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TA N F I E L D C H A M B E R S<br />

EMPLOYMENT GROUP BULLETIN<br />

Welcome <strong>to</strong> the spring edition of the Employment Group Bulletin. First, Martina Murphy tackles<br />

the employment status of members of LLPs and controlling shareholders. Inside, you will also<br />

find Paul Stevenson’s timely thoughts on pay for staff kept at home by the wrong kind of snow.<br />

2009 was a busy year for employment practitioners in which a depressed economy seemed <strong>to</strong><br />

do little <strong>to</strong> diminish the appetite for litigation. Indeed, the ever-increasing number of claims<br />

contributed <strong>to</strong> serious listing difficulties in some Tribunals. It will be interesting <strong>to</strong> see if the<br />

recently announced 6-month pilot scheme of evening sittings will ease the pressure in 2010.<br />

Catriona MacLaren<br />

Member, shareholder or employee<br />

Small scale businesses, solici<strong>to</strong>rs’ firms, multi-billion pound hedge funds: a wide range of<br />

businesses have now chosen <strong>to</strong> become Limited Liability Partnerships (LLPs). However, the<br />

structure of LLPs, with membership often by those in senior roles in the business, has<br />

implications in employment law. Members may have rights not just as members, but also as<br />

employees. Similar questions arise when majority shareholders work for their companies. This<br />

article reviews the principles <strong>to</strong> be used by employment tribunals in determining the<br />

employment status of such individuals.<br />

Employment status of members of LLPs<br />

UK LLPs are governed by the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000. ‘Members’ of an LLP (often<br />

described as ‘partners’) are similar <strong>to</strong> shareholders and direc<strong>to</strong>rs of a limited company. Individual<br />

members are self-employed for income tax purposes on their share of the profits from the LLP (s.13 LLP<br />

Act 2000). Their basic employment position appears straightforward; a partner is not an employee<br />

(Cowell v Quilter Goodison [1989] IRLR 392, CA), essentially because the partnership itself does not<br />

have a separate or corporate identity.<br />

Problems have arisen, however, in relation <strong>to</strong> the employment status of non-equity partners and where<br />

there are complex arrangements. Burgess v O’Brien (1966) 1 ITR 164 emphasised that the relationship<br />

between a salaried partner and a partnership is a question of fact in each case. It appears that the usual<br />

assumption is that the relevant status is either partner or employee rather than neither.<br />

A recent Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) decision, Kovats v 1) TFO Management LLP and 2) The<br />

Family Group of Companies (UK) (2009) ICR 1140, has shed some light on the issue. Kovats (K), a<br />

partner of TFO, appealed against an employment tribunal's decision that he had not also been an<br />

employee. His role was <strong>to</strong> act as chief investment officer. He had signed a deed of accession, agreeing <strong>to</strong><br />

be bound by TFO's members' agreement and was entitled <strong>to</strong> a fixed annual membership distribution. At<br />

his own request he had opted <strong>to</strong> be paid gross and be responsible for his own tax and NI contributions.<br />

Following discontent with his performance a resolution was passed requiring him <strong>to</strong> retire from the<br />

partnership. K brought a claim for unfair dismissal. The tribunal dismissed the claim on the ground that<br />

it did not have jurisdiction because he had not been an employee. In doing so, it <strong>to</strong>ok as its starting point<br />

the LLP Act 2000 s.4(4) - “a member of a limited liability partnership shall not be regarded for any purpose<br />

as employed by the limited liability partnership unless, if he and the other members were partners in a<br />

ISSUE NO 6: Winter 2010<br />

Member, shareholder<br />

or employee<br />

SNOW PROBLEMS<br />

continued overleaf<br />

W W W. T A N F I E L D C H A M B E R S . C O . U K


Martina Murphy<br />

Martina acts on behalf of NHS Trusts, the<br />

Metropolitan Police Authority, and local<br />

authorities, and is on Thompsons Solici<strong>to</strong>rs'<br />

approved panel of Counsel. Martina is also<br />

on the Employment Committee for the<br />

Federation of Small Businesses.<br />

Recently, in November 2009, she was instructed on behalf of a FTSE<br />

250 Company in its application for a High Court injunction which<br />

involved issues of restrictive covenants and protection of<br />

confidential information.<br />

When she's not working, Martina is a keen runner and has<br />

completed the London Marathon. She can often be found at a<br />

ridiculously early hour running around Greenwich Park with the<br />

Greenwich Runners.<br />

partnership, he would be regarded for that purpose as employed by the<br />

partnership.”<br />

The EAT dismissed the appeal, upholding the ET’s decision. In enacting<br />

s.4(4), Parliament had expressly provided that the legal test for<br />

determining whether a person was a partner or an employee of a<br />

partnership (the test under Partnership Act 1890) also determined<br />

whether a member of an LLP was employed by it for the purposes of the<br />

Employment Rights Act 1996. In the context of partnership, the tribunal<br />

had <strong>to</strong> decide first whether a person fell within the category of<br />

