenues rose
from $1.26 billion in 1970, to $3,107 billion in 1973, leaped to $22,574 billion by 1974,
and jumped to a phenomenal $98.1 billion in 1982. 39 The improvements in the national oil
economy was translated into construction boom that swept Riyadh, in particular and the
Saudi cities, towns and villages, in general (Table 6.1).
Table 6.1 illustrates the dramatic increase in construction activity in Riyadh compared
to the total number of permits issued by municipal authorities in the Kingdom. According
to the census of 1974, Riyadh had a population of 666,000 inhabitants, approximately 10
percent of the nation's population estimated at 7 million. 40 . Especially during the early
1970s, Riyadh's share of construction permits was considerably high compared to the
number of permits issued by municipalities nationwide. In 1974, the year in which an
official population census was compiled and also the year which followed the phenomenal
increase in world oil prices, Riyadh was the first among the nation's settlements to benefit
from the oil bounties, evident in the 30 percent share of the total numbers of construction
permits nationwide.
A. Urban Economy: Government Growth and Industrialization
Riyadh's growth continued unabated, corroborating the preponderance of the state
input in the development of the national urban system. In the decade ending 1977, the
city's population more than doubled reaching 690,000 inhabitants. Between 1968 and
1977, rapid population growth closely paralleled economic growth. The total number of
jobs rose from 75,000 to 180,000 during the same period, while the broad structure of
economic activity remained similar to that of the 1960s. The tertiary sector (government,
trade and commerce) accounted for 76 percent of this composition- 33% was government,
commercial activities and other services 28%, transport 8%, and utilities 1.5%. In 1977,
the government sector employed 60,000 persons, while commerce and construction

Table 6.1
Number of Permits (Construction, Renovation & Walling (Fencing) Issued by Municipal
Authorities in Riyadh, Arar and Huraimla Compare to the National Total
City Permit 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Type
Riyah Constailicn 2,155 3,467 3,885 6,124 8,284 9,813 11,206 11,231 11,433 12,154 5,057 4,781 1237 11,211 11,340 2,722
Rcnovaiai 115 109 629 2,062 1,496 897 571 296 n 1 2 - 46 3 171 10
Wiling 837 379 367 364 476 534 1,054 879 863 919 685 300 411 779 878 157
Total 3,107 3,955 4,881 8,550 10,256 11,244 12,831 12,406 12,325 13,074 5,760 5,081 12,704 11,993 12,389 2,889
Aar Cosnmnicn 137 139 49 60 333 533 857 705 758 694 316 m 145 1,077 431 299
Renovcn 6 11 6 2 10 24 - 5 16 174 33 37 33 32 40 34
Walling 88 98 32 43 129 311 741 584 415 566 196 51 10 51 49 26
Total 231 248 87 105 472 868 1,598 1,294 1,189 1,434 545 336 248 1,160 520 359
Hutinila Gnstnrticn 15 10 23 45 28 49 16 160 58 na 95 114 88 88 56 64
Raivalicn - - - - - 2 3 1 1 na 4 1 - 3 2 3
Wailing 1 1 1 3 2 2 2 1 68 na 31 24 24 21 16 28
Total 16 11 24 48 30 53 21 162 127 na 130 139 112 112 74 95
Nationl Total 14,540 17,097 18,303 27,983 44,650 67,346 70,970 58,497 63,780 83,518 72,021 77,463 78,884 76,763 63,227 48,927
Oil Revenues 1,885 2,775 4,430 22,574 25,676 30,755 36,540 32,234 48,435 84,466 70,479 37,352 31,470 18,323 13,555 -
Source: Ministry of Interior, Municipal Affairs, Statistical Administration, Municipal Atatistics, 137211972-1406119S6 (Riyadh: Ministry of
Interior), MOMRA, Municipal Statistics, 140911989 (Riyadh: MOMRA Publising Press), Ismail Duais (1986), 127.

210
employed 37,000 and 26,000 respectively, indicating the preponderance of the tertiary
sector over the industrial. In 1987, the number of government employees increased to
183,000. This figure comprises 39 percent of the city's employed labor force, totaling
474,000. Seventy-eight percent of the Saudi working force was employed by the
government. 41
Table 6.2 illustrates Riyadh's beneficial status of being the seat of government. The
table lists the funds allocated for the provision of municipal services in some Saudi cities.
In 1975, Riyadh boasted a population approximating 700,000 and its Municipality (Amanat
Madinat Arriyadh) received SR 2.6 billion while Jeddah, populated by 600,000 was
allotted only SR 1.3 billion.
In terms of Riyadh's non-governmental economic growth, that is the private sector, it
ranks first in terms of the number of industrial establishments among the nation's cities. In
1963, the city had 6,894 non-government private establishments enlisting 15,400
employees. By 1976, Riyadh had 30,611 private establishments. In the same period, the
City's labor force engaging in urban activities tripled from 94,991 to 272,376. 42 Table
6.3 exhibits the growth in number of establishments and employees in selective Saudi
cities. The tremendous growth in the private sector corroborates the intensity of urban
growth in the Kingdom's major cities in general and Riyadh in particular. In 1981, Riyadh
possessed 74 percent of the Central Region's private establishments alone and housed 89
percent of the Central Region's labor force employed by the private sector. The Capital
contained 21 percent of the Kingdom's total private establishments (surpassing Jeddah by
1,960 establishments) and 27 percent of the private sector's labor force. This attests to the
massive benefits bestowed upon the city for being the seat of the government.
Yet, the consumptive nature of Riyadh is evident in the fact that only 16 percent of the
City's consumer goods are made and assembled by its specious industries (which employ
8% of the City's manpower); 76 percent are imported from outside the country and 8
percent are imported from the country's regions. Moreover, 70 percent of Riyadh's
production is consumed locally. In short, the markedly active urban economy heavily
depends on the government. Both the private construction sector, which employs 30
percent of the City's private man power, and the private service sector 24 percent, rely on
state spending (Table 6.3).

Municipally
population
(1940s)
Table 6.2
Funds Allocated for the Provision of Municipal Services in million SR
Selected Major Cities (1975-1988) And Population Estimates
population
(1974)
1966 1975 1976 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1988
Riyadh 30,000 666,840 36.8 2,630 1,401 1,700 1,145 2,404 3,455 3,375 1,929 1,907 688
Jeddah 30,000 561,104 36.2 1,296 936 688 660 765 1,954 1,901 1,901 1,286 90
Makkah 80,000 366,801 43.1 1,866 1,504 1,001 606 1,346 1,274 1,262 859 1,607 71
Madinah 20,000 198,186 28.3 555 621 334 321 615 989 777 648 698 396
Dammam - 127,844 10.1 221 177 117 113 93 1,899 1,563 629 434 174
Taif 5,000 204,857 8.7 213 155 118 207 178 338 428 267 162 50
Buraydah 20,000 69,940 na 191 108 119 146 322 1,259 479 391 209 63
Jizan n.a. 32,812 na 87 81 59 42 118 119 102 47 80 23
Abha n.a. 30,150 na 174 117 167 44 33 47 155 141 142 14
Hail 10,000 40,502 na 168 87 78 54 44 242 261 274 313 37
Tabuk 1.0,000 74,825 na 325 198 137 111 133 354 330 163 461 41
Total* - 2,373,861 - 7,726 5,324 4,518 3,449 6,051 11,927 10,633 7,249 7,299 1,647
Riyadh/Total (%) 28 - 34 26 38 33 40 29 32 27 26 42
Source: Minstry ofFinancy, Statistical Indicator, 1400H/1980, p. 32; K.M. Al-Ankary & S El-Bushra (eds.), 1989, p. 12. * Total' only represents
figures in the table; Ministry of Interior, Municipal Affairs, Statistical Administration, Municipal Atatislics, 137211972-140611986 (Riyadh: Ministry of
Interior), MOMRA, Municipal Statistics, 140911989 (Riyadh: MOMRA Publising Press).

212
B. City Master Plans
Oil wealth has enabled the government to embark upon vigorous national and urban
planning schemes aimed at increasing the living-standards of the population by all feasible
means (higher income, better housing and hygiene, etc.) and by upgrading the built
environment for projected future economic prosperity. Though progressive, these
regulations were wrought in isolation of public input. In 1973, the Council of Ministers
adopted Riyadh Master Plan, the first formal attempt to circumscribe the City's unbridled
growth.
Table 6.3
Number of Private Establishments and Employment in Selective Saudi
Cities
City No. of No. of No. No. Of No. of No. of
Establish­ Employees Establish­ Employees Establish­ Employees
ments (1963) ments (1976) ments (1981)
(1963) (1976) (1981)
Riyadh 6,894 15,400 16,409 94,9911 30,611* 272,376
Jeddah 7,007 18,234 13,828 62,907 28,651 221,975
Makkah 6,160 14,379 8,114 22,657 12,332 43,632
Maidnah 3,030 6,489 4,247 14,097 7,906 27,851
Taif 2,609 4,520 4,805 11,902 6,735 22,005
Al-Ahsa 2,511 4,496 3,349 9,857 5,458 15,383
Dammam 1,762 4,737 4,405 32,670 6,828 96,535
Al-Khobar 1,132 3,818 1,598 15,425 3,446 55,136
Arar 265 454 477 1,803 1,245 3,319
Sources: Statistical Year Book (1965), p. 199; Statistical Year Book (1989), 643. * As of 1986, the
number of private establishments increased to 44,643; comprising 26,977 commercial (90% of which is
retail), 15,823 services, and 1,842 designated as industrial (58% were furniture-related, 16% metal products,
and 6% involved in stone, mud and glass works). Industrial establishments occupied 19 km 2 (6.5%) of the
City's area. Source: Report On Urban Domain for The City of Riyadh (1989), 7.
1. Doxiadis Plan for Riyadh, 1973
Departure from the traditional design standards of the medina culminated in the
adoption of Doxiadis' City Master Plan in 1973 by the Council of Ministries. The
approach of contracting Western consultants to produce master plans was in vogue in many
Third World and Developing countries. They were archetypical solutions to rapidly

213
expanding cities. Master city plans are long-range, multi-phase conceptualizations of
towns future growth. They constituted comprehensive land use and infrastructure
development plans, projected in tune with vigorous national economic growth schemes.
All sought to facilitate economic prosperity and social stability through manipulating the
spatial system. Along with the housing loans provided through the REDF, Riyadh's new
Master Plan institutionalized the grid and indoctrinated the villa as the preferred form of
laying new districts by setting rectilinear lot-sizes, and enforcing set-back regulations. 43
The new Plan was sought to guide development in according with the objectives of the
political authorities,
- flexibility, so as to accommodate varying rates of growth;
- a fair distribution of services to all levels of the population;
- a transportation system based on the use of private vehicles. 44
The above main objectives were translated into (1) the adoption of the linear form for
the City toward the north with a Central Business Area a spine extending north-south
allowing Doxiadis; (2) the redesigning of certain areas within the City as "self-contained"
units, that is with their own service cores with access to medium level service centers and
the central CBD; (3) the charting of a new road system with hierarchy of streets and
pedestrian precincts. The Plan included the detailed design of individual Action Area
Plans, those deemed potential for development, covering 11.5 square kilometers, in an
effort to relive the City's center.
By shifting to comprehensive city planning, the authorities sought to control Riyadh
and other major cities' phenomenal growth. Sectoral planning approaches of the past,
mainly the laying of land subdivisions according to planning-by-laws measures
implemented by cities' municipalities, proved lacking. This new orientation was an attempt
to create more economically and efficient urban systems in line with national economic
growth plans. The justification of such a massive allocation in the urban built environment
was to increase the population's share in the benefits reaped through oil revenues. Also, as
Deputy Minister of Rural and Municipal Affairs, Khalid Al-Ankary, points out, it is
"indicative of the Saudi government's intention to develop a modem urban network which
is capable of assuming its functions in die newly emerging industrial economy." 45 Prior to
the 1970s, the majority of Riyadh's population lived in substandard housing. Now, it was
intended they would benefit from generous housing subsidies, free land, interest-free loans
on industrial establishments, all geared to shift towns and cities subsistent economies to

214
modern ones capable of meeting the rising demands of the population. The improved
living standards and government spending, all contributed to city expansion.
The realization of these targets has come at the expense of state intervention.
Bestowed with immense oil revenues, the state spearhead the march to modernization. In
the prevalence of overcrowded neighborhoods lay not only the danger of disease and
degradation of social mores but also the latent prospect of widespread revolutionary
sentiments, which previously surfaced during the 1950s and the 1960s. Yet, sharing
national resources did not necessarily mean sharing decision making. In their shift to
comprehensive physical planning, that is to city master plans, planners failed to include the
city's residents. Citizens were not informed on their city's destiny, and businessmen were
not consulted on the economic value of the new plan. Both groups were perceived, by
administrators and planners, as uneducated on the complex techniques of the modern city
planning. Due to this exclusion of the populace, city planning remained highly technical
and bureaucratic.
The Doxiadis Plan was organized around a system of two-by-two kilometer superblocks.
Such a repetitive framework was justified for its flexibility, a crucial criterion for a
city undergoing rapid growth (Figure 6.13). The Doxiadis planners envisioned a
functional city, predicated on a modular grid, simple, straight forward, easy and legible
urban framework for a city's population growing at 100,000 per annum. It was projected
that the 1970 plan would serve the city's needs up to the year 2,000. The municipality
(Amanat Madinat Arriyadh) was to preside on the implementation of zoning regulations
outlined in Doxiadis' plan. For example, regulations required that land owners provide up
to 30 percent of their subdivision land for streets, open space and, if large enough, public
services, such as a school. Land developers and individual house builders were required to
meet the detailed instruction on building codes including height, lot size, setbacks and
residential type. The application of these regulations has resulted in profound similarity
between communities within the cities and among cities.
The 1968 Doxiadis' master plan for Riyadh, which was put into effect in 1971, and
its subsequent regulations set the direction for future growth. The consequence was a city
organized into the modern, high-income north and the semi-traditional, low-income south.
For example, the Plan proposed average plot sizes ranging between 150 m 2 and 250 m 2 for
South and old Riyadh; minimum 400 m 2 for the northern part. As such, the Plan ignored

215
Commerce. Busincu tad Ciric
|QQ Dntnn Coounercul ind One Ccstn
W//M% Royii AIM
EZSI Msfiulsaunoi
ZZZR Industry "7- '
itlliU!! Rcpooil Puti, Sporn Crounds, Athletic Centre
Green Aieu tAd LaswuDoa*
RSSSSSa Spctul Um (MiliUry.Oiher loxunitiom eic...)
nrrm Uoivemry Campui .,. ,,
•ES2J Airpon Arti ' '
E£3 Riihnyi 1 ^ "
... .1" Propoted Rutw*y Lint ' (
Figure 6.13
The 1971 Doxiadis Master Plan was originally to serve the City's needs until the year
2,000. Source: Daghistani (1985).

216
the culturally relevant values that imbued the process of physical growth for centuries,
producing ecological stasis. The modern outcome seemed inevitable: people abandoned the
traditional built environment altogether. Of course, the process of laying land subdivisions
using the grid, which started in the 1940s, preceded the wholesale arrangement of the city
into super-blocks of 2-by-2 miles by Doxiadis. In short, the Plan institutionalized the
segregation of the city by income, hence imposing an economic map on the population,
which hitherto valued social ties over economic privatism.
The implementation of various modernization programs by the state resulted in
frenzied speculation in the real estate market which siphoned savings to the landed
aristocracy. Moreover, the timing of the Doxiadis Plan coincided with the skyrocketing of
oil prices which enabled the government to launch the first Five-Year Development plan
(1970-75), an ambitious shift to national planning in which the government allocated
massive funds for infrastructural development nationwide. The combined efforts by the
various government agencies created vast job opportunities which engaged the population
of cities and towns in the implementation of the government-financed modernization
programs. The state's orchestrated development necessitated the importation of large
numbers of expatriates, hence adding more pressure on the already stressed housing
market. To relieve the shortage, the government inaugurated various state housing
programs, including the Real Estate Development Fund in 1974. Citizens who could
afford building their own homes abandoned the overcrowded mud communities, some of
which were later inhabited by the imported labor force. Now, with the great sums of
national resources allocated in housing, road construction and upgrading social services
and utilities, the previously vacant Doxiadis Plan's super-blocks, became the stage for
building construction at the periphery. Once structures were built, the municipality and
other public utilities would provide streets, electricity, water and telephone service.
While the Doxiadis Plan was conceived for projected growth until the year 2,000, the
demand for land for construction was soon to surpass the Plan's demarcated boundaries. It
was not that the area in the Plan was fully developed. To the contrary, a substantial
proportion of area remained undeveloped, "white land," as owners aspired for a future
upsurge in land prices to reap a high return on their untaxed properties (Figure 6.6).
With the adoption of city master plans, planners now turned to the city with more
practical concerns: the functioning of a rapidly growing city as a system, with special

217
attention to economic determinants. Typically, the city was conceived in Doxiadis' report
as a center of industry and traffic, which translated into a rationalized system of land use
and transport network, all confirming the trend to depart from historical traditions. It also
reflected Saudi planners' interest to rationalize growth according to new imperatives
brought about by modernization. The Plan advocated the idea of a city, worthy of national
esteem and meaning. The plan was justified on the basis that it advocated a rational city, a
concept planners avowed to be in the best interest of the state and the population. Planners
focused on the practical arrangements of the physical city, embracing such elements as
streets, transit, parks, open space and playgrounds, urban renewal and design, as well as
planning and construction of communities within the city. By underestimating the political
nature of planning, Saudi planners, working for the government and various agencies
conducting decisions related to urban development, conceived of the city as a passive
depot, far from being an area of equitable and positive political interaction between city
actors. So, planners took the governmentalizing of the city as being in the collective
interest of city dwellers.
The subject of the Plan was growth, while its theme was the orderly programming of
the Capital's activities of government and private investment according to a scheme which
took into account the projected growth over the next thirty years. The goal was to establish
order by imposing specialized land functions, such as open (green) space, housing,
government, industry and transportation. It was hoped the Plan, which came with a
package of zoning ordinances, would assure beneficial future growth. The plan forbade
industrial activities in residential areas which were sorted into sub-zoned districts allowing
for different lot sizes, encouraging growth-by-income segregation. The "goodness" of the
future was now purely based on an idealized notion of orderly, specialized arrangements of
zones in space, all in the new blueprint charted by Doxiadis Associates of Athens, Greece.
The key to this plan's successful outcome lay in the construction of new communities
serviced by schools, open space, and commercial facilities at the center of each 2-by-2
kilometer super block. All hoped this would attain the production of coherent communities
marked by single-family housing units served by wide boulevards, in contrast to the tiny
homes of the compact mud communities, an embarrassing, anachronistic reminder of
poverty and backwardness. The resulting landscape was miles upon miles of semideveloped
grid blocks extending the city's area inefficiently over the desert plateau, a form
which was neither governed by competitive market processes nor conformance to

218
traditional values.
The "doxiadization" of Riyadh amounted to the superimposition of Westernrationalism
on a traditionally based society. The problematic practice of zoning, that was
conceived in the West as a tool of exclusion, was generalized to the Saudi city, a place were
separating of people by class was previously unknown. Under the pressure of
urbanization and economic growth, any plan was better than no plan; waiting meant
anarchy. However, to some Saudi planners and government officials, the "Westernization"
of the Saudi traditional built environment was deemed as synonymous with modernization
and prosperity. In 1978, the Municipality contracted a new international consultant firm
to help furnish a new plan for Riyadh.
2. Riyadh's Second Master Plan by SECT International
The economic boom of the 1970s rendered the Doxiadis Plan, originally targeted for
the year 2,000, obsolete. By the mid 1390s/1970s, land subdivisions crossed the Plan's
300 square kilometer area, many objectives in the Doxiadis Plan did not materialize as
projected and the city's population quadrupled from 1968 to 1977. For example, neither
the planned community hierarchy, the neighborhood centers, nor the diffusion of the
congested center by the linear CBD concept has realized (e.g. the number of shops
increased from 400 units to 5,400 during the same period). 46 SECT studies found that the
"main problems all stem from the difficulties inherent in coordinating the initiative of the
private development sector with policies directing public projects." In 1369H (1976), the
Deputy Ministry for Physical Planning contracted SECT International/ SEDES (SECT), a
French firm to devise a new plan for Riyadh. SECT agreed to retain the Doxiadis Master
Plan "as a basis for reference and to provide an overall planning background but it will no
longer be regarded as a rigid and detailed proposal" (Figure 6.14). 47
The SECT firm summarized the major problems as those resulting from a lack of
implementation, insufficient information and the virtual lack of coordination between the
various government departments executing large-scale projects. Many government projects
were undertaken without sufficient consideration for the larger environmental ramifications
such projects would require and generate, infrastructure, and community facilities such as
schools, commercial centers, etc.
SECT introduced a series of documents based on new data and local, growing

219
zr/M
Khjzian
J
T.\. Street
Figure 6.14
In 1977, SECT/Sedes planners essentially maintained the 1971 Doxiadis Master Plan
circulation network and expanded it to meet Riyadh's future growth. SECT's planners
experimented with visionary concepts for Riyadh that was far from reality. Source:
Daghistani (1985).

220
expertise from the Deputy Ministry's planning staff. The new proposals, including the
Execution and Actions Master Plan and development studies, known as Riyadh Action
Master Plan (RAMP). These documents were made to meet the following grandiose
objectives "(1) guiding future development, (2) redeveloping old neighborhoods, (3)
creating serviceable new communities, (3) reorganizing the Central Area of the City and,
(5) defining an urban policy." 48 On the micro level, however, the RAMP included a
document on Planning Regulations which dealt with zoning regulations and building
standards. For example, the RAMP offered flexibility in the area of setbacks, for example,
the new regulations abolished side and rear setbacks in some districts. In neighborhoods
where owners chose to have setbacks, new guidelines were introduced to minimize the
encroachment on residents' privacy. RAMP also allowed for new accommodations for
square lots, a configuration the Doxiadis Plan did not consider. Finally, the SECT Plan
pushed for respect for preservation of traditional architecture and design values.
But the SECT Plan, like that of the Doxiadis one, lacked sufficient powers to bring
about change. Several major reasons which stood against implementation, most paramount
was that of the established land tenure in the city and lack of a central planning agency with
sufficient powers to put RAMP proposals into effect. The adoption of RAMP was largely
preempted by sporadic ribbon development and the distribution of massive urban and
periphery land to public entities and private landlords. For example, by the time RAMP
was completed in 1977, the actual built area of Riyadh approximated 100 square kilometer
or one-third the 300 square kilometer area of Doxiadis Master Plan. Yet, the land
subdivision process covered the entire area of the Master Plan and 200 square kilometer
more (Figure 6). At that stage, the prospect for implementation of SECT'S proposals
seemed dim, given the distribution of public land to numerous holders and the increasing
pressure for housing resulting from population growth and improved living standards,
generous housing subsidies, and other pro-growth urban policies.
Second, the generally technical proposals comprising RAMP lacked the presence of
an able central planning agency with sufficient powers to assure coordination and
implementation. Inadequate local expertise, conflict of authority and overlapping
responsibilities have been some of the major impediments to successful implementation. 49
Finally, under conditions of rapid economic development and pressures of population
increase, less attention was given to the future; a preoccupation with immediate problems of

221
urban growth consumed most of the available energies. Nevertheless, despite these
difficulties, the RAMP project must be credited for being more realistic and more attentive
to local cultural aspects of the city. Meanwhile, subsequent urban growth of Riyadh took
the form of the exploitable grid subdivisions within the original Doxiadis circulation
framework and the extended one by SECT.
C. Housing in the 1970s and 1980s
A study in 1978 was concluded with alarming results on the housing situation in
Riyadh. It contended that
only 2 per cent of all income earners in Riyadh's area are able to buy a new
detached house....This is not merely a problem of an inequitable income
distribution; the average person in Riyadh has become impoverished with
respect to his ability to buy a house, even though his income in Riyal terms,
or his ability to acquire other consumer goods, including apartment has
grown. 50
Due to the sudden influx of expatriates and rural migration, inflation soared and with
it house prices. The construction boom of the 1970s was made possible by the swelling
government treasury, thanks to increased world demand for oil output. During this decade,
the massive allocation in the built environment encouraged local citizens and foreign firms
alike to participate in the booming construction industry. This resulted in an increase in
citizens earnings, accelerating migration, hence exacerbating the demand for more and
better housing. Recall that between 1968 and 1974, the population of Riyadh grew from
300,000 to 667,000. The 1978's study attributed the 122 per cent increase in population to
the rapid increase of household formation, set-up by young people leaving their parents'
home at an earlier age, improved hygienic standards resulting in reduced mortality rates,
and the influx of rural migrants, as well as foreign immigrants.
The private housing market fell short of meeting this sharp increase in demand.
Several factors can be identified with the sluggish functioning of the housing sector.
Firstly, Islamic teachings, observed by the conservative Saudi nationals, prohibit the use of
financing methods based on interest-bearing loans. These are looked upon by the
conservative population as socially gauche. Secondly, artificial restrictions, such as
skyrocketing land prices due to the frenzied speculative real estate market, thwarted the
production of new housing. The cost of land accounted for half the price tag of the total

222
cost of a new dwelling. Consequently, buyers sought cheap land at the expanding fringe,
hence contributing to the leap-frog pattern of urban development characterizing Riyadh as
well as many other Saudi cities' urban forms. 51
Thirdly, the development programs of the mid 1970's resulted in an influx of foreign
firms and laborers to help build the new government projects causing an acute housing
shortage. The cost of housing multiplied five fold between 1970 and 1979. Finally, the
spurt of construction triggered by the government's first and second national development
plans called for massive imports of construction materials. Saudi ports and land transport
systems, geared toward the relatively slow development of the 1960s, were flooded with
tremendous imported construction materials stockpiled at ports for months awaiting
processing.
By the middle of the 1970s, it was clear that Riyadh was approaching a housing
crisis. Faced with such glaring prospects of the chaotic housing market, and marked by
rackrents and inflated housing prices, the government took the onus of increasing the
housing stock. The government established the Real Estate Development Fund (REDF) in
1974, a totally government-financed agency to enable Saudi citizens and corporations the
opportunity of participating in the production of new housing units, both for private and
commercial uses. The REDF provides zero-interest loans up to $100,000 to individual
Saudi households, due within 25 years. Loans are available to any citizen who is married
and who is 18 years or older, or to single citizens who are 21 years old and above.
Applicants have to provide legal title to the land in a subdivided residential zone.
Recipients are completely responsible for designing and supervising the construction of
their homes. To encourage amortization loans, 20% of the annual payment is forgiven if
paid within sixty days of its due time and if the entire loan is redeemed in one payment,
30% of the loan value is forgiven. The REDF also provides zero-interest investment loans
designed to help provide residential, office and commercial space by Saudi private
developers. Loans can go up as high as $3 million to such investors.
Thanks to the 1973 increases in oil prices, government's oil revenues highly
increased, causing the state to shift gears to expedite its modernization program. Then,
better than ever, improving the living standards of the population was both economically
feasible and politically viable. Government projects and policies created a vacuum for
adept and skilled workers only to be imported from foreign nations. The increase in

223
government spending fueled city-ward migration, improved living standards, and enticed
expatriates, all of which fell heavily on the stagnated housing market. Housing was one of
the primary items of the ambitious national five-year plans of the 1970s. The REDF,
which was launched to increase the production of houses by individuals and private firms,
was earmarked with hefty sums in the second plan (1975-1980). The second Five-Year
Plan (1975-80) allotted $142 billion (compared to the first Five-Year Plan of $9.2) for
building the country's physical infrastructure (e.g., the construction sector to build housing
units and provide industrial buildings, schools, and hospitals, among others). The Plan
envisaged the funding of 329,000 housing units nationwide at the cost of $24.5 billion.
Although the Second Plan (1975-80) was earmarked with a total of 92,000 dwelling units
for Riyadh, it was not until 1991 that the number of REDF-financed housing loans reached
85,878, at the cost of $6.67 billion. Moreover, more than 13,097 housing units were
constructed by the various government agencies in the city.
This contributed to the flight from the congested older, mostly mud, residential
neighborhoods and to the centrifugal waves of building activity toward the periphery (72%
of Saudi households moved to their present residents in the period 1982-87). By 1988, the
REDF contributed to the construction of 413,958 private housing units in 2,531 Saudi
settlements. 52 The REDF has also dispensed 2,358 investment loans at a cost of $1.3
billion to finance the production of another 26,488 housing units, 1,612 office buildings,
and 3,703 shops nationwide. By 1988, the REDF-subsidized loans reached a sum of
$27.2 billion, nationwide. 53 In addition, to enable the low-income population to obtain a
REDF loan, which stipulated land ownership, Riyadh's Municipality has distributed more
than 100,000 lots amounting to an area of more than 45 square kilometers (out of a total
city residential area of 92 km 2 ) free of charge. 54 The combined efforts of these housing
subsidies and programs have contributed to a housing stock of 349,605 units in Riyadh
alone (Table 5.4). A 1987 survey by the High Authority For Riyadh Development
(HARD), which covered 297,860 units of Riyadh's 349,605 housing stock, concluded that
"due largely to assistance from the REDF, the majority of Saudis (86 % of the heads of
households) own their own home. Of those who own, 65 per cent received a loan from
this fund." 55
The generous REDF loans enabled many Saudis to attain a high level of construction
and finishing standards, a luxury which matched that of the aristocracy. These luxurious
accommodations were to reward the rising ranks of the middle class and tacitly symbolized

224
the adherence of the population to the established rules of the distribution of a national
resource, that is oil, under the monarchy. The wide, elegant, landscaped, paved
boulevards lined with high-rise apartment and office buildings, modern villas and mansions
expressed the union of the nascent middle class values with authoritarian planning. The
suburbanization of the Saudi city owes its impetus and character to the government's
generous programs of modernization, especially the historic REDF. In light of the housing
crisis of the 1970s (and given the Saudi political and economic exigencies) the emergence
of the Saudi residential suburb can be perceived more as a solution to the substandard,
ramshackle mud communities, a government-led effort rather than solely a middle class
driven process.
Table 6.4
Increase in population, area and number of housing units, Riyadh city,
1935-1986
YEAR 1919 1935 1950 1960 1968 1986
Population 19,000 36,000 84,000 181,000 300,000 1.5 mill
Area (km 2 ) 0.5* 0.5* 4.3 16 40 495
No. of
Houses
- 4,836 12,297 29,143 51,160 349,605
Sources: Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia, High Commission for the Development of Arriyadh. 1987. Land Use
Survey: Summary Report, p. 23; Faris, Adeeb. 1982. Ar Riyadh: Wathbat Izdihar fee Assahra'a alArabiyh.
(Arabic). * Area of walled town, Report on The Urban Domain For Madinat Arriyadh, (1989) 24.
D. Urban Renewal in the Historical Core
Due to rapid urbanization and development, the traditional core's structure and
circulation network was gradually replaced with a modern urban form suited for the car,
increasing business activity and ever expanding administrative structures. As previously
mentioned, the dramatic growth in the administration under King Abdul-Aziz and his heir,
King Saud, led to the first attempt to modernize the center during King Saud's reign in the
late 1950s. By the late 1970s, Saudi planners began to think of the historical area as an a
core of cultural value, as a "collective memory" of the political developments which led to
the rise of King Abdul-Aziz. An urban redevelopment program to restore the ailing
historical core and to boost its cultural and commercial vigor was looked upon by
government officials and planners as a long a waited step to bring the deteriorating center
into sync with the essentially modernized outer areas of the city one more time. The goal
now is to revamp the historical tissue with emphasis on local architectural heritage while

225
paying consideration to the center as a "Central Business District" (Figure 15).
The historical core, on which stood the walled town of 1909 housing a population of
17,000 on an area of 273,400 square meters, has been undergoing massive urban
redevelopment to rebuild the traditional center since 1979 (Figure 16). The administrative,
cultural and commercial project (The Governance Palace Area) is a three-phase construction
program of which the second phase is estimated to cost $119.4 million, and is government
funded. 56 A special task committee, the Office for the Development of the Governance
Palace (ODGP) was inaugurated in 1979 to oversee the urban redevelopment project.
Council of Ministers' Order number 221 in 2/9/1403 (1983) authorized the creation of a
new planning authority, the High Authority For Riyadh Development (HARD) whose one
of its tasks the ODGP project. Originally, HARD was inaugurated in 1975 with
exceptional powers and financial backing on behalf of the state to supervise the
construction of a housing development for the Ministry of Interior and the Diplomatic
Quarter. It was agreed that a higher government body must be established to focus on
long-term urban planning, research and coordination between the various building
programs by the government and private sector. HARD was created independently from
the Municipality (the Amanah), which was already inundated by the everyday details of
growth control and building documentation. Following its creation in 1975, HARD
presided over the design and construction of the new, lavish Diplomatic Quarter (DQ) built
to house foreign embassies. As the DQ experiment was deemed successful by state
officials, HARD was given power and cash to handle large-scale public projects and to act
as a state arm in striking private-public partnerships and promoting private investment, one
of which is the Governance Palace Project (GPP).
By the late 1970s, the center was so crowded with structures that modernization
could only be achieved by the enormously cumbersome, disruptive and expensive method
of urban renewal. HARD embarked upon a program of physical design aimed at
rejuvenating the downtown, essentially the construction of new headquarters for the
Governor, the police department and the Municipality (Amanat Madinat Arriyadh), several
office and commercial buildings and shopping malls in various phases. It was given
exceptional powers to design and contract to cut wide, straight boulevards and create
squares and parks through the maze of narrow streets, buying up and demolishing any
building that stood in the way. All projects, in one way or another, were downtown
oriented; Less emphasis was paid to the other remaining parts of the city. The goal was to

226
Figure 6.15
Traditional pattern in the
historical core. Northern
growth followed conventional
urban processes. Source:
Daghistani (1985).
I:I(J0U0
Cb) Al-Dirah: Riyadh's Oldest Neighborhood
Figure 6.16
Urban renewal in the historical core. The governance Palace Project (GPP) represents
state's role in shaping the modern urban landscape. This large-scale development
represents an example of "clean-sweep planning" at the traditional center. Source: High
commission for the Development of Riyadh (1401H/1990).