partnership or employment. If it decided that the person was not a<br />

partner, it did not follow that the person was necessarily an employee;<br />

the usual common law tests would still need <strong>to</strong> be applied, as the person<br />

might in fact be self-employed.<br />

The EAT decided that the tribunal had been correct <strong>to</strong> conclude that the<br />

words "any purpose" and "that purpose" in s.4(4) had <strong>to</strong> be regarded as<br />

a reference <strong>to</strong> K's role as chief investment officer, and that it had <strong>to</strong> ask<br />

itself whether, if the LLP was a normal partnership under the Partnership<br />

Act 1890, K's role as chief investment officer would be regarded as<br />

employment. The tribunal had been entitled, on the evidence before it, <strong>to</strong><br />

conclude that K was not an employee of TFO. It had applied the correct<br />

legal test and had made findings of fact, which it was entitled <strong>to</strong> make.<br />

The employee status of a controlling shareholder<br />

In Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regula<strong>to</strong>ry<br />

Reform (BERR) v Neufeld & Anor [2009] IRLR 475 CA the Court of<br />

Appeal has given guidance on the approach employment tribunals<br />

should take in considering whether a majority shareholder should be<br />

regarded as an employee.<br />

The case concerned the common situation of a majority shareholder<br />

and/or direc<strong>to</strong>r of an insolvent company claiming <strong>to</strong> be an ‘employee’ in<br />

order <strong>to</strong> claim certain unpaid amounts from the Secretary of State under<br />

the Employment Rights Act 1996 s.182 Part XII (‘employee rights on<br />

insolvency of the employer’). On the facts of these joined cases, direc<strong>to</strong>rs<br />

with 90% (Neufeld) and 100% (Howe) shareholdings respectively in<br />

their companies were employees.<br />

Although the CA stated that whether or not such a shareholder/direc<strong>to</strong>r<br />

is an employee of the company is a question of fact, they gave some<br />

helpful guidance. In any such case there are likely <strong>to</strong> be two issues,<br />

although in practice the evidence relevant <strong>to</strong> their resolution will be<br />

likely <strong>to</strong> overlap.<br />

a. The first and logically preliminary issue will be whether the putative<br />

contract is a genuine contract or a sham.<br />

b. The second issue, assuming there is a genuine contract, is whether it<br />

amounted <strong>to</strong> a contract of employment (as opposed <strong>to</strong> eg a contract<br />

for services) at the relevant time.<br />

The CA made it clear, that, in particular, it will be no answer <strong>to</strong> a<br />

majority/controlling shareholder’s claim <strong>to</strong> be an employee <strong>to</strong> argue that<br />

he cannot be an employee in law because:<br />

(i) The extent of his control of the company means that the control<br />

condition of a contract of employment cannot be satisfied; or<br />

(ii) He has practical control over his own destiny and cannot be<br />

dismissed from his employment except with his consent.<br />

Further, the CA observed that an owner acting as an owner, as is<br />

inevitable in small companies for example, can also be an employee.<br />

TC<br />

Snow Problems<br />

Although what has been arguably the coldest snap in a<br />

generation has passed, its effects will be long felt. The popular<br />

press reported that millions were <strong>to</strong>ld that they would lose a<br />

day’s pay if they did not get in<strong>to</strong> work while Sky News announced<br />

that one in ten firms said that their entire workforce had been<br />

absent at times during the worst affected period. This article<br />

considers the issues which are likely <strong>to</strong> arise during episodes of<br />

extreme weather and suggests a guideline approach.<br />

Starting point<br />

our authors<br />

The starting point will always be the contract of employment or<br />

written particulars of employment. If there is a clearly defined policy<br />

<strong>to</strong> deal with inclement weather then that should be the end of the<br />

matter. This, however, will rarely be the case.<br />

Disciplinary sanction<br />

Theoretically, an employer might want <strong>to</strong> take disciplinary steps<br />

against an employee who has failed <strong>to</strong> turn up for work if, in their<br />

opinion, the employee was able <strong>to</strong> work but had chosen not <strong>to</strong>.<br />