227
bring more customers to the downtown, to beautify it, and to raise or maintain downtown
business property values and commercial vigor. In addition to the historical meaning, this
program is best characterized as modernizing the inner city, an effort to counter its
increasingly deteriorating physical appeal.
The GPP project was sought to enhance the "cultural and historical" meaning of the
nation. It was hoped that such a development would become a sacrosanct expression of the
nation's past, for it was from this precise location, that the campaign to consolidate the
nation took place. However, from a planning stand point, the project is based on a new
philosophy, that is the conception which sees the core as the center of a prosperous city and
vital to it's economic potential.
The upgrading of the deteriorating core resulted in an oasis of large-scale, modem
development in contrast to the surrounding tier, formed by ramshackle, low-rise apartment
buildings and stores, encircling scores of one or two-story mud houses, laying halfoccupied.
Unless an effective road network and other creative marketing concepts were
attempted to attract affluent shoppers at the periphery, the commercial activities of the core
were vulnerable to tough competition by the modern shopping centers, endowed with
ample parking areas and road systems, and, more importantly, closer to affluent
inhabitants. The success of the CBD program depends on active participation by
businesses, a role whose realization may necessarily result in the crossing of the political
threshold, hitherto severed from the economic sphere. The CBD's economic vitality hinges
on political progressivness and structural changes in the City's urban economy. Currently,
the City's economic growth owes its vigor to government spending which is strongly
related to a national resource, oil, a resource whose income fluctuates with world demand
for oil. Finally, the GPP's urban renewal lacks cultural diversity, viz museums,
restaurants, open and green space large enough to allow for cultural and entertainment
activities and ceremonial parades, all conducive to the 'pep' associated with historical cities
of the Middle East and Europe.
IV. THE CONTEMPORARY URBAN FORM
The confluence of political and economic developments since the inception of the
Saudi government has forged a new city form, the metropolis, in sharp contrast to the
traditional, 'medina'. Due to the rapid pace of development, urban forms have mutated

228
exhibiting decentralized sprawl, owing largely to the nation's political and economic
imperatives, modern technology, and adoption of Western programs. The contemporary
urban form is characterized by: i) Architectural hybridism; ii) 'no man land'; iii) dispersed,
low-density, leap-frog pattern of growth; iv) high proportion of government land use; and
v) large-scale, government development.
A. Architectural Hybridism
As noted earlier, the introverted courtyard, mud house design has been supplanted
with the 'International Mediterranean' villa and apartment buildings. They were built of
concrete and were introduced to help ease the surmounting demand for housing. The eight
kilometer diameter core is a mixture of rundown mud houses and old, smaller maisonettes
currently occupied by predominantly male foreign laborers, multi-story, multi-unit
residential, office and commercial uses interspersed with second rate hotels. Currently, the
center is undergoing a massive 'clean-sweep planning' development, a public-private urban
renewal program to rejuvenate its cultural, administrative and commercial vitality. The
advent of and excessive reliance on the automobile emancipated residents from clustering in
the small core. The increasing use of the automobile has led to the development of
commercial strip and other related paraphernalia of the highway, that is the and the low
density in the new periphery. 57 The density of modern urban forms is one fifth that of the
traditional ones; technological means, such as the automobile helped save time, though at
the expense of devouring space.
The resulting landscape is a hodgepodge of architectural styles built with myriad
building materials. On the old labyrinthine, narrow road system, an orthogonal road
network was superimposed to alleviate the center's chronic vehicular congestion. The
familiar Western urban ecology, has materialized in the Saudi city with the migrants
occupying the center of the main city and the affluent living in the suburbs. Three major
rings comprising Riyadh's urban form can be discerned.
First, the teeming, compact core contains most of the city's ramshackle buildings and
housing stock within an eight kilometer diameter of the center. On this area of 50.2 square
kilometer (or 10% of the city's 495 square kilometer developed area) lives an approximate
40 per cent of the city's population. 58 The core also houses many married expatriates,
teachers, skilled laborers, and professionals mainly in the low-rise apartment buildings.

229
While the foci of capitalist world cities exhibit a preponderance of business-dominated,
skyscrapers-dotting the bustling hub, the Riyadh skyline reflects a core with a torn identity:
on the one hand, struggling, sluggish commerce juxtaposed with ramshackle residential
quarters; on the other, strong government manifest in high-standard, new urban
development.
The second major ring comprises a limitless expanse of two-story residential units
constituting vanishing blocks of low density residential areas (34 units per hectare)
suffused with rows of apartment buildings lining the arterial roads. This ring was formed
during the decades of the 1950s and the 1960s. Its street network was rectilinear with no
conception of a city master plan. Street plating proceeded in the interstices formed by the
tarmac roads radiating from the center to the government-built suburbs of Nasiriyah, al
Murabaa, and al-Malaz. This section was to house the new mushrooming land uses
hitherto unbeknown to the traditional built environment such as governmental, suburban
commercial, office space, and green spaces. The negatively perceived traditional
architecture of the mud-core was replaced with the modern symbol of progress. This
ring's growth was more of a response to continued migration than that of the 1970s which
owes the majority of its growth to the improved life-styles of residents and to the
proliferation of government projects. It embodies the dramatic changes that necessitated the
use of alien (modem) architecture, government expansion and the institutionalization of
planning.
The third ring, the "outer city," encompasses the area built during the 1970s and
1980s within the framework of Doxiadis Master Plan of 1971. Though its projections were
deemed obsolete due to rapid growth, the Plan's broad guidelines and flexible system of
land subdivision has abided in directing new development by simply repeating the module.
This ring is a testimony of affluence, of broad avenues, parks, extensive open space,
barren parking lots, glass, and marble buildings, diversified and personalized boxes of
marble villas interspersed by opulent and colossal mansions, and the proliferation of largescale
development. Most prominent are the government buildings, conspicuous,
pretentious and futuristic mega-structures, asserting the preponderance of government input
in the city's economy. With fast-food restaurants and gas-stations at the major road
intersections and freeway exits, the resulting urban form is evocative of North American
decentralized, low-density sprawl with no relevance to the core, now senescent,
disemboweled, and haphazard. The new urban landscape epitomizes what Kenneth Brown

230
terms "The Contemporary city of Incoherence." 59
B. 'No Man's Land
The wholesale adoption of the gridiron network based on rectangular lots was a
practical approach to adopt to the new technologies and exigencies of rapid growth.
Several negative outcomes have resulted from the unchecked application of the grid iron
and its corollary the setbacked villa: (1) the encroachment on residents' privacy by
neighbors and other public and private buildings' users, (2) the creation of large,
uncovered areas as part of the developed land, e.g. yards, wide boulevards, streets and
ample parking space, all have diluted the urban mass, and (3) the production of "walled
corridors", that is wide and extensive urban space dedicated to circulation, streets and
sidewalks separated from adjacent properties by high walls. These negative outcomes will
be discussed in the following paragraphs.
First, the superimposition of the villa, situated in rectangular lots and surrounded by
an outer yard, has occurred at the cost of abandoning the traditional mud house built around
the courtyard, historically suited for environmental conditions and social norms. The
majority of modern buildings, including villas and other non-residential uses are setback
from property lines according to municipal formulas (e.g. structures must be built at a
distance no less than that of one-fifth the street width from the property line). Moreover,
the majority of these buildings are two-story structures or more and built with
unconventional fenestrations: large windows and balconies overlooking neighbors' yards.
This has caused considerable infringement on many of the overwhelmingly conservative
households, which view privacy as a necessity.
To counteract the lost privacy and to maximize utilization of yards by household
members, residents have resorted to antidotal measures such as the construction of high
walls, as high as two stories, rimming their outer yards and the erection of high screens
between neighbors and the blinding of windows (e, g, with screens), all to shield their
homes and yards from obtrusive looks. The ubiquitous wall has become a physical
manifestation of cultural emphasis on privacy. These walls and screens have become an
indispensable element of, not only residential units, but also commercial complexes,
governmental buildings, public parks, and the like. In the West and other urban systems
with moderate climates, setbacks have been utilized as landscaped areas and yards therefore

231
mollifying and complementing the rather rigid street scapes and contributing to a scenery of
ambience . In the dry desert climate of Riyadh, coupled with emphatic concern for privacy,
the insipid application of the grid and its walled villa has resulted in desolate, anti-social
street scapes contributing to the sterile sense of place. Consequently, the wall has resulted
in an abysmal impact on the modern city's landscape: blocks upon blocks of residential
units and commercial uses wrapped with walls up to nine feet high contributing to the
overriding lack of a sense of place.
Second, the setback requirements together with the wide streets resulted in
underutilized areas within the developed urban land. In a typical land subdivision, the area
assigned for streets varies between 25.5% to 38% of the total area, while setback
regulations have resulted in immense unbuilt areas, within developed properties. In
addition, the modernization of the Saudi built environment has ushered in an expansion of
traditional functions such as governmental, educational and circulation spaces.
Modernization has also resulted in an outcropping of new land uses: military, health,
recreational, and transportation. The contemporary (industrialized) functions require large
uncovered urban land such as parking, and storage.
Third, the relatively walls (six to nine feet high) surrounding the yards of the villas
have become a de rigueur. The ubiquitous wall is built at the property line to shield users
from obtrusive looks by outsiders as well as for security reasons. The outcome of
wrapping properties (private and public) from the modern network of wide streets (25 to
100 feet wide) is a dust-swept, barren space prone to direct sun heat, that creates "walled
corridors" constituting the contemporary circulation space. In contrast to the modern built
environment, the compact, traditional built environment's buildings were built abreast,
starting at the sidewalk. They were built relatively high (two to three stories) and were
served by an exceptionally narrow street network (7 to 25 feet wide). This configuration
between built forms and circulation space offered considerable shaded areas for movement,
play and social gatherings. The meandering, semi-covered passageways were carefully
laid down to provide for privacy, functionality and allowed for the flow of cool breezes.
The resulting modern landscape is repulsive, rigid and a repetitive environment of
asphalted streets systematically ending at ever vanishing, straight, oven-hot walls,
especially during the hot summer, which alienates streets' social activities. Riyadh
possesses 400 square kilometer of paved roads, feeding an urban expanse of 1,012 square

232
kilometer. These "no-man" territories are hospitable only to the automobile, which in their
own are threatening elements to street users, including pedestrians and children eager to
play outside as soon as the temperature descends to comfortable levels.
The widespread adoption of the grid system in Riyadh resulted in reducing the area
assigned for private land use from 75 percent in the traditional area to 50 percent (given that
existing planned areas are fully built). The new municipal codes provide minimal solutions
to the emerging problems its own building codes have created, leaving residents to devise
"band-aid" solutions to the privacy issue. Municipal building codes (e.g. setbacks,
building height and building types allow only for "passive" forms, that is protective
measures by residents (screens and high walls) are allowed. "Active" or "positive"
approaches such as creative architectural and culturally oriented urban design solutions (lot
configurations that maximize privacy) have not yet been widely explored by private land
developers or incorporated into municipal codes. Nor have existing urban design and
planning processes allowed for systematic and effective input on the residents' part. In the
traditional Arab-Muslim built environments, shariy'ah upheld privacy and permeated
customary building practices, while residents maintained greater say in their
neighborhoods. For example, nowadays, residents cannot sue their neighbors for
infringements of privacy. Instead, a duality of legislation ensues with the consensus
leaning more toward the secular, technical codes of the municipal system. 60
C. Dispersed Growth
The absence of property tax constitutes a major factor behind the slow development
of urban land currently hoarded by land speculators. The absence of taxes and other prodevelopment
incentives, have contributed to an urban form characterized by scattered
development, bound only by the major highway network. The fact that land prices tend to
decrease as one travels from the town center helps lower-income groups to seek cheaper
land at the periphery in order to obtain an REDF loan. Consequendy, 51 per cent of
Riyadh's metropolitan 1,000 square kilometer area is unbuilt, though platted and serviced:
(eighty five per cent of the undeveloped land has already been serviced with one or more
types of public utility). The projected capacity of Riyadh's Urban Domain at its First
Phase, which ends in 1995, is 3.4 million inhabitants at its full utilization (Figure 6.17).
The dispersion of residents over large, half-built tracts of land negates any possibility of
effective small-community life for Saudi city dwellers.

233
The modern urban form possesses a circulation space three-times its traditional
predecessor. The modern street network devours 20 per cent of developed land, while
seventy-five per cent of the land is assigned to private land use in the traditional built
environment, the developed residential stock in the metropolis has diminished to 19 per
cent. Finally, the semi-private space (endorsed by Islamic shariy'ah ) of the old town has
been obliterated from the new urban form. 61 Together with these changes, a dramatic
outcropping of specialized land uses were introduced in the new modern urban form such
as office space, recreational uses and parks. Unlike the traditional city where the
commercial organ is located in the hub, the new commercial uses migrated from the core as
customers settled in the periphery. According to a 1989 report, only 495 square kilometers
of the City's area of 1,012 square kilometers was developed (including the road network).
So Riyadh was continually bulging but never able to expand efficiently.
The beginnings of this form of sporadic development followed the inception of the
Kingdom in the 1940s, and was exacerbated in the 1950s and 1960s, and took momentum
in the construction boom decade of the 1970s. This growth was put into check in 1986
when the Council of Ministers adopted the Urban Domain (No. 13, 9/1/1406 H./1986).
The U.D. was adopted in response to incessant building activity at the periphery, hitherto
guaranteed free state-paid public services and infrastructure by the government. With less
oil revenues available to the government (oil revenues dropped from $102 billion in 1981 to
$37.3 in 1985) more attention was given to the economic ramifications of uncontrolled
urban growth. In addition to Riyadh, the new UD was applied to 198 major Saudi cities
and towns (Figure 6.17).
D. Government Land Uses
Most notable about the contemporary Saudi settlement, in general, is its large share of
directly built or indirectly subsidized land uses. By the mid-1980s, the government sector
employed 78 per cent of the city's Saudi labor force and 13 per cent of the foreign labor
force. These figures indicate the city's heavy reliance on the government sector for its
survival, a factor which has been translated into a preponderance of government-related
functions in space. The government-built land uses including the buildings and the street
network, are entirely built by the respective public agencies. Government-developed uses
account for 54 per cent of the city's developed area (including the road network). The
entirely government-built and maintained road system constitutes 20% of the city's

234
h|
HW
flSPil^il
B80&' i
Figure 6.17
The Urban Domain of Riyadh. Area in gray denotes city area in 1995 which is eligible
for free government housing loans, infrastructure and public services. Crossed area
denotes zone to be eligible between 1995 and 2005. Source: High Commission for the
Development of Riyadh, Report on Urban Domain For the City of Riyadh, Riyadh
Municipality (1989).

235
developed land use. Another 13 square kilometers (3 per cent) is devoted to space for
public utilities, a heavily subsidized sector. The 'government and other public uses'
consume 18 per cent of the land. 62 Riyadh's approximately 349,600 residential units
consume 19 per cent of the developed city land (including the developed street network) out
of which the REDF has contributed 85,878 housing loans 63 . In addition, the governmentbuilt
residential stock amounts to more than 8,882 residential units by the various
government agencies. Monthly rents are levied on much of the government housing stock
or are deducted from employees' stipends (Figure 6.18). 64
According to the U.D. projections (Table: 6.5), the phenomenon of preponderant
government land uses will persist in the coming two decades. The 1989 UD lists
government-related land uses consuming 55 percent of Riyadh's current area. The UD's
projections calculate an additional area of 13,710 to the existing Riyadh's area of 49,550.
The UD assigns 63 percent of this additional area for government-related land uses (by
1995) within the 1995 "Urban Domain," while 50 percent of additional land uses is
earmarked for government control within the guidelines of the city by 2005.
E. Large-scale Development
The fourth feature of contemporary urban forms is the phenomenon of large-scale
development, especially by the government. As noted earlier, the 1970s had their share of
large-scale projects attesting to the government's considerable impact in the making and
conditioning of the modern, post-traditional urban form. Royal Decree number 1650 of
1975, which authorized the transfer of the foreign diplomatic embassies from Jeddah to
Riyadh, also authorized the creation of the government-sponsored Diplomatic Quarter
Agency in 1974 to plan the entirely new Diplomatic Quarter (D.Q.) 65 With the
completion of all construction stages, the D.Q. is equipped to serve a population of 22,000
working in and serving 120 world embassies. The prize-winning design of D.Q. has been
lavishly endowed with amenities. For instance, the D.Q. encompasses half of the City's
total park land of one square kilometer. Becoming a sort of windowcase dressing, the
D.Q.'s high-quality construction standards, which until now have reached a price tag of
approximately SR 2,158 million ($575.5 million), corroborate the government's power,
pride and economic strength. 66 The D.Q. is also an attempt to break away from Riyadh's
historical isolationism. Following the construction of the railroad during King Abdul-Aziz

236
''gaCaflafla&n i'PPft
ip; fcSwff 1
K31® i m m> ^ey
ULAYA MASTER PLAN
IjjJ) t-Jjta . jl^Jl lalrtMl
Figure 6.18
During the booming decade of the 1970s, the government launched several programs to
lessen the housing shortage such as the multi-story housing development for military
personnel (2). The government also sponsored public-private development such as the one
in the suburb of Ulayya, north of the city center. The Ulayya development featured office
and residential uses and a shopping center (1). Source: Daghistani (1985).

237
in 1950, and the transfer of the government ministries during King Saud's reign, the D.Q.
represents one of the last measures to assure Riyadh as the unified Capital, the historical
house of Al-Saud, the founders of the nation-state (Figure 6.19-1).
Another major large-scale government project is the King Abdul-Aziz City for
Science and Technology (KACST). KACST was created in 1977 as a national research
center to "Conduct applied scientific research programs in the fields that serve the economic
and social development objectives of the Kingdom." 67 The KACST project was allotted
ninety nine hectares of government land. The large, fully-serviced project consists of three
major projects, comprising 374 residential units, a recreational center, schools,
kindergartens, mosques, and related facilities; primary infrastructure, utilities; as well as
laboratories and a research institute. The cost, estimated at the early time of construction,
was SR 400 million ($106.6 million). 68
Yet another example of large-scale government development was the transfer of the
employees of the Foreign Ministry to a new award-winning housing complex north of
Riyadh on 390,000 square meter of public land. It is a 612-housing unit project, equipped
with public utilities built at the cost of SR 679 million ($181 million). It includes a large
mosque, schools, and recreation clubs. The construction of a 612-unit housing project for
the recently transferred employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs constitutes another
example of government input into the modern built environment. The award-winning
housing complex north of Riyadh occupies an area of 390,000 square meters of public
land. It is equipped with public utilities and was built at the cost of SR 679 million ($181
million). It includes a large mosque, schools, and recreation clubs. The 35,000 student
King Saud University is another large scale development which covers an area of 9 square
kilometers of public land. The Ministry of Public Works and Housing's 7,755 housing
units contributed an area of more than 12 square kilometers to the city developed area. The
government subsidized industrial land use occupies 16.4 square kilometers.
Finally, in 1984, King Fahad A1 Saud dedicated the $3.5 billion King Khalid
International Airport, the largest in the Middle East and one of the world's largest airports,
35 kilometers north of the city, contributing an area of 225 square kilometers to the city's
total area of 928 square kilometers (including undeveloped land). It was built to replace
the in-town 'old' airport which was the second busiest airport in the Kingdom, serving 5.3
million passengers per annum. The new airport is equipped to serve 15 million passengers

238
(f/c- :V^!T ''
J '
m
V. 1
m Jvd
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
Figure 6.19
The Diplomatic Quarter
exemplifies state-sponsored,
large-scale planned ("model")
communities (1).
Government land uses (in
gray) dominate the
contemporary urban form
(2).Source: High Commission
for the Development of
Riyadh, Embassies' Quarter
(1989).
M*w*ffKn

239
Table 6.5
Riyadh's Land Uses and Area in Hectares
AREA AREA
FUNCTION CURRENT NEEDED BY NEEDED BY
1995 2005
Residential
Area ha
9,200
%
18.6 2,600 7,750
Commercial 3,600 7.26 1,400 1,750
Mixed (Res.& Commercial) 4,500 9.07 1,100 3,800
Industrial 1,900 3.83
-
11,500
Government 4,000 8.07 685 1,230
Government (Private)* 1,300 2.62 - -
Public Facilities 21,500 43.4 6,870 10,377
Agricultural 3,053 6.16 - -
Historical 37 0.07 - -
Open Area 460 0.92 980 840
Restricted Land - - - -
Land For Future Devlpt. - - 75 14,433
Total 49,550 100 13,710 51,680
Grand Total 63,260 114,940
* Government private uses denotes military and other strategic uses. Source: Ministry of Municipalities
and Rural Affairs (MOMRA), Atlas of Saudi Cities: The Urban Domain (Riyadh: MOMRA, 1989), 7.

240
per annum. If the airport, which lies within the City's land use, is to be added to the City's
developed area of 477 square kilometers, the government land use will increase to 68 per
cent of total area (Figure 6.19-1).
SUMMARY
Dramatic political developments since the turn of the century established Riyadh as
the political capital of the new nation-state. Under King Abdul-Aziz, the new nation-state
ushered in a new era of political stability and security which induced a modest urbanization
process to major urban centers. The discovery of oil in the late 1930s added strength to
King Abdul-Aziz's government, and the increasing world demand for oil following World
War II heralded prosperity. Riyadh, the seat of the nascent state, benefited substantially,
thanks to the increases in oil royalties which enabled King Abdul-Aziz to bring about
economic changes that attracted more residents to the city. With more oil income, King
Saud turned to the modernization of the city. During the 1950s, Riyadh' population
growth was unprecedented (from 39,000 in 1950 to 126,000 by 1960) when King Saud
decided to move the ministries to Riyadh. The construction of large-scale, physical
development of al-Al-Malaz ("New Riyadh") and the royal suburb, Annasiriyah, indicated
the departure from prevailing architecture and urban planning norms and heralded a new
period of direct role of the central state in urban development.
During the 1960s, King Faisal placed less emphasis on physical development,
especially in the capital, shifting focus to the modernization of the central bureaucracy,
improving national defense capabilities and other infrastructural reforms (e.g.
transportation) which aimed at boosting the country's economic development. The
improvements in national road system, which also benefited villages, towns and cities'
populations, placed Riyadh at the hub of the new road transportation network. In the filed
of physical planning, Faisal's reforms culminated in the shift from piecemeal land
subdivisions to comprehensive city master plans, starting with Riyadh. In order to harness
negative outcomes of rapid urban growth, the government relied on European planning
expertise to devise long-range plans to guide city's growth. The economic boom of the
1970s resulted in an unprecedented government urban development programs, coupled
with population growth, hindered the Doxiadis' projections obsolete. The distribution of
land to numerous owners and lack of a central planning agency with sufficient powers and

241
expertise impeded the implementation of most of SECT'S proposals. Ostensibly,
subsequent growth followed individual land subdivisions by land owners and construction
of mega-projects by the government.
The resulting urban form is a Westernized, modernized and sanitized metropolis
marked with half-built sprawl. The modern urban form is also characterized with rigidness
that is blind to local cultural needs and environmental realities. Economically, the new
urban form is inefficient for allocation of enormous oil funds predicated more on
sociopolitical criteria than economic efficiency. Two overriding characteristics marked the
central government's interest in urban planning: paternalism and quest for order in the built
environment.

242
Notes to Chapter VI
1 Riyadh's history goes back to the pre-Islamic period. Today's Riyadh occupies what archaeologists
believe was the site of scattered settlements, Mi'kal, A1 Owed, and the surrounding farmland
comprising Hijr. Hijr's historical survival was owed to the presence of water made possible by the
confluence of several major wadis and the fact the Hijr lay at the locus of several major trade routes.
^
The emphasis on Wahhabism conjures a wrong understanding that is Wahhabism is a new sect of
Islam. The early movement materialized on the pure religious aims of Ibn Abdul-Wahhab and, as
Safran (1988) claims, the material interests of Ibn Saud, who added to his religious intentions the
benefits derived from expanding his tax base (Safran, 1986). Both acknowledged the fact that there were
many wrong practices, such as seeking worldly benefits by slaughtering livestock at old trees and
seeking the dead for help. Such practices were considered antithetical to Islamic teachings as ordained by
the Prophet in the seventh century A.D.
3 There were estimated to have been between 50-73 thousand fighting men. See for example, Captain C.
C. Lewis, "Ibn Saud & the Future of Arabia," International Affairs (July, 1933): 518-534.
4
Geralding Rendel, "Across Saudi Arabia," The Geographic Magazine (January 1938), 170.
5 See for example, K. Brown, ed. Middle Eastern Cities in Comparative Perspective (London: Ithaca
Press, 1986).
6 The number of mosques multiplied to 445 in 1976. By 1984 the number was 1,285 mosques.
7 Ahmed M. Alwashmi, Ar Riyadh: City and Residents, How it was and How they Lived (Riyadh:
National Guard Printing Press, no date).
8 For a discussion on upper and ruling classes in Saudi society see Mordechai Abir, "The Consolidation
of the Ruling Class and the New Elites in Saudi Arabia" Middle Eastern Studies 2 (April, 1987).
9 The Higher Commission for the Development of Arriyadh, Demographic, Transportation, Land Use,
and Economic Studies for the city of Arriyadh (Riyadh: National Offset Printing Press, October,
1987),11.
10 H. St. J. B. Philby, A Pilgrim In Arabia (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1946), 120.
D. van der Meulen, quoted in A. I. Daghistani. Ar-Riyadh: Urban Development and Planning
(Riyadh: Saudi Arabian Printing Company, 1985), 74.
Peter Mansfield. The New Arabians. (Chicago: J. G. Ferguson Publishing Company, 1981), 75.
13 Until 1934, the ownership of cars was limited to the royal family. Elizabeth Monroe. Philby of
Arabia (London: Quart Books, 1980), 157.
14 Monroe, 134.
15
Doxiadis Associates, Riyadh, Existing Conditions (Athens: 1968).

243
16 Adeeb Faris. Ar Riyadh: Wathbat Izdiharfi Assahra 'a al Arabiyh. (Arabic). Published Dissertation.
(Beirut: Nimnim, 1982). Subhi A. Assaied, "Coin Telephone Booths in die City of Riyadh: A
Geographical Study of Characteristics and Spatial Distribution", Occasional Papers (Riyadh: King Saud
University Press, 1990).
17
Compare this form of city-state relationship to the United States' urban experience. During the US'
early urbanization, cities gradually assumed self-rule over their local affairs. They acquired power either
by piecemeal grant or by charter update. For example, New York before 1731, was incorporated as a
municipal borough under royal charter and governed by a mayor. In 1731, a new charter was composed
which gave New Yorkers voting rights to choose councilmen to make the laws. This progressive step
forced city government to be more responsive to its expanded constituency and politicians promised
better administration and services. Moreover, New York's growth proceeded without any provision of
major public open space until 1851 when the issue of a public park was taken up by newly elected
Mayor Kingsland. Source: A. E. J. Morris, History of Urban Form: Before the Industrial Revolutions
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1986).
During the early decades, government agencies that provided direct services to the public collected fees
and rents for its functions and property. With the improving government oil revenues, such fees were
either obliterated or maintained at their pre-1970s nominal values. See A. S. Al Sabban, "Saudi Arabia
Municipalities: History, Organization and Structure," In Politics, Administration, and Development in
Saudi Arabia, edited by A. Dahlan, 97-127 (Brentwood, MD.: Amana, 1990).
19 Walead Abdulaal, "Implications of Subdivision Activity for the Urban Growth of Madina," Urban
Studies, 27 (May, 1990), 725. Though commenting on Madina, Riyadh acutely resembles such a
situation.
20 The first three five-year development plans, 1970-75,1975-80, and 1980-85 involved $9.2, $182 and
$237 billion respectively. Consequently, imports soared from SR 14.8 billion in 1975 to SR 135.3
billion in 1985. The second plan emphasized the allocation of enormous resources in the construction
sector, to build the nation's infrastructure needs for future economic growth based on the diversification
of the economy. The construction sector accounted for 50 percent of budgeted outlays during the five
year period (Safran, 1986:220).
21 See for example, Delwin A. Roy, "Islamic Banking" Middle Eastern Studies, 3 (July, 1991): 427-456;
Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "Islamic Economics: Novel Perspectives" Middle Eastern Studies 4 (October,
1989): 516-530.
22 it should be noted here that in addition to the authorities' requirement for setbacks in modern, grid
development, citizens' preference for the new concept of the villa, i.e. acculturation, must not be
underestimated. The villa was looked upon as the modern residence, wealthy Saudis saw in foreign
Arab countries and copied.
23 The improvements in the Saudi economy first hit cities enticing ruralites and expatriates seeking better
jobs. Tlie poor migrants were forced to reside in huts which they constructed on their own using scrap
materials such as tin sheets, wood, cement blocks and other temporary materials. Despite the high
growth rates of Riyadh's population, it was notable that it did not experience the substantial presence of
shantytowns, characteristic of rapid urbanization. A 1968 Doxiadis study reported that huts consumed
only six blocks of the city's total number of 4,433 blocks. The absence of serious problems of
shantytown could be attributed to several major factors such as, the prevailing easy and cheap building
method using locally produced mud bricks; and also the social cohesiveness of the society. Upon their

244
arrival, migrants sought relatives who shared their homes, enlarged them to accommodate new arrivals,
or offered financial help for new comers to build or rent homes. Third, it was also due to economic
factors: the rapid rates of urbanization was parallel with accelerated economic growth made possible by
rising oil exports. The following table shows a breakdown of city blocks by construction type in
1968.
Table 6.6: Construction Types in Riyadhs during the 1960s.
Construction Type Number of Blocks Percentage of Total Blocks
(in Blocks)
Mud block
Cement block
Reinforced block
Stone
Tin sheets (temporary huts)
Undefined
1,975
1,549
143
189
6
571
46
34
3
4
0
13
Source: Doxiadis, Existing Conditions, (1968), 171.
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
Faddan (1983), 182-186. See discussion in Chapter Seven of this study.
An exception was given to land at the southern part of the city, away from the oil company's area. In
addition, the Royal Decree stipulated that owners of units built of temporary materials should be
requested to use permanent materials as a condition for permit renewal. It was also mandated that units
adjacent to American Oil Company's compounds must be built with concrete and cement bricks. Al-
Subaie (1989), 146.
Amos Rapoport, "Learning About Settlements and Energy From Historical Precedents" Ekistics, 325
(July/August, 1987), 263.
Speerplan Regional-Und Stadtplaner. Riyadh Diplomatic Quarter: Master Plan Draft Report.
(Germany, 1978), 1-20.
Faddan (1983).
H. St. J. B. Philby, "Riyadh: Ancient and Modern," The Middle East Journal 2(Spring, 1959), 135.
Ibid., 133.
E. Monroe, 293.
High Commission for Riyadh Development. 1990. Economic Environment in Riyadh City (Jubail:
Support Industry Printing Center) p. 6.
In N. C. Grill, 50.
Doxiadis (1968).
Ibid, 210.

245
36 H. St J. B. Philby, "Riyadh: Ancient and Modern," The Middle East Journal 2 (1959): 131.
37
Mansfield, 76.
High Commission for the Development of Arriyadh. 1990. Economic Climate in Riyadh City
(Arabic) (Jubail: Support Industry Printing Center).
39 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Ministry of Planning. 1983. Achievements of the Development Plans:
1390-1403 (1970-1983). P. 2.
40 The government did not publish the Kingdom's total population, leaving the total number to
speculation. An average of national and international estimates suggests a national population of 7
million.
41
In 1987, Saudis accounted for only 13% (or 37,000) of the number of employees in the private sector.
Of the 37,000 Saudis working in the private sector, 21,000 were wage and salary earners. Most of the
rest were non-salaried managers of private establishments. Eighteen percent of non-Saudi workers in
the private sector were private household workers. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, High Commission for
the Development of Arriyadh. Demographic, Transportation, Land Use, and Economic Studies For the
City of Arriyadh, Executive Summary (Riyadh: National Offset Printing Press, October, 1987), 16.
42 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Central Department of
Statistics, Statistical Year Book: Twenty Fifth Issue, 1409/1989 Riyadh: CDS), 634.
43 In Riyadh the villa type comprises 37.9% of the residential stock. Source: High Commission for the
Development of Riyadh. Land Use Survey: Summary Report. (Riyadh: A1 Shathry Consulting
Engineering, 1987). However, the proportion of mud houses shrunk from 45% in 1968 to 7.5% by
1986. Apartment units comprise 39% of the housing stock.
44 SECT International/SEDES. Arriyadh: Hadirah Dawolliah (Riyadh: International Metropolis, c.
1977), 14.
45 Khalid M. Al-Ankary and El-Sayed El-Bushra, "Urban Growth and Urbanization in Saudi Arabia." In
Urban and Rural Profiles in Saudi Arabia (Berlin, Gebrudern Borntraeger, 1989), 12.
46
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Information, A. I. Daghistani. Ar-Riyadh, Urban Development
and Planning (Riaydh: Saudi Arabian Printing Co. Ltd., 1985), 110.
47 SECT, 19
48
Ibid, 37.
49
M. E. Bonine, "The Urbanization of the Persian Gulf Nations." In The Persian Gulf States: A General
Survey, edited by A.J. Cottrell, C. Bosworth, M. Burrell, K. McLachlan, and R. Savory, 225-278
(Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1980).
50 Speerplan Regional-Und Stadtplaner, 2-284.

246
5 1 This was countered in 1986 when the Council of Ministers adopted the Urban Domain (No. 13,
9/1/1406 H. (1986)) to put growth under check.
52 By 1985, in addition to the REDF-related units of 287,000,333,406 were produced by the various
government ministries. Ministry of Information, Domestic Information, Wathaiek littariekh,
Mukhtarat min Kalimat wa Liqaat Jalalat al Malik Fahad bin Abdul-Aziz (Documents for History:
Selective Quotes From King Fahad Speeches and Meetings), (Riyadh: Al-Malek Publishing House, no
date of publication), 257.
Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Real Estate Development
Fund: Annual Report. 1987/1988. In addition, by 1985, the total number of residential units reached
777,704 nationwide, 403,852 apartment units and 33,852 single houses by the Ministry of Public
Works and Housing, 287,000 by the REDF, 33,000 by the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu,
and 50,000 by other government agencies. King Fahad Al Saud, "Public Speech Addressing the Saudi
Students in the US", Washington D.C. , 11/23/1404H, In Documents For the History, Selective
Speeches by H.M. King Fahad Al Saud, Ministry of Public Information (Riyadh: Al Ibikan for
Publications, no date),.257.
54 For the 100,000 figure see A. A. Al Shalhoob 1991. "Riyadh Completes its Embellishment By Year
2000". An interview with Riyadh's Mayor Al Yamamah. January 2 1991. pp. 28-33. However, the
official magazine of the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs, Al Baladiyat. March 1986, reported
that 36,000 lots occupying an area of 45 square km (out of a total city residential area of 92 square km)
were given at no cost to Saudi citizens. "Governmental Services and International Cooperative Offices
in Riyadh," Al Baladiyat. No 5, 2nd year, March 1986, p. 61. By 1985, the government has
distributed more than 2.5 million lots (at varying area) to citizens nationwide (Ministry of Information,
op. cit, p. 260).
55 High Commission For the Development of Airiyadh. Taqreer Nitaq Annmou Al-Omrani Le Madinat
Arriyadh, Amanat Madinat Arriadh [Report on Urban Domain For the City of Riyadh, Riyadh
Municipality] 1989, p. 101. Currently vacancy rates stands at 30%. This is due to several factors
including first, the REDF hefty loans and their lax requirements, the departure of large numbers of
expatriates who helped build the country during the construction boom, and the availability of
substantial substandard housing units in the mud communities (11,448 out of 93,045 comprising the
city's residential stock).
56 High Commission For The Development of Arriyadh. Program for the Development of Governing
Palace Area: Third Stage ,(1989), 6.
57 In the period 1968-1970 there were 60,000 vehicles. In 1987, there were over 4.4 million registered
vehicles in the Kingdom. The number of vehicles registered increased by over 148,000 in 1987, alone.
For Riyadh, the number of vehicles increased from 67,607 in 1971 to 773,795 in 1981. Source: M.
Mohammadain, "Traffic Accidents in the City of Riyadh" in Saudi Cities: Distribution and
Morphology (Riyadh: King Saud University Press, 1983): 335-377.
58 High Commission For The Development of Arriyadh. 1989. Program for the Development of
Governing Palace Area: Third Stage, p. 3. Also, at the compact central ring lives 850 people per
hectare, while only 10 inhabitants per hectar live at the shapeless periphery. The overall City's
districts average 45 inhabitants per hectare. Source: Report on Urban Domain for the City of Riyadh
(1989), 3.

247
59
K. Brown. Middle Eastern Cities in Comparative Perspective (London: Ithaca Press, 1986), 74.
60
A1 Hathloul (1981).
61 Including the developed road network which occupies 42% of the metropolis developed area. Source: A1
Hathloul & Anis-ur-Rhaman, op. cited; and High Commission for the Development of Riyadh. Land
Use Survey: Summary Report. June, 21, 1987
62 If the area of the King Khalid airport is added, the proportion of government land uses will amount to
69 percent High Commission for the Development of Riyadh. Land Use Survey: Summary Report.
June, 21, 1987.
63 Some of these loans are for multi-unit buildings. In addition, the REDFs Corporate Investment
Program helped the production of 26,488 housing units, 1,612 offices, and 3,703 store spaces.
Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Real Estate Development
Fund: Annual Report. 1987/1988, (1988), 22.
64 The government has been distributing lots for residential uses to low income groups amounting to 45
square kilometers by 1986, which constitutes forty nine percent of Riyadh's total residential area of
ninety two sq. km. Moreover, the state provides hefty interest-free loans for industrial enterprises.
Source: "Governmental Services and International Cooperative Offices in Riyadh". Al Baladiyat. No. 5,
2nd year (March, 1986), 61. Also, it provides subsidized rents at nominal annual prices of SR 0.08
(less than two cents) per square meter) in the 21.4 square kilometers manufacturing zoned districts.
Source: High Commission for the Development of Arriyadh, Madinat Arriyadh, A Glimpse (Riyadh:
Al-Obican Press, c. 1990), 2 (in Arabic).
65 Currently carries the name The Higher Commission for the Development of Arriyadh as translated from
Arabic. It is also called the Arriyadh Development Authority.
66 Council of Ministers' resolution number 3/R/51 of 27/2/1399 H. (1978). The D.Q. has been hailed as
a model urban development. Its 8 sq. kilometers are divided as follows: 31% parks, 14% for missions'
buildings and staff residences, 22% residential wards, 50 kilometer road network comprising 17% of
land, 6% commercial uses, and 11% for public services (schools, fire station, religious, infrastructure,
recreational, cultural, administrative, etc.).
67 King Abdul-Aziz City for Science and Technology. 1981. Master Development Plan. p. 4.
68
Ibid.

CHAPTER VII
OIL INDUSTRIALIZATION CREATES MODERN-INDUSTRIAL URBAN
FORMS: THE CASE OF ARAR
In chapter six and seven I will investigate the effects brought about by the formation
of the new nation-state on the built forms of smaller Saudi settlements, Arar and Huraimla.
In this chapter, I will discuss the impact of oil industrialization on the emergence of the new
town of Arar, built in the late 1940s. The discovery of vast oil reserves in the Kingdom
has been the catalyst of an unprecedented urbanization process. New cities and towns were
born in response to the development of a complex network of oil drilling, processing,
refineries and loading facilities. The goal of this chapter is, first, to highlight the impact of
oil industrialization on the birth and growth of Arar, under the auspices of the modern
nation-state; and, second, to outline the relationship between state-led development and
planning, and the impact of such intervention on Arar's urban development and form.
Arar has a population of 65,000 inhabitants largely involved in state-created and
related employment, and the supporting commercial services. Arar was chosen as the
second unit of analysis in this study for its smaller population and the nature of its genesis:
unlike Riyadh and Huraimla, which both evolved from pre-industrial, agrarian forms, Arar
grew from a modern planned origin. It originated as an industrial compound and evolved
as an industrial camp to house the working force involved in the construction of the Trans
Arab Pipeline (Tapline) during the 1940s by the nascent oil industry. The decision by the
Tapline consortium to establish several pump stations along the 1069 miles pipe line
carrying oil from the Eastern Saudi Province to Sidon, Lebanon, on the Mediterranean Sea,
resulted in the creation of nuclei for new settlements on the otherwise barren desert
expanse, hitherto used by Bedouins and caravans. As such, Arar owes its existence to the
emergence of the economic environment and political order under the new nation-state,
and, thus, by exploring its development we can examine the impact of the government in
shaping the contemporary urban process and form.
I. LOCATION
Arar's undesirable physical as well as locational qualities explains the lack of
settlement in the area in the past. Arar was named after one of the two major wadi beds

249
(valleys), Arar and Badanah, which transverse the dreary wilderness encompassing the
Northern Frontier region of Saudi Arabia. The wadi Arar dominates the complex network
of smaller wadis and dry creeks, which all coalesce into one major wadi spine, Arar, that
vanishes into the Iraqi territory, sixty kilometers north east. The city functions as the
capital and the regional center of the Northern Frontier Province. In 1947 the construction
of a pipeline to transport crude oil from the Saudi fields in the Eastern Province to Sidon,
Lebanon, commenced. The imperatives of transporting crude oil from the oil rich Eastern
Province via the vast, uninhabited desert necessitated the installation of four pump stations.
Since the location of these pump stations was in a region that possessed no major
settlements and was scarcely inhabited, the Tapline built its own industrial compounds at
suitable intervals. Locations were chosen according to criteria which included partaking of
the advantages associated with nomads' seasonal migration routes at intersections with
major wadis. The site of today's Arar at the intersection of the pipeline and the two major
wadis, Arar and Badanah, met such a criterion.
Soon the new settlement attracted merchants, Bedouins and travelers. Thanks to the
construction of the Tapline tarmac road, water wells and other services attached to the
concessions given by the Saudi government to the Tapline company were provided. The
previously barren region's routes have since become safe and thereby allowed for Arar's
travel related services to prosper. Though intended to merely facilitate oil transport to the
American and European markets, the Tapline project turned out to be a successful urban,
regional and national development tool as well. The Tapline corridor has rejuvenated
confidence in national and regional growth primarily in the underdeveloped Northern
Frontier region. This success in turn instigated urbanization in the region and contributed
to the realization of the government's hijar program which was aimed at settling the roving
nomadic population in agricultural colonies.
II. GENESIS: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS SPUR MODERN URBAN GROWTH
Arar offers a unique case of urban development ab initio in which a new city
originated from naught in response to modern international political economic exigencies.
It epitomizes the process of restructuring the traditional national urban system in response
to international economic tides. Economically, Arar's birth and early growth were due to
the construction of the Trans-Arabian Pipe Line (Tapline), a venture which was completed
in December, 1950. The construction of the pipeline was a direct result of connecting the

250
modern Saudi "enclave economy," based on oil production, to the international market
system. Ironically, Arar's birth was exogenously spurred by the complex political,
economic and military epochs during and in the wake of World War n, it was part of the
competitive struggle between British and U.S. oil companies during the 1940s over oil
concessions in the Gulf region. The scheme of the Tapline was largely meant to meet the
American oil companies's goals, while working on Saudi Arabian territory. In developing
the Tapline project, it "had hardly been contemplated that the oil production might
encourage and bring about the economic development and reconstruction of the Middle East
itself." Rather, the Saudi "oil was only thought of in terms of the reconstruction of Europe
and its post-war markets." 1 Therefore, the Tapline idea was originally conceived on the
drawing boards of the U.S. government's foreign policy staff and military circles based on
economic and political criteria contributing to the (realization of) U.S. interests in the
Middle East and Europe. Helmet Mejcher stated
Already in December 1942 the project of a Transarabian Pipeline from the
province of Al-Hasa to the Mediterranean had been considered in the context
of the general war effort....Furthermore, the pipeline project was bound to
bring the adjacent Arab countries-Transjordan, Palestine, Syria and Egypt into
the orbit of American policy as well....The West was concerned to conserve
its oil resources at the expense of the eastern hemisphere....Its whole
entrepreneurial scope points to the fact that the interest being taken into
account were not those of the region but those of the western companies and
governments. 2
The idea to build the Tapline was originally proposed by Harold Ickes, President
Roosevelt's Secretary for the Interior, during the 1940s. Obsessed with U.S. future needs
to "acquire and participate in the development of foreign oil reserves," Ickes introduced
several ideas, one of which was the construction of the Tapline to carry crude oil from the
Saudi oil fields in the Eastern Province to Sidon, Lebanon, on the Mediterranean shores.
"This would have the double advantage of ensuring a regular supply of cheap oil to the
government and of leading inevitably to an agreement with the British, and so guaranteeing
the position of U.S. oil companies in the area." Though the idea of intervention by the
U.S. government in American oil companies' ventures overseas was vigorously opposed
by the American oil industry, California Arabian Standard Oil Company's (Casco)
executives, the predecessor of today's Aramco, thought "the pipeline project in itself was
sound. "3 In 1947 construction commenced and on December 2,1950, oil was loaded on
the first tanker at Sidon, Lebanon.

251
The unprecedented venture of building the Tapline project required an enormous labor
force amounting to 16,000 workers at its peak. The early structures of Arar housed
Bedouins seeking jobs and benefits in the industrial camp. The agreement between the
Saudi government and the Tapline company stipulated that the Tapline build houses and
public facilities for those working in connection with the project. 4 In addition to the Arar
industrial camp, three other major pump stations at A1 Qaisomah, Rafha, 284 kilometers to
the south, and Turaif, 238 kilometers to the north were added. The new industrial
compounds serving the pump stations formed the "Tapline urban corridor" upon which
future growth ensued. At the location of each pump station, an industrial compound was
built to house a professional staff and support facilities to maintain these pump stations.
(Figure 7.1).
The remote, uninhabited area of the pipeline imposed upon Tapline (Trans-
Arabian Pipe Line) the necessity of building complete communities at the main
pump stations, with repair shops, supply depots, airstrips, communications,
housing, hospitals, schools, feeding and recreation facilities and utilitiesevery
thing needed for self-sufficiency. 5
In line with the agreement between the Saudi government and Tapline, the oil
company built schools, health clinics, warehouses, airfields and some public-oriented
facilities. Moreover, the Tapline, at the request of the government, constructed a tarmac
road paralleling the pipeline, connecting the various growth poles dotting the Tapline
corridor, a project which was completed by the mid-1960s. Although the road was
essentially meant to serve the trans-saharan pipeline and its industrial compounds, it
generated a substantial volume of traffic altering the regional urban network and creating
considerable commercial activity of regional, national, and international significance. The
combined effects of creating health services, water, educational and transport facilities have
since bestowed the Tapline corridor's towns with large numbers of immigrants.
Arar's population, in particular, grew during the 1960s at an annual growth rate of
4.6 percent, a higher growth rate per annum than its Tapline sisters (Turaif, 3.5%, Rafha,
3.7) a rate which was more than double the national population growth rate of 2.5 percent.
Between 1962 and 1973, Turaif s population grew from 7,000 to 9,500 and Rafha from
4,000 to 5,500. In comparison, Arar's population increased from 9,000 to 14,000.

252
BUSTIC MAP OF &AUOI ARABIA
Figure 7.1 , J . A
Map of Sauid Arabia showing major cities and towns, including Arar. Source: Doxiadis,
Arar, Present Conditions (1975).

253
Between 1973 and 1986 Arar witnessed an increase in its population at the average growth
rate of 24 percent, a growth which, by 1987, gave Arar a population of 65,000. During
the same period Turaif s population reached 20,000 while Rafha attained 17,000, both
increased at an annual rate of 7.3 percent and 13.9 percent respectively. Such growth rates
reflected the acute urbanization process associated with economic and administrative sector
development brought by oil industrialization and the growing influence and affluence of the
central government.
Especially during its early years of formation, the transport of oil was the raison de
etre for Arar's existence. Yet, oil served only as the kickoff for Arar's subsequent
development the ground up. Oil-related activity has set in motion an urbanization process
that continued even with the suspension of most of the oil transported through the Tapline
following the eruption of the civil war in Lebanon in the mid 1970s. Arar was to pick up
on its own, relying on government employment and business generated by the residents'
demand and traffic of the Tapline highway connecting the Arabian Gulf with the
Mediterranean shores. For example, by 1973, Arar witnessed daily traffic of 136 trucks,
1,289 small cars, 35 buses and 191 taxis. 6 In addition, the Tapline towns were equipped
with airfields which strengthened the new towns with national urban centers. During the
1970s, a new airport was constructed serving approximately 70 flights per week.
Politically, Arar's subsequent development could only be understood in light of the
Kingdom's socio-political environment, in general, and the city's administrative and
borderline role in the regional geopolitics, in particular. Arar's industrial complex is
situated in the middle an unsettled region in the north part of the Kingdom abutting Jordan
and Iraq. The need to assure Saudi sovereignty over this desolate area called for extra
attention by the central authorities to settle the barren area. Although the genesis and early
growth of the Tapline's towns reposed on the economic principles of oil marketing, later
urban development must be credited to the national government's interest in enhancing
urban centers in the desolate northern region for several factors, one of which was the
central government's concern for national security and sovereignty.
III. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE
During the 1950s and early 1960s, Arar's growth continued as the town attracted
more inhabitants, a reflection of the urbanization process throughout the nation, thanks to

254
improved oil revenues. Government income, which amounted to merely $7.5 in 1936 ($3
million derived from oil production and $4.5 million levied on pilgrims), rose to $10
million following the end of World War n. In 1950, government income multiplied,
reaching $37 million and by 1955 revenues leaped to $350 million per annum, a staggering
sum by Saudi standards at that time. The increase in economic means were paralleled with
the acceleration and broadening of contacts by the population with the outside world. With
the increase in the masses' acculturation and societal awareness, a modified concept of the
relationship between the ruler and the governed emerged which gradually supplanted the
tribal notion of authority with a monarchic nation-state run by a centralized bureaucracy and
based largely on traditional values. Aware of the rising aspirations of the population, the
Saudi national government swiftly engaged the society in an intensive process of
modernization. 7
As we saw in Riyadh's case, the major cities were the first to enjoy the churns of the
new wealth. But the other towns were not behind. Bedouins and town ruralites flocked to
the emerging oil towns seeking better job opportunities and public services. For example,
during the early 1970s, the Northern region's urban centers offered an average income of
$334 per annum in comparison to $163 for those living outside cities. 8 In the case of Arar,
its viable administrative and military roles brought about substantial population growth.
This called for more government services which in turn required more governmental jobs.
The government met rising needs with more services such as schools and the expansion of
its health services. By 1973, Arar boasted a population of 14,000 with a flourishing
division of labor involved in the expanding job market offered by state agencies and
supporting services, specifically education and health. Arar's prosperity was enhanced
when the town was nominated as the administrative regional center serving the Northern
Frontiers' region, then populated by an estimated 325,000 inhabitants. In 1973, migration
constituted the major share of Arar's population growth. For example, in 1973, only 3.2
percent (or 198 people) of Arar's population had lived in the town for more than 24 years,
a figure which represented those who remained after construction of the pipeline in the
1940s.
Arar's early population growth was essentially a reflection of the demand for labor to
work in the construction of the pipeline project, which peaked to 16,000 workers at one
time. Nevertheless, the oil transport and maintenance employment remained very limited,
comprising less than 5 percent of the total employment market in Arar. This proportion

255
even shrank considerably following the eruption of the civil war in Lebanon, which halted
loading of Saudi oil at Sidon. Moreover, during the 1980s government construction of the
giant East-West Pipeline carrying crude oil from the East Province to Yanbu on the Red Sea
(to avoid the precarious political environment in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon) further
decreased the use of the Tapline. Due to these factors, the amount of oil transported
through the Tapline was reduced to a trickle, barely sufficient to meet the needs of the
Jordanian market.
Yet, Arar's economic prosperity and urban growth continued apace and thrived on
expanding government employment, militarization, travel and freight related businesses, a
growth which reflected the rising strategic role of the Northern Frontier region to national
security. According to the Doxiadis study of 1973, government employment claimed 53
percent of the total employment market in Arar. Commercial and other services accounted
for 16.4 percent. The transport and small industries employed 5.2 percent, while mining
and rock cutting accounted for 4.2 percent, and 4 percent in agriculture. In total the tertiary
sector (administration, business, services) accounted for 76 percent of the city's
employment. Out of the 3,006 work force of Arar, 72 percent (2,166) were wage earners,
25.1 percent worked outside the formal sector (referred to here as non-wage earning
occupations such as tending livestock, selling fuel, and other crafts) while only 1.8 percent
were registered as business establishments.
Table 7.1 illustrates the preponderance of the Tertiary sector in Arar's economy. In
total, it absorbed 76 percent of the city's man power in 1973. The number of private
establishments (commerce, private services and service industries) increased from 477 in
1976 to 1,245 in 1981 employing 1,803 and 3,319 respectively, thanks to government
sponsored private sector promotion policies as well as favorable market conditions the
state's modernization programs have engendered. 9 This is not unique to Arar: the service
sector has been the major employer in the Saudi Northern Region's (NR) cities, Hail,
Skaka, Aljouf, Arar, and Algurriyat. The service sector in the NR's towns accounted for
77 percent, the secondary sector (light manufacturing) and construction employed 15
percent of these towns' employment, while the primary sector (industry, mining and
agriculture) employment 8 percent. The growth of the service sector attests to the
significance of the government role, direct and indirect, in the urbanization process in Saudi
Arabia, a role which would reach record levels in the 1970s and 1980s. The
preponderance of the service sector, which in itself is dominated by, and dependent on,

256
government spending, corroborated the consumer-oriented urban economies heavily
relying on state sponsorship and patronage. 10 As such, the urban entity has become a
"closed" economic system, one which receives government funds which in turn are used to
obtain outside goods.
Table 7.1
Employment by Economic Sector (1974)
SECTOR
Percent
Agriculture 4.0
Mining and Rock Cutting 4.2
Manufacturing * 5.2
Electricity, Gas and Water 1.0
Construction 10.6
Commerce, Restaurants and Hotels 16.4
Transport, Storage Freight 5.2
Money, Finance and Real Estate 0.4
Social Services 52.8
Others 0.2
Total 10000
Source: Doxiadis, Northern Province, (1974).
IV. URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND URBAN PLANNING
Arar's birth was a function of the imperatives of economic development under the
new nation-state. The very early Tapline's structures, which designated the 1950's
industrial compound, were portable, wooden units assembled to house the Tapline's staff
and their families. According to the agreement with the Saudi government, the Tapline also
agreed to develop a land subdivision, which later was commonly referred to as "Tapline
Houses" (Figure 7.2-B).
The Tapline Houses which constituted the nucleus of newly born Arar were located
across the Wadi of Badnah, three kilometers south-east of the Tapline pumping
installations. Shortly thereafter, Bedouins and other temporary residents pitched tents
while ruralites constructed mud and brick houses in the vicinity of the Tapline Houses.
The combined effects of the Tapline jobs (directly related to the industrial complex), the
provision of health services and water, construction and government-related employment,

257
JL IgUi v /
•
Arar's layout during the 1970s. The industrial compound for oil pumping facilities (A), the
town, which originated from the Tapline Houses (B), the old airfield (C), and the Tapline
road (D). Source: Doxiadis, Avar, Present Conditions (1975).