As part of any disciplinary procedure an employer would be required<br />

<strong>to</strong> inquire in<strong>to</strong> the known circumstances of each absence. This would<br />

be essential given that consistency in treatment is one of the<br />

hallmarks of a fair disciplinary procedure. Given the extreme weather<br />

experienced almost universally this year it would be difficult for an<br />

employer <strong>to</strong> investigate the circumstances of each case and, therefore,<br />

<strong>to</strong> ensure a consistent approach.<br />

It would almost always be unfair <strong>to</strong> dismiss an employee for failing <strong>to</strong><br />

turn up <strong>to</strong> work where hampered by snow, particularly where the<br />

employer was aware that the employee would not be able <strong>to</strong> attend.<br />

Deductions from wages<br />

Anecdotal evidence suggests that some employers have proposed <strong>to</strong><br />

make, or have made, deductions from wages. By way of the ERA 1996,<br />

ss. 13(1) and 15(1) no deductions may be made from a worker’s<br />

wages unless:<br />

i. It is required or permitted by a statu<strong>to</strong>ry or contractual provision;<br />

or<br />

ii. The worker in question has given his/her prior consent <strong>to</strong> the<br />

deduction.<br />

continued on back page<br />

W W W. TA N F I E L D C H A M B E R S . C O . U K


Paul Stevenson<br />

Paul Stevenson has a thriving and diverse<br />

employment practice and frequently appears<br />

in employment tribunals at every stage from<br />

review hearings and pre-hearing reviews<br />

through <strong>to</strong> final hearings. Paul has wideranging<br />

experience of advising and drafting<br />

particulars of complaint and resistance in all<br />

manner of employment claims from unfair dismissal <strong>to</strong> age and<br />

disability discrimination. He has also advised on compromise<br />

agreements and restrictive covenants. Recent experience includes<br />

providing advice <strong>to</strong> and appearing for both Claimants and<br />

Respondents in redundancy claims where TUPE and the Working Time<br />

Regulations were engaged. When away from his desk, Paul is the chair<br />

of a charity working in west Africa and provides advice and assistance<br />

<strong>to</strong> a student publishing company in Oxford. He enjoys good food,<br />

pho<strong>to</strong>graphy, politics, reading and travel.<br />

These provisions cover any sums which a worker would normally<br />

expect <strong>to</strong> be paid in connection with his/her employment and where<br />

the <strong>to</strong>tal amount of wages paid on any occasion is less than the <strong>to</strong>tal<br />

amount properly payable on that occasion. Where a worker is faced<br />

with such a deduction it is extremely important that they have<br />

recourse <strong>to</strong> their contract of employment in order <strong>to</strong> see what it<br />

permits.<br />

To be entitled <strong>to</strong> pay, the employee must show that he/she has<br />

worked or is willing <strong>to</strong> work for it: the governing authority is Miles v<br />

Wakefield Metropolitan District Council [1987] I.C.R. 368. Albeit<br />

obiter, Lord Brightman expressly differentiated between the facts of<br />

that case and what he referred <strong>to</strong> as “a failure <strong>to</strong> work, or work<br />

efficiently, as a result of illness or other unavoidable impediment, where<br />

special considerations apply”. He plainly did not envisage the<br />

nationwide inability <strong>to</strong> attend work which we saw earlier this year. It<br />

will be a question of fact in any case whether an employee was willing<br />

<strong>to</strong> work. Given, however, that many parts of the country were subject<br />

<strong>to</strong> warnings not <strong>to</strong> travel if at all possible employers should be aware<br />

that it would be difficult <strong>to</strong> argue that a snowbound employee was<br />

unwilling <strong>to</strong> work.<br />

If an employer attempts <strong>to</strong> make a deduction purportedly in<br />

accordance with a contractual provision, the terms of the contract<br />

must have been shown <strong>to</strong> the worker or, if not made in writing, its<br />

effect must have been notified <strong>to</strong> the worker before the deduction is<br />

made: see the ERA 1996, ss. 13(2), 15(2).<br />

An employee faced with a deduction from wage should seek speedy<br />

legal advice because much will depend on the factual circumstances of<br />

their employment contract. The complaint ought <strong>to</strong> be presented<br />

within three months beginning with the date of the deduction of<br />

which complaint is made.<br />

Childcare<br />

In a related concern, the closure of thousands of schools gave many<br />

parents unexpected daytime childcare concerns. So what approach<br />

can an employee expect<br />

As a general rule, employees have the right <strong>to</strong> take reasonable unpaid<br />

leave <strong>to</strong> deal with unexpected disruption or termination of<br />

arrangements for the care of a dependant: ERA 1996, s. 57A(1).<br />

Statu<strong>to</strong>ry protection does not, however, compel an employer <strong>to</strong> give<br />

time off <strong>to</strong> allow an employee personally <strong>to</strong> provide care beyond the<br />

reasonable amount necessary <strong>to</strong> deal with the immediate crisis. There<br />

would, however, be an argument that where a school closure is not<br />

announced until the last minute an employee could seek statu<strong>to</strong>ry<br />

protection for taking the full day off. The amount of time which is<br />

reasonable depends on all the circumstances and an employee should<br />

inform the employer as soon as reasonably practicable and state how<br />

long he/she expects <strong>to</strong> be absent.<br />

A guideline approach<br />

Employers should develop a clear extreme weather policy which sets<br />

out, in advance, what is expected of both parties. The overriding<br />

concern for an employer should be <strong>to</strong> ensure that a consistent<br />

practice is applied across their workforce.<br />

Employers should take a balanced approach and should bear in mind<br />

that they have a duty of care <strong>to</strong> their employees <strong>to</strong> see that employees<br />

are not subjected <strong>to</strong> any unnecessary risk of injury and should<br />

consider the possible liability attached <strong>to</strong> forcing an employee <strong>to</strong><br />

travel when it would be unsafe.<br />

Any policy should emphasize that employees have a contractual duty<br />

<strong>to</strong> attend work and that, where possible, employees should take all<br />

reasonable steps <strong>to</strong> attend work and should keep in regular contact<br />

with their employer. Alongside encouraging flexible/home working<br />

where possible, employers should foster a culture of advance<br />

planning, particularly in matters relating <strong>to</strong> child care and should<br />

consider options such as reasonable unpaid leave <strong>to</strong> cover child care.<br />

The policy should make clear provision for early closure of a<br />

workplace where appropriate. If employees who cannot make it <strong>to</strong><br />

work will be required <strong>to</strong> take a day’s leave as part of their holiday<br />

entitlement this should be unambiguous. A timely reminder of a<br />

definite policy such as this whenever snow falls might mean that<br />

employees tempted <strong>to</strong> be ‘unable’ <strong>to</strong> travel <strong>to</strong> work are suddenly able<br />

<strong>to</strong> make it.<br />

PAUL STEVENSON<br />

W W W. TA N F I E L D C H A M B E R S . C O . U K


Kevin Moore<br />

Kevin Moore has been a barristers’ clerk<br />

for 35 years and joined <strong>Chambers</strong> in 1999<br />

having previously been senior clerk in a<br />

highly regarded commercial set. He is a<br />

member of the Institute of Barristers’<br />

Clerks.<br />

Kevin is responsible for the overall clerking of <strong>Chambers</strong> and is<br />

happy <strong>to</strong> discuss any aspect of the service with clients. His flexible<br />

and pragmatic approach <strong>to</strong> the job is appreciated by solici<strong>to</strong>rs who<br />

instruct <strong>Chambers</strong> and has been recognised in the Legal 500.<br />

Kevin is married with 3 grown up children who still manage <strong>to</strong> be<br />

a drain on resources. In his spare time Kevin is a long suffering<br />

supporter of West Ham United FC.<br />

David Wright<br />

David has been clerking for 10 years in<br />

leading commercial and employment sets.<br />

He qualified as a barristers’ clerk in 2002<br />

and is a member of the Institute of<br />

Barristers’ Clerks.<br />

In 2007, David joined <strong>Tanfield</strong> <strong>Chambers</strong> as<br />

Principal Employment and Commercial Clerk where he has put his<br />

wealth of experience <strong>to</strong> good use. His combination of hard-work,<br />

organisation and reliability has proved a real asset <strong>to</strong> <strong>Chambers</strong>.<br />

When agreeing fees, David always strives <strong>to</strong> remain client focussed<br />

and fair.<br />

In his spare time David studies Hapkido (a Korean martial art) and<br />

enjoys playing football and badmin<strong>to</strong>n. He is also a bit of a film buff.<br />

Rimer LJ’s Judgment in Neufeld approved Elias P’s guidance in para 98 of<br />

Clark v Clark Construction Initiatives [2008] IRLR 364 EAT on<br />

deciding whether a majority shareholder should have employment<br />

status, with two qualifications:<br />

(1) The onus is on the party denying a contract; where an individual has<br />

paid an employee's tax and NI, prima facie he is entitled <strong>to</strong> an employee's<br />

rights. Neufeld added that guideline (1) should not be read as<br />

constituting a formal reversal of the burden of proof on <strong>to</strong> the party<br />

denying employment status. It may still be necessary for the putative<br />

employee <strong>to</strong> do more than produce documentation <strong>to</strong> satisfy the tribunal.<br />