258
all attracted nomads, ruralites and immigrants from distant settlements and Arab countries
as well. Consequently, government services were expanded to meet the increasing demand
for public services and educational facilities generated by population growth and improved
living conditions in Arar and the region it served. For example, between 1973 and 1986,
the number of schools increased from 15 to 39 while the number of students increased
from 9,583 in 1982 to 16,594 in 1989. Arar was supplied its administrative components, a
regional imarah (principality or emeer's governorhsip), police station and mail and
telegram office. Construction activity prospered in response to increasing demand for
buildings setting a north-west growth pattern.
While some migrants managed to obtain dwellings through the formal housing
market, others were forced to live in temporary units. Peripheral growth surpassed the
sluggish physical planning and growth controls as practiced by the municipality.
Consequently, there was no uniformity governed peripheral growth. Shanty towns were
comprised of tents, as well as mud and concrete structures, while others were built with
scrap materials. Few paid attention to uniformity and land ownership. Outside the original
Tapline Houses, modern villa type residences mingled with "Arabic" houses, or biout
sha'abiyah (a modified version of which the organization of indoor spaces matched that of
courtyard mud houses, i.e. introverted arrangement of rooms, but built with modern
building materials and modified fenestration). Communities that were dominated by such
hybrid architecture were commonly referred to as 'ahieaa Sha'abiyah (popular or
communities of the masses). 11 They were usually inhabited by low income households.
For instance, in 1973, monthly income for households that lived in concrete (modern villa
type), the popular, the mud houses and the shanty towns (denoted as "others") were SR
1,140, SR 860, SR 720 and SR 390 respectively. 12 The original rectilinear layout of the
Tapline Houses' land subdivision remained dominant. Commercial and public land uses
were clustered around the central thoroughfare (later called King Abdul-Aziz) which
continued as the town's major commercial center. The Imarah (Principality) which was
located at the eastern end of Arar formed an opposing magnet, hence strengthening the eastwest
linear pattern of Arar's urban form.
Generally speaking, Arar is essentially a modern, planned town. Its development has
passed through five major planning phases or experiments, (1) the original Tapline plan of
the early 1950s, (2) land tenure, (3) the 1960s' expansion of the Tapline plan, (4) the 1973

259
Doxiadis Plan, (5) militarization, (6) the land subdivision phase, and (7), the Urban
Domain of 1989.
A. The Tapline Plan, 1950s
During the early stage (1950-1955), Arar's urban form comprised three discrete
components. First, was the planned, industrial complex, fenced and isolated from the
remaining (Arab) population. Its highly functional form, which resembled the form of an
electronic circuit, reflected the functions associated with oil processing technology. An
airfield was built across the town from Badnah wadi to the west, next to the Tapline
industrial compound's and was largely geared toward the needs of the Tapline and
Aramco's operations (Figure 7.2-C). It served as the industrial compound and the town's
major airfield until it was replaced with a new airport, 11 kilometers south of Arar in 1976.
Second, there were the "Tapline Houses" (Figure 7.3-A). They were designed and
built by the Tapline company to house Tapline workers and government employees. The
Tapline planners subdivided an area across the Badanah wadi east of the industrial
compound. The original development of the Tapline Houses covered an approximate area
of one square kilometer. It comprised a gridiron layout of streets delimiting 40-by-40
meters blocks, four lots each. The introduction of the gridiron layout resulted in larger lots
than those found in the traditional built environment. Typical grid pattern land
subdivisions' lots were platted creating lot areas no smaller than 400 square meter while
traditional residential lot areas averaged between 200 and 270 square meter.
The Tapline Houses development was bifurcated by a two-lane central road forming
the commercial spine of Arar. Shops and government public buildings serving the city's
population as well as the region at large were soon to be added to the built form of Arar.
Topography, marked by rugged terrain and presence of several wadis, was a major factor
that shaped Arar's early form and dictated its future growth. As such, Arar's original
growth was confined to the area east of Badanah and north of Arar wadis.
Originally, the Tapline development was little more than a large-scale mixed
enterprise, government-sponsored land subdivision. Although started from an auspicious
planned origin, the housing development lacked an integrated system of built zones,
circulation, recreation facilities and other open spaces. As was the case in Aramco's
planned communities for its Arab workers in Dammam, A1 Khobar, Rahima and

m
a i-.t,',
260
AR'AR
COMMUNITY STRUCTURE
Community
Figure 7.3
Arar's communities during the early 1970s. Area (A) constitutes the original subdivision
of the Tapline Houses, (B) the subdivision plan of the 1960s, (C) the National Guards
community comprising mainly mud houses and biout sha'abiyah, Area (D) was populated
by Bedouins camps, community (E) housed educational buildings, few houses and
Bedouins' tents, and (F), which was built on the Tapline road, was used for Arar's
Hospital. Source: Doxiadis, Arar, Present Conditions (1975).

261
Aththouqbah, the Tapline company implemented a plan with standards that were neither
consistent with the local culture nor equal to those enjoyed by its (American) oil
communities' residents. 13 As such, the plan fell short of being a genuine attempt to
experiment with new planning paradigms of modern comprehensive planning, that is to
treat the city as a system, suited to Arar's rapid development and culture.
B. Land Tenure
Because the location of Arar was selected in the midst of barren land, documentation
of land ownership, did not exist, hence land fell under government ownership. Arar's
original form comprised two discrete parts: the industrial camp and Arar proper.(Figure
4). 14 The industrial complex encompassed the apparatus of oil transportation and
maintenance ancillary facilities. It also included a small community which housed the
technical staff overseeing the plant and a hospital. The second part of Arar's development
was a community specifically platted for the purpose of housing government functions and
staff, in conjunction with the concession by the government to the Tapline, a request which
reflected the central state's interest in strengthening its presence in the desolate region. The
land for the new industrial complex and the Arab community was appropriated from
government land. Arar's early structures were built by the Tapline for the government in
what is commonly referred to as the "Tapline Houses" ("Arab") community (Figure 4 B).
The developed property was a public-private venture and legal ownership of residential and
commercial uses were gradually ceded to residents according to pricing formulas. 15
To encourage the sedentarization of the nomads and to enlist ruralites in the growing
modern economy, various mechanisms were devised by the government to .help citizens
obtain land for housing and private development. With the majority of the population
moving to and living in towns, and cities, the government has maintained the tradition of
transferring public land to private ownership. Royal Decrees no. 7,800 dated 10/7/1380H
(1960), stipulated royal permission for granting land. 16 To qualify for free land, citizens
were required to submit petitions showing proof of citizenship and the location requested to
the Royal authority. Royal Decree no. 59 dated 19/4/1401 (1981) clarified criteria for
lower income groups (LIG) to qualify for free land. Some of the conditions attached to
LIG grants were that the owner had to be 18 years or older, must not own land or had not
previously obtained a REDF loan, must start construction within a five-year period, and
should not sell or rent during the five year period following its delivery to the applicant. 17

262
Petitioners' requests were examined in light of certain criteria, such as the availability of
land, the city in which it lay, the status of the petitioner, and his or her need. Citizens were
also allowed to request a royal fief, that is minhah, by applying for land without
necessarily having LIG status.
The process of privatization of the land can be outlined as follows. The municipality
earmarks certain lots for distribution to the public either free of charge or at nominal prices.
Three prices were identified for the country's municipal and rural land. 18 Procedures were
also set for transferring land from public to private ownership. The three prices per square
meter for Arar's municipal land were listed, SR10.00 for land class A, SR6.00 for class B,
and SR3.00 for class C; classification was based on land location (one U.S dollar was the
equivalent of SR 3.5 in 1978). A second form of transfer of public land to citizens was
that of helping low income groups obtain land for their own residences. In this case, the
government provided lots of 400 square meters to citizens whom authorities deemed as
underprivileged, or of "limited-income." In the later case, residents were entitled only to
one lot which could be locked in restrictive conditions concerning its sale and rents. 19 The
third method of transfer of land to private ownership was that of minah — Royal gifts in the
form of land free of charge to qualified applicants. In the case of minhah, the King
endowed grants, such as land, to citizens according to certain qualifications, including
actual need, social status, and availability of land for distribution. Depending on the
availability of land, an applicant could be granted land at a central location in an important
city, or endowed a larger area at any location owned by the state. Recipients of
government land would sell at market prices upon the legal transfer of ownership.
The practice of allotting land free to citizens dramatically increased during the late
1970s and 1980s, partially due to the expedition of the urbanization process but especially
in response to the inauguration of the Real Estate Development Fund's (REDF) generous
housing loans. The REDFs requirements stipulated the legal possession of residential land
in a municipally-sanctioned land subdivision. To qualify for a REDFs interest-free loan,
residents were required to show proof of land ownership in a municipally sanctioned
residential zone.
The government also offered public land at nominal rents in connection with its
industrial promotion programs. The provision of land for industrial uses, that is for the
development of auxiliary light industrial services (autoshops, simple metal and wood

263
processing and assembly, etc.) as well as heavy manufacturing, at nominal prices has been
part of government programs aimed at encouraging citizens to participate in the modern
economy. Municipal authorities devised physical plans identifying industrial zones. Land
was subdivided and rented to Saudi entrepreneurs at prices as low as SR 0.08 per square
meter ($0.02) per annum. 20 In 1986, urban land categorized as "industrial" accounted for
15 hectares, or 1.6 percent of Arar's total area of 925 hectares, (see new information on
land subdivisions).
As Arar's population increased, squatter settlements sprouted housing ruralites and
Bedouins. Shanty towns, comprising tents, mud houses and other structures built with
temporary building materials developed in an uncontrolled fashion exhibiting a mix of the
traditional organic form and scattered Bedouin camps, appeared outside the formal land
market. 21 In 1973, squatter settlements on public land accounted for up to 30 percent of
the city's total residential stock. Legal title for lots were only given to those who bought
and built in platted areas in compliance with the planning by laws imposed by the
municipality and other government agencies. Moreover, only legally sanctioned lots were
entitled to municipal services, such as water, electricity, telephone and benefits from
government public services.
C. Militarization: Planning a Model Community
Since its birth in 1950, Arar has fulfilled economic, administrative and military roles.
It benefited from its location on the economically active Tapline corridor and served as the
administrative capital for the Northern Province. In addition to these political economic
functions, Arar was to benefit substantially from increasing expenditures of the military.
Arar is located 188 miles southeast of the Saudi-Jordanian border and less than 40 miles
southwest of Iraq. Due to its proximity to the border, Arar garnered a strategic military
distinction which reflected the central government's concern over its sovereignty in this
ulterior region. 22 The vitality of the northern region to the national security of Saudi
Arabia can only be understood in light of the international political developments that swept
the Middle East following the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent colonialization
of its territories by European powers (1910s-1960s). Although Saudi Arabia was formed
without passing through de facto colonialism, the demarcation of its borders took place
when neighboring Arab territories were under colonial administration. Until today,
segments of many Arab countries borders, including Saudi Arabia, are still the subject of

264
heated territorial conflicts. The Northern Frontier, of which Arar serves as its
administrative capital and major urban center, constitutes one of the five major regions
forming Saudi Arabia. Its neighbors Iraq and Jordan are both jealous of the potentially oil
rich region lying south of their borders. Moreover, historically, the region has been the
grazing grounds for several powerful major Bedouin tribes whose migratory pattern has
frequently defied the authority of all these governments' jurisdictional powers. As Saudi
polity matured, it recognized the significance of protecting its frontiers. Arar was to benefit
dramatically by the international as well as national political and economic developments.
Until 1958, Iraq and Transjordan (known today as Jordan) were ruled by Hashimite
monarchs, King Abdullah and King Faisal, sons of Sharif Hussein of Makkah, head of the
Hashimite dynasty which governed the Western Province under the Ottoman rule, and the
Hijaz region in Saudi Arabia, before the Saud House 23 . In his campaign to unify the
country, King Abdul-Aziz overpowered his Hashimites rivals in a humiliating showdown
which concluded with the termination of their rule over Hijaz during the 1920s.
Furthermore, the Northern Province, which lacked established settlements, has been the
grazing grounds for nomads who historically swore allegiance to their tribe and land and
not to any established authority. The Saudi northern borders remained the focus of many
border disputes, so much so that two neutral zones were drafted along the border by the
British, who were the arbiters between the newly bom nation-states.
Owing to the precarious geopolitics of the Kingdom's northern borderline, Arar was
chosen by the central state as the northern base for several military and security force
communities. Arar serves as a regional base for a substantial Internal Security force, has a
regional airport (one of twenty two in the nation) and houses scores of National Guard
(NG) units and hundreds of personnel. 24 The presence of the NG forces has contributed
to the urban economy of Arar through the employment it has generated. The National
Guards have offered employment opportunities to citizens nationwide, especially the
nomads. For instance, the government offers exclusive health benefits and free land or
accommodation, among others, to those who work in the NG. By 1973, two of Arar's
five residential districts were distributed to National Guard staff (Figure 7.3 C and D), both
occupied a substantial portion of the city's area.
In its effort to attract nationals to the area, the Ministry of Interior provided wholly
designed and built model communities for its Internal Security Forces (ISF), thanks to the

265
rising oil revenues. 25 During the 1970s, the Ministry of Interior contracted international
architects and contractors to construct 4,672 housing units in fully serviced and wellplanned
communities in 16 Saudi cities. Due to the
recent dynamic growth of cities, towns and villages and the increasing need to
provide housing in support of its Internal Security Forces, the Ministry of
Interior embarked on an ambitious program to develop, establish and maintain
well conceived and planned new communities throughout the
Kingdom....The New communities have been planned to provide an
environment that respects and preserves the Saudi "Quality of Life", to
encourage, where possible an integration of the new community with the
neighboring settlements. 26
In November, 1980, the Ministry of Interior commenced the five year large-scale
community development. Arar received 453 units on a location which added 40 hectares to
the city's area (Figure 7.4-A). The 2,700 residents "model" community included a large
congregational mosque, 2 clubs, four schools, a recreation center with an auditorium,
shops and a health center. In contrast to Arar's other scattered, half-built land
subdivisions, the ISF is uniquely designed and professionally built by international firms
aided by young Saudi architects. In contrast to Arar's layout, which is marked by a
disjointed planning process largely due to lax municipal controls and uncoordinated
sanctioning of land subdivisions, the ISF development emphasized a meandering loop
feeding the major residential zones, clustered around the central service area where the
Friday mosque, shops, the clubs were located. Schools were scattered around the site in
calculated proportions according to the age and number of students. The project handbook
boasted that "A network of traffic-free pedestrian ways is provided between clusters of
housing, allowing for a high degree of safe pedestrian circulation around the site." 27
Allocation of the various project's elements was carefully organized to benefit from
topographical and climatic considerations (Figure 7.3-B). The project was fully finished at
professional standards (including streets, pavement, lighting and sewage treatment
plant/facilities, etc.). Residential units were furnished. The total cost, including
community services and other costs, was reported at SR455 million ($130 million), or one
million per unit. 28
Moreover, the Ministry of Defense and Aviation has maintained a provincial
department and a regional hospital at this ulterior town. The Ministry of Defense, which
oversees and runs the only national civilian airline, Saudia, also maintains Arar's airport.

266
•-*iJ^ J!
To Turavf
Site
1.5 km
jlkJI
To Airport
Arar
Site Location
A
«**$*£•
.^f-X
.. *
Ministry of Interior ISF Housing Project stands as a "model" planned community. The
site is shown in relation to Arar's Doxiadis Master Plan of 1974 (A). Unlike Doxiadis
gridiron layout, the ISF master plan comprises careful allocation of buildings and open
space based (B). Ministry of Interior, Urban Design and Community Development In
Saudi Arabia: A Case Study: Internal Security Forces Housing Project, Vol. 2 (c. 1985).

267
In 1976, the government authorized the construction of the provincial airport 11 kilometers
to the south of Arar. The new airport, which occupies a substantial area of the desert, has
since become a magnet of urban growth on the Tapline highway leading to Rafha, 280
kilometers to the south. Several major land subdivisions, most of which were earmarked
for free distribution to citizens, were located on the road to the airport, hence confirming
the town's growth toward the new airport, contrary to Doxiadis' projections of
northeastern and eastern urban growth. These military facilities constitute what is
designated as "private (exclusive) government" land uses. Along with other government
civil developments, these large-scale developments and urban functions match the
predominant contribution of the government in the making and shaping of the
contemporary Saudi built forms in Arar and other settlements.
D. The Subdivision Plan of The 1960s
The process of platting larger lots en masse, coupled with the widespread use of the
automobile set in motion an urban growth of high magnitude, between 7 and 24 percent per
annum, the highest in the nation's history. Nevertheless, up until the late 1970s, Arar
remained essentially a "walking city," 76 percent of Arar's residents (above 13 years old)
walked to their destinations. At the rim of the existing Arar grid, shanty towns sprouted
housing Bedouins and other poor residents, inevitably taking the traditional organic form.
Rapid population growth hindered the subdivision obsolete as growth proceeded outside
the gridiron area taking inevitably a combination of the traditional organic form and
scattered Bedouin camps. An attempt to circumvent the haphazard growth outside the
Tapline development was made by the government during the early 1960s
In its attempts to impose order on the rapidly growing city, the municipal staff
extended land subdivisions outside the 'Tapline Houses' original nucleus in the early 1960s
(Figure 7. 3, B).. The new land subdivision added an area of 3.75 square kilometers to the
Tapline's original one square kilometers grid area (Figure 3, area A). King Abdul-Aziz's
central road was built over the Badnah wadi along King Abdul-Aziz road which improved
accessibility to the tarmac road leading to Rafha to the south and Turaif to the north (Figure
7.5). A new bridge facilitated physical growth across the wadi toward the international
highway. The plan also implemented modifications to the existing Tapline plan (i.e., the
"Tapline Houses" subdivision of 1950) in light of cultural needs and past experience. For
example, residents were given freedom to build their own houses with flexible setback

268
regulations. Unlike the Tapline Houses area which were designed according to the villa
model (e.g. the house is situated amidst a yard), the new plan enabled residents to use the
modified Arabic house style (e.g. building around a courtyard without set backs). The
combination of using new building materials and traditional space organization resulted in
the hybrid architecture found in the ahiyaa sha'abiyah. The "Arabic house" characterizes
the early phase of rapid urban growth in most Saudi settlements, marked with austere
adaptation to modern construction technology and convenience (Figure 7.6). The 1960s'
plan also allowed for the provision and expansion of commercial uses, public office space
and services and devised a hierarchy of road systems.
Still, the plan, as did its Tapline predecessor and the 1973 Doxiadis plan, could not
foresee the rapid population growth of the 1960s and the spate of urban growth brought by
the 1970s construction boom. Arar's municipality subdivision plan failed to pay due
respect to the environmental context and did not associate economic development with the
physical growth it projected. Moreover, physical planning as practiced by municipalities in
many Saudi settlements paid little attention to larger social and economic forces. During the
1960s, Arar's growth persisted at high population growth rates of 4.6 percent, reflecting
the proliferation of jobs in the government sector and the private sector, an expansion
which paralleled the modernization programs of the government. In addition, the city was
benefited by the steady increase of traffic on the Tapline highway, the gateway to Saudi
Arabia's Eastern and Middle regions. Shops branched from King Abdul-Aziz Road to
King Faisal and Talhah Bin Azzubair streets, while the process of building squatter
settlements persisted, reflecting the steady urbanization process steps ahead of physical
planning measures (Figure 7.7).
E. The Doxiadis Plan, 1970s
A1 Hathloul and Amroush contended that the preparation of the 1974 Doxiadis plan
"conformed to the ambitious developmental programs espoused by the government during
the 1970s for all Saudi cities. It was hoped that the production of these [master] plans
would coordinate, accommodate for and guide cities' long-term growth." 29 As a regional
center, Arar was one of these cities deemed important enough to be studied by Doxiadis
Associates. Between 1965 and 1973, Arar witnessed a 4.6 percent population growth.
Moreover, during the same period Arar, although enjoying an increasing number of
government services, experienced uncontrolled urban development due to the lack of

269
rv^
Figure 7.5
King Abdul-Aziz Road became the commercial spine for Arar, resulting in a linear growth
pattern. It bifurcates the city into two major parts connecting the Imarah (principality) with
the Tapline road. Source: Doxiadis, Arar, Present Conditions (1974).

270
jyu
A. B
Figure 7.6
The Tapline planners utilized a
gridiron pattern to subdivide the Arab
community, that is the Tapline
Houses, instead of attempting to
forge a socially pertinent physical
plan that adheres to the local culture
and physical context. (A) represents
a layout of typical traditional built
form in northern Saudi Arabia.
Arar's inhabitants built mud houses
upon their arrival to Arar during the
1960s (B&C), and then substituted
the mud houses with the modified
version, post-mud house o the same
lot, i.e. forming one of the ah'iyaa
ashshaa'biyah communities (D). The
Tapline Houses (E) were platted and
built by the Tapline company using
modern building materials. Source:
Doxiadis, Arar, Present Conditions
(1974).
A STREET WITH
MUO HOUSES

271
I—
_r

272
effective planning (Figure 7.8). The Doxiadis study found that Arar's subdivision plan of
the 1960s lacked vision, comprehensivness and a conception of Arar's future growth.
During the 1950s and 1960s, Arar experienced chaotic expansion which took the form of
municipally sanctioned large-scale land subdivision coupled with substantial squatters
communities (Doxiadis, 1973). Like much of municipal physical planning practiced in the
Kingdom prior to 1970s, the 1960s plan espoused a piecemeal, essentially reactive
approach to urban problems and needs. The Doxiadis study characterized the typical
growth pattern. It found out that
Despite the preparation of a plan for Arar [i.e. the plan of the 1960s], the city
developed and grew speedily without [adhering to] proper composition and
without effective essence [substance] which caused the city to easily surpass
planning requirements. This led to imperfect organization of the city's
functions shown in defective land uses which lacked solutions pertinent to file
general needs of the city [sic]. 30
The Doxiadis Associates found a city growing in a "disproportionate fashion" and
that many residential units lacked basic utilities. In 1974, 60 percent of Arar's 2,382
residential units had electricity. While Arar's power station's supplied 750 kilowatt, the
actual need of the city was estimated at 1,800 kilowatt. Residential areas consumed 60
percent of the daily output of electricity leaving 20-25 percent for government buildings,
and 15-20 for small industries (mainly automobile repair shops, construction needs and
everyday services). Sixty seven percent of Arar's households received municipal potable
water while the remaining 33 percent hauled their daily needs of water from community
taps. Arar's garbage collection system handled only 30 m 3 of daily refuse, 120 short of the
actual 150 m 3 daily generation of refuse. The already outdated telephone service (offered
free by the Tapline) provided 99 telephone lines distributed to government departments,
businesses and households. Out of Arar's 47.2-kilometer circulation space, only 3.7
kilometers were paved, and even those lacked traffic lights and road signage.31 In many
instances, solutions to Arar's growth needs were reactive and taken ex post facto.
The 1974 Doxiadis' report concluded with an earnest recommendation that it was
timely to adopt a master plan based on current data, and contextually pertinent analyses of
current growth trends. Because "the city lacks sufficient facilities for its neighborhoods,
which hinders its growth and minimizes the effective utilization of the city," the Doxiadis

273
; 'i'%
Residential Area
rV s3\^CtUl
EXISTING. AIRPORT
Administrative Building
Shopping Area*
l>j\\
Workshops and Light Industries
Educalional Buildings
BAOANAH HOSnfAU FOR TAPLINE
\=J»TLI
•yj '
-i~
Mosques and Religious Buildings
Health Facilities
-JKll
Sport Fields and Recreational Areas
. @
Military Buildings
"I ^
Farms
Open Air Markets
Figure 7.8
By the 1970s, Arar grew into a city of 14,000 inhabitants working in the government and
service sectors. It was chosen by the central government as the capital for the Northern
Province with a flourishing division of land uses. Source: Doxiadis, Arar, Present
Conditions (1975).

274
study emphasized that the "need calls to the preparation of a master, comprehensive plan
and a planning system to follow the general development of the city." 32
The Doxiadis Consultants projected population and urban growth based on the
current growth rate of 4.6 per annum. Accordingly, a population of 31,600 inhabitants by
1993 was estimated. A master plan covering an area of 840 hectares, compared to the
town's area of 270 hectares, was approved by the Council of Ministers (Figure 7.9). The
Doxiadis planners acknowledged the peculiar nature of Arar's growth factors: it was a
regional center, a border city lying at the locus of nomadic migration routes, had national
and international traffic, was a city of vital significance to the nation's security and one
which symbolized the monarchy's hegemony and sovereignty in the northern ulterior
region.
Similar to Riyadh's master plan, Doxiadis planners charted a flexible, open-ended
plan to allow for high growth rates suited to the dynamic city of Arar. 33 An open-ended
grid iron pattern was adopted with King Abdul-Aziz Road as its central commercial spine,
hence strengthening the east-west expandability. The plan included an hierarchical system
of discrete residential districts, circulation space and parking, ostensibly based on the
automobile as the popular mode of transportation. The plan was supplemented with
copious, well produced and illustrated documents containing diagrams, growth trends,
detailed maps for land use and zoning, all neatly packaged to convey an ideal urban setting
bound for a smooth and prosperous future. For example, the plan envisioned recreational
parks occupying the wadi beds, given the implementation of measures to circumvent
floods. 34
The plan estimated the city's future density to be 49 inhabitants per hectare and the
formula was followed which designated 50 percent of the city's land for residential uses,
25 percent for circulation space, with the rest earmarked for commercial and other urban
services, as well as open and recreation space. Residential districts were designed around
sub-centers, each housing residential community services. Residential districts were
allocated to partake in the ideal circulation space, pedestrian and vehicular, and calculated
relationships between homes, schools and open space. Typically, the various sub-centers
were arranged in space in relation to major commercial spine of King Abdul-Aziz Road
serving the city at large. In short, Doxiadis' planners postulated an ideal Western
organization of urban elements in space. They envisioned an urban society congenially

275
j "Hf
\\\X j»Lfc
AR'AR
FINAl MASTER PtAN- YEAR' 1993
E3S5S&
Mo|«« Orttfl «ini a>v) 0»*A ]»MH
ei a,®
:%vv;v
-•mm
C3s;
% :.y.«:.--.- ,
Figure 7.9 ,
Doxiadis' 1975 Master Plan for the city of Arar was designed to suffice the city s
population physical needs until 1993. Source: Doxiadis, Arar, Final Major Plan, No. 40
(1975).

276
governed by decision-making organs involving public agencies and private institutions
endowed with cash and land at their disposal. It assumed a population characterized by
amity, altruism, urbanity and community: a community of "believers" bound to follow
Doxiadis* design in full faith.
Despite its well meaning, the Doxiadis plan was little more than a Utopian exercise, an
ambitious attempt on behalf of Doxiadis Associates and the callow local planners to apply
theoretical idealism to a city undergoing rapid growth virtually ab initio. The failure of the
Doxiadis plan could not be attributed solely to the fact that the Doxiadis Associates paid
little attention to the sociopolitical and physical environment of the Saudi city, this is to say
the least. In fact, the Doxiadis plan was a professional exercise of technical planning in a
society that craved such expertise. The Doxiadis studies for Arar and other Saudi cities and
regions, were based on national regional trends and local surveys and analyses of problems
and needs, though their end results were often little more than window dressing.
Several flaws in Arar's Doxiadis experiment can be discerned. First, a lack of clear
vision concerning the post-design stage, that is the implementation phase. Doxiadis' final
report, although it identified the various necessary land uses (e.g. what was needed), did
not specify "operational" means by which the program could be put into effect (e.g. what to
give whom and how). For example, the Final Major Report (FMR) projected an increase
in the total number of residential units from 2,200 units in 1972 to 5,260 by 1993, for all
income groups. The FMR was so detailed that it listed projections of required land uses
down to, for example, the number of rooms needed per household and the area needed per
unit for a certain number of members per household for the years 1975,1980,1985, and
1993. The FMR also enumerated needed commercial, health, educational, mosques, etc.
down to the square meter. 35 In sum, the Doxiadis planners entrusted the callow Saudi
authorities and their nascent planning organs with the implementation of the copious
documents, already based on data of the 1960s made obsolete by the phenomenal
modernization programs of the 1970s.
Second, the very nature of the Saudi land tenure system stood as a major obstacle to
the realization of the Plan. The societal predilection for private ownership of property, the
government distribution of free land, lax practices of land privatization, and the absence of
taxes contributed substantially to the failure of the Doxiadis plan. 36 The economic
programs of the 1970s and 1980s brought higher income to the Saudi population, enabling

277
them to seek better and larger lands for homes and other urban uses. Consequently, the
real estate market has become the battlefield for frenzied speculative land practices. 37 A
new urban land aristocracy emerged which laid its tight grips on land that promised
lucrative returns. These land-related policies resulted in skyrocketing land prices which
made construction in many areas within the Doxiadis plan unattainable by many ordinary
denizens and even Government departments seeking large lots for their large scale projects
(e.g. the Internal Security Forces housing development, the Ministry of Health and
Defense). All were forced to obtain land at lower prices ostensibly outside the Doxiadis
Plan (Figure 10). A centrifugal process of land subdivisioning and construction took
momentum under the five-year plans' modernization programs which commenced in 1970.
Most importantly, Arar's physical growth continued unabated until seemingly harnessed by
the launching Of the Urban Domain regulations in 1986.
Finally, the Plan was duly technical, that is it overlooked the role of the citizen in the
shaping of Arar's future development. But this was not solely, if at all, the mistake of the
foreign planning firm. The technical aspect of both local and imported planning was a
reflection of the centralized political system's character and government-sponsored towns'
economies. Planning firms, characteristically and legally were obliged to yield to the
contract and acquiesce to the clients demands. 38 Faced with such a formidable political
environment, foreign planners hope that their proposals are used to aid decisions by
politicians and the affected population. Ideally, the implementation of the plan was left to
the local authorities and planners to abide by the plan, amend it or discard it based on
concurrence and feedback. In sum, the failure of Arar's Doxiadis Plan was a function of
several factors one of which was the foreign planner's inattention to the sociopolitical and
physical environment of the host country.
The explosive 1970s population growth added to the chaotic urban growth of Arar.
The Arar experiment was a testimony to the failure of the perfunctory, wholesale grand
design approach to cities. The Doxiadis experiment corroborates the axiom that cities are
dynamic and complex urban systems, inhabited by social actors involved in an ever
growing, learning process. It proves that successful top-down, urban planning is only an
illusion.

278
F. Piecemeal Development: Land Subdivisions in the 1970s
Arar was yet to experience the most dramatic growth in its forty year old history.
According to a survey by Doxiadis Associates in 1973, 2,382 households lived in houses
comprising four major types of structures: 738 concrete houses, 532 mud units, 402 units
of the biout sha'abiyah type (i.e. built of cement bricks and organized around a
courtyard), and shantytowns. Like many Saudi cities, Arar was to benefit from the
generous allocation in the modernization of the national economy by the central
government, especially the housing programs. Being the major urban center and the capital
of the Northern Province, one of the Kingdom's five provinces, Arar's development was
only a matter of time.
Although Arar's municipality paid respect to the general framework of Doxiadis
Master Plan of 1974, the detailed program of land uses and circulation space were not
adhered to and their was not compatible growth between the various land uses, community
space and recreation as detailed in the Plan. Residential development deviated from the
specified program, mainly due to the very nature of the government land distribution
program which enabled many residents to obtain land through bureaucratic rationing rather
than through the market place. It was also partially due to the uncoordinated allocation of
resources, funds and land, to the various public and social services in an organized
fashion. 39
In the wake of the dramatically improved economic environment in the 1970s, land
speculation flared as large sums of state funds were channeled into the physical
environment. Residential land development proceeded in the form of (1) legal land
subdivisions authorized by the municipality and (2) squatter settlements at the outskirts,
especially on government land. Moreover, the various government agencies struggled to
solicit funds from the central state for their projects while locally they competed to seize
whatever land that fulfilled their needs. Residents sought land through the private market
as well as through the free land distribution programs to take advantage of the REDFs
convenient loans which enabled many citizens the access to the formal housing market.
Upon its transfer to private ownership, land was platted into smaller lots for market
speculation. Municipally sanctioned subdivisions were guaranteed government utilities
(water, electricity and telephone) and public services such as schools, health clinics,

279
mosques and the like. The number of residential lots jumped from 2,382 in 1972 to
10,930 in 1989 (Figure 7.10). 40
The outcome has been a continuous process of peripheral land growth, though
considerable platted land lay undeveloped in Arar proper. The number of construction
permits issued by Arar's municipality increased steadily from 87 permits per year in 1973
to and peaked at 1,598 in 1977 (Table 6.1). To meet the rising demand for land by citizens
who sought the benefits associated with the REDF loans, in particular, and other
government promotional subsidies, in general, Arar's Municipality distributed land free of
charge to qualified applicants as shown in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2
Land Subdivisions, Commercial, Recreational and Industrial
Subdivisions Approval Date Number of Developed Vacant Lots
lots Lots
Old Arar* Pre-1970s 3,300 3,000 300
Al-Mosadiyah 1977 895 785 110
Al-Faisaliyah 1977 2,058 1950 108
Al-Aziziyah 1980 1,185 1,031 154
Al-Salehiyah 1981 3,340 541 2,799
A1 Mansuoriyah 1988 1,634 na na
Badanah 1988 962 na na
Arrabowah 1989 822 na na
Commercial (area)** - - 9.5 hectare
Parks (area) - - 23.9 hectare
Industrial Uses
-
520 na
* "Old Arar" denotes Mohamaddiyah and Al-Khaldiyah residential communities which
include the "Tapline Houses" and land subdivisions that were part of the 1960s Plan. **
The Municipality builds and leases at nominal prices the majority of Arar's commercial land
uses.
The process of land subdivision surpassed Doxiadis' 840 hectares for a population of
31,100 by the year 2,000. By 1986, Arar's population rose to 65,000 and the city's land
uses covered an area of 2,600 hectares, thanks to the unchecked process of land
subdivision and the conversion of large tracts of public land which surrounded Arar to
specific "government land" uses (Table, 7.2 and 7.3).
G. The Urban Domain, 1980s
The oil-related dramatic changes of the 1970s and the 1980s bestowed Arar with a 24
percent population growth rate per annum, higher than the nation's capital, Riyadh, whose
annual growth rate peaked at 9 percent. Table 6.2 exhibits the phenomenal increase in

280
t way/'' /fit
Figure 7.10
A map of Arar showing land subdivisions (1-6) and major government land uses (in
gray). Source: MOMRA, Urban Domain Development, City of Arar.

281
construction permits issued by Riyadh, Arar and Huraimla' municipalities. The increase in
number of permits reflected the impact of massive public and largely government-led and
subsidized private investment in the cities' physical infrastructure, education and health
services, among others. For example, by 1989, Arar's residents received 6,646 REDF
housing loans which added to the city's residential stock of 7,975 units, most of which
were built on larger lots (i.e. 20 by 20 meters and larger) than the earlier ones. 41 During
the 1980s, the government embarked upon its large-scale development schemes, such as
the Ministry of Interior's 420-unit housing development for its ISF members which was
located outside the Doxiadis Plan (Figure 7.2). 42 The expansion of the city's residential
stock was paralleled by the expansion in government land. By 1987, Arar boasted a
population of 65,000 inhabitants, more than double the projected figure by Doxiadis
Associates for 1993. The combined effects of government spending and population
growth coupled with improved living conditions of the population, all translated in the
expansion of Arar's area. In 1987, the city reached a total area of 2,600 hectares (Table
7.3)43
Arar's development in the 1970s took the typical land subdivision approach., that is
the platting of outlying land to meet rapid population growth. Because there were no taxes
levied on property in the Kingdom, land owners kept land in their possession for long
periods of time with no incentive to develop. Buyers sought larger lots through the
government free land program or through the market at the city's periphery. This resulted
in the scattered, leap-frog development process, and inefficient urban sprawl characteristic
of most Saudi contemporary urban forms, in which considerable land lay undeveloped.
For example, in Arar, out of the total 10,930 lots comprising Arar's urban area, 3,560 or
33 percent remained undeveloped. 44 The end result was scattered land subdivisions semideveloped
and serviced at substantial per-unit costs.
In order to counter this inefficient, costly sprawl, the government halted the issuing
of land subdivisions in all Saudi cities 45 for two years during which deliberations by
government agencies facilitated the promulgation of the Urban Domain (Royal Decree
number 175 dated 18/9/1409H (circa 1989)). 46 The UD constitutes a set of guidelines
limiting peripheral land development to two domains for a town or a city. It identified
existing land uses, growth patterns and future needs for the two domains. The first domain
encircled the existing urban area limiting the area to be serviced by the government by 1415

282
(1995). The second domain enveloped the first domain and identified land suitable for
development until the year 1425H (Figure 7.11). According to the UD, land laying within
the second domain would not qualify for government free services, until needed services in
the first domain were met, though exceptions abound. Unlike the master plan approach,
the UD set guidelines and criteria for development leaving to the individual municipalities
the details of everyday activities, according to the ratified royal decrees, statutes and
ministerial circulars issued at the central level.
According to the UD of 1989, the total approved area for development in Arar was
925 hectares. The UD's first domain which identifies developable land up to 1995 allowed
for an area of 6,785 hectares. The second domain sanctioned another 2,240 hectares by
2005, in addition to the approved area of 7,710 hectares in 1995. In total, Arar's UD
earmarked a total area of 9,950 hectares by 2005 as developable, urban land. 47 Table 7.3
illustrates the UD listing of existing and future projections. Table 7.3 identifies land uses
and their respective areas. Government land, public and "private", accounts for 2,134
hectares or 82 percent of Arar land uses. The residential uses account for 14 percent of the
city's area. Through its REDF, military housing and land distribution policies, the
government has been instrumental in the production of the housing units which comprise
suburban growth (80% of Arar's housing units were REDF financed). For instance, the
REDF alone has helped in the construction of 4,340 housing units totaling SRI,186.7
billion ($330 million), or an average of SR273,425 ($78,000) per unit.
As such, and especially outside the Tapline Houses, the state has set the general
goals, policies, strategies, priorities and guidelines for development, thanks to its financial
contribution. Through its master plans, the state outlined the structure and components of
the modern physical environment. Through its massive allocation in modernizing the Saudi
society and its urban systems, the government has relied on oil revenues to engage the
society in an ever increasing urban and economic development. Through the creation of
employment in the public sector and lucrative measures to establish a modern private sector
from naught, the state has orchestrated the national march toward modernization, thereby
dwarfing the market forces. By doing so, the state has envisioned the future and, through
its pro-development intervention, has preempted the course of urban development for
decades to come with a careful mix between modernization (e.g. Western planning) and
tradition (i.e. government and municipal structures conducive to the reproduction and
sustenance of the prevailing national political structure), all reflected on the contemporary

283
Figure 7.11
The Urban Domain for Arar which designated developable are up to 1995 (A),
developable area up to 2005, and the city boundaries (outer line). Source: MOMRA,
Urban Domain Development, City of Arar.

284
Table 7.3
Area of Land Uses As Listed in the Urban Domain of Arar (in hectares)
Land Uses Existing Area Existing Area Needed Land by Needed Land
(%) 1995 by 2015
Residential 365 14.00 227.00 307
Commercial 52 2.00 8.5 18
Mixed (Comm. Res.) 48.78 1.90 15 25
Industrial 3.75 0.15 50 75
Government (public)* 159.80 6.15 58.5 33.50
Government (private)** 693.90 26.70 693.9 -
Public Services/Utilities 157 6.00 56 88
Agriculture 3.75. 0.15 - -
Historical - - - -
Open Space 30 1.15 25 15
Restricted Areas 440 16.90 2,500 150
Land for Future Developable 646 24.90 2,122.5 1,528.5
Total Area 2,600 100 5,756.4 2,240
Total (cumulative) 2,600 - 8,356.4 10,596.4
* Area designating Government (public) denotes local and regional administrative services.
** Denotes governmental land that is currently or reserved for military and security
departments. Source: Atlas of Saudi Cities: Urban Domain (1989), 15.

285
built environment, all consistent with the political system's traditional character and
contributing to the sustenance of the socio-political and economic status quo.
SUMMARY
From an industrial complex on the Tapline oil corridor, Arar emerged as a regional
urban center serving political, economic and military functions as well housing a population
of 65,500 inhabitants. The birth of Arar in 1950 represents the restructuring of the modern
national urban network according to the emerging oil economy and under the auspices of
the nation-state. The shift from traditional-subsistence town economies- manifest in -
maritime and caravan trade centers, oasis settlements and hamlets- to a modern ones chiefly
dependent on oil production and central government's backing signaled an irrevocable
process of urbanization. As the significance of the Tapline project to the national economy
diminished in the mid 1970s, the political importance of the town emerged as the major
force behind Arar's accelerated urban growth. Originally built for pure economic reasons,
that is, to meet the logistics of oil transportation, Arar's subsequent growth reflected the
national government's political goals, viz as a military outpost and an administrative service
center for one of the Kingdom's barren regions.
The nation-state in its efforts to cultivate massive oil resources has effectively
participated in the urbanization of the desolate northern region through the redistribution of
oil income to all regions, including the Northern Province, by creating jobs and investment
in the build environment. Arar was endowed with government departments which brought
the previously industrial camp into a status capable of serving the needs of the region's
population as well as to fulfill national security goals and symbolize the monarchy's
suzerainty.
Arar's planned growth intermittently witnessed the proliferation of haphazard growth
in the form of shantytowns. Arar's development typified modern urban planning practices
in Saudi Arabia manifest in the major phases of platting grid-iron land subdivisions, the
less-than successful experiment with a master plan, and the latest, seemingly pragmatic
Urban Domain approach. All Arar's growth phases, save the original oil complex built by
the Tapline, conformed to the national codes of urban design and legislation. The
uncoordinated implementation of numerous urban growth-related decrees by the central

286
government and the lack of adequate planning expertise stood as the major damper against
the realization of otherwise progressive pro-growth policies. The ISF planned community,
though built at a higher cost per-housing unit, presents an example of controlled large-scale
urban planning experiment in which some design values (e.g. respect for privacy,
calculated separation between pedestrian and motor traffic movement, and organized
allocation of community services in space) were adhered to. In contrast, the relaxed
systems of the REDF housing program and land distribution policies encouraged scattered
peripheral growth. Still, the outcome is an inevitable physical growth which resembled
most Saudi contemporary built forms: urban sprawl based on the grid system and the villa
model, thanks to the REDF generous housing loans and the free land policies.

287
Notes to Chapter VII
1 Helmut Mejcher, "Saudi Arabia's "Vital Link To The West': Some Political, Strategic and Tribal
Aspects of the Transarabian Pipeline(TAP) in the Stage of Planning 1940-1950," Middle Eastern
Studies 18 (October, 1982): 371.
2 Mejcher, 359.
^ Peter Mansfield, The New Arabians (Chicago: J.G. Ferguson Publishing Co., 1980), 68-70.
4 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Selected Documents of the International
Petroleum Industry, Saudi Arabia- Pre-1966 (Buffalo, New York: William S. Hein & Co., Inc.,
1983), 55.
5' Arabian American Oil Company, Aramco Handbook: Oil and the Middle East (Netherlands: Enschede
en Zonen-Haarlem, 1968), 152.
6 Doxiadis, Arar, Existing Conditions, Final Report No. 5 (1974).
7 King Saud's reign was a period of ambivalence, Saud was caught in a whirlpool of tradition versus
modernity which was brought about by increasing pressure from within the country's leading sectors as
well as outside, both by friends and foes (see chapter two of this study). Development brought changes
in the society, which in turn yearned for a larger share in the national resources and the national
decision-making process.
8 Doxiadis Associates, Northern Region: Urban and Regional Plan and Program for Improving Existing
Conditions , Final (Revised) Report No. 1, Volume 1 (Athens, Greece: Doxiadis Associates, 1974),
146.
9 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Statistical Year Book 20th
Issue, 1409H (1989), 635.
The role of government has been instrumental to the development of modern economies based on
government employment, services and development programs in agricultural as well as urban
settlements. For example, Al-Shamli, in northern Saudi Arabia's Hail region, a town of 130
dwellings, the government sector employs 32% while agriculture accounts for 12%. Al-Saghra of the
Al-Baha district, is inhabited by a population of 32,000. The leading employer is government which
employs 30%, followed by commerce 27%. and agriculture and construction which both employ 13%.
In 1983, Al-Ju'ranha in Makkah's district had a population of 1,700 living in 310 dwellings (and 1,100
vacant lots in modern subdivisions). The government sector was the leading sector accounting for
55%, followed by transport (21%) and trade (15%) all giving the tertiary sector a ninety percent share in
the town's economy. The agricultural sector employed only 3%. Muhammad Aslam Mughal," Land
Use in Rural Settlements of Saudi Arabia- Transition and Prospects," In Al-Ankary and El-Bushra,
Urban and Rural Profiles in Saudi Arabia (1989).
11 The modified form of this dwelling type prevalent in ahieaa Sha'abiyah is essentially an introverted
housing unit organized around the courtyard. It also called biout Sha 'abiyah (houses or residence of
the masses).

288
12 Doxiadis Associates (September, 1974).
13 This may be attributed to the Tapline's lack of interest; in their attempt to reap the greatest profits
possible, Tapline might have justified the building of modern communities though lacking appropriate
services, on the basis that the prevailing traditional and nomadic population would not appreciate such
modern novelties.
Royal Decree no. 8/6/1607 dated 15/9/1365H. (1935) dictated that undocumented or undeveloped land
belonged to the state, henceforth.
15 MOMRA's Circular no. 1855/4 dated 6/6//1390H. (1970) based on Royal Decree no. 5774 dated
26/3/1390H. authorized the transfer of residential land from the Tapline to Saudi workers free of charge.
Both decisions were built on Royal Decree no. 2720/1 dated 9/5/1376H. (1956) which gave Aramco's
workers free land to build their units which were financed by Aramco. MOMRA, 1975, Volume II,
157.
16
See for example, Royal Decree no. 2/1/13/1009 dated 17/6/1374H.(1954), no.l 1003 dated 8/5/86H
(1966), no. 24540 dated 1/12/1388H., and MOMRA's Circular no. 563/3 dated 26/2/1387H. (waw)
gave control over peripheral land to municipalities. According to Circular no. 23/5 dated 17/1/1395H.
and 381/5 dated 16/11/1395H. (waw) municipalities were urged to speed up the distribution of free land
to limited-income citizens to counter the illegal take over of public and private land by poor
immigrants. Circular no. 211/5 dated 6/7/1398H., for example, attribute the proliferation of squatter
settlements in various Saudi settlements to the slow distribution of free land by municipalities.
17 The conditions concerning construction and freedom to sell or rent were dropped In 1981, the year
which alone witnessed the distribution of 46,000 lots free of charge (Council of Ministers Order no. 59
dated 19/4/1401H. and 9698 dated 28/4/1401H and(C.1981)).
18 Circular number 15/5 dated 14/1/1398H. (waw) referred to municipal land and Circular number 1700
dated 25/4/1398H. (waw) concerned rural land. However, Circular number 1700 dated 25/4/1398H.
(waw) concerns land lying in villages and "cluster villages." It lists prices per square meter ranging
between SR 1 and SR4 (approximately $.25-$1.00).
19 For more details, refer to Royal Decrees no. 11003 dated 8/5/86H (1966), no. 437 dated 1/6/1398H (c.
1978), and no. 59 dated 19/4/1401 (c. 1981) concerning criteria for low-income groups (LIG) to qualify
for free land. Some of the conditions attached to an LIG's grant that he or she is 18 years or older,
must not own land or has previously obtained a REDFs loan. He or she must build within a five-year
duration and may not sell or rent the property without due process. The 1401H legislation was
amended in the Council of Ministers' Decision number 153 dated 9/7/1407H. (1987).
20 High Commission for the Development of Riyadh. Madinat Arriyadh: Lamahat Mukhtasarah (Riyadh
City: Brief Aspects) (Riyadh: Al-Obaican Press, c. 1989), 2.
21 Government legislation concerning the development of squatter settlements has been ambivalent. On
the one hand, there is strict interest in obliterating shantytowns within the urban areas (e.g. Council of
Ministers' Decision no. 977 dated 3/7/1388H. empowered municipalities to demolish shantytowns).
On the other hand, the government has been considerate toward the impoverished and "limited-income"
groups. For example, Royal Decrees no. 2410 dated I7/1/1386H and no. 1003 dated 8/5/1386H and
Circular no. 961 dated 21/4/1386H (waw) stipulated that squatters who own no land are entitled to land

289
free of charge. If such person was constructed a building on private land then his/her dwelling should
be demolished. However, if a person attempted building on public land, he or she was given the chance
to buy it and abide by current zoning regulations. Circulars 218/5 dated 18/7/1402 (waw) and 1528/11
(meem) dated 16/11/1401H (both based on Royal Decree no. 24422 dated 16/11/1401H 961) authorized
the creation of a special task force to review squatter settlements. Dwellings built before 1385H were
ordered to be demolished and dwellers were given instead a 400-m^ lot in a platted area. Royal Decree
no. 24422 dated 11/10/1400H. outlined measures to curtail the development of shantytowns.
22 This tendency toward militarization was aptly discussed in N. Safran. Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless
Quest for Security (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).
23 in return for their war services against the Turks, Sharief Hussein's sons, Faisal and Abdullah were
rewarded by Winston Churchil, then head of the British Middle East Department, as monarchs for the
newly established Transjordan and Iraq, then under the British. See for example, E. Monroe, Philby of
Arabia (London: Quartet Books, 1980), 107.
24 The significance of Arar was further highlighted by the Gulf War incidents, for the town lies 63
kilometers from the Saudi-Iraqi border.
25 The ISF is a branch of the Ministry of Interior, while the National Guard is a separate entity directly
connected to the King, who holds the position of the Comman'der in Chief of the national security
apparatus.
26 Ministry of Interior, Urban Design and Community Development In Saudi Arabia: A Case Study:
Internal Security Forces Housing Project, Vol. 1 (Jeddah: Tihama, no date), 9.
27 Ministry of Interior, Urban Design and Community Development In Saudi Arabia: A Case Study:
Internal Security Forces Housing Project, Vol. 2 (Jeddah: Tihama, no date),. 13.
28 This is a high cost when compared to the cost of an average REDF loan of SR273,425 in Arar. A fair
comparison must include the cost of land (a highly fluctuating value), the cost of servicing and laying
infrastructure and social services, landscaping, construction standards, and other public utilities which
are comparable to those found in the ISFs project.
29 s. A1 Hathloul and A. Amroush, "The New Cities and the Regional Planning Strategies: The Cities of
Tapline in Saudi Arabia," Unpublished paper presented to the "New Cities" Symposium (Jubail Saudi
Arabia, Rabi'a Aththani 24-28,1409, December 3-7,1989), 29 (translated from Arabic).
Doxiadis Associates, Northern Region: Urban and Regional Plan and Program for Improving Existing
Conditions , Final (Revised) Report No. 5, Volume 1 (Athens, Greece: Doxiadis Associates, 1974),
220. Approximate translation from Arabic text.
Doxiadis Associates, Arar, Existing Conditions, Report No. 5 (1974), 223.
32 ibid, 220 (translation from Arabic).
33 The master plan based on the standard super block concept was used in Riyadh, which was largely
duplicated as the "base blue-print" for other Saudi towns studied by Doxiadis Associates.

290
34 it could also be attributed to the lack of (1) control, (2) clear perception of users and (3) the long-term
range of the Doxiadis plan. In the case of the ISF housing development, the authority was vested in
the Department of Housing in the Ministry of Interior whose planners maintained full control on
dispensing land and funds to house specific users, at one point in time.
Doxiadis Associates, Northern Region, Major Plans: Arar, Final Major Plan, No. 40, April, 1975.
(Athens and Riyadh, Doxiadis Association).
36 By forgoing the opportunity to synchronize population growth and demand for land, distributing free
land, and the provision of community services and the laying of infrastructure, the government missed
the chance to control urban sprawl.
37 See additional discussion in Chapter Five.
38 in autocratic political systems, planning firms are likely to be encouraged, if not explicitly requested to
stay aloof of local politics and distributional issues and to avoid information that might reveal
shortcomings on the part of their clients, e.g. a state.
39 An example of urban development with full programmed government control over the distribution of
land and suitable community services is the ISF housing development in Arar.
40 Doxiadis Associates, Northern Region, Major Plans: Arar, Final Major Plan, No. 40, April, 1975.
(Athens and Riyadh, Doxiadis Association), 40; Special Report, "Arar" Al-Baladiyat, No. (1989): 14-
21.
41 Special Report, "Arar" Al-Baladiyat, No. (1989): 14-21. The number of loans may not equal the
number of units. A loan may be obtained to build a multi-unit apartment building.
42 As discussed in the section on land tenure, Chapter Five, the government ministries share the
responsibility of the bulging modern Saudi urban forms. Because their urban projects call for the
construction of large compounds and communities, it is procedurally easier and cheaper for departments
to request peripheral parcels of land which are usually owned by the government rather than seeking
intown land, geared toward individual buyers in the private market. Moreover, its difficult to deal with
intown land when ownership is in the hand of many individuals.
43 MOMRA, Atlas of Saudi Cities, Existing Conditions (Riyadh: Deputy Ministry for City Planning,
1987), 29.
44 MOMRA, Atlas of Saudi Cities, The Urban Domain (Riyadh: Deputy Ministry for City Planning,
1989), 30.
45
Royal Decree No. 13 dated 9/1/1406H (c. 1986).
4^ The government's effort to inhibit urban sprawl goes back to 1977. Royal Decree 117 dated
25/8/1397H. addressed the need to come up with solutions to the problems. These efforts culminated
in Royal Decree No. 13 dated 9/1/1406H.

291
47 A1 Hathloul and Amroush (1988) list 1987 figures of Arar's area. Citing an earlier version of the UD,
they contend that Arar's land needs for the first domain (up to 1995) are 414 hectares and another 549
hectares until 2005. Such estimates are based on the existing city area of 925 hectares as listed in the
Saudi Cities Atlas, Existing Conditions of 1987. However, the Saudi Atlas, Urban Domain was
based on studies summarized in the Saudi Cities Atlas, Existing Conditions. The UD which was
sanctified in 1989 lists an existing area of the city at 2,600 hectares (as opposed to the 925 hectares
originally listed in the 1987 estimates).

CHAPTER VIH
STATE-LED URBANIZATION TRANSFORMS AGRARIAN FORMS:
HURAIMLA, FROM AGRARIAN SETTLEMENT TO REGIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE CENTER
Huraimla is an old agricultural settlement, one of the many agrarian constellations
dotting the Saudi Najdi region. Its morphology and socioeconomic system closely
resembled and shared, though at a smaller scale, the overall attributes of Najd's preindustrial
settlements. Although it experienced considerable influence in the relatively
precarious war environment engulfing Najdi towns and villages, unlike Riyadh, Huraimla
did not benefit from locational characteristics, such as the proximity to the larger wadis and
was not located on an established trade route. Instead, this, the little settlement acquired
agricultural means to sustain its subsistence.
Like most Saudi towns and villages, Huraimla was soon to enjoy the sponsorship of
the central government. Though at a less considerable fashion than major cities,
Huraimla's quaint village-like form was gradual witness to unprecedented development
conforming to the major political and economic trends sweeping the Saudi society and its
urban system. For instance, Huraimla's population, which was estimated at 500
inhabitants in the late 1910s gradually increased to 3,870 by 1974 and reached 5,500 in
1986. 1 Between 1975 and 1987, Huraimla's population increased from 3,900 to 5,500
(or 3% per annum) while the total developed area of the traditional, old town increased
from 47 hectares to 407.62 hectares. Density decreased from 126 inhabitants per hectare in
the compact, old town to 14 inhabitants per hectare in the post-1968 "city." 2 With the
increased central government's role in the settlement's local affairs and financial support,
Huraimla was given its own bureaucracy: an imarah (house of ameer, principality or
governorship) headed by the ameer who presided over the various nascent government
departments' branches, namely schools, a health clinic and a police station. 3 Not only did
these "modern" functions add new land uses to the traditional settlement's built form, but
also the new functions generated migration disrupting the historical population stasis, for
due to better living conditions, the population demanded more and better urban facilities.
Huraimla began to witness the pulse economic growth that was caused, first, by
increased oil revenues, which created new jobs in the modern economy and led to the
emergence of a new division of labor outside the traditional subsistence economy

293
(inevitably calling for the importation of out-of-town immigrants, some of whom came
from nearby countries). Second, with disposable income in the residents' hands, the urban
economy prospered. For example, with more outsiders in town, demand for new housing
units ensued, which in turn called for growth in the construction sector's employment. The
improvement in households' income also resulted in the diversification and growth of
commercial uses and services. The simple, traditional socioeconomic structure of the
agrarian village has drastically been altered in response to the new changes and multiplying
effects associated with the modernization programs of the government enlisting oil
resources in the development of the nation's urban system(s). The goal of this chapter is to
outline the relationship between state-led development and the impact of such intervention
on Huraimla's urban development and form.
In this chapter, I will first discuss the locational and physical attributes of Huriamla.
Next, I will give a brief narration of the agrarian town's history and development, which
typifies the dominant cultural forces that shaped pre-industrial forms in Saudi Arabia, in
general, and Najdi towns, in particular. In the remaining part of the chapter, I will focus
on the urban development of Huraimla's traditional and contemporary forms with particular
emphasis on political forces sweeping Najdi town and, following the consolidation of the
nation-state, on the state's impact on the transformation of the local built environment.
I. LOCATION AND PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS
Huraimla is located in the Central Province, Najd, 86 kilometers north west of
Riyadh, the seat of the central government. Huriamla houses the amarah and municipality
for the Ashsha'eeb sub-region as well as the seat for branches of various ministries, hence
serving as the administrative center for the sub-region of Ashsha'eeb. Ashsha'eeb refers to
the relatively low, flat area formed by escarpments suffusing the desert basin which is
confined by rugged terrain of low mountains.
Ashsha'eeb comprises a number of arterial wadis and tributaries whose meager
though crucial running water explained the emergence of several villages and towns, Al-
Gareenah, Sodoos, Malham, Salboukh and Al-Barrah, all dominated by Huraimla.
Huraimla is located at the confluence of the major wadis suffusing Ashsha'eeb's basin
(Figure 8.1 and 8.2). Along with its relatively developed system of walls, the

294
,^\ , ' •
• v. *,>&>*>, , Huraimla
•-"TO :; J ' > • ' '
//I
Figure 8.1
Map of Saudi Arabia
(inset) shows the
location of Huraimal.
It also shows the treelike
system of valleys
and the location of
Huraimla at the locus
of network of
tributaries. Source:
Esa (1986).
i±r v
'»
-7V
( * .
L. V
J ^/S
/< »
A
/ y w rfv. \ ;i
,-, r
Figure 8.2
Huraimla is
surrounded with a
larger area of
farmland, a factor
which bestowed its
inhabitants with
sustenance and
enticed predators.
Source: A1 Tua'is
(1979).

295
Ashsha'eeb's topography helped residents in securing a steady, though sluggish and
precarious, development during the last four centuries. According to the 1974 census,
Ashsha'eeb sub-region had a population of 6,030 inhabitants. Huraimla alone claimed
3,870 inhabitants (64%) of Ashsha'eeb's total population. By 1987, Huraimla's
population rose to 5,500.
II. HISTORY: GENESIS
Throughout its relatively short history of five centuries, Huraimla has experienced
crucial episodes giving the town its distinctive character among the A'ard region which
includes Riyadh and Diry'ah, the cradle of the A1 Saud house. For example, Huraimla was
the first nominee for Mohammed bin Abdul-Wahhab's drive for religious reform known in
the West as Wahhabism. Ibn Abdul-Wahhab called for the reestablishment of the pure
teachings of the Prophet Mohammed who lived in the seventh century A.D. His reform
zeal set in motion a religious-expansionist drive which culminated in the creation of modern
Saudi Arabia. Huraimla was also the starting point of the second drive to unify the country
under the Al-Saud dynasty following the razing of Dyri'ah by the Ottoman viceroy in
Egypt, Ibrahim Basha in 1811. In 1259H/C. 1824 Huraimla's ruler, Hamad A1 Mubarak,
hosted Imam Faisal Bin Turky Al-Saud, the grand father of King Abdul-Aziz, the founder
of today's Saudi Arabia, following his escape from captivity in Egypt. Since its
establishment in the ninth century H (c. 15th A.D.), Huraimla secured a leading position in
the ensemble of settlements comprising Ashsha'eeb area. Nearby inhabitants and nomads
visited the settlement for religious advice by its qadi (judge or religious scholar) and for its
market.
Although a reference to Huraimla can be found in pre-Islamic and early Islamic
poems, sources point that the Huraimla area was part of a large territory owned by a
influential Najdi ruler. 4 However, the significant indication for actual physical, building
and agriculture, development goes back to 880H/1460 AD. It is commonly narrated and
accepted that the existing Huraimla was first developed in 1460 by the son of a prominent
tribal chief who lived in Syria. Yousuf Abo-Reeshah was told by his father, who
descended from Najdi origins and probably heard about the location, to immigrate back to
Najd in order to avoid the war then raging between some tribes living in Syria. Putatively,
Abo-Reeshah, following the instruction of his father, found in the relatively bestowed wadi

296
what met his criteria. Abo-Reeshah's sojourn in Huraimla lasted only thirteen years during
which he and his entourage established farms and built houses and encircled the new
investment with a wall which remains extant until today. According to the legend, Abo-
Reeshah decided to return to Syria partially due to the improved situation their. Following
the departure of Abo-Reeshah, the new estate enticed powerful neighbors. Huraimla fell
under the control of Al-U'taiyan and later under the control of ameer Al-O'aiynah, Ibn
Mu'mmar.
Huraimla's second physical development commenced in 1045H (c. 1625 A.D.) when
the A1 Abo-Rabbaa' clan purchased the estate from Ibn Mu'ammar, the ameer of Al-
O'aynah. Under the A1 Abo-Rabbaa', Huraimla prospered and developed sustainable
yields of agriculture and possessed livestock which aroused the interest of the nearby
settlements' rulers. The threat posed by Huraimla's neighbors warranted the construction
of several walls throughout its war-ridden history, a fate which conditioned the agrarian
settlement's traditional morphology. In 1138H (c.1718 A.D.), Huriamla entered a new
epoch following the arrival of Sheikh Abdul-Wahhab Bin Sulaiman Al-Musharraf, the
father of Mohammed Bin Abdul-Wahhab, who founded the eleventh century's Islamic
reform movement (Wahhabism). The arrival of Abdul-Wahhab Bin Sulaiman confirmed
the status of Huraimla in the largely impoverished region as a learning center in Najd.
Following the death of his father, Mohammed Bin Abdul-Wahhab pressed for more reform
which created confrontation by feuding factions of the towns' rulers. Mohammed Bin
Abdul-Wahhab was forced to leave the town following a failed assassination by an enraged
mob. In 1156H (c. 1736 A.D.), Mohammed Bin Abdul-Wahhab left Huraimla to O'yainah
and later to Diry'yah where he and Mohammad Bin Saud, the forebearer of today's Al-
Saud dynasty, agreed to commence the Wahhabi reforms in 1744. Since the departure of
Bin Abdul-Wahhab, Huraimla occupied a secondary role after Diry'yiah, which was under
the leadership of Abdul-Wahhab and Al-Saud.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADITIONAL BUILT FORM
Yosuf Abo-Reeshah's agricultural development occupied an area of 64.9 hectares,
and was surrounded by a formidable wall 3,075 meters long. 5 During Huraimla's warridden
history (c. 1500-1930s) five walls were constructed to shield the town from
marauding Bedouin's and neighboring towns rulers' expansionist attempts. The war
environment that characterized Najdi towns and villages conditioned its morphology. The

297
impact of these series of battles and interludes of peace time can be traced and identified
with the traditional integument of Huraimla, (1) the early, Abo-Reeshah's "scattered"
pattern (880-1045), (2) the compact formation following the control of Huraimla by Abo-
Rabba'a clan, and (3) the (multi-nuclear) compact-scattered growth. 6
A. "Scattered" Development: 880-1045 H. (c.1460-1625 A.D.)
The first structures of Huraimla's precocious v growth were laid by Abo-Reeshah
following his arrival in the Ash'aeeb area (Huraimla) in 880 (c. 1460 A.D.). Abo-
Reeshah's development is primarily defined by a wall, which was later named Hami Abo-
Reeshah. Cognizant of the value of the investment and the threat posed by the marauding
Bedouins nomads and neighboring towns' inhabitants, he swiftly laid a formidable 3,075-.
meter wall system interspersed with thirteen watch towers and three gates. The 20-foothigh
wall rimmed an area of 64.9 hectares of farms, including water wells and buildings.
Abo-Reeshah's wall continued to serve as an outer protective wall for several internal
walled developments in Huraimla and defined developed area during the first two centuries
of its birth.
B. Compact Pattern: 1045H/1625-1233H/1818
During the first two centuries following the departure of Abo-Reeshah, Huraimla's
inchoate development was marked with clusters of structures and farms grouped around
water wells. This pattern was abandoned when the region passed through a period of
insecurity marked by incessant bursts of raids and battles. Huraimla's built form reflected
two overriding factors. On the one hand, Huraimla's residents reeled under persistent
threats from outsiders. Especially in a region that was marked by penury, Huraimla's
tenuous prosperity enticed rancorous interests by neighbors and Bedouins. Faced with
such threats, residents were forced to live close together. On the other hand an atmosphere
of feuds between families had also compelled some dissenting households to build separate
quarters and encircle them with walls. Huraimla experienced a recrudescence of feuds that,
coupled with migrants joining the settlement's growing population, caused the proliferation
of different walled clusters which characterized the town's traditional built form.
However, the process of building did not go outside Abo-Reeshah's walled area.