(2) The mere fact of majority shareholding (or de fac<strong>to</strong> control) does not<br />

in itself prevent a contract arising.<br />

(3) Similarly, entrepreneur status does not in itself prevent a contract<br />

arising.<br />

(4) If the parties conduct themselves according <strong>to</strong> the contract (eg as <strong>to</strong><br />

hours and holidays), that is a strong pointer <strong>to</strong>wards employment.<br />

(5) Conversely, if their conduct is inconsistent with (or not governed by)<br />

the contract, that is a strong pointer against employment.<br />

(6) The assertion that there is a genuine contract will be undermined if<br />

there is nothing in writing. Neufeld added that guideline (6) may be<br />

expressed <strong>to</strong>o negatively. Lack of writing may be an important<br />

consideration but if the parties' conduct tends <strong>to</strong> show a true contract of<br />

employment 'we would not wish tribunals <strong>to</strong> seize <strong>to</strong>o readily on the<br />

absence of a written agreement <strong>to</strong> justify a rejection of the claim'.<br />

(7) The taking of loans from the company (or the shareholder<br />

guaranteeing its debts) is not intrinsically inconsistent with employment.<br />

(8) Although majority shareholding and/or control will always be<br />

relevant and may be decisive, that fact alone should not justify a finding<br />

of no employment.<br />

Recently, the EAT applied Neufeld in Ashby v Monterry Designs Ltd<br />

(2009) 18/12/2009 holding that a tribunal had misdirected itself when<br />

deciding that a shareholder in a company had not been its employee. The<br />

tribunal had not had the benefit of Neufeld when reaching its decision<br />

and had placed <strong>to</strong>o much weight upon the question of control in<br />

determining whether there was a contract of employment.<br />

Practical effect<br />

The CA were informed in Neufeld that in “2008 there were some 12,000<br />

claims by direc<strong>to</strong>rs on the National Insurance Fund, of which some 600 had<br />

gone or were expected <strong>to</strong> go <strong>to</strong> employment tribunals”. The CA assumed<br />

that a considerable number were direc<strong>to</strong>rs who were also controlling<br />

shareholders.<br />

A claim on the NI fund could add up <strong>to</strong> £21,280 assuming that the<br />

maximum redundancy, wages, holiday pay and compensa<strong>to</strong>ry notice pay<br />

were all claimed, and the limit on weekly pay is £380 (as it is from 1<br />

Oc<strong>to</strong>ber 2009 under s.189). In the author’s view, such potential claims<br />

are likely <strong>to</strong> be worth pursuing even for high net worth potential<br />

claimants, in the current financial climate.<br />

MARTINA MURPHY<br />

For further information or <strong>to</strong> instruct a barrister, please contact<br />

David Wright, Employment Clerk or Kevin Moore, Senior<br />

Clerk, on 0207 421 5300 or clerks@tanfieldchambers.co.uk<br />

employment barristers:<br />

David Berkley QC (1979)<br />

Andrew Thompson* (1969)<br />

Paul Staddon (1976)<br />

David Daly (1979)<br />

Simon Cheves (1980)<br />

Robin Howard (1986)<br />

Chris<strong>to</strong>pher Bamford (1987)<br />

Stephen Heath (1992)<br />

Catriona MacLaren (1993)<br />

Peter Linstead (1994)<br />

Martina Murphy (1998)<br />

Andrew Sheftel (2004)<br />

Louise Mankau (2005)<br />

Paul Stevenson (2006)<br />

Gemma de Cordova (2006)<br />

Cecily Crampin (2008)<br />

* Joint Edi<strong>to</strong>r of Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employment Law<br />

<strong>Tanfield</strong> <strong>Chambers</strong>’ dedicated conference facilities are readily accessible<br />

by the mobility-impaired. Please contact the clerks <strong>to</strong> agree fees in<br />

advance, whether on a fixed or hourly rate. Feedback on our service is<br />

welcomed and should be directed <strong>to</strong> the Senior Clerk, Kevin Moore. A<br />

copy of <strong>Chambers</strong> Complaints’ Procedure is available on our website or<br />

on request.<br />

To contact us: T: +44 (0) 20 7421 5300, F: +44 (0) 20 7421 5333, DX: 46 London Chancery Lane, E: clerks@tanfieldchambers.co.uk<br />

Address: <strong>Tanfield</strong> <strong>Chambers</strong>, 2-5 Warwick Court, London, WC1R 5DJ

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