298
The phase of the compact pattern witnessed the development of three new walled
quarters, all within the confines of the original Abo-Reeshah's wall {Harm Abo-Reeshah).
The oldest of the three walled quarters was that of Al-Hisian which was built during the
second half of the eleventh century Hegira (c. 1630-1680 A.D). Al-Hisian wall was built to
shield Huraimla's residents during a time of increased threat by outsiders. The 437-meter
wall encircled an area of 12,188 square meters (1.2 hectares) and housed all of Huraimla's
inhabitants leaving the farmed area unwalled. Meanwhile, after resurgence of family feuds,
a group of families moved to an area to the northwest of Al-Hisian's quarter and within the
Hami Abo-Reeshah. The new settlement comprised two quarters, Al-Barahah and Al-
Igdah (literally the knot), combined formed a much larger area than the old Al-Hisian
(compact) quarter and offered ample area for future expansion (Figure 8.3). A wall was
constructed around the two new quarters and was named Al-Igdah. Al-Igdah's wall was
462 meters long and encircled an area of 12,312 square meters (1.2 hectares).
As Huraimla's population increased, the process of building new quarters continued,
attesting to an era of prosperity rarely matched by its counterparts in the region. Four
nuclei of new quarters appeared during the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries H. Al-
Malqa and Garrashah were built during the period when Huraimla hosted the prominent
reformer, Mohammed Bin Abdul-Wahhab whose efforts to rejuvenate the pure beliefs of
Islam attracted interested students to the town (c. 1140sH/1740s.). Ibn Abdul-Wahhab's
house lies in this area. The period also witnessed the outcropping of another two new
quarters, Numailan and Al-Henini.
The twelfth century H. brought an outburst of attacks by outsiders. Huraimla's amir,
Hamad A1 Mubarak built a new, wider wall in an effort to offer all the scattered clusters
comprising Huraimla with one, combined wall. The new wall was named Al-jama'ah (or
group) connoting its grouping of the scattered walled areas of Al-Igdaha and AL-Hisian.
The Al-Jama'ah wall was built large enough to include a sufficient area of farmland, which
was sought to give residents security and a necessary supply of food. The Al-Jama'ah wall
was 1,550 meters long, and rimmed an area of 155,688 square meters (15.6 hectares) The
wall system also included thirteen watch towers and five gates. The wall served as the
town's major walled area for the coming two centuries until it fell to ruin during the early
fourteenth century H (c. 1900) and its remains were completely razed by Huraimla's
municipality in 1387H./1968 to allow for the expansion of the town.

299
The historical
development of
Huraimla's system of
walls and quarters
Figure 8.3
• rfu ••• -• .w ""'j 5
. T v:c-:: -v •--:>/
A.-.C- -*'• ..^SM • .J"--' -.- ..
-^p*>* r *fl8OT3te •• v*-"' -' - ' s
reflected the
inhabitants' great
emphasis on security:
(A) designates the first
wall, Hami Abo-
Reeshah, (B) al-
Hisian wall, (C) Al-
Iqdah wall, (D) al-
Jama'ah wall (or Alii
alad), (E) Ibn Gasim
wall (or Soor Ibn
Gasim). Source: Esa
(1986).
•I
Figure 8.4
Traditional Huraimla
before the construction
of the main road
through its compact
quarters. To the east,
new neighborhoods
sprouted with
modifications
accommodate the
increasing number of
cars. Private land
outside the wall was
platted forming
straight streets and
rectilinear lots.
Source: Al-Tua'is
(1970).

300
In an effort to compel the residents of the Al-Hisian's quarter to join the new larger
quarter of Al-Jama'ah, Hamad A1 Mubarak ordered the demolishing of the quarter and its
wall. This action resulted in the addition of two new quarters to the new Al-Jama'ah
quarter, namely Ghusaibah and Ashshahwani during the second half of the twelfth century
H. The compact pattern phase lasted for one century, during which a total of nine quarters
were established. The total area of these quarters constituted forty percent of Huraimla's
extant traditional urban form (i.e. medina) occupying 86.5 hectares. During its compact
patterned growth, Huraimla's built area did not cross the walls of Al-Jama'ah, nor its
developed land, that is agricultural development, crossed the boundaries of Hami Abo-
Reeshah. 1
C. Compact-Scattered Growth: (c. 1140sH/1740s.)
The drive to rejuvenate the essentials of Islam by Mohammed Bin Abdul-Wahhab and
Ibn Saud consolidated the warring factions among Najdi towns by shifting neighboring
settlements' energies from perennial confrontation and violent skirmishes to a common
enemy at the frontier of the rapidly expanding realm of the Wahhabi state. By endorsing
the Wahhabi reform, and in return for peace, Huraimla offered its support and allegiance.
During this respite of peace, new quarters sprouted outside the walled settlement to the
southwest. Houses and farmland proliferated outside Hami Abo-Reeshah for the first time
in Huraimla's development history. Farms outside Hami Abo-Reeshah's wall
accommodated 72 percent of the town's stock of farmland. Simultaneously, the building
process inside the Al-Jama'ah walled mass continued in response to natural increases in
Huraimla's population. During the last decades of the thirteenth century H. (c.1860-1890).
Two new quarters, Mowafig and Al-Wositah grew in response to demand for land by the
growing population. The two quarters added 15 percent of mass to the compacted area of
traditional Huraimla. Nevertheless, the area within the walled Al-Jama'ah compact form
offered sufficient area for growth until the explosive growth of the 1960s (Figure 4).
But the interlude of peace did not last and soon the scourge of war lingered again.
During the 1810s, Ibrahim Basha, the son of the Ottoman viceroy in Egypt, Mohammed
Ali, in an effort to combat the Wahhabis, marched toward Diry'ah in an expeditionary force
with a substantial surplus of tribesman. 8 Basha was instructed to lay waste the capital of
the Wahhabi capital, Diry'ah then under the control of Saud ibn Abdul-Aziz ibn

301
Mohammad (1803-14) the grandson of Mohammad ibn Saud, the co-founder of the
Wahhabi cause. Ibn Saud, who hoped that a well-defended Huxaimla would serve as an
additional defense against the marching forces of Ibrahim Pasha, ordered the ruler of
Huraimla, Musa ibn Gasim, to build the longest wall ever, commonly known as Soor Ibn
Gasim. The 6.5 kilometer wall which surrounded the entire developed territory, buildings
and farms, encircled an area of 2.9 square kilometers (290 hectares). The wall system
included twenty watch towers and several gates. Huraimla managed to survive the scourge
of confronting the unprecedented army of Ibrahim Pasha who, after meeting with
representatives of Huraimla headed by Hamad A1 Mubarak, agreed to safeguard the
destruction of the town.
Following the destruction of the Diry'ah, Najd entered an era of political hiatus
interspersed with waves of disorder. The expansion of Huraimla's traditional physical
environment typifies building processes of pre-industrial Najdi oasis towns. Under
conditions of the perennial war environment, meager water resources, geographic isolation
and adherence to stern Islamic teachings, the traditional Najdi built environment evolved.
In the dramatic developments following the promulgation of the new Saudi nation state, the
Najdi traditional model of physical development ceased to exist, and the traditional built
environment has since undergone a profound metamorphosis under the modern political
economic and technological imperatives. In the remaining part of this chapter, I will
discuss the early, gradual changes which emanated from the new political and economic
order and the later (post-1970s) dramatic incidents which forged the contemporary built
environment in the Kingdom.
IV. POST-UNIFICATION HURAIMLA: TRADITIONAL (1900-1970) GROWTH AND
POST-1970S "PLANNED" GROWTH
The unification of Saudi Arabia under King Abdul-Aziz brought a new era of farflung
security, growth and prosperity. The consolidation of power in the form of a central
state meant the cessation of feuding towns' populations engaging in an ongoing struggle
over the meager resources offered by the desert environment. The establishment of a
modern state ushered in political stability and, due to the discovery of oil in enormous
quantities, economic support under the aegis of the central power focusing the population's
energies toward growth, ostensibly starting in, and reflected upon the physical
environment.

302
Huraimla offers an interesting case study in which an agricultural-based subsistence
economy town gave way to a service economy (by 1982,57% of Huramila's working
force was employed in the tertiary sector, of which the government services, by 1989,
accounted for 55% of the town's labor force). Two particular phases can be discerned in
the urban process which followed the emergence of the nation state in 1932. First, as the
town underwent slow, yet steady economic development, Huraimla grew following a
modified vernacular architecture, using new design styles and imported building materials.
This pattern dominated in the newly built structures until 1968. Second, with the
multiplying of central government's wealth, Huraimla's population increasingly aspired
toward the modem modus vivendi: the wholesale adoption of modem conveniences such as
the car, electricity, and a massive array of consumer goods, made possible by the
government's modernization programs. During this second phase, Huraimla entered a new
era of "planned" growth: marked by centrally-ordained growth controls, eclectic
architecture and the rectilinear layout of lots and circulation space. Because urban planning
as practiced by municipal authorities is based on instructions by the national government, a
process which has been essentially applied equally to most of today's Saudi settlements,
Huraimla's new growth would inevitably resemble other suburban development in other
Saudi settlements. 9
A. Modified Traditional Growth
The confluence of political stability, economic prosperity, and improved health
provisions resulted in steady natural population growth nationwide. The government
allocation in modernization programs, though first targeted for large cities, trickled to
smaller settlements. Despite the national trend of city-ward migration by villagers and
towns' residents to Riyadh and other major cities, Huraimla's population increased
gradually from a mere 500 inhabitants during the late 1910s to 3,870 in 1974 and reached
5,500 by 1987. Demand for new buildings started with vacant areas, within the Al-
Jama'ah wall, by filling open spaces and substituting the old, ramshackle stock.
Nevertheless, the building process during the formative decades of the Kingdom (1930s-
1960s), or prior to 1960s, the decade which witnessed the inauguration of the municipality,
remained within the confines of the Al-Jama'ah wall.
Meanwhile, citizens aspired to the land outside the walled area, for the curving
property lines inside the compact walled town did not suit the trend to larger houses with

303
rectangular forms. In 1965-66 the government authorized the establishment of the
municipality, baladyyah, to serve the growing town and the five settlements comprising
Ashsha'eeb's area (county). 10 In 1968, Huraimla was connected with Riyadh by a tarmac
road, which brought mixed results to the hitherto largely isolated settlement. On the one
hand, it facilitated the transporting of Huraimla's crops to the expanding markets of
Riyadh, hence rejuvenating the town's agricultural sector. On the other hand, with a fast,
easy commute, Huramila's residents more than ever sought the Capital for their shopping
needs, which dealt a blow to commercial activity in the town.
To the north and north-east of the Al-Jama'ah wall, and following the new tarmac
road, new land subdivisions were platted by land owners with the supervision of the
municipal staff. The new neighborhoods were laid down with larger, standardized lots of
15-by-15 meters, to suit the modified traditional house type served with wider, straight
streets (Figures 8.5, 8.6 and 8.7). Moreover, land prices inside the walled settlement were
overinflated making peripheral land more attractive. Lastiy, the new land subdivisions
offered an opportunity to build anew at the improved construction standards in the newly
subdivided neighborhoods, rather than building the "modernized" units and buildings
amidst the ramshackle mud houses with their meandering and narrow circulation space.
Al-Hillah, Assubaikhah, Attawail'ah, Azzaidani, Ashariy'ah, and Um-Alkhawabi,
Al-Khawi, and Almarizah grew in response to the rising demand for larger and better
equipped houses (Figure 8.4: 12-21). The process of converting farmland to subdivisions
was made possible by municipally prescribed growth controls and planning regulations.
Unlike the building processes in traditional built forms, where demand for new land was in
response to actual need for space, contemporary growth has mostly been speculative.
Owners of peripheral farms, who sought municipal approval for platting, opted northern
growth, ostensibly following the tarmac road leading to Riyadh. Moreover, the northern
expansion was inevitable, for the traditional, walled built mass was besieged with wadis,
farms and cemeteries. The new Imarah (principality), the court, the police department and
the municipality were the first to move to the modern part of town.
Meanwhile, the traditional compact walled town seemed anachronistic, its tortuous
and ill-serviced, technologically-lacking mud dwellings did not rhyme with the rising
sentiments of residents in the progressive £lan of modernization sweeping the Kingdom.
Al-Tua'is captured the common attitude,

304
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305
The built form of present Huraimla embodies the accumulation of years of
political tides which forced its structures to the confines of walls. Its
expansion conformed to the size of its inhabitants, security, and their
superficial and limited vision to the planning of the town [sic], the similitude
of all other villages and cities of Najd up to recent time. The outcome was a
city of narrow alleys, short and meandering streets, some of which are deadends,
non-hygienic and/or covered/roofed, all followed no controls but
random expansion [sic]. 11
B. Urban Planning: Intervention In The Built Environment, The
Introduction Of Municipality
For the purpose of this case study, urban planning is defined as the objective
intervention in the built environment to attain a predetermined set(s) of social goals. On a
larger-scale, it involves the rational application of means to predetermined ends, to regulate
urban growth, given the prevailing means and considering competing alternative. Given
the first definition, the creation of the municipality in 1965 could be considered as the
benchmark for "modern" urban planning in Huraimla. The inauguration of the imarah
(principality), the establishment of a police power, public schools, and municipality
(baladyyah), have been an embodiment of the increasing role of the central state in the local
affairs, including the management of the urban development process. As a government
institution, the baladyyah derives its support and instruction from the Deputy Ministry for
Municipalities and Rural affairs at Riyadh. This means that decisions concerning local
urban growth and management must first be sanctioned by the central agency.
Simultaneously, the baladyyah also implements numerous circulars, decrees and
ordinances that are priori ratified and codified by the Council of Ministers. It also meant
that the customary building practices which characterized the traditional building processes
are subjected to nationally adopted municipal codes. Nevertheless, for the local population,
the establishment of the municipality has been perceived as synonymous with
"modernization."
To Al-Tua'is, as well as to many of Huraimla's inhabitants, the inauguration of the
municipality, with its technical modus operandi, constituted the deus ex machina which
often was perceived as a crucial step toward modernization of their archaic town. The
traditional compact form, with its tortuous, narrow circulation space and partially

306
Figure 8.7
The municipality's
modernization practices took
the form of bulldozing the
town's center to allow for
new building and wider,
straight streets. The new
structures were hastily glued
to the organic fabric without
respect for traditional
architecture and design.
Source: Al-Tuai's (1979).
m GIB estate
rajj)
£S C.j«J
KJa u^r
do
(
Figure 8.8
With more funds, the
municipality has presided over
the modernization of the
quaint traditional built form.
Map shows the impact of
municipal public works such
as the laying of the main road
which penetrated the compact
towns and the demolishing of
some parts to allow for the
construction of new buildings
and streets. Source: Esa
(1986).

307
dilapidated, mud houses had become an impediment in the path to modernity. Al-Tua'is
asserts
Yet, the opening of Huraimla's municipality in 1385/86 (c. 1965) constitutes
an important civilized leap in the history of planning the city [sic]. For it
contributed to its change through the implementation of projects, one after
another, according to plans each, in the long run, suits its [Huraimla's]
progressive period as part of the Kingdom at present. In addition to the
widening of the old streets, [the municipality] also has embarked upon the
demolishing and laying of wide avenues as it aspires to eliminate the
haphazard [sic] layout of the city during the coming twenty years, and the
overseeing of rapid urban growth, the coordination and modern residences
according to styles which suit the needs and hygienic requirements. 12
The municipality has since led the march to a new growth suited to the exigencies of
the modern age. The combined impact of widespread use of the automobile, the increasing
population, rising living standards, and the acculturation brought about by modernization,
all justified seemingly radical intervention by the fledgling municipal staff. 13 Starting with
the demolishing of the Al-Jama'ah historical wall and its gates, the municipality
spearheaded the sudden departure from the vernacular standards of urban design and
building processes which forged the traditional built environment of Huraimla. Inside the
traditional fabric, the municipality embarked upon a program of modernizing the "archaic"
fabric, implementing surgical operations that disemboweled the compact walled settlement.
Since its creation in 1968, in its efforts to "modernize" the ramshackle quarters, the
municipality bulldozed a significant proportion of the meandering alleys of Huraimla to
allow for the construction of new buildings, streets and parking space (Figures 8.5-8.7).
Old buildings that lay in the way of the automobile were mercilessly demolished to allow
for wider, straight streets suited for the car. Al-Tua'is, who marveled at the active role of
the municipality, likened the municipality's intervention as being "civilized touches", that is
the introduction of hygienic standards, implementation of new services and expanding
circulation space to allow access for the increasing traffic brought about by the rising
number of automobiles, despite the loss of the historical buildings. 14
In 1968, the municipal staff presided over the demolishing of the traditional central
suq area of Al-Mashab as part of the municipality's modernization program. The old suq ,
which comprised twenty six small (2 by 3 meters) shops (stalls), some of which stood for
the last 150 years old, was razed. The dilapidated structures were replaced with rows of
larger shops built with concrete. While the need for a larger commercial area (suq) was
justified by the fact that the crammed central area and its tiny shops could not be adopted to

308
the rising demand for upgrading the civic space, the municipal staff neither respected the
prevailing architecture nor the contour of the traditional massed area when it recreated the
new commercial center. In typical haste, the municipality substituted the quaint, organic
fabric with a cacophonous jumble of architectural styles, freestanding and patched to the
old adjacent structures.(Figure 8.8).
Following the construction of the new suq, the municipality turned to the old meat
market, which the staff did not deem compatible with municipal hygienic standards. The
improved town's economy resulted in a rise in income by residents and expatriates who
were imported to work in the various sectors of the economy, hence demand for better and
more local crops and imported goods multiplied. A new specialized market for meat and
produce was constructed in 1969. In addition, a new, well-equipped abattoir was
constructed outside the town offering free service to the town's meat merchants and the
public. The municipality paid the full cost of the two projects which amounted to SR
392,200 ($98,000) a considerable sum by the town's standards during that time.
Meanwhile, the municipal staff was considering a profound move to build a new
roadway which would split asunder the traditional tissue. In 1973, the municipality
completed the construction of the 15-meter wide street which penetrated the old town, and
connected the towns' tree-like circulation network to the road leading to Riyadh (Figures
8.5-8.7). The municipality paid SR600,000 ($150,000) for the compensation of
properties, and the paving and lighting of the central road project. In the process, some of
the buildings were left half-demolished lending a scene reminiscent of a war-torn zone.
The project of the central road did not include funds for landscaping. 15 Nor was minimum
respect paid to the old system of open space. With the destruction of the traditional fabric
to allow for the new road a tenacious network of social ties and neighorhoodness were
shattered as well. Consequently, in addition to the half-demolished dwellings, a tier of
buildings adjacent to the road fell to ruin as residents evacuated the area due to the inroad
on the residents' privacy brought about by traffic generated by the new road (Figure 8.9).
If anything has marked the municipality's enthusiasm for modernity then it was its
undisputed and remarkably negative attitude toward traditional architectural heritage. This
apathy could be attributed to the substantial number of foreign-educated technical staff in
the municipal staff, most of whom were foreigners, hence less attentive to local heritage.
The anti-vernacular attitude must also be blamed on the calculated attempts by the state to

309
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310
coax the traditional society into modernization. Saleh A1 Hathloul (1981) addresses the
government role in sponsoring large-scale development which borrowed heavily from
western urban design and architecture. Such wholesale adoption of paradigms inspired the
new shift to alien ones. Yousef Fadan (1983) highlights the additional impact of the
government's broadcasting, press and publication campaign on the population's clamorous
substitution of traditional building practices with imported ones. Fadan, commenting on
the unique role of government propaganda in facilitating its developmental goals, states
It was served not only to foster a favorable mode regarding the government
and to build for its political support, but also to create a climate conducive to
national development....More important to realize, however, is that the
information heard on the radio, or read and seen on the pages of newspapers
and publications all complement one another in focusing the public attention
always on national development. 16
According to Fadan, the government-controlled media has provided the "psychosocial
stimuli" to advance its development goals and cajole the population into the
modernization path the state chose to follow in a cautious balance with traditional Islamic
values. Fadan noted,
In fact, in almost all official statements for major projects or development
policies stress the conformity of the goals and policies to the Islamic law and
the society's cultural heritage. On the other hand, terms such as "tamadon"
(civilization), "al-tatawar" al-mi c mmari" (architectural progress), "al-iCmarah"
al-mu c aasirah" (contemporary architecture), "al-taqaddom" (modernization
and progress) are among the many terms presumably utilized to raise the
general level of aspiration and to provide a climate for national
development. 17
The municipality-sponsored projects, including street widening, lighting and garbage
collection, etc., were totally funded by the central state. For example, the municipality's
projects ("improvements") between 1965 and 1973 totaled SR992,000 ($282,857).
Between 1973 and 1976, the municipality contracted projects and services that cost
SR840,395. During 1976, the municipality was contemplating a package of projects
totaling SR20.8 million. In 1976 alone, the municipality presided over projects under
construction that totaled SR4.9 million ($2.8 million). 18 Between 1965 and 1976, the
municipality's staff spent SR40.5 million on various civic tasks, including cleaning,
garbage collection, street widening and the like. During the same decade, the number of
municipality's staff increased from 13 to 33 employees. The municipal staff was also

311
responsible for issuing building and small business permits, supervising the compliance of
construction and businesses to legal and other established growth standards, and also the
platting of subdivisions.
By not being responsible for the financial burden of upgrading the old town and the
provision of community services, such as potable water, garbage collection and the
construction of streets and municipal buildings, and other collectively consumed services,
residents have become the beneficiaries of these government funded projects. As long as
the municipality was willing to pick up the various civic improvement's and services
expenses, residents were expected to do nothing but appreciate and marvel at the palpable,
free services offered by the state. With its adept technical staff, the municipality has placed
itself as the chief player and space organizer in contemporary Saudi urban systems. With
local politics muted, the new imarah and the baladyyah have preempted the decisionmaking
process which traditionally was carried out by local city notables and town's amirs.
Likewise, the newly established government functions, school directory, health and police,
and other administrative agencies, along with the state's sinew and fiscal backing, have
rendered traditional influence of town's notables obsolete. Their traditional roles have been
emasculated and dwarfed by the newly established, well funded government agencies.
Stripped from their political power and status, city notables felt diffident as they could not
match the municipality's 61an and the principality's ultimate control over the everyday
affairs of the local community. In short, the municipality has become the agent for urban
change, the arm the central state could depend upon to facilitate physical transformation
(Figure 8.10).
C. "Planned" Growth: Land Subdivisions In The Traditional Town
Like almost all Saudi settlements, Huraimla's share in oil wealth was inevitable. The
inauguration of the imarah (principality), the establishment of a police power, public
education, and the establishment of the municipality (baladyyah) in 1965, were an
embodiment of the increasing role of the central state (at the local level) in the local affairs
and building practices of Huraimla. Starting with the second national five-year
development plan, the state set explicit guidelines to develop rural areas, partially to mollify
city-ward migration and attain a balanced rural-urban development. 19 The municipality is a
government institution which derives its support and instruction from the Deputy Ministry
for Municipalities and Rural Affairs at Riyadh. This meant that decisions concerning local

312
XT",1^4^
Figure 8.10
The municipality lead
urban development in
Al-Hazm during the
early 1980s: (A)
shows a major
intersection, (B)
Huraimla's new 100-
bed hospital, and (C)
a typical subdivision
comprising central
(Friday) mosque,
park, large asphalt
space, and the villa
type housing
overlooking wide
boulevards which
symbolized status and
perceived compatible
with the new
technology, all
reflected the departure
from traditional
architecture. Source:
Author (1991).

313
urban growth and management must first be authorized by the Deputy Ministry for
Municipal and Rural Affairs at the Capital. Likewise, the municipality also implemented
numerous circulars, decrees and ordinances that are apriori ratified and codified by the
Council of Ministers. It also meant that the customary building practices which
characterized the traditional building processes were supplanted by institutionalized national
municipal codes. The application of these codes en masse at the national level has
contributed largely to similar urban forms in Saudi Arabia. In the pre-industrial, pre-Saudi
urban environments, different regions in the country developed unique morphologies
highly adapted to their physical and cultural systems.
Still, to the local population, the establishment of the municipality has been perceived
as synonymous with "modernization," and an arm of the wealthy state. Already by the
close of the 1960s, Huraimla's growth followed the east and north axis of the new tarmac
road leading to Al-Garinah, a village a few miles to the east, and Riyadh, 50 miles to the
southwest. As land prices rose, farmers converted their farm land into residential uses.
The municipal staff would plat their properties into rectilinear subdivisions, with straight
and wider streets geared toward the accommodation of the automobile. Land was
subdivided according to the gird, with streets 25 feet wide to allow for the car. The new
houses in the area immediately east and north of the demolished al Jama'ah wall, were built
comprising hybrid styles, essentially conforming to the post-mud pattern found in the
ah'yaa ashsha'abiyah (popular neighborhoods or communities) in Riyadh, Arar and many
other Saudi settlements. These units are built on rectangular lots, with no setbacks from
streets and neighbors and, like their predecessors, the mud houses, included a courtyard.
The ah'yaa ashsha'abiyah 's model house is a modified version, a middle-step
residential unit which accompanied the transitional period from the mud house to the
modem villa. It is built with cement bricks and roofs were reinforced with wooden beams.
It was tiled and finished with newly adopted building materials, such as cement tiles, metal
doors, wooden or metal windows with glass and outside shutters. The "post-mud house"
was equipped with electrical wiring and sanitary fixtures, and later with aircooling units.
Figures 8.4 and 8.5 show the differences between the town's organic organization of built
cells and circulation spaces in the old settlement and the new modified neighborhoods
eastern (Ashshariy'ah and Attwail'ah) neighborhoods (Assubaikhah) with orthogonal

314
layouts to the north. Figure 8.11 illustrates the modified post-mud house common to the
ah'yaa ashsha'abiyah.
By the mid-1970s, the municipality had turned from the process of limited surgical
practices of demolishing the historical tissue to allow for larger concrete buildings and
wider streets, to the wholesale laying of land subdivisions according to its standardized
land subdivision by-laws. Land subdivisions 307 and 314 extended the city's built area
north toward the Riyadh-Gasab regional road, while in the historical suq area, land
subdivision number 382 dealt with the redevelopment around the old central mosque in
1980. To the southeast of the historical town, subdivision 329 was also platted. The total
area of new subdivisions (307, 314 and 329) added 21.9 hectares to the walled area, only
two hectares less than the combined area of the twenty two small quarters comprising
traditional Huraimla (Figure 8.12).
But vigorous government spending aimed at development in the 1970s* ushured in a
flurry of construction which rendered the three subdivisions insufficient to meet the
projected needs of public, social services and residential land. For example, the number of
construction permits issued by the municipality increased dramatically from 16 permits per
year in 1971 to 48 permits per year in 1974, and rose steadily to 162 in 1978 (Table 6.1).
Faced with the prospect of skyrocketing land prices in the limited area north of the town,
including subdivisions 307,314 and 329, due to high demand for land, the municipal staff
frantically looked westward, across the wadis and farms besieging the old town for new
land to develop. Despite opposition by residents who invested in northern growth, the
municipality's director spearheaded the effort to win the approval of the central government
to subdivide the Al-Hazm area, two kilometers west of the placid old town. 20
In short, prior to the 1970s, Huraimla's development took the form of creating new
neighborhoods and the demolishing of old, ramshackle structures inside the traditional
fabric by the municipality to allow for new streets and structures. Yet, the piecemeal
practice of demolishing structures for streets, implementing hygienic standards and
documenting building processes in the traditional, walled town was not the only scope of
the municipal staffs activity. During the 1970s, the government extended its free-land
program to enable citizens to build their own homes and businesses. Following the central
government's approval, and to encourage popular west-bound growth, Huraimla's
municipality expedited the delivery of the newly subdivided government land free of charge

315
Figure 8.11
Starting during the 1960s, new neighborhoods grew outside the wall reflecting residents'
improved living conditions. The new houses were designed around the courtyard without
setbacks and with modified architecture adapted to the new novelties (e.g. electricity, air
conditioning and municipal potable water. Source: Author (1991).

316
iiifcES:
iQsai
Figure 8.12
Al-Hazm (New Huraimla) is located approximately 1.5 miles to the west of the compact
walled town. It encompassed land subdivisions (1, 2,3,4,5,6,10, the central
government services, the new sports area, and the industrial zone). Around the old town,
the process of land subdividing continued apace on private, previously farm land 7,8,9,
11,12,13,14,15,16, and 17 (see Table 8.1). Source: MOMRA, Urban Domain for
Huraimla (1991).

317
to virtually all those who applied for a grant. The municipal staff with alacrity hastened the
delivery of needed lots to ministerial departments waiting for land to commence their
projects. The baladyyah commenced the radical shift by presiding over the construction
spree in New Huraimla starting with the construction of its own office complex.
D. Al-Hazm: "New Huraimla" (1979-Present)
According to Al-Tua'is (1979), early builders of Huraimla valued security over
potential natural disasters; since its birth in the ninth century H (14th A.D.) the town has
been under incessant threat from raids and floods. Old Huraimla is besieged by a system
of wadis, tributaries, and creeks from all sides but a small area to the north, which is
obstructed by a deep-cliffed mountain range. Moreover, considerable land lying within
Huraimla's vicinity has been utilized for agriculture; while the remainder was used for
cemeteries, all factors which contributed to the lack of available developable land. Given
population projections, Huraimla's northern option proved incapable to meet the town's
rising needs for land. Despite the opposition by some land owners and residents, who
favored northern growth, Huraimla's municipality's staff vehemently and resolutely led the
effort to move the city to Al-Hazm area, which offered a vast expanse of land, two
kilometers west of the old town. The fact that the Al-Hazm lay in an area that was
government owned served as a stimulating factor to start anew unconstrained suburban
development at standards which matched those followed by the Kingdom's leading cities
(Figures 8.13 and 8.14).
In Al-Hazm, the municipal staff envisioned a central service area (subdivision 398)
housing a modern hospital, a new municipality, schools and an array of public facilities,
whose construction funds had been assured by the central state (Figure 8.15). Al-Hazm
offered a viable alternative to the extant natural constraints to growth in the old town where
land prices skyrocketed and had become an obstacle to growth. Moreover, by moving to
Al-Hazm, the municipality averted the onerous task of squeezing the newly state-offered
projects into the traditional town where developable land was scarce. In addition,
considerable land lying in the walled town and the surrounding farms were owned by
families locked in a maze of inheritance and property rights. This rendered the
expropriation of land for the new projects and new dwellings a formidable task. Such
expropriation would have involved large funds, a factor which also might have resulted in

318
Figures 8.13
By the late 1970s some Huraimla's inhabitants turned to the villa as the preferred type of
residence. However, the wide adoption of the villa was largely due to municipal land
subdivision regulations which established the setback system. Source: Author (1991).
Figure 8.14
A new land subdivision in the Al-Hazm area ("New Huraimla"). Source: Author (1991).

319
lid
t)3acs
• 1 11 iffrhj =3
asin>==| KSBiiSggrg
ecDefrn^s
I li Hllri
iTTTTiggSTl
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Figure 8.15
Al-Hazm comprised
gridiron-patterned
land subdivision on
public land. Lots
were distributed free
of charge to the public
by the government.
Source: MOMRA,
Urban Domain for
Huraimla.
Figure 8.16
Huraimla
contemporary
developed area.
Source: MOMRA,
Urban Domain for
Huraimla.

320
the suspension or the loss of the proposed projects by the central government, the
municipality and the local population yearned to attain both for need and prestige. 21
In 1977, the municipality began the free land rush in Al-Hazm area, or "New
Huraimla." The first two land subdivisions (310 and 319), which were approved for
distribution of 1,196 residential lots, readily covered an area of 144 hectares. By 1985, the
Al-Hazm development comprised seven new subdivisions including 310 and 319,
comprising 2,600 residential lots occupying an area of 3.08 square kilometers. The lots
took the rectilinear form with dimensions of 20-by-20 for lower income groups and 30-by-
30 meters for minah grants (land obtained through royal courtesy) and the setback villa
was the official residential pattern for single housing units. The Al-Hazm development also
included a subdivision, 354, for recreational use, and subdivision 398 for government and
commercial services. To encourage small-scale, service-oriented industries, the
government offered interest-free loans and rent land at nominal prices ($0.08 per m 2 ) for
industrial establishments. Huraimla's subdivision number 346 was designated for
industrial uses in compliance with the state industrial incentive program. By 1987, the total
platted area of Al-Hazm amounted to 3.85 square kilometers, as opposed to the old village
non-farm, developed area of 0.84 square kilometers, including the 0.24 square kilometers
area which laid within the old, walled town). In short, out of the 329.9 hectares of
residential land subdivisions since 1972, only 32.3 were converted from private land,
while the remaining 396.7 hectares were government land which underwent privatization.
Although the Al-Hazm offered a viable alternative to the next-to-town growth, due to
its free land factor, Al-Hazm did not negate conterminous growth of Huraimla proper.'
Huraimla's planned northern growth continued following the tarmac road to Riyadh, yet at
a slower pace. In the area adjacent to the walled town, the municipality also approved
subdivisions 144, 147, 152, 161, 245, 307, 314, 318, 321, 329, 334 for sale to the public
(Figure 8.12, subdivisions 7 through 9 and 11 through 17). However, land owners were
forced to keep their land prices competitive and in tune with the overall factors shaping the
land market.
The demand for more minah (gifts by the King in the form of plots) free lots
continued uninterrupted, by both residents and other Huraimlawis who lived outside
Huraimla. The free land program, although giving priority to lower income groups and
town residents, was also expanded to outsiders who wished to apply for land in

321
Huraimla. 22 Between 1970 and 1975,20 hectares were added to the town's area. In
addition to land inside the walled area (either on demolished mud houses and/or in small
farms within the wall), the area north of the town in particular, was targeted in the post
1960s. Between 1975 and 1980, another 30 hectares were added to the old compact mass.
In 1989, the area of Hiiramila's residential use jumped to 329.9 hectares, and a total urban
area reaching more than 407.62 hectares (Table 8.1).
Because of Huramila's unique terrain, which limited the prospect of connected,
uninterrupted growth with the old town, and due to the dramatic economic developments
since the 1970s, detached suburban development ensued which resulted in a bipolar urban
form. Al-Hazm comprises the modern, planned, serviced part of the town, while the old,
compact area is the old town. As such, and to some extent, Al-Hazm can be considered as
an example of a wholly planned community more than a suburb. Table 8.1 corroborates
the dramatic government-led urban process: centrally-controlled municipal planning,
construction of public projects, generous housing subsidies (through the REDF) and the
private sector's pro-growth promotion, and distribution of free public land for residential
and industrial uses.
Yet, Huraimla's expansion to Al-Hazm ("New Huraimla") was not merely the
function of local market forces of supply and demand at inertia. Rather, the bold decision
to transfer the town's administrative and public center and substantial residential tracts for
residential use two kilometers to the west, must be seen in light of the policies and
programs implemented by the central state. Since its promulgation in the 1930s, the
government has been allocating substantial sums of capital in the provision of basic social
and physical infrastructure and public services and suburbanization-oriented policies. In
short, the transformation of the traditional built environment must be placed in the context
of political, administrative, and economic developments that have been orchestrated by the
central state. 23
5. The Urban Domain (1989-Present)
With the increase in national oil income in the 1970s, the state has been engaging the
traditional society in ambitious developmental programs. The modernization of the
economy has been supplemented by urban policies, such as free and subsidized housing,
agricultural loans and the distribution of free land to virtually all qualified adult residents.

322
Table 8.1
Number of Lots/Buildings In Old and New Huraimla (Al-Hazm)
Subdivision Type of Approval Area No. of No. of %
Use Date (ha) Dev.
lots
Old Huraimla* Mixed - 23.8 367 - -
144 Residential 1980 0.49 24 0 0
147 Residential 1980 4.2 11 0 0
152 Residential 1981 0.53 18 8 45
161 Residential 1982 0.46 18 10 55
248 Residential 1975 1.04 14 0 0
307&314 Residential 1977 25.6 229 2 0.9
318 Residential 1978 42 42 0 0
321 Residential 1978 0.4 4 0 0
329 Residential 1977 6.1 20 5 25
334 Residential 1978 3.8 20 7 35
310 Residential 1977 78 744 334 45
319 Residential 1977 73 355 127 36
370 Residential 1980 39 446 14 3
384 Residential 1980 40 376 1 0.3
423 Residential 1983 40 300 6 2
437 Residential 1984 9.5 42 0 0
453 Residential 1985 36 240 0 0
346 . Industrial 1980 38.5 n.a. -
Zone
354 Sports Area 1980 15 n.a. -
398 Gov.& 1982 24.2 n.a
-
Services
Total 407.62 2,902 514 17
* Old Huraimla comprises 22 quarters (neighborhoods). Sources: Isa, S. (1986), 17,37, Report On The
Domain of Urban Development For Huraimla City (1989), 50.

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In Huraimla, to encourage and expedite the transfer of new residential, commercial,
industrial growth to Al-Hazm area, the municipal staff stepped up their efforts to win royal
approval to give out free lots to the public. Because land lying immediately within the
vicinity of the old town was essentially private and mired in complex property rights, and
because of their rising prices, the transfer of new growth to Al-Hazm was only a matter of
time.
Al-Hazm was essentially subdivided en masse at one point and lots were distributed
free on a random basis. Applicants rushed to take advantage of the free land offer although
some did not intend to actually build in the near future. Recipients either built or sold their
lots for cash and used the money to buy land in another location that suited their needs. In
both cases, the construction flurry which was made possible by the REDF loans and the
Land Distribution Program (LDP) fueled a spate of speculation in the real estate market
unprecedented by the town's standards. These lucrative ventures brought mixed results.
On the one hand, investment in the real estate market brought additional income to
participants and prosperity to the construction industry. On the other hand, the speculative
practices also resulted in higher prices close to the center, where services, for example
schools, existed, hence causing a continuous centrifugal movement toward the periphery
where land prices were less expensive. Due to the fact that few recipients actually intended
to build on their lots, dispersed growth marked new suburban development in Al-Hazm.
Some of those who obtained land through the Land LDP did not originally intend to build
in the near future, for some land recipients did not live or work in Huraimla, and could not
build their own homes for lack of sufficient funds, or lived with their parents. 24
Moreover, plots were also received by those who had lived or showed proof that the
applicant descended from one of Huraimla's families, though do not live in the town.
The combined effects of demanding free or less expensive land at the outer rim where
the government guaranteed free infrastructure and assured the provision of social and
public services helped the spread of the urban area ahead of actual need. By 1987,
Huraimla's bipolar urban form reached a total area of 407.62 hectares, out of which 31
percent was developed and only 17 percent of residential lots in subdivisions, since 1972,
were actually built. 25 Consequently, the urban area continued to bulge outward
inefficiently. 26

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To counter this inefficient growth of Saudi settlements, largely caused by their
modernization programs, the government introduced the Urban Domain (UD) in 1986, as
mentioned earlier. Huraimla's UD was adopted in 1988. Accordingly, its,peripheral
development would be subjected to controls limiting growth to two phases, 1995 and 2005
respectively, based on analyses of general trends in each town, the needed developable
land, type of public services needed and quantities to be allowed per phase (Figure 8.16). 27
The UD projections were meant to help government planners allocate sufficient funds for
the coming two decades in line with the national five-year development plans.
Table 8.2
Huraimla's Land Uses, Current Area and Future Needs (in hectares)
Land Uses Existing Existing Needed Land Needed Land
Area Area by 1995 by 2005
(hectares) (%) (hectares) (hectares)
Residential 51 10.8 20 27
Commercial 0.7 0.15 2 3
Mixed (Comm. Res.) 0.5 0.11 1.5 3.5
Industrial 0.2 0.04 1.5 4.5
Government (public)* 24.73 5.3 8.57 6.95
Government (private)** - - - -
Public Services/Utilities 30 6.4 6.3 8.14
Agriculture - - - -
Historical 1 0.2 - -
Open Space 20 4.3 1 1.5
Restricted Areas - - - -
Land for Future 342 72.7 233 107
Development
Total Area 470 100 273.87 161.59
Total (commulative) 470 - 743.40 905.00
* Area designating Government (public) denotes local and regional administrative services.
** Denotes governmental land that is currently or reserved for military and security departments. Source:
Atlas of Saudi Cities: Urban Domain (1989), 15.
Table 8.2 shows current and projected land uses based on 1987 surveys of Huraimla.
It tallies the trend of the large share of government ownership and management of
considerable land uses and functions in contemporary urban forms. Huraimla's new
industrial zone, which accounted for 38.5 hectares is owned and rented by the municipality
to establishments at subsidized, nominal fees, while "public services," "open space,"
"restricted areas" are controlled and developed directly by the state. The total area of these
land uses amounted to 73.4 percent of the total developed area of Huraimla in 1987. When

325
compared to the traditional built environment, the private (mostly residential) uses
accounted for the majority of the mass area. What could be considered public space in the
traditional environment was that of circulation, religious and cemeteries; all the remaining
space was private.
SUMMARY
The role of the state in shaping the product of the spatial map of Huraimla can be
summarized in the following points. First, the state has set the standards of the
contemporary urban forms by using its prerogative right to make decisions concerning
municipal zoning and land use regulations. Second, the central government has*contributed
immensely to the production of the modern spatial system, both in character and scope, by
directly allocating funds for construction and maintenance of public, military and social
services, all paid by the government without the imposition of taxes on the inhabitants.
Third, the indirect role of the state must not be underestimated. By offering free land, the
government has increased the number of landed population dramatically. Also, through
REDFs generous free-interest housing loans, the central government has increased the
number of home owners, and specifically expedited the adoption of the villa, the hallmark
of Saudi contemporary housing forms. Since the establishment of REDF in 1975,
Huraimla inhabitants have obtained 346 loans, with costs totaling SR85.5 million ($23.75
million or $68,654 per loan), which amounted to 42% of Huraimla's 818 unit housing
stock. These provisions helped recipients gain extra income which consequently
contributed to the improvement of the construction sector, and, through the multiplier
factor, gave impetus to a nascent private commercial and service sector.
The promulgation of the new nation-state has ushered in a new era of peace and
security to the Kingdom's settlements. In its efforts to modernize the nation, the
government has supplied administrative, police, social and public services to every
settlement based on various criteria, including population size, urban economy, and
national security, among others. The inauguration of the imarah (principality), the
establishment of a police power, the resumption of public schools, and the establishment of
the municipality (baladyyah) in 1965, embodied the increasing role of the central state in
the local affairs and building practices of Huraimla. The municipality is a local government
institution which derives its support and instruction from the national Deputy Ministry for
Municipalities and Rural Affairs at Riyadh. This means that decisions concerning local

326
urban growth and management must first be authorized by the central agency. In addition,
the municipality has implemented numerous circulars, decrees and ordinances which were a
priori ratified and codified by the Council of Ministers. This government intervention,
manifest in its local agencies, in general, and the municipality in particular, meant that the
customary building practices which had characterized the traditional building processes
have been supplanted by national municipal codes. Yet, for the local population, the
establishment of the municipality has been perceived as synonymous with "modernization."

327
Notes to Chapter VIII
1 H. St. John Philby, Arabia of the Wahhabis (London: Constable, 1928); Mohammad H. Abo-Sin,
"Tawziea' Assukkan fee Imarat Huraimla" [Population Distribution in Huraimla's Principality] In
Imarat Huraimla: Dirasah Joghraphiya wa Maidaniyah [Huraimla's Principality: Geographic and Field
Study] (Riyadh: Islamic University of Imam Mohammad Bin Saud), 289-314; Ministry of Municipal
and Rural Affairs (MOMRA), General Directory for Municipal and Rural Affairs, Riyadh Region,
Taqreer Nitaq Annomou Al Omrani Lee Madinat Huraimla [Report on Domain of Urban Development:
City of Huraimla] (Riyadh, MOMRA, 1989).
2 According to MOMRA's definition, a settlement is considered a "city" if it contains a municipality.
The presence of the political amarah, which houses the town's ameer (town governor), the
municipality and the other government administrative organs, health, educational and police, and
commercial services all justify the elevation of a village and/or a town to the status of city. Ministry
of Municipal and Rural Affairs (MOMRA), General Directory for Municipal and Rural Affairs, Riyadh
Region, Taqreer Nitaq Annomou Al Omrani Lee Madinat Huraimla [Report on Domain of Urban
Development: City of Huraimla] (Riyadh, MOMRA, 1989), 25.
3 Actually, in addition to his bureaucratic role, the ameer serves as a ceremonial, paternalistic viceroy of
the King, in the town. The ameer reports directly to the Ministry of Interior and usually performs
duties similar to the King at the local level. He accepts petitions, intervenes on behalf of citizens to
the various government departments in his domain and the central power. The town's ameer
coordinates the tasks of the representatives of the various ministries in his territory and solicits advice
and agreement when necessary, though each representative reports directly to his ministry at the central
government for approval. In short, unlike the traditional chief who used to be one of the major and
prestigious clans of the town or a tribe, the modern (administrative) ameer combines the paternalistic
character of the traditional chief with the tasks of the bureaucrat.
4 It is documented that the whole area belonged to a prominent tribal chief named Houthah Bin Ali Al-
Hanafi. He was contacted by Prophet Mohammed who asked him to join the new religion of Islam.
Al-Hanafi, fearing to lose some of his status, refused. Saleh Nasir Al-Tua'is, The Geography ofAl
Shai'eeb Area: the City of Huraimla, (Riyadh, unknown press, 1979).
5 Al-Tua'is, (1979), op. cit., and Salah, A. Esa, "Madinat Huraimla: Nasha'tuha, wa Nomouwha Al
Omrani (The City of Huraimla: Its Birth and Urban Development), In Imarat Huraimla: Dirasah
Joghraphiyyah wa Maidaniyyah [Huraimla's Principality: Geographic and Field Study] Second Part,
(Riyadh: Islamic University of Imam Mohammad Bin Saud, 1986), 8-46, based on archaeological
evidence.
6
Esa (1986).
7
Ibid., 32.
^
The force was said to consist of a brigade comprising 2,000 cavalry, 5,600 infantry, 12 guns.
9 Not all settlements received equal funding by the central government. Settlements were variably
bestowed due to many factors such as the settlements strategic role, based on economic and/or
sociopolitical criteria.. For example, the allocation in modernizing the nation's military has bestowed
tremendous funds on some Saudi towns and cities. Cities of Hafr Al Batin, Khamis Mushait and

328
Tabuk have been transformed into bustling military bases. The Holy cities of Makkah and Madinah
received tremendous sums of capital from the state due to their religious status.
I consider the year 1968 a watershed in Huraimla's urban history. Huraimla's Municipality, which was
inaugurated in 1386H/1965, started subdividing the land north of the walled, compact town ostensibly
following the grid iron system and lots were larger by traditional standards.
11
Al-Tua'is, 181.
12 Al-Tua'is, 183, (author translation).
13 Saudi citizens living in villages and towns were affected by urban strides which they confronted during
their visits to major cities such as Riyadh, where the economically better off population had adopted
architectural elements in the design of housing units and other buildings. The interaction between the
country's population and the government's intensive pro-modernization propaganda through the
government-controlled press, and government-owned television and radio broadcast systems have
expedited the wholesale adoption of the mostly Western architecture (see for example Faddan, 1983).
1 4 Ibid, 225.
15 Clause Four of the Council of Ministers' Decision No. 977 dated 3/7/1388H (1968) stipulated that,
once they were compensated, property owners are responsible for the clearing of the remaining
demolished buildings or building walls or to hide the remaining parts.
16 Yousef M.O. Fadan, The Development of Contemporary Housing in Saudi Arabia [1950-1983]: A
Study in Cross-Cultural Influence Under Conditions of Rapid Change. Unpublished Ph.D.
Dissertation (Cambridge: MIT, 1983), 182.
1 Ibid, 186.
1® By comparison, during the same period (1965-1976), Riyadh's Municipality allocated SR2.9 billion
($828.6 million). Arar's municipality, an agency with a staff of 85, spent SR 85.1 million. Ministry
of Interior, Deputy For Municipalities, Annashrah Annisflyah Lee lhsa 'at Al Baladyyat: AnnisfAl
Awaal, 1392H (1976) [Semi-Annual List For Municipal Statistics, First Half (Riyadh: Ministry of
Interior), 176.
l^ In its official publications and media, the government has been emphatic about the its commitment to
"...balanced regional development" and "the provision of basic services to all citizens in the Kingdom."
See for example, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, Summary of the Fifth
Development Plan, 1410-1415 (1990-1995) (Riyadh: Ministry of Planning Press), 85. The Plan
earmarks SR38.9 billion for the total planned public expenditures for municipal programs throughout
the nation for the five-year period.
20 MOMRA, Circular No. 563/3 dated 26/2/1387H (1967) (letter waw), gives municipalities development
rights over undeveloped land surrounding towns and cities. Royal Decree No. 11003 dated 8/5/1386 H
(1966) authorizes municipalities to subdivide speedily and sell lots to citizens according to defined
nominal prices. The Decree also permits municipalities to allot lots of 400 to "limited-income"
citizens free of charge.

329
21 For example, the estate al Al-U'daibyyah is owned by tens of households whose members descend from
the same grand parents and whose descendants live all over the country. This makes if difficult to sell
the estate without the collective agreement by the members or their legal representatives. Because
those affected by its sale are numerous, the monetary return per member included in the will is
minuscule, hence no reward or incentive warrant its sale.
22 See for example Royal Decree no. 7,800 dated 10/7/1380H (c.1960), which stipulates a royal
permission for granting land; no. 11003 dated 8/5/86H (c. 1968), no. 437 dated 1/6/1398H (c. 1978),
and no. 59 dated 19/4/1401 (c. 1981) concerning criteria for lower income groups (LIG) to qualify for
free land. Some of the conditions attached to an LIG's grant that he or she is 18 years or older, must
not own land or obtain a REDF loan, among others. However, citizens can also request a royal grant
by applying for land without the necessary LIG status. The King is entitled to grant land to individuals
under certain rules. In this case, a citizen may be granted land in any locality in the nation, depending
on the availability of land that is undergoing distribution by a government agency, i.e. the
municipality.
23 The phenomenon of rapid conversion of large peripheral tracts into land subdivisions has characterized
contemporary development of virtually all Saudi settlements. For example, in Hafr Al-Batin, which
lies in the northeast of the country, land speculation has, by 1979, extended to an area which can
accommodate the needs of a population of 411,000, or 26 times more than its current population. This
population figure would take 65 years to be realized (assuming a 5% annual population growth). A. H.
Azzahrani, "Dirasat fee Hajm al-Moroor wa Attanabou'at Al Morooryyah" (Studies in Traffic Size and
Traffic Projections.), Unpublished paper presented to the Symposium on Planning and Design.(Riyadh:
King Saud University, March 25-26,1986), 3. In the case of Madinah, the city which houses the
prophet's mosque, hence revered by Muslims worldwide, developed plots comprise 30% of all the
subdivided plots, and "are scattered in fragmented subdivisions." Walead Abdulaal (1990): 728.
24 According to the LDP program, adults, 18 years or older, are eligible for free land. At this early age,
many conform to the "limited income" condition in the LDP program and few are likely to build a
house in the near future. See for example, Council of Ministers' Order No. 437 dated 1/6/1398H, No.
59 dated 19/4/1401H, and MOMRA's Circular No. S'ad/9751 dated 29/8/1407H.
25
MOMRA (1989), 24.
26 For discussion of land tenure in Saudi Arabia see the elaboration in the special section on this subject
in chapter five on Riyadh.
27 In its efforts to control peripheral development, the government introduced the Urban Domain. The
UD includes government policies concerning right of services to peripheral land. The UD concept
started as early as 1977 (see Council of Ministers' Decision no. 1170 dated 25/8/1397H and MOMRA's
Circulars no. 641 dated 18/1/1398 H.(Kha), no 5942 dated 18/9/1398,1383 dated 24/3/1399H, no.
2492 dated 11/6/1399H (Waw), no. 1383 dated 24/3/1399H., no. 84 dated 24/7/1405H. and Council of
Ministers Decisions no. 7/1397 dated 1/1/1405H., no. 69 dated 9/8/1405H., and finally Council of
Ministers' Decision no. 13 dated 9/1/1406H. which halted the issue of land subdivisions for a period of
two years to give government agencies and municipalities time to ponder methods to control peripheral
growth.

CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION: ENVISIONING THE PLURALISTIC CITY
The essence of cities is not material accretion, but human action,
human institutions, human organizations.
- E.C. Monkkonen
During the last six decades, Saudi Arabian society has mutated from a predominantly
rural and nomadic society to an urbanized one, characteristically centered in cities and
towns. Even those living in rural areas have abandoned agriculture as the mainstay of their
previously subsistence economies and engaged in government and other service
employment, the major pillars of towns' modern economies. The previously tripartite
spatial system comprising the religious-trade towns of the Hijaz region, the scattered
agrarian settlements, and the nomads, has been transformed into an established network of
industrialized urban sub-systems. Yet the urbanization of Saudi Arabia was not simply the
result of population increase in cities. The concurrent rise in cities' share of the national
population depended on complex processes for which the concept of the nation-state offers
the beginning of an explanation, as I have shown.
Due to the dominant role of the state in urban process and the massive allocation of oil
revenues in modernizing the society, Saudi settlements evolved exhibiting a similar urban
pattern, character and landscape. Although largely modernized and distinctively
westernized technologically, the contemporary urban form has also been sparse and blind
to cultural values and physical context. The central argument of this study is that our
understanding of the Saudi city must consider the relationship between the state and the
society, for such a relationship determines the state's role vis a vis urban development.
This relationship has set the pace and character of state intervention in the urban process.
In Saudi Arabia, the emergence of the monarchic nation-state and government-led
industrialism has transformed the urban landscape so that the present Saudi city differs
dramatically from its historical predecessors.
I have argued that the promulgation of the nation-state in 1932 constituted the turning
point in the traditional stasis in Saudi Arabia. The consolidation of power under King
Abdul-Aziz and his progeny transferred the hitherto dispersed control over the nation's
isolated communities to the new political center, Riyadh, the seat of the Royal family. This

331
polarization of power under the King was soon to be reinforced with the flow of oilderived
funds dispensed from the capital; the funds were then allocated to the growing
settlements. Under the new nation-state, the society enjoyed a new sense of security and,
thanks to the government's encouragement, aspired to progress.
A promising life seemed more than ever attainable in the growing major towns and
induced migration to the cities. Small villages thrived. A few evolved into regionaladministrative
centers. As the nation-state guaranteed protection and security, urban forms
grew out of their walled enclaves and, with vigorous government modernization programs,
exploded into a sprawl, leaving behind atrophied cores. At the periphery, the ease and
simplicity of low-density land subdivision preempted any rigorous physical planning. In
short, the rise of the Saudi nation-state has resulted in the emergence of a new typology of
national government backed settlements composed of administrative cities, industrial cities,
and military towns, in addition to the ancient holy cities of Makkah, Madinah and
commercial cities like Jeddah.
Due to the prevailing political character and structure of the monarchic government
and its prerogative right to oil revenues, it is reasonable to view the contemporary urban
network under the monarchy as a system of unified settlements which fed on a central and
dominant capital, Riyadh. This channeling of oil revenues to local communities gradually
supplanted the settlements' traditional economies, hence reinforcing the economic
dependence of cities, towns and villages on the central state. Further, it contributed to the
political integrity of the fragile and nascent nation-state. Modernization, which has been
effectively employed by the government, can also be seen as a legitimizing instrument in
the volatile political environment of the Middle East generally and of Saudi Arabia, in
particular. Moreover, owing to the peculiar developmental stage of the traditional,
impoverished and illiterate society during the formation of the new nation-state, consequent
urban development took place in a heavily centralized state-regulated framework.
This profound metamorphosis cannot be merely attributed to impersonal changes in
technology brought about by the new imperatives of the oil industry. Similarly, the whole
substitution of traditional built forms with modern ones cannot be attributed merely to the
shifts in responsibility and in the use of private ownership and residents' control of their
neighborhoods; that is, symptoms must not be confused with causes. Nor can the legal
system, a sub-system of a culture, be solely relied upon to explain the complex processes

332
comprising the whole. In short, an isolated understanding of cultural sub-systems does not
yield a complete picture of the complex urban process.
Rather, as this study has shown, in a traditionally-based political economic system
and other forms of autocratic states, spatial restructuring of the national urban network and
internal organization of built forms is better understood by the role the state plays in the
urban process. The nature and character of the government vis a vis the society determines
just how representative the decision-making process is, both in the society, and, in
particular, in urban planning. While the built environment is the product of cumulative
decisions in space, it particularly reflects the interests of the powerful actors in the society,
viz the state in this case study. 1 In non-democratic, developing political systems, attempts
to fathom urban processes that overlook the peculiar role of the state in social development
are very likely to end up with an only partially effective, if not erroneous, conclusion.
Indeed planners and urban designers need to understand the socio-political environment of
the local or host societies and devise methods suited for them.
In this study, particular attention was given to the profound influence and direct input
of the Saudi government on the departure from traditional building processes and the
wholesale adoption of Westernized, modernized urban forms. I have also addressed urban
planning as one component of the government's whole process of transformation toward
modernizing the society. Due to its absolute de facto power and control of the oil resource,
the Saudi government has preempted the decision-making process at the national level,
including urban planning activity and urban policy making.
From the early introduction of municipal legislation to bring order to the growing
holy cities of Makkah and Madinah in the 1940s, to the adoption of the Urban Domain
approach in the late 1980s, urban planning in Saudi Arabia has teen the domain of the
central bureaucracy. There are rich sources of information on which planners and
researchers can build. The creation of the so-called "Arab" oil towns, despite
shortcomings, is among them. Also included are the widespread use of grid land
subdivisions in suburban development outside the traditional towns, the resort to master
plans in larger towns, and the adoption of "model" planned communities.
In analyzing the transformation of the Saudi urban system, I have attempted to place
the urban process in the larger picture of the nation's sociopolitical and economic

333
development. This requires the examination of the state's developmental policies, its
political economic contexts and their direct and indirect impacts on the built environment. I
explored the various apparatuses the state has developed to maintain order in Saudi
settlements undergoing rapid urbanization and to achieve modernization. This process has
been compatible with, and complementary to, the monarchy's power and status in the
society, a path the government deemed in the best interest of the population.
I. CONTEMPORARY URBAN FORMS
The dramatic episodes of the first three decades of development (1930s-1960s) rose
to a crescendo during the 1970s and 1980s, two decades in which the Saudi city exploded
into a far-flung, though inefficient and cumbersome sprawl. In the three case studies of
Riyadh, Arar and Huraimla I have focused on the scope and character of government
intervention in the modern urban development process in the Kingdom. Thus, for
example, the previously compact, pre-industrial walled town of Riyadh grew into a
bustling urban sprawl teeming with freeways, mega-projects and myriad specialized urban
functions. Arar grew from an industrial camp on the pipeline, transporting oil to the
Mediterranean Sea in the late 1940s, into a regional administrative center and military
"outpost" in the desolate northern region of the Kingdom. The socially representative and
environmentally efficient built form of Huraimla shed its traditional integument for a bipolar
urban form whose discrete parts lie at odds with each other.
The implications of the social, political and economic developments on the
Kingdom's urban forms have been profound. Oil wealth facilitated the miraculous
emergence of the metropolis on the desolate desert landscape, while the political character
shaped it and largely determined its growth pattern. At the same time, the Saudi
settlements' internal structures have developed from the pre-industrial traditional forms of
the Middle Eastern-Muslim settlements to new, modernized urban areas, with increasing
division of labor and specialization of land uses. Due to the new centralized control, spatial
stratification in the modern metropolis is no longer endogamous, that is chiefly based on
family, tribe or place of origin criteria, a factor which shaped the composition of traditional
settlements' quarters.
Rather, access to living in modern neighborhoods is economic- based on the ability to
pay, and, in the case of REDF housing loans and land distribution by the state, to secure a

334
loan. The physical development of contemporary Saudi urban forms can be outlined as
follows. First, around the traditional compact form, a ring of "traditional suburban"
development took place outside the wall and abutting it. This "traditional suburban" ring
retained the very characteristics of the traditional urban processes, however, with little
modifications to allow for the introduction of the automobile, although a tendency to build
on a large scale also marked the early phase. Second, with the improving national income,
the trickle of urban migration soon became a flood as the national government diverted oil
revenues to the development of various settlements, a process which altered the spatial map
of the nation.
New communities, ah'iyaa ashsha'abiyah, sprouted, adopting new technological
improvements. The traditional mud house, comprising irregularly-shaped indoor spaces
clustered around a courtyard, was modified to the so-called "Arab" house which had larger
openings and was equipped with electrical and sanitary improvements reflecting the rising
living standards of the population. However, the development during this transitional,
intermediate phase, given the developmental stage of the government and the society, was
too frantic to permit adequate control. This phase also included the proliferation of
Bedouin camps and shanty towns. Third, by the 1950s, the villa, a freestanding and
outward-facing housing unit, was adopted by the royalty and the upper class. It
symbolized prestige and status. At the same time, another basically new form, the rental
apartment complex, began to line the major roads. The complexes had been introduced to
house the increasing expatriate population.
The 1960s witnessed the spread of the villa to the expanding middle-class, a group
which grew because of government employment and spending. The 1970s' government
subventions and suburban-oriented housing programs fueled suburbanization at an
unprecedented tempo. Finally, the suburbanization of the Saudi city reached an
unprecedented level in the 1980s when the distribution of free land allowed limited-income
groups to reach out for their share of the generous pro-sprawl housing subsidies.
Movement to the suburbs became attainable among the lower-income population. In
addition, with the increase of automobile ownership, the city's periphery became accessible
to families of modest means. By the late 1980s, the limited-income suburbs had
leapfrogged across the elegant boulevards, while the REDF-subsidized housing units
expanded beyond municipally-serviced areas. Modernized, sanitized urban forms- fancy

335
residential suburbs, megalomaniac government projects, commercial malls, glass and
marble-wrapped high-rise buildings, and freeways- bestowed an image of progress.
II. TRADITIONAL MEDINA VS. THE PRAGMATIC METROPOLIS
The following section comprises a discussion and an evaluation of the contemporary
built forms in light of the six traditional cultural attributes that were discussed in Chapter V.
Modernization programs, coupled with increasing technology, and the expansion of
bureaucratic control have caused the demise of traditional cultural attributes which forged
traditional built forms, that is the medina (Chapter V). The consolidation of the various
regions' "town-states" which constitute today's Saudi Arabia has focused the dispersed
populations' energies into one geopolitical unit, that is the nation-state. Nationalism, as
with technology itself, has come to substitute, in part, the traditional cultural values and
functions, operating in effect as a secular force (e.g. rational decision making and technical
urban planning) and as a key integrative mechanism in modern Saudi society. The state has
supplanted religion as the major force in shaping urban forms.
New modes of political control, urban design and planning, land tenure and
distribution policies, home ownership, and infrastructure provisions have emerged under
the auspices of the central state. In table 9.1,1 present a matrix outlining the major cultural
attributes in both traditional built environments, and the ones in the modern era.
A. Government and Political Control
The traditional amir around whom the political, economic and social affairs turned has
been replaced with a new political center: a powerful king aided with a complex
bureaucracy, oil revenues and a modern security apparatus. As power increasingly shifted
to the center, the state's economic aid to local settlements has eclipsed concerns over local
control, and the traditional amirs' powers which were based on subsistence economy have
eroded. At the local level, the town's amir (who traditionally represented his people) was
substituted with the bureaucratic amir, a viceroy who represents the king at the local level. 2
While in the past, the amir exercised substantial powers using discretion, consultation
with notables who represented major clans, and, if needed, coercion to maintain the
cohesion of his realm, the modern amir, with the help of the heads of the various local

336
CULTURAL
ATTRIBUTES
Government
Control
Economy
Urban Planning and
Design
Land Ownership and
Distribution
Home Ownership
Public
Infrastructure
Table 9.1:
Matrix of Cultural Urban Attributes
TRADITIONAL BUILT
FORMS
• Princedoms, Tribal sheikdoms,
Decentralized
(1) Inter-Settlements:
• Dispersed political nodes of power
• Minimum interaction with a
political center
(2) Intra-Settlement:
• Traditional authority
• Intricate system based on an
hierarchy of customary decisionmaking
forms of participation
• Local administration of residential
quarters
• Subsistence agriculture and pastoral
economy
• Atomistic markets
• Tax-based income
• Informal sector
• Local initiative
• Spontaneous growth,
• Governed by social norms
(as opposed to technical)
• Environmentally responsive
• Macroclimate
• Land was a social resource,
• Post development tenure,
• Irregular lots,
• Islamic inheritance law allows for
divisibility of property
• Shufah helped forge kinship-based
quarters
• Buildings determined lot shape,
hence town/ neighborhoods forms.
• Cooperatively financed and
Self-Help,
• Mostly local building materials,
• Extended family
• Residents maintained neighborhoods,
Waqf supported public services
• Minimum intervention by
authorities in local affairs
CONTEMPORARY BUILT
FORMS
• Monarchy, Nationalism,
Centralized
(1) Inter-Settlements:
• Hierarchical organization of centrally
administered regions, sub-regions and
settlements
(2) Intra-Settlements:
• The bureaucratic amir relies on and
coordinates a network of specialized
state agencies such as the
municipality, police, schools, health,
etc.
• Traditional (symbolic) viceroy
• Oil-based national economy,
• Nationally integrated,
• Diversified urban economies, highly
dependent on oil revenues through
government allocation mechanisms,
and employment
• Formal sector
• Excessively and central state activity
• Top-down
• Technical (secular)
• Western-inspired
• Microclimate
• Land as commodity
• Large-scale acquisition of land and
subdivision,
• Indivisibility of land
• Conversion of raw land based on
actual need and market speculation
• Credit: Private Institution
• Credit: state subsidized
• Largely imported building materials,
• Nuclear family
• Government provided

337
branches of the central government, coordinates bureaucratic functions to implement
national goals. 3 The new town's principality, the imarah, and municipality, the baladiyah,
and other central government branches served as surrogate organizations which
implemented progressive national modernization programs and urban planning legislation.
Consequently, local autonomy was gradually transformed into subservient administrative
parts of the central political order.
B. Economy
As previously mentioned, oil revenues have offered windfall income to the central
government. This has greatly diminished the significance of settlement revenues to the
central government, which abandoned reliance on towns' generated taxes (e.g. zakat) and
other sources of local revenue following the discovery of oil. Oil income has enabled the
central state to be a distributor of the natural resource, hence heralding an increasing role of
the elitist and paternalistic welfare state in modern urban economies. As oil revenues
poured into government coffers, the central state helped in the expansion of employment,
absorbing a large number of the working force, from the traditional sectors to the newlyestablished
public agencies (schools and health clinics, etc.). In addition, the massive
modernization programs helped in the creation of considerable jobs in the private sector,
and transformed traditional town subsistence economies into modern, diversified, yet
heavily subsidized urban economies.
Due to the expansion of employment outside the traditional sectors, new divisions of
labor ensued, which vastly contributed to the division of work and living spaces in the
contemporary city. Moreover, the booming decades of the 1970s and 1980s engendered
work opportunities which required the recruitment of skilled and non-skilled Saudis and
foreigners to the growing cities, bringing new lifestyles and values into every settlement,
hitherto closed to the outside world. The modern developments fostered the emergence of
a formal capital intensive economic sector characterized by regulated entry to the various
economic activities, reliance on imported resources (commodities, labor, technology)
corporate organization, large-scale operation. Indeed, the government underwriting of
local settlements' economies did transform the national network of settlements, changing it
from a patchwork of small villages thriving on agriculture and fishing into a national
complex of urban centers and settlements largely dependent on government aid.

338
C. Urban Design and Planning
Under pressures of urbanization, the state scrambled for expertise in urban
development. First, it sought oil companies' planners and, later foreign planning
consultants, to design communities for workers enlisted in the oil industry. Gridiron land
subdivisions were laid outside the traditional medina, in a hectic response to the
proliferation of shanty towns and squatter settlements. The flexible and socially-responsive
mechanisms that fostered the traditional built environment were overlooked.
The centrally funded and well-staffed municipality was soon to take over the
responsibility of maintaining neighborhoods and assumed the duties of providing public
works and services traditionally handled by settlements' populations without external
intervention. As an organ of the central bureaucracy, the municipality implemented
standardized technical regulations in the conversion of new land into developable lots en
masse.
Relying on foreign expertise and Western-educated Saudi professionals, the
municipality has, since its indoctrination, used secular (that is, technical and legal urban
practices largely molded after those developed under colonial powers in nearby Arab
countries) rather than developing local urban growth mechanisms based on local values in
the design of new communities and in the upgrading of old ones. Platted rectilinear blocks
containing large lots and wide boulevards shaped the post-traditional growth, outside the
traditional walls and in the new planned towns.
Newly laid boulevards were constructed besieging the compact cores, occasionally
and mercilessly ripping through their historical sanctity. Setbacks, partially a result of
acculturation as well as imposed municipal legislation, were widely adopted. Municipal
codes ignored issues of privacy. Under municipal and other prescriptive bureaucratic
procedures, neighbors could not object to openings that infringed on their privacy.
Likewise, the environmentally compatible traditional built environment with its
macroclimatic solutions stood in contrast to the modern metropolis, largely blind to the
harsh climate of the desert. In the metropolis, modern transportation and
telecommunications made it possible for the different land uses to scatter in space. A
relatively authoritarian, planning-by numbers approach has become the norm, substituting
technical know-how for local participation.

339
Whilst steps toward integrated national, urban and regional planning are now
apparent in the Kingdom, city planning is hampered by the very solutions which were
ostensibly devised to solve city problems and guide its growth: a sprawl marked with
indifference to environment, efficiency, and popular scrutiny. It is tempting to blame the
haphazard jumble of half-built land uses on the involved government agencies, but the lure
of suburban life- with its modern, tree-lined streets, spacious lots, sense of rising living
standards, generous free land and subsidized, pro-ownership housing programs- was too
enticing to government officials and inhabitants to await the development of a genuine
urban model. 4 Obviously, higher standards of living (better, spacious houses, potable
water networks, water-refuse systems, modern transportation and telecommunications,
social mobility in vastly expanding economic sectors) prevail now as compared to a few
decades ago, and surely millions of people have been comfortable housed. To a large
extent, the government, paternalistic as it has been, proceeded with what ever planning
expertise it deemed necessary to the betterment of the settlement physical and social
standards.
D. Land Ownership and Distribution
The booming decade of the 1970s witnessed unprecedented population growth and
deployment of considerable sums of capital in the building of cities. Initially, surgical
programs for the redevelopment or conservation of existing communities resulted in the
relocation of scores of city center inhabitants to the commercialized land of the suburb. In
effect, a process of displacement occurred in which ruralites and non-professional laborers
inhabited the dated traditional cores as nationals moved to the periphery. 5 New public and
public-private housing programs and large-scale government urban developments were
vigorously launched during this decade and the decade of the 1980s.
To comply with energetic development plans, which called for allocation of large
outlays in infrastructure, large tracts of land were moved from the public to the private
domain, subdivided and sold or distributed free of charge according to several criteria.
Real estate speculation became a grand obsession, in part because property was one of the
few secure forms of investments open to many. Virtually all social groups were engaging
in building and selling of property as a speculative venture, some as a secondary venture
besides their permanent occupation. By the mid 1980s, the Saudi government had
distributed 2.5 million parcels of land and lots, averaging one lot for every four citizens. 6

340
In a move to bring order to the growing cities, the municipalities subjected new
subdivisions to formulas which regulated the proportions of streets to building space,
percentage of built space within lots, and building type height. They relied excessively on
rationalistic by-laws planning in the layout of peripheral land, creating uniform and
monotonous streets and blocks.
The above approach culminated in the large-scale platting of zoned urban spaces and
the application of city master plans. Easy terms of land distribution policies enabled many
citizens to become landowners, some of whom lacked interest or the financial means to
develop their lots in the near future. However, with the increase in car ownership,
residences and other buildings were scattered amidst half-empty lots according to a mostly
market pricing system.
Although many citizens were able to obtain land under the government distribution
programs, their control over how to develop their parcels has become locked in obligatory
conditions under nationally standardized municipal guidelines. As such, the application of
traditional principles were discontinued. For example, the principle of shufa'a (the priority
given to a neighbor to buy property next door to them) was no longer sanctioned under the
new municipal controls or the legal system. Nor was subdivision of a property according
to Islamic inheritance law permissible. 7 Finally, the concept offina, a semi-private space
abutting the house, which traditionally belonged under the collective control of the house
owners, was now outlawed and replaced with rigid segregation of private and public (e.g.
street) uses.
E. Home Ownership
The influx of large numbers of people to the growing urban centers intensified the
demand for housing. Traditional methods of construction (based on meager credit and selfhelp)
fell short of meeting skyrocketing demand. Moreover, Islamic conventions have
slowed the adoption of Western-like credit institutions which helped in the creation of the
private housing sector in many countries. To help uplift the living standards of the Saudi
population, the government has invested substantially in the provision of healthy and
decent shelters. To fill the gap in credit housing markets, the central government
experimented with various housing programs, such as free and subsidized public housing
for government employees and subsidized private housing through the REDF, which gave

341
such a dynamism to suburban growth. Because of these programs, most Saudi households
have managed to move to modern housing, leaving their traditional mud and stone houses
to deterioration in the traditional cores.
F. Public Infrastructure
The influx of workers from the various Saudi regions and foreign countries has
rendered traditional rules of responsibility obsolete: modern cultural heterogeneity defied
collective responsibility among neighborhoods' residents. This has posed a challenge to
traditional roles collectively played by neighborhood members. With the suburbanization
of contemporary Saudi settlements, access to modern neighborhoods became a function of
land market pricing, receivability of free government land, or employment agency as
opposed to kinship. 8
Instead, without efforts to develop localism, that is buttressing traditional institutions to
accommodate modern technology and urban needs, traditional attributes and hence urban
continuity were disrupted; the state has assumed the leadership to modernize the society. A
first step was to improve the well-being of the population, as the basis for economic
revival. Economic development required the allocation of an enormous portion of oil
revenues to upgrade Saudi settlements' infrastructure systems and public services,
inevitably necessitating the importation of technology. The laying of new platted annexes,
equipped with electricity, telephone networks, sewage systems, piped water, and increased
automobile accessibility, all required the creation of specialized bureaucracies to handle the
new services. These modern functions would not have been possible through the meager
surplus offered by the traditional economies of towns. The national government has
emerged as the agent to pick up the slack.
With the coordination of other central government departments, the municipality has
presided over the maintenance and the construction of streets, parks, schools, fire stations,
police, bridges and other public projects and services all paid through the central state (not
through the waqf institution). Instead of allowing the development of local systems of
governance that could utilize centrally-supplied funds based on government-set quotas, the
government has expanded the tentacles of its bureaucratic apparatus to determine the needed
funds for development for every settlement.

342
The loss of local responsibility has been both a product of the preponderance of the
central government and local apathy, thanks to non-taxed aid to local communities. The
provision of modern infrastructure and public services, not only offered lucrative economic
outlets to locals, but also were offered without imposing financial burdens on the local
population. The increasing secularization of the Saudi society, coupled with the rise in
economic non-taxed aid to local towns, has expedited the secularization of the urban space.
Using secular-technical criteria, the municipality and other central government departments
have replaced traditional forms of responsibility, and have undermined religious
institutions, such as waqf.
The state's substantial involvement in the production of contemporary Saudi
settlements is paradoxical, one which poses an uncompromising reality: that is benefits of
central government control (with free services but loss of local participation) versus local
control of community's affairs with less government intervention. To the political
leadership, the underwriting of community development serves as a legitimizing factor as
well as a given right for all communities to share in the national natural resource, that is oil.
Yet, the sponsorship of the modern built forms represents an economic burden on the
central state and hinders self-sustenance in the long-term. To the population, however,
discontinuity of government aid poses an acute urban conundrum, a cessation of which
conjures an image of local disaster as local communities have become more and more
dependent on government aid.
All in all, the infusion of settlements with prescriptive urban legislation and planning
models, the underwriting of infrastructure developments and social services, the application
of standardized housing programs, land distribution patterns, and the construction of
government buildings of similar architecture design (schools, mosques, clinics, police and
fire stations, post offices, etc.), all have facilitated the production of modern built forms
which, while originated from distinctive urban patterns, grew to resemble each other
despite their geographic setting, urban economies or genesis. Consequently, the
diversified architecture of the various regions of the Kingdom have dissolved into one
whole.

343
HI. ENVISIONING THE PLURALISTIC CITY
What can be done to restore desirable traditional urban attributes as well as
authenticity and to promote economic independence while acknowledging modern time
exigencies (i.e. the political economic structure under the modem nation-state and
technology) is a crucial and challenging question which needs to be addressed in this
closing part of the study. In his analysis of modern housing development in Saudi Arabia,
Peter Rowe characterizes the contemporary urban landscape as "distinctly modern and
Western." 9 Yet the modernization of the built environment in Saudi Arabia has also
amounted to rigid, cumbersome urban sprawl out of sync with the culture and at odds with
the prevailing sterile desert ecosystem. The indulgence in Western suburbanization
conveyed a sense of prosperity which cloaked the increasing alienation of the desert
physical environment and masked the enormous social and economic cost of the bulging
sprawl.
Writing about the ramifications of modernizing traditional societies, C.E. Black stated
that, "at the heart of alienation is the impersonality of the societies in which the entire life of
an individual— work, home, nourishment, health, communication, recreation— is managed
by a variety of bureaucratic organizations that tend to treat individuals as numbers, bodies,
or abstract entities." 10 Anne Moudon (1988) contends, "A rigid or hard physical system
exists when the decisions of a few individuals affect the collective realm of the large
physical scale." 11 A major factor behind this rigidness in Saudi Arabia, I argue, has to do
with alienation, that is the distancing of residents from control over their immediate
environment.
Paternalism and a quest for socio-political order and oil wealth marked the Saudi
modernization process and shaped its urban form. Modernization theory presupposes a
positive relationship between socioeconomic development and political participation.
According to the theory, the spreading of political information and political awareness must
accompany socioeconomic mobility and urban modernization. 12 Yet central power has
accrued in Saudi Arabia at the cost of emasculating local communities' political
development. The government has orchestrated the society's change from traditional,
independent subsistence socioeconomic urban systems to consumer-based, service-oriented
and modernized ones highly dependent on government financial backing.

344
Such government intervention was predicated on the tacit conviction that the society
would be unable to transform itself without the active role and specialized organs of the
central bureaucracy. Ostensibly, the Monarchic government was skeptical that the mostly
illiterate and underdeveloped society could meet the increasing pressure for change brought
about by oil industrialization, without the commanding role of the state. Thus the decisionmaking
process, including urban planning, has increasingly concentrated within the central
bureaucracy, a realm under the control of the King. At the local level, the degree of control
over the environment was drastically diminished with the creation of the central
bureaucratic municipality, rather than the local community. To bring about change,
residents have had to rely on a ponderous municipal system and other constricting
procedures, a process entangled in a bureaucratic labyrinth.
In good city form, Lynch contends that the betterment of a city can be induced by
improving its "fit," that is "to put the control of it into the hand of its immediate users, who
have the stake and the knowledge to make it function well." 13 Lynch considers a "good
place" to be "one which is appropriate to the person and her culture, makes her aware of
her community, her past, the web of life, and the universe and of time and space in which
those are contained." 14 To mollify the rigid, bulging, environmentally incongruent and
impersonal Saudi built forms, a decentralization of central power is necessary and timely.
Centralized, technocratic and technical urban planning must gradually give in to local
control of urban development.
The delegation of power to local communities will help foster indigenous political
personality and, thus on the urban level, infuse pluralism in urban planning and design. In
the realm of urban design, an intricate system of organizing open circulation and built
spaces should adhere to formulas that both meet and guarantee neighbors' needs for
privacy and mollify the harsh desert environment of the Kingdom. This could be attained,
for example, by gradually empowering local municipalities to form local governments with
elected officials.
Local control might be attained by reestablishing traditional forms of city controls,
that is the notables' role (e.g. the mukhtar and the omdah) in shaping their districts or
quarters. Then community residents could propose creative measures reflecting their needs
in their immediate built environment as opposed to the existing impersonal, spaceless and
standardized regulations of the central bureaucracy. Within the new municipal

345
government, a greater flexibility would be granted to local districts to establish procedures
by which, for example, land allocation and other forms of subventions are granted on an
actual needs basis. For example, absenteeism and lax land development controls are at the
center of the present urban sprawl. This results in costly infrastructure and an ineffectual
supply of public services at the city scale. Land distribution policies can be controlled by
local communities and delivered to those able to utilize them.
By increasing local participation it is hoped that locally determined measures would
help relieve the vexing problem of scattered development which the Urban Domain was
introduced to solve in the late 1980s. Finally, municipal governments may be encouraged
to compete in attracting central government funds on a feasibility basis which, in the longrun,
aims at creating economically solvent urban economies. Ultimately, towns could
economize urban development. In short, I argue for environmentally compatible,
efficiency based, and collectively justified urban development.
The hope for the political realm is that diverse patches will result in a quilt of
personalized urban communities, as opposed to the prevalent hard, rigid and singular
physical systems. Economically, the government's overburdened commitment to finance
local, spread-out urban forms will presumably be lessened by local supervision of the
distribution of land to eligible recipients and allocation of public services and utilities to the
population. Bureaucratically, the process of reestablishing local participation in the
decision-making process ostensibly eases the cumbersome and bloating functions of the
central administrative system.
Saudi urban development reflects the attempts of the state to coax its traditional
society into the industrial era. Oil riches have allowed the state to engage the society in a
rapid development process while maintaining the social coherence and political stability of a
nation-state with a traditional monarchy at its top. In the Saudi course of economic
development, market forces take a secondary role in the production and conditioning of the
modern urban scene; for economic and urban policies conform less to efficiency than to the
sociopolitical character of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, apolitical approaches to understand the
Saudi urban transformation fall short of rendering a complete picture.
The Saudi city's mutation reflects the society's yearning to attain modernization. The
remarkable development of the modern Saudi city has been due to propitious conditions.

346
In the quest for modernization, the state's underwriting of massive public, infrastructure,
and large-scale urban development has satiated the urban network with immense financial
backing. The intent has been to transform the traditional medina to meet the modern
functions introduced as part of the modernization of the society. In the process, traditional
urban qualities were obscured and the resulting contemporary built form is an expression of
modern urban development process.
The modernization of the built environment has served several basic cultural
purposes. It has served as an outlet for government spending, avowed by public officials
as a sine qua non step to prepare Saudi nationals for an active future economic
independence. The improvement of the Saudi population's health, living, and educational
standards, and provision of massive, modern infrastructure are sought to lessen the
country's economic dependence on the oil sector. At the same time, massive funding of a
newly built environment has served as a means for redistribution of the swelling national
treasury to what was once predominantly poor, illiterate population. From this perspective,
the form of the Saudi city should not be seen as an engine for economic growth primarily,
rather it is better understood as a means for collective consumption, a means for
redistribution of oil wealth to the population, for sociopolitical stability and for cultural
integrity in the transition to modern urban life in Saudi Arabia.

347
Notes to Chapter IX
1
The ability of powerful actors to influence the urban process holds, though at a different degree, in
democratic free-market economies such as the United States. In his article, "Economics and Zoning
Laws", William A. Fischel criticizes traditional economic theories for downplaying political factors in
analyzing zoning and related land use controls. He argues for a property-rights approach to zoning,
because it addresses "the motives of zoning officials realistically, "and "places zoning in its proper
sphere, local politics." Fischel argues for an "economic theory of politics" to understand zoning. He
shows how politicians, doing what they are supposed to do in a democratic society, will use zoning to
win voters support by yielding to their demands. For example, the "special-interest model" addresses
the fact that voters cannot follow closely what is going on. This leaves ample space for special
interest groups to influence officials to whom they promise campaign contributions.
2
In most cases, contemporary amirs do not necessarily belong to a noble local family in the town or
city. Especially, in regions with vital economic and political weight, a senior member of the A1 Saud
dynasty is appointed as amir.
^
It must be noted here that in addition to these tasks, local amirs exercise symbolic traditional duties
such as those of the majlis (See footnote 11, Chapter HI).
4
Virtually, all Saudi planners and bureaucrats who I interviewed during the information gathering stage
of this study acknowledged the need to search a compromising urban paradigm that blends modem
technology with traditional values. Being pragmatics, they admitted that with their ramshackle mud
communities, unproperly serviced and inaccessible to automobiles, etc., traditional centers of Saudi
settlements lost against the Westernized modern suburbs. What is lacking is a vision of how to forgo
the "enticing" reality for an unclear idealism.
5
Approximately 50% of Riyadh's population lives in 50 square kilometers, or 5% of the city's area of
1062 square kilometers. Source: High Commission for the Development of Arriyadh. Program for the
Development of the Governing Palace Area: Third Stage (Rabi Awwal, 1409/1989), 3.
6 Fahad A1 Saud (the King). "Public Speech Addressing the Saudi Students in the US, 11/23/1404H." In
Wathaek Littariekh, Mukhtarat min Kalimat wa Liqaat Jalalat al Malik Fahad bin Abdul-Aziz
[Documents for History: Selective Speeches by H.M. King Fahad Al Saud]. Riyadh: Ministry of
Information, no date of publication, not dated), 260.
7
See discussion of Islamic inheritance law under land tenure in Chapter II and, in Chapter V, under home
ownership.
8 To help relieve housing shortages and to entice employment, some government agencies and military
departments built their own housing complexes which were only distributed to their employees.
9 Peter Rowe, "Dual Aspects of Tradition in Saudi Arabian Urban Housing Development," In Setha Low
and Erve Chambers, Housing Culture and Design: A Comparative Perspective (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989), 314.
C.E. Black. The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History (New York: Harper &
Row, Publishers, 1966), 32.

348
11
Anne Vernez Modoun. Built for Change: Neighborhood Architecture in San Francisco (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1986), 92.
12
Karl Deutsch, quoted in East Cam, "Urbanization and Political Behavior." In The Middle East City:
Ancient Traditions Confront a Modern World, edited by A. Saqqaf (New York: Paragon House
Publishers, 1987), 339.
1
^ Kevin Lynch loosely relates the "fit" of a settlement, that is the degree to which "its spatial and
temporal pattern matches the customary behavior of its inhabitants," to comfort, satisfaction and
efficiency Kevin Lynch, Good City Form (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987), 152. I risk the
general proposition that the contemporary Saudi built environment does not meet such criteria,
especially comfort and efficiency. Tarik Al-Solaiman (1989), who attempted to gauge such a
subjective indicator, cautiously concluded that the totally designed and built "model" communities,
such as the Diplomatic Quarter in Riyadh and the Internal Security Forces' community housing in
Arar, are a "more favorable alternative to that of grid-iron speculative land sub-divisioning," which
marks the majority of contemporary uiban development in the Kingdom T. Al-Soliman, "The
Characteristics of Planned Communities and their Impact on Urban Development and Residents
Perceptions." In Urban and Rural Profiles in Saudi Arabia, edited by K. Al-Ankaiy and El-Sayed El-
Bushra, 45-76 (Berlin: Gebrudem Borntraeger, 1989), 73.
14 Lynch, 142.

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VITA
Faisal Abdul-Aziz M. Mubarak
Born: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 1957
EDUCATION:
High School
Ma'had Al-Aasimah Annamouthaji (Capital Model Institute), 1974/75
Bachelor of Architecture,
King Saud University,
Riyadh, 1981
Master of Urban and Regional Planning
(Urban and Regional Planning/International Development)
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, 1986
Ph.D.
University of Washington,
College of Architecture and Urban Design and Planning
(Department of Urban Design and Planning)
Seattle, 1992.
AWARDS
University of Washington:
Social Sciences Dissertation Fellowship, 1991
King Saud University, Scholarship for graduate education for the Master and Ph.D.,
1983-1992.
Summer internship: by King Saud University; GMW Partners, Architects and Planners:
London, Great Britain, 1979.
WORK EXPERIENCE
Teaching Assistant, 1982.
College of Ai -Picture and Planning, King Saud University.
Architect (Co-founder), 1981-82.
Saudi Designers, Architecture and Interior Design.
Architect/Project Coordinator, 1981.
General Organization for Social Insurance, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